DEPLOYMENT OF A FIRST ARMY.

The movement began on our side only with the resources of the army which had held the left of our front during the battle of the Marne, reinforced on Sept. 15 by one army corps.

This reinforcement, not being sufficient to hold the enemy's offensive, (district of Vaudelincourt-Mouchy-Uaugy,) a fresh army was transported more to the left, with the task "of acting against the German right wing in order to disengage its neighbor, ... while preserving a flanking direction in its march in relation to the fresh units that the enemy might be able to put into line."

To cover the detrainments of this fresh army in the district Clermont-Beauvais-Boix a cavalry corps and four territorial divisions were ordered to establish themselves on both banks of the Somme. In the wooded hills, however, which extend between the Oise and Lassigny the enemy displayed increasing activity. Nevertheless, the order still further to broaden the movement toward the left was maintained, while the territorial divisions were to move toward Bethune and Aubigny. The march to the sea went on.

From the 21st to the 26th all our forces were engaged in the district Lassigny-Roye-Peronne, with alternations of reverse and success. It was the first act of the great struggle which was to spread as it went on. On the 26th the whole of the Sixth German Army was deployed against us. We retained all our positions, but we could do no more; consequently there was still the risk that the enemy, by means of a fresh afflux of forces, might succeed in turning us.

Once more reinforcements, two army corps, were directed no longer on Beauvais, but toward Amiens. The front was then again to extend. A fresh army was constituted more to the north.

DEPLOYMENT OF THE SECOND ARMY.

From Sept. 30 onward we could not but observe that the enemy, already strongly posted on the plateau of Thiepval, was continually slipping his forces from south to north, and everywhere confronting us with remarkable energy.

Accordingly, on Oct. 1 two cavalry corps were directed to make a leap forward and, operating on both banks of the Scarpe, to put themselves in touch with the garrison of Dunkirk, which, on its side, had pushed forward as far as Douai. But on Oct. 2 and 3 the bulk of our fresh army was very strongly attacked in the district of Arras and Lens. Confronting it were two corps of cavalry, the guards, four active army corps, and two reserve corps. A fresh French army corps was immediately transported and detrained in the Lille district.

But once more the attacks became more pressing, and on Oct. 4 it was a question whether, in view of the enemy's activity both west of the Oise and south of the Somme, and also further to the north, a retreat would not have to be made. General Joffre resolutely put this hypothesis aside and ordered the offensive to be resumed with the reinforcements that had arrived. It was, however, clear that, despite the efforts of all, our front, extended to the sea as it was by a mere ribbon of troops, did not possess the solidity to enable it to resist with complete safety a German attack, the violence of which could well be foreseen.

In the Arras district the position was fairly good. But between the Oise and Arras we were holding our own only with difficulty. Finally, to the north, on the Lille-Estaires-Merville-Hazebrouck-Cassel front, our cavalry and our territorials had their work cut out against eight divisions of German cavalry, with very strong infantry supports. It was at this moment that the transport of the British Army to the northern theatre of operations began.



THE TRANSPORT OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

Field Marshal French had, as early as the end of September, expressed the wish to see his army resume its initial place on the left of the allied armies. He explained this wish on the ground of the greater facility of which his communications would have the advantage in this new position, and also of the impending arrival of two divisions of infantry from home and of two infantry divisions and a cavalry division from India, which would be able to deploy more easily on that terrain. In spite of the difficulties which such a removal involved, owing to the intensive use of the railways by our own units, General Joffre decided at the beginning of October to meet the Field Marshal's wishes and to have the British Army removed from the Aisne.

It was clearly specified that on the northern terrain the British Army should co-operate to the same end as ourselves, the stopping of the German right. In other terms, the British Army was to prolong the front of the general disposition without a break, attacking as soon as possible, and at the same time seeking touch with the Belgian Army.

But the detraining took longer than had been expected, and it was not possible to attack the Germans during the time when they had only cavalry in the Lille district and further to the north.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE BELGIAN ARMY.

There remained the Belgian Army. On leaving Antwerp on Oct. 9 the Belgian Army, which was covered by 8,000 British bluejackets and 6,000 French bluejackets, at first intended to retire as far as to the north of Calais, but afterwards determined to make a stand in Belgian territory. Unfortunately, the condition of the Belgian troops, exhausted by a struggle of more than three months, did not allow any immediate hopes to be based upon them. This situation weighed on our plans and delayed their execution.

On the 16th we made progress to the east of Ypres. On the 18th our cavalry even reached Roulers and Cortemark. But it was now evident that, in view of the continual reinforcing of the German right, our left was not capable of maintaining the advantages obtained during the previous few days. To attain our end and make our front inviolable a fresh effort was necessary. That effort was immediately made by the dispatch to the north of the Lys of considerable French forces, which formed the French Army of Belgium.

THE FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM.

The French Army of Belgium consisted, to begin with, of two territorial divisions, four divisions of cavalry, and a naval brigade. Directly after its constitution it was strengthened by elements from other points on the front whose arrival extended from Oct. 27 to Nov. 11. These reinforcements were equivalent altogether in value to five army corps, a division of cavalry, a territorial division, and sixteen regiments of cavalry, plus sixty pieces of heavy artillery.

Thus was completed the strategic manoeuvre defined by the instructions of the General in Chief on Sept. 11 and developed during the five following weeks with the ampleness we have just seen. The movements of troops carried out during this period were methodically combined with the pursuit of operations, both defensive and offensive, from the Oise to the North Sea.

On Oct. 22 our left, bounded six weeks earlier by the Noyon district, rested on Nieuport, thanks to the successive deployment of five fresh armies—three French armies, the British Army, and the Belgian Army.

Thus the co-ordination decided upon by the General in Chief attained its end. The barrier was established. It remained to maintain it against the enemy's offensive. That was the object and the result of the battle of Flanders, Oct. 22 to Nov. 15.

OPERATIONS IN FLANDERS.

The fourth installment of the French review takes up the operations in Flanders, as follows:

The German attack in Flanders was conducted strategically and tactically with remarkable energy. The complete and indisputable defeat in which it resulted is therefore significant.

The forces of which the enemy disposed for this operation between the sea and the Lys comprised:

(1) The entire Fourth Army commanded by the Duke of Wuerttemberg, consisting of one naval division, one division of Ersatz Reserve, (men who had received no training before the war,) which was liberated by the fall of Antwerp; the Twenty-second, Twenty-third, Twenty-sixth and Twenty-seventh Reserve Corps, and the Forty-eighth Division belonging to the Twenty-fourth Reserve Corps.

(2) A portion of another army under General von Fabeck, consisting of the Fifteenth Corps, two Bavarian corps and three (unspecified) divisions.

(3) Part of the Sixth Army under the command of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. This army, more than a third of which took part in the battle of Flanders, comprised the Nineteenth Army Corps, portions of the Thirteenth Corps and the Eighteenth Reserve Corps, the Seventh and Fourteenth Corps, the First Bavarian Reserve Corps, the Guards, and the Fourth Army Corps.

(4) Four highly mobile cavalry corps prepared and supported the action of the troops enumerated above. Everything possible had been done to fortify the "morale" of the troops. At the beginning of October the Crown Prince of Bavaria in a proclamation had exhorted his soldiers "to make the decisive effort against the French left wing," and "to settle thus the fate of the great battle which has lasted for weeks."



On Oct. 28, Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria declared in an army order that his troops "had just been fighting under very difficult conditions," and he added: "It is our business now not to let the struggle with our most detested enemy drag on longer.... The decisive blow is still to be struck." On Oct. 30, General von Deimling, commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps (belonging to General von Fabeck's command,) issued an order declaring that "the thrust against Ypres will be of decisive importance." It should be noted also that the Emperor proceeded in person to Thielt and Courtrai to exalt by his presence the ardor of his troops. Finally, at the close of October, the entire German press incessantly proclaimed the importance of the "Battle of Calais." It is superfluous to add that events in Poland explain in a large measure the passionate resolve of the German General Staff to obtain a decision in the Western theatre of operations at all costs. This decision would be obtained if our left were pierced or driven in. To reach Calais, that is, to break our left; to carry Ypres, that is, to cut it in half; through both points to menace the communications and supplies of the British expeditionary corps, perhaps even to threaten Britain in her island—such was the German plan in the Battle of Flanders. It was a plan that could not be executed.

CHECK OF GERMAN ATTACK.

The enemy, who had at his disposal a considerable quantity of heavy artillery, directed his efforts at first upon the coast and the country to the north of Dixmude. His objective was manifestly the capture of Dunkirk, then of Calais and Boulogne, and this objective he pursued until Nov. 1.

On Oct. 23 the Belgians along the railway line from Nieuport to Dixmude were strengthened by a French division. Dixmude was occupied by our marines (fusiliers marins). During the subsequent day our forces along the railway developed a significant resistance against an enemy superior in number and backed by heavy artillery. On the 29th the inundations effected between the canal and the railway line spread along our front. On the 30th we recaptured Ramscapelle, the only point on the railway which Belgians had lost. On the 1st and 2d of November the enemy bombarded Furnes, but began to show signs of weariness. On the 2d he evacuated the ground between the Yser and the railway, abandoning cannon, dead and wounded. On the 3d our troops were able to re-enter the Dixmude district. The success achieved by the enemy at Dixmude at this juncture was without fruit. They succeeded in taking the town. They could not debouch from it. The coastal attack had thus proved a total failure. Since then it has never been renewed. The Battle of Calais, so noisily announced by the German press, amounted to a decided reverse for the Germans.

GERMAN DEFEAT AT YPRES.

The enemy had now begun an attack more important than its predecessor, in view of the numbers engaged in it. This attack was intended as a renewal to the south of the effort which had just been shattered in the north. Instead of turning our flank on the coast, it was now sought to drive in the right of our northern army under the shock of powerful masses. This was the Battle of Ypres.

In order to understand this long, desperate, and furious battle, we must hark back a few days in point of time. At the moment when our cavalry reached Roulers and Cortemark (Oct. 28) our territorial divisions from Dunkirk, under General Biden, had occupied and organized a defensive position at Ypres. It was a point d'appui, enabling us to prepare and maintain our connections with the Belgian Army. From Oct. 23 two British and French army corps were in occupation of this position, which was to be the base of their forward march in the direction of Roulers-Menin. The delays already explained and the strength of the forces brought up by the enemy soon brought to a standstill our progress along the line Poelcapelle, Paschendaele, Zandvorde, and Gheluvelt. But in spite of the stoppage here, Ypres was solidly covered, and the connections of all the allied forces were established. Against the line thus formed the German attack was hurled from Oct. 25 to Nov. 13, to the north, the east, and the south of Ypres. From Oct. 26 on the attacks were renewed daily with extraordinary violence, obliging us to employ our reinforcements at the most threatened points as soon as they came up. Thus, on Oct. 31, we were obliged to send supports to the British cavalry, then to the two British corps between which the cavalry formed the connecting link, and finally to intercalate between these two corps a force equivalent to two army corps. Between Oct. 30 and Nov. 6 Ypres was several times in danger. The British lost Zandvorde, Gheluvelt, Messines, and Wytschaete. The front of the Allies, thus contracted, was all the more difficult to defend; but defended it was without a recoil.

REINFORCEMENTS ARRIVE.

The arrival of three French divisions in our line enabled us to resume from the 4th to the 8th a vigorous offensive. On the 10th and 11th this offensive, brought up against fresh and sharper German attacks, was checked. Before it could be renewed the arrival of fresh reinforcements had to be awaited, which were dispatched to the north on Nov. 12. By the 14th our troops had again begun to progress, barring the road to Ypres against the German attacks, and inflicting on the enemy, who advanced in massed formation, losses which were especially terrible in consequence of the fact that the French and British artillery had crowded nearly 300 guns on to these few kilometers of front.

Thus the main mass of the Germans sustained the same defeat as the detachments operating further to the north along the coast. The support which, according to the idea of the German General Staff, the attack on Ypres was to render to the coastal attack, was as futile as that attack itself had been.

During the second half of November the enemy, exhausted and having lost in the Battle of Ypres alone more than 150,000 men, did not attempt to renew his effort, but confined himself to an intermittent cannonade. We, on the contrary, achieved appreciable progress to the north and south of Ypres, and insured definitely by a powerful defensive organization of the position the inviolability of our front.

[The compiler of the report here adds a footnote saying that the bodies of more than 40,000 Germans were found on the battlefield during these three weeks of battle. The report next proceeds to summarize the character and results of the operations since the Battle of Flanders—that is, during the period Nov. 30-Feb. 1.]

Since the former date the French supreme command had not thought it advisable to embark upon important offensive operations. It has confined itself to local attacks, the main object of which was to hold in front of us as large a number of German corps as possible, and thus to hinder the withdrawal of the troops which to our knowledge the German General Staff was anxious to dispatch to Russia.

FEW SENT TO THE EAST.

As a matter of fact, the numbers transported to the eastern front have been very moderate. Of the fifty-two army corps which faced us on the western front, Germany has only been able to take four and one-half corps for the eastern front. On the other hand, climatic conditions—the rain, mud, and mist—were such as to diminish the effectiveness of offensive operations and to add to the costliness of any undertaken, which was another reason for postponing them. Still another reason lies in the fact that from now on the allied forces can count upon a steadily expanding growth, equally in point of numbers and units as of material, while the German forces have attained the maximum of their power, and can only diminish now both in numbers and in value. These conditions explain the character of the siege warfare which the operations have assumed during the period under review.



Meanwhile, it is by no means the case that the siege warfare has had the same results for the Germans as for us. From Nov. 15 to Feb. 1, our opponents, in spite of very numerous attacks, did not succeed in taking anything from us, except a few hundred metres of ground to the north of Soissons. We, on the contrary, have obtained numerous and appreciable results.

[The French writer here proceeds to strike a balance of gains and losses between the allied and the German forces in France during the Winter campaign. The result he sums up as follows:]

1. A general progress of our troops; very marked at certain points.

2. A general falling back of the enemy, except to the northeast of Soissons.

To complete the balance it must be added that:

1. The German offensive in Poland was checked a month ago.

2. The Russian offensive continues in Galicia and the Carpathians.

3. A large part of the Turkish Caucasian army has been annihilated.

4. Germany has exhausted her resources of officers, (there are now on an average twelve officers to a regiment,) and henceforth will only be able to develop her resources in men to the detriment of the existing units.

5. The allied armies, on the contrary, possess the power of reinforcing themselves in a very considerable degree.

It may, therefore, be declared that in order to obtain complete success it is sufficient for France and her allies to know how to wait and to prepare victory with indefatigable patience.

The German offensive is broken.

The German defensive will be broken in its turn.

[It is evident from the report that the numbered German army corps are Prussian corps unless otherwise specified.]

THE FRENCH ARMY AS IT IS.

LONDON, March 18, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—All of Part II., of the historical review of the war, emanating from French official sources, and purely from the French viewpoint, has been received by The Associated Press. Part II, deals with the conditions in the French Army, furnishing a most interesting chapter on this subject under the title, "The French Army as it Is."

The compiler of the report, beginning this part of his review on Feb. 1, says that the condition of the French Army is excellent and appreciably superior to what it was at the beginning of the war from the three points of view of numbers, quality, and equipment. Continuing, he says:

In the higher command important changes have been made. It has, in fact, been rejuvenated by the promotion of young commanders of proved quality to high rank. All the old Generals, who at the beginning of August were at the head of large commands, have been gradually eliminated, some as the result of the physical strain of war and others by appointment to territorial commands. This rejuvenation of the higher ranks of the army has been carried out in a far-reaching manner, and it may be said that it has embraced all the grades of the military hierarchy from commanders of brigades to commanders of armies. The result has been to lower the average age of general officers by ten years. Today more than three-fourths of the officers commanding armies and army corps are less than 60 years of age. Some are considerably younger. A number of the army corps commanders are from 46 to 54 years of age, and the brigade commanders are usually under 50. There are, in fact, at the front extremely few general officers over 60, and these are men who are in full possession of their physical and intellectual powers.

MANY COLONELS PROMOTED.

This rejuvenation of the high command was facilitated by a number of circumstances, notable among which were the strengthening of the higher regimental ranks carried out during the three years preceding the war, as a result of which at the outset of the campaign each infantry regiment had two Lieutenant Colonels, and each cavalry and artillery regiment a Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel, and also the system of promotion for the duration of the war. Many officers who began the war as Colonels now command brigades. Some are even at the head of divisions or army corps. Ability proved on the field of battle is now immediately recognized and utilized, and in this way it has been possible to provide in the most favorable manner for the vacancies created by the changes in command which were considered necessary in the first weeks of the war.

The higher grades of the French Army are inspired by a remarkable unity in the matter of military theory, and by a solidarity of spirit which has found striking expression in the course of the numerous moves of army corps from one part of the theatre of operations to another, which have been carried out since the beginning of the war.

The cavalry after six months of war still possesses an excess of officers. There are on an average thirty-six officers to a regiment instead of the thirty-one considered to be the necessary minimum. The artillery, which has suffered relatively little, has also an excess of officers, and is further able to count upon a large number of Captains and other officers, who before the war were employed in the arsenals or in technical research. Finally the reserve artillery officers have nearly all proved to be excellent battery commanders.

The losses in the junior commissioned ranks have naturally been highest in the infantry. There is, however, nothing like a want of officers in this arm. Many Captains and Lieutenants who have been wounded by machine-gun fire (such wounds are usually slight and quickly healed,) have been able to return speedily to the front. The reserve officers have in general done remarkably well, and in many cases have shown quite exceptional aptitude for the rank of company commanders. The non-commissioned officers promoted to sub-Lieutenancies make excellent section leaders, and even show themselves very clever and energetic company commanders in the field.

It must be remembered also that thanks to the intellectual and physical development of the generation now serving with the colors; and thanks, above all, to the warlike qualities of the race, and the democratic spirit of our army, we have been able to draw upon the lower grades and even upon the rank and file for officers. Many men who began the war on Aug. 2 as privates, now wear the officers' epaulettes. The elasticity of our regulations regarding promotion in war time, the absence of the spirit of caste, and the friendly welcome extended by all officers to those of their military inferiors who have shown under fire their fitness to command, have enabled us to meet all requirements.

The state of our infantry on Jan. 15 was very satisfactory and much superior to that of the German infantry. On an average each of our regiments has forty-eight officers, including eighteen regular officers, fifteen reserve officers, and fifteen non-commissioned officers. In each regiment six of the twelve companies are commanded by Captains who are regular officers, three by Captains of the reserve and three by Lieutenants. Each company has at least three officers. The state of the army as regards the commissioned ranks from the highest to the lowest is declared to be exceptionally brilliant. The army is led by young, well-trained, and daring chiefs, and the lower commissioned ranks have acquired the art of war by experience.

2,500,000 FRENCH AT FRONT.

Including all ranks, France now has more than 2,500,000 men at the front, and every unit is, or was on Jan. 15, at war strength. The infantry companies are at least 200 strong. In many regiments the companies have a strength of 250 or more.

In other arms, which have suffered less than the infantry, the units are all up to, or above, regulation strength.

This fact constitutes one of the most important advantages of the French Army over the Germans. While Germany has created a great number of new units, army corps or divisions, which absorbed at a blow all of her available resources in officers and men, the French supreme command has avoided the formation of new units, except in limited number, and has only admitted exceptions to this rule when it was able to count with certainty on being able to provide amply for both the present and future requirements of the new units, as regards all ranks, without encroaching upon the reserves needed for the existing units.

At the same time, thanks to the depots in the interior of the country, the effectives at the front have been maintained at full strength. The sources of supply for this purpose were the remainder of the eleven classes of the reserves, the younger classes of the territorial army, and the new class of 1914. A large number of the men wounded in the earlier engagements of the war have been able to return to the front. They have been incorporated in the new drafts, providing these with a useful stiffening of war-tried men.

With regard to the supplies of men upon which the army can draw to repair the wastage at the front, we learn that there are practically half as many men in the depots as at the front, in other words about 1,250,000. Further supplies of men are provided by the class of 1915 and the revision of the various categories of men of military age previously exempted on grounds of health or for other reasons from the duty of bearing arms. As a result of this measure nearly half a million men have been claimed for the army, almost all of whom, after rigorous physical tests, have been declared fit for military service.

DRILLED BY CONVALESCENTS.

In the depots in which the new soldiers are being trained the services of many officers and non-commissioned officers discharged as convalescents after being wounded are utilized in order to give a practical turn to the instruction. There are still many voluntary enlistments, and with all these resources of men the army can count upon reinforcements soon to be available which will considerably augment its offensive power.

The quality of the troops has improved perceptibly since the beginning of the war. The men have become hardened and used to war, and their health—largely owing to the excellence of the commissariat—is extremely satisfactory. In spite of the severity of the Winter hardly any cases of disease of the respiratory organs have occurred, and the sanitary returns of the army show an appreciable improvement on those of the preceding Winter.

With regard to the reserves, experience has verified the dictum of the Serbian and Bulgarian Generals in the war of 1913, namely, that "two months in the field are necessary in order to get at the full value of reserves." Our infantry is now accustomed to the rapid and thorough "organization" of the defensive. In August it neither liked nor had the habit of using the spade. Today those who see our trenches are astounded. They are veritable improvised fortresses, proof against the 77-millimeter gun and often against artillery of higher calibre. During the last five months not a single encounter can be cited in which our infantry did not have the advantage over the German infantry. All the enemy's attacks have been repulsed, except to the north of Soissons, where their success was due to the flooded state of the Aisne and the carrying away of our bridges. Our attacks, on the other hand, have yielded important results, and have been carried out with plenty of spirit, although without the imprudence which cost us such heavy losses in August.

The cavalry has made remarkable progress. Throughout October this branch was called on to eke out the inadequate numbers of the infantry, and showed itself perfectly adapted to the necessities of fighting on foot. Several regiments of cavalry have been used as infantry, and, armed with rifles, have rendered the most valuable services.

The artillery has displayed a superiority in the use of its admirable material, which is recognized by the Germans themselves.

LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—Further installments of the French official review of the condition of the French Army after six months of war have been obtained by The Associated Press. The sixth installment deals with material, artillery, transport, and supplies, and the seventh takes up the situation of the German Army and makes an analysis of the German forces in the field and available for service.

The first chapter of the seventh installment, headed "The German Effort," opens with a statement as to the German forces at the beginning of the campaign. The writer says:

The military effort of Germany at the outset of the campaign exceeded all anticipations. Her design was to crush the French Army in a few weeks under a tremendous mass of troops. Nothing was neglected to bring that mass together.

The number of German army corps in time of peace is twenty-five. When war began the German General Staff put in the field on the two theatres of operations: 1, as fighting troops, (active, reserve, Ersatz or Landwehr,) sixty-one army corps; 2, as troops to guard communications and territory, formations of the Landsturm.

In October six and a half new army corps made their appearance, plus a division of sailors—in all seven corps. From the end of November to the end of December there was only an insignificant increase, consisting of the division of sailors. In January, 1915, the number of fighting formations put into line by the German Army was therefore sixty-nine army corps, divided as follows:

Active corps, twenty-five and a half; reserve corps, twenty-one and a half; Ersatz brigades, six and a half; reserve corps of new formation, seven and a half, and corps of Landwehr, eight and a half.

GERMANY'S GREAT INITIAL EFFORT.

The immense effort thus made by Germany explains itself very well, if, having regard to the position of Germany at the opening of the war, one considers that of the Allies. Germany desired to take advantage of the circumstances which enabled her to make a simultaneous mobilization of all her forces—a mobilization which the three allied armies could not carry out so rapidly. Germany wished with the mass of troops to crush first of all the adversary who appeared to her the most dangerous. This effort, broken for the first time on the Marne, attained its maximum at the moment of the battle of Flanders, in which more than fifty army corps out of sixty-nine were pitted against the French, British, and Belgian Armies.

Here also the method followed by Germany is easily comprehensible. At the end of October the Russian danger was beginning to become pressing, and it was necessary to win a decisive victory in the western theatre of the war. It was imperative to give international opinion the impression that Germany remained in that quarter mistress of operations. Finally, it behooved her by this victory to gain the freedom to transport a large number of army corps to Poland. We have seen that the battle of Flanders, instead of being a success for Germany, was a marked defeat. This defeat was fraught with results, and it dominates the present position of the German Army. The plans above described of the German mobilization, which had their justification in view of a prompt victory, were calculated to become extremely perilous from the moment that that victory failed to be gained.

INITIATIVE LOST BY GERMANY.

From that moment, in fact, Germany lost the initiative and the direction of the war. And, furthermore, she was condemned to suffer the counter-effects of the enormous and precipitate effort which she had made in vain. From the point of view of her effectiveness and her regimental cadres, (basic organization,) she had undergone a wastage which her adversaries, on the other hand, had been able to save themselves. She had, in the words of the proverb, put all her eggs in one basket, and in spite of her large population she could no longer, owing to the immediate and sterile abuse which she had made of her resources, pretend to regain the superiority of numbers.

She was reduced to facing as best she could on both war fronts the unceasingly increasing forces of the Allies. She had attained the maximum of tension and had secured a minimum of results. She had thus landed herself in a difficulty which will henceforward go on increasing and which is made clear when the wastage which her army has suffered is closely studied.

WASTAGE OF GERMAN EFFECTIVES.

Chapter II. of this section of the review bears the headline "Wastage of German Effectives."

The wastage of effectives is easy to establish, it says. We have for the purpose two sources—the official lists of losses published by the German General Staff and the notebooks, letters, and archives of soldiers and officers killed and taken prisoners. These different documents show that by the middle of January the German losses on the two fronts were 1,800,000 men.

These figures are certainly less than the reality, because, for one thing, the sick are not comprised, and, for another, the losses in the last battle in Poland are not included. Let us accept them, however; let us accept also that out of these 1,800,000 men 500,000—this is the normal proportion—have been able to rejoin after being cured. Thus the final loss for five months of the campaign has been 1,300,000 men, or 260,000 men per month. These figures agree exactly with what can be ascertained when the variations of effectives in certain regiments are examined.

It is certain that the majority of the German regiments have had to be completely renewed. What, then, is the situation created by these enormous losses?

This question is answered by a statement headed "German troops available for 1915."

The total of German formations known at the beginning of January, says the review, represented in round numbers 4,000,000 men. According to the official reports on German recruiting, the entire resources of Germany in men amount to 9,000,000. But from these 9,000,000 have to be deducted men employed on railways, in the police, and in certain administrations and industries—altogether 500,000 men. The total resources available for the war were therefore 8,500,000. Out of these about one-half, say 4,000,000, are now at the front. The definitive losses represent at least 1,300,000 men. The available resources amounted, then, at the beginning of January, to 3,200,000 men.

GERMANY'S RESERVES UNTRAINED.

Of what are these resources composed? Chiefly of men who were untrained in time of peace, the trained reservists having almost all left the depots for the front. It has, moreover, to be noted that out of these 3,200,000 men there are, according to the statistics, 800,000 who are more than 39 years of age, and therefore of only mediocre military value. Thus there remain 2,400,000. Finally, the category of the untrained in peace comprises, according to the estimates of German military authorities themselves, one-quarter of inefficients.

The really valuable resources capable of campaigning are therefore just 2,000,000. These men, comprising the 1915, 1916, and 1917 classes, called out in anticipation, constitute—and this point cannot be too strongly insisted upon—the total of available resources for the operations during the twelve months of 1915. As to what the military value of these troops will be, considering the haste with which they have been trained, the formidable losses sustained in the battle of Flanders by the newly formed corps show very clearly. Their military value will be limited.

GERMAN LOSSES 260,000 A MONTH.

When it is remembered that, according to the German documents themselves, the definite loss each month is 260,000 men, it is manifest that the available resources for the year 1915 will not suffice to fill the gaps of a war of ten months.

It is then superabundantly established that in the matter of effectives Germany has reached the maximum of possible effort. If with the men at present available she creates, as it is certain that she is preparing to do at this moment, fresh formations, she will be preventing herself, if the war lasts another ten months, as is admissible, from being able to complete afresh her old formations. If she creates no new formations, she will have in 1915 exactly what is necessary and no more to complete the existing units afresh.

Bearing in mind the ways of the German General Staff, one may suppose that, disregarding the eventual impossibility of recompleting, it is still addressing itself to creating new formations. The weakness to which Germany will expose herself in the matter of effectives has just been set forth, and it is easy to show that this weakness will be still further aggravated by the wastage in the regimental orders.

PRAISES FRENCH "SEVENTY-FIVES."

In the sixth installment, beginning with the field gun, the famous "seventy-fives," the compiler of the report, after rehearsing the splendid qualities of this weapon—its power, its rapidity of action, and its precision—points out that it possesses a degree of strength and endurance which makes it an implement of war of the first order.

It may be stated without hesitation [says the review] that our "seventy-five" guns are in as perfect condition today as they were on the first day of the war, although the use made of them has exceeded all calculations. The consumption of projectiles was, in fact, so enormous as to cause for a moment an ammunition crisis, which, however, was completely overcome several weeks ago.

The methodical and complete exploitation of all the resources of the country, organized since the beginning of the war, has enabled us to accumulate a considerable stock of fresh munitions, and an increasing rate of production is henceforth assured. We are thus sure of being able to provide without particular effort for all the needs of the campaign, present and future, however long the war may last, and it is this certainty which has enabled us to supply projectiles to several of the allied armies, among others, to the Serbian and Belgian armies. From the statements of German prisoners we have learned that the effectiveness of our new projectiles is superior to that of the old ones.

FRENCH HEAVY GUNS SUPERIOR.

Our heavy artillery was in process of reorganization when the war broke out, with the result that we were indisputably in a position of inferiority in respect of this arm during the first battles. But today the roles have been changed and our adversaries themselves acknowledge the superiority of our heavy artillery.

The change has been brought about in various ways, partly by the intense activity of the cannon foundries in new production, partly by the employment at the front of the enormous reserves of artillery preserved in the fortresses. The very large number of heavy guns at the front represents only a part of the total number available for use. There is an abundant stock of projectiles for the heavy artillery, which, as in the case of the field gun ammunition, is daily growing in importance. The same is true of the reserves of powder and other explosives and of all materials needed for the manufacture of shells.

With regard to small arms, hand grenades, bombs, and all the devices for lifetaking which the trench warfare at short distance has brought into use, the position of the French troops is in every way favorable.

There follows a passage on the development of the machine gun in this kind of warfare.

Owing to the extended use of this weapon, the number supplied to the various units has been appreciably increased, says the review. Not only is each unit in possession of its full regulation complement of machine guns, but the number of these guns attached to each unit has been increased since Feb. 1 by one-third.

The report next passes to the transport service, which, it says, has worked with remarkable precision since the beginning of the war. This section of the review closes by referring to food supplies for the army, which are described as abundant.

LONDON, March 27, (Correspondence of The Associated Press.)—The eighth installment of the French official review of the war, previous chapters of which have been published, takes up the German losses of officers, the wastage of guns and projectiles, and "the moral wastage of the German Army."

The chapter on losses of officers begins with the statement that the condition of the cadres, or basic organizations, in the German Army is bad. The proportion of officers, and notably of officers by profession, has been enormously reduced, it says; and a report made in December showed that in a total of 124 companies, active or reserve, there were only 49 officers of the active army. The active regiments have at the present time, according to the review, an average of 12 professional officers; the reserve regiments, 9 to 10; the reserve regiments of new formation, 6 to 7; and it is to be remembered that these officers have to be drawn upon afresh for the creation of new units.

"If Germany creates new army corps, and if the war lasts ten months," it continues, "she will reduce almost to nothing the number of professional officers in each regiment, a number which already is very insufficient."

FRENCH CONDITIONS IN CONTRAST.

The French report points out that on the other hand, all the French regiments have been constantly kept at a minimum figure of eighteen professional officers per regiment. At the same time it admits that the commanders of German corps, commanders of active battalions, and the officers attached to the commanders of army corps are officers by profession.

The French report then addresses itself to the wastage of material. Discussing the wastage of guns, it says:

It is easy to ascertain the German losses in artillery. On Dec. 28 the Sixty-sixth Regiment of Artillery entrained at Courtrai for Germany twenty-two guns, of which eighteen were used up. This figure is extremely high for a single regiment.

The same facts have been ascertained as regards heavy artillery. On Dec. 21 and 22 seventy-seven guns of heavy artillery, which were no longer serviceable, were sent to Cologne. These movements, which are not isolated facts, show how ill the German artillery has resisted the ordeal of the campaign.

Other proofs, moreover, are decisive. For some weeks we have noted the very peculiar aspect of the marking on the bands of a great number of shells of the 77 gun. When these markings are compared with those of shells fired three months ago it is plain beyond all question that the tubes are worn and that many of them require to be replaced. This loss in guns is aggravated by the necessity which has arisen of drawing upon the original army corps for the guns assigned to the recently formed corps or those in course of formation. Several regiments of field artillery have, in fact, had to give up two batteries.

WEARING OUT OF MATERIAL.

These two phenomena—wearing out of material and drafts upon batteries—will inevitably result either in the reduction of batteries from six to four guns, a reduction of the number of batteries in the army corps, or the partial substitution for 77 guns of 9-centimeter cannon of the old pattern, the presence of which has been many times perceived at the front.

Furthermore, the German artillery lacks and has lacked for a very long time munitions. It has been obliged to reduce its consumption of shells in a notable degree. No doubt is possible in this respect. The statements of prisoners since the battle of the Marne, and still more since the battle of the Yser, make it clear that the number of shots allowed to the batteries for each action is strictly limited. We have found on officers killed or taken prisoner the actual orders prescribing positively a strict economy of munitions.

For the last three months, too, we notice that the quality of the projectiles is mediocre. Many of them do not burst. On Jan. 7, in the course of a bombardment of Laventie, scarcely any of the German shells burst. The proportion of non-bursts was estimated at two-fifths by the British on Dec. 14, two-thirds by ourselves in the same month. On Jan. 3 at Bourg-et-Comin, and at other places since then, shrapnel fell the explosion of which scarcely broke the envelope and the bullets were projected without any force. About the same time our Fourteenth Army Corps was fired at with shrapnel loaded with fragments of glass, and on several points of our front shell casings of very bad quality have been found, denoting hasty manufacture and the use of materials taken at hazard.

From numerous indications it appears that the Germans are beginning to run short of their 1898 pattern rifle. A certain number of the last reinforcements (January) are armed with carbines or rifles of a poor sort without bayonets. Others have not even rifles. Prisoners taken at Woevre had old-pattern weapons.

The upshot of these observations is that Germany, despite her large stores at the beginning, and the great resources of her industrial production, presents manifest signs of wear, and that the official optimism which she displays does not correspond with the reality of the facts.

MORAL WASTAGE.

Under the caption "Moral Wastage of the German Army," the review continues:

The material losses of the German Army have corresponded with a moral wastage which it is interesting and possible to follow, both from the interrogation of prisoners and the pocketbooks and letters seized upon them or on the killed.

At the beginning of the war the entire German Army, as was natural, was animated by an unshakable faith in the military superiority of the empire. It lived on the recollections of 1870, and on those of the long years of peace, during which all the powers which had to do with Germany displayed toward her a spirit of conciliation and patience which might pass for weakness.

The first prisoners we took in August showed themselves wholly indifferent to the reverses of the German Army. They were sincerely and profoundly convinced that, if the German Army retired, it was in virtue of a preconceived plan, and that our successes would lead to nothing. The events at the end of August were calculated to strengthen this contention in the minds of the German soldiers.

The strategic retreat of the French Army, the facility with which the German armies were able to advance from Aug. 25 to Sept. 5, gave our adversaries a feeling of absolute and final superiority, which manifested itself at that time by all the statements gleaned and all the documents seized.

At the moment of the battle of the Marne the first impression was one of failure of comprehension and of stupor. A great number of German soldiers, notably those who fell into our hands during the first days of that battle, believed fully, as at the end of August, that the retreat they were ordered to make was only a means of luring us into a trap. German military opinion was suddenly converted when the soldiers saw that this retreat continued, and that it was being carried out in disorder, under conditions which left no doubt as to its cause and its extent.

This time it was really a defeat, and a defeat aggravated by the absence of regular supplies and by the physical and moral depression which was the result. The severity of the losses sustained, the overpowering effects of the French artillery, began from this moment to be noted in the German pocketbooks with veritable terror. Hope revived, however, at the end of some weeks, and there is to be found in the letters of soldiers and officers the announcement of "a great movement" which is being prepared, and which is to lead the German armies anew as far as Paris.

LOSSES IN "BATTLE OF CALAIS."

This is the great "battle of Calais," which, contrary to the anticipations of the enemy, was in reality fought to the east of the Yser. The losses of the Germans, which during those ten days exceeded 150,000 men, and may perhaps have reached 200,000, produced a terrifying impression on the troops. From that moment prisoners no longer declared themselves sure of success. For a certain time they had been consoled by the announcement of the capture of Warsaw. This pretended success having proved to be fictitious, incredulity became general.

During the last two months the most intelligent of the prisoners have all admitted that no one could any longer say on which side victory would rest. If we think of the absolute confidence with which the German people had been sustained, this avowal is of great importance.

Letters seized on a dead officer speak of the imminence of a military and economic hemming-in of Germany. They discuss the possibility of Germany finding herself after the war with "empty hands and pockets turned inside out." There is no longer any question of imposing the conqueror's law upon adversaries at his mercy, but of fighting with the energy of despair to secure an honorable peace. An officer of the General Staff who was made prisoner on Jan. 18 said: "Perhaps this struggle of despair has already begun."

There follows a chapter bearing the title, "The System of Lies," in which the review describes the methods by which it is alleged the German Government "made a sustained effort to create in the army an artificial state of mind based entirely upon lies and a scientific system of fables."



SONNET ON THE BELGIAN EXPATRIATION.

By THOMAS HARDY.

[From King Albert's Book.]

I dreamt that people from the Land of Chimes Arrived one Autumn morning with their bells, To hoist them on the towers and citadels Of my own country, that the musical rhymes

Rung by them into space at measured times Amid the market's daily stir and stress, And the night's empty starlit silentness, Might solace souls of this and kindred climes.

Then I awoke; and, lo, before me stood The visioned ones, but pale and full of fear; From Bruges they came, and Antwerp, and Ostend,

No carillons in their train. Vicissitude Had left these tinkling to the invaders' ear, And ravaged street, and smoldering gable-end.



War Correspondence

A Month of German Submarine War

By Vice Admiral Kirchhoff of the German Navy

Under the heading, "A Month of U-Boat War," Vice Admiral Kirchhoff of the German Navy discusses the German submarine warfare against merchant shipping in its first month. The article, appearing in the Hamburger Framdenblatt of March 19, 1915, is reproduced:

On March 18 a month had passed since the beginning of our sharp procedure against our worst foe. We can in every way be satisfied with the results achieved in the meantime! In spite of all "steps" taken before and thereafter, the English have everywhere had important losses to show at sea—some 200 ships lost since the beginning of the war, according to the latest statements of the Allies—so that even they themselves no longer dare to talk about the "German bluff."

On the new and greater "war zone" established by us, our submarines have known how to work bravely, and have been able, for instance, to operate successfully on a single morning on the east coast, in the Channel, and in the Irish Sea. We have heard of many losses of our opponents, and on the other hand of the subjugation of only two of our brave U-boats. Ceaselessly they are active on the coasts of Albion; shipping is paralyzed at some points; steamship companies—including also many neutral ones—have suspended their sailings; in short, our threat of a more acute condition of war "with all means at hand" has been fully fulfilled.

The "peaceful shipping," too, has taken notice of it and adjusted itself according to our instructions. The official objections of neutrals have died away without effect; throughout the world we have already been given right; the shipping circles of the neutral States are in great part holding entirely back. The empty threats that floated over to us from across the Channel, that the captured crews of German submarines will be treated differently than other prisoners—yes, as plain pirates and sea robbers—those are nothing but an insignificant ebullition of British "moral insanity." They are a part of the hypocritical cant without which, somehow, Great Britain cannot get along. If Great Britain should act in accordance with it, however, then we shall know what we, for our part, have to do!

German and probably English mines, too, have helped our submarines in clearing up among the English mercantile and war fleet. Many merchant ships warned long in advance have been compelled to believe in the warning, and with them frequently a great part of their crews—"without any warning whatever," as our opponents like to say.

All measures of defense, yes, even more significant, all measures of deception and boastful "ruses de guerre," and even all attempts to hush up the news of German accomplishments and whenever possible to suppress it completely—all these efforts have been futile. Our results surpass the expectations that had been cherished. Who knows how many accomplishments other than those which have been published may also have been achieved? Foreign newspapers report a large number of steamships overdue. From overseas likewise we receive favorable reports about the sinking of enemy ships. But the best is the news that our submarines have succeeded in sinking two English auxiliary cruisers and perhaps also one or two larger English transport ships with several thousand men on board.

The last announcement has filled us all with greatest satisfaction. This, our latest method of warfare, is "truly humane"; it leads more speedily to the goal than anything else, so that the number of victims will in the end be smaller after all. It brings peace to all of us sooner than the empty paper protests and crying to Heaven about violence and international law, law of the sea, and laws of humanity could do. In the innocent exalted island kingdom many a fellow is already striking; why should not even the recruit strike, who is also beginning to get a glimmer of the truth that there are no props in the ocean waves?

The more opponents come before the bows of our ships and are sunk, the better! Down with them to the bottom of the sea; that alone will help! Let us hope that we shall soon receive more such cheerful news.



Three Weeks of the War in Champagne

By a British Observer

The following article, issued by the British Press Bureau, London, March 18, 1915, is from a British observer with the French forces in the field who has the permission of General Joffre to send communications home from time to time, giving descriptions of the work, &c., of the French Army which will be of interest to the British reader.

I propose to give some account of the operations which have been in progress for the last three weeks in Champagne. Every day since Feb. 15 the official communiques find something to say about a district which lies midway between Rheims and Verdun. The three places which are always mentioned, which form the points of reference, are Perthes-lez-Hurlus, Le Mesnil-lez-Hurlus, and Beausejour Farm. The distance between the first and the last is three and one-half miles; the front on which the fighting has taken place is about five miles; and the French have been attacking at one point or another in this front every day for the last three weeks. It is, therefore, an operation of a different kind to those which we have seen during the Winter months. Those were local efforts, lasting a day or two, designed to keep the enemy busy and prevent him from withdrawing troops elsewhere; this is a sustained effort, made with the object of keeping a constant pressure on his first line of defense, of affecting his use of the railway from Bazancourt to Challerange, a few miles to the north, and of wearing down his reserves of men and ammunition. It may be said that Feb. 15 marks the opening of the 1915 campaign, and that this first phase will find an important place when the history of the war comes to be written.

We must first know something of the nature of the country, which is entirely different to that in which the British Army is fighting. It is one vast plain, undulating, the hills at most 200 feet higher than the valleys, gentle slopes everywhere. The soil is rather chalky, poor, barely worth cultivating; after heavy rain the whole plain becomes a sea of shallow mud; and it dries equally quickly. The only features are the pine woods, which have been planted by hundreds. From the point of view of profit, this would not appear to have been a success; either the soil is too poor, or else it is unsuitable to the maritime pine; for the trees are rarely more than 25 feet high. As each rise is topped, a new stretch of plain, a new set of small woods appear, just like that which has been left behind.



The villages are few and small, most of them are in ruins after the fighting in September; and the troops live almost entirely in colonies of little huts of wood or straw, about four feet high, dotted about in the woods, in the valleys, wherever a little water and shelter is obtainable. Lack of villages means lack of roads; this has been one of the great difficulties to be faced; but, at the same time, the movement of wagons across country is possible to a far greater extent than in Flanders, although it is often necessary to use eight or ten horses to get a gun or wagon to the point desired.

From the military point of view the country is eminently suitable for troops, with its possibilities of concealment, of producing sudden surprises with cavalry, and of manoeuvre generally. It is, in fact, the training ground of the great military centre of Chalons; and French troops have doubtless been exercised over this ground in every branch of military operation, except that in which they are engaged at the present moment.

What commander, training his men over this ground, could have imagined that the area from Perthes-lez-Hurlus to Beausejour Farm would become two fortress lines, developed and improved for four months; or that he would have to carry out an attack modeled on the same system as that employed in the last great siege undertaken by French troops, that of Sebastopol in 1855? Yet this is what is being done. Every day an attack is made on a trench, on the edge of one of the little woods or to gain ground in one of them; every day the ground gained has to be transformed so as to give protection to its new occupants and means of access to their supports; every night, and on many days, the enemy's counter-attacks have to be repulsed.

Each attack has to be prepared by a violent and accurate artillery fire; it may be said that a trench has to be morally captured by gun fire before it can be actually seized by the infantry. Once in the new trench, the men have to work with their intrenching tools, without exposing themselves, and wait for a counter-attack, doing what damage they can to the enemy with hand grenades and machine guns. Thus the amount of rifle fire is very small; it is a war of explosives and bayonets.

Looking at the battle at a distance of about 2,000 yards from the enemy's line, the stillness of what one sees is in marked contrast to the turmoil of shells passing overhead. The only movement is the cloud of smoke and earth that marks the burst of a shell. Here and there long white lines are visible, when a trench has brought the chalky subsoil up to the top, but the number of trenches seen is very small compared to the number that exist, for one cannot see into the valleys, and the top of the ground is an unhealthy place to choose for seating a trench. The woods are pointed out, with the names given them by the soldiers, but it needs fieldglasses to see the few stumps that remain in those where the artillery has done its work. And then a telephone message arrives, saying that the enemy are threatening a counter-attack at a certain point, and three minutes later there is a redoubled whistling of shells. At first one cannot see the result of this fire—the guns are searching the low ground where the enemy's reserves are preparing for the movement, but a little later the ground in front of the threatened trench becomes alive with shell bursts, for the searching has given place to the building up of a wall of fire through which it is impossible for the foe to pass without enormous loss.

The attached map may enable us to look more closely at what has been achieved. The lowest dotted line, numbered 15, is the line of the French trenches on Feb. 15. They were then close up to the front of the German line with its network of barbed wire, its machine-gun emplacements, often of concrete, and its underground chambers for sheltering men from the shells. Each successive dotted line shows the line held by the French on the evening of the date written in the dotted line. Thus the total gain of ground, that between the most southerly and the most northerly dotted lines, varies between 200 yards, where the lines are close together northeast of Perthes, and 1,400 yards, half way between Le Mesnil and Beausejour Farm. But the whole of this space has been a series of trenches and fortified woods, each of which has had to be attacked separately.

[Illustration: Map of the French Operations in the Champagne

Some of the severest fighting on the western battle front took place in this little section of about four miles of trenches, lying between Rheimes and Verdun. For a whole month from Feb. 15, the attacks were kept up by the French forces almost continuously, and the sketch gives the graphic result of changes for three weeks of that time. Ostensibly the purpose of the French was to pierce the German line and cut the railway a few miles to the rear. Incidentally, the French aimed to keep their opponents busy, and thus prevent any reinforcements being sent to von Hindenburg in the east.

The total gain of ground—that between the most southerly and most northerly dotted lines—varies from 200 yards northeast of Perthes to 1,400 yards, half way between Le Mesnil and Beausejour Farm. But the whole of this space has been a series of trenches and fortified woods, each of which had to be attacked separately.

The letters (A to G) in the sketch indicate the points of the severest fighting. A (the "little fort") was taken and lost three times before the French finally held it. B saw some of the stiffest encounters, the Germans attacking the hill nearly every day after the French captured it, and even the Prussian Guard being put in. The woods at C, D, and E were centres of terrific combats, in which trenching and mining were continuous tasks. The redoubt at F was captured only after large losses on both sides. At the extreme west is still another wood, (G.) which the French attacked three times before they were successful in getting a foothold there.]

Some of the points where the fighting has been heaviest are shown in letters on the map. A is the "little fort," a redoubt on an open spur, holding perhaps 500 men. This was first attacked in January; it was partly taken, but the French in the end retained only the southern corner, where they remained for something like a fortnight. On Feb. 16 it was again taken in part, and lost the same day. On the 17th the same thing happened. On the 23d they once more got into the work; in the evening they repulsed five separate counter-attacks; then a sixth succeeded in turning them out. On the 27th they took all except a bit of trench in the northern face, and two days later they made that good, as well as a trench about fifty yards to the north of the work.

B is a small hill, marked 196. The capture of this, with its two lines of trenches, was one of the most brilliant pieces of work done. Since this date, the 26th, the enemy have continued to counter-attack nearly every day. It was here that the Prussian Guard was put in; but they have failed to get it back, and their losses have been very high. The prisoners stated that one regiment had its Colonel and all the superior officers killed or wounded. C is a wood, called the "Yellow Burnt Wood." It is still in the hands of the Germans, a regular nest of machine guns, which command the ground not only to the front but also down valleys to the east and west. The French are just in the southwest corner.

At D there are two woods; the southern we will call No. 3, the northern No. 4. On the 16th our allies got a trench just south of No. 3; they got into the wood on the 18th, and fought backward and forward in the wood that day and all the 19th and 20th; by the evening of the 20th they had almost reached the northern edge. On the 21st a stronger counter-attack than usual was repulsed, and in pursuing the retiring enemy they secured the northern edge. On the 22d there was more fighting in No. 3, but in the end the French managed to make their way into No. 4 as far as a trench which runs along a crest midway through the wood. The next six days saw continuous fighting in No. 4, sometimes near the northern end, sometimes at the crest in the middle, and occasionally back near the southern end. The French now hold the northern edge, and have pushed troops into the "Square" wood just north of the line of the 25th.

At E again there are two small woods; these were both captured on the 26th, but the trenches in the northern one had been mined, and the French had no sooner seized them than they were blown up. At F there was another small redoubt; part of this was taken on the 19th from the east, but the work was not finally captured till the 27th, when 240 corpses were found in it. On the extreme west, at G, is a wood which has twice been unsuccessfully attacked. On the first occasion troops got into the wood, but a severe snowstorm prevented the artillery from continuing to assist them, and they were driven out. The second was an attempt to surprise the enemy at 2 A.M. on the 25th; this also failed. A third attack was made on March 7 and was successful; the French line now runs through the wood.

The above will serve to show the tenacity which is required for an operation of this kind. Up to the present the French have made steady and continuous progress, and their success may be best judged from the fact that they have not been forced back on any day behind the line they held in the morning, despite innumerable counter-attacks. And this is not merely a question of ground, but one of increasing moral superiority, for it is in the unsuccessful counter-attacks that losses are heavy, and these and the sense of failure affect the morale of an army sooner or later.

Will the French push through the line? Will a hole be made, or is the enemy like a badger, who digs himself in rather faster than you can dig him out? I cannot tell; it would indeed be an astonishing measure of success for a first attempt, and the enemy may require a great deal more hammering at many points before he has definitely had enough at any one point. But these operations have brought the day closer, and turn our thoughts to the time when we shall be able to move forward, and one finds the cavalrymen wondering whether perhaps they, too, will get their chance.



The Germans Concrete Trenches

By F.H. Gailor, American Rhodes Scholar of New College, Oxford

[From The London Daily Mail, March 24, 1915.]

At the kind invitation of General Longchamps, German Military Governor of the Province of Namur, I spent two days with him going along the country in and behind the firing line in Northern France from near Rheims to the small village of Monthois, near Vouziers, on the Aisne.

About five miles out of Monthois we came to the artillery positions of the Germans. We could see the flashes of the guns long before we reached the hills where they were placed, but when we came up and dismounted the position was most cleverly concealed by a higher hill in front and the heavy woods which served as a screen for the artillery. I noticed many holes where the French shells had burst, and the valley to the north looked as if some one had been experimenting with a well digger. One 21-centimeter shell had cut a swath about 100 yards long out of the woods on the hill where we dismounted. The trees were twisted from their stumps as if a small cyclone had passed, and one could realize the damage the shells could do merely by the displaced air.

We went on forward into the valley on foot and stopped about two hundred yards in front and to the left of where the German guns were firing. There, although of course we could not see the French position, we could hear and see their shells as they exploded. They were firing short, one of the officers told me, because they thought the Germans were on the forward hill. He could see one of the French aeroplanes directing their fire, but I could not make it out. We stayed there listening to the shells and watching the few movements of German batteries that were taking place. A party of officers hidden by the trees were taking observations and telephoning the results of the German fire and, no doubt, of the French fire in the German trenches. There was no excitement; but for the noise the whole scene reminded me of some kind of construction work, such as building a railroad.

After about an hour, when nothing had happened, one began to realize that even such excitement may become monotonous and be taken as a matter of course. One of the officers told me that the Germans had been there since the beginning of October and that even the trenches were in the same position as when they first came.

Certainly the trenches seem permanent enough for spending many Winters. A number of them have now been built of concrete, especially in that swampy part near the Aisne where they strike water about three feet underground. The difficulty is in draining out the water when it rains.

Some of the trenches have two stories, and at the back of many of them are subterranean rest houses built of concrete and connected with the trenches by passages. The rooms are about seven feet high and ten feet square, and above the ground all evidence of the work is concealed by green boughs and shrubbery so that they may escape the attention of the enemy's aeroplanes.

With the noise and the fatigue, the men say it is impossible to sleep naturally, but they become so used to the firing and so weary that they become oblivious of everything even when shells are falling within a dozen yards of them. They stay in the trenches five days and then get five days' rest. In talking to the men one feels the influence on them of a curious sort of fatalism—they have been lucky so far and will come through all right. One sees and feels everywhere the spirit of a great game. The strain of football a thousand times magnified. The joy of winning and boyish pleasure in getting ahead of the other fellows side by side with the stronger passions of hatred and anger and the sight of agony and death.

We talked to some of the little groups of men along the road who were going back to their five days in the trenches. Of course all large units are split up so as not to attract attention. They were all the same, all sure of winning, and all bearded, muddy, and determined. I could not help thinking of American football players at the end of the first half. These men seemed all the same. I have no recollection of a single individual. The "system" and its work has made a type not only of clothes but of face. Their answers to the usual questions were all the same, and one felt in talking to them that their opinions were machine-made. Three points stood out—Germany is right and will win; England is wrong and will knuckle under; we hate England because we are alike in religion, custom, and opinion, and it is the war of kindred races. Everywhere one met the arguments and stories of unfairness and cruelty in fighting that have appeared in the English papers, but with the names reversed. English soldiers had surrendered and then fired; had shot from beneath a Red Cross flag or had killed prisoners. The stories were simple and as hackneyed as most of those current in England.

The concrete rest houses were interesting. Most of them have furniture made from trees "to amuse us and pass the time." Both officers and men use the same type of house, though discipline forbids that the same house be used by both officers and men. The light in these houses is bad and the ventilation not all that it should be, but they are extremely careful about sanitation, and everywhere one smells disinfectants and sees evidence of scrupulous guarding against disease. Oil and candles are scarce and the "pocket electric" that all the men and officers carry does not last long enough for much reading. There are always telephone connections, but in most cases visits are impossible save by way of the underground passages and the trenches.

One officer described the life as entirely normal; another said, in speaking of a Louis XV. couch which had been borrowed from a near-by chateau and was the pride of a regiment, "Oh! we are cave-dwellers, but we have some of the luxuries of at least the nineteenth century."

The Major Commandant at Rethel showed me a letter from a friend demanding "some easy chairs and a piano for his trench house," and the Major said, "I hear they have music up on the Yser, but the French are too close to us here!"

All that I saw of the German Red Cross leads me to believe that it is adequate and efficient. At Rethel we saw a Red Cross train of thirty-two cars perfectly equipped. The cars are made specially with open corridors, so that stretchers or rubber-wheeled trucks may be rolled from one car to another. The berths are in two tiers, much like an American sleeping car, and each car when full holds twenty-eight men. There is an operating car fully equipped for the most delicate and dangerous cases; in fact, when we saw the train at Rethel it had stopped on its way to Germany for an operation on a man's brain.



The Spirits of Mankind

By Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States

The conviction that great spiritual forces will assert themselves at the end of the European war to enlighten the judgment and steady the spirits of mankind was expressed by President Wilson in an address of welcome delivered at the Maryland annual conference of the Methodist Protestant Church at Washington on April 8, 1915. The text of his address appears below.

These are days of great perplexity, when a great cloud of trouble hangs and broods over the greater part of the world. It seems as if great, blind, material forces had been released which had for long been held in leash and restraint. And yet underneath that you can see the strong impulses of great ideals.

It would be impossible for men to go through what men are going through on the battlefields of Europe and struggle through the present dark night of their terrible struggle if it were not that they saw, or thought that they saw, the broadening of light where the morning should come up and believed that they were standing each on his side of the contest for some eternal principle for right.

Then all about them, all about us, there sits the silent, waiting tribunal which is going to utter the ultimate judgment upon this struggle, the great tribunal of the opinion of the world; and I fancy I see, I hope that I see, I pray that it may be that I do truly see, great spiritual forces lying waiting for the outcome of this thing to assert themselves, and are asserting themselves even now to enlighten our judgment and steady our spirits.

No man is wise enough to pronounce judgment, but we can all hold our spirits in readiness to accept the truth when it dawns on us and is revealed to us in the outcome of this titanic struggle.

It is of infinite benefit that in assemblages like this and in every sort of assemblage we should constantly go back to the sources of our moral inspiration and question ourselves as to what principle it is that we are acting on. Whither are we bound? What do we wish to see triumph? And if we wish to see certain things triumph, why do we wish to see them triumph? What is there in them that is for the lasting benefit of mankind?

For we are not in this world to amuse ourselves with its affairs. We are here to push the whole sluggish mass forward in some particular direction, and unless you know the direction in which you want to go your force is of no avail. Do you love righteousness? is what each one of us ought to ask himself. And if you love righteousness are you ready to translate righteousness into action and be ashamed and afraid before no man?

It seems to me, therefore, that it is worth suggesting to you that you are not sitting here merely to transact the business and express the ideals of a great church as represented in the State of Maryland, but you are here also as part of the assize of humanity, to remind yourselves of the things that are permanent and eternal, which if we do not translate into action we have failed in the fundamental things of our lives.

You will see that it is only in such general terms that one can speak in the midst of a confused world, because, as I have already said, no man has the key to this confusion. No man can see the outcome, but every man can keep his own spirit prepared to contribute to the net result when the outcome displays itself.



"What the Germans Say About Their Own Methods of Warfare"

By Joseph Bedier, Professor in the College de France

[From an article in the Revue de Paris for January, 1915.]

I purpose to show that the German armies cannot altogether escape the reproach of violating on occasion the law of nations. I shall establish this by French methods, through the use of documents of sound value.

My texts are genuine, well vouched for, and I have taken pains to subject them to a critical examination, as scrupulous and minute as heretofore in times of peace I expended in weighing the authority of some ancient chronicle, or in scrutinizing the authenticity of some charter. Perhaps this care was born of professional habit, or due to a natural craving for exactness, but in either case it is a voucher for the work, which is meant for all comers—for the passer-by, for the indifferent, and even for my country's foes. My wish is that the veriest looker-on, idly turning these pages, may be confronted only with documents whose authenticity will be self-evident, if he is willing to see, and whose ignominious tale will reach his heart, if ye have a heart.

I have, moreover, sought for documents not only incontestably genuine but of unquestioned authority. Accusation is easy, while proof is difficult. No belligerent has ever been troubled to find mountains of testimony, true or false, against his enemy; but were this evidence gathered by the most exalted magistrates, under the most solemn judicial sanction, it must unfortunately long remain useless; until the accused has full opportunity to controvert it, every one is free to treat it as false or, at the best, as controvertible. For this reason I shall avoid resting the case upon Belgian or French statements, though I know them to be true. My purpose has been to bring forward such testimony that no man living, be he even a German, should be privileged to cast a doubt upon it. German crimes will be established by German documents.

These will be taken mainly from the "War Diaries," which Article 75 of the German Army Regulations for Field Service enjoins upon soldiers to keep during their marches, and which were seized by the French upon the persons of their prisoners, as military papers, as authorized by Article 4 of The Hague Convention of 1907. The number of these is daily increasing, and I trust that some day, for the edification of all, the complete collection may be lodged in the Germanic section of manuscripts in the National Library. Meantime, the Marquis de Dampierre, paleographer and archivist, graduate of the Ecole des Chartes, is preparing, and will shortly publish, a volume in which the greater part of these notebooks will be minutely described, transcribed, and clarified. Personally, I have only examined about forty of them, but they will answer my purpose, by presenting relevant extracts, furnishing the name, rank, and regiment of the author, with indications of time and place. Classification is difficult, mainly because ten lines of a single text not infrequently furnish evidence of a variety of offenses. I must take them almost at random, grouping them under such analogies or association of ideas or images as they may offer.

I.

The first notebook at hand is that of a soldier of the Prussian Guard, the Gefreiter Paul Spielmann, (of Company I, First Brigade of the Infantry Guard.) He tells the story of an unexpected night alarm on the 1st of September in a village near Blamont. The bugle sounds, and the Guard, startled from sleep, begins the massacre, (Figs. 1 and 2:)



The inhabitants fled through the village. It was horrible. The walls of houses are bespattered with blood and the faces of the dead are hideous to look upon. They were buried at once, some sixty of them. Among them many old women, old men, and one woman pregnant—the whole a dreadful sight. Three children huddled together—all dead. Altar and arches of the church shattered. Telephone communication with the enemy was found there. This morning, Sept. 2, all the survivors were driven out; I saw four little boys carrying on two poles a cradle with a child some five or six months old. The whole makes a fearful sight. Blow upon blow! Thunderbolt on thunderbolt! Everything given over to plunder. I saw a mother with her two little ones—one of them had a great wound in the head and an eye put out.

Deserved repression, remarks this soldier: "They had telephone communication with the enemy." And yet, we may recall that by Article 30 of The Hague Convention of 1907, signed on behalf of H.M. the Emperor of Germany, "no collective penalty, pecuniary or other, shall be proclaimed against a population, by reason of individual acts for which the population is not responsible in solido." What tribunal during that dreadful night took the pains to establish this joint participation?



II.

The unsigned notebook of a soldier of the Thirty-second Reserve Infantry (Fourth Reserve Corps) has this entry:

Creil, Sept. 3.—The iron bridge was blown up. For this we set the streets on fire, and shot the civilians.

Yet it must be obvious that only the regular troops of the French Engineer Corps could have blown up the iron bridge at Creil; the civilians had no hand in it. As an excuse for these massacres, when any excuse is offered, the notebooks usually note that "civilians" or "francs-tireurs" had fired on the troops. But the "scrap of paper" which Germany subscribed—the Convention of 1907—provides in its first article "the laws, the rights, and the duties are not applicable solely to the army, but also to militia and bodies of volunteers" under certain conditions, of which the main one is that they shall "openly bear arms;" while Article 2 stipulates that "the population of an unoccupied territory, which on the approach of the enemy spontaneously takes up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to organize as provided in Article I, shall be considered as a belligerent, if they bear arms openly and observe the laws and customs of war."



In the light of this text, the bearing of the barbarous recitals which follow may be properly estimated:

(a) Notebook of Private Hassemer, (Eighth Corps, Sept. 3, 1914, at Sommepy, Marne.)—Dreadful butchery. Village burned to the ground; the French thrown into the burning houses, civilians and all burned together.

(b) Notebook of Lieut. Kietzmann, (Second Company, First Battalion, Forty-ninth Infantry,) under date of Aug. 18, 1914, (Fig. 3.)—A short distance above Diest is the village of Schaffen. About fifty civilians were concealed in the church tower, and from there fired on our troops with a mitrailleuse. All the civilians were shot.

[It may here be noted, for the sake of precision, that the First Report of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry, Antwerp, Aug. 28, Page 3, identifies some of the "civilians" killed at Schaffen on the 18th of August; among them, "the wife of Francois Luyckz, 45 years of age, with her daughter aged 12, who were discovered in a sewer and shot"; and "the daughter of Jean Ooyen, 9 years of age, who was shot"; and "Andre Willem, sacristain, who was bound to a tree and burned alive."]

(c) Notebook of a Saxon officer, unnamed, (178th Regiment, Twelfth Army Corps, First Saxon Corps,) Aug. 26.—The exquisite village of Gue-d'Hossus (Ardennes) was given to the flames, although to my mind it was guiltless. I am told that a cyclist fell from his machine, and in his fall his gun was discharged; at once the firing was begun in his direction, and thereupon all the male inhabitants were simply thrown into the flames. It is to be hoped that like atrocities will not be repeated.

This Saxon officer had, nevertheless, already witnessed like "atrocities." The preceding day, Aug. 25, at Villers-en-Fagne, (Belgian Ardennes,) "where we found grenadiers of the guard, killed and wounded," he had seen "the cure and other inhabitants shot"; and three days previous, Aug. 23, at the village of Bouvignes, north of Dinant, he had witnessed what he thus describes:

Through a breach made in the rear we get access into the residence of a well-to-do inhabitant and occupy the house. Passing through a number of apartments, we reach a door where we find the corpse of the owner. Further on in the interior our men have wrecked everything like vandals. Everything has been searched. Outside, throughout the country, the spectacle of the inhabitants who have been shot defies any description. They have been shot at such short range that they are almost decapitated. Every house has been ransacked to the furthest corners, and the inhabitants dragged from their hiding places. The men shot; the women and children locked into a convent, from which shots were fired. And, for this reason, the convent is about to be set fire to; it may, however be ransomed if it surrenders the guilty ones and pays a ransom of 15,000 francs.

We shall see as we proceed how these notebooks complement one another.

(d) Notebook of the Private Philipp, (from Kamenz, Saxony, First Company, First Battalion, 178th Regiment.) On the day indicated above—Aug. 23—a private of the same regiment was the witness of a scene similar to that just described; perhaps, the same scene, but the point of view is different.—At 10 o'clock in the evening the First Battalion of the 178th came down into the burning village to the north of Dinant—a saddening spectacle—to make one shiver. At the entrance to the village lay the bodies of some fifty citizens, shot for having fired upon our troops from ambush. In the course of the night many others were shot down in like manner, so that we counted more than two hundred. Women and children, holding their lamps, were compelled to assist at this horrible spectacle. We then sat down midst the corpses to eat our rice, as we had eaten nothing since morning. (Fig. 4.)



Here is a military picture fully outlined, and worthy to compete in the Academy of Fine Arts of Dresden. But one passage of the text is somewhat obscure and might embarrass the artist—"Women and children, holding their lamps, were compelled to assist at this horrible spectacle." What spectacle?—the shooting, or the counting of the corpses? To get some certainty on this historic point, the artist should question that noble soldier—the Colonel of the 178th.

His work of that night, however, was in accord with the spirit of his companions in arms, and of his chiefs. We may assure ourselves of this by consulting the Sixth Report of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry upon, the violation of the rules of the law of nations (Havre, Nov. 10, 1914) and the ignoble proclamations placarded by the Germans throughout Belgium. I will content myself with three short extracts.

Extract from a proclamation of General von Buelow, placarded at Liege, Aug. 22, 1914:

The inhabitants of the city of Andenne, after having protested their peaceful intentions, were guilty of a treacherous surprise upon our troops. It was with my consent that the General in Chief set fire to the whole locality, and that about one hundred persons were shot.

(The Belgian report controverts the accusation against the inhabitants of Andenne of having taken hostile measures against the German troops, and adds: "As a matter of fact, more than two hundred persons were shot"—almost everything was ravaged. For a distance of at least three leagues the houses were destroyed by fire.)

Extract from a proclamation of Major Dieckmann, placarded at Grivegnee, Sept. 8, 1914:

Any one not responding instantly to the command "raise your arms" is subject to the penalty of death.

Extract from proclamation of Marshal Baron von der Goltz, placarded at Brussels, Oct. 5, 1914:

Hereafter the localities nearest the place where similar acts (destruction of railways or telegraphic lines) were done—whether or not they were accomplices in the act—will be punished without mercy. To this end hostages have been taken from all the localities adjacent to railways menaced by similar attacks, and upon the first attempt to destroy the railways, telegraphic or telephone lines, they will at once be shot.

III.

I copy from the first page of an unsigned notebook, (Fig. 5:)

Langeviller, Aug. 22.—Village destroyed by the Eleventh Battalion of Pioneers. Three women hanged to trees; the first dead I have seen.

Who can these three women be?—criminals undoubtedly—guilty of having fired upon German troops, unless, indeed, they may have been "in communication by telephone" with the enemy; and the Eleventh Pioneers unquestionably meted out to them just punishment. But, at all events, they expiated their guilt, and the Eleventh Pioneers has passed on. The crime these women committed is unknown to the troops which are to follow. Among these new troops will there be found no chief, no Christian, to order the ropes cut and allow these dangling bodies to rest on the earth?



No, the regiment passes under the gibbets and their flags brush against the hanging corpses; they pass on, Colonel and officers—gentlemen all—Kulturtraeger. And they do this knowingly; these corpses must hang there as an example, not for the other women of the village, for these doubtless already understand, but as an example to the regiment and to the other regiments that will follow, and who must be attuned to war, who must be taught their stern duty to kill women when occasion offers. The teaching will be effective, unquestionably. Shall we look for proof of it? The young soldier, who tells us above that these corpses were the first dead he had ever seen, adds a week later, on the tenth and last page of his notebook, the following, (Fig. 6:)

In this way we destroyed eight dwellings and their inhabitants. In one of the houses we bayoneted two men, with their wives and a young girl 18 years old. The young: one almost unmanned me, her look was so innocent! But we could not master the excited troop, for at such times they are no longer men—they are beasts.



Let me add a few texts which will attest that these assassinations of women and children are customary tasks set to German soldiers:

(a) The writer in a notebook, unsigned, reports that at Orchies (Nord) "a woman was shot for not having obeyed the command to halt!" whereupon he adds, "the whole locality was set on fire." (Fig. 7.)



(b) The officer of the 178th Saxon Regiment, mentioned above, reports that in the vicinity of Lisognes (Belgian Ardennes) "the Chasseur of Marburg, having placed three women in line, killed them all with one shot."

(c) A few lines more, taken from the notebook of the Reservist Schlauter (Third Battery, Fourth Regiment, Field Artillery of the Guard,) (Fig. 8:)

Aug. 25, (in Belgium.)—We shot 300 of the inhabitants of the town. Those that survived the salvo were requisitioned as grave diggers. You should have seen the women at that time! But it was impossible to do otherwise. In our march upon Wilot things went better; the inhabitants who wished to leave were allowed to do so. But whoever fired was shot. Upon our leaving Owele the rifles rang out, and with that, flames, women, and all the rest.



IV.

Frequently when a German troop want to carry a position, they place before them civilians—men, women, and children—and find shelter behind these ramparts of living flesh. As such a stratagem is essentially playing upon the nobility of heart of the adversary, and saying to him "you won't fire upon these unfortunates, I know it, and I hold you at my mercy, unarmed, because you are not as craven as I am," as it implies a homage to the enemy and the self-degradation of the one employing it, it is almost inconceivable that soldiers should resort to it; it represents a new invention in the long story of human vileness, which even the dreadful Penitentiels of the Middle Ages had not discovered. In reading the stories from French, Belgian, and English sources, attributing such practices to the Germans, it has made me doubt, if not the truthfulness, at least the detailed exactness of the stories. It seemed to me that the tales must be of crimes by men who would be disavowed, individual lapses, which do not dishonor the nation, because the nation on ascertaining them would repudiate them. But how can we doubt that the German Nation has, on the contrary, accepted these acts as exploits worthy of herself, that in them she recognizes her own aptitudes, and finds pleasure in the contemplation; how, I ask, can we doubt this in reading the following narrative signed by a Bavarian officer, Lieut. A. Eberlein, spread out in the columns of one of the best known periodicals of Germany, the Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten, in its issue of Wednesday, Oct. 7, 1914, Page 22, Lieut. Eberlein relates there the occupation of Saint-Die at the end of August. He entered the town at the head of a column, and while waiting for reinforcements was compelled to barricade himself in a house, (Fig. 9:)