A producing monopoly is one controlling the manufacture or the source of supply of an article; a trading monopoly is one controlling the avenues of commerce between the source and the consumers.

Monopolies are lasting or temporary, according to the duration of control. By far the larger number are of the temporary sort, because high prices strongly stimulate efforts to develop other sources of supply. Yet the average profits of a monopoly may be large throughout a succession of periods of high and low prices.

Monopolies are general or local, according to the extent of territory where their power is felt. At its maximum where transportation and other costs most effectually shut out competition, monopoly power shades off to zero on the border-line of competitive territory. The frequent use of the adjectives partial, limited, and virtual are implied but usually superfluous recognitions of the relative character of monopoly.

Sec. 2. Political sources of monopoly. Monopoly gets its power from various sources. A political monopoly derives its power of control from a special grant from the government, forbidding others to engage in that business. The typical political monopoly is that conferred by a crown patent bestowing the exclusive right to carry on a certain business. A second kind is that conferred by a patent for invention, or the copyright on books, the object of which is to stimulate invention, research, and writing by giving the full control and protection of the government to the inventor and the writer or their assignees. In this case the privilege is socially earned by the monopolist; it is not gotten for nothing. Moreover, the patent, being limited in time, expires and becomes a social possession. A third kind is a governmental monopoly for purposes of revenue. In France and Japan the governments control the tobacco trade, and the high price charged for tobacco makes this monopoly yield large revenues. A fourth kind is that derived from franchises for public service corporations, such as those supplying electricity, gas and water. These franchises are granted to private capitalists to induce them to invest capital in enterprises that are helpful to the community.

Sec. 3. Natural agents as sources of monopoly. "Economic" monopoly, so-called, arises when the ownership of scarce natural agents, as mines, land, water-power, comes under the control of one man or one group of men who agree on a price. Economic monopoly is a result of private property that is undesigned by the government or by society. It is exceptional, considering the whole range of private property, but it is important. The oil-wells embracing the main sources of the world's supply have largely come under one control. One corporation may control so many of the richest iron mines of the country as to be able to fix a price different from that which would result under competition. Coal mines, especially those of some peculiar and limited kind, such as anthracite, appear to become easily an object of monopolization. Economic monopoly merges into political monopolies, such as patents and franchises. Private property is a political institution designed to further social welfare, and only rarely is property in any particular business a monopoly. Private control of great natural resources might have been prevented in many cases had it been foreseen.

Sec. 4. Capitalistic monopoly; aspects of the problem. Capitalistic monopoly, variously called contractual, organized, commercial or industrial monopoly, arises when men unite their wealth to control a market, to overpower or intimidate opposition, and to keep out or limit competition by the mere magnitude of their wealth. These various kinds so merge into each other that they cannot always be distinguished in practice. A patent may help a capitalistic monopoly in getting control of a market; great wealth may enable a company to get control of rare natural resources.

In the discussion of industrial monopoly, the problem now before us, there is a good deal of vagueness and misunderstanding because of lack of definiteness in the use of words which have rapidly shifted in meaning. The word "trust" originally applied, and still in legal usage applies, to a particular form of organization, that of a board of trustees holding the stock, and thus unifying the control, of two or more formerly separate enterprises. The Standard Oil Company at one time had this form of organization, which was declared by the courts to be illegal (ultra vires) for corporations. Now "trust" often is used in the sense of a corporation having monopoly power in some degree; either broadly, of any monopolistic corporation (including railways and local public utilities), or, oftener, limited to manufacturing and commercial monopolies, otherwise called "industrial trusts" in contrast with franchise trusts and railroads.[2] The word "combination" referred originally to a more or less thoro "merger," with a view to attaining monopolistic power, of a number of formerly separate organizations, as in the case of the United States Steel Corporation. But the word is often used as if it were a synonym for trust (in a narrower or wider sense) even as applied to a single enterprise that has grown to be monopolistic. A "trust" in the legal sense of a form of organization, and "combinations" as above defined, might have no monopoly power whatever; whereas a monopoly may be possessed by an individual owner (e.g., of a patent right, railroad, waterworks plant), or by a single corporation that has simply grown monopolistic without the trust form of organization or without combination.

Now it is evident that the real problem is that of monopoly, however attained. Monopoly may be defined as such a degree of control over the supply of goods in a given market that a net gain will result if a portion is withheld.[3] In accord with growing and now dominant usage it is well to observe the following meanings in our discussion. "Combination" is a term referring particularly to one method by which monopolies are formed. "Trust," in the now popular sense, is best limited to an industrial, primarily manufacturing, enterprise or group of enterprises, with some degree of monopoly power due not to a "special franchise" giving the use of streets and highways and the right of eminent domain, nor to a single patent, but to a group of favoring technical, financial, and economic conditions. The trust may consist of a single establishment; or of a group of establishments separately operated but united in a "pool" to divide output, territory, or earnings; or of such a group held together by a holding company, or combined into one corporation. Public utility is the name of special franchise enterprises of the kind just mentioned, including, in the broad sense, railroads and local utilities such as street railways, gas, water, and electric light-plants.

Sec. 5. Industrial monopoly and fostering conditions. The problem of monopoly is probably as old as markets. From the first coming together of groups of men to trade there were doubtless efforts made by some individuals and groups of traders to manipulate conditions so as to get higher prices than they could get in a free and open market.[4] There are traces of these practices in ancient times, and the history of the Middle Ages is full of evidences both of monopolistic practices and of the efforts to prevent or control them.

If this fact is borne in mind it may help us to distinguish in thought four features of enterprise that are readily and constantly confused, viz: large individual capital, large production, corporate organization, and monopoly.[5] Evidently any one of these features may appear without the other; e.g., a person of large aggregate capital may have his investments distributed among a large number of small enterprises, such as farms, without a trace of corporate organization or monopoly, and numerous examples could be given of large production, or of corporate organization, or of monopoly without one or more of the other features.

But the presence of any one of these features is a favoring condition for the development of the others. Hence they are frequently found together, and of late this occurs increasingly. It is difficult to say in every, indeed in any, case which feature has been cause and which effect in this development, but, on the whole, large production seems to have been primary. Itself made possible by inventions, by better transportation, and by the widening of markets, it in turn helped to build up large individual fortunes, and then to create a need for the corporate form of organization. And monopoly power no doubt is more easily gained by large aggregations of capital in a corporation having the advantages of large production.

Sec. 6. Growth of large industry in the nineteenth century. The great recent growth of the monopoly problem is in part to be explained as the result of the growth of large industry, not as the sole cause, but as a favoring condition. Before the middle of the last century a tool-using household industry, on farms and in homes where the greater part of the things used were produced in the family, was still the typical organization in the United States.[6] A family produced somewhat more than it needed of food and cloth and exchanged with its neighbors; so with shoes, candles, soap, and cured meats. The early factories growing out of the household industry were small. Since that time two counter forces have been at work to affect the ratio of manufacturing establishments to population. The number of small establishments has been increased by the many industries producing the things once made on farms, and by increasing demands for comforts and luxuries. Many establishments producing the staple products that can be transported have been consolidated or have been enlarged, so that the unit of production now averages much larger. The number of cotton-weaving factories was about the same in 1900 as it had been seventy years earlier, while population has grown six fold. Iron- and steel-mills were fewer in 1900 than in 1880. In industries having local markets or local sources of materials, such as grist mills and saw mills, the change in numbers was less, for many small establishments were started in outlying districts at the same time that the mills became larger in the great population centers. But the average number of employees and the average capital per establishment increased in every period between census enumerations.

Sec. 7. Methods of forming combinations. Combinations of previously independent enterprises may be more or less complete and are made by different methods. Four major methods are:

(1) The pool, by which the enterprises continue to be separately operated, but divide the traffic (or output), or the earnings, or the territory, in prearranged proportions.

(2) The trust, in a legal sense (as defined above in section 5).

(3) The holding company, a corporation with the sole purpose of holding the shares of stock, or a controlling number of them, in various corporations otherwise nominally independent.

(4) Consolidation into one company.

At least five minor methods may be distinguished; these are here numbered continuously with the preceding four.

(5) Lease by one company of the plants of one or more other companies.

(6) Ownership of stock by one corporation in another corporation, sufficient to give substantial influence over its policy, if not absolute control.

(7) Ownership of stock in two or more competing companies, by the same individual or group of individuals, to such an extent as appreciably to unify the policies of the competing companies.

(8) Interlocking directorates, that is, boards of competing companies containing one or more of the same persons as directors.

(9) Gentlemen's agreements, mere friendly informal conferences and understandings as to common policies.

Sec. 8. Growth of combinations after 1880. Undoubtedly industry before 1860 had some elements of monopoly. Monopoly constituted part of the banking problem; it began to be evident in the railroads almost at once, and it rapidly increased as street railways and other public utilities were constructed. But after 1880 occurred the formation in larger numbers of industrial enterprises which appeared to exercise some monopoly power. In the years between 1890 and 1900 this movement was still more rapid. Consolidation took place on a great scale in railroads and in manufactures. Much of this has been of such a kind that it does not appear at all in the figures showing the number of establishments and of employees. In the data regarding this movement given by different authorities, many discrepancies appear, as there is no generally accepted rule by which to determine the selection of the companies to be included in the lists. One financial authority gave the following figures[7] regarding the industrial companies reorganized into larger units in the United States between 1860 and 1899, not including combinations in such businesses as banking, shipping, and railroad transportation. Some of the enterprises here included have much and others probably have little or no monopolistic power.

Decade Number Organized Total Nominal Capital

1860-60 ............... 2 $ 13,000,000 1870-79 ............... 4 135,000,000 1880-89 ............... 18 288,000,000 1890-99 ............... 157 3,150,000,000 ———————- ——— ———————- Total, 40 years ........ 181 $3,586,000,000

Sec. 9. The great period of trust formation. The number of trusts organized and the capital represented by this movement in the last of these decades were seven times as great as in the thirty years preceding. The figures by years for the decade 1890-1899 are as follows:

Decade Number Organized Total Nominal Capital

1890 ................... 6 $82,000,000 1891 ................... 13 168,000,000 1892 ................... 13 140,000,000 1893 ................... 5 226,000,000 1894 ................... 2 35,000,000 1895 ................... 7 104,000,000 1896 ................... 3 40,000,000 1897 ................... 6 93,000,000 1898 ................... 22 574,000,000 1899 ................... 80 1,688,000,000 ———————— —— ——————— Total, 10 years ......... 157 $3,150,000,000

The influence of great prosperity shows in the large number of combinations; but in 1893, the number was less, altho the total nominal capital (stocks and bonds) was still the greatest it had ever been in any year. Then came the period of depression, 1894-97, when both the numbers and the capital were comparatively small. Then from 1898 to 1901 followed the period of the greatest formation of trusts the world has ever seen.

The list of these four years contains the names of the most widely known American combinations, a few of which are here given with the years of their formation: 1898, American Thread, National Biscuit; 1899, Amalgamated Copper, American Woolen, Royal Baking Powder, Standard Oil of N.J., American Hide and Leather, United Shoe Machinery, American Window Glass; 1900, Crucible Steel, American Bridge; 1901, United States Steel Corporation, Consolidated Tobacco, Eastman Kodak, American Locomotive.

Sec. 10. Height of the movement toward combinations. In a list by another authority[8] it appears that the data for all industrial trusts are in round numbers as follows:

Number of Plants Acquired Total Date Number or Controlled Nominal Capital

Jan. 1, 1904 318 5288 $7,246,000,000

These figures compared with those given above would indicate that the industrial trusts had about doubled in the years 1900-1903 inclusive. Probably most of this growth was in the years 1900 and 1901; then the movement became very slow, because, as is generally believed, of the aroused public opinion, of more vigorous prosecution by the government, and of additional legislation against trusts. The authority last cited gives in a more comprehensive list, in six groups, all the monopolistic combinations in the United States, at the date of January 1, 1904, as follows (the figures just given above being the totals of the first three groups):

No. of Plants Total Nominal Groups Number Acquired or Controlled Capital

1. Greater industrial trusts 7 1528 $2,260,000,000 2. Lesser industrial trusts 298 3426 4,055,000,000 3. Other industrial trusts in process of reorganization or readjustment 13 334 528,000,000 4. Franchise trusts 111 1336 3,735,000,000 5. Great steam railroad groups 6 790 9,017,000,000 6. Allied independent 10 250 380,000,000 —- ——- ——————— Total, 445 8664 $20,000,000,000

Sec. 11. Motive to avoid competition. This remarkable movement toward the formation of united corporations from formerly independent enterprises called forth a variety of explanations. The organizers of trusts gave as the first explanation of their action that it was the necessary result of excessive competition. It is not to be denied that a hard fight and lower prices often preceded the formation of the trusts. But as this excessive competition usually is begun for the very purpose of forcing others into a combination, this explanation is a begging of the question. It is fallacious also in that it ignores the marginal principle in the problem of profits. Profits are never the same in all factories, and to those manufacturers that are on the margin competition may appear excessive. It generally has been the largest and strongest factories, in the more favored situations, that, in order to get rid of troublesome competitors, have forced the smaller, weaker, industries to come into the trust. In other cases the smaller enterprises have been eager to be taken in at a good price, altho they might have continued to operate independently with moderate profits. When, therefore, it is said that competition is destructive, it may be a partial truth, but more likely it is a pleasantry reflecting the happy humor of the prosperous promoters of the combination.

Sec. 12. Motive to effect economies. Another advantage of the combination of competing plants that was strongly emphasized was the economy of large production.[9] The economies that are possible within a single factory may be still greater in a number of combined or federated industries. The cost of management, amount of stock carried, advertising, cost of selling the product, may all be smaller per unit of product. Each independent factory must send its drummers into every part of the country to seek business. In combination they can divide the territory, visit every merchant and get larger orders at smaller cost. A large aggregation can control credit better and escape losses from bad debts. By regulating and equalizing the output in the different localities, it can run more nearly full time. Being acquainted with the entire situation, it can reduce the friction. A combination has advantages in shipment. It can have a clearing-house for orders and ship from the nearest source of supply. The least efficient factories can be first closed when demand falls off. Factories can be specialized to produce that for which each is best fitted. The magnitude of the industry and its presence in different localities often, in the period of trust formation, served to strengthen its influence with the railroads, and to increase its political as well as its economic power.

Another phase of corporate growth is the "integration of industry," that is, the grouping under one control of a whole series of industries. One company may carry the iron ore through all the processes from the mine to the finished product. A railroad line across the continent owns its own steamers for shipping goods to Asia or Europe. Large wholesale houses own or control the output of entire factories.

Sec. 13. Profits from monopoly and gains of promoters. There are, however, well-recognized limitations to the economy of large production in the single establishment,[10] and of late there has been ever-increasing skepticism as to the net economy actually attributable to combinations. Undoubtedly the merging of a number of old plants has sometimes effected an immediate improvement in the weaker ones. A new broom sweeps clean. This movement chanced to be contemporaneous with the development of "efficiency engineering," and of "scientific cost-accounting," and these better methods, already developed and applied in comparatively small plants, could be more quickly extended to the other plants brought into the combination. Moreover, the personal organizations in the separate enterprises had been brought to a high state of efficiency by the stimulus of competition, and there is reason to fear that, after some years of centralized bureaucratic organization, much of this efficiency may be lost.

There seems no doubt that the strong motive for forming combinations is the profit to the organizers.[11] Whatever was the more generous motive or more fundamental economic reason assigned by the promoters, the investing public confidently expected that higher prices would be the chief result. There are indirect as well as direct gains to the promoters of a combination. There is the gain from the production and sale of goods to consumers, and there is the gain from the financial management, from the rise and fall in the value of stock. The promoters of a combination often expect to make from sales to the investing public far more than from sales to the consumer of the product. A season of prosperity and confidence, when trusts and their enormous profits are constantly discussed, has an effect on the public mind like that of the gold discoveries in California and in the Klondike. Then is the time for the promoter to offer shares without limit to investors.

Sec. 14. Monopoly's power to raise prices. There is no doubt that the formation of a combination from competing plants can and does give a control over prices, a monopoly power, not possessed by the separate competing establishments. The same kind of power might be attained by the growth of one establishment outstripping all its competitors, or by a new enterprise coming into the field backed by powerful capitalists. But this would work slower and less extensive results than does the formation of a combination.

Of course, the fundamental principles of price cannot be changed by a trust; a selling monopoly can affect price only as it affects supply or demand.[12] The strongest trust yet seen has not been omnipotent. Many careless expressions on the subject are heard even from ordinarily careful writers and speakers: "The trust can fix its own prices," "has unlimited control," "can determine what it will pay and for what it will sell." This implies that trusts are benevolent, seeing that the prices they charge are usually not far in excess of competitive prices in the past. Such a view overlooks the forces that limit the price a monopoly can charge. If the supply remains the same, no trust can make the price go higher. The monopoly usually directs its efforts to affecting the supply, leaving the price to adjust itself. It can affect the supply either by lessening its own output or by intimidating and forcing out its competitors. It is true that this logical order is not always the order of events. The trust may not first limit the supply, and then wait for prices to adjust themselves; it may first raise its prices, but unless it is prepared to limit the supply in accordance with the new resulting conditions of demand, such action would be vain. The control of the sources of supply is the logical explanation of the higher price, even tho the limitation of supply is effected later by successive acts found necessary to maintain the higher price.

The report of the Federal Industrial Commission, which, from 1898 to 1901, investigated the trusts, showed that immediately upon their formation, the industrial combinations had raised their prices.[13] Prices might be lowered again but only when and where competition became troublesome, thus causing either "price-wars" or discrimination.

[Footnote 1: See Vol. I, p. 76.]

[Footnote 2: As in the list in sec. 8, below.]

[Footnote 3: See Vol. I, chs. 8 and 31.]

[Footnote 4: See Vol. I, ch. 8, on competition and monopoly, and ch. 31, on monopoly prices and large production. An understanding of the definitions and of the general principles distinguishing competition and monopoly is a necessary prerequisite to a profitable discussion of the practical problem of monopoly.]

[Footnote 5: See Vol. I, p. 267, on capital; pp. 388-393, on large production. See also references in preceding note on monopoly; and ch. 27, secs. 1 and 2, on corporate organization.]

[Footnote 6: See above, ch. 26, sec. 3; and ch. 25, secs. 6 and 7.]

[Footnote 7: Compiled from data given by "The Journal of Commerce and Commercial Bulletin," reprinted in "The Commercial Year Book," Vol. V, 1900, pp. 564-569.]

[Footnote 8: John Moody, "The Truth About the Trusts," 1904]

[Footnote 9: See Vol. I, pp. 388-393.]

[Footnote 10: See Vol. I, pp. 391-392.]

[Footnote 11: See Vol. I, p. 334, on the function of the promoter.]

[Footnote 12: See Vol. I, pp. 80-85, 382-387, 394-396.]

[Footnote 13: A summary of this evidence is given in the author's "Principles of Economics" (1904), pp. 327-330. A fuller outline of the results of the Commission's conclusions may be found in "The Trust Problem," by J.W. Jenks, who acted as expert in the investigation.]



CHAPTER 29

PUBLIC POLICY IN RESPECT TO MONOPOLY

Sec. 1. Moral judgments of competition and monopoly. Sec. 2. Public character of private trade. Sec. 3. Evil economic effects of monopolistic price. Sec. 4. Common law on restraint of trade. Sec. 5. Growing disapproval of combination. Sec. 6. Competition sometimes favored regardless of results. Sec. 7. Increasing regard for results of competition. Sec. 8. Common law remedy for monopoly ineffective. Sec. 9. First federal legislation against monopoly. Sec. 10. Policy of the Sherman anti-trust law. Sec. 11. Policy of monopoly-accepted-and-regulated. Sec. 12. Field of its application. Sec. 13. Industrial trusts,—a natural evolution? Sec. 14. Artificial versus natural growth. Sec. 15. Kinds of unfair practices. Sec. 16. Growing conception of fair competition. Sec. 17. The trust issues in 1912. Sec. 18. Anti-trust legislation in 1914.

Sec. 1. Moral judgments of competition and monopoly. What should be the attitude of society toward monopoly? Is it good or bad as compared with competition? Some very strong ethical judgments bearing on practical problems are found in the popular mind connected with the ideas of competition and monopoly. Competition usually is pronounced bad when viewed from the standpoint of the competitors who are losing by it, and as good when viewed from the standpoint of the traders on the other side of the market who gain by that competition. Competition among buyers thus appears to sellers to be a good thing; that among sellers appears to themselves to be a bad thing (and vice versa). Many persons are moved by sympathy to pronounce competition among low-paid and underfed workers to be bad, and each worker is convinced that it is so in his own trade. Yet nearly all men are of one mind that competition is a good thing in most industries, those that are thought of as supplying "the general public." Monopoly is believed by the public to be wrong in such cases, and competition to be the normal and right condition of trade. Yet there are some men interested in "large business" who look upon competition as bad, and upon monopoly as having essentially the nature of friendly cooeperation. The roots of these opinions, or prejudices, are easily discoverable in the theoretical study of the nature of monopoly.[1] Yet often different men or groups of men feel so strongly on this matter, viewing it from their own standpoints, that they are quite unable to understand how any one else can feel otherwise. There is thus a great deal of controversy to no purpose.

Sec. 2. Public character of private trade. Any such general judgment as that of the public, tho it may be mistaken in some details, is likely to be a resultant of broad experience. There is in competitive trade a public, a social character, which monopoly destroys. Even in a simple auction, when the bidding is really competitive, price depends far less on shrewd bargaining, on bluff, or on stubbornness, than is the case in isolated trade. Each bidder is compelled by self-interest to outbid his less eager competitors, and thus the limits within which the price must fall are narrowly fixed. The auction-sale is less a purely personal matter, takes on a more public aspect, has a more socialized character than isolated trade, depends more on forces outside the control of any one man, and results in a price fixed with greater definiteness. The price in a more developed market results from the play of impersonal forces, or at least from the play of personal forces which have come under the rules of the market.[2] This price men are ready to accept as fair. It has a democratic character, whereas the gains of monopoly price arouse resentment as being the work of personal, and felt to be despotic, power. Monopoly price is a bad price to the one who pays it, not only because it is a high price but because it bears the character of personal extortion.

The medieval notion of justum pretium, the just price, may have been often misapplied, and it was often criticized and ridiculed by economists in the period of idealized competition (from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill). But at the heart of the notion was the judgment that general uniform prices fixed in the open market are the proper norms for prices when one of the traders is caught at an exceptional disadvantage. The modern world has been compelled to reexamine the conception of the just price.

Sec. 3. Evil economic effects of monopolistic price. Theoretical analysis confirms this view. Any exercise of monopolistic power over price keeps some, the weaker bidders, from getting any of the desired goods, or limits them to their most urgently desired units. What may be called "the theoretically correct price"[3] with two-sided competition is the one that permits the maximum number of trades with a margin of gain to each trader. In narrowing the possibility of substitution of goods by trade, the sum of values of goods for most men is diminished. All citizens thus that are the victims of an artificially created scarcity look upon monopoly as "bad," just as they do upon the evils of nature—drought, locusts, fires, and pestilence. A monopoly has an indirect and more distant effect upon the spirit of all those trading with it. If they are producers selling at prices depressed by monopoly, their money incomes are reduced; if they are consumers buying at monopoly prices, their real-incomes are reduced; in either case their psychic incomes, the motives of all industry, are diminished, and their industrial energies are relaxed.

Sec. 4. Common law on restraint of trade. The first recorded case in English law, wherein the courts sought to prevent the limiting of competition by agreement, runs back to the year 1415, in the reign of Henry V. This was a very simple case of a contract in restraint of trade, whereby a dyer agreed not to practise his craft within the town for half a year. The court declared the contract illegal (and hence unenforceable in a court) and administered a severe reproof to the craftsman who made it. Thus was set forth the doctrine of the moral and legal obligation of each economic agent to compete fully, freely, and without restraint upon his action, even restraint imposed upon himself by a contract voluntarily entered into for his own advantage.

Not until the eighteenth century was this rigid doctrine somewhat relaxed so as to permit the sale of the "good will" of a business under limited conditions, and some "reasonable" contracts in restraint of trade. Later the emphasis was somewhat further shifted, by judicial interpretations, from the notion of free competition to that of "fair" competition, so as to permit contracts involving moderate restraint of trade, if the essential element of competition was retained. Thus it was said that a piano manufacturer might by contract grant an exclusive agency to a dealer in a certain territory, there being many other competing makes of pianos, and such a contract "does not operate to suppress competition nor to regulate the production or sale of any commodity."[4] But with such moderate limitations the courts in cases under the common law have steadily disapproved contracts in restraint of trade that would appear to be to the disadvantage of third parties, whether producers or consumers.

Sec. 5. Growing disapproval of combination. The attitude of the courts became in one respect stricter. Some earlier cases involved the doctrine that what is lawful for an individual to do alone is lawful if done in combination with others. Indeed, a comparatively recent case[5] declared regarding a group of dealers, agreeing not to deal with another, that "desire to free themselves from competition was a sufficient excuse" for such action. But the general trend has been to the doctrine that a combination of men "has hurtful powers and influences not possessed by the individual." Hence threats of associations of traders (retailers or wholesalers) not to deal with another if he continued to deal with some third party have been declared acts in restraint of trade.[6] Yet in the case cited the court seemed to have been more concerned with protecting "the individual against encroachment upon his rights by a greater power," "one of the most sacred duties of the courts," than with rights and interests of the general public, endangered by such restraint of trade.

Sec. 6. Competition sometimes favored regardless of results. In another respect the courts have wavered in their attitude toward competition, the general doctrine being that competition, particularly the cutting of prices, is absolutely justifiable, regardless of circumstances. In the leading English case[7] the facts were that the larger steamship companies sent to Hankow additional ships, now called, figuratively, "fighting ships," to "smash" freights in order to ruin tramp steamship owners and drive them out of the field. The court held that this constituted no legal wrong to the tramp steamship owners, and scouted the idea of the court's looking at the motives in price cutting, or taking into consideration in any way what the court called "some imaginary normal standard of freights and prices." And of this case the lawyer is forced to say: "Undoubtedly the excellent opinion just quoted represents the law everywhere," even tho there are other cases difficult to harmonize with it.[8]

To the economist, not bound in like manner by legal precedent, such a verdict was from the first impossible. The court appears to have considered that only the rights of the private litigants, the tramp steamship owners, were involved, not the rights and interests of the shipping public; it considered the immediate and not the ultimate effects of the "smashing" of rates; it allowed itself to be deceived by the appearance of acts that in outer form were competition, but that had as their purpose the strengthening and maintenance of monopoly. These acts are forms of the "unfair" practices that will be mentioned later.[9]

Sec. 7. Increasing regard for results of competition. Despite the binding precedents, the courts in some later decisions have refused to look upon competition as good regardless of its motives and of its consequences. In a federal case[10] the judge, in a brief and acute dictum, recognized the evil of a rate war that would result from threats of definite cuts. They impair "the usefulness of the railroads themselves, and cause great public and private loss." The court's opinion was no doubt largely influenced by the fact that railroad rates were already subject to regulation: "Every precaution has been taken by state legislatures and by the congress to keep them just and reasonable,—just and reasonable for the public and for the carriers."

In a state case[11] the facts were that a man of wealth started a barber shop and employed a barber to injure the plaintiff and drive him out of business. The court recognized that while, as a general proposition, "competition in trade and business is desirable," it may in certain cases result in "grievous and manifold wrongs to individuals"; and in this case the "malevolent" man of wealth was declared to be "guilty of a wanton wrong and an actionable tort." The economists can but pronounce this judgment admirable so far as it goes, but it is remarkably confined to a consideration of the private legal rights of the injured competitor, and gives hardly a hint of a higher criterion for judging competitive acts, that of the general welfare.

Sec. 8. Common law remedy for monopoly ineffective. The common law contained prohibitions enough, both broad and specific, against contracts and acts in restraint of trade. The common law contained likewise a closely related body of doctrine by which the railroads, as common carriers, ought to have given equitable and undiscriminating rates to all shippers. There was a strong body of influential opinion that long maintained that the case was sufficiently covered, that the only thing needed was to enforce the common law. Even now, after all that has elapsed, there are some in railroad and business circles who still appear to hold that opinion. But the evils of railroad discrimination and of other monopolistic practices continued, and for some cause the common law was not enforced, excepting occasionally, disconnectedly, and without important results.

Why? The answer may be ventured that in the common law the whole question of restraint of trade was treated primarily as one of private rights and only incidentally as one involving general public policy. Cases came before the courts only on complaint of some individual that felt injured. Now the injury of higher prices due to contracts in restraint of trade is usually diffused among many customers, and the loss of any one is less than the expense of bringing suit. Consequently, it rarely happened that cases were brought before the courts except by one of the two equally guilty parties to a contract in restraint of trade, when the other party had failed in some way to do his part. When such an illegal contract in restraint of trade was proved before a court by a defendant in a civil suit the contract was declared unenforceable, and the only penalty in practice was that the plaintiff could not collect his debt or secure performance from the defendant.[12] A very similar situation existed in the case of the individual's grievances against railroad charges and services.

Sec. 9. Federal legislation against monopoly. The passage of the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887[13] prohibiting discrimination and railway pooling, and that of the Act of 1890 "to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," popularly known as the "Sherman Anti-trust Law," were part of one public movement to remedy monopoly. From one point of view it seems true, as has often been said, that in essence these statutes were simply enactments of long established principles of the common law. Section 1 of the Sherman law declared illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations." Section 2 made it a misdemeanor "to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize."

But from another point of view, these new laws showed a marked change both in the conception of the interests involved and in the means of preventing the evils. The evil was at last conceived of as a general public evil; the laws are not merely to protect individuals,[14] but "to regulate commerce," "to protect trade and commerce." More important still, it was made the duty of public officers (district-attorneys of the United States) to institute proceedings in equity "to prevent and restrain" violation of the Sherman Act, and a special Commission was instituted to deal with railroad cases. It was this undertaking of the initiative by the government, the treatment of the problem as one of the general welfare, that marked a new epoch in this field. The methods and agencies provided might be at first inadequate and ineffective, but time and experience could remedy those defects.

Sec. 10. Policy of the Sherman anti-trust law. But in important respects opinion and policies were not yet clear and consistent. They wavered from one to another conception of the method for dealing with the problem. It was clear only that laissez-faire had been laid aside. There are three other possible policies reflecting as many different conceptions of the problem of monopoly: (1) monopoly-prosecuted, (2) monopoly-accepted-and-regulated, (3) competition-maintained-and-regulated. The policy of monopoly-prosecuted is merely negative. This is the policy of the Sherman law. It opposed no positive action to the making of monopolistic contracts and to the formation of combinations, but declared them to be illegal and provided for their prosecution and punishment after the mischief had been done. The great epoch of the formation of combinations[15] followed the enactment of this law. True, lack of experience by the department of justice, and lack of vigorous effort to enforce the law, and the slow action of the courts were largely to blame for this result. The law has proved to be more effective to prevent new combinations since it has been successfully enforced in a few notable cases. But once large combinations have been formed and complex individual financial interests have become involved, the courts have proved to be incapable of undoing the deeds. In practice the most sweeping remedy attempted under the law has been the dissolution of enormous combinations formed years after the law went into effect. This has been called the job of unscrambling the eggs. The most notable cases were those of the Standard Oil Company and of the Tobacco Company, decided in 1911, the results being absurdly futile.

Sec. 11. Policy of monopoly-accepted-and-regulated. A second policy may be called that of monopoly-accepted-and-regulated. This is represented by the Interstate Commerce Act (at first weakly, and more vigorously after its amendment), and by the great mass of state legislation putting the local and interurban public utilities under the control of regulative commissions. For some decades after these industries developed, the public faith was in competition as the effective regulator. If monopolistic prices were too high, another company was chartered to build a parallel railroad or another horse-car line on the next street, or to lay down another set of gas pipes in the same block. Almost from the first some students of the subject saw the wastefulness and futility of this kind of competition, and nearly a half century later the public reluctantly came to this view. Still, sad to relate, the same history had to be repeated in regard to the telegraph and telephone industry, and in some quarters the ultimate outcome is not yet recognized. The Interstate Commerce Act itself, with odd inconsistency, contains an anti-pooling provision (section 5) the purpose of which seems to have been to compel competition as to rates which is now practically impossible under the other provisions of the law. The policy of "monopoly-accepted" was seen to involve as a necessary feature, public regulation of rates, to the point, if necessary, of absolutely fixing them. The principle has come to be accepted that wherever competition ends there public regulation of prices and service begins. Monopolistic enterprises are ipso facto quasi-public institutions.

Sec. 12. Field of its application. This policy, gradually extending in practice, came to be applied to the class of industries which, for lack of a better name, are called local utilities. The one characteristic that they all have in common is that the service, or product, which is sold requires for its delivery an expensive, permanent, physical plant, and some special use of public highways. Thus gas pipes, water pipes, poles and wires for telegraph, telephones and electric light, street railways, regular steam railroads and some other minor industries all answer to this test.[16]

Beginning about the year 1900 one state after another enlarged the powers of its state railroad commission or created a new corporation commission to regulate these "local" or "public utilities."[17] They have accomplished much, but the development of this kind of regulation has not proceeded in many cases beyond the adjustment of relative rates and the abolition of discrimination among the different individuals and classes of customers. Experience has shown the great difficulty of determining what is a fair absolute level of charges. A new science of accounting has been developing to assist in the solution of a problem, the complexity of which transcends the agencies at hand to deal with it. With this policy applied to the local utility (and railroad) phase of monopoly, there remains still the problem of the industrial trusts in the manufacturing enterprises.

Sec. 13. The industrial trust,—a natural evolution? The policy that one is inclined to favor regarding industrial trusts depends very much on one's answer to the question: Are or are not industrial trusts natural growths? In this bare form the question is somewhat vague, but the thought of those who answer it in the affirmative is positive if not always entirely clear. They (at least the extreme representatives of this view) declare that trusts have been, are, and will continue to be, the results of a "natural evolution" of business conditions, as inevitable as the great changes in the physical world. If this is so man and society must recognize the facts, must waste no efforts vainly in fighting against fate, but should accept the trusts and realize their possibilities for good. And these are declared to be great, for it is assumed that without the trusts all of the economies of large production must be sacrificed. Irresistible economic forces, it is said, are creating larger and larger units of business; friendly cooeperation and unified action must take the place of competition in business.

The outcome must be monopoly in every important line of manufacturing industry and perhaps of commerce. In view of public opinion toward monopoly, its acceptance necessitates its regulation. This argument is supported by appeal to the experience in the field of railroads and other local utilities, where public opinion has, after long hesitation, recognized competition to be impracticable and the acceptance of monopoly as inevitable. As extremes often meet, the view of the industrial trust as a natural evolution is most favored on the one hand by men of "big business," already interested financially in trusts, and on the other hand by the most radical communists (or socialists) whose ideal is the complete monopolization of industry under the government.

Sec. 14. Artificial versus natural growth. Opposed to this view is a deep and widespread popular opinion or prejudice, against the trust and in favor of competition. General opinion in this case (as not always) finds much support in special economic studies of the methods by which the existing industrial trusts came into being. First the question properly is raised; just what is meant by "natural"? In a sense everything has been the natural outcome of evolution,—the steam engine, the submarine, the boycott, militarism. In an equally good, if not better sense, every mechanical invention and every method of industrial organization is artificial, has been the result of man's choice and effort. In any case men may choose as good or reject as unsuitable or bad, any particular mechanical device, and society may decide to adopt any particular policy toward a certain form of business organization and certain business practices (unless, indeed, our philosophy be that of automatism, crude determination or fatalism, regarding all human affairs).

Now when one examines the methods which the notable trusts actually did employ, and apparently had to employ, even when they were already powerful single enterprises, in order to destroy their competitors and to attain their monopolistic power, the word "natural" seems hardly to describe the process. The evidence is not a matter of hearsay but is embodied in a long line of judicial decisions, and in numerous special inquiries by governmental commissions and officials.[18]

Sec. 15. Kinds of unfair practices. This evidence is a startling array of "unfair practices" and "unfair" forms of competition, which, however novel in appearance, are essentially of the kind that has been illegal under the common law for the past five hundred years. Many of these practices were baldly dishonest, many of them were contemptibly mean. The manifold varieties of unfair competition may be roughly grouped under three headings according as they are connected with (1) Illegal favors received from public or quasi-public officials; (2) Discrimination against, or control of, customers; (3) Foul tactics against competitors.

(1) Among the practices in the first group are discriminatory rates and rebates from railroads, favoritism in matters of taxation, undue influence in legislatures, special manipulation of tariff rates through powerful lobbies, or paid agents, undue influence in the courts through the employment of lawyers of the highest talent, who often later became judges.

(2) Among the unfair practices toward customers are discriminations among them by the various forms of price cutting, grants of credit, and kinds of service. The liberty of retail dealers is limited in a variety of ways, such as fixing resale prices, requirement of exclusive dealing, and full-line forcing.

(3) All the methods just mentioned as employed in dealings with customers are likewise unfair toward competitors. Many other methods are used to the same end, such as: enticing away their employees, or corrupting and bribing them to act as spies, paying secret commissions, false advertising, misrepresenting competitors, imitating their patterns in goods of defective workmanship, shutting off their credit or their supplies of materials, acquiring stock in competing companies, malicious suits, infringement of patents, intimidation by threats of business injury or of scandalous exposures, operation of bogus independent companies.

Sec. 16. Growing conception of fair competition. Any industrial trust that was able to gain domination and monopoly power only by the use of such practices, or any part of them, can hardly be deemed the result of a "natural evolution." If "artificial" means the use of artifices surely this development deserves the adjective. Yet even if not natural, this development may be thought to be "inevitable," human nature being as it is. But the bald fact is that while the great trust movement was in progress no effort worthy of the name was being made to enforce even the then existing laws and to oppose this artificial development. The same allegation of inevitableness was once commonly made of discriminatory railroad rates and rebates, evils which have been in large part remedied only since the period 1903-1906, when at last intelligent action was taken.

To those that came to see the problem in this light, acceptance of industrial monopoly with its complex task of fixing by public commission the prices on innumerable kinds and qualities of goods seemed at least premature. Rather, the first step toward a solution seemed to be the vigorous prevention of unfair practices, and the next step a positive regularizing of "fair competition."[19] The fundamental idea in this is the enforcement of a common market price (plus freights) at any one time to all the customers of an enterprise. By this plan potential competition would become actual, and small enterprises that were efficient might compete successfully within their own fields with large enterprises that maintained prices above a true competitive level. Even general lowering of prices by a large enterprise with evident purpose of killing off smaller competitors is unfair competition under this conception. It was for years recognized that the realization of this policy required legislation regarding uniform prices and the creation of a commission for the administration of the law.

Sec. 17. The trust issues in 1912. The campaign of 1912 presented in an interesting manner the three policies above outlined. The Republican party led by President Taft stood for the policy of monopoly-prosecuted; its program was the vigorous enforcement of the Sherman law. The Progressive party, led by Mr. Roosevelt, stood in the main for the policy of "monopoly-accepted-and-regulated"; its program called for minimizing prosecution and for developing a system of regulation of trust-prices. The Democratic party, led by Mr. Wilson, stood for the policy of competition-maintained-and-regulated, and the problem was to find means to strengthen and regularize the forces of competition.

In practice these programs doubtless would be less divergent than they appear. All alike proposed the retention of the Sherman law. The two proposals to go further were presented as mutually exclusive alternatives, whereas they necessarily must supplement each other in some degree. The Progressives did not expect all industries to become monopolies, and the Democrats tacitly conceded to monopoly-accepted the large field of transportation and local utilities it already had occupied. But there was a real difference in the angle of approach and a real difference in emphasis. The Democratic program (the somewhat unclearly) showed greater distrust of monopoly and greater faith in the possibilities of creating fair conditions of competition (which never had fully prevailed) in which efficiency would be able to prove its merits and monopoly would work its own undoing. It was the more logical for the country to give this policy at least a trial before adopting irrevocably the policy of general industrial monopoly. In either case competition actual or potential is the fundamental principle by which prices have to be regulated. Where competition is enforced it is by applying some general rules that create a general market price instead of discriminatory prices, but the fixing of the price is left to the competitors. Where monopoly is accepted prices must be fixed with reference to an estimated competitive standard, that which under hypothetically free conditions would just suffice to attract and retain private enterprise and capital.

Sec. 18. Anti-trust legislation of 1914. The anti-trust legislation of 1914, passed by the Democratic party to carry out its program, is embodied in two acts: the Clayton Act, laying down new rules; and the Federal Trade Commission Act, mainly to provide an agency with administrative and quasi-judicial functions to deal with unfair practices. This displaced the Bureau of Corporations, established in 1903. The Clayton Act forbids discrimination where the effect may be to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly. Due allowance may be made for difference in the cost of selling or transportation, but a difference is not required in such cases. It forbids contracts to prevent dealers from handling other brands. It forbids corporate ownership of stock in a competing corporation, forbids interlocking directorates in large banks and in other competing corporations, with capital, surplus and undivided profits aggregating more than $1,000,000. The Trade Commission Act in addition to its administrative provisions for investigation, reports, and readjustment of the business of companies upon request of the courts, declares that "unfair methods of competition in commerce" are unlawful, and both empowers and directs the Commission to prevent their use (banks and common carriers subject to other acts being excepted).

These acts are too new to have been given a fair test. They have, however, given evidence of exercising at once an influence upon the situation. They are imperfect in some details that will require amendment; but they mark the beginning of a new policy toward industrial monopoly, the results of which will be watched with the deepest interest.

[Footnote 1: See Vol. I, especially pp. 74 and 75.]

[Footnote 2: See Vol. I, pp 59, 68, 70-71]

[Footnote 3: See Vol. I, pp. 66, 67.]

[Footnote 4: 77 Miss., 476. Cited by Bruce Wyman, "Control of the Market," p. 137.]

[Footnote 5: 19 R.I., 255.]

[Footnote 6: 115 Ga., 429.]

[Footnote 7: Mogul Steamship Company v. McGregor (L.R. 23 Q.B.D. 598).]

[Footnote 8: Bruce Wyman, "Control of the Market," p. 22. In 1914 (216 Fed. 971), a federal court granted an injunction restraining the use of fighting ships by a combination, and in 1915 (220 Fed 235), the court indicated a willingness to grant a similar injunction if necessary. Similarly "fighting brands" of goods have been recently prohibited.]

[Footnote 9: See below, sec. 15.]

[Footnote 10: Averrill v. Southern Railway (75 Fed. Rep. 736).]

[Footnote 11: 107 Minn. 145.]

[Footnote 12: Arnott v. Pittston and Elmira Coal Co., 68 N.Y. 558 (1877).]

[Footnote 13: See ch. 27, sec. 16.]

[Footnote 14: At the same time the rights of injured individuals are better safeguarded by sec. 7 of the Sherman law, permitting the recovery of threefold damages and attorney's fees.]

[Footnote 15: See ch. 28, sec. 9.]

[Footnote 16: See further, ch. 30, secs. 5-9.]

[Footnote 17: See ch. 27, sec. 15, on state commissions.]

[Footnote 18: A few among the most important sources are the Report of the Industrial Commission, 1898-1901, 19 volumes; reports of the Bureau of Corporations on the petroleum and tobacco industries; U.S. Supreme Court decisions, e.g., the Addystone Pipe case (175 U.S. 211), given in Ripley, Trusts, Pools, and Corporations, p. 86; the Standard Oil case (221 U.S. 1), and the Tobacco Trust case (221 U.S. 106); and the very comprehensive volume on "Trust Laws and Unfair Competition," by Joseph E. Davies, Commissioner of Corporations, Washington, 1916.]

[Footnote 19: John B. Clark, the distinguished professor of economics in Columbia University, has been the foremost and clearest exponent of this idea, in his "The Control of Trusts," 1901, 2d ed., 1912, and in other works.]



CHAPTER 30

PUBLIC OWNERSHIP

Sec. 1. Waves of opinion as to public ownership. Sec. 2. Primary functions of government favoring public ownership. Sec. 3. Economic influences favoring public ownership. Sec. 4. Forms of municipal ownership. Sec. 5. Localized production favoring monopoly. Sec. 6. Economies of large production favoring monopoly, Sec. 7. Uniformity of products favoring monopoly. Sec. 8. Franchises favoring monopoly. Sec. 9. Various policies toward local public service industries. Sec. 10. State ownership of various kinds. Sec. 11. National ownership. Sec. 12. Economic basis of public ownership.

Sec. 1. Waves of opinion as to public ownership. Opinion and practice in the matter of the public ownership of wealth and the direct management of enterprises has moved in waves. In feudal times, when government was practically identical with the personal ruler, and the private "domains" of the lord or king were the sole source of his public revenues,[1] holdings of this kind were very large. Their public nature came to be more fully recognized, but they did not yield large revenues, and gradually were in large part sold or given away to private owners. This was particularly true in England, and in a less degree on the continent of Europe. The conviction grew that the state, or government, was an inefficient enterpriser, and that the sound public policy was to foster private industry and obtain public revenues by taxation. The ideal was embodied in the laissez-faire philosophy that government should confine itself exclusively to the most essential political functions, leaving the economic functions absolutely alone. It should keep the peace, prevent men from beating and robbing each other, and preserve the personal liberty of the citizen.[2] Thus, it was believed, all of the economic needs would be provided for by competition, in the best way humanly possible, in the quantities and at the rate needed. This policy attained its maximum influence in the first half of the nineteenth century in England, and in America probably just before the Civil War, in the decade of the fifties.

Sec. 2. Primary functions of government favoring public ownership. Some public ownership, however, is necessary for the exercise even of the primary political functions of the state. Civilized government requires the use of numerous material agents. Buildings for legislative and executive offices, custom-houses, post-offices, lighthouses, can be rented of private citizens, as post-offices usually are in small places; but it is obviously economical and convenient in large cities for the government to own the public buildings. Government can reduce to a minimum its direct employment of officials by "farming out" the taxes, as all countries once did to some extent, and as France continued to do up to the French Revolution. It is now the general policy for government to own or control its essential agencies, but this does not involve in every case the employment of day-labor direct as in cleaning the streets or collecting garbage. The more simple political functions shade off into the economic. To coinage usually are added the issue of legal-tender notes and certain banking functions: the post carries packages, transmits money, and in most countries now performs the function of a savings-bank for small amounts. The social and industrial functions undertaken by public agencies have steadily increased since the middle of the nineteenth century, and the sphere of the state has been enlarging.[3] The question ever open is as to the proper limits to this development.

Sec. 3. Economic influences favoring public ownership. In some cases private ownership is difficult because of the excessive cost of collecting for the service. The cost of maintaining toll houses on a turnpike sometimes exceeds the amount collected. Collection in other cases, as for the service of lighthouses to passing ships, is impossible. Public industry may secure, through the economy of large production, a cheaper and more efficient service, the benefits and costs being diffused throughout the community. The benefits of the work of experiment-stations for agriculture are felt immediately by the farmers, but are diffused to all citizens. A manufacturer able to keep his method secret, or to retain his advantages for a time, can afford to undertake experiments in his factory, but the farmer seldom can. The public ownership of parks for the use of all gives a maximum of economy in the production of the most essential goods,—fresh air, sunshine, natural beauty, and playgrounds in the midst of crowded populations. Municipal ownership of waterworks is an extension of the same idea. Not only because large amounts of water are used by the public, but because cheap, pure, abundant water is an essential condition to good citizenship, speculation should in every possible way be eliminated from this industry.

The assumption is made in the laissez-faire doctrine that the interest of the public harmonizes with that of the individual. But this proves often not to be the case. For example, the forest has an immediate value to its owners and to the consumers of lumber, and it has also a diffused utility in its influence on industry, on climate, on navigation, on water-power and on floods. Yet, as the private owner, unless a great land monopolist, does not control enough of the forest to appreciably affect any of these things, and could rarely sell them even if he could affect them, he will cut down the tree whenever he can gain by doing so. In this situation either governmental control or governmental ownership of forests is essential.

Each kind of political unit, or subdivision of government, develops characteristic kinds of public ownership and industry. Federal states consist of three main groups of political units: national, provincial, and local. Provincial units are the largest subdivisions, as the American "states," or commonwealths, the German states, and the provinces in other countries. The term local political unit is more complex and may mean county, township, village, city, or school or sanitary district; but most of what is to be said of local ownership refers to cities or to incorporated villages.

Sec. 4. Forms of municipal ownership. Local political units acquire ownership only in local industries and in wealth used locally by the citizens. Nearly all parks and recreation grounds are owned by cities. As population has become more dense, private yards of any extent have become impossible, in cities, for all but the wealthy. Public ownership of parks insures a "breathing place" and recreation grounds to the common man in the most economical way. Of late the movement for large and small public parks and playgrounds has gone on rapidly in American cities. Related to parks are public baths, public libraries, art collections, museums, zoological gardens, etc. Some have seen danger in this policy, but the public sees no such danger so long as the things supplied gratify the higher tastes—as art, music, literature, and social recreation. These give no encouragement to the increase of improvident families and to the breaking down of independent character. The means of local communication—streets, roads, bridges—were once owned largely by private citizens. Here and there still are found toll roads and toll bridges built under charters granted a century ago, but tolls on public thoroughfares are for the most part abolished. A public market, where the producer from the farm and the city consumer can meet, is an old institution. About two thirds of the cities of 30,000 population or more have public markets or scales, and fully one third have public markets of importance. New York City has six large retail and wholesale markets, for selling meat and farm produce, in which rents or fees are charged, and several open markets. There has recently been a large movement in this direction.

The providing of apparatus for extinguishing fires is always a public duty; the conveyance of waste water is increasingly a public function. The supply of pure water for domestic and business uses, for fire protection and for street cleaning, while often a private enterprise in villages, and sometimes in large cities, is increasingly undertaken by public agencies. Most of the largest cities now own their own water supply systems. Public ownership of gas and electric lighting is less common, as the utility supplied is not so essential and the industry is somewhat less subject to monopoly; but the difference is one of degree only. Street railroads are often under public ownership in Europe; but there have thus far been few cases of the kind in the United States and Canada.[4]

Sec. 5. Localized production favoring monopoly. A number of these enterprises have characteristics in common which appear to make inevitable their drift into monopolistic control. Waterworks, gas, electric lighting, street railways, telephone systems, are among these. However fierce may be the competition for a time, sooner or later either one company drives out the other or buys it up, or both come to an agreement by which the public is made to pay higher prices.

A feature favoring the growth of monopoly when such industries are left to private enterprise is the need to produce and supply the commodity or service at a given locality. While two street railways can compete on neighboring streets, it is physically impossible for two or more to compete on the same street. Two systems of water-mains or gas-mains can be put down, as sometimes is done, but this is not only a great economic waste, but the tearing up of the streets is an intolerable public nuisance. This difficulty is less marked in the case of telephones and electric lighting, and some persons still cling to faith in competition to regulate the rates in those industries; but faith in competition between water companies and between gas companies has been given up by nearly all persons now, as it was long since by students of the subject.

Sec. 6. Economies of large production favoring monopoly. A second feature favoring monopoly in such industries is the marked advantage of large production in them. These industries are usually spoken of as "industries of increasing returns." This advantage is enjoyed in some degree by every enterprise, but it is gradually neutralized and limited. The need to extend an expensive physical plant to every point where customers are to be served, and the very much smaller cost per unit of delivering large amounts of water, gas, electricity, and transportation, on the same street, offers a greater inducement for one competitor to crowd out or buy out the other at a more than liberal price. Even then, larger net dividends and correspondingly larger capitalization are secured than were before possible to both companies combined.

Sec. 7. Uniformity of products favoring monopoly. A third feature favoring monopoly is uniformity in the quality of the furnished. It is a general truth that competition is most persistent where there is the greatest range of choice open to the customer, and consequently the most individual treatment required of the enterpriser. An artist, even a storekeeper, attracts about him a body of patrons who like his product (for the merchant's manner and method of dealing are a part of the quality of his goods), and who cannot be tempted away by slight differences in price. Rival companies in the stage of competition are seen to claim superiority for their particular goods and to improve their service in every way possible. A new telephone company, entering where a monopoly has held the field, works at once a wonderful betterment in rates, courtesy, and service. But as the product of all competitors attains the highest technical standard possible at the time, the rivalry is reduced to one of price, and it is usually a "fight to the finish."

Sec. 8. Franchises favoring monopoly. A fourth feature favoring monopoly in these enterprises is the necessity of making permanent and exceptional use of the public streets and alleys. If this right were granted by a general law to every citizen, this feature would be sufficiently implied in the foregoing discussion. As it would be intolerable to allow private interests to use public property in whatever way they wished, the legislative body makes special grants in such cases in view of the circumstances. Not only is the legislature (or council, or county board of commissioners, etc.) led by the economic difficulties to withhold a charter from a second company, but it may be corruptly influenced by the company already established. The knowledge of the opposition to be encountered in getting a franchise must keep competitors out, even tho monopoly prices are maintained.

In view of these several features, which are so closely related that they form a common character, more or less fully shared by various industries, and especially in view of the necessity for the formal granting to them of peculiar privileges in the form of a public franchise, the public, in order to protect the general interest, is forced to undertake an exceptional control of these industries.

Sec. 9. Various policies toward local public service industries. Several courses are open to the public, acting in its political capacity, to retain those monopolistic advantages for the general welfare. (a) It may do nothing, trusting vainly to competition to regulate the rate, or consciously leaving the result to be worked out by the monopoly principle; this is what in most cases has been done in the past in America. (b) It may attempt, in granting the franchise, to fix near cost the charge for the service or product, so that the franchise will be worth little as private property. (c) It may leave the rate to be fixed by the monopoly principle, but charge for the franchise so much that the value of the monopoly is appropriated into the public treasury. (d) It may have public officials carry on the business, either selling the product at cost or making monopoly profits that go into the public treasury. Various combinations of these plans are followed in practice, the most common plan being the fixing of maximum rates which, with improved methods, generally become ineffective. It is difficult to fix a uniform rate that is equitable, because conditions change, and, further, because a uniform rate must be applied to all parts of the town, altho the cost of service varies greatly. It is difficult because of the limited number of competent bidders, to sell the franchise for what it is worth. There remains the policy of public ownership to secure the profits of monopoly to the public, either directly or in a diffused manner. There is no doubt that the general trend of municipal policy everywhere is toward public ownership of this type of local public service industries.

Sec. 10. State ownership of various kinds. The movement toward public ownership by the American states has been much less marked than that by the municipalities. The commonwealths have retired from some fields where once they were engaged in industry. Students of American history know that between the years 1830 and 1840 some states engaged largely, even wildly, in canal building, railroad construction, banking and in other enterprises. The undertaking of these industries was determined often by political and by selfish local interests, and their operation often was wasteful. A few enterprises succeeded, the most notable of these being the Erie Canal in New York. The unsuccessful ones remained worthless property in the hands of the state or were sold to private companies, as in the case of the Pennsylvania Railroad. This reckless state enterprise was a bitter lesson in public ownership, and continued for three quarters of a century to have such an effect on public opinion, that few proposals for public ownership could have a fair hearing in America, But railroads and canals are publicly owned, and more or less successfully operated, by many foreign states, as in Prussia and other German states, in Switzerland, and in the new states of Australia, and this policy is rapidly extending to other countries and to varied industries.

There has been recently a greatly increased interest in forestry shown by the American states. This is especially likely to be a state enterprise wherever the forest tracts are entirely within the limits of the state, as is the case in New York and Pennsylvania which have been foremost in this work. At present at least 32 states have forestry departments. Most of the forests in Germany are either communal or state-owned. The schools, a great industry for turning out a product of public utility, are largely conducted by the American states and by local units rather than by the nation or by private enterprise. The state encourages researches in the arts and sciences, and gives technical training. A variety of minor enterprises have been undertaken by states to supply salt, phosphate, banking facilities, even some manufactures. One after another the states are adopting the "state use" system of labor in the prisons and public institutions, engaging in agriculture and manufacturing on a large scale, and using the products, amounting to millions of dollars annually, almost entirely for public purposes.

Sec. 11. National ownership. The national governments everywhere appear to be enlarging the field of their ownership. This policy has its roots far in the past. Some industries grow out of the political needs of government. Established as a means of communication with military outposts, the post became a convenient means of communication for merchants and other citizens and grew into a great economic institution. In most countries the telegraph is publicly owned and has been annexed to the post, to which it is very closely related in purpose. National ownership of railroads is the rule, and our policy of private ownership the great exception in the world to-day. Many persons, even some in railroad circles, believe that national ownership of railroads is sure to develop out of our present policy of regulation.

The national improvements connected with rivers and harbors were first political—that is, they were for the use of the government's navy; they became, secondly, commercial—for the free use of all citizens engaged in trade; and they continue to unite these two characters. Forestry is most largely undertaken in this country by the national government, partly because some forest areas in the West extend over state boundaries, and largely because large tracts of public forest lands were still unsold at the time public attention was attracted to the subject. Since 1890, the policy of reserving great areas for forests, and picturesque districts for national parks, has developed greatly in the United States. The national forest area contained in the various forests in 20 states (not including Alaska and Porto Rico), now covers about 225,000 square miles, equal in area to five states of the size of Pennsylvania. There are, besides, fourteen large national parks, ranging in size from a few hundred acres up to over 2,140,000 acres (the area of the Yellowstone National Park), and aggregating 4,600,000 acres, nearly the size of Massachusetts or of New Jersey, besides numerous other national reservations for monuments and antiquities.

In some countries mines are thought to be peculiarly fitted for national ownership and control. In the German Empire the several states own coal, salt, and other mines. Coinage and banking are everywhere looked upon as functions of sovereignty, and yet it is no more necessary for a nation to own its own mint in order to control the monetary system than for it to print the banknotes in order to regulate their issue. The American government has its own printing office. The fish commission, and the various branches of the department, cooeperate with private industry in many ways. This brief survey suggests that the industries undertaken by government are both varied in nature and large in extent, altho small in proportion to the mass of private industry.

Sec. 12. Economic basis of public ownership. The question as to the proper limits of public ownership is one most actively debated. The movement is progressing in accordance with the principle that public ownership is economically justified wherever it secures a product or service of widespread use that would otherwise be impossible, or insures the public a better quality or a lower price. The question of public ownership is not exclusively an economic question. There are incidental problems, such as its effects on enterprise and on political integrity, with which it is not possible here to deal. In the main, however, public ownership is simply a business policy which must be justified by its economic results. In the case of a general social benefit not to be secured without public ownership (as popular education or the climatic effect of forests), the only question to answer is whether the utility is worth the cost. In the case of industries already in private hands, as waterworks, gas and electric lighting, there is needed, to make a wise decision possible, a knowledge of the effect a change to public ownership will have upon cost and service. If public officials can furnish some goods cheaper than they are furnished by private enterprise, it is because of the wide margin of monopoly profit, not because there is any magic in public ownership. The same general items of cost must be met. The first cost of the plant and the annual interest payments are much the same. Experience shows that, because of political influence and of public opinion, wages are likely to be higher under public ownership, but salaries for management lower. Public collection of dues along with taxes is an advantage not enjoyed by private companies. Several public officials sometimes share the same office and thus reduce expenses. In small towns the public electric lighting and waterworks have been operated more economically under one roof. Some items of cost may be less under public management, but on the whole, public industry probably has no advantage in these respects. Public industry does not have to meet the costs of lobbying and blackmail which are often forced upon private companies. But the greatest source of saving in public ownership is the value of monopoly privileges that, under private management, go into private pockets.

The temptation of political corruption may be more insistent when a large force of men is constantly employed, and when large supplies are constantly purchased, by public officials, but the temptation is not so strong or so centralized as it is in the granting of franchises to wealthy corporations. Public industry is weakened by the absence of certain motives to excellence that are present in private business. The income of public officials not being dependent on the economy of management, the spur and motives of competitive industry are lacking. No social discovery has made individual honesty and civic virtue useless to good government.

The decision in any specific case is one dependent on local conditions, and the exact limits of public ownership are not fixed. Industry is changing so rapidly that new adjustments are made every year. The main outlines of public ownership, however, are now in large part determined. Some industries do well, others ill, under public management, and between these lie many debatable cases. Waterworks and probably electric lighting, because of the comparative simplicity of their operation, are more suitable for public ownership than are gas works. No absolute line divides the one group from the other. But whatever the changes, the fact can not be ignored that the increase of public ownership is altering in manifold ways the organization of industry, and is reacting upon the production of wealth, and the distribution of incomes.

[Footnote 1: See above, ch. 16, sec. 5.]

[Footnote 2: See above, ch. 16, sec. 2, on the police function.]

[Footnote 3: See ch. 16, secs. 3 and 4.]

[Footnote 4: See above, ch. 16, sec. 5, statistics of receipts from public service enterprises.]



CHAPTER 31

SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM

Sec. 1. The distribution of incomes. Sec. 2. Distribution by force and by status. Sec. 3. Social effects of the right to transmit property. Sec. 4. Effects of the right to inherit property. Sec. 5. Broader social effects of inheritance. Sec. 6. Limitations upon intestate inheritance. Sec. 7. Some merits of competition. Sec. 8. Wide acceptance of competition. Sec. 9. "Economic harmonies" and discords. Sec. 10. Competition modified by charitable distribution. Sec. 11. Competition modified by authoritative distribution. Sec. 12. Meanings of socialism. Sec. 13. Philosophic socialism. Sec. 14. Socialism in action. Sec. 15. Origin of the radical socialist party. Sec. 16. The two pillars of "scientific" socialism. Sec. 17. Aspects of the materialistic philosophy of history. Sec. 18. Utopian nature of "scientific" socialism. Sec. 19. Its unreal and negative character. Sec. 20. Revisionism and opportunism in the socialist party. Sec. 21. Alluring claims of party-socialism. Sec. 22. Growth and nature of the socialist vote. Sec. 23. Economic legislation and the political parties.

Sec. 1. The distribution of incomes. The great economic progress of the past two centuries has been mainly in lines of technical production. The developing natural sciences and mechanic arts have given men a marvelously increased control over forces and materials. This has multiplied the quantities of goods of most kinds at the disposal of men, collectively considered. All men, with rare exceptions, have been gainers; but the increased production has been very unequally distributed among the members of the community. More and more insistently the plea and the demand have been made for better methods of distribution that will give to the masses of the people a larger share of the goods produced. Production is largely a problem of the technical arts; distribution is a problem of social economy.

Two aspects of distribution may be distinguished: functional distribution is the attribution of value (yields) to wealth and labor considered impersonally, as groups of productive agents; and personal distribution is the actual movement of incomes into the control of persons.[1] Personal incomes, whether monetary, real, or psychic, are the sum of a number of elements. Some parts are due to services performed by the person himself. When one combs his own hair he is performing for himself a service that is a part of his income. Benjamin Franklin said it was better to teach a boy to shave himself than to give him a thousand dollars with which to pay barbers for a life-time. Other parts of income are the uses and fruits of legally controlled wealth; chance finds, as gifts of value or lost and abandoned goods; goods assigned to one by authority; wealth inherited; illegal gains by robbery; goods secured on credit; gifts either of things or of services. The many methods by which incomes are distributed to the persons making up a society may be grouped in the following five general classes: force, status, charity, competition, and authority. These will be discussed in due order.

Sec. 2. Distribution by force and by status. Distribution by force is the most primitive mode of distribution. The stronger takes from the weaker. Forceful distribution still persists in the form of crime, and if we include fraud within the term it still affects an enormous amount of income. The lawless take whatever they can, and the supporters and officers of the law do what they can to check the acts. Slavery is distribution by force, as is the levying of war indemnities from a conquered people.

Distribution may be by status, or set rules and customs. In this case men receive incomes that are independent of their efforts and outside of their control. Distribution by status is guided neither by the personal merit of the recipients nor by the value of their direct services, but the merits and acts of men not living. Feudal society was built on status. Men were born to certain privileges and positions; they inherited property which could neither be bought nor sold; they followed trades which could rarely be entered by any outside of favored families. Caste in India and in other Oriental countries regulates a large part of the life of the people.

This method still prevails to a greater extent in our society than is usually recognized.[2] By public opinion and by prejudice, status is still maintained in respect to the choice of occupations even where the law has formally abolished it, as is seen in modern race problems, in western countries to-day inheritance of property is the main legal form of status and it shades off into other forms of distribution. Private property must find its justification in social expediency.[3] There is no feature of it that is more questioned than is the right of inheritance.

Sec. 3. Social effects of the right to transmit property. The right to transmit property by inheritance or by bequest may be judged with reference to its effects upon the giver, upon the receiver, and upon society at large. It is well to take these three points of view. The right to dispose of property either during life or at death has undoubtedly in many ways a good effect upon the character of men. It stimulates the husband and father to provide for his wife and children, and spurs others to continued economic activity. There is a joy in giving, a joy in the power to bestow one's wealth upon those one loves, or as one pleases. Much of the existing wealth probably never would have been created if men had not had this right. But there is a limit to the working of this motive, and other motives often are more effective. Many a man after gaining a competence continues to work for love of wealth and power in his own lifetime, as the miser continues to toil for love of gold. When men without families die wealthy, when men not having the slightest interest in their nearest relatives labor till their dying days to amass wealth, it is evident that the right to bequeath property has little to do with their efforts. Love of accumulation and love of power in these cases supply the motives. A more limited liberty to dispose of property at death might still suffice, therefore, to call out the greater part of the efforts now made to accumulate property.

Sec. 4. Effects of the right to inherit property. That the effects upon the receiver of the property are good is somewhat more doubtful. It is true that children reared in families of large incomes would be great sufferers if plunged into poverty at the death of their parents. There is much social justification for permitting families to maintain an accustomed standard of comfort. Few would deny that provision by parents to provide education and opportunity for their children is commendable and desirable. But the evil effects of waiting for dead men's shoes are proverbial. Many a boy's greatest curse has been his father's fortune. Many a man of native ability waits idly for fortune to come and lets opportunities for self-help slip by unheeded. The world often exclaims over the failure of the sons of noted men to achieve great things, for, despite confusing evidence, men still have faith in biologic heredity. A too easy fortune saps ambition and relaxes energy; and thus rich men's sons, if not most carefully and wisely trained, are often made paupers in spirit, while the self-made fathers think their boys have better opportunities than they themselves enjoyed. The greater social loss is not the dissipated fortunes, but the ruined characters. Andrew Carnegie said that it would be a good thing if every boy had to start in poverty and make his own way. Cecil Rhodes recorded in his will his contempt for the idle, expectant heir.

Sec. 5. Broader social effects of inheritance. Inheritance has good effects for the community insofar as it helps to secure efficient management of wealth. If the son or relative has been in business with the deceased, there is a reason that he should inherit the property, and his succession to it makes the least disturbance to existing business conditions. This consideration, however, has less weight as the corporate form of organization becomes well nigh universal in "big business." Every profligate son, every incompetent heir, is an argument against the inheritance of property. It is to society's interest that no able-bodied member should stand idle. Every child should have presented to him the motive to use his powers in useful ways. Moreover, many feel that the great fortunes now accumulating through successive generations in the hands of a few families are a danger to our free society, even if these fortunes should continue to be well administered. There is a widespread feeling that the heredity of great wealth is, like the heredity of political power, out of harmony with the democratic spirit. Democracy wishes to see men and individuals put to the test, not profiting forever by the deeds of their forebears. This feeling is shared by those who cannot be charged with radical prejudices. It was startling when a conservative body of lawyers meeting in their state association in Illinois, passed a resolution favoring moderate limits to inherited fortunes. Almost every year sees bills of this purport introduced in the legislatures and in Congress. Probably no one of many current radical proposals is more widely favored than this, among men of otherwise conservative social views. Tho sum most often mentioned as the proper limit is $1,000,000, but in every case it is a sum larger than the fortune of the person speaking.[4]

Sec. 6. Limitations upon intestate inheritance. A proposal less crude and with strong reasons of social expediency in its favor is to limit the right of intestate inheritance to persons that have been in essential economic and social relations with the deceased. The foregoing considerations show that the case for the right of gift in the lifetime of the giver is strongest; that for the right of bequest comes next. The man who has acquired wealth may usually be trusted to decide who bear to him close social or personal relations, and to say whose lives have in a measure furnished the motives of his activity. But the right of intestate inheritance by distant relatives is one that stands on weak social foundations. It is a survival from more patriarchal conditions when, in the large family, or clan, the bond of unity was very strong. A truer test to-day of the proper limits for intestate inheritance is whether the wish to provide for these heirs has furnished the motive for the producing and preserving of the wealth. The claims of those nearest in blood and closest in personal relations are strongest. Family affection and friendship form the strongest of social ties, and it is socially expedient to cultivate them. Motives for abstinence and industry must be strengthened. But the same test shows that the zealous regard of the American law for the rights of distant kinsmen in foreign lands, or in distant quarters of this country, is irrational, and is unjust to the community where the fortune was made. Public opinion tends strongly toward this idea.