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Memoirs of the Private Life, Return, and Reign of Napoleon in 1815, Vol. I
by Pierre Antoine Edouard Fleury de Chaboulon
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[Footnote 93: The Emperor Alexander, in particular, expressed the most generous indignation.]

The column itself was long offensive to the jealous eyes of the enemies of our glory. They conspired its destruction; and would have accomplished it, had they dared. History, which leaves nothing unpunished, will brand, I trust, these unworthy Frenchmen, these new Vandals, with eternal disgrace. It will inscribe their names, and their sacrilegious wishes, on the foot of the immortal column, which they wanted to overturn. No doubt it will also tell, that the federates, the half-pay officers, and all the partisans of Napoleon, whom some have been pleased to represent as madmen, as robbers, respected during the hundred days the statue of Henry IV.; though this statue, placed within reach of their blows, and constructed of frail materials, would have fallen with the slightest shock.

Napoleon had said to the national guard of Paris, "We yet know of none that are enemies:" and these words were true. It had been remarked, that the foreign troops concentrated themselves on our frontiers, but none of their dispositions appeared hostile, and Napoleon might still reasonably hope, that his care to maintain peace would not be fruitless.

On the very day of his entry into Lyons, he had hastened to commission Prince Joseph, to declare to the Austrian and Russian ministers at the Helvetic diet, that he was ready to ratify the treaty of Paris.

When he arrived in the capital, he found that the foreign ministers, particularly Baron de Vincent, the Austrian minister, and M. Boudiakeen, Russian charge d'affaire, had not yet quitted it, for want of passports.

He caused the departure of M. de Vincent and M. de Boudiakeen to be delayed; and directed the Duke of Vicenza to see them, and assure them anew of his pacific disposition.

Baron de Vincent at first refused all kind of communication or conferences; but at length he consented to meet M. de Vicenza at the house of a third person. They had a conference together at Madame de Souza's. M. de Vincent did not conceal the resolution of the allies, to oppose Napoleon's retaining the throne: but he hinted, that in his opinion there might not be the same repugnance to his son. He engaged, however, to make known the sentiments of Napoleon to the Emperor of Austria; and consented to take charge of a letter for the Empress Marie Louise[94].

[Footnote 94: M. de Vincent set out before this letter was written, and it was entrusted to his secretary. The Emperor of Austria ordered it to be delivered into his hands, and contented himself with informing the Empress Marie, that he had received news of her husband, and that he was well.]

M. de Boudiakeen, after having equally refused the conference proposed by the Duke of Vicenza, finished also with accepting it. It was agreed, that they should meet at the house of Mademoiselle Cauchelet, lady of the bedchamber to the Princess Hortense.

M. de Jaucourt had forgotten to take out of the port-folio of foreign affairs a secret treaty, by which England, Austria, and France, had mutually engaged to oppose, peaceably or by force, the dismemberment of Saxony, which Russia and Prussia openly conspired.

The Emperor thought, that this treaty might perhaps alienate these two powers from the Bourbon interest, and generate distrust and discord between the allies. He directed the Duke of Vicenza, to show it to the Russian minister; and represent it to him as a fresh proof of the ingratitude, with which the court of the Tuileries repaid the numerous benefits of Alexander. The existence of this triple alliance was wholly unknown to M. de Boudiakeen, and appeared to cause him as much surprise as dissatisfaction. But he declared, that he was too well acquainted with the principles of his sovereign, to venture to flatter himself, that the circumstance of this treaty, or any other, could produce a favourable change in his disposition. He promised, however, to make a faithful report to him of the conference he had had with M. de Vicenza; and to express to him the desire, manifested by the Emperor Napoleon, of becoming again the ally and friend of Russia.

The Emperor, in order to give more efficacy to his proposals, directed the Princess Hortense, to confirm them in person to the Emperor Alexander. He also caused letters to be written to Prince Eugene, and to the Grand Duchess Stephanie of Baden, to request them, to renew the same assurances to that sovereign, and to neglect no means of detaching him from the coalition.

In fine, the Emperor directed overtures to be made to the cabinet of London, by means of a person pointed out by the Duke of Otranto; and in order to gain the suffrage of the parliament, and give the English ministry a pledge of his good intentions beforehand, he abolished the slave trade by a spontaneous decree.

After having taken these indirect steps, Napoleon thought his duty as well as his dignity required him, to give a solemn and authentic character to the manifestation of his pacific intentions.

Accordingly he wrote to the foreign sovereigns a letter couched in the following terms:

"Sire, my brother,

"You will have heard in the course of last month of my return to the French coast, my entering Paris, and the departure of the Bourbon family. The true nature of these events must now be known to your Majesty: they are the work of an irresistible power, the work and the unanimous will of a great nation, who knows its duties and its rights. The dynasty, which force had bestowed on the French people, was not formed for them: the Bourbons would not accommodate themselves either to their sentiments, or to their manners. France could not but separate itself from them. Her voice called for a deliverer: the expectations, that had induced me, to make the greatest of all sacrifices, had been frustrated. I came, and from the spot where I touched the shore I was conducted by the love of my people to the bosom of my capital. The first wish of my heart is, to repay such great affection by the maintenance of an honourable tranquillity. The re-establishment of the imperial throne being necessary to the happiness of the French, nothing can be more pleasing to my thoughts, than to render it at the same time advantageous to the consolidation of the tranquillity of Europe. Sufficient glory had crowned the standards of the different nations by turns; the vicissitudes of fate have occasioned a sufficient succession of great successes and great defeats: a nobler career now opens itself to sovereigns, and I am the first to enter it. After having exhibited to the world the spectacle of great battles, it will be more pleasing, henceforth to know no rivalry but that of the advantages of peace, no strife but the sacred striving after the happiness of nations. France takes a pleasure in frankly proclaiming this noble end of all her wishes. Jealous of her own independence, the invariable principle of her politics will be the most absolute respect for the independence of other nations. If such be the personal sentiments of your Majesty, as I am happy to persuade myself, the general tranquillity is ensured for a long time to come; and justice, sitting on the confines of states, will be sufficient alone to guard their frontiers.

"Paris, the 4th of April."

The Duke of Vicenza received orders, personally to express to the foreign ministers the sentiments, with which the Emperor was animated: but the couriers, who carried his despatches, could not reach the places of their destination; one was arrested at Kehl, another at Mayence; a third, sent off for Italy, could not get beyond Turin; the communications were interrupted. The arrangements of the declaration of the congress of Vienna of the 13th of March were acted upon already.

This declaration, transmitted directly by the emissaries of the King to the prefects of the frontier cities, and distributed by the royalists, was in circulation at Paris. The inferior papers had announced its appearance, and united in asserting, that such an act was unworthy of the allied sovereigns, and could only be the work of calumny and malevolence.

However, when it became impossible to question its legitimacy, it was necessary to come to the resolution of no longer making a mystery of it to the French people; and accordingly the following account was given of it in the Moniteur on the 13th of April.

"Council of Ministers.

"Sitting of the 29th of March.

"The Duke of Otranto, minister of the general police, states, that he is about to read to the council a declaration, dated Vienna the 13th, which is supposed to have been issued by the congress:

"That this declaration, as it contains an incentive to the assassination of the Emperor, appears to him apocryphal: that, if it should prove genuine, it would be unexampled in the history of the world: that the libellous style, in which it is written, gives room to suppose, it ought to be classed among the papers fabricated by party-spirit, and by those pamphleteers, who of late years have foisted themselves uncommissioned into all state affairs: that it pretends to be signed by the English ministers; but it is impossible to suppose, that the ministers of a free nation, and particularly Lord Wellington, could have taken a step inconsistent with the legislation of their country, and with their own characters: that it pretends to be signed by the ministers of Austria; but it is impossible to conceive, whatever political dissensions may subsist between them, that a father could call for the assassination of his son: that, contrary to every principle of religion and morality, it is derogatory to the honourable character of the sovereigns, whose mandates are thus compromised by the libellists: that this declaration has been known several days, but, from the considerations abovementioned, it could not be considered otherwise than as deserving the profoundest contempt: that it was not deemed fit to engage the attention of the ministry, till official reports from Metz and Strasburg made known, that it had been brought into France by couriers from the Prince of Benevento; a fact confirmed by the result of the investigation that took place, and the interrogatories put: in fine, that it is proved, that this paper, which could not have been signed by the ministers of Austria, Russia, and England, was issued by the legation of the Count of Lille at Vienna; which legation had added to the crime of provoking assassination that of falsifying the signature of the members of the congress.

"The pretended declaration of the congress, the reports from Metz and Strasburg, as well as the investigation and interrogatories conducted by order of the minister of the general police, which ascertain, that the said declaration proceeded from the plenipotentiaries of the Count of Lille at Vienna, will be sent to the presidents of the sections of the council.

"DECLARATION.

"The powers, who signed the treaty of Paris, assembled in Congress at Vienna, being informed of the escape of Napoleon Bonaparte, and of his entering France by force of arms, owe to their own dignity, and to the interests of society, a solemn declaration of the sentiments, with which this event has inspired them.

"By thus infringing the convention, which settled him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte has destroyed the only legal title he had to his situation in life (auquel son existence se trouvait attachee.) By re-appearing in France, with the design of disturbing and subverting it, he has deprived himself of the protection of the laws, and has made manifest to the universe, that there can be neither peace nor truce with him.

"The powers declare in consequence, that Napoleon Bonaparte has thrown himself out of all the relations of civilized society; and that, as an enemy and disturber of the world, he has rendered himself obnoxious to public vengeance.

"At the same time they declare, that, firmly resolved to maintain unbroken the treaty of Paris of the 30th of March, 1814, and the arrangements sanctioned by that treaty, as well as those they have decreed, or may yet decree, for completing and consolidating it; they will employ all their means, and unite all their efforts, to prevent the general peace, the object of the wishes of all Europe, the constant aim of their labours, from being disturbed anew; and to guard it from every attempt, that would threaten to replunge nations into the disorders and calamities of revolutions.

"And though intimately persuaded, that all France, rallying round its legitimate sovereign, will annihilate without delay this last attempt of a criminal and impotent delirium, all the sovereigns of Europe, animated with the same sentiments, and guided by the same principles, declare, that if, contrary to all calculation, any real danger whatever should arise from this event, they will be ready to furnish the King of France and the French nation, or any other government that may be attacked, with the succours necessary to restore the public tranquillity, as soon as they shall be demanded, and to make common cause against all, who may attempt to disturb it.

"The present declaration, inserted in the register of the congress assembled at Vienna, in the sitting of the 13th of March, 1815, shall be made public.

"Done and certified as true by the plenipotentiaries of the eight powers, who signed the Treaty of Paris, at Vienna, the 13th of March, 1815.

Here follow the signatures in the alphabetical order of the courts.

"Austria { The Prince de METTERNICH, { The Baron de WESSEMBERG.

Spain P. GOMEZ LABRADOR. (Espagne)

{ The Prince de TALLEYRAND, France { The Duke D'ALBERG, { LATOUR DUPIN, { The Count ALEXIS DE NOAILLES.

{ WELLINGTON, { CLANCARTY, Great Britain { CATHCART, { STEWART.

{ The Count PALMELA, Portugal { SALDANHA, { LOBO.

{ The Prince de HARDENBERG, Prussia { The Baron de HUMBOLDT.

{ The Count de RASOUMOWSKI, Russia { The Count de STAKELBERG, { The Count de NESSELRODE.

Sweden LOWENHIELM."

This declaration, which no doubt will hereafter excite the astonishment of posterity, was commented upon and victoriously refuted by the Emperor himself. Count Boulay, to whom the following report is ascribed, had no farther share in it, than condensing it a little, and softening some of its expressions.

Report of the committee of presidents of the council of state.

"In consequence of the reference made to it, the committee, composed of the presidents of the sections of the council of state, has examined the declaration of the 13th of March, the report of the minister of the general police, and the papers added to them.

"The declaration is in an unusual form, composed in such strange terms, and expresses such anti-social ideas, that the committee was led to consider it as one of those supposititious productions, by means of which despicable men endeavour to impose upon people's minds, and mislead the public opinion.

"But the verification of the examinations taken at Metz, and of the interrogatories of the couriers, admit no doubt, that the declaration was sent by members of the French legation at Vienna; and consequently it must be considered as adopted and signed by them.

"It is under this last point of view, that the committee imagines it ought first to examine this production, which has no precedent in the annals of diplomacy, and in which Frenchmen, men invested with the most respectable of public characters, begin with a sort of outlawry, with a provocation to assassinate the Emperor Napoleon.

"We say with the minister of the police, that this declaration is the work of the French plenipotentiaries: because those of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England, could not have been capable of signing a paper, which the sovereigns and people, to whom they belong, will be eager to disavow.

"And in the first place these plenipotentiaries, most of them coadjutors in the treaty of Paris, know, that Napoleon was there acknowledged as retaining the title of Emperor, and as sovereign of the island of Elba: they would have mentioned him by these titles, and would not have deviated, either in matter or in manner, from the respect they impose.

"They would have felt, that, agreeably to the laws of nations, a prince, however trifling the extent or population of his state, enjoys, as far as regards his political and civil character, the rights belonging to every sovereign prince in respect to the most powerful monarch; and Napoleon, acknowledged under the title of Emperor, and in quality of a sovereign prince, by all the powers, was no more amenable to the congress of Vienna than any of them.

"The forgetfulness of these principles, impossible to be supposed in plenipotentiaries, who weigh the rights of nations maturely with wisdom and consideration, has nothing astonishing in it when manifested by French ministers, whose conscience reproaches them with more than one act of treason, in whom fear has engendered rage, and whose remorse leads their reason astray.

"Such men as these may have risked the fabrication and the publication of a piece like the pretended declaration of the 13th of March, in the hope of stopping the progress of Napoleon, and misleading the French people with regard to the real sentiments of foreign powers.

"But they cannot judge like these powers of the merits of a nation, which they have misunderstood, betrayed, and delivered up to the arms of foreigners.

"This nation, brave and generous, revolts against every thing that bears the marks of cowardice and oppression: its affections are heightened, when the object of them is threatened or affected by a great injustice; and assassination, which the commencement of the declaration of the 13th of March is intended to excite, will find not a single hand to execute it, either among the twenty-five millions of Frenchmen, the majority of whom attended, guarded, and protected Napoleon from the Mediterranean to the capital; nor among the eighteen millions of Italians, the six millions of Belgians or inhabitants of the banks of the Rhine, and the numerous nations of Germany, who, on this solemn occasion, have not pronounced his name without respectful remembrance; nor a single individual of the indignant English nation, whose honourable sentiments disavow the language, that those men have dared to attribute to the sovereigns.

"The people of Europe are enlightened; they judge the rights of Napoleon, the rights of the allied princes, and those of the Bourbons.

"They know, that the convention of Fontainbleau was a treaty between sovereigns. Its violation, the entrance of Napoleon into the French territory, like any other infraction of a diplomatic act, like any hostile invasion, could only bring on an ordinary war; the result of which can only be, to the person, that of being conqueror or conquered, free or a prisoner of war; to possessions, that of being lost or preserved, diminished or increased; and that every thought, every threat, every attempt, against the life of a prince at war with another, is a thing unheard of in the history of nations, and of the cabinets of Europe.

"In the violence, the rage, the forgetfulness of principle, that characterize the declaration of the 13th of March, we recognize the envoys of the same prince, the organs of the same councils, who, by the ordinance of the 6th of March, also put Napoleon out of the pale of the law, also invoked for him the daggers of assassins, and also promised a reward to whoever would bring his head.

"Yet what has Napoleon done? By his confidence he has honoured the men of all nations, who were insulted by the infamous office to which they were invited: he has shown himself temperate, generous, a protector, even toward those who had devoted his head to destruction.

"When he spoke to General Excelmans, marching toward the column that closely pressed Louis Stanislas Xavier; to General Count Erlon, who was to receive him at Lille; to General Clausel, who was going to Bourdeaux, where the Duchess of Angouleme was; to General Grouchy, who marched to put a stop to the civil disturbances excited by the Duke of Angouleme; every where, in short, orders were given by the Emperor, that their persons should be respected, and sheltered from all attack, from all danger, from all violence, during their progress on the French territories, and to the moment of their quitting them.

"Contemporary nations and posterity will judge, on which side respect has been paid in this grand conjuncture to the rights of nations and of sovereigns, to the laws of war, the principles of civilization, and the maxims of law civil and religious: they will pronounce between Napoleon and the house of Bourbon.

"If, after having examined the pretended declaration of the congress in this first point of view, we discuss it in its relations to diplomatic conventions, to the treaty of Fontainbleau of the 11th of April, ratified by the French government, we shall find, that their violation is imputable only to those very persons who charge it on Napoleon.

"The treaty of Fontainbleau has been violated by the allied powers, and by the house of Bourbon, in what regards the Emperor Napoleon and his family, in what affects the rights and interests of the French nation:

"1st. The Empress Marie Louise and her son were to obtain passports and an escort, to enable them to repair to the Emperor: but, far from performing this promise, the wife was separated by force from her husband, the son from his father, and this under painful circumstances, when the strongest mind finds it necessary to seek consolation and support in the bosom of its family and domestic affections.

"2d. The safety of Napoleon, of the imperial family, and of their suite, was guarantied (Art. 14 of the treaty) by all the powers: yet bands of assassins were organized in France under the eyes of the French government, and even by its orders, as the solemn proceedings against the Sieur de Maubreuil will shortly prove, to attack both the Emperor, his brothers, and their wives: this first branch of the plot failing of the expected success, a tumult was planned at Orgon, on the road taken by the Emperor, in order to make an attempt against his life by the hands of some brigands: one of the cut-throats of Georges, the Sieur Brulart, raised for the purpose to the rank of major-general, known in Brittany, in Anjou, in Normandy, in la Vendee, throughout all England, by the blood he has shed, was sent to Corsica as governor, in order to prepare and insure the crime; and, in fact, several solitary assassins attempted, in the island of Elba, to gain, by the murder of Napoleon, the culpable and disgraceful salary which was promised them.

"3d. The duchies of Parma and Placentia were given in full propriety to Marie Louise, for herself, her son, and his descendants: yet, after long refusal to put them into possession, the injustice was consummated by an absolute spoliation, under the illusory pretext of an exchange without valuation, without proportion, without sovereignty, without consent; and the documents existing in the office of foreign affairs, of which we have had an account presented to us, prove, that it was at the instance and through the intrigues of the Prince of Benevento, that Marie Louise and her son were despoiled.

"4th. A suitable establishment, out of France, had been given to Prince Eugene, the adopted son of Napoleon, who has done honour to France, where he was born, and gained the affection of Italy, where he was naturalized; yet he has obtained nothing.

"5th. The Emperor had stipulated (Art. 3 of the treaty) in favour of his brave soldiers the preservation of their salaries from the Napoleon fund (sur le mont Napoleon); he had reserved out of the extraordinary domain, and the funds remaining of the civil list, the means of recompensing his servants, and of paying the soldiers, that attached themselves to his fate. The whole was taken away and kept back by the ministers of the Bourbons. An agent of the French soldiers went in vain to Vienna, to claim for them the most sacred of all property, the price of their valour and their blood.

"6th. The preservation of the property, movable and immovable, of the Emperor's family, is stipulated by the same treaty (Art. 6); yet it has been despoiled of both: in France, with force of arms, by commissioned brigands; in Italy, by the violence of military commanders; in both countries by seizures and sequestrations solemnly appointed.

"7th. The Emperor Napoleon was to receive two millions of francs a year, and his family two millions and a half, agreeably to the distribution fixed by Art. 6 of the treaty: but the French government has constantly refused to fulfil these engagements, and Napoleon would have soon seen himself reduced to the necessity of dismissing his faithful guard, for want of the means of ensuring its pay, if he had not found in the grateful remembrances of the bankers and merchants of Genoa and Italy the honourable resource of a loan of twelve millions, which was offered him.

"8th. In fine, it was not without a motive, that certain persons were desirous of separating from Napoleon, by any means, the companions of his glory, models of attachment and constancy, unshaken guaranties of his life and safety. The island of Elba was secured to him in full property (Art. 3 of the treaty): yet the resolution to deprive him of it, desired by the Bourbons, and solicited by their agents, had been taken at the Congress.

"And if Providence in its justice had not interposed, Europe would have seen attempts made against the person, the liberty of Napoleon, banished for ever at the mercy of his enemies, far from his family, separated from his servants, either to St. Lucie, or to St. Helena, which was assigned him as a prison.

"And when the allied powers, yielding to the imprudent wishes, or cruel instigations, of the agents of the house of Bourbon, have stooped to violate a solemn contract, on the faith of which Napoleon had absolved the French nation from its oaths; when himself, and all the members of his family, saw themselves menaced and attacked in their persons, in their property, in their affections, in all the rights stipulated in their favour as princes, and even in those secured by the laws to simple citizens; how ought Napoleon to act?

"Ought he, after having endured so many insults, and suffered so many acts of injustice, to consent to the complete violation of the engagements entered into with him; and, resigning himself to the fate prepared for him, abandon also to their fearful destiny, his wife, his son, his relations, and his faithful servants?

"Such a resolution seems to require more than human strength of mind: yet Napoleon was capable of taking it, if the peace and happiness of France could have been purchased by this new sacrifice. He would again have devoted himself for the French people, from whom, as he wishes to declare in the face of all Europe, he makes it his glory to hold every thing, to whom he refers every thing, and to whom alone he will hold himself responsible for his actions and devote his life.

"It was for France alone, and to save her from the calamities of an intestine war, that he abdicated the crown in 1814. He restored to the French people the rights he held from them; he left them free to choose a new master, and to found their liberty and happiness on institutions, that would protect both.

"He hoped, that the nation would preserve all it had acquired by five and twenty years of glorious fighting; and the exercise of its sovereignty in the choice of a dynasty, and in stipulating the conditions, on which it should be called to the throne.

"He expected from the new government respect for the glory of the armies, and for the rights of the brave; the guaranty of all the new interests, interests generated and maintained during a quarter of a century, resulting from all the civil and political laws, observed and revered during that time, because they are identified with the manners, habits, and wants of the nation.

"Far from all this, every idea of the sovereignty of the people has been discarded.

"The principle, on which all public and civil legislation has been founded since the revolution, has been equally discarded.

"France has been treated as a revolted country, reconquered by the armies of its ancient masters, and subjugated anew to a feudal domination.

"A constitutional law has been imposed on France, as easy to be eluded as revoked; and in the form of royal ordinances simply, without consulting the nation, without even hearing those bodies, become illegal, the phantoms of national representation.

"The violation of this charter has been checked only by the timidity of the government; the extent of the abuses of its authority has been limited only by its weakness.

"The disjointing of the army, the dispersion of its officers, the exile of several, the debasement of the soldiers, the suppression of their endowments, the privation of their pay or pensions; the reduction of the pay of the legionaries, the despoiling them of their honours, the pre-eminence given to the decorations of the feudal monarchy, the contempt of the citizens, designated anew under the name of tiers-etat (third estate); the spoliation of the purchasers of national property, prepared and already begun, the actual diminution of value of such as was obliged to be sold; the return of the feudal system in its titles, privileges, and useful rights, the re-establishment of tramontane principles, the abolition of the liberties of the Gallican church, the annihilation of the Concordat, the re-establishment of tithes, the reviving intolerance of an exclusive form of worship; the domination of a handful of nobles over a people accustomed to equality: are what the ministers of the Bourbons have done, or wished to do, for the people of France.

"It was under such circumstances, that the Emperor Napoleon quitted the island of Elba: such were the motives of the resolution he took, and not the consideration of his own personal interests, so trivial in his opinion compared with the interests of the nation, to which he has devoted his existence.

"He has not brought war into the bosom of France: on the contrary, he has extinguished the war, which the possessors of national property, constituting four fifths of the landholders throughout France, would have been compelled to make upon their despoilers; the war, which the citizens, oppressed, degraded, humiliated by the nobles, would have been forced to declare against their oppressors; the war, which the Protestants, the Jews, and the people of different sects, would have been obliged to maintain against their persecutors.

"He came to deliver France; and as a deliverer he has been received.

"He arrived almost alone; he travelled two hundred and twenty leagues, without meeting any obstacle, without a battle; and has resumed without resistance, in the midst of the capital, and of the acclamations of an immense majority of the citizens, the throne relinquished by the Bourbons; who, from among the army, their own household, the national guards, or the people, could not raise a single person in arms, to endeavour to maintain them in it.

"Yet, replaced at the head of the nation, which had already chosen him three times, and has just elected him a fourth time by the reception it gave him on his march, and his triumphant arrival; of that nation, by which, and for the interest of which, he wishes to reign;

"What is the desire of Napoleon? What the French people desire, the independence of France, peace within, peace with all nations, the execution of the treaty of Paris, of the 30th of May, 1814.

"What is there, then, changed in the future state of Europe, and in the hope of repose promised it? What voice is raised, to demand those succours, which, according to the declaration, are to be granted only when claimed?

"There is nothing changed, if the allied powers recur, as we have a right to expect from them, to just and temperate sentiments; if they acknowledge, that the existence of France in a respectable and independent state, as far from conquering as from being conquered, from domineering as from being held in subjection, is necessary to the balance of great realms, as well as to the guaranty of smaller states.

"There is nothing changed, if, not attempting to compel France to resume with a dynasty, which she can no longer desire, the feudal chains she has broken, and to submit to the seigneurial or ecclesiastical pretensions, from which it has emancipated itself, those powers do not attempt to impose on her laws, to interfere in her internal concerns, to assign her a particular form of government, to give her masters suited to the interests and passions of her neighbours.

"There is nothing changed, if, while France is occupied in preparing the new social compact, that shall guaranty the liberty of her citizens, and the triumph of those generous ideas, that prevail in Europe, and can no longer be stifled; she be not compelled, to call off her attention from these pacific ideas, and from the means of domestic prosperity, to which the people and their chief are desirous of devoting themselves in happy concord, in order to prepare for battle.

"There is nothing changed, if, while the French nation demands nothing, but to remain at peace with all Europe, an unjust coalition do not oblige her to defend, as it did in 1792, her will, and her rights, and her independence, and the sovereign of her choice."

This eloquent refutation, full of irrefragable facts, and reasonings not to be refuted, was no longer necessary. French honour had judged and condemned the Congress of Vienna and its Declaration.

When this declaration appeared, France grew pale: she was astonished, affrighted at the calamities, which the future boded; and groaned at the idea of being exposed to a war for the sake of one single man.

This first impression over, her pride, her virtue, felt indignant, that the allies should dare to conceive the thought, that she would yield to their menaces, and cowardly consent, to give Napoleon up to them.

Had Napoleon been no more than a simple citizen, the attempt to violate by authority the rights of men and nations in his person would have been sufficient, to induce the French, or at least all worthy of the name, to think themselves obliged to protect and defend him.

But Napoleon was not merely a simple citizen, he was the head of the French nation: it was for having aggrandized it by his conquests, and ennobled it by his victories, that he was proscribed by foreigners; and the most timid as well as the most generous made it their sacred duty to place him under the safeguard of the nation, and of French honour.

Thus the declaration of the Congress, instead of intimidating France, heightened its courage; instead of separating Napoleon from the French, drew still more close the bands that united them; instead of calling down on his head the public vengeance, rendered him more estimable and more dear in the eyes of the people.

If Napoleon, availing himself of these generous sentiments, had said to the French: "You have restored to me the crown, foreigners are desirous of tearing it from me; I am ready, either to defend it, or to lay it down; say which I shall do:" the whole nation would have understood Napoleon, and would have risen in a body, to cause the sovereign of its heart and its choice to be respected.

But Napoleon had other ideas: he considered the declaration of the Congress merely as a paper adapted to the circumstances of the day, the object of which was, at the time when it was subscribed by the allies, to support the courage of the royalists, and to restore to the Bourbons the confidence and moral strength they had lost.

He thought, that his entrance into Paris, and the entire pacification of the South, would have completely changed the state of things; and he hoped, that foreign nations would ultimately acknowledge him, when they were convinced, that he had been re-established on the throne by the unanimous consent of the French, and that his ideas of conquest and dominion had given place to the real desire of respecting the tranquillity and independence of his neighbours, and of living in harmony with them.

In fine, he considered, that prudence would induce the allies, as it was their interest, not to engage in a war, the results of which could not be favourable to them: "They will feel, that they will not this time have to do with the France of 1814; and that their successes, if they gain any, will be no longer decisive, but will merely serve to render the war more obstinate and bloody; while, if victory favour me, I may become as formidable as ever. I have for me Belgium and the Rhenish provinces, and with a tricoloured flag and a proclamation I could revolutionize them in four-and-twenty hours."

The treaty of the 25th of March, by which the great powers, renewing the arrangements of the treaty of Chaumont, engaged themselves anew not to lay down their arms, as long as Napoleon should be on the throne, appeared to him merely the natural consequence of the act of the 13th of March, and of the erroneous opinions the allies had formed of France. He thought, that it would not alter the state of the question; and resolved, notwithstanding this treaty, and the affronting manner in which his first overtures were received, to endeavour repeatedly to make the voice of truth, of reason, and of peace, heard at Vienna.

Baron de Stassart, late auditor to the council of state and prefect, had been made chamberlain of Austria, or of Bavaria, since the restoration. He was at Paris. The Emperor, hoping he might be able to reach Vienna under favour of his quality of chamberlain, charged him with a mission for the Empress Marie Louise, and fresh despatches for the Emperor of Austria. Napoleon at the same time had recourse to other means: he was aware of the intimacy and connexions of MM. D. de St. L** and de Mont** with Prince Talleyrand; and persuaded, that M. de Talleyrand would procure for them authority to repair to Vienna, he resolved, to send them thither. He did not deceive himself with the idea, that they would accept their mission for any other purpose than that of more easily serving the royal cause; but he paid little regard to their intrigues with the King, provided they delivered and brought back with exactness the despatches, that should be entrusted to them[95].

[Footnote 95: It was a laughable singularity, that, of all the double-faced men employed by the Emperor, there was no one, in whom he had more confidence, than he had in M. de Mont**. He had formerly ill-treated, persecuted, and banished him: he knew, that he detested him, and was the most intimate, the most devoted friend of M. de Talleyrand: but he knew also the bent of M. de Mont**'s mind; and he thought, that he would feel an infinite pleasure, in executing his mission well, and humming [rouer] M. de Talleyrand, who flattered himself, that he had never been hummed by any person. I know not whether M. de Mont** found it pleasant, or not, to take in M. de Talleyrand; what I know is, that he justified the expectations of Napoleon, and brought back to him intact the letters, that were delivered to him by M. de Mont**.]

About the King, however, and what passed at Ghent, he took little concern: his anxious eyes were turned to Vienna; and convinced of the influence, that M. de Talleyrand might exert there, he particularly directed M. ****, to offer him his favour, and money also, if he would abandon the Bourbons, and employ his talents and experience for the benefit of the imperial cause.

The Emperor, who did not cease to hope, that his exertions, time, and reflection, might effect some changes in the resolutions of the allies, heard with extreme displeasure, that the King of Naples had commenced hostilities.

This prince had long been dissatisfied with the complaisance, with which the allied sovereigns listened to the protests of France, Savoy, and Spain: and, though his crown had been guarantied to him by a solemn compact with Austria, and by the formal declarations of Russia and England, he foresaw, that the doctrine of legitimacy would carry the point against the faith of treaties, and that Austria, though interested in not allowing another crown to be transferred to the house of Bourbon, would be obliged to submit to the unanimous will of the other powers.

Thus the fear of being driven from the throne, and the resolution to maintain himself in it, possessed Joachim, when the news of the successful landing of Napoleon reached Naples.

The horror with which the Austrian sway inspired the Italians, the attachment they retained to Napoleon, and the joy they displayed on hearing of his departure from the island of Elba, persuaded the King, that he should find no difficulty in raising Italy; and he flattered himself with bringing the allies, either by force of arms, or by way of negotiation, to guaranty to him irrevocably the possession of his kingdom.

Desirous on the other hand of securing the protection of Napoleon, in case of failure of success, he secretly despatched an emissary to congratulate him; and announce, that, with a view of seconding his operations, he was about to attack the Austrians, and, if his wishes were answered by victory, he would soon join him with a formidable army: "in fine," he wrote, "the moment of atoning for the wrong I have done your Majesty, and of proving my attachment, is now arrived; I will not let it escape."

This letter, which I deciphered, reached the Emperor at Auxerre; and he immediately enjoined the King, to continue his preparations, but wait for his giving him the signal, before he commenced hostilities. The natural impetuosity and impatience of this Prince did not allow him, to wait for the answer of Napoleon, and when his despatches arrived, the gauntlet had been thrown down.

The better to disguise his intentions, Joachim had summoned the ambassadors of Austria and England, immediately on hearing of the landing of Napoleon, and had assured them, that he would remain faithful to his engagements. When he had assembled his army (put in motion under pretence of reinforcing his troops in the March of Ancona), he fell unexpectedly on the Austrians; and announced to the Italians, by a proclamation dated at Rimini the 31st of March, that he had taken up arms to liberate Italy from a foreign yoke, and restore its ancient freedom and independence.

"Italians," said he to them, "the moment is arrived, when the great decrees of destiny are to be fulfilled. Providence at length calls you, to become an independent people: one cry resounds from the Alps to the straits of Scylla, the independence of Italy. By what right would foreigners rob you of your independence, the first right, and the first good, of all nations?

"Formerly masters of the world, you have expiated this fatal glory by an oppression of twenty centuries. Let your glory now be, to have no more masters.

"Fourscore thousand Italians hasten to you under the command of their king. They swear not to rest, till Italy is free. Italians of all countries, second their magnanimous efforts ... let those, who have borne arms, resume them, let the unpractised youth exercise themselves in the use of them, let all the friends of their country raise up one generous voice for liberty.

"Can England refuse you her suffrages, she whose noblest claim to glory is to spend her blood and treasure for the independence and freedom of nations?

"I call on all the brave, to come and fight with me; I call on all men of enlightened understandings, to prepare, while the passions are silent, the constitution and laws, that ought henceforward to govern happy and independent Italy."

This proclamation, to the great astonishment of Italy and France, did not once mention the name of Napoleon. It kept the most profound silence respecting his return, his intercourse with Joachim, and the hopes their combined efforts must inspire.

Joachim however was not ignorant of the ascendancy, which the name of Napoleon had on the spirit and courage of the Italians. But he knew also, that this name was odious to the English, and dared not invoke it, for fear of displeasing them. He thought he was sufficiently powerful of himself, to act independently of the Emperor; and that it would be enough, if he showed himself in arms to the Italian nation, and offered it independence, to raise it at his pleasure. He deceived himself: all his strength was borrowed from Napoleon: personally he enjoyed no weight, no influence, in Italy. The Italians could not forgive him for having betrayed his brother-in-law and benefactor in 1814, or for having revealed to Austria the patriotic conspiracy of Milan in 1815[96].

[Footnote 96: I know not whether the fact be true: but, true or false, it had the same effect on the minds of the Italians.]

Thus prejudiced, they durst not confide in him; his intentions appeared doubtful, his promises vague, his resources uncertain; and they remained quiet spectators of the combat.

It is not, in fact, by concealments, that people are reduced or hurried away: to subjugate them, it is necessary, to convince their hearts and their understandings; and the heart and the understanding comprehend no language but the straight forward voice of truth. Unhappily this language was no longer known to Murat. Since his accession to the throne, he had adopted the system of dissimulation and duplicity, which pretty generally characterise Italian politics. These narrow politics, which support themselves by cunning and temporizing, were incompatible with the French blood, that circulated in his veins; and the continual conflicts, that arose between his novel inclinations and his natural petulance, were incessantly rendering his words and actions at variance, and leading him into devious paths, where he could not fail, to go astray and meet his ruin.

Nevertheless, such is the magic power of the sacred words of liberty and our country, that Murat did not utter them in vain. Bologna and a few cities declared for him; and a number of young Italians ran to enlist under his standards. Victory favoured their first steps; but Napoleon did not deceive himself: the moment had been ill-chosen, he foresaw the defection or ruin of Murat, and what passed beyond the Alps no longer inspired him with any thing but disgust. From that time he turned his attention with more ardor than ever to the means of struggling alone against his adversaries, whose proceedings began to assume a threatening appearance.

The royal government, partly through fear, partly from economy, had disorganized the army, reduced the regiments one half, changed their denominations, and dispersed the soldiers among new battalions.

Napoleon re-established the regiments on their ancient footing; restored to them their glorious surnames of Invincible, Incomparable, Terrible, One to Ten, &c. &c., which they had acquired and merited in the field of battle. He recalled to their standards the brave men who had been banished from them; and the army, which was scarcely fourscore thousand strong, soon reckoned on its lists near two hundred thousand fighting men.

The marines[97] and guards of the coasts, who so brilliantly signalized their courage in the plains of Lutzen and Bautzen, were united under the command of their officers, and formed a body of fifteen or eighteen thousand men, who were appointed to protect our maritime establishments, or, in case of necessity, reinforce the active army.

[Footnote 97: Les marins. Properly, perhaps, the seamen, whom Napoleon took from the ships of war, and converted into soldiers.—Tr.]

The cavalry of the imperial guard and the old grenadiers opened their ranks to ten thousand soldiers selected from the flank companies; the light artillery was re-organized; and the young guard received an addition of several regiments.

But it was not sufficient to restore to the army the forces, of which it had been deprived; it was equally necessary, to repair its destitution: the foot wanted arms and clothing, the cavalry had neither saddles nor horses.

The Emperor looked to all these things.

Levies and purchases of horses were made at once in all the departments.

The gendarmerie, by giving up the ten thousand horses belonging to it, which it replaced immediately, supplied the heavy cavalry with so many horses already trained, which in ten days rendered its numerous squadrons complete.

Spacious manufactories of clothing, arms, and equipage, were opened at once in all parts.

The Emperor caused an account of the number of workmen, and the produce of their labour, to be delivered to him every morning. He knew how long it took a tailor to finish a soldier's dress, a wheelwright to construct a carriage, or an armourer to fit up a musket. He knew the quantity of arms, in a good or bad state, contained in the arsenals. "You will find," he wrote to the minister at war, "in such an arsenal, so many old muskets, and so many broken up. Set a hundred men at work there, and arm me five hundred men a week." Such was the extent and variety of Napoleon's genius, that he soared without effort to the loftiest abstractions of the art of governing, and descended with the same facility to the minutest details of management.

Extraordinary commissioners were employed at the same time to direct the repairing and fortifying of the frontier towns. They employed themselves day and night on this important business. But the slightest delay appeared to the Emperor an age of expectation, and frequently he put his hand to the work himself. He was perfectly acquainted with the nature of the fortifications of every place, the number of men it ought to contain, and the approaches necessary to be defended; and in a few hours he settled what the most experienced engineer would have found it difficult to conceive and determine in several days. And let it not be supposed, that the works he thus ordered bore any marks of precipitancy. At the head of his topographical cabinet he had one of the first engineer officers in France, General Bernard; and this general, too brave, too loyal, to be a flatterer, could never enough admire the profound knowledge the Emperor possessed of the art of fortification, and his happy and prompt application of it.

The zeal and joint efforts of these committees, and of the Emperor, produced, in a short time, effects truly miraculous. All France seemed an intrenched camp. Napoleon, in the articles he wrote[98], frequently gave an account of the progress of his armament, of the fortified places, and of the works of defence. I will transcribe here one of these articles, which, exclusive of the merit of depicting the aspect of France at that period, in a better manner than I could, appears to me well adapted to convey an idea of the fervid activity of Napoleon, and the immensity of the objects his eye embraced.

[Footnote 98: For the Moniteur, I presume.—Tr.]

"All the strong places on the northern frontier, from Dunkirk to Charlemont, are furnished with ordnance, provision, and stores: the sluices are put into order, and the country will be inundated at the first hostile movement: field-works have been laid out in the forest of Mormale: measures are taken for throwing up intrenchments in the different passes of the forest of Aregonne: all the strong places of Lorraine are prepared: intrenchments are formed at the five passes of the Vosges: the fortresses of Alsace are equipped: orders are given for the defence of the pass of Jura, and all the frontiers of the Alps. The passes of the Somme, which are in the third line, are putting into order. In the interior, Guise, la Ferte, Vitry, Soissons, Chateau Thierry, and Langres, are equipping and fortifying. Orders have been issued even for constructing works on the heights of Montmartre and Menilmontant, and furnishing them with three hundred pieces of ordnance: they will be formed at first of earth, and the solidity of permanent fortifications will be given them in succession.

"His Majesty has ordered, that Lyons should be put into a state of defence: a tete-de-pont will be established at Broteaux. The drawbridge at La Guillotiere is replacing. The space between the Saone and the Rhone will be fortified: some redoubts are preparing to be constructed in advance of this space. A redoubt will be constructed on the height of Pierre en Size, to support a work, that closes the city on the right bank. The heights, that command the quarter of St. Jean, on the right bank of the Saone, will be defended by several redoubts: a train of eighty pieces of cannon, with the necessary stores, is sent off for Lyons. Sisteron and the bridge of St. Esprit will be placed in a state of defence. Eight armies or corps of observation are formed: namely

"The army of the North;

"The army of the Moselle;

"The army of the Rhine;

"The corps of observation of the Jura, which is assembling at Befort;

"The army of the Alps, which is assembling at Chambery;

"The corps of observation of the Pyrenees, which is assembling at Perpignan and at Bordeaux;

"And the army of reserve, which is assembling at Paris and at Laon.

"The old soldiers are every where on the march, animated with the greatest enthusiasm, and come to complete our hundred and twenty regiments of infantry. The purchases made for remounting the cavalry have been going on rapidly for this month, and will soon render our seventy regiments of cavalry fully complete. Regiments of volunteer cavalry are forming in many parts: Alsace has already furnished two regiments of lancers, of a thousand men each. We have reason to think, that this example will be followed in Brittany, Normandy, and Limousin, the province in which the greatest number of horses are bred.

"Parks of artillery, forming more than a hundred and fifty batteries, are already harnessed, and on the march for the different armies. The corps of artillery for the defence of Lyons is composed of two companies formed in the school of Alfort. The corps for serving the three hundred pieces of ordnance, that will be placed on the heights of Paris, will consist of twelve companies of marine artillery, two companies of invalids, two companies of the school of Alfort, two companies of the polytechnic school, two companies of the school of St. Cyr, and six companies of foot artillery.

"Corps of partisans and free corps are forming in a great number of departments. An adjutant-general, stationed with each general commanding in chief, will conduct the correspondence with these corps; which, if the enemy be rash enough to penetrate into our territories, will fall upon his communications in the mountains and forests, and find support in the fortified towns.

"The organization of the levy in mass of Alsace, Lorraine, the county of Messin, Franche Comte, Burgundy, Dauphiny, and Picardy, is prepared.

"All the cities will arm in defence of their vicinity: they will follow the example of Chalons sur Saone, Tournus, and St. Jean de Losne. Every unfortified town even would betray the national honour, if it surrendered to light troops, and did not make the best defence its means will allow, till the arrival of infantry and artillery in such force, that its resistance would cease to be prescribed by the laws of war.

"Every thing is in motion in all parts of France. If the coalition persist in the designs they have announced of making war on us, if they violate our frontiers, it is easy to foresee, what fruits they will reap from their attempt on the rights of the French nation: all the departments will emulate in zeal those of Alsace, the Vosges, Franche Comte, Burgundy, and the Lyonese; every where the people are animated with a patriotic spirit, and ready to make any sacrifice, to maintain the independence of the nation, and the honour of the throne."

In fine, to complete his means of resistance and attack, the Emperor remodelled the national guard, and divided it into three thousand one hundred and thirty battalions, forming a body of two millions two hundred and fifty thousand men. All the national guards from twenty years old to forty were classed in active companies of light infantry and grenadiers, and fifteen hundred of these companies, or a hundred and eighty thousand men, were immediately placed at the disposal of the minister at war, to form the garrisons of the frontier places, and reinforce the armies of reserve.

The general officers sent to the frontier departments, to accelerate the raising and departure of this national militia, had need only to show themselves, to accomplish their mission. Every citizen aspired beforehand to the honour of making a part of it; and in the provinces of the east, the north, and the centre, it was found necessary to form supernumerary companies[99]. The father would have renounced his son, the wife her husband, the girl her betrothed lover, if they had been deaf to the voice of honour and their country. The mothers themselves, who at other times had so bitterly deplored the departure of their children, encouraged them, like the Spartans, to march against the enemy, and fall, if it must be so, in the sacred cause of their country. This picture is not an exaggeration, it is faithful, it is true. Never was a more beautiful spectacle exhibited to the eyes of any man, to whom the glory and independence of his country were dear, than that of the enthusiasm and martial joy, with which the warlike inhabitants of Alsace, Lorraine, Burgundy, Champagne, and the Vosges, were animated. The roads were covered with waggons loaded with young warriors, who hastened, gaily singing, to the post of honour assigned them by Napoleon: the population of the towns and villages received them on their way with applauses, which inflamed their minds with fresh ardor, and made them enjoy by anticipation the praises and acclamations, that their friends, parents, and fellow-citizens would lavish on them at their return.

[Footnote 99: I cannot avoid here making a comparison. On the 15th of March, the Count d'Artois wished to form a legion from the light infantry and grenadiers of the national guard of Paris. He reviewed the twelve legions, harangued them, and announced, that he would march at the head of the volunteer national guards: a hundred and fifty turned out.

Napoleon from his closet called the national guard to the defence of the imperial cause: 150,000 men took up arms, and hastened to battle.

What must we conclude from this coldness on the one hand, and this enthusiasm on the other? I leave the question to be answered by those, who pretend, that the revolution of the 20th of March obtained the assent only of a handful of factious persons.]

France seemed to call aloud, to see her eclipsed greatness restored. She had recovered all her energy: an evident proof, that the strength of a nation is always the work of the prince, by whom it is governed. It is he, who enervates the public spirit, and bastardizes his subjects, by the effeminacy of his government: or it is he, who inspires them with the love of their country, with priding themselves in it, and leads them to undertake, whatever can augment its glory and its power.

To draw still more closely the bonds of union between the French people, and impart greater intensity to their patriotism, Napoleon authorized the re-establishment of popular clubs, and the formation of civic confederations. This time his expectations were not answered by success. The major part of the clubs were filled with men, who formerly composed the revolutionary tribunals and societies; and their imprecations against kings, and their liberticide motions, made the Emperor fear, that he had revived the spirit of anarchy.

The sentiments manifested by the federates equally disquieted him. He perceived, that he did not occupy the first place in their thoughts and affections; that the primary wish of their hearts was liberty; and, as this liberty was in his eyes synonimous with republicanism, he exerted all his endeavours to moderate, restrain, and repress, the development of these patriotic associations. Perhaps there were men among the federates, whose principles might be dangerous, and their intentions criminal: but in general they consisted of pure patriots, who had taken up arms to defend the imperial government, and not to overturn it.

Napoleon had never been able to surmount the aversion, which he felt for the veterans of the revolution. He dreaded their constancy, and their daring spirit; and he would have thought himself in danger, if not lost, had they become consolidated, and resumed their ascendancy. This panic fear was the cause, that he did not reap from the confederations the advantages he promised himself; and which they would unquestionably have afforded him, if he had not clogged their wings. It was also the cause of his committing a perhaps still greater fault, that of putting a stop to the popular movements, that had shown themselves in most of the departments. In the critical state in which he found himself, and into which he had drawn France, he should not have disregarded any means of security; and the most efficacious, the most analogous to his situation, was indisputably that of engaging the people most intimately in his fate, and in his defence. It was necessary, therefore, while preventing them from spilling a single drop of blood, to let them compromise themselves with some of those incorrigible ultras, who had harassed, ill-treated, and insulted them, since the restoration. The people would then have been more sensible, that it was no longer the personal cause of Napoleon alone, that they had to defend; and the dread of chastisement, and of the yoke, would have restored to them that ancient enthusiasm, which had proved so fatal to the first coalition.

The moderation adopted by Napoleon on this occasion was honourable, but not politic. He conducted himself, as he might have done at a time, when all parties, confounded together and reconciled, acknowledged him for their sole and only sovereign. But things had changed: he had no longer the whole of France in his favour; and hence it was necessary, that he should conduct himself rather as the head of a party, than as a sovereign; and that he should display as it were all the vigour and energy of the leader of a faction. Energy unites men, by taking from them all uncertainty, and hurrying them with violence toward their object. Moderation, on the contrary, divides and enervates them, because it leaves them to their own irresolution, and allows them leisure, to listen to their interests, their scruples, and their fears.

The attention paid by the Emperor to his military preparations did not prevent his continuing to occupy himself on the welfare of the state, and endeavour more and more to conciliate the confidence and affection of the public.

Already, in other days, he had drawn out from its ruins the ancient University. A new basis, more broad, more extensive, more majestic, had raised this noble institution to a level with the age, and with France. But the first stage of education did not answer the efforts made to improve it, and to diffuse it among the younger classes of society.

M. Carnot, in a report that combined the most pleasing philanthropy with the most sage and lofty views, taught the Emperor the advantages of the methods of Bell and Lancaster, and the monarch and the minister made a present to France, to morality, to humanity, of the system of mutual instruction.

The Emperor, on removing his eyes from this interesting youth, the hope of the country, turned them to those old soldiers, who had formerly been its pride and support.

A royal ordinance had expelled from their asylum a considerable number of invalids, and had taken from them a portion of their endowments: a decree restored them to their rights; and a visit, which the Emperor paid these veterans in glory, added a kindness to the benefit.

He also repaired to the Polytechnic school. It was the first time of his showing himself to its pupils. Their love of perfect liberty, their inclination for republican institutions, had long alienated from them the affections of the Emperor: but the striking bravery they had displayed under the walls of Paris had restored to them his esteem and friendship; and it was satisfactory to him (these are his own words), to have such a fine occasion of reconciling himself with them.

The suburb of St. Antoine, that cradle of the revolution, was not forgotten. The Emperor traversed it from one end to the other. He had the doors of all the workshops opened to him, and examined them very minutely. The numerous workmen of the manufactory of M. Lenoir, who retained a grateful remembrance of what the Emperor had done for their master and for themselves, loaded him with expressions of their attachment. The commissary of police of the quarter had followed Napoleon into this manufactory; and, willing to set the example, opened his mouth to its utmost extent, to holla as loud as he could bawl "Long live the Emperor!" but, by a terrible slip of the tongue, a very distinct "Long live the King!" on the contrary issued from it. This caused great confusion: but the Emperor, turning to him, said in a rallying tone: "So, Mr. Commissary, you are determined then not to get rid of your bad habits." This sally was the signal for a general laugh: and the commissary, plucking up his spirits, convinced Napoleon by many a vigorous "Long live the Emperor!" that we never lose any thing by a little patience.

The Emperor was accompanied only by three officers of his household. It was impossible for them to defend him from the approaches and caresses of the people: the women kissed his hands; the men squeezed them, till they made him cry out; both expressed to him in a thousand ways, which I cannot transcribe, the difference they made between him and his predecessor. At all times he had been much beloved by the class of workmen and artisans. He had enriched it: and interest is the prime mover of regard among the people, as well as among the great[100].

[Footnote 100: The reverses of Napoleon's fortune had been so rapid, that the possessors of great places, and of great preferment, had not had time to retrench their way of living. When the Bourbons were recalled, they were obliged to come to a reckoning with their means, and all these extravagant expenses ceased at once.

On the other hand, the new court, in order to distinguish itself from the imperial court, substituted the most offensive simplicity for the useful pomp of Napoleon. The richest emigrants imitated this pernicious example; and, as Napoleon remarked, the luxury of the table was almost the only kind, on which encouragement was not spared. The result of this economical system was, that the produce of our manufactories remained unemployed, and industry was suddenly paralyzed.

Thus commerce, which had loudly called for peace, was almost totally annihilated by it: and the manufacturers, the mechanics, the merchants (those of the sea-ports excepted), greatly regretted those happy times, when we were at war.

In fact, it must be admitted, that our industry was indebted to the war, and to our conquests, for its progress, and its prodigious increase. The war, by depriving us of the products of the English manufactories, had taught us, to manufacture for ourselves. The continual prohibition of these articles protected our rising manufactures from the danger of competition; and allowed them to engage with safety in the trials and expenses necessary for equalling or surpassing in perfection foreign manufactures. In all parts of the empire were seen manufactories for spinning and weaving cotton; and this branch of trade, almost unknown before, employed three hundred thousand work people, and produced goods to the value of more than two hundred and fifty millions.

The other products of our industry equally received improvements and extension; and France, in spite of the conscription, reckoned in its numerous workshops nearly twelve hundred thousand workpeople.

If this flourishing state of our continental trade were the effect of the enlargement of our territory, and the scope the war had given to our industry, we must say, that it was also the result of the succour, encouragement, and honorary distinctions, which Napoleon knew how to bestow appropriately on our manufacturers; and the return for those enormous sacrifices he made, to create, repair, and keep in order, those superb roads, and those numerous canals, which rendered the communications between France, and the countries subjected to its empire, equally easy, safe, and pleasant.]

The Emperor received a great number of petitions during his excursions. Unable to read them all, he ordered me, to examine them carefully, and give him an account of them. He loved to repay the confidence that the people reposed in him; and frequently granted to the request of an obscure and unknown citizen, what he would perhaps have refused to the entreaties of a marshal or a minister. The utility of these familiar communications between the nation and the sovereign was not confined, in his eyes, to the solitary interests of the petitioner. He considered them as efficacious means of coming at the knowledge of abuses and acts of injustice, and of keeping the depositaries of authority within the limits of their duty. He was fond of encouraging them, that the phrase, If the Emperor knew it, or The Emperor shall know it, might solace the heart of the oppressed, and make the oppressor tremble.

In former days he had appointed a special commission, to receive petitions, and give them suitable effect. This benefit not appearing to him sufficiently complete, he would have them subjected to a preliminary examination, under his own eye. He decided himself the method to be followed: and directed me, to make known to him every day, without disguise, the complaints, wants, and wishes, of the French people. I made it a point of duty, of honour, to execute this task in a proper manner, and to become the zealous protector of those who had none. Every morning I laid before the Emperor an analytical report of the requests capable of demanding his attention: he examined them with care, made marginal notes on them with his own hand, and sent them to his ministers with a favourable decision, or an order to verify them, and give him an account of the result.

In fine, to fulfil, as much as in him lay, the public expectation, the Emperor made numerous changes in the laws relating to the consolidated taxes (droits reunis), which, while they diminished the impost, freed it from its abuses and tyrannical forms, and rendered it less odious, and more supportable. These beneficial meliorations, though incomplete, were received with gratitude; and the Emperor was thanked for his endeavours to reconcile the interests of individuals with the wants of the public treasury.

But the satisfaction Napoleon derived from the happy effects of his solicitude was frequently disturbed by the disquietude and perplexity, which the cabals and manoeuvres of the royalists occasioned him. "The priests and the nobles," said he one day in a fit of ill-humour, "are playing a deep game. If I were to let loose the people upon them, they would all be devoured in the twinkling of an eye[101]."

[Footnote 101: These words, and several others that I have quoted, prove Napoleon not to have been ignorant of the use he might make of the people. If he did not have recourse to them, no doubt it was because he feared, that the remedy might prove worse than the disease.]

By a decree of the 25th of March, he had already ordered the ministers of the King, and the civil and military officers of his household, as well as of those of the princes, as also the chiefs of the Chouans, of the Vendeans, and of the royal volunteers, to remove to a distance of thirty leagues from Paris. This prudent precaution was but imperfectly executed. M. Fouche, to secure himself a refuge in the King's party, had sent for the principal of the proscribed persons to his house; expressed to them how much he felt interested for their situation, and the efforts he had made, to prevent their banishment; and finally authorised them pretty generally, to remain at Paris.

The Emperor, not aware that their audacity was owing to the protection of his minister, watched for an opportunity of intimidating them by an act of severity. While things were in this state, a M. de Lascours, a colonel, was arrested at Dunkirk, where he had introduced himself as an emissary from the King. Napoleon, deceived by the similarity of the name, supposed this officer to be the person, who pretended, in 1814, to have received orders, to blow up the powder magazine at Grenelle, and refused to execute them. "I should be sorry," said he, "to sacrifice by way of example a worthy man; but an impostor like this deserves no pity. Write to the minister at war, to have him taken before a military commission, and tried as an instigator to civil war, and to the overturning of the established government."

The Emperor, turning towards me, added: "How is it, that the absurd fable of this man has not been contradicted?"—"Sire," I answered, "Gourgaud has often assured me, that all your officers had publicly avowed their sentiments on it; and that it had been the intention of several generals, and particularly of general Tirlet, to unmask this odious lie to the King; but...." "Enough," said the Emperor, "I make no account of intentions: send the order, and let me hear no more of him."

I lost sight of this business: but I have since learned, that M. de Lascours was acquitted.

If M. de Lascours had been so unfortunate, as to fall a victim to his zeal, the Emperor would have been accused of barbarity; yet he was neither cruel nor sanguinary, for cruelty must not be confounded with severity. I know but one single act, the result of the most fatal counsels, for which, alas! he may be reproached by posterity[102]. Who besides have been the victims of his pretended ferocity? Will the death of Georges, and his obscure accomplices, be considered as a judicial murder? Are the infernal machine and its terrible ravages forgotten? Georges, at the head of the Chouans, was a misled Frenchman, to be pitied, and to be spared. Georges, at the head of a band of assassins, was undeserving of pity, and the cause of morality, as well as of humanity, demanded his punishment.

[Footnote 102: Napoleon, during the hundred days, entertained for a moment the design of issuing a demi-official note on the arrest and death of the Duke of Enghien.

The following memorandums are taken from papers, from which the note was to have been compiled.

Reports from the police had informed Napoleon, that there were conspiracies of the royalists beyond the Rhine, and that they were conducted and supported,

1st, by Messrs. Drake and Spencer Smith, the English ministers at Stutgard, and at Munich;

2dly, by the Duke d'Enghien and General Dumourier:

The central point of the former was at Offenbourg; where were some emigrants, some English agents, and the Baroness de Reich, so noted for her political intrigues:

The central point of the latter was given out to be at the castle of Ettenheim, where the Duke d'Enghien, Dumourier, an English colonel, and several agents of the Bourbons, resided.

The hundred and twenty thousand francs given by the minister Drake to the Sieur Rosey, chef de bataillon, to excite an insurrection,

The declarations of Mehee;

And the reports of M. Sh***, prefect of Strasbourg, and brother-in-law of the Duke de Fel....; leave no doubt of the existence of the intrigues at Offenbourg and Ettenheim, to which M. Sh*** ascribes in particular the agitation, and symptoms of discontent, that prevail at Weissembourg, and in several parts of Alsace.

On the other hand, the conspiracy of the 3d of Nivose had just broken out. The discoveries made by the servant of Georges, and by other individuals, led to the belief, that the Duke d'Enghien had been sent by England to the borders of the Rhine, in order to place himself at the head of the insurrection, as soon as Napoleon was made away with.

The necessity of putting an end to these plots, and strike terror into their instigators by a grand act of reprisal, squared in an incredible degree with the political considerations, that led Napoleon to attempt a bold stroke, in order to give the revolution, and the revolutionists, those guaranties, which circumstances demanded:

Napoleon, named consul for life (I borrow here the language of the Manuscript from St. Helena), felt the weakness of his situation, the ridiculousness of his consulship. It was necessary to establish something solid, to serve as a support to the revolution. The republicans were alarmed at the height, on which circumstances had placed him: they were suspicious of the use he might make of his power: they dreaded his renewing an antiquated royalty by the help of his army. The royalists fomented this rumour, and took a delight in representing him as an ape of the ancient monarchs: other royalists, more adroit, whispered about, that he was enamoured of the part of Monk, and that he would take the pains to restore the power, only to make a present of it to the Bourbons, when it should be in a proper state to be offered them.

Ordinary minds, unacquainted with his powers, credited these reports; they sanctioned the tales of the royalist party, and decried him to the people, and to the army; for they began to suspect him, and his attachment to their cause. He could not allow such an opinion to pass current, because it tended to unhinge every thing. It was necessary, at all events, to undeceive France, the royalists, and Europe at large, in order that they might know, what they had to reckon upon in him. A persecution of reports in detail never produces any thing but a bad effect, for it does not attack the root of the evil.

The death of the Duke d'Enghien would decide the question, that agitated France; it would decide the character of Napoleon beyond return; in fine, it might intimidate and punish the authors of the plots incessantly contriving against his life, and against the state: accordingly he determined on it.

He sent for Marshal Berthier, and this minister directed General Ord**, by an order which the Emperor dictated, and which I have seen, to set off post for Strasbourg; to cause General Lev** to place under his orders fifteen boatmen, three hundred dragoons from the garrison of Schelstadt, and thirty gendarmes; to pass the Rhine at Rheinan, to proceed to Ettenheim, to surround the town, and to carry off the Duke d'Enghien, Dumourier, an English colonel, and all the persons in their suite.

The Duke d'Enghien, General Thumery, Colonel de Grunstein, Lieutenant Schmidt, Abbe Weinburn, and five other inferior persons, were arrested by a chef d'escadron of the gendarmerie, named Ch**, who was charged with this part of the expedition.

Then, and then only, it became certain, that Dumourier was not at Ettenheim. General Thumery had been mistaken for him. This mistake, occasioned by the similarity of their rank, and some likeness of sound between their names, which the Germans pronounced nearly alike, had heightened the importance and criminality of the pretended plots at Ettenheim in the mind of Napoleon, and had the most fatal influence on his determination.

The Duke d'Enghien was brought from Strasbourg to Paris, and carried before a military commission.

The Empress Josephine, the Princess Hortense, fell at Napoleon's feet in tears, and conjured him to spare the life of the Duke d'Enghien. Prince Cambaceres and the Prince of Neufchatel strongly remonstrated to him on the horrible inutility of the blow he was about to strike. He appeared to hesitate, when the information was brought him, that the prince was no more.

Napoleon had not expected so speedy a catastrophe. He had even given orders to M. Real, to repair to Vincennes, to interrogate the Duke d'Enghien: but his trial and execution had been hastened by Murat; who, urged by some regicides, at the head of whom was M. Fou***, thought he should render a service to Napoleon, to his family, and to France, by insuring the death of a Bourbon.

The Prince de T***, whom the Emperor often publicly reproached with having advised the seizure and death of the Duke d'Enghien, was directed to pacify the court of Baden, and to justify the violation of its territory in the eyes of Europe. M. de Caulincourt being at Strasbourg, the Emperor thought him more proper than any other person, to follow up a negotiation, if the turn of affairs should require it; and he was directed to send to the minister of Baden the despatch of the Prince de T***. But there was no need of having recourse to negotiations: the court, far from complaining of the violation of its territory, expressed itself well contented, that the step taken had saved it the disgrace of consenting, or the embarrassment of a refusal.

This is an exact and true recital of the circumstances, that preceded, followed, and accompanied, the carrying off and death of the last of the house of Conde.

The seizure of the Duke d'Enghien was long imputed to M. de Caulincourt, and is still imputed to him by persons uninformed of the truth.

Some assert, that he arrested him with his own hands:

Others, that he gave orders for the seizure of his person: both these imputations are equally false.

He did not arrest the Duke d'Enghien, for his seizure was executed and consummated by chef d'escadron Ch***.

Neither directly, nor indirectly, did he give orders for seizing the prince: for the particular mission, to carry him off, was confided to General Ord**, and this general had no orders to receive from M. de Caulincourt his equal, perhaps even his inferior.

What made it be supposed, at a time when it was not possible to explain the facts, that M. de Caulincourt had been employed to seize the Duke d'Enghien, or cause him to be seized, was, that M. de Caulincourt received, at the same moment as General Ord**, orders to repair to Strasbourg, to cause the emigrants and English agents, who had fixed the seat of their intrigues at Offenbourg, to be carried off. But this mission, for which it would be requisite to take measures in concert with General Ord**, and perhaps even to assist him in case of need; for a simultaneous proceeding was necessary, that one expedition might not cause the failure of the other; this mission, I say, though analogous to that of General Ord**, had no real connexion with it.

Their objects were different:

That of one was to carry off the Duke d'Enghien from Ettenheim;

That of the other, to seize the conspirators at Offenbourg, which was eight or ten leagues distant.

Perhaps it will be objected, that M. de Caulincourt was not ignorant of General Ord**'s being directed, to seize the Duke d'Enghien. Be it so: I cannot perceive the consequence, attempted to be drawn from this. But what I have seen in the cabinet, and what I attest, is, that the order given to M. de Caulincourt said nothing of Ettenheim, and that the name of the Duke d'Enghien was not even mentioned in it: it related solely, in the first place, to the construction of a flotilla, that was preparing on the Rhine; and, secondly, to the expedition of Offenbourg; an expedition that terminated, as no doubt is still remembered, in the laughable flight of the minister Drake and his agents.

I have thought it my duty as a Frenchman and an historian, to enter into these details, and destroy for ever an error, which malevolence and the spirit of party have laid hold of, in order to tarnish the political life of one of the men, who do the greatest honour to the imperial government and to France.

M. de Caulincourt would not have been less irreproachable, had he committed the fatal seizure ascribed to him: he would have done his duty, as General Ord** did his. A soldier is not the judge of the orders he is to execute. The great Conde, covered with the laurels of Rocroy, Fribourg, Norlinguen, and Lenz, was arrested, in spite of the faith pledged to him, in the apartments of the King; yet neither his contemporaries, nor posterity, have charged Marshal d'Albret with this arrest as a crime.]

Will it be said, that Pichegru was strangled by his orders? The designs of Pichegru were so clearly substantiated, and the laws so clear, that he could not escape the scaffold: why, then, should he cause him to be murdered? The greatest criminals themselves do not commit useless crimes. Were apprehensions entertained of the disclosures he might make?... What could he disclose to the French people? That Napoleon aspired to the throne? Of this no one was ignorant.

A man, that Napoleon had reason to dread, was Moreau: was his life attempted? Yet it was less dangerous, to assassinate him, than to send to a tribunal, where guilt presided, a warrior at that time so dear to France and to the army.

No, Napoleon was not cruel, he was not sanguinary. If he were sometimes inexorable, it was because there are circumstances, in which the monarch must shut his heart to compassion, and leave the law free to act: but, if he knew how to punish, he was also capable of pardoning; and, at the moment when he gave up Georges[103] to the sword of justice, he spared the lives of Messrs. de Polignac and the Marquis de Riviere, whose courage and zeal he respected.

[Footnote 103: I have been assured, that Georges was three times offered his pardon by Napoleon, if he would promise, not to engage in any conspiracy again; and that it was not till after his third refusal, that his sentence was ordered to be carried into execution.]

The Emperor did not stop at the rigorous trial, to which he had delivered over the person of M. de Lascours: by a decree, dated the 18th of March, and published the 9th of April, he ordered the condemnation, and the sequestration of the property of

The Prince of Benevento, The Duke of Ragusa, The Duke of Alberg, The Abbe de Montesquiou, The Count de Jaucourt, The Count de Bournonville, and The Sieurs Lynch, Vitrolles, Alexis de Noailles, Bourienne, Bellard, La Roche-Jaquelin, and Sostene de la Rochefoucault[104];

[Footnote 104: Marshal Augereau, Duke de Castiglione, was also in this list. His name was struck out at the request of the duchess, and in consideration of the proclamation, which he published on the 23d of March.]

All of whom, as members of the provisional government, or agents of the royal party, had concurred in the subversion of the imperial government, previous to the abdication of Napoleon.

This decree, though supposed to have originated at Lyons, first saw the light at Paris; and was, as I have just said, the result of the ill humour, into which the plots of the royalists had thrown Napoleon. The terms, in which it was originally couched, too clearly attested its source: the first article said; "are declared traitors to their country, and shall be punished as such, &c."

It was I, who wrote this decree, from the dictation of the Emperor. When I had finished it, he ordered me, to go and get it signed by Count Bertrand, who had countersigned the decrees of Lyons. I went to the marshal. He read the decree, and returned it to me, saying: "I will never sign it: this is not what the Emperor promised us; they who advise him, to take such measures, are his bitterest enemies; I will speak to him about it." I related this firm and courageous answer to Napoleon word for word. He ordered me, to return to the grand Marshal, to endeavour to overcome his repugnance, and, if he still persisted, to bring him to him. Count Bertrand instantly followed me, with head erect, into the Emperor's closet. "I am astonished," said Napoleon to him in a dry tone, "that you make such difficulties about it to me. The severity I wish to display is necessary for the good of the state."—"I do not think so, Sire."—"I do, I tell you: and it is my business alone to judge of it. I did not ask your advice, but your signature, which is only a matter of form, and cannot in any way compromise you."—"Sire, a minister, who countersigns the act of a sovereign, is morally responsible for that act; and I should think myself wanting in my duty to your Majesty, and perhaps to myself, if I were weak enough to set my hand to such measures. If your Majesty choose to reign by the laws, you have no right, arbitrarily to pronounce, by a simple decree, sentence of death, and forfeiture of property, against your subjects. If you choose to act as a dictator, and to have no law but your own will, you have no need of the addition of my signature. Your Majesty has declared, by your proclamations, that you would grant a general amnesty. I countersigned them most cordially; and I will not countersign the decree, that revokes them."—"But you well know, I always told you, that I never would pardon Marmont, Talleyrand, and Augereau; and that I promised only to overlook, what had passed since my abdication. I know better than you, what I ought to do, to keep my promises, and ensure the tranquillity of the state. I begun with being indulgent, even to weakness and the royalists, instead of appreciating my moderation, have abused it: they bestir themselves, they conspire, and I ought and will bring them to their senses. I would rather have my blows fall on traitors, than on men who are misled. Besides, all those who are on the list, Augereau excepted, are out of France, or in concealment. I shall not seek for them: my intention is to terrify them more than harm them. You see, therefore," continued the Emperor, softening his voice, "you have not rightly considered the business: sign this for me, my dear Bertrand: you must."—"I cannot, Sire. I request your Majesty's permission, to submit my observations to you in writing."—"All that, my dear sir, will make us lose time: you are startled, I assure you, without any reason; sign, I tell you; I request you, you will do me pleasure."—"Permit me, Sire, to wait, till your Majesty has seen my observations." The marshal went away. This noble resistance did not offend the Emperor: the language of truth and honour never displeased him, when it issued from a pure heart.

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