The Spanish army on the south side of the Tagus, between Badajos and Alcantara, amounts to 21,000 men; of which 10,000 are encamped at Badajos, 8,000 at Albuquerque, and the remainder between Vincenti and Alcantara. The Prince of Peace was daily expected at head-quarters. His aides-de-camp were already arrived, and a train of 700 mules had been collected for the conveyance of his baggage. The French detachment was destined to join the army of Castile, which I already mentioned to your lordship has returned from its movements towards the northern provinces, and taken a position to the southward of Ciudad Rodrigo. Its numbers and distribution are not so accurately known, but it is stated to be equal to the army of Estremadura, with the addition of the French auxiliaries.

I have the honour to be, &c.

To Lord Hawkesbury. J.M. FRERE.

No. 2.

MY LORD,

By intelligence which arrived from Cadiz, in date of the second of this month, it appears that there were in that port five Spanish ships of the line, which had pushed out from Ferrol, conformably to the report which I mentioned to your lordship in my last despatch. There was at the same time (in Cadiz) an additional force of eight or ten sail preparing for sea; four of them of the line, and the remainder frigates. This equipment was however retarded by the want of naval stores, particularly sailcloth and cables, which was occasioned by the late fire which has taken place in the arsenal, as well as by the total want of money, which was such that many of the officers were actually reduced to subsist on charity.

The informant, whose authority may be depended on, adds that a squadron from Brest was expected to join them. It was supposed that the whole armament would be directed against Portugal; and this supposition was not weakened by a report which was given out industriously that the object of the intended expedition was to make a landing on the coast of Barbary, in order to force the Emperor of Morocco to shut his ports against the English. The ships from Ferrol have the French and Spanish colours united in the same flag. It was understood that the ships now arming in Cadiz were to be commanded by French officers. They were victualled only for a very short voyage.

Respecting the danger to which this capital would be exposed by a coup-de-main, which might be attempted in spite of the batteries at the entrance of the river, as well as the possibility of effecting a landing a few miles off Cascaes, your lordship has at hand the means of information so much superior to any which I could presume to offer, or collect from professional persons here, that I shall only presume to solicit your lordship's attention to the consideration of this subject, and to the necessity which may arise out of it, for employing a naval force upon this station. Don Rodrigo has informed me that the three Portuguese ships of the line, which I mentioned to your lordship as preparing for service, will be ready within three weeks to form a junction with any force which his Majesty might be pleased to detach, for the defence of Portugal; and that two more would be prepared to follow them within a short time after.

It appears by a letter from Viana, that the master of an English vessel, who had been captured on the 10th ultimo by Le Telegraph privateer, and carried into Corunna on the 23rd, had found there two large French frigates, which had arrived immediately before him in eight days from Cherbourg, laden with some ammunition, and destined (as they reported) for Cadiz. The master of Le Telegraph had avoided putting into any of his own ports from the apprehension of being detained, as it was reported that other privateers had been stopped, and stripped of their men, on account of a secret expedition which was fitting out in the French ports.

I have the honour to be, &c. J.H. FRERE.

The Right Honourable Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. &c.

No. 3.

Intelligence arrived from General O'Hara, at Gibraltar.

Arrived by land the crew of the Fortune privateer, consisting of twelve men. They report that last Saturday, between three and four P.M. they saw two three-deckers and three seventy-fours arrive at Cadiz from Ferrol; that the Santissima Trinidad, another Spanish three-decker, is completed and ready in that harbour; and that they are fitting out five other line-of-battle ships at Cadiz, which have their lower-masts in; that, in order to man the said ships, they are detaining all the crews of the French privateers; that those eleven ships are to be commanded by French officers; and they say the five ships in the Caraccas will soon be ready,—that they observed a number of seamen rigging them.—Gibraltar, 29th April 1801.

List of the armament fitting out at Cadiz.

Guns.

Santissima Trinidada 140 Atlante 80 Ferrivel 80 San Antonio 80 Suberano 80 San Justo 74 San Januario 80 Intrepido 80 Firme 80

The above ships are commanded by French officers, and probably, therefore, are those which are alluded to as having been ceded to France.

Guns Guns A. Real de St. Carlos 120 Bergantina St. Andre 24 St. Hermenegildo 120 Balandra Aglina 14 St. Fernando 120 St. Nicalao 14 St. Agustino 80 4 gun-boats [27] 2 } St. Izidoro 80 20 built by the inhabitants } Argonauta 80 of Cadiz 1 } Fragata Sabina 44 18 gun-boats 1 Fragata Perula 40 4 burlates

[27] 24-pounders each.

Caesar, Cawsand Bay, 9th June 1801.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of their lordships' secret orders, dated 6th instant; and, in compliance therewith, I have directed Captain Stirling, of his Majesty's ship Pompee, to put himself under my command.

Be pleased to inform their lordships that Admiral Sir Thomas Pasley has acquainted me that there is no hired armed brig at this port except the Louisa, and has placed the Joseph, hired cutter, only under my orders.

I am, sir, Your most obedient servant, JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To Evan Nepean, Esq. &c. &c. &c.

We need scarcely add that every possible exertion was made on the part of the admiral, the captains, officers, and crews of the respective ships, to get the squadron ready for sea; and in eight days the equipment was completed.

Before we record a circumstance which, in rewarding the merits of the new commander-in-chief, afforded great and universal satisfaction to the royal navy, we take occasion to introduce a correspondence, which, in order to avoid interruption of the narrative, has been omitted, and which will now be found more interesting.

Royal George, between Ushant and the Black Rocks, 26th July 1800.

MY DEAR LORD,

I need not describe to your lordship the merit of Sir James Saumarez, which cannot be surpassed. In a conversation I accidentally had with him last evening, I learned that his ambition had been much disappointed in not being created a baronet; and he thought I was wanting, in not pointing to this object in the letter I had the honour to write your lordship by him, after the battle of the Nile, where he was second in command; and he also conceives that your lordship led him to hope this mark of approbation of his services would have been conferred upon him. May I therefore trespass upon your indulgence, to request you will bring it about, if possible, as nothing can gratify me more, than that officers, who have signalised themselves under my auspices, should be amply rewarded.

Yours, most faithfully, ST. VINCENT.

To the Right Hon. Earl Spencer.

A copy of the preceding having been sent by Earl St. Vincent to Sir James, produced the following answer:—

MY LORD,

Permit me to express my sincere acknowledgments for the very handsome letter you have done me the favour to write on a certain subject to Lord Spencer. Whether it meets with the expected success, or otherwise, I shall ever feel grateful for your obliging intentions towards me: at the same time, I am persuaded your lordship must coincide with my feelings, when I observe that the boon now pointed out was no more than the services I had the good fortune to be employed upon, gave me reason to expect long before this.

That health, and every possible success may ever attend your lordship, is the fervent wish of

My dear lord, Your much obliged, and faithful humble servant,

JAS. SAUMAREZ. Caesar, 29th July 1800.

On the 13th of June, his Majesty, having taken into consideration the meritorious services of Sir James Saumarez, was pleased to create him a Baronet of the United Kingdom; and, as an additional mark of the royal favour, permission was granted under the King's sign manual to wear the supporters to the arms of his family (which had been registered in the Heralds' office since the reign of Charles the Second); a privilege to which no commoner is entitled without a dispensation from the Crown. Of these honours Sir James was informed by Earl St. Vincent, at that time First Lord of the Admiralty, at the moment the Caesar and squadron were about to proceed on one of the most interesting, and, as it turned out, one of the most glorious expeditions that ever left the shores of Great Britain.



CHAPTER XIV.

1801.

Sir James sails from England in command of a squadron of six sail of the line on a particular service.—Arrives off Cadiz.—Attacks a French squadron at Algeziras.—Captain Brenton's account of the battle.—Loss of the Hannibal.—Colonel Connolly's statements.—Logs of the Caesar and ships of the squadron.—Sir James proceeds to Gibraltar.—Remarks.—Flag of truce sent to Algeziras.—Correspondence with Linois.—Squadron refit at Gibraltar.

On the 16th June the signal was made to unmoor; and soon after, for the squadron to weigh. The wind being fair, the ships quickly cleared the English Channel, and crossed the Bay of Biscay. Cape Finisterre was reached on the 22nd; on the 26th the squadron hove to off the Tagus, and sent letters on shore at Lisbon. The detachment was now joined by the Phaeton, Captain Morris, and proceeded off Cadiz, where it arrived on the 28th June: to announce this, the following letter was written to Admiral Lord Keith, who had then the chief command on the Mediterranean station:

Caesar, off Cadiz, 26th June 1801.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your lordship of my arrival off Cadiz with the ships named on the margin[28] under my orders; having sailed from Cawsand Bay on the 16th instant. On the 26th I was joined, off Lisbon, by the Phaeton, Captain Morris, from whom I received the enclosed state of the enemy's ships at Cadiz.[29] The Venerable and Superb have both joined the squadron; and I have taken these ships under my orders, agreeably to my instructions from my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I shall take the earliest opportunity of transmitting to your lordship a copy of those instructions; but having at present no other vessel than the Plymouth, hired lugger, I cannot part with her further than to Gibraltar.

I have the honour to be, Your lordship's most obedient humble servant, JAS. SAUMAREZ.

Right Honourable Lord Keith, K.B. &c.

[28] Caesar, Pompee, Spencer, Hannibal, Audacious, Thames, Phaeton, and Plymouth, hired lugger.

[29] See list already given.

The squadron continued to cruise off Cadiz, and frequently to reconnoitre the harbour; while the Superb was stationed off Lagos as a look-out ship to westward, and the Thames in the Straits of Gibraltar to the eastward.

Nothing of importance occurred until the 5th, when intelligence was received as to the situation of a French squadron. Sir James accordingly despatched the Plymouth lugger with the following letters to the Secretary of the Admiralty, and to Mr. Frere, the English ambassador at Lisbon:

Caesar, off Cadiz, 5th July 1801. SIR

In my letter of the 29th ultimo, I acquainted you, for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, of my arrival before Cadiz with the squadron under my orders, and of my having been joined by the Venerable and Superb.

You will please to inform their lordships, that, early this morning, a despatch-boat joined me from Gibraltar, with intelligence that three French line-of-battle ships and a frigate were seen, on the 1st instant, endeavouring to pass the Straits from the eastward; and the Plymouth lugger has since joined me, whose commander informs me that they anchored yesterday off Algeziras. As from the different accounts I form great hopes of being able to attack them with success, I am proceeding to the eastward, and I hope to reach the bay early to-morrow morning. The ships in Cadiz are getting in forwardness to put to sea. Eight appeared this morning with top-gallant yards across and sails bent, and four others with their top-masts rigged. I have directed the commander of the Plymouth, hired lugger, after having landed this letter at Faro, to cruise off Cape St. Mary's to apprise any of his Majesty's ships of my rendezvous, giving them such further information as he may be possessed of.

I am, sir, your most obedient servant, JAMES SAUMAREZ. Evan Nepean, Esq. &c. &c. &c. Admiralty.

Caesar, off Cadiz, 5th July 1801.

SIR,

I have the honour to acquaint you with my having this instant received information, by an express from Gibraltar, that three sail of French line-of-battle ships and a frigate had anchored yesterday in Algeziras Bay, after being three days in endeavouring to pass the Straits from the eastward. They are supposed to be destined for Cadiz. I am proceeding off Gibraltar, in hopes it may be practicable to attack them, or prevent the junction of their other ships, from whom they are said to be separated. I request you will please to forward the letters I take the liberty to enclose herewith. I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obedient humble servant, JAMES SAUMAREZ.

Governor O'Hara writes that he is without intelligence from Egypt since the repulse of the French, the 21st March.

His Excellency J.H. Frere, Esq. &c. &c. &c. Lisbon.

It now becomes our duty to give a particular account of the defensive means of the French Admiral. The road of Algeziras, six miles distant from Gibraltar, is open to the eastward. It is shallow, with sunken rocks in several parts. The town is nearly in the centre, at the bottom of the Bay; about a third of a mile from which there is a tower standing on a point, and off this point is Isla Verda, whereon is a battery of seven long 24-pounders. About a mile to the southward of this battery is Fort Santa Garcia. The English ships had to pass these fortifications before they could reach the French line. The northward of the town was no less protected, having at the distance of about two-thirds of a mile the fort of San Jago, mounting five long 18-pounders, besides the tower Almirante. By referring to the diagrams, it will be manifest that the road is admirably protected by these fortifications, while those at a greater distance to the northward would be of some service in throwing shells, and in preventing the ships from working up to the attack. There were also fourteen large gun-boats, whose positions, as shown, were such as to form a serious opposition to an approaching enemy in light and variable winds.

Before we proceed to a description of the attack on the enemy's well-protected squadron, we must intreat the reader to pause, while we call his attention to the circumstance of the British ships, led by the gallant Hood, slowly and silently approaching the batteries of an enemy, strongly reinforced, perfectly prepared to receive them, and knowing well that they could not suffer any injury from the ships, while every shot from their cannon must tell. Silence, undoubtedly derives importance from the circumstances under which it is observed, and we cannot well refer to an instance where silence could have had a more solemn and impressive character than that which must have been observed on this occasion, until broken by the roar of the enemy's destructive engines.

Captain (now Admiral Sir Jahleel) Brenton, who was flag-captain of the Caesar, has kindly transmitted the following particular and authentic account of all that took place on that eventful day, which afforded the enemy a short-lived triumph. We shall make no apology for giving it in his own words:

On Sunday, the 5th July 1801, a despatch-boat was seen in the S.E., and at two P.M. came alongside the Caesar, with intelligence of a French squadron having anchored in Algeziras Bay, consisting of three sail of the line and a frigate.[30] The Admiral immediately decided on attacking them; and ordered the Thames frigate to proceed off St. Lucar to recall the Superb, and make sail with the Pompee, Hannibal, Spencer, Audacious, and Venerable, for the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar; making the signal to prepare for action, and for anchoring by the stern.

[30] Le Formidable, 84. Dessaix, 84. Indomptable, 74: and Meuron, 38.

The day was beautiful, with a light air from the westward. At eleven o'clock the ship's company was, as usual, assembled for the purpose of Divine service. The appearance of this congregation, under the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed,—proceeding, as they all knew they were, to engage in battle with the enemy, with the probability that many had but a few remaining hours to live,—was solemn and deeply impressive. The crew were all dressed in white, as is customary in warm climates; and being arranged according to their respective divisions on the quarter-deck, with the band and the marines on the poop, and the Admiral and the officers under the poop awning, an effect was produced highly animating, solemn, and appropriate; while the meek, devotional countenance of the well-tried Admiral indicated that he derived his confidence and support from its only true source.

Our chaplain, the Rev. Mr. Holliday, gave an excellent discourse, appropriate to the occasion; and it cannot be doubted but the impressions it made on that eventful day were deep and affecting, however temporary.

I had of course much communication with the Admiral during the course of this day and the ensuing night. He was, as usual, calm, cheerful, and collected; foreseeing, and endeavouring to provide for, whatever might be required during the struggle which we were anticipating. He was quite aware of the difficulties we had to encounter, and fully determined to overcome them if possible.[31]

[31] The following memorandum was communicated to the squadron before bearing up for Gibraltar Bay:

Memorandum

Caesar, 5th July 1801.

If the Rear-admiral finds the enemy's ships in a situation to be attacked, the following is the order in which it is to be executed:

The Venerable to lead into the bay, and pass the enemy's ships without anchoring;

The Pompee to anchor abreast of the inner ship of the enemy's line;

The Audacious, } " Caesar, } to anchor abreast of the enemy's ships " Spencer, } and batteries; " Hannibal, }

{ to keep under sail, and annoy the enemy's " Superb, { batteries and gun-boats during the attack " Thames, { assisted by the Plymouth lugger.

The boats of the different ships to be lowered down and armed, in readiness to act where required.

Given on board the Caesar, off Tariffa, 5th July 1801. JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To the respective Captains.

At daylight we were off Tariffa, with light airs from the westward, which at seven freshened to a strong breeze, and enabled the Venerable to open the Bay of Algeziras, in which the French squadron were discovered at anchor. On the Venerable making the signal that she could weather the enemy, the Admiral made another to take stations for mutual support. The Pompee, Venerable, and Audacious were soon at an anchor, and at thirty-five minutes after eight began the action with the enemy. The Caesar at nine o'clock opened her fire, and at fifteen minutes past nine came to an anchor ahead of the Venerable. The Spencer and Hannibal passed under our lee, nearly becalmed, and anchored without the Caesar, firing, as the smoke subsided, through the openings between our ships at the enemy.

About ten o'clock the fire of the French ships appeared to slacken so much that I ventured to suggest to the Admiral that a flag of truce might be sent in, with a notice to the Spaniards that if the British squadron were permitted to take away the French ships without any further molestation from the batteries, the town would be respected, and no further injury done to it.

The Admiral expressed his readiness to do this; but considered the advantage we had gained, as yet, not sufficiently decisive to justify such a measure. And his judgment was but too correct. The decrease of the fire from the French ships arose from their being occupied in warping close in-shore; and, shortly after this period, the Pompee having broken her sheer, lost her commanding position relative to the French Admiral, whom she had been raking with great effect, and now became raked in her turn. At twenty minutes after ten, the boats of the squadron were sent to her assistance, and, having cut her cables, she was towed out of her exposed situation.

At thirty-five minutes after ten, the Admiral, observing how much the enemy had increased their distance from us by warping in-shore, ordered our cables to be cut, and sail to be made upon the ships, in the hope of being able to close with them. He also sent me on board the Spencer, with orders to Captain Darby to weigh, and work up to the enemy. The Hannibal, having already received these orders, was in the act of obeying them, and soon after opened her fire upon the French Admiral; but in the gallant endeavour to get between the Formidable and the shore, and not being aware of the French Admiral's change of position by warping in, Captain Ferris unfortunately ran his ship aground, abreast of the battery of St. Jago, and under the raking fire of the Formidable. In this helpless state he continued to engage the enemy until, to use the French Admiral's words, his decks were jonche de morts. He had seventy-three killed and sixty-four wounded,—a very unusual proportion, as, in general, the wounded trebles the number of the killed; but this may be accounted for by the Hannibal being so near that the enemy's shot passed through her sides without making any splinters, to which the greater number of wounds are attributable.

From the time the Caesar cut her cable, she and the Audacious were constantly engaged with the Indomptable, Meuron, and island batteries, and occasionally with the Dessaix, as they could bring their guns-to bear; but the perpetual flaws of wind rendered this very difficult, and exposed them frequently to a severe and raking fire from the enemy. The Admiral made the signal for the marines to be prepared to land on the island; but, as the boats were all employed in assisting the Pompee and Hannibal, this was rendered impracticable. At length, finding every effort fruitless to close with the enemy, the Admiral was under the necessity of withdrawing his ships from this unequal contest with winds and batteries; but it was not until all hope had vanished of saving the Hannibal that he left her in possession of the enemy.

The accompanying diagram shows first, the position of the hostile squadrons at the moment the Spencer, and Venerable, and Caesar, had anchored; secondly, their position when the action ceased, and when the Hannibal was in possession of the enemy.

The action of Algeziras was certainly obstinately fought, and gallantly contested on both sides. It is true that the French had little to do but to attend to their guns, being either at an anchor in their strong position, or warping towards the shore. In this operation the Spaniards had the hardest duty, being employed in their boats in carrying out hawsers, and even in heaving them in. Success seemed certain to the British squadron till the Pompee broke her sheer; after that, it was one continued but unavailing struggle to recover the ground we had lost by this misfortune: and we retreated to Gibraltar when all hope was at an end, the Admiral justly considering the importance of repairing the damages already sustained, and of preserving the lives of his gallant crew, which would be uselessly sacrificed by a continuance of a hopeless contest.

Never did I contemplate more real greatness of mind than was displayed on this occasion by our heroic chief. The calmness and cheerfulness with which he met and sustained the sad reverses of this most trying day, were objects worthy of remark and admiration. Whilst going into the Bay of Algeziras, he desired me to look over my signal-book, and to mark such signals as might be likely to be called for. He had already done the same, and when, during the heat of the action, any of the flags were destroyed, or the halliards shot away, I was astonished at the readiness with which he ordered one signal to be substituted for another, according as the signification might answer the purpose, without any reference to the book.

On reaching our anchorage off the Mole of Gibraltar, after giving the necessary orders for the disposal and refitting of his squadron, he returned to his cabin with a deep sense of the responsibility he had incurred; but supported by the unqualified conviction that every exertion had been made to obtain success, and that the disappointment resulted from circumstances over which he had no control.

The action terminated, as appears by the log, at thirty-five minutes after one; and the squadron proceeded to Gibraltar. As soon as the ship was secured, the Admiral sent me on shore to the governor, to relate to him the events of the two preceding days. I found him sitting in his balcony, which commanded a view of the Bay and Algeziras, evidently deeply affected by the unlooked-for termination of an attack upon the French squadron, and anxiously reflecting on the probable results.

On my return on board, the Admiral had retired to his cot; and I had no means of communicating with him until next morning. I could then, however, perceive that under all the severity of disappointment he experienced from our failure, and the loss of the Hannibal, he felt that no honour had been lost; that every effort had been made to obtain success; and that he derived comfort from the sanguine hopes he entertained that an opportunity might present itself in which he should be able to retrieve the loss.

He ordered me to take a flag of truce and wait upon the French Admiral, and propose an exchange of prisoners; which M. Linois refused, alleging that it was not in his power to establish a cartel for the purpose until he obtained the sanction of the Minister of the Marine at Paris, to whom he had sent off an express as soon as the firing had ceased on the preceding day; but he consented to send over the officers on parole. The object of the French Admiral was very obvious. He concluded we wanted the men to replace those that had been killed and wounded; but he thought, justly, that sending over officers on parole would be a harmless act of courtesy, from which we could reap no immediate benefit. It will be seen that, subsequently to the second action, (only six days after the first,) when his despatches from Algeziras had scarcely reached Paris, he did not wait for an answer from the Minister of the Marine: but circumstances had altered. We had taken a line-of-battle ship, and burned two first-rates; and he now wished to get as many of the crew back as possible.

We shall now transcribe the Rear-admiral's official account of the battle: this affords additional particulars, and proves that every step had been taken to insure success; which, but from circumstances that often blight the fairest prospects, would have had a very different result. We shall venture to add, that, had the gallant Admiral hesitated to make the attempt, he would have rendered himself obnoxious to animadversions, not only from all the squadron under his command, but from every one on the Rock of Gibraltar who witnessed the enemy's squadron of inferior force setting, as it were, that of Sir James at defiance; while it would have afforded the French and Spaniards a just, or, at least a plausible subject of exultation. But Sir James, with that decision of character and coolness, when in the presence of an enemy, for which he was always remarkable, did not hesitate one moment on the attack, which was made with consummate skill, and maintained with a perseverance never surpassed.

Caesar, Gibraltar, 6th July 1801.

SIR,

I have to request you will be pleased to inform my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that, conformable to my letter of yesterday's date, I stood through the Straits, with his Majesty's squadron under my orders, with the intention of attacking three French line-of-battle ships and a frigate that I was informed were at anchor off Algeziras. On opening Cabrita Point, I found the ships lay at a considerable distance from the enemy's batteries; and having a leading wind up to them, every reasonable hope of success in the attack was afforded.

I had previously directed Captain Hood in the Venerable, from his experience and knowledge of the anchorage, to lead the squadron, which he executed with his accustomed gallantry; and, although it was not intended he should anchor, he found himself under the necessity of so doing, from the wind failing,—a circumstance so much to be apprehended in this country, and to which I have to attribute the want of success in this well-intended enterprise. Captain Stirling anchored, conformably to the enclosed order of attack, opposite to the inner ship of the enemy, and brought the Pompee to action in the most spirited and gallant manner; an example which was followed by the commanders of every ship in the squadron.

Captains Darby and Ferris, owing to light winds, were prevented for a considerable time from coming into action. At length, the Hannibal getting a breeze, Captain Ferris had the most favourable prospect of being alongside one of the enemy's ships, when the Hannibal unfortunately took the ground; and I am extremely concerned to acquaint their lordships that, after having made every possible effort with this ship and the Audacious to rescue her from the enemy, I was under the necessity to make sail, being at the time only three cables' length from one of the enemy's batteries.

My thanks are particularly due to all the captains and men under my orders; and, although their endeavours have not been crowned with success, I trust the thousands of spectators from his Majesty's garrison, and also the surrounding coast, will do justice to their valour and intrepidity, which were not to be checked by the fire from the numerous batteries (however formidable) that surrounded Algeziras.

I feel it incumbent upon me to state to their lordships the great merits of Captain Brenton of the Caesar, whose cool judgment and intrepid conduct, I will venture to pronounce, were never surpassed. I also beg leave to recommend to their lordships' notice my flag-lieutenant, Mr. Philip Dumaresq, who has served with me from the commencement of this war, and is a most deserving officer. Mr. Lamborn and the other lieutenants are also entitled to great praise; as well as Captain Maxwell of the Marines, and the other officers of his corps serving on board the Caesar.

The enemy's ships consisted of two of eighty-four guns and one of seventy-four, with a large frigate: two of the former are aground, and the whole are rendered totally unserviceable.

His Majesty's ships have suffered considerably in their masts and rigging; but I hope will soon be refitted, and in readiness to proceed on service.

Inclosed is the return of the killed and wounded from the different ships of the squadron. Amongst other valuable men I have most sincerely to lament the loss of Mr. William Grave, master of the Caesar. I cannot close this letter without rendering the most ample justice to the great bravery of Captain Ferris: the loss in his ship must have been very considerable both in officers and men; but I have the satisfaction to be informed that his Majesty has not lost so valuable an officer.

The Honourable Captain Dundas, of his Majesty's sloop the Calpe, made his vessel as useful as possible, and kept up a spirited fire on one of the enemy's batteries. I have also to express my approbation of Lieutenant Janvrin, commander of the gun-boats; who, having joined me with intelligence, served as volunteer on board the Caesar.

I am, Your most obedient servant, JAS. SAUMAREZ.

To Evan Nepean, Esq. &c. &c. &c.

On the return of the squadron to the Mole of Gibraltar, the following public order was issued by the Admiral.

Caesar, in Rosia Bay, 6th July 1801.

Rear-admiral Sir James Saumarez desires to express in the strongest terms the high sense he entertains of the gallantry and valiant conduct of all the captains, officers, and men belonging to the squadron under his orders, in the attack made this day on the enemy's ships and batteries; and, although the result has not proved so successful as his expectations had framed, he trusts that the glory they have acquired on this occasion will ever be acknowledged by their country.

JAS. SAUMAREZ.

To the respective Captains.

The following addition to Sir James's despatch gives the account of the capture of the Hannibal, from Captain Ferris, then a prisoner at Algeziras.

Caesar, Gibraltar, 9th july 1801.

SIR,

I herewith enclose a letter from Captain Ferris of his Majesty's late ship Hannibal, which I request you will please to lay before their lordships; and I have only to express my deep regret that his well-meant endeavours to bring his ship to close action should have occasioned so severe a loss. I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obedient servant, JAS. SAUMAREZ. Evan Nepean, Esq. Admiralty.

Algeziras Bay, 7th July 1801.

SIR,

I have little more to tell you of the fate of his Majesty's ship Hannibal than yourself must have observed; only, that from the number of batteries, and ships' gun-boats, &c. we had to encounter, our guns soon got knocked up; and I found it was impossible to do anything, either for the preservation of the ship, or for the good of the service. Our boats, sails, rigging, and springs being all shot away, and having so many killed and wounded, as will appear by the annexed list, I thought it prudent to strike, and thereby preserve the lives of the brave men that remained.

Had I been successful in the view before me previously to the ship taking the ground, my praises of the conduct of my officers and ship's company could not have exceeded their merits; but I have, notwithstanding, the satisfaction to say, that every order was obeyed and carried into execution with that promptitude and alacrity becoming British officers and seamen.

I am, sir, Your most obedient humble servant, S. FERRIS.

To Rear-admiral Sir James Saumarez.

It has now become necessary that we should notice a controversy which has taken place between the authors of the different naval histories on the subject of the Battle of Algeziras; and we have been led to make minute inquiries, first, into the cause of the discrepancies of the different accounts; and, secondly, into the truth, which we have been the better able to do from our personal knowledge and recent communication with some of the officers of the Hannibal and Caesar, on whose veracity we can depend. We are happy to add that the result of our inquiries has been satisfactory, and, we trust, will completely clear up and reconcile the facts, while it will leave no reflection of a dubious character on the conduct of the heroic commander of the squadron.

It appears that no difference of opinion arose on this subject until the court-martial of Captain Ferris, which took place on the 1st September 1801, at Portsmouth, Rear-admiral Holloway president; when, as usual on trials for the loss of a ship, Captain Ferris read his narrative, which he begins thus:

"In giving a detail of the circumstances which led to the loss of his Majesty's late ship Hannibal, I am sorry that, owing to my clerk being killed, whose remarks were lost,[32] I cannot be so particular as to the exact times of signals being made as I otherwise should have been; but I shall state them to you to the best of my recollection."

[32] The captain's clerk is stationed in action to take minutes of the events as they occur.

After this admission, is it not surprising that the controversy should be mainly founded on the time at which the Hannibal struck her colours? Captain Ferris says, "about two o'clock;" while by the log of the Caesar the action had entirely ceased at thirty-five minutes past one. It may be asked, why did not the court, which must have seen the discrepancy between his narrative and the public and other documents before it, inquire into the truth by requiring the evidence of the officers and crew, none of whom were examined as to the time the ship struck: but the duty of the court being confined to the trial of Captain Ferris, his officers and crew, and it being (whether supported or not) evident and notorious that they had defended their ship to the last extremity, they had (unluckily for Sir James) nothing to do but to pronounce an honourable acquittal.

The next contradiction which appears, relates to the boats which were sent to the assistance of the Hannibal. Captain Ferris says, "The Admiral, having previously made my signal of recall, sent a boat from the Caesar, and another from the Venerable, to my assistance; but, finding they could afford me none, I sent the Venerable's boat back, and the crew of the Caesar in one of my own cutters, their pinnace having been sunk by a shot alongside."

I am bound to say that this assertion is not borne out either by the testimony of those who were in the boats of the Caesar and the Venerable, or by the officers of the Hannibal; because, as will be seen hereafter, these boats never reached the Hannibal, when aground, until after she had struck her colours.

Captain Ferris next relates that "About twelve o'clock our ships were all out of gun-shot of the enemy, and we had the fire of the whole French squadron, batteries, and gun-boats, to contend with alone; against which we continued to keep up as brisk a fire as could be expected, even by men in the most sanguine anticipation of victory, until near two o'clock."

Now this is quite impossible, as, by the log of every ship, the squadron was engaging much later: by the Caesar, until 1h. 35m.; by the Audacious, until 1h. 20m.; by the Venerable, until 1h. 30m. &c.; before which, the ensign of the Hannibal was seen, from every ship, Union down.

It has been unwarrantably alleged by some that the Hannibal hauled the ensign down, and then hoisted it reversed, as a signal of distress, and afterwards, when she struck, hauled it down; and that the French hoisted it union down to decoy the Calpe. But, for the refutation of these absurdities, we must refer the reader to the testimony of Colonel Connolly, who was then acting captain of the marines, an officer of the highest character, whose veracity cannot be questioned; and who, moreover, from being the only officer on the poop when the colours were struck, had a better opportunity of knowing the facts than any other. The following are the questions which we put to Colonel Connolly, with his answers, given verbatim:

Did the enemy take possession of the Hannibal before the colours were hoisted union down?

The colours were hauled down by Captain Ferris's orders, and remained so; but, being so near the Formidable, the captain of her was on board of us in two minutes after we had struck, and the colours were hoisted union downwards by the Frenchmen.[33]

[33] When the French happen to take one of our men-of-war, they do not, as we would do, hoist their own colours over their opponents', but hoist the English ensign union downwards. It so seldom happened that an English man-of-war was taken by the French, that this circumstance was known to very few in the navy, and consequently, the ensign reversed was known only as the signal of distress used by merchant-ships.

Were the colours hoisted union down by the enemy; or, at any time, by Captain Ferris's orders?

By the enemy.

Did the boats come before or after the colours were hoisted union downwards, to render her assistance?

The boats from our ships did not get near us till after we were in possession of the enemy; and I called to an old shipmate of mine in the Venerable's barge, and told him so, as he came under the starboard quarter; but he persisted in coming on board, and was taken.

What boats were taken; and what boats escaped?

A good many were taken. The Venerable's barge and her first lieutenant; and another lieutenant, in the Caesar's boat, of some ship lying at Gibraltar; beside the mids. I am not aware indeed that any escaped.

What French officer took possession of the Hannibal?

I am not quite certain whether it was the captain of the Formidable or the Dessaix; they were both very close to us: however, he was a very little fellow.

To what prison were you taken?

The ship's company were divided into two prisons, which appeared to have been stables. There was no water in one of them, and the distress of our poor fellows, on that account, was truly shocking: often, when they would give money to the people outside to bring them some to drink, they would walk off with it, and never bring the water.

On this occasion Colonel Connolly recognised a French officer who had been a short time previously a prisoner on board the Warrior, to whom he had been particularly civil, supplying him with linen, &c.; and who left the ship with protestations of his desire to make every return in his power, if the "fortune of war" should give him an opportunity: but when he claimed the performance of his promise, his reply was, "Monsieur de Connolly, I very sorry for your misfortune; but I wish you good morning!" and left him with a sarcastic sneer.

It is evident, from this testimony, that the colours were only struck once, and hoisted once union down, and only hoisted union down by the Frenchmen; and that the boats of the Caesar and Venerable were only once on board the Hannibal after she was aground; namely, when their crews were taken prisoners. But both these boats were actually sent to her assistance at a previous period, when the Hannibal was directed by the Admiral to endeavour to obtain a position to rake the Formidable; and it was then that they were sent back. Captain Brenton first received the report of the Hannibal having her colours union downwards between twelve and one, while the Caesar was engaging the island battery, and the Dessaix and the Muiron.

The Caesar's boat was sent with others to the assistance of the Hannibal, according to the log, at seventeen minutes past one, and must have reached her certainly before the action ceased, and found her in the hands of the enemy, as described by Colonel Connolly.

It is absurd to suppose that, while actually engaging the enemy, Captain Ferris would haul down his colours, to hoist them as a signal of distress, when he had other ensigns to hoist, and when there was a signal in the book, "In distress, and in want of immediate assistance:" this is a circumstance which, I will venture to assert, never occurred in any naval action.

Captain Brenton, being decidedly of the same opinion, adds, "I can only say, when it was reported to me, while in action, that the Hannibal's colours were reversed, I considered her to be in possession of the enemy: that the Admiral took the same view of the subject, I have not the least doubt; and I think nothing would have induced him to abandon the Hannibal while she was engaged. I will further add, that I never remember the slightest doubt being expressed of the Hannibal having struck before the action terminated, until I read the narrative of Captain Ferris, at his court-martial, some time afterwards."

The moment these champions of "liberte, egalite, et la mort," entered the Hannibal, plunder was the order of the day; and, in their furious haste to get at the officers' trunks, they cruelly trod over the wounded in the cockpit and cable-tiers. Colonel Connolly relates that in a few minutes one of them had taken his new cocked-hat, and appeared on deck with it. He himself had given up seeking his desk, which contained a considerable sum of money besides valuable papers, because he could not get at it without creeping over the wounded; but the French, not so particular, soon found it.

We shall now give the extracts of the various logs to which we have had access. These have never yet been published, and we trust they will set the matter at rest. It is some satisfaction indeed, that all authors agree in declaring that nothing more could have been done, and that the honour of the British flag was to the last gloriously maintained on the 6th of July 1801.

Extract of the Caesar's log in the Battle of Algeziras, 5th July:

Winds S.W. and variable. At 12h. 30m. P.M. up mainsail and in royals; at 2h. made the signal for the squadron to prepare for battle, and, anchoring, bent the sheet cable through the larboard gun-room port to the sheet anchor; at 4h. set steering-sails,—fresh breezes and fair; at 8h. moderate breezes,—Cape Moulinau E.N.E. seven or eight miles; at 12h. (midnight), light airs inclinable to calm,—squadron in company, Venerable S.S.E. one mile. At 12h. 30m. (6th), in steering-sails, and at 12h. 40m. lowered down the yawl; at 3h. 45m. a breeze sprung up,—made the signal for attention; at 4h. 5m. beat to quarters,—Cabrita Point, S.E. by E. three or four leagues,—made the Pompee's signal to close; at 5h. set top-gallant steering-sails, and at 6h. the fore-top-mast steering-sail; at 7h. 45m. made the Venerable's signal to haul the wind,—took in the starboard steering-sails; at 8h. in steering-sails; at 8h. 5m. in top-gallant sails,—made the signal for being at liberty to engage the enemy in passing; at 8h. do. to take stations for mutual support; at 8h. 25m. set top-gallant sails,—the enemy's ships opened their fire,—saw the Venerable break round off,—Caesar fired at a Spanish battery in passing; at 8h. 35m. the action commenced with the Pompee, Venerable, and Audacious; at 8h. 45m. made the signal for the ships astern to make more sail; at 9h. light breezes, and variable,—opened our fire, and the engagement became general; at 9h. 15m. passed the Venerable, and came to with the sheet-anchor in nine fathoms,—the sheet-cable became taut,—let go the best bower to steady the ship,—Spencer and Hannibal passed under our lee,—hailed them to get the boats ahead, and tow into action,—light airs; at 9h. 35m. the Spencer opened her fire; at 9h. 40m. the Hannibal, do.—our spanker-boom shot away; at 10h. 20m. sent boats to the Pompee and Hannibal; at 10h. 26m. made the Hannibal's signal to tack,—saw the Pompee had broke her sheer, apparently by a flaw of wind, and was raked by the French Admiral; at 10h. 30m. made the Pompee's signal to cut or slip; at 10h. 35m., a breeze springing up from the N.W., cut our cable, wore, and made sail, engaging the enemy's ships while passing them; at 10h. 50m. the Hannibal opened her fire on the French Admiral; at 10h. 52m. made the signal for the squadron to come to,—the wind on the starboard tack; at 11h. 5m. made the signal for the boats to tow the Pompee,—Caesar engaging the southernmost ships,—Audacious, ditto,—Caesar opened her fire on the island battery,—Audacious and Caesar becalmed near the island reef,—boats employed towing the ship's head round; afternoon,—light winds and variable weather,—engaging the enemy; at 12h. 33m. made the signal for the Hannibal being aground,—employed engaging the southernmost ship; at 1h. 17m. Audacious wore,—made the signal for armed-boats to proceed as denoted; at 1h. 35m. the action ceased,—found the main-mast shot through in five places, (and other damage which need not be mentioned,) nine men killed, twenty-five wounded, and seven missing; at 5h. came-to at Gibraltar, with the small bower employed warping alongside of the sheer hulk.

The Venerable's log, which we have examined at the depot at Deptford, and which is signed by Captain Hood, fully corroborates the above, with the addition,—"At 12h. 40m. sent the first lieutenant in the pinnace to assist the Hannibal;" and this officer (Lieutenant Collis) in his own journal mentions the same fact. When he arrived at the Hannibal, she was in possession of the enemy; and he was taken prisoner, with his boat's crew, by persisting to go on board after he was warned by Lieutenant (now Colonel) Connolly, of the Marines. He says it was in consequence of the ensign being reversed that the boats were sent; and, before any of the boats reached her, she was in possession of the French, who hoisted the colours union downwards themselves, and that they never were hoisted in that manner at any other time.

These facts are also corroborated by the logs and journals of the Audacious and Spencer, which will be given in the next chapter. Every ship, indeed, mentions the impossibility of affording any assistance to the Hannibal, and that the signal was not made to leave off action until her situation was utterly hopeless.

The nature of the well-protected road of Algeziras being fully manifest in the diagram facing the 346th page, it is unnecessary to point out the difficulties the squadron had to contend with from the five strong batteries, which were served with much effect by the French artillerymen. The numerous gun-boats stationed at Algeziras for the annoyance of our commerce, were from their constant practice in that kind of warfare, of themselves a most formidable enemy; besides, the assistance they afforded in warping their ships in-shore, and placing them in such a position as to enable the different batteries to support them. But the failure of the attack must be mainly attributed to the unsteadiness and faintness of the wind, which enabled none of the squadron to obtain the position it wished; that is, in-shore of the enemy: while, by falling calm at a moment the most disadvantageous, it left the ships exposed to the enemy's fire without the possibility of returning it.

The loss sustained by each ship was severe. The Caesar had her master, Mr. William Grave, six seamen, and two marines, killed; her boatswain, G.W. Forster, seventeen seamen, one boy, and six marines, wounded; besides the capture of Lieutenant Janvarin, a volunteer, Mr. Richard Best, and seven seamen, who were taken by boarding the Hannibal when in possession of the enemy. Her masts, particularly the main-mast, and yards, were very much injured; her boats were all cut to pieces, besides that taken at the Hannibal; and there were many shots in her hull. The Pompee had Mr. P. Roxborough, master, Mr. Stewart, midshipman, ten seamen, and three marines killed; Lieutenants Cheesman, Stapleton, and Innes, Messrs. Currie, Hillier, and Hibbert, fifty-three seamen, and ten marines, wounded. She was so completely damaged in masts, rigging, and sails, that all hope of refitting her as promptly as the rest was at an end. The Spencer had Mr. Spencer, a midshipman, and five seamen, killed; Mr. Chatterton, midshipman, twenty-three seamen, and three marines wounded. She was damaged chiefly in her rigging and sails, which were soon repaired. The Venerable had Mr. W. Gibbons, midshipman, and eight seamen, killed; Messrs. Austin and Collins, midshipmen, twenty seamen, and four marines, wounded; and eight missing. The Hannibal had seventy-five killed, among whom were Mr. D. Lindsay, clerk, and Lieut. James Williams, R.M.; and seventy wounded and missing. The Audacious had eight killed; Lieut. Day, of the Marines, thirty-one seamen and marines, wounded. The total loss of the squadron being one hundred and twenty-three killed, two hundred and forty-two wounded, and twenty-two missing.

The loss of the French and Spaniards, by their own accounts, was considerable; the former having three hundred and six killed,—among whom were Captains Moncousu, of the Dessaix, seventy-four, and Lalonde, of the Indomptable, eighty-four,—and near five hundred wounded; five gun-boats were sunk, and others damaged; and the forts, in which eleven men were killed, received considerable injury. The ships suffered a good deal in hull, masts, and rigging; but not so much as was anticipated.

The French, as might be expected, from their usual disregard to truth, made this out one of the most brilliant exploits ever performed. Their account stated that three French ships had completely beaten six English, which took refuge in Gibraltar after leaving the Hannibal in their possession, &c.; saying nothing of the heavy batteries and gun-boats they had to contend with. But the Spaniards, in the Madrid Gazette extraordinary, represented the "action as very obstinate and bloody on both sides; and likewise on the part of the batteries, which decided the fate of the day:" and in another place, "the fire of our batteries was so hot and well supported that the enemy suffered most from them; and particularly it is to the St. Jago we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manoeuvre of attempting to pass between the French Rear-admiral's ship, the Formidable, and the shore, made her take the ground; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertions to get her afloat, it was found impossible to move her. Then the fire from the battery very soon dismasted her, and compelled her to strike."[34]

[34] James, vol. iii. p. 120.

The diagram, besides pointing out the situations of the five strong batteries, which so completely protect the harbour, and which did the greatest execution, shows the first position of the ships about the time they all anchored, and before the enemy's ships had warped near the shore. The second, represented by the outlines, shows the situation of the hostile squadrons at the time the Hannibal struck, when the Pompee had nearly reached the Mole, the distance of which from Algeziras is little more than four miles, and the Spencer was considerably advanced in that direction.

We cannot conclude our account of this action without a few remarks on the circumstances we have related. There cannot be a doubt that, had the enemy remained in the position he held at the commencement of the action, every ship would have been taken. Praise is certainly due to Admiral Linois for his able manoeuvre of warping his ships aground, being the only chance he had of escaping; while it was acknowledging that, as long as his ships were continued afloat, he had no confidence in protection from the batteries, strong as they were, against the valour and perseverance of British seamen.

Although the attack was not crowned with the success it merited, in a national point of view the result was as complete as if the whole squadron had been destroyed, as the enemy were thereby prevented from proceeding further in the execution of the ulterior object of their expedition; and the chance of this alone was sufficient to justify Sir James in this bold and daring attempt, which, it will be seen, ultimately led to one of the most glorious achievements which adorn the annals of the empire.[35]

[35] The discrepancies between the diagram and some of the statements given in the logs, are easily accounted for by the changes which took place in the positions of the ships during the action.



CHAPTER XV.

1801.

Observations on the Battle of Algeziras.—Copies of the Journals of the Spencer, Audacious, and Venerable.—Remarks on them.—Further particulars.—The Spanish account.—The French account.—Bulletin from the Moniteur.—Anecdote of an occurrence at St. Malo.—Sword presented to Linois.—Lines on the occasion.—His improvement of Naval tactics.—Epigram.—Anecdote of the intrepidity of one of the Caesar's men.

It has been mentioned in the preceding chapter that, owing chiefly to the minutes of Captain Ferris's court-martial, and to the discrepancies in different statements, a controversy has arisen on the subject. In order to avoid the possibility of our becoming a party thereto, correct copies of the logs, which are now at the Record Office in the Admiralty, are subjoined, after having been compared with those at Somerset House.

Copy of the Log of his Majesty's ship Spencer, 6th July 1801.

Moderate and cloudy,—spoke his Majesty's ship Caesar, which informed us of having intelligence of three sail of French line-of-battle ships and a frigate being in Algeziras Bay,—answered the signal to prepare for battle at anchor,—employed clearing ship for battle at anchor; at 6h. Apes hill S.E.; at half-past 6 beat the general to quarters,—ship clear for action; A.M. light airs and variable; at 4h. sprung up a breeze from the westward; at 7h. 58m. saw three French sail-of-the-line and one frigate, lying under the protection of the Spanish batteries of Algeziras, and a strong fortified island to the southward, and a number of forts and redoubts to the westward of them.

At 8h. 17m. the batteries commenced firing on the Venerable, Pompee, and Audacious,—Venerable commenced firing; at 9h. 11m. we commenced firing; at 9h. 35m. found the sheet-cable cut through by the enemy's shot; at 9h. 48m. anchored between the Caesar and the Hannibal, Audacious astern, the Pompee on our larboard bow, having a battery and the French Admiral's ship to oppose us on our larboard beam, a battery and gun-boats ahead; at 10h. 33m. dismasted and disabled a gun-boat that was rowing to the assistance of the others; at 10h. 39m. cut the cable per Admiral's order whilst wearing,—the gun-boats attempted to approach us from under the land, but the brisk fire that was kept up made them retreat in great disorder; at 11h. 3m. answered the signal to come to the wind on the larboard tack (No. 98); at 11h. 7m. commenced firing at the outer ships of the enemy, which was kept up at intervals.

At 11h. 37m. observed the Hannibal under the batteries at the north end of the town, with her main-top-mast shot away and aground, but keeping up a brisk fire on the enemy's ships and batteries; P.M. Hannibal still on shore, but keeping up a brisk fire at the enemy's ships and batteries; at 1h. 16m. observed the Hannibal to slacken her fire, shortly after the ensign hauled down and hoisted union downwards; at 1h. 35m. observed the enemy's boats boarding the Hannibal; at 1h. 44m. ceased firing,—found the ship had suffered considerably in her hull, having several shots on both sides between wind and water. Our loss in the action was six killed, twenty-seven badly wounded, two of whom died of their wounds. The fore-mast, bowsprit, main-top-mast, main-top-gallant yard, and main-top-sail yard badly wounded; the boats and booms shot through in several places; the cutter and yawl that were towing astern were sunk by the enemy. At 6h. 30m. anchored per signal, and moored ship in Rosia Bay, Gibraltar.

The following is a correct copy of the Audacious's log, at Somerset House.

This log, like the former, begins in the evening of the 5th July 1801.

Wind S.W. P.M. moderate and hazy; half-past 2 tacked,—Cape Trafalgar S.E. three or four leagues,—got springs on the anchors; at 8h. standing up the Gut of Gibraltar,—Admiral S. by W. three-quarters of a mile; at 12h. taken aback, came to the wind on the land-tack; at 6h. Gibraltar Rock N. by E. four or five leagues,—shortened sail to let the Pompee go ahead to her station; at half-past 7, saw the enemy's ships at anchor in Algeziras Roads, consisting of three line-of-battle ships, a frigate, gun-boats, &c.; three-quarters past 7, the batteries commenced firing on our ships as they passed; twenty minutes past 8, the enemy's ships began to fire on our ships; at half-past 8, the action became hot on both sides,—the Venerable, Pompee, and Audacious as yet only in action; at half-past 9, the Caesar, Spencer, and Hannibal joined the action against the ships and batteries; at 11h. cut the cables, and tried to tow the ship's head round to the eastward, to bring the ship's broadside to bear on her opponent, but without effect; by this time the sails and rigging being much cut up, and the ship unmanageable, got the kedge anchor with a five-inch hawser out on the starboard bow, and succeeded in bringing the broadside to bear; at noon, light airs inclining to calm,—Caesar, Spencer, under way, still in action.

P.M. dark weather; at forty-five minutes past 12, the Venerable and Pompee hauled to the wind on the starboard tack; at 1h. cut the sheet-cable, and slipped the end of the kedge hawser, and spring on the sheet-anchor,—got the boats ahead to tow,—found the ship drifting under the island fort, which did us considerable injury,—the rocks close under the lee-bow,—cut away the best bower-anchor to check her head, and bring her broadside to bear, it being calm; at twenty minutes past 1, a light breeze sprung up off-shore,—cut away the best bower-cable, and made sail on the starboard tack,—observed the Hannibal on shore, and the enemy take possession of her; at 4h. anchored in Rosia Bay, Gibraltar.

The next is the journal of Captain Hood of the Venerable.

6th July 1801.

Monday, 6th July, wind variable off Algeziras,—Gibraltar Bay, light breezes, and variable,—the captain went on board the Caesar,—all sail set,—squadron in company,—the captain returned,—got the sheet-cable through the stern-port, and bent it to the anchor,—got springs on the sheet and bower-anchors; at 2h. Captain Hood went on board the Admiral; at 3h. returned,—received a midshipman and seven men per the Plymouth lugger, and from the Boladore, Spanish lugger; at 4h. Cape Trafalgar, N.E. seven or eight miles,—all sail set,—made and shortened sail occasionally for the squadron, and tacked occasionally,—A.M. do. weather; at 4h. made more sail; at 7h. discovered the enemy, consisting of three two-decked ships and a frigate, with an Admiral's flag flying, at anchor under the town and batteries of Algeziras, protected by many gun-boats, &c.—all sail set, standing in for the enemy, followed by the Pompee, Audacious, Caesar, Spencer, and Hannibal; at 7h. 50m. the batteries opened their fire on us,—Pompee and Audacious one mile and a half distant from us astern.

At 8h. it fell calm; at 8h. 20m. the Pompee and Audacious, bringing up the breeze, passed us to windward, when the enemy's ships opened their fire on us; at 8h. 14m. a light air sprung up,—passed the Audacious to leeward, at which time the Pompee and Audacious opened their fire; at 8h. 20m. the breeze dying away, came to with the sheet-anchor, as did the Pompee and Audacious,—hove in the spring; and at 8h. 30m. opened our fire on the French Admiral's ship: at 10h. the Caesar anchored on our bow, and sent a spring on board of us; at the same time the action became general, and the Hannibal got on shore, after attempting to cut off the French Admiral's ship.

At 10h. 20m. the Pompee drifted between us and the French Admiral's,—hove in our spring, and brought our guns to bear on the other enemy's ship on our bow, and the other's stern: at 12h. the Pompee drifted between our fire and the enemy's,—slipt the sheet-cable, and eight-inch hawser, the spring, with the intention of getting alongside the enemy's southernmost ship,—light air springing up at the time from the N.E.; in awaiting this opportunity, the mizen-top-mast, fore-braces, and jibb halyards, with various other standing and running rigging, shot away, and main-mast badly wounded: at 11h. 15m. breeze dying away prevented our intention,—opened our fire on the southernmost ship; at 12h. calm and hazy,—Caesar, Hannibal, Audacious, Spencer, and us still firing on the enemy's ships, batteries, and gun-boats,—boats of the squadron towing off the Pompee to Gibraltar; P.M. calm,—still firing on the enemy's ships, which were warping farther in-shore.

At 12h. 40m. sent Lieutenant Collis in the pinnace to assist the Hannibal; at 1h. 40m. finding it impossible to near the enemy's ships with safety, it being calm, and a strong current setting in-shore, their batteries firing red-hot shot and throwing shells, ceased the action as per signal, as did the other ships, and steered for Gibraltar,—observed the Hannibal ceased firing, and hoist the colours reversed, having her fore and mainmasts shot away, and being in ten foot water, rendered all assistance useless.

24 Nov. 1801.[36] S. HOOD.

[36] The journal of Lieutenant Collis of the Venerable, the officer who was sent to assist the Hannibal, and was taken prisoner when on board, but who was sent to Gibraltar on parole, need not be given, as it is an exact copy of the captain's log.

Thus the logs and journals of the captains and officers of the Spencer, Audacious, Venerable, and Caesar, all agree that the Hannibal struck her colours between 1h. 20m. and 1h. 40m. The Pompee, being by this time near the Mole at Gibraltar, could not see nor take minutes of that circumstance. The Spencer, according to her position at that time, was in the best situation for seeing the Hannibal, and accordingly her log is the most particular. The Caesar's log need not be given, as it would be merely a repetition of Captain Brenton's narrative. All these agree with Colonel Connolly's testimony, and their evidence is quite conclusive as to the following facts; namely, that the Hannibal struck her colours before the main-mast fell; that these colours were hoisted union down by the enemy, who had possession of the ship before the boats came alongside from the Venerable and Caesar, and that to save her was quite impossible.

The following further particulars relative to the action are given in the extract of a letter from an officer of the Caesar, dated at Gibraltar:

There is one point that needs explanation; namely, when the Caesar cut her cable at half-past ten o'clock, it was from a fine breeze springing up, and the hope of closing with the enemy. Orders were given for that purpose to the Audacious and Venerable; the Caesar wore round them, and brought her broadside to bear on the Indomptable's bow, lying there (about three cables distant from her) a considerable time, with the fore-top-sail to the mast (aback). The Audacious, bringing up a breeze from the north-west, passed between us and the enemy, who, in this part of the day, suffered materially, his fore-top-mast going about five minutes before twelve o'clock. Shortly afterwards, the Audacious and Caesar were becalmed upon the broadside of the Indomptable, without being able to bring one of their guns to bear,—the Caesar not more than three cables' length from the island battery, and the Audacious still nearer,—both ships drifting on the reef.

It was at this time that Sir James Saumarez formed the resolution of attacking the island with marines. Boats were signalised for the purpose; but, being all employed with the Pompee, or sunk by the enemy's fire, it was found impracticable. A breeze again sprung up, and Sir James directed his ship to be laid alongside of the Indomptable, in the firm resolution of carrying her. The sails were trimmed for that purpose as well as the crippled state of the masts would allow, but a calm ensued. The Venerable had never received the breeze from the time of her cutting, and still lay unmanageable. The Spencer had drifted considerably in repairing her rigging.

The following is a translation of the Spanish official account of the battle of Algeziras, 6th July 1801:

The division of three French line-of-battle ships and one frigate, under the command of Rear-admiral Citizen Linois, that sailed from the road of Toulon on the 25th last June, destined for Cadiz, came in sight of this station and bay on the 1st of July; and, the Levant wind having failed on entering the Straits, they cruised between the coast of Africa and that of Europe, in which they captured the English brig of war the Speedy, of sixteen guns, that was a Mahon packet, and was conducting to Gibraltar a prize, the merchant brig the Union, loaded with oil and provisions.

The continuation of the westerly winds obliged the said division to come into this port on the 5th instant, at seven in the evening. From that moment, recollecting the desperate attacks of the English at Alexandria and Copenhagen, we could not but expect that their squadron, which had been seen off Cadiz on the 3rd instant, under the command of Rear-admiral Saumarez, would come and attack this division. So it happened.

As soon as the English received intelligence where the French had anchored, they steered directly for the Straits; and, on the 6th instant, at half-past six in the morning, six English ships doubled the Point of Carnero, and, coming round the island of Algeziras, advanced in a line within half cannon-shot of the French ships. The batteries of St. Garcia and the island opened their fire upon the English; and afterwards the frigate and republican ships.

As soon as the English line came opposite the French ships at anchor, they opened upon them an animated, bold, and unremitting fire. The English Admiral having placed himself against the French, and the British ship Hannibal being under sail, cannonaded furiously the French Admiral, who, with superior spirit and success, resisted them; insomuch that, having carried away the Admiral's mizen-mast, and sails of the main and fore-mast, with no small damage of his hull, the commander of the English ship Hannibal, despising the fire from the battery of St. Jago, pushed on to his succour; and, intending to place the French Admiral between two fires, by running between him and the shore, had the imprudence, being unacquainted with his position, to place himself within a quarter of a gun-shot of the battery, and ran aground. He relieved his Admiral, who, after this, went out of the action; but he lost his own ship and crew, as the fire from the battery and French Admiral dismantled him, and killed three parts of his ship's company.

Until this ship's surrender, which was about the time of the retreat of the English Admiral, the fire was constant upon the two French ships and frigate, as well as upon the seven Spanish gun-boats, the batteries of the island, St. Garcia, St. Jago, La Almiranta, and Almirante, which, as opportunity offered, returned their fire.

The battle lasted from half-past eight o'clock in the morning, when the fort of St. Garcia opened its fire, till two in the afternoon, when the last shot was fired from the French ship Indomptable. The persevering, active, and tremendous fire of the enemy, and that of the two nations (French and Spanish), were only distinguishable by the prudence, skill, and greatness of soul with which the allied chiefs directed theirs, and the audacity, temerity, and confusion which were shown in that of the English. The idea of this kind of fighting, which we form from the account of the battles of Alexandria and Copenhagen, does not, in proportion to the numbers engaged, bear any comparison with that of Algeziras, either in point of bloodiness or obstinacy.

The English, after having left the glory and the field of battle to the two nations, covered with shame, and taught by dear-bought experience, have only given an unequivocal proof of their inveterate hatred to France and Spain; since, not being able to obtain any advantage over the French and Spanish forces, they directed their fire against an inoffensive town, which received no small injury in the buildings. This is the only glory which the arms of Great Britain have to boast of.

The Pompee was towed out of the action by eight boats, who came to her succour from the garrison of Gibraltar. She was kept afloat by casks, or otherwise could not have been brought in.

The ships of the French Republic which sustained this attack were the Formidable, 84, Citizen Linois; Dessaix, 74, Moncousu, killed; L'Indomptable, 84, La Londe, killed; the frigate Muiron, 36, Martinencq; five Spanish gun-boats damaged, and two sunk. In the French ships, three hundred and six killed; one hundred and eighty-four wounded. We suppose in the English squadron above five hundred are killed, and from two hundred and seventy to two hundred and eighty wounded.

MADRID GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY.

Merida, 10 July 1801.

The general commandant of the camp at St. Roque, in a despatch of the 6th instant, transmitted by a courier extraordinary, communicates an account of an action which has been fought between six sail of the line, and other vessels of war, belonging to the English, and the French squadron of three ships of the line, and one frigate, lying at anchor in the harbour of Algeziras; and of the glorious result which has taken place for his Majesty's arms, and those of the Republic, his ally.

About eight in the morning of that day, (viz. the 6th,) there were seen, coming out of Gibraltar, one ship of eighty-four guns, five of seventy-four, a lugger of sixteen, another of ten, and a polacre of ten, two armed launches, and fourteen boats. This force, under the command of a Rear-admiral, stood into Algeziras, for the purpose of attacking the French squadron then anchored in that port, which, as has been already stated, consisted of three sail of the line, and one frigate. The commanders of this squadron, being aware of the enemy's intention, made their dispositions for defence, placing themselves, as well as they were able, under the cover of our batteries, and waiting in this position for his approach.

The action commenced at nine; it was very obstinate and bloody on both sides, and likewise on the part of our batteries, which decided the fate of the day. The action was continued till two in the afternoon, at which hour the English drew off with the loss of one ship of the line; taking in tow another, which was dismasted and damaged in the hull; and having sustained very great loss and damage in the rest of their vessels. Their loss in men must have been considerable, as it is certain that a great number were killed and wounded on board all the ships. The French also have been equal sufferers, the killed and wounded in their squadron being estimated at eight hundred: that of our troops has been less; out of the whole, only the royal regiment of Ronda has lost eleven men.

The fire of our batteries was so hot and well supported, that the enemy suffered most from them; and particularly it is to that of St. Jago we owe the capture of the English ship, for her bold manoeuvre of attempting to pass between the French Rear-admiral's ship, the Formidable, and the shore, made her take the ground; and, notwithstanding the utmost exertion to put her afloat, it being found impossible to move her, the fire from the battery very soon dismasted her, and compelled her to strike. The French vessels, and our batteries, have likewise received a good deal of damage; but they are already in a course of repair; and the most active dispositions are making in order to cause the enemy to repent, should he have any intention of renewing the action with troops so animated and well-conducted as ours and the French have proved themselves in the engagement of the 6th.

The French account of this action, as we have already noticed, was still more exaggerated than the Spanish; and, unfortunately for the friends and relatives of the Admiral, officers, and men of the squadron, it made its way to England some time previously to the true accounts,—causing much uneasiness. The Moniteur announced that

On the 5th July, at eight o'clock in the morning, the cannonade commenced against six English ships, which lost no time in coming within musket-shot of the French vessels. The action then became very warm. These two squadrons seemed equally animated with a determination to conquer. If the French squadron had any advantage in point of situation, the English had double their force, and several of their vessels had ninety guns each: already had the English ship, Hannibal, of seventy-four guns, contrived to place herself between the French squadron and the shore. It was now eleven o'clock A.M., and this proved the decisive moment. For two hours the Formidable, the French Admiral's ship, successfully opposed three English ships.

One of the British squadron, which was singly engaged with a French vessel, struck her colours at three-quarters past eleven. Immediately after, the Hannibal, exposed to the fire of three French ships, which fired from two decks, also struck her colours: about half-past twelve, the English squadron cut their cables, and sailed away. The Hannibal was boarded by the Formidable. Of six hundred men, who composed her crew, three hundred were killed. The first ship that struck her colours was retaken by a great number of gun-boats, and other vessels, sent out from Gibraltar. This action covers the French arms with glory, and shows what they are capable of accomplishing. Rear-admiral Linois proceeded to Cadiz with the Hannibal, in order to repair her damage.[37] We wait with impatience the returns of the loss sustained by each ship.

[37] This was a gratuitous falsehood.

These accounts appear to have reached Paris on the 11th July. On the 19th, the following bulletin reached St. Malo.

Three French ships of the line and a frigate, under the command of Rear-admiral Linois, were attacked on the 6th instant by six English sail of the line and a frigate. The English were completely beaten, and took refuge in Gibraltar, leaving in possession of the French the Hannibal, of seventy-four guns: another ship of the line had struck, but was towed off by a great number of gun-vessels, which sailed from Gibraltar to her relief.

About this time, the Jason frigate, having been wrecked near St. Malo, the captain and crew were made prisoners. The author was sent in with a flag of truce by Commodore Cunningham, of the Clyde, to negotiate for the exchange of prisoners; when the French officer, with an air of triumph and exultation, handed him a copy of that bulletin: but, as soon as the negotiation was ended, the author had the pleasure of handing to him, in return, the Gazette account of the victory of the 13th, which Sir James Saumarez had gained over Linois, and which the Commodore had received, fortunately, on that day. The Frenchman's chagrin may be easily imagined, when he threw down the Gazette, with the exclamation 'Ce n'est pas vrai!'

On the statement of Linois' victory, as it was called, reaching Paris, a handsome sword was sent to him; which, however, did not reach him until after his subsequent defeat. On this occasion the following Epigram was written.

In the days of the Bourbons, a man was rewarded For standing the brunt of the day: But, now, this old maxim in France is discarded,— Men are honoured for running away!

In the French accounts nothing was mentioned of their running their ships aground to escape from the English, which is, indeed, the only thing Citizen Linois deserved any credit for doing. At the same time, it could not fail to convince both the French and Spanish troops, of the want of confidence he must have had in his crews, and of their evident inferiority: it was certainly a new mode of fighting, which called forth the following lines on this improvement in naval tactics.

To mar our skill, fam'd Linois, thou hast found A certain way,—by fighting ships on ground; Fix deep in sand thy centre, van, and rear, Nor e'er St. Vincent, Duncan, Nelson, fear. While, o'er the main, Britannia's thunder rolls, She leaves to thee the trident of the shoals!

In concluding this chapter, we shall relate the following anecdote of British heroism, derived from Captain Brenton's Naval History.

When, in the hottest part of the action at Algeziras, the Caesar broke her sheer,—that is, her situation was altered by a puff or flaw of wind so as to change the direction of her head, and turn her round, that her guns could not be brought to bear on her opponent,—the captain ordered the boat to be lowered down from the stern, to convey a warp to the Audacious; but the boat was found to be knocked to pieces by the enemy's shot. Before other means could be resorted to, Michael Collins, a young sailor belonging to the Caesar's mizen-top, seized the end of a lead-line, and exclaiming, "You shall soon have a warp," darted into the sea from the tafrail, and swam with the line to the Audacious, where it was received, and by that means a hawser was run out which answered the intended purpose.



CHAPTER XVI.

1801.

Mole of Gibraltar.—Negociation for the exchange of prisoners unsuccessful.—Captain Ferris and the officers of the Hannibal return on parole.—They sail for England in the Plymouth lugger, which carries home despatches and private letters.—Despatch sent to Lord Keith.—Admiral Saumarez shifts his flag to the Audacious.—Extraordinary exertions of the crew of the Caesar.—Their admirable conduct.—Captain Brenton and the garrison.—Arrival of the Spanish squadron at Algeziras.—Increased exertions of the crews of the squadron.—Private letters.—Preparations to attack the enemy.

The squadron being now in the Mole at Gibraltar, the wounded having been removed to the hospital, and the necessary orders given for refitting with all possible speed, the Admiral lost no time in turning his attention to the situation of the captain, officers, and crew of the unfortunate Hannibal, which had so nobly maintained the honour of the British flag.

Sir Jahleel Brenton says, "He ordered me to take a flag of truce, and wait upon the French admiral (Linois), proposing an exchange of prisoners, which the latter refused, alleging that it was not in his power to establish a cartel for the purpose, until he obtained the sanction of the Minister of the Marine at Paris, to whom he had sent off an express, as soon as the firing had ceased, on the preceding day; but he consented to send over on parole Captain Ferris and the officers of the Hannibal. The object of the French Admiral was very obvious; he concluded we wanted to replace the men who were killed, and wounded; but he justly thought, that sending officers on parole would be an act of harmless courtesy, from which we could reap no immediate benefit. It will be seen that, after the second action, when his dispatches from Algeziras could scarcely have reached Paris, (only six days having elapsed,) he did not wait for an answer from the Minister of Marine. But circumstances had altered; we had taken a line-of-battle ship, and burned two first-rates; and he then wished to get back as many of the crews as possible."

The following correspondence, which took place between Sir James Saumarez and the French Admiral Linois, shows the deep interest Sir James took in the distressing situation of the crew of the Hannibal, of which an account was brought to him by Captain Brenton, together with the assurance that Captain Ferris and his officers would be liberated on parole.

Caesar, off Rosia Bay, 8th July 1801.

SIR,

Solicitous as I am for the welfare of the men unfortunately wounded on board his Majesty's ship Hannibal, and desirous to have them conveyed as speedily as possible to this garrison, I propose to send a boat early to-morrow morning with a flag of truce, and I trust no objection can be made to their coming by her.

Being informed that Captain Ferris and his officers have permission to come on their parole, a boat will also be sent for them. I have the honour to be, sir,

Your most obedient and most humble servant, JAS. SAUMAREZ.

To Rear-admiral Linois, commanding the French squadron at Algeziras.

The boat having returned from Algeziras with Captain Ferris and his officers, but not with the crew of the Hannibal, Sir James despatched another boat, with the following letter to Admiral Linois:

Caesar, off Rosia Bay, 9th July 1801.

SIR,

Having received different reports, particularly from Captain Ferris, that the men who had the misfortune of being wounded on board his Majesty's ship Hannibal are left in the most afflicting condition, and are unprovided with every kind of refreshment, I am impelled, from motives of humanity, to renew my application to you that they may be permitted to come to this place by the boat now sent for them; and that you will also permit those wounded men who are confined in the prison, and who, I understand, are without any surgical attendance whatever, to accompany them. I have the honour to be, sir,

With all possible regard, your obedient servant, JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To Rear-admiral Linois, commanding the French squadron at Algeziras.

This application was, however, not attended with success; and the sufferings of the unfortunate wounded at Algeziras were extreme, until circumstances changed, in consequence of the second action.

We shall now continue the authentic and interesting communication which Sir Jahleel Brenton has so kindly made to us:

"The morning of the 7th July was passed in getting the Caesar secured in the Mole, and in landing the wounded men that still remained on board; also in stripping the ship, and in ascertaining the amount of injury she had sustained. The main-mast was so much injured that it became necessary to take it out and get in a new one; the fore-mast was also very badly wounded, but capable of being fished and rendered serviceable. Every effort was made to complete our repairs, and get again ready for sea. On the following day, Captain Ferris and his officers, who were sent on parole, arrived. They were accompanied by Lord Cochrane and the officers of the Speedy, sloop of war, which had been taken on the 3rd by Linois' squadron, off Malaga."

The Admiral now prepared duplicates of his despatches for the Admiralty, which Lieutenant Janvarin, of the Calpe, who was taken in the Caesar's boat, assisting the Hannibal, had been previously charged to carry to Faro. These were confided to Lieutenant Hills, of the Hannibal, who, with Captain Ferris, were embarked on board the Plymouth lugger for England. Sir Jableel Brenton says: "On taking leave of the Admiral, the scene was deeply interesting, and even affecting. Sir James, after giving Captain Ferris the highest credit for his gallant daring, to which the loss of the Hannibal was attributed, and lamenting that their united endeavours had not been crowned with the success they merited, added, adverting to his despatches, 'Tell them, sir, that I feel convinced I shall soon have an opportunity of attacking the enemy again, and that they may depend on my availing myself of it.'"

On the 9th, in the afternoon, the Superb and Thames, which had continued to watch the enemy off Cadiz, were seen coming through the Straits under a crowd of canvass, with the signal for an enemy flying; and they had scarcely rounded Cabrita Point before the Spanish squadron, consisting of six sail of the line, were seen in pursuit of them, and soon after anchored in Algeziras with the French squadron.

Sir James now added the following to his despatches to Lord Keith:

Caesar, Gibraltar, 9th July 1801.

MY LORD,

I have the honour to inform your lordship that the Superb and Thames are now standing into the bay, with the signal for the enemy's being in sight; and I understand from Governor O'Hara that he has information from Cadiz that all the Spanish and French ships in that port were ordered to Algeziras Bay to take the French ships to Carthagena.

I hope to have all the squadron ready before this day week; and, as they cannot possibly put to sea under a fortnight at the earliest, I hope something may join me from your lordship before they can put to sea: but, on the event of their sailing before such junction, I shall follow them up with all the ships with me, and proceed off Minorca, which will be my rendezvous till I have the honour of hearing from your lordship.

I am sorry to mention that the Hannibal is got off; but Captain Ferris, who has just come over on his parole, describes her in the worst condition, as well as the three French ships, and does not think they can be repaired under a fortnight or three weeks at the earliest; as does Lord Cochrane, who is likewise come over on his parole.

I have the honour to be Your lordship's most obedient and most humble servant, JAMES SAUMAREZ.

To Right Hon. Lord Keith, K.B. &c. &c. &c.

The public despatches being closed, Sir James wrote the following letters, which were sent by the same conveyance; and, as they contain his own private feelings on the occasion, they will be read with interest:

Caesar, Rosia Bay, 6th July 1801.

MY DEAR RICHARD,

After the warm expectations my friends have always formed for my success in the public service, they will be distressed on being informed of my having failed in an enterprise with the squadron on three French line-of-battle ships at anchor off Algeziras. I was informed by different expresses from this garrison of their having attempted to pass the Straits for Cadiz, and having anchored at some distance from the batteries. I made sail yesterday with the intention to attack them, if found practicable. We got round the point of the bay at about seven this morning, and at half-past eight the action began, and during the first hour, promised the most favourable hopes of success; when, by a most unfortunate circumstance, the Hannibal got aground, and at once destroyed all my expectations, though the action was continued for nearly four hours after.

Every possible effort was made to rescue her from the enemy's fire; and after repeated attempts, and a very great risk of this ship and the Audacious getting on shore under the enemy's batteries, I was under the necessity of abandoning the Hannibal to her fate. Although we have not succeeded in bringing off the enemy's ships, they are, we believe, very seriously damaged. Two of them are aground, and it is not expected they will be got off.

Wednesday, 9th July 1801.

Having found a conveyance by way of Tangier, I sent you a duplicate of this. The Superb and Thames have just made their appearance, with the signal for the enemy being out of port. I think it is a good thing to have drawn them this way, as I trust the first Levanter will bring us ships from the Mediterranean. Captain Ferris goes by this opportunity, and has promised to forward this immediately to you. He will be heard of at the Admiralty, or at the Adelphi Hotel. Great praise is due for the brave defence of his ship.

10th July 1801.

It is incalculable how much I have on my hands, night and day; but, thank God! my health is good, though my anxiety is great. A fresh Levanter having sprung up, the lugger sails immediately. Phil. Dumaresq is very well, as are all the others. Poor Graves is the only person we have lost of the class of officers. I also wrote to you, by way of Lisbon, only an hour since, and just before the easterly wind set in. I trust none of my friends will suffer anxiety on my account. This will be addressed to you, my dear Richard, and you will forward it to my brother. He will be happy in being able to satisfy those who have friends on board that they have all escaped unhurt. H. Brock, with the young men from the island, are all well. I am, &c.

JAS. SAUMAREZ.

To Richard Saumarez, Esq.

Extracts of letters written on the 7th July 1801, to Lady Saumarez:

I have formed a thousand apprehensions lest an account of the events of yesterday should reach England through France before the arrival of my despatches (which were sent off by way of Faro), and fill your mind with cruel anxiety on my account; and this fear is much increased lest those despatches should not even arrive, as I was obliged to send them by a doubtful opportunity, through Tetuan and Tangier, the wind not admitting any vessel to pass the Straits.

Trusting, however, to their safety, I will not repeat their contents; but will only observe that, when I sat down to write to you, it was the first interval of rest from one of the most bustling scenes I ever witnessed, and from experiencing one of the severest disappointments I have ever known; having, for a considerable period during the action, flattered myself with the strongest confidence that the most complete success would have attended the enterprise.

I resign myself to the decree of DIVINE PROVIDENCE, whose will the winds obey; and I have great cause to be thankful for not having been forsaken in the hour of danger, but for having my courage strengthened as the peril increased. Feeling, as I do, all the responsibility on an event of this importance to the country, I should be miserable had I to reproach myself for having undertaken the enterprise on light grounds, or with having failed in the planning or in the execution; but, on the contrary, it is admitted by every one to have been most judicious. It is therefore only in the result that I have been unfortunate, and that arising from unforeseen and inevitable causes. I have been too much employed to reflect on the light in which the business may be viewed in England; but, conscious of having done my duty, and to the utmost of my exertions, I shall be indifferent as to the rest. I only trust that all my friends, but you more particularly, will be superior to any reflexions that may be made, should there be any unfavourable to me; though I hope for better things, and that with the liberal, at least, that which has been well intended, and carried on with conduct and bravery, will be held in some estimation.