[Footnote 18: Some railway bills before the Home of Lords.]

June 3,1836.

* * * * *

Moderation of the Opposition in the House of Lords towards the Melbourne Government.

From my own experience, I must take the liberty of observing, that I consider the conduct pursued by noble lords on this side of the house, throughout the present session, to have been marked with the utmost moderation. For myself, I think I am correct in stating, that since the address to the throne in answer to the king's speech, with the exception only of one occasion, when I requested the noble viscount to postpone the Corporations (Ireland) Bill till after the Easter holidays, I never entered the house till after Easter. Since that period, I have certainly taken part in the proceedings that have been going forward in the house, and I have felt it my duty to oppose some of the measures of government; but I think I shall be borne out when I say that I have accompanied the vote which I have given with observations expressed in terms of great moderation. I have acted on all occasions to the best of my opinion, and in a way which I thought most calculated to be beneficial to the country. The noble viscount has been pleased to taunt us for not having addressed the king with a view to obtain his and his colleagues' removal from the situations which they hold. If the noble viscount would look at the manner in which they were appointed to office, if he would look at the whole history for the last twelve months I think he would find sufficient reason for our not having adopted that course of proceeding. The noble viscount knows very well upon what ground he stands, and knowing that, it would have been just as well in him if he had avoided his taunts against us for not having asked the king to remove him from office. I would take the liberty to recommend the noble viscount to consider himself not as the minister of a democratic body in another place, but as the minister of a sovereign in a limited monarchy, in a country, great in point of extent, great in its possessions, and in the various interests which it comprises; and that considering these circumstances, he should, in future, concert such measures as he has reason to think may pass with the approval and suit the general interests of all,—meet the good will of all,—and not of one particular party in one particular place only. If the noble viscount will but follow that course for some little time, he will find no difficulty in conducting the business of government in this house, but will find every facility afforded him in forwarding measures of the above description. I would beg the noble lord to recollect one fact, in regard to the church of England, whether in England or Ireland. Let him recollect that the avowed policy followed by this country during the last three hundred years, has been to retain inviolable the church establishment. We are called here to consult particularly for the good of the church; and if the noble viscount brings forward any measures relating to that subject, let him recollect that all measures of such a kind must be discussed by us with that particular object in view. This is not only the old feeling of this house of three hundred years' standing, but it is that on which we acted no longer than eight or nine years ago, when we had occasion to review the safeguards and general landmarks whereby the church establishment of this country was defended.

August 18, 1836.

The Quadruple Treaty. Effects of our Intervention in Spain.

It is well known to your lordships that I was one of those who objected to the treaty called the "Quadruple Treaty." It is perfectly true that I was afterwards instrumental in carrying it into effect; because it was my duty, in the situation in which I was placed at that time, to carry into effect those treaties which his majesty had entered into, whether I had originally approved of them or not. I cannot, therefore, now, disapprove of the due execution of the quadruple treaty by others; nor will I refuse my assent to the proposition that the measures which his majesty has adopted in execution of the treaty are satisfactory as far as we have any knowledge of them. If any measures should have been adopted, not already provided for in the treaty, it will be our duty to consider them calmly and dispassionately. Much discussion has taken place in other countries with respect to the course pursued by other members of this alliance, in the execution of this treaty. I must say, that so far as I am enabled to form a judgment of the treaty, (and I know nothing more than what appears on the face of the treaty itself) it seems to me that it has been fairly executed by all the parties who subscribed it. When I had the honour of serving his majesty in 1834, I was called upon to state whether the treaty in question would be carried into execution. I then stated what I understood was the meaning and scope of the treaty;—viz. that there should be no armed intervention in the internal affairs of Spain, which should tend to affect the independence of that country. That was my sense of the treaty at the time—it is my sense of the treaty at the present moment—it was so understood by the other parties to the treaty. It was the understanding of all parties that there should he no military intervention in the internal affairs of Spain. This was the understanding of the treaty, and in the month of November, 1834, this explanation was communicated and was satisfactory to the Spanish government.

I consider that the attempt by his majesty's government, aided even by the strongest power in Europe, to force upon Spain any form of government, must fail. Those who should make the attempt must take upon themselves not only the expenses of their own army in a most expensive contest, but those of the civil and military government of Spain; and they must hold their position in Spain, and defray their expenses till the new government should be settled and submitted to, and tranquillity established in the country. I should like to see how the Commons House of Parliament, or the Chamber of Deputies, would treat a proposition that should call upon them to agree to a vote of money for any such operation, for the purpose of forcibly imposing a liberal government on Spain, or on any other country. I contend my lords, that this scheme is absolutely impracticable. His majesty's ministers may rely on it, that they have undertaken that which they never can perform; and that the sooner they place themselves on the footing on which they ought strictly to stand with reference to the quadruple alliance, the sooner will the pacification of Spain, which we must all of us anxiously wish for, be accomplished. I feel, for one, the strongest objection to anything like interference with the internal affairs of the Peninsula. I object to it, not only on account of the vast expense it must inevitably entail upon this country, but still more so on account of the injury which it inflicts on the parties existing in that state. Of my own certain knowledge I can state, that the individuals composing these parties in Spain, have actually been ruined, their properties confiscated, their fortunes sacrificed, by the course which his majesty's government have pursued. Acting under the assurances of his majesty's government, individuals have adopted a certain line of conduct. They followed his majesty's government, as a party in the state. His majesty's government, thus acting, is obliged to move forward with the democratic movement The unfortunate persons I have alluded to have, in consequence, been abandoned, their fortunes sacrificed, and their prospects blighted for ever. Events like these, my lords, which affect the character as well as the influence of the country, inclined me to be more adverse to such interference than I should be on the mere score of expense. I do not mean to oppose the address, but in taking this course, I beg to be clearly understood as not holding myself bound to approve of the employment of any force beyond that stipulated for by the quadruple treaty, which treaty parliament has recognised.

January 30,1837.

The Poor Law Act has surpassed his expectation.

My lords, I supported the bill while it was in this house; and having given that support to the bill from being a witness to the evils, and being apprehensive of the consequences likely to have attended the former system, I conceive it to be my duty to come forward on this occasion, and to state that this bill has surpassed any expectation which I had formed of the benefits likely to result from it. The bill, my lords, may require amendment in certain parts, and it appears that his majesty's government have taken measures to ascertain what points in the bill so require amendment. I, for one, am ready to pay the greatest attention to the points which may be brought under the consideration of this house. But I must say that I approve of the measure as far as it has gone hitherto, and I have witnessed its operation. I do not talk of what I have seen generally, I talk of the details of the management of the bill, from having witnessed that management in different workhouses, in different parts of the country in which I have resided; and I must say that it has been practically beneficial, and particularly in cases such as these. First of all, it has put the workman and his employer upon a true and friendly footing of confidence. Then it has connected the man of property, the man of the highest rank in his country, with the lowest class, with the labouring class, by admitting such to the board of Guardians. I can mention some noble lords, who are ornaments to this house, and who constantly attend at the weekly meetings of the guardians, being elected guardians by the parishes in the neighbourhood in which they reside. No measure could be attended with better results, and being convinced that it will effect still greater benefits, sincerely thinking so, I should be ashamed if I did not step forward, and at once avow my sentiments respecting it. I avow at once that I supported the bill at the time his majesty's ministers proposed it—that I do not repent of what I did on that occasion in so supporting it—but, on the contrary, that I rejoice in the part I then took; and I now congratulate his majesty's ministers on its success.

April 7, 1837.

* * * * *

The Universities—their Education System the admiration of the World.

The working of all these colleges and of the system on which they are regulated, is for the benefit of the public; and in each and every college the object is to carry into execution the will of the founder, just as it would probably have been had he lived to this period. In every case the great object of the governing authorities is, to benefit the public by the education of the youth who resort to these institutions. The noble viscount (Melbourne) could not help admitting that these institutions have worked well, and that latterly a great improvement has taken place in the system of education pursued under their auspices. The noble viscount has also spoken of the great improvement in the system of education pursued in the new university of Durham, and in other new universities elsewhere. But, nevertheless, the noble viscount could not help admitting that the old universities of Oxford and Cambridge possess the merit of having established in England an excellent system of education, which is, in point of fact, the envy and admiration of the world.

April 11, 1837.

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The Quadruple Treaty condemned.

My lords, I must confess that I did not approve of the original Quadruple Treaty. I considered it inconsistent with the ancient principle and the policy and practice adopted in this country with regard to Portugal, to avoid to interfere in the disputes between the two princes of the House of Braganza, which had been the policy of this country for many years. It sanctioned the introduction of Spanish troops into Portugal, which measure was inconsistent with our defensive relations with Portugal, and which had been objected to and prevented in that very contest between the rival princes of the House of Braganza. Yet it gave no fresh assistance to bring the contests in Portugal to a conclusion, excepting the promise to give the aid of this country by the employment of a naval force in co-operation with the Spanish and Portuguese troops, which aid was not necessary. Another objection which I entertained to the Quadruple Treaty was, that it mixed up France and this country in the offers and promises made to Don Carlos and Don Miguel, in the fifth and sixth articles of the treaty. These powers became, in fact, guarantees for the performance of these engagements, as well as for the performance of the engagements made under the same articles of the treaty to the subjects of Portugal and Spain. It is impossible to describe the inconvenience of such articles; they require the interference of government in hundreds of little questions. I have felt the inconvenience of those articles since their adoption; I stated my objections to them at the time, and I have seen no reason, since, to alter the opinions I then formed.

April 21, 1837.

* * * * *

Effects of the Additional Articles to the Quadruple Treaty.

By the first of the additional articles to the treaty, the King of the French obliged himself to take such measures in those parts of his dominions which adjoined to Spain, as might be calculated to prevent succours of men, arms, and warlike stores being sent from France into Spain; and the King of Great Britain engaged, under the second of the said additional articles, to furnish such arms and warlike stores as her majesty the Queen of Spain might require; and further to assist her majesty with a naval force if necessary. The Duke of Braganza was to give his best assistance to serve her majesty, that he might be called upon to render. So that those additional articles were essentially different from the terms and provisions of the original treaty, by which the removal of the two princes from Portugal was effected. I do not mean to say, that, in the preamble to that treaty, allusion is not made to the affairs both of Spain and Portugal, but there still is a remarkable difference between the words used in the treaty and the additional articles; and moat particularly in relation to the part to be taken by this country.

April 21, 1837.

* * * * *

The Legion and the Stock Exchange.—Impotency of our interference.

I contend, as I have before contended in this house, that his majesty's present ministers (Lord Melbourne's government) ought not to have departed from the position which the previous administration had established while they were in power. I will not pretend to say what would have been the result of their following out that course, but this I do say, that the course pursued by his lordship's government has not benefited the military or the financial affairs of Spain, or promoted the peace of that country or the general tranquillity of Europe, or attained any of the political advantages which the noble viscount boasts have been attained by his departure from that position which the previous government had occupied and left to their successors. But, my lords, it did unfortunately happen that certain parties in this country had been connected with the Spanish finances; and it was important to those parties that the red coats should make their appearance in Spain, and that the name of "Great Britain," and of the British legion, should be mixed up in the operations of the war. Money was raised in this country to defray the expense of the equipment of the "Legion," as it was called, of 10,000 or 12,000 men, and also of their pay, their food, and maintenance, for a certain number of months; and the noble lords, in order that this scheme might be carried into execution, gave their consent to the order in council for the suspension of the Foreign Enlistment Act. The corps gathered in this country, and went to Spain, in the spring of the year 1835, nearly two years ago. Their first operation upon their arrival at St. Sebastian, was a march over the very same ground to the very spot which was the scene of the late disaster. My lords, up to that moment, the Eliot convention, as it is most honourably and justly called, had been carried into execution. It was on that day departed from on both sides, and from that day to this, I firmly believe, from all I have seen and read,—and I have read much on the subject within the last few days—there has been no certainty in the execution of that convention. Not only has there been no certainty in the execution of that convention, but, notwithstanding the millions of money that Spain has expended,—notwithstanding the blood which has been shed and the number of lives that have been lost,—I will venture to say, that the military affairs of the Queen of Spain are in a worse condition now than they were in the month of May, 1835.

The whole of the policy of the British government, therefore; all the operations of the British legion, backed by the British squadron; have effected nothing more nor less towards putting an end to the war, and giving peace to Spain and to Europe, than the removal of the blockade of St. Sebastian from one point to another, so as not to come within the liability of being affected by the 68-pounders of the British steamers, under the command of Lord John Hay.

April 21,1837.

* * * * *

Uselessness of the operations of the Legion, and Lord John Hay's Squadron, at St. Sebastian.

If the noble lord supposes that the safety of St. Sebastian had been more or less endangered by the blockade, I can assure him that he is much mistaken; for, from what I know of that fortified town, which is one of the first or second order in Europe, I can take upon myself to say that the Carlists might have been left in their original position without any danger whatever to the town, because they could not make an attack upon such a fortress. In the whole course of the war they have not, to my knowledge, taken by an attack any fortified post; or even any open town of any magnitude, prepared for its defence. They could not have distressed St. Sebastian for provisions, because its communication with the sea could not be prevented. I say, it could not be prevented, even if the whole British fleet were blockading it, instead of being there to relieve it. The amount of inconvenience felt in the town from the Carlist force being in the neighbourhood, was neither more nor less than the unpleasantness of ladies and gentlemen, residing there, being prevented taking their evening walks in the neighbourhood. This is the whole amount of the inconvenience from which the town was relieved. This was the whole amount of the service rendered.

April 21,1837.

Strictures on General Evans.

My lords, I will go a little further. I will say, that I firmly believe that the connexion between the legion and the fleet has been injurious to the military operations of the queen of Spain's generals. That is my decided opinion, founded upon my knowledge of the nature of the country, and of the position of both parties. My lords, there is one point to which I refer; that is, the want of communication between the Queen of Spain's generals, which can be relied upon. If corps of the size of those now employed are not actually joined, there must be a certain communication between them; for, without communication there can be no co-operation; and any attempt at co-operation would, in my opinion, in all probability, lead to disasters such as have recently taken place at Hernani. How are these troops situated? General Evans's troops are at St. Sebastian; General Saarsfield is at the other side of the Borunda, at Pampeluna; and Espartero, with his army, is at Bilboa. It is impossible that there can be any communication between these three, except by the French frontier, and by sea from Socoa, or by the Ebro. An arrangement is made for an attack, and a day named. What was the consequence? General Evans made an attack, but General Saarsfield, at Pampeluna, does not attack; there is a frost or snow, or rain, or some physical impediment which prevents a movement on the part of Saarsfield. General Evans cannot be informed in time, and the enemy has opportunity and leisure to throw his whole force upon General Evans; who, even if the troops had behaved well, would have been compelled to retire. The position, therefore, of the legion at St. Sebastian, in order to co-operate with the British squadron, that there might be something like British co-operation, was not an operation of war, it was one of stock-jobbing. My lords, it is a matter of much surprise to me, that General Evans, who, having acquired the confidence of his majesty's government, and that of the Queen of Spain, I presume must be an able man—it is, certainly, a surprising circumstance, that having had experience of the difficulties of carrying on communication in that country, and having met with a check in the month of January, 1836, for want of communication, he should not have felt the danger of his position, and should have omitted to put himself in communication to a certainty with corps in whose co-operation he was to act, instead of keeping himself at a distance, in order that he might carry on operations in concert with his majesty's fleet.

April 21,1837.

* * * * *

Undisciplined state of the Legion.

The noble lord has stated that he will not recall the marines. I would beg to remind your lordships, and the noble viscount in particular, of this fact—that the marines are properly the garrisons of his majesty's ships, and that upon no pretence ought they to be moved from a fair and safe communication with the ships to which they belong. The noble lord states, that he is responsible, and that he will take upon himself the responsibility. I have commanded his majesty's armies, and have incurred as many risks, and faced more difficulties than, I hope, the noble lord will ever have to encounter. I have been engaged in hostilities of this description, where co-operation was carried on upon the coast; and though I certainly would do as much for the service, and I believe I may say, have done as much for the service, as the noble lord, yet I would not venture, and have never ventured, to put any corps whatever in co-operation with the Spaniards, or in any situation whatever in which the detached troops could not communicate with the corps from which they were detached; and, above all, upon the sea-coast, where the troops detached could not hold communication with the ships. The first order to each of these detachments was, to keep the communication with their ships. The loss of 400 or 500 marines may not materially involve the honour of this country, but the lives of the men ought not to be endangered, as they must be, if care be not taken that they should have a communication with a point of safety, without some very extraordinary cause. We hear of the operations of the marines with the Austrians. But the Spanish troops, and particularly the British legion, are not the Austrians. I cannot consider this corps of General Evans to be in a state of discipline and subordination, such as a body of troops ought to be in, with which his majesty's marine forces ought to be connected. They have suffered very considerably; their losses have been great, and have affected their subordination, their good order and discipline, particularly in the presence of an enemy. A disaster or panic may occur among the best troops; but among such, order can be re-established. It does not appear that these are in the state in which they ought to be, to render it safe to co-operate with them. No efforts of their officers can, in such cases, have any effect upon them.

April 21,1837.

* * * * *

Intervention, if at all, should be on a National Scale.

The noble viscount says that we are carrying on these operations with the object of maintaining the peace of Europe; and these objects are, more especially, put forth in a pamphlet which is attributed to a colleague of the noble viscount, who has applauded his opinions, if he has not gone further, and adopted them as his own. Is the noble lord desirous, in accordance with the policy so set forth, to press upon the nation the adoption of the system of a general combination of the powers of the west, upon principles offensive as well as defensive, against the powers of the north and east of Europe? If so momentous an affair and such a course are seriously contemplated, they should not be commenced by stealth, but in a manner worthy of the character of a great nation like Great Britain. It is not by allowing Spain to raise a legion here in the first instance, and afterwards by sending a few hundred marines, that any really important object can be accomplished. But if the noble lords are in earnest, a message should be sent to parliament, and the support of the country should be called for, to this new scheme of policy; and a commanding force should be sent, in order to carry it into execution. But I recommend the noble viscount well to consider the length of time which must elapse before these operations can be brought to a conclusion; the expense which must, in the first instance, be incurred; and the lengthened period which must elapse before the troops can be withdrawn, and the other expenses can be discontinued, which must be incurred if this scheme be undertaken. The noble lord must establish a government in Spain; he must have the assistance of a Spanish army; and he must pay, equip, and provide for, not only his majesty's troops, but every Spanish officer and soldier employed in the settlement of the government of the country. It may be said, that there are financial resources in Spain; but I am much mistaken, regarding the state of the Spanish military establishments and Spanish finances, if there are not non-effective establishments, such as pensions, retired allowances, expenses of garrisons, and others, which will consume the whole of the pecuniary resources of Spain, however well managed, even without including the interest of the existing debt. I think that, if this country should have this matter fairly brought under its view, it would not be thought advisable to enter upon the scheme proposed in this pamphlet. But we are told that France ought to act this part; and that we ought to give France our moral support. France act! At whose expense? France would have the same difficulties—nay, greater difficulties—than this country. Is it intended that we are to subsidise France? No such thing; we are to assist with our ships and marines on the coast, but it is France that is to carry on the operations in the interior, and pay this expense. Is it believed that Louis Philippe has lost his senses? If we cannot expect that France will pay all this expense, what is to become of the integrity of the Spanish dominions, and the independence of the Spanish government, after the operations shall he concluded?

April 21,1837.

* * * * *

Necessity of Conciliating the Protestants of Ireland.

My anxious wish, my lords, has always been—and I have frankly stated it more than once in my place in this house—that the Protestants of Ireland should be on the best terms with the government of this country, and that the government should give them every protection and support in its power. My firm opinion is, that the safety of this country in connection with Ireland, the safety of the union, the permanence of the union, and, indeed, the honour of the empire, all depend, in a great measure, if not entirely, on the good understanding which may subsist between the government and the Protestants of Ireland. I am also certain that the prosperity of the Protestants in Ireland, and the safety of their persons, of their riches, and of everything dear to men, depend on their being on terms of good understanding with the government; but that things will not go on as they ought to go on, until government induces the Protestants of that country to return to that good understanding. That has been my opinion ever since the commencement of these unfortunate dissensions, seven years ago; and I should be sorry to say, this evening, one word which might be calculated to increase the irritation now existing between both these parties. The noble viscount (Melbourne) has admitted that the Protestants of Ireland have great reason to feel the awkwardness of their present position, and to entertain jealousy of the government; and I must own that the noble viscount, instead of aggravating that description of feeling which he admits the Protestants of Ireland ought to have, should use, as I conceive, every exertion in his power to conciliate them, and to make them feel that they may depend upon the government for the protection of their lives and property, and that they will not be sacrificed to those who are preaching up sedition against the institutions of their country, and insurrections against the persons and property of her people. These Protestants are in number not less than 2,000,000. I believe they hold, my lords, about nine-tenths of the property of Ireland; and I am sure that they are persons of the best education and of the best conduct in that country. I believe that the province in which they reside is as well cultivated and as well conducted in every respect as any portion of England; and the inhabitants of it deserve on every account all the protection which the government can afford them. Let us see, my lords, whether they have not reason to feel jealousy of the government in consequence of the transactions of the last few years. Look at the total destruction of the property of tithe—look at the treatment of their church—look at the various occurrences which have taken place, and see whether they have not reason to apprehend that there is a latent intention of putting down the Protestant livings in Ireland, and of substituting a voluntary system in place of their present church establishment. Do you suppose that men of their description do not calculate on the events which are likely to happen? Do you suppose that they do not read the history of past times? We have heard the noble viscount talking of the history of the year 1782, and of the year 1798, and of various other transactions. Let us look at the letters of Henry Lord Clarendon, formerly chief governor of Ireland; and, having looked at them, let any man ask himself whether the Protestants of Ireland have not a right to conceive that matters are advancing rapidly to the state described by that noble personage, and whether the same description of power is not now growing up which exercised so enormous an influence on the government of his day. I consider that the statements made by the different peers who have spoken to night from this (the conservative) side of the house ought to have, and I trust they will have, a powerful effect on the Protestant mind of this country. At the same time that these statements are brought forward, and the facts are made known to the public, showing that neither property nor life is secure in Ireland, his majesty comes down to parliament with a speech, in which he says, "Ireland is in a state of tranquillity;" and yet there is not one gentleman residing in Ireland who was not aware, when that speech was delivered, that a general association had been formed and was in existence in Dublin for the sole purpose of agitation—of that agitation which, as Lord Wellesley told the country, was the cause of disturbances as undoubtedly as any one circumstance ever was the cause of another. Do your lordships suppose that the Protestants of Ireland are not aware of that fact?

April 28,1837.

* * * * *

Lord Normanby's Gaol Deliveries.

What was the next step of which the Protestants of Ireland complained? The lord lieutenant, they say, went into the country, from place to place, without having any communication either with the judges or with the magistrates;—and that is a fact on which I greatly rely—the lord lieutenant, they say, released at every county gaol which he visited a certain number of prisoners. I have said, that the Protestants of Ireland have a very peculiar interest in the impartial administration of the law, and in the tranquillity of the country, because they form the great body of its landed proprietors. They must look at such a transaction with jealousy; and if there had been no circumstances connected with such a transaction save those which have been stated this evening, it must, I think, be admitted, that if the conduct of the lord lieutenant was not without precedent (and I believe that no precedent can he found for it) it has yet been still of such rare occurrence that it ought never to be repeated. I do not mean to say that this power of enlarging prisoners has never been exercised, but I maintain that it had never previously been exercised in such a manner. I do not pretend to be acquainted with the technicalities of the law on this subject; but it occurs to me that several of the persons who have been released in this peculiar manner by the lord lieutenant, had surely been guilty of felony. I do not know exactly what the state of the law is, at present, upon this subject, but I apprehend that persons who have been found guilty of felony ought to have some document conveying their pardon, or in default of its production they become, I believe, liable to certain fines and forfeitures. But in the present case persons guilty of felony have been enlarged without any writing at all, at the simple order of the lord lieutenant, I must say, that a proceeding of this sort is highly irregular, and that it is such an exercise of power as a lord lieutenant in the ordinary discharge of his duty ought not to repeat; and further, that this was an exercise of power which was most likely to produce a very pernicious effect on the minds of the Protestants of Ireland.

April 28, 1837.

* * * * *

Objections to the Irish Corporations Bill of 1837.

I stated, on a former occasion, that these corporations existed in their present shape, and were brought to their present state, principally with a view to the support and protection of the religion of the Church of England established in Ireland. Whatever may be done with respect to these corporations for the future, in my opinion that object ought never to be lost sight of. It may be doubted, from what has lately occurred in this country, whether that opinion is so unanimously adopted as it was in former years; but I may venture to say, the support of the Church of England in Ireland is still the policy of this country—the policy which his majesty is sworn to maintain—the policy which this house is called, by writs of summons, to uphold—the policy which every member of this, or the other house of parliament, is sworn to uphold by the oaths which he has voluntarily taken. Under these circumstances, I think I may safely say that, according to the ancient constitution, according to the modern constitution, according to the uniform policy of this country for the last 300 years, the maintenance of the Church of England in Ireland forms a prominent and important point of legislative concern. Looking to this bill now under consideration, in relation principally to that policy, it goes undoubtedly to establish a very large number of corporations in Ireland, the mode of their formation being to give votes to the very lowest class of the population of the towns in which these corporations are to be formed. This is to be done, not upon evidence of their possessing property—not, as in England, upon residence, upon the payment of rates, or on the evidence of their possessing anything in the nature of property; but simply on the condition that the parties possess a 5l. or a 10l. qualification, made up of all kinds and descriptions of property put together, and this without any proof whatever, excepting the oath of the parties themselves, of their possessing even that qualification. It is well known to your lordships that a system of perjury prevails in all parts of Ireland, with a view to establish franchise of this description. I have recently seen accounts of enquiries before select committees in certain parliamentary elections which have taken place in that country, and it is impossible to glance at them without being impressed with the conviction that, if any description of franchise depend solely on the oaths of the holders, every species of enquiry will be nugatory; and it will be just as wise to establish at once a system of universal suffrage, as to establish a system of franchise in such a manner. These corporations, thus formed by persons holding a franchise of this description, acquired solely by their own swearing, and without any evidence whatever of their possessing any property except their own oaths, establish a system upon which no reliance can be placed, and on which no establishment whatever can safely depend. If your lordships want any proof of the danger to the church of Ireland by the establishment of corporations of this description, I will refer your lordships to the declarations, I would not say of those who are the declared enemies, but I must say, the strongest opponents of the church, and who are found, on every occasion, making the greatest possible exertions against the church in Ireland, These persons are heard declaring publicly and repeatedly, almost under the very view of the government—"Give us but this corporation bill, and all the rest must follow." If there be any doubt about it, I beg to say, I shall not be disposed to listen to the threats of any man; but when my own senses convince me that such must be the result, I mean danger to the establishment, I do say it is my duty to attend to warnings of the description to which I have adverted.

May 5, 1837.

* * * * *

Eulogium on King William the Fourth.

I have served his late majesty in the highest situations; I have been in his council as well as the noble viscount (Melbourne). I, indeed, did not serve him so long as the noble viscount, or even under any such prosperous circumstances as the noble viscount; but I have had opportunities of witnessing, under all these circumstances, the personal advantages of character so ably described by the noble viscount. It has fallen to my lot to serve his majesty at different periods, and in different capacities; and, while I had the happiness of doing so, upon all those occasions I have witnessed not only all the virtues ascribed to him by the noble viscount, but likewise a firmness, a discretion, a candour, a justice, and a spirit of conciliation towards others,—a respect for all. Probably there never was a sovereign who, in such circumstances and encompassed by so many difficulties, more successfully met them than he did upon every occasion on which he had to engage them. I was induced to serve his majesty, not only from my sense of duty—not alone from the feeling that the sovereign of this country has the right to command my services in any situation in which it might be considered that I might be of use—but from a feeling of gratitude to his majesty for favours, for personal distinctions, conferred upon me, notwithstanding that I had been unfortunately in the position of opposing myself to his majesty's views and intentions when he was employed in a high situation under government,[19] and in consequence of which he had to resign that great office which he must, beyond all others, have been most anxious to retain. Notwithstanding that, my lords, he employed me in his service; and he, as a sovereign, manifested towards me a kindness, condescension, and favour, which, so long as I live, I never can forget. I considered myself, then, not only bound by duty, and the sense I felt of gratitude to all the sovereigns of this country, under whom I had lived, but more especially towards his late majesty, to relieve him from every difficulty I could, under any circumstances.

[Footnote 19: William the Fourth, when Duke of Clarence, was under the necessity of resigning the office of Lord High Admiral, while the Duke of Wellington was premier.]

June 22, 1837.

* * * * *

Agrarian Disturbances in Ireland are earned by Political Agitation.

The noble earl opposite has stated, that the tranquillity mentioned in her majesty's speech from the throne, on opening the present parliament, was not intended to mean judicial or agrarian tranquillity, but political tranquillity. And what is the sort of political tranquillity existing in Ireland? I believe that a very few days before the speech in which the word tranquillity is used was delivered, the association which was assembled in the capital of Ireland, under the eyes of the noble earl opposite, was dissolved; but, at the same time, her majesty was given to understand, that she was not to have the choice of her ministers, but that they must be selected by the gentleman who was the founder and the head of that association. Now, to talk of tranquillity—political tranquillity—in any part of that country, looking at the situation in which it is placed, is vague and idle. The noble earl has said, that the agrarian disturbances in Ireland are not to be attributed to political agitation. Now, one of the greatest authorities that ever appeared in this or any other country—a noble relation of mine—stated, that "agrarian disturbances in Ireland were to be attributed to political agitation, and to nothing else, as much as effect was to be attributed to cause in any instance whatever." I say, then, that in Ireland they have agrarian disturbances because they have political agitations.

November 27, 1837.

* * * * *

Principle of Imprisonment for Debt.

One of the causes of debts being incurred in this country is, in a great degree, the power which creditors at present possess to arrest their debtors upon mesne process; and I still further believe that it is the facility which is thus given of obtaining credit, that has been the cause of the great mercantile prosperity of the country. The enormous transactions upon credit are such, that both individuals and the public generally, require further means of recovering debts than exist in other countries.

December 5,1837.

The Case of Dr. Hampden.

The late king was advised to appoint that gentleman to be Regius Professor of Divinity in the university of Oxford. There can be no doubt that the general opinion of the university was, that that gentleman's theological tenets were not exactly orthodox, or consistent with the articles of the church of England,—an opinion which the publication of certain works by that gentleman has tended to establish.

Several persons in the university considered it their duty to petition his majesty, praying, if the appointment had not been completed, that he would not make it. I believe that another address was presented to his majesty, entreating his majesty not to sanction that appointment, which, however, was made, contrary to the views of the university at large; and a short time afterwards, Dr. Hampden thought right, in his inaugural lecture, to state that he then felt it his duty to explain the opinions which had been complained of. I do not pretend to be a judge either of those opinions or that explanation; but this I will venture to say, and I believe your lordships will concur in the opinion, that in proportion as Dr. Hampden found it necessary to give an explanation of his sentiments, in the same proportion were those justified who thought proper to disapprove of them. I believe it will be admitted that, if a clergyman who published certain opinions, not being orthodox, thought proper to come forward and explain those opinions, at least they who were opposed to such opinions had some justification, on their being repeated, for the course they had taken in disapproving of them. This is all I wish to say respecting the opinions and explanation of Dr. Hampden. His appointment having been made, notwithstanding the petition of a vast number of the clergy of Oxford, and the general opinion expressed there that it should not be made, a request was preferred to the heads of houses that they would propose some measure to the convocation which would have the effect of marking the disapprobation on the part of that body of the opinions and appointment of Dr. Hampden. The noble earl has alluded to the act of convocation excluding Dr. Hampden from being one of those to appoint the select preachers, and also from sitting at the board of heresy. I am not disposed to say anything against Dr. Hampden; but this I must say, that, considering the whole transaction, my opinion is, the convocation did as little upon that occasion as it was possible to do, consistently with the necessity which existed of taking some notice of that gentleman, his opinions and conduct. Since that period, I really believe that the university, and the bishops of the church of England, and all the persons who have any influence on this question, have done everything in their power to put it down, and prevent it becoming a subject of discussion, even in the university or elsewhere. For myself, I can say, I have invariably pursued that course, it being my object to prevent any discussion on the matter; and I never should have mentioned it, here or elsewhere, publicly, if the noble earl had not forced it upon me on the present occasion. I certainly lament the transaction, principally because I consider it is likely to produce a schism in the church; and I have been as anxious as any man can be in my situation, to prevent the university from proceeding on the subject in such a manner as may, by possibility, lead to that result.

The noble earl adverted to the conduct of a gentleman who is now vice-chancellor of the university, and who has, in his capacity of head of a house, prohibited the attendance of the students in divinity upon the lectures of the Regius Professor. I do not at all pretend to be competent to mark the difference between the private and public lectures of the Regius Professor; but I certainly do not approve of the course taken by that gentleman. In my opinion, the question is not one to be considered by the head of a house; for, in fact, no ordination can be conferred by him or the Regius Professor of Divinity. Ordination can only be conferred by the bishops of the church; and whether the students attend the lectures of the Regius Professor of Divinity, or those of the Margaret Professor, or of any other professor, I will say, it is the duty of the bishops of the church to consider who are the persons coming for ordination, and whether they are qualified or not, without taking into consideration the certificates of the Regius Professor of Divinity, the head of a house, or any other individual. It is, I contend, the duty of the bishops to examine into the subject themselves, without reference to the certificate of any individual whatever. I must observe, however, with regard to the course adopted by the vice-chancellor, that I am thoroughly convinced, not only from what that gentleman has stated to me, but from my knowledge of that gentleman's conduct, and his character for candour and fairness, that he had the very wisest motives in pursuing that course, from which he departed as soon as he found that the bishops of the church had determined upon observing a different line, conceiving that he was then relieved from all charge and responsibility in the situation which he held. Such is the history of that transaction; and I have only to say, with respect to that gentleman, and with respect to others of the university of Oxford, that it was their anxious wish and desire to avoid taking any step in reference to Dr. Hampden, lest it should, in any manner whatever, lead to what they would consider the greatest possible misfortune—a schism in the church.

December 21,1837.

* * * * *

A great country cannot wage a little war.

January 16, 1838.

* * * * *

Conduct of the Canadian Leaders.

I differ entirely from the noble and learned lord in thinking that the act of 1831 established the British constitution in Canada, for it is not consistent with the British constitution to leave the civil government of the country—and especially to leave the judges of the land—to be provided for by an annual vote of the parliament. I say, my lords, that the British constitution, for the last hundred and fifty years at least, has made a fixed and not uncertain provision for supporting the dignity of the crown, for meeting the expenses attendant on the administration of the civil government, and most particularly for the independence of the judges of the land. But is that the state of things in Lower Canada? No. I maintain that the act of 1831 did not establish the British constitution in the colonies of Upper and Lower Canada, but something quite distinct; for it gave to the people a popular representation, which, in my opinion, is the cause of all the disputes that have followed, and of the insurrection which has taken place. It gave individuals the power to create prejudices in the minds of the people, to weaken the loyalty of the Canadians, and to raise them in hostility against her majesty's crown and government. And what has been the object of these individuals in the course which they have pursued? They have supposed that, by creating dissatisfaction amongst the people, they could thereby throw off the authority of the crown; and, by gathering the people around them, overturn the government established in the colony. Such have been the objects of those individuals who have been seen running off to the neighbouring territories of the United States as soon as they found their own persons exposed to danger. This turned out to be the real state of the case; for the would-be leaders left the unfortunate people in a state of rebellion against her majesty's government, and ran off themselves, letting the unlucky inhabitants return to their houses as best they could; and forcing them to submit, with the best grace they might, to the mercy of her majesty's government.

January 18, 1838.

Evils of popular Rights.

I warned the noble lord against endangering the establishments of the country, by giving anything like an authority to a popular assembly to withhold the funds necessary for carrying on the civil government; for nothing is more needful to a country than to uphold the civil power, and the independence—as well pecuniary as political—of the judges of the land. And let noble lords learn, from the events in Canada, and other dominions in North America, what it is to hold forth what are called "popular rights," but which are not popular rights either here or elsewhere; and what occasion is thereby given to the perpetuation of a system of agitation which ends in insurrection and rebellion, and the coming to blows with her majesty's troops.

January 18,1838.

* * * * *

Importance of reducing the Canadian Rebels.

I confess, my lords, that I have a feeling for the honour of my country, and I cannot but believe that if, by any misfortune, we should fail in restoring peace in Lower Canada, at an early period of time, we shall receive a blow, with respect to our military character, to our reputation, and to our honour, of which it will require years to enable us to remove the effects.

January 18,1838.

* * * * *

An Elective Legislative Council in Canada deprecated.

My lords, there is one topic which has been adverted to by the noble and learned lord (Lord Brougham), upon which I think it necessary to say a word, although it is not alluded to in the address, and will more properly form a subject of the discussion on the bill which is to be brought in upon some future day—and that is the establishment in Lower Canada of an elective legislative council. The noble and learned lord, with all his knowledge of Lower Canada, has not, in my opinion, sufficiently adverted to the fact of the difference of the two races of inhabitants in that country. My lords, it may be easy to talk, here, of establishing an elective council, but if the noble and learned lord will look into the discussions which have taken place upon that subject, and to the opinions that have been delivered upon it by the different parties, in that colony, he will find that British inhabitants are to the full as much opposed to that arrangement as the French are in favour of it, he will find that in point of fact, they would be in a state of insurrection against that arrangement, in the same degree as the French are now supposed to be in a state of insurrection in favour of an elective legislative council. I will likewise beg the noble and learned lord, and I would entreat the noble viscount opposite, and every member of her majesty's government, to attend to this fact, that an elective legislative council is not the constitution of the British monarchy; that a legislative council appointed by the monarch is the constitution of this country; that this was so stated in the discussions upon the bill passed in the year 1791, by all the great authorities who discussed that measure, amongst others by Mr. Fox himself. That gentleman said, "that a legislative council, appointed by the monarch, is an essential part of the British constitution."

January 18, 1838.

Concessions to Democracy cannot be rescinded.

Your lordships ought also to recollect that, since the passing of the reform bill, the taxes required from householders paying 10l. of yearly rent have been greatly reduced, and I believe that the poor-rates have also been diminished. These reductions have afforded great relief to that particular class of persons, greater than has been given to any other portion of society; and I think that, under the circumstances, the amount of qualification ought not to be further diminished, for, if it be, a worse description of electors will be the inevitable consequence. I perfectly recollect that a noble friend of mine, whom I do not now see in his place, warned your lordships, on a former occasion, of the danger of making any approach to democracy in a measure like this; and he told your lordships that, if once such a measure was adopted, you could never turn back from it. If it be found, when carried into operation, to act ever so injuriously—if its tendency be found to be ever so destructive to the peace and well-being of society—still you cannot fall back on the point from which you started; for, if once granted, the measure must be permanent.

March 8, 1838.

* * * * *

Short-sighted Conduct of the West Indian Colonists.

There is no man in this house, or in the country, who has been more anxious than myself, that the measure passed for the abolition of slavery should be entirely successful. I have, however, conceived from the first, that the only chance of its success would arise from the colonial legislatures acting with good faith, and carrying the measure, after it had passed the imperial parliament, into strict execution; for which measure they have received what they acknowledge, by their adhesion to the principle of the bill, a competent compensation. It appears, however, to be beyond doubt, that they have not carried the new system into execution as they ought to have done; and some two or three years ago, your lordships were under the necessity of consenting to a bill, rendered necessary in consequence of the legislature of Jamaica having refused, under not very creditable circumstances, to enact a law which it had positively promised to pass. Under these circumstances, considering that we are now approaching to within a couple of years of the period when a new state of society is to be established in all the British possessions where slavery has ever existed, I must say, I think parliament ought not to hesitate about adopting some measure of the description now proposed, for the purpose of carrying into full and complete execution the object which the imperial legislature had in view when the emancipation act was passed. It appears to me, that if the legislatures of the colonies had acted as sensible men ought to have done, in the circumstances in which they were placed four years ago, they would have had before them, and the British parliament would have had before it, a very different prospect from that which, I fear, exists at the present moment.

March 13, 1838.

Lord Melbourne's Government Inimical to the Church.

It appears that the policy of her majesty's government is—I will use the mildest term that can be employed—not to encourage the established church. I am afraid that it will appear from what passed in another place, in the last session of parliament, and even in this, that the church of England—the established church of England—is not to be encouraged by her majesty's government. I am sure that those who recollect what has occurred in parliament, during the last few years, will admit that no great encouragement has been shown by ministers to the church of Ireland, that branch of the established church of England which is stationed in the latter country. I say therefore, my lords, that this is the policy of the government of this country; and, I must own, also, it is most sincerely to be lamented by every friend of the constitution, and of the peace, order, and happiness of the community.

March 30, 1838.

* * * * *

A Free Press in Malta deprecated.

Now, in regard to this matter of a free press in Malta, I crave your lordships' attention to the facts of the case for a moment, and I beg the house to bear them in mind. What is Malta? It is a fortress and a seaport—it is a great naval and military arsenal for our shipping and forces in the Mediterranean. We hold it by conquest. We hold it as an important post, as a great military and naval arsenal, and as nothing more. My lords, if these are the facts, we might as well think of planting a free press on the fore deck of the admiral's flag-ship in the Mediterranean, or on the caverns of the batteries of Gibraltar, or in the camp of Sir John Colborne in Canada, as of establishing it in Malta. A free press in Malta in the Italian language is an absurdity. Of the hundred thousand individuals who compose the population of Malta, three-fourths at least speak nothing but the Maltese dialect, and do not understand the Italian language. Of the one hundred thousand inhabitants of the island, at least three-fourths can neither read nor write. What advantages, then, can accrue to the people of Malta from the establishment of a free press? We do not want to teach our English sailors and soldiers to understand Italian. A free press will find no readers among them either. Who, then, is it for? These gentlemen say, that, unless the government support a free press in Malta, it cannot exist of itself, and they suggest an expense of L800 a year in its favour. They have done nothing more than this that I am aware of since their appointment, and it is plain, that the savings spoken of by the noble baron as having been effected by their recommendation are completely swallowed up by the project of a free press. My lords, I cannot help thinking that it is wholly unnecessary and greatly unbecoming of the government to form such an establishment, of such a description, in such a place as Malta; and the more particularly, as the object for which it is made, must be both of a dangerous tendency to this country, and fraught with evil to others. The free press which they propose, is to be conducted, not by foreign Italians, but by Maltese, subjects of her majesty, enjoying the same privileges as we do. Now, what does this mean? It means that the licence to do wrong is unlimited. If it were conducted by foreign Italians, you could have a check upon them if they acted in such a manner as would tend to compromise us with our neighbours—you could send them out of the island—you could prevent their doing injury in that manner by various ways. But here you have no such check—you have no check at all—your free press in that respect is uncontrollable. If the free press chooses to preach up insurrection in Italy from its den in Malta, you have no power of preventing it. Were the conductors foreign Italians you could lay your hand on them at once, and dispose of them as aliens; but you cannot do that with the Maltese subjects, enjoying the same right and possessing the same freedom as ourselves. I did hope, that we should have been cured by this time of our experiments on exciting insurrection in the other countries of Europe—in the dominions of neighbouring princes—in the territories of our allies. I did think that we had received a sufficient lesson in these matters to last us a long time, even for ever, in the results which have taken place through such interference in Portugal, Spain, Italy—ay, and in Canada too—and that they had put an end to our dangerous mania for exciting insurrection in foreign countries. Such, my lords, I assert is the object of a free press in Malta—to excite insurrection in the dominions of our neighbour and ally, the King of the Two Sicilies, and in the dominions of the King of Sardinia—and I confess that I am ashamed of the government, considering the results that have taken place, from the doctrines promulgated by it, that they have not done everything in their power to suppress instead of encouraging and supporting it; and that they had not sent out their commissions with full power to do so, rather than instructed them to call for its establishment.

May 3, 1838.

* * * * *

State of Poverty in Ireland.

Of all the countries in Europe, Ireland is the one in which it has appeared to me to be least possible to establish anything in the nature of the English poor-laws. The opinion delivered by others has been, that there are no materials to be found in Ireland proper for forming, or if formed for administering with salutary effect, any system of poor-laws such as exists in this country; and I, my lords, believe that there is no doubt whatever of the justice and truth of that opinion, considering the English poor-laws, as they formerly existed, and as they were carried into execution up to the year 1834, when the noble lords opposite introduced the measure which amended them. While, however, I say this, I am bound at the same time to express my entire concurrence in the opinion declared by the noble viscount, that there never was a country in which poverty existed to such a degree as it exists in that part of the United Kingdom. My lords, I was in office in that country—I held a high situation in the administration of the government of Ireland thirty years ago—and I must say, that from that time to this there has scarcely elapsed a single year in which the government has not at certain periods of it entertained the most serious apprehensions of actual famine. My lords, I am firmly convinced that from the year 1806 down to the present time, a year has not passed in which the government have not been called on to give assistance to relieve the poverty and distress which prevailed in Ireland, and owing to circumstances over which no human power could have any control. One of the circumstances which has most frequently led to this lamentable state of things, has been the failure or delay of the potato crops, and there have been known times when two, three, and even as many as four months have intervened before these crops, which are used as a subsistence by the people, could be brought into the market; and such are the social relations in that country, that the people have no means of coming to market to purchase like the people of England. My lords, this is a fact that is undoubted, and one that I believe never existed in any country in the world except Ireland.

May 21, 1838.

* * * * *

The Numbers of a Meeting may render it Illegal.

The numbers of a meeting—that is to say, such an assembly of persons as would create terror in the minds of people living in the neighbourhood,—would justify the magistrate in taking measures to disperse it.

June 15, 1838.

Real cause of our interference in Spain.

The system of interference adopted by his late majesty's government, by means of the quadruple treaty, was with a view to the contest between extreme opinions—it was more with a view of aiding these extreme opinions, than to the arrangement of the mere differences between Don Carlos, upon the one side, and the queen, or her daughter, upon the other; to support certain opinions, and not to determine the succession, was the cause of interference. I regret interference upon that ground; I object to interference upon that ground; and I say, moreover, that we were not right in interfering upon that ground. I maintain that, more particularly on account of the extreme opinions that prevailed, we ought not to have interfered at all; but most especially we ought not, according to the common practice of this government, and in accordance with the declared political principles of the noble lords themselves, to have interfered in a question involving extreme political opinions. Now it has unfortunately happened that extreme political principles have been forced upon a great part of Europe by means of large armies and of great military forces, and it was consequently expected that the same thing would succeed in Spain. This, I believe, was the object of our interference with Spain, and not to determine the Spanish succession.

June 19, 1838.

We had no right to interfere against Don Carlos.

I say we had no business to interfere in the question of succession. There might have been some pretext for interference in the question of succession, if any of the powers of Europe had taken part with Don Carlos, but that was not the case. The noble baron (Lord Holland) cheers. I say, confidently, that not one of the powers in Europe had stirred a finger in support of the pretensions of Don Carlos. I say, then, that, according to all principles—the principles supported and acted upon by this country, in the case of the house of Braganza, and many other cases that I could mention—we ought to have avoided interference; and we ought to have avoided interference by armies more particularly, in the contests in Spain. I say, my lords, that not a sword had been moved in Europe in favour of Don Carlos. When Don Carlos went to Spain, in the summer of 1834, there were not three battalions in arms in that country in his favour. This I positively state as a fact. But, on the contrary, in the space of forty leagues there were forty fortified posts in possession of the queen's troops. Now, my lords, this is a positive fact; and I say that, in the year 1835, when the armistice was negotiated, when the exchange of prisoners was negotiated by Lord Eliot, Don Carlos had then acquired a superiority over the queen's forces, who were obliged to take up a position on the right of the Ebro. That is to say, between the interval of time I have mentioned,—and this is a positive fact upon which your lordships may rely, and to which I pledge my word,—between the summer of 1834 and the period at which the exchange of prisoners was agreed upon in 1835,—that is, in the course of a very few months,—the superiority had been gained by Don Carlos in that part of the country, so far that he had forced the enemy to take up a position on the other side of the Ebro, abandoning all their fortified posts, except Pampeluna and one other; and, I must add, they had very wisely abandoned them, because they found they could not march to their relief through the country. Now, my lords, this is literally and truly a fact; and it is a fact not to be forgotten, with respect to the present contest in Spain. I say, then, that it was the business of this government not to have interfered by force. We ought not to have done so, according to the noble marquis's principle—that there ought to be no interference between two hostile parties in a nation like Spain.

June 19, 1838.

* * * * *

The Legion a failure.

The noble viscount has told your lordships, certainly, that he sent out an expedition; and the noble marquis has informed us that it has always been the policy of this country to encourage such expeditions. Now, without meaning to assert that the result of that expedition was a dire catastrophe, I must be permitted to say that the legion has been, in my opinion and conviction, a complete failure. It has cost the Spanish government an enormous sum of money. Great expectations were raised respecting it, not one of which has been fulfilled. When the legion went to Spain, the Queen of Spain's army was in all the provinces, with the exception of Biscay and Navarre. Her government was established in all parts of Spain, excepting these places. Excepting them, all other places might be said to be in a state of tranquillity. But it appears the Queen of Spain could not carry on the war, unless she got ten thousand Isle of Dogsmen—a legion from England, and another from France. If the Spanish government had asked for officers, or for arms, or for money, or for artillery, I should not have been surprised, as I know well the manner in which the Spanish arsenals are supplied. But asking for 10,000 men from England to destroy Don Carlos, who was shut up in the mountains, was a matter really not to be seriously thought of. The object was not to bring 10,000, or 15,000, or 20,000 men into action, but to bring the red coats and the blue coats, the French and English troops, into the contest; that was the object, and the view was, to produce a moral effect. But the government ought to have known that that which gave them the influence on the one side, was fatal to that influence on the other. Thus was an end put to that moral influence which this country could, and ought to have exerted, but which can only be effectually exercised by strict adherence, throughout all her proceedings, to the plain principles of justice. If this country enter into a treaty, let her carry it honourably through; but let her not push her interference further than is necessary for exerting her influence over both parties, in order to settle existing differences. I have said that the legion was a failure. Of that there cannot be the slightest doubt. The war is now in the same state as it was in the year 1835, except that Don Carlos has more men.

June 19, 1838.

* * * * *

The Opposition should give aid to the Government when a war is inevitable.

The noble viscount tells us that we did not object to the appointment of the Earl of Durham as governor-general of Canada—that we did not object to the powers confided to him; that we—referring particularly to me—urged this government by all the means in their power to send out large forces, and take care to be strong in that part of the world; advice which, I admit, I did repeat over and over again, until I fatigued myself and the house by doing so. But why did I not object to those powers being given to the Earl of Durham? Because, seeing the government in difficulties—seeing the colony in a state of rebellion—and seeing that the government possessed confidence in another place—I thought it was not my duty to excite opposition to measures which they thought it might be proper to adopt; and therefore I took them all upon their recommendation. Very possibly I was wrong in so doing; indeed, it appears that I was wrong; but I took the course which I then considered it my duty to take. I declared that I would not follow the example of those who, being convinced of the certainty that the country would be involved in a war, yet thought proper to oppose all measures that were necessary for carrying on that war. Neither would I deny assistance to those who were absent, and who were carrying on the government to the best of their ability; but I would give the government a fair support, in order to pacify a country which might be in a state of war or rebellion. That was the course which I followed on the occasion alluded to by the noble viscount. With respect to the Earl of Durham, I am personally unacquainted with him; and I considered that the noble viscount and her majesty's government ought to have known best who was the person most qualified to act as governor of Canada.

August 9, 1838.

* * * * *

Lord Durham's Ordinance[20] a grossly illegal Act.

A grossly illegal act has been committed—not a mere technical error, or one having reference to small or nice points of law, but an illegal act of great magnitude, and relating to points of the most grave importance—an act so clearly illegal, that no man capable of understanding the first principles of justice can doubt of its impropriety. It is impossible that the people of this country can suffer any man to be driven into banishment without trial, or that they can allow him, afterwards, to be condemned to death, without having been convicted of any crime but that of returning to his own country.

[Footnote 20: The Earl of Durham, governor-general of the Canadas, had issued an ordinance, transporting to Bermuda Dr. Nelson and seven others, guilty by confession of high treason, and subjecting them to death if they returned to Canada. Lord Brougham, actuated, as was asserted by some, by personal feeling against Lord Durham, protested against this act in the face of the country. His speech on the occasion was one of the most powerful he ever delivered. It is scarcely necessary to add that Lord Durham immediately and precipitately resigned his governorship.]

August 9, 1838.

* * * * *

Inadequacy of our Navy.

There is nothing more certain than that, if you come to be entirely dependent for corn on the countries bordering on the Baltic, you would have the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Russia (as has been known before), levying a tax upon the exportation of that article of food to the Thames, and elsewhere in this country. * * I entirely agree with the noble and learned lord on the expediency of avoiding any interference with foreign powers on the subject of commercial matters; but I confess that I cannot view the state of our commercial relations, and of our position in the world generally, in connection with these commercial pursuits, with any degree of unmixed satisfaction. On the contrary, I do deplore the state in which we find ourselves placed in many parts of the world, particularly as it has been described in the course of the evening by my noble friend (Viscount Strangford). What I attribute that state of our commercial relations to, in a great degree, is, the extreme weakness and tottering condition of our naval establishments. I do not mean to complain of the distribution of our naval establishments; though, at the same time, I by no means intend to unsay what I have said in respect to the expeditions to Spain, which I cannot approve of; but I repeat my expression that I consider our naval establishments to be in too weak and tottering a condition to answer the purpose for which they were intended, which was to give protection to the commercial interests of the country in all parts of the world; for the commerce of England does extend to all parts of the world. There is not a port, not a river, which is not visited by the ships of her majesty's subjects; and her majesty's subjects have an undoubted right to protection in whatever part of the world they may think proper to visit in the pursuits of commerce. The circumstance of which I complain I do not at all attribute to neglect upon the part of the admiralty, neither do I include in my censure the noble earl who is at the head of the admiralty; but those I do blame are the individuals who have thought proper to reduce the establishments of the country to such a degree, that protection cannot possibly be given in all places where it is required.

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I will remind your lordships that, since the peace, and particularly within the last twenty years, three great navies have sprung up in Europe, which are four times as strong as they were at any former period. Other navies, it is true, are put down; but we remain much the same. A great deal has been said, by way of comparison, between the strength of our navy in 1792, and in the years 1814 and 1815; but when we talk of strength in this case, we ought not to look at the subject without adverting to the naval establishments of other powers. Now, although our marine force should even be on the same footing as before, our commerce is not only tripled, but extended to a degree ten times greater than it ever was before; and there is not a part of the earth, from one pole to the other, in which the protection of our navy is not required for our commerce. I must say that, if we should at any time incur the misfortune of being involved in another war—which God forbid!—the only mode of keeping out of the difficulty would be to maintain such a navy as would give protection to her majesty's subjects in all parts of the globe.

August 14, 1838.

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Neutrality of Belgium.

I hope that it never may be lost sight of in this country, that the original foundation of the independence of Belgium, as a separate kingdom, was this condition, namely, its perpetual neutrality. That condition I consider to have been the foundation of that transaction, and I hope that this will never be forgotten by this country, or by Europe.

February 5, 1839.

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Aggressions on Canada from the United States.

I must say I should very much wish to see suitable measures adopted to carry into execution the intentions which her majesty declares in her speech, of maintaining her rights of sovereignty over Canada. The system of levying private war which prevails on that continent is not wholly unknown in other parts of the world. I have read of it as existing in the deserts of Central Asia; I have heard of its being practised, as a system, by the Asiatics on the frontiers of the Russian monarchy, where a perpetual warfare is going on between those tribes and the troops sent to repress their inroads—a warfare that has been waged in those countries from century to century. We read also of circumstances of the same kind occurring in Africa—of wars carried on by barbarous tribes against the possessions of the British government in Africa, the contests of savages against a civilized people. But this is a war carried on by a nation supposed to be considerably advanced in the scale of civilization—by men governing themselves, electing their servants by ballot and general suffrage, and living under institutions of that description. Yet these are the very men who come in at night, and with fire and torch destroy the property of her majesty's subjects, for no reason whatever except that they obey her majesty's laws, and carry into effect her royal commands. Of such a system of warfare there are, I believe, no examples, except, as I have stated, among the most lawless of the barbarous tribes of the East and of Africa. It is quite out of the question that her majesty's loyal subjects, invited to their habitations, and fixed in them, by her majesty's authority and that of her predecessors, should not endeavour to retaliate the sufferings thus inflicted upon them, unless protected by the strong arm of government; but how can government protect them, except by taking strong measures, when these persons are found invading her majesty's dominions for the purpose of plundering and destroying the property of her majesty's subjects, to intercept them in their retreat, to take them prisoners, and punish them according to the laws of the country they have insulted?

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There can be no doubt a civil government in any country is capable of preventing the collection of a body of troops, and the invasion of the territory of a neighbouring power. A body of "sympathisers" has been organised in the States to carry on the plan of invasion; and are we to sit down quietly and pass unnoticed this unwarrantable interference?

February 5, 1839.

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Agitation by Authority.

I now come to the last paragraph of the speech, in which her majesty complains, that she has observed with pain the efforts which have been made, in some parts of the country, to excite her subjects to disobedience and resistance to the law, and to recommend dangerous and illegal acts. Now, I really think that this affecting paragraph cannot have raised very pleasant reflections in the breasts of many noble lords who are in the habit of supporting her majesty's ministers. It is but too true that various persons have endeavoured to excite her majesty's subjects to resist the law; but I am afraid much of this spirit may be traced to what has taken place in this house on former occasions. I have heard persons, charged with the highest employments of government, insisting upon the rights of this people to assemble for the expression of their sentiments, declaiming against any restriction on that right, and preaching upon this doctrine without restricting it in the manner declared by law—namely, that these assemblies must not be in numbers sufficient to create alarm. It was but very lately that a great officer of state, travelling about the country, made a speech to the same purport at Liverpool, and stated those opinions in the most unreserved manner, at the very moment when men were assembling by torch-light meetings. We have heard for a number of years past of the extraordinary tranquillity of Ireland, and as often as I have listened to the phrase, I have protested against it; but there is a gentleman, high in the confidence of government, who goes about devising new modes of agitation every day. That gentleman ought to have a special copy of the speech sent to him! One time he talks of raising 2,000,000 of men—at another time of a fund of 20,000 l. sterling, which is deposited in his private bank, and ultimately to be deposited in his private pocket. In order to further his new schemes of agitation, that gentleman has declared his intention of raising 60,000 fighting men for her majesty, though he has never, that I am aware of, been employed as a recruiting officer. Sometimes these boasts do not turn out to be true; but if not 60,000 persons, there may be 6,000, or some force of that description, which would be a serious inconvenience to the government.

February 5, 1839.

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Folly of carrying on war with a peace establishment.

This country is at war—at war in two quarters of the world—at war in America and at war in Asia; and what I say is this, that when a country is at war, I understand that the fleet of that country should be put upon a war establishment; whereas, these returns are made on a peace establishment—nay, I believe on one much lower,—on a reduced peace establishment; and yet we are pretending to carry on war in two countries of the world with such means! I warned your lordships a year and a half ago—indeed nearly two years ago, against any such attempt. I believe that we have been feeling the inconvenience of such an attempt from that period up to the present time, and I only hope and trust in God, that we shall not experience still further inconvenience and disasters from our perseverance in it. A peace establishment, and a reduced peace establishment, may be very fit and very proper for carrying on the service of the country in time of peace; but when we come to carry on war, our peace establishment is not found equal to the performance of the duties required from the establishment in time of peace, and still less to those extended duties which must be performed in time of war.