Internationalism on the one side, national self-government on the other, are the radical conditions of the growth of a social mind which is the essence, as opposed to the form, of democracy. But as to form itself a word must, in conclusion, be said. If the forms are unsuitable the will cannot express itself, and if it fails of adequate expression it is in the end thwarted, repressed and paralyzed. In the matter of form the inherent difficulty of democratic government, whether direct or representative, is that it is government by majority, not government by universal consent. Its decisions are those of the larger part of the people, not of the whole. This defect is an unavoidable consequence of the necessities of decision and the impossibility of securing universal agreement. Statesmen have sought to remedy it by applying something of the nature of a brake upon the process of change. They have felt that to justify a new departure of any magnitude there must be something more than a bare majority. There must either be a large majority, two-thirds or three-fourths of the electorate, or there must be some friction to be overcome which will serve to test the depth and force as well as the numerical extent of the feeling behind the new proposal. In the United Kingdom we have one official brake, the House of Lords, and several unofficial ones, the civil service, the permanent determined opposition of the Bench to democratic measures, the Press, and all that we call Society. All these brakes act in one way only. There is no brake upon reaction—a lack which becomes more serious in proportion as the Conservative party acquires a definite and constructive policy of its own. In this situation the Liberal party set itself to deal with the official brake by the simple method of reducing its effective strength, but, to be honest, without having made up its mind as to the nature of the brake which it would like to substitute. On this question a few general remarks would seem to be in place. The function of a check on the House of Commons is to secure reconsideration. Conservative leaders are in the right when they point to the accidental elements that go to the constitution of parliamentary majorities. The programme of any general election is always composite, and a man finds himself compelled, for example, to choose between a Tariff Reformer whose views on education he approves, and a Free Trader whose educational policy he detests. In part this defect might be remedied by the Proportional system to which, whether against the grain or not, Liberals will find themselves driven the more they insist on the genuinely representative character of the House of Commons. But even a Proportional system would not wholly clear the issues before the electorate. The average man gives his vote on the question which he takes to be most important in itself, and which he supposes to be most likely to come up for immediate settlement. But he is always liable to find his expectations defeated, and a Parliament which is in reality elected on one issue may proceed to deal with quite another. The remedy proposed by the Parliament Bill was a two years' delay, which, it was held, would secure full discussion and considerable opportunity for the manifestation of opinion should it be adverse. This proposal had been put to the constituencies twice over, and had been ratified by them if any legislative proposal ever was ratified. It should enable the House of Commons, as the representatives of the people, to decide freely on the permanent constitution of the country. The Bill itself, however, does not lay down the lines of a permanent settlement. For, to begin with, in leaving the constitution of the House of Lords unaltered it provides a one-sided check, operating only on democratic measures which in any case have to run the gauntlet of the permanent officials, the judges, the Press, and Society. For permanent use the brake must be two-sided. Secondly, it is to be feared that the principle of delay would be an insufficient check upon a large and headstrong majority. What is really needed is that the people should have the opportunity of considering a proposal afresh. This could be secured in either of two ways: (1) by allowing the suspensory veto of the Second Chamber to hold a measure over to a new Parliament; (2) by allowing the House of Commons to submit a bill in the form in which it finally leaves the House to a direct popular vote. It is to my mind regrettable that so many Liberals should have closed the door on the Referendum. It is true that there are many measures to which it would be ill suited. For example, measures affecting a particular class or a particular locality would be apt to go by the board. They might command a large and enthusiastic majority among those primarily affected by them, but only receive a languid assent elsewhere, and they might be defeated by a majority beaten up for extraneous purposes among those without first-hand knowledge of the problems with which they are intended to deal. Again, if a referendum were to work at all it would only be in relation to measures of the first class, and only, if the public convenience is to be consulted, on very rare occasions. In all ordinary cases of insuperable difference between the Houses, the government of the day would accept the postponement of the measure till the new Parliament. But there are measures of urgency, measures of fundamental import, above all, measures which cut across the ordinary lines of party, and with which, in consequence, our system is impotent to deal, and on these the direct consultation of the people would be the most suitable method of solution.[13]

What we need, then, is an impartial second chamber distinctly subordinate to the House of Commons, incapable of touching finance and therefore of overthrowing a ministry, but able to secure the submission of a measure either to the direct vote of the people or to the verdict of a second election—the government of the day having the choice between the alternatives. Such a chamber might be instituted by direct popular election. But the multiplication of elections is not good for the working of democracy, and it would be difficult to reconcile a directly elected house to a subordinate position. It might, therefore, as an alternative, be elected on a proportional system by the House of Commons itself, its members retaining their seat for two Parliaments. To bridge over the change half of the chamber for the present Parliament might be elected by the existing House of Lords, and their representatives retiring at the end of this Parliament would leave the next House of Commons and every future House of Commons with one-half of the chamber to elect. This Second Chamber would then reflect in equal proportions the existing and the last House of Commons, and the balance between parties should be fairly held.[14] This chamber would have ample power of securing reasonable amendments and would also have good ground for exercising moderation in pressing its views. If the public were behind the measure it would know that in the end the House of Commons could carry it in its teeth, whether by referendum or by a renewed vote of confidence at a general election. The Commons, on their side, would have reasons for exhibiting a conciliatory temper. They would not wish to be forced either to postpone or to appeal. As to which method they would choose they would have absolute discretion, and if they went to the country with a series of popular measures hung up and awaiting their return for ratification, they would justly feel themselves in a strong position.

So far as to forms. The actual future of democracy, however, rests upon deeper issues. It is bound up with the general advance of civilization. The organic character of society is, we have seen, in one sense, an ideal. In another sense it is an actuality. That is to say, nothing of any import affects the social life on one side without setting up reactions all through the tissue. Hence, for example, we cannot maintain great political progress without some corresponding advance on other sides. People are not fully free in their political capacity when they are subject industrially to conditions which take the life and heart out of them. A nation as a whole cannot be in the full sense free while it fears another or gives cause of fear to another. The social problem must be viewed as a whole. We touch here the greatest weakness in modern reform movements. The spirit of specialism has invaded political and social activity, and in greater and greater degree men consecrate their whole energy to a particular cause to the almost cynical disregard of all other considerations. "Not such the help, nor these the defenders" which this moment of the world's progress needs. Rather we want to learn our supreme lesson from the school of Cobden. For them the political problem was one, manifold in its ramifications but undivided in its essence. It was a problem of realizing liberty. We have seen reason to think that their conception of liberty was too thin, and that to appreciate its concrete content we must understand it as resting upon mutual restraint and value it as a basis of mutual aid. For us, therefore, harmony serves better as a unifying conception. It remains for us to carry it through with the same logical cogency, the same practical resourcefulness, the same driving force that inspired the earlier Radicals, that gave fire to Cobden's statistics, and lent compelling power to the eloquence of Bright. We need less of the fanatics of sectarianism and more of the unifying mind. Our reformers must learn to rely less on the advertising value of immediate success and more on the deeper but less striking changes of practice or of feeling, to think less of catching votes and more of convincing opinion. We need a fuller co-operation among those of genuine democratic feeling and more agreement as to the order of reform. At present progress is blocked by the very competition of many causes for the first place in the advance. Here, again, devolution will help us, but what would help still more would be a clearer sense of the necessity of co-operation between all who profess and call themselves democrats, based on a fuller appreciation of the breadth and the depth of their own meaning. The advice seems cold to the fiery spirits, but they may come to learn that the vision of justice in the wholeness of her beauty kindles a passion that may not flare up into moments of dramatic scintillation, but burns with the enduring glow of the central heat.

FOOTNOTES:

[13] I need hardly add that financial measures are entirely unsuited to a referendum. Financial and executive control go together, and to take either of them out of the hands of the majority in the House of Commons is not to reform our system but to destroy it root and branch. The same is not true of legislative control. There are cases in which a government might fairly submit a legislative measure to the people without electing to stand or fall by it.

[14] Probably the best alternative to these proposals is that of a small directly elected Second Chamber, with a provision for a joint session in case of insuperable disagreement, but with no provision for delay. This proposal has the advantage, apparently, of commanding a measure of Conservative support.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

LOCKE.—Second Treatise on Civil Government (1689).

PAINE.—The Rights of Man (1792).

BENTHAM.—Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789!).

J. S. MILL.—Principles of Political Economy (Books IV and V).

On Liberty.

Representative Government.

The Subjection of Women.

Autobiography.

COBDEN.—Political Writings.

BRIGHT.—Speeches.

MAZZINI.—The Duties of Man.

Thoughts on Democracy in Europe.

JEVONS.—The State in Relation to Labour.

T. H. GREEN.—Principles of Political Obligation. Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract (Works, vol. iii).

MORLEY.—Life of Cobden. Life of Gladstone.

F. W. HIRST.—The Manchester School.

G. LOWES DICKINSON.—Liberty and Justice.

PROF. H. JONES.—The Working Faith of the Social Reformer.

PROF. McCUNN.—Six Radical Thinkers.



INDEX

Association, right of, 37-8

Authoritarian rule, 8-10, 18, 21, 47, 54

Birth rate, 181

Charity, State, and Justice, 182

Church and State, 12

City States, 10-13, 16

Civil liberty, 21

Coercion, where justified, 139-154

Colonies, 41-4, 106, 216, 240

Conservatism, 88, 176, 217

Democracy, future of, 227-236, 242-51

Economic liberty, 34-8, 157

Education, 32, 40, 154

Feudalism, 15-18

Fiscal liberty, 25-6, 34, 78-81

Foreign policy, 41, 104-5

Freedom, conditions of, 23-4, 28, 31, 58, 91-2, 140, 146

Gladstone, W. E., 102-6

Greece, ancient, 10-13

Habeas Corpus Act, 23

Imperialism, 215, 221-4, 239

Industry, regulation of, 35-6, 82-8, 93

Inequality, the defence of, 131

Inherited wealth, 197-9

Ireland, 41, 103, 219, 224

Laissez-faire, 78-101

Land question, 82, 95-8, 175-6, 192-3

Liberalism, beginning of, 19, 51

Manchester school, 57

Militarism, 8, 45, 80, 148, 237-9

Mill, J. S., 107-15, 116

Monopolies, 97-100

National liberty, 40-4

Natural order, theory of, 54-64

Old Age Pensions, 156, 177

Opinion, Liberty and, 116-23

Organic Concept of Society, 125-30, 135

Peace, International, 80-1, 225, 237

Personal liberty, 26-31

Petition of Right, 22

Poor Law, 155, 177-9, 184

Popular sovereignty, 45-8, 64, 112

Poverty line, 162

Progress, nature of, 137

Property, rights of, 94-5, 100, 168, 186, 188

Proportional representation, 114, 243

Referendum, 245-6

Religions liberty, 29-31

Revolutionary Declarations, 60-2

Rome, ancient, 13-14

Second Chamber, the, 242-8

Socialism, 165, 167-72, 191, 211, 215, 219

Social liberty, 31-3, 140

Speculation, 195

Super-tax, 199-201

Temperance, 180, 226

Trade unions, 38, 84, 161, 220, 223

Unemployed, 160

Utilitarianism, 57, 65-77, 107

Wage," "living, 159, 163-4, 177, 205-8

Wealth, social basis of, 187-91, 194

Women, rights of, 33, 39, 86, 112, 114, 179

Work, right to, 159

Printed by The Riverside Press, Edinburgh

THE END