In the meantime, a very different solution of the difficulty has commended itself to the partisans of the proposed Court. M. Renault, the accomplished Reporter of the committee which deals in the first instance with the subject, after stating that "sur beaucoup de points le droit de la guerre maritime est encore incertain, et chaque Etat le formule au gre de ses idees et de ses interets," lays down that, in accordance with strict juridical reasoning, when international law is silent an international Court should apply the law of the captor. He is, nevertheless, prepared to recommend, as the spokesman of the committee, that in such cases the Judges should decide "d'apres les principes[C] generaux de la justice et de l'equite"—a process which I had, less complimentarily, described as "evolving new rules out of their inner consciousness." The Court, in pursuance of this confessedly "hardie solution," would be called upon to "faire le droit."

One may be permitted to hope that this proposal will not be accepted. The beneficent action of English Judges in developing the common law of England may possibly be cited in its favour; but the analogy is delusive. The Courts of a given country in evolving new rules of law are almost certain to do so in accordance with the views of public policy generally entertained in that country. Should they act otherwise their error can be promptly corrected by the national Legislature. Far different would be the effect of the decision of an international Court, in which, though it might run directly counter to British theory and practice, Great Britain would have bound herself beforehand to acquiesce. The only quasi-legislative body by which the ratio decidendi of such a decision could be disallowed would be an international gathering in which British views might find scanty support. The development of a system of national law by national Judges offers no analogy to the working of an international Court, empowered, at its free will and pleasure, to disregard the views of a sovereign Power as to the proper rule to be applied in cases as to which international law gives no guidance. In such cases the ultimate adjustment of differences of view is the appropriate work, not of a law Court, but of diplomacy.

It is hardly necessary to combat the notion that there already exists, in nubibus, a complete system of prize law, which is in some mysterious way accessible to Judges, and reveals to them the rule applicable to each new case as it arises. This notion, so far as it is prevalent, seems to have arisen from a mistaken reading of certain dicta of Lord Stowell, in which that great Judge, in his finest eighteenth-century manner, insists that the law which it was his duty to administer "has no locality" and "belongs to other nations as well as our own." He was, of course, thinking of the rules of prize law upon which the nations are agreed, not of the numerous questions upon which no agreement exists, and was dealing with the difficult position of a Judge who has to choose (as in the recent Moray Firth case) between obedience to such rules and obedience to the legislative, or quasi-legislative, acts of his own Government.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Eggishorn, Suisse, September 16 (1907).

A NEW PRIZE LAW

Sir,—The speech of the Prime Minister at the Guildhall contains a paragraph which will be read with a sense of relief by those who, like myself, have all along viewed with surprise and apprehension The Hague proposals for an international prize Court.

Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman admits that "it is desirable, and it may be essential, that, before legislation can be undertaken to make such a Court effective, the leading maritime nations should come to an agreement as to the rules regarding some of the more important subjects of warfare which are to be administered by the Court"; and his subsequent eulogy of the Court presupposes that it is provided with "a body of rules which has received the sanction of the great maritime Powers." What is said as to the necessary postponement of any legislation in the sense of The Hague Convention must, of course, apply a fortiori to the ratification of the Convention.

We have here, for the first time, an authoritative repudiation of the notion that fifteen gentlemen of mixed nationality composing an international prize Court, are to be let loose to "make law," in accordance with what may happen to be their conceptions of "justice and equity." It seems at last to be recognised that such a Court cannot be set to work unless, and until, the great maritime Powers shall have come to an agreement upon the rules of law which the Court is to administer.

I may add that it is surely too much to expect that the rules in question will be discussed by the Powers, to use Sir H. Campbell-Bannerman's phrase, "without any political arriere pensee." Compromise between opposing political interests must ever remain one of the most important factors in the development of the law of nations.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, November 11 (1907).

Although the establishment of an International Prize Court of Appeal was not one of the topics included in the programme of the Russian invitation; to a second Peace Conference, no objection was made to its being taken into consideration, when proposals to that effect were made by the British and American delegates to the Conference. The idea seems first to have been suggested by Huebner, who proposed to confer jurisdiction in cases of neutral prize on Courts composed of ministers or consuls, accredited by neutrals to the belligerents, together with commissioners appointed by the Sovereign of the captors or of the country to which the prize has been brought, as also, perhaps, "des personnes pleines de probite et de connaissances dans tout ce qui concerne les Loix des Nations et les Traites des Puissances modernes." The Court is to decide in accordance with treaties, "ou, a leur defaut, la loi universelle des nations." De la Saisie des Batiments neutres (1759), ii. pp. 45-61. The Institut de Droit International, after discussions extending over several years, accepted the principle of an International Court of Appeal, though only in combination with a complete scheme of prize law, in its Code des Prises maritimes, completed in 1887, section 100.

At the Conference of 1907, the work of several committees, and a masterly report by Professor Renault, Parl. Papers, No. iv. (1908), p. 9, resulted in The Hague Convention, No. xii. of that year, providing for the establishment of a mixed Court of Appeal from national prize Courts.

According to Art. 7 of this Convention, in default of any relevant treaty between the Governments of the litigant parties, and of generally recognised rules of international law bearing upon the question at issue, the Court is to decide "in accordance with the general principles of justice and equity." It seems, however, to have been soon perceived that the proposal to institute a Court, unprovided with any fixed system of law by which to decide the cases which might be brought before it, could not well be entertained, and the Final Act of the Conference accordingly expresses a wish that "the preparation of a Reglement, relative to the laws and customs of maritime war, may be mentioned in the programme of the next Conference."

Thereupon, without waiting for the meeting of a third Hague Conference, the British Government on February 27, 1908, addressed a circular to the great maritime Powers, which, after alluding to the impression gained "that the establishment of the International Prize Court would not meet with general acceptance so long as vagueness and uncertainty exist as to the principles which the Court, in dealing with appeals brought before it, would apply to questions of far-reaching importance, affecting naval policy and practice," went on to propose that another Conference should meet in London, in the autumn of the same year, "with the object of arriving at an agreement as to what are the generally recognised principles of international law within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Convention, as to those matters wherein the practice of nations has varied, and of then formulating the rules which, in the absence of special treaty provisions applicable to a particular case, the Court should observe in dealing with appeals brought before it for decision.... It would be difficult, if not impossible, for H.M. Government to carry the legislation necessary to give effect to the Convention, unless they could assure both Houses of the British Parliament that some more definite understanding had been reached as to the rules by which the new Tribunal should be governed."

In response to this invitation, delegates from ten principal maritime States assembled at the Foreign Office on December 4, 1908, and after discussing the topics to which their attention was directed, viz.: (1) Contraband; (2) Blockade; (3) Continuous voyage; (4) Destruction of neutral prizes; (5) Unneutral service; (6) Conversion of merchant vessels into warships on the high seas; (7) Transfer to a neutral flag; (8) Nationality or domicil, as the test of enemy property; signed on February 26, 1909, the Declaration of London.

The Convention No. xii. of 1907 and the Declaration of London of 1909 have alike failed to obtain ratification. Cf. now the two immediately following sections, 9 and 10.

An ultimate Court of Appeal in cases of Prize seems now likely to be provided by the "Permanent Court of International Justice," proposed by the League of Nations in pursuance of Art. 14 of the Treaty of Versailles. See also Art. 24 of the Treaty. Cf. supra, p. 2.

* * * * *

SECTION 9

The Naval Prize Bill

The first two letters in this section contain the criticisms of the Bill to which allusion is made in the first lines of a letter of later date, q.v. supra, p. 36. On the rejection of the Bill, see ib., note 1.

THE NAVAL PRIZE BILL

Sir—A paternal interest in the Naval Prize Bill may perhaps be thought a sufficient excuse for the few remarks which I am about to make upon it. The Bill owes its existence to a suggestion made by me, just ten years ago, while engaged in bringing up to date for the Admiralty my Manual of Naval Prise Law of 1888. It was drafted by me, after prolonged communications with Judges, Law Officers, and the Government Departments concerned, so as not only to reproduce the provisions of several "cross and cuffing" statutes dealing with the subject, but also to exhibit them in a more logical order than is always to be met with in Acts of Parliament.

The Bill was thought of sufficient importance to be mentioned on two occasions in the King's Speech, and has been several times passed, after careful consideration, by the House of Lords; but pressure of other business has hitherto impeded its passage through the House of Commons. It has now been reintroduced, this time in the Lower House, with an imposing backing of Government support; primarily, no doubt, with a view to facilitating the ratification of The Hague Convention for the establishment of an International Prize Court of Appeal. For this purpose, several pieces of new cloth have been sewn into the old garment, and I may perhaps be allowed to call attention to three or four points in which, on a first reading, the new clauses strike one as needing reconsideration.

Tactical reasons have, no doubt, operated to induce the Government to include in the Consolidation Bill the provisions for which statutory authority must be obtained before it will be possible to ratify the Convention; instead of first introducing a Bill having this sole object in view, and afterwards, should this be passed, inserting the new law in a reintroduced Consolidation Bill.

The course adopted necessitates an otherwise unnecessary preamble, and the qualification of the new Part III. by the words "in the event of an International Prize Court being established" (Clause 23). The reference, by the by, in this clause to "the said Convention" is somewhat awkward, no mention of any Convention having occurred previously, except in the preamble of the Bill. Is not also the statutory approval given by this clause, not only to the Convention of 1907 but also to "any Convention amending the same," somewhat startling, as tending to exclude Parliamentary criticism of such an amending Convention before its ratification?

By Clause 9, the members of the Judicial Committee who are to be nominated to act as the British Court of Appeal in cases of prize are to be described by the novel title of "the Supreme Prize Court." Is not the use made of the term "Supreme" in the Judicature Acts, as covering both the High Court and the Court of Appeal, already sufficiently unsatisfactory?

But the question which, of all others saute aux yeux, in reading the new Part III., is whether the Convention is to be approved as it stands, irrespectively of a general acceptance of the new Code of Prize Law contained in the Declaration of London of 1909. The objections to Art. 7 of the Contention, providing that, in the absence of rules of International Law generally recognised (and on many points of Prize Law there are no such rules), the Court is to decide in accordance with (what it may be pleased to consider) "the general principles of law and equity," are well known. The purpose of the Declaration of London (itself the subject of much difference of opinion) was to curtail this licence of decision, by providing the Court with so much ascertained Prize Law as to render action under the too-elastic phrase above quoted almost inconceivable.

Is it too much of a counsel of perfection to suggest that the debatable questions arising under the Convention of 1907 and the Declaration of 1909 should first be threshed out in discussions on a Bill dealing with those questions only; and that the decision, if any, thus arrived at should be subsequently inserted, freed from hypothesis, in the Consolidation Bill which has so long awaited the leisure of the House of Commons?

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, July 10 (1910).

THE NAVAL PRIZE BILL

Sir,—The Government has so far yielded to the representations of the Opposition as to have refrained from forcing on Friday night a division upon the Naval Prize Bill. Is it too much to hope that the Government may even now withdraw altogether a measure so ill adapted to place fairly before Parliament the question of the desirability of ratifying two documents held by a large body of competent opinion to be certain, if ratified, seriously to endanger the vital interests of the country? The Bill, as I have already pointed out, as originally drawn, was a careful consolidation of the law and procedure governing British Courts of Prize. Into this has now been incongruously thrust a set of clauses intended to give effect to a novel and highly controversial proposal for the creation of an International Prize Court. About the Declaration of London, alleged to contain a body of law which would adequately equip such a Court for the performance of its duties, not a word is said in the Bill; yet, should approval of the Bill be snatched by a purely party majority, the intention of the Government is to proceed straightway to the ratification both of the Prize Court Convention and the Declaration. Whether they intend also to endeavour to obtain the ratification, as an auxiliary Convention, of the lengthy covering commentary upon the Declaration, supplied by the committee by which the Declaration was drafted, does not yet appear. Of such a step I have already written that it "would be calamitous should a practice be introduced of attempting to cure the imperfect expression of a treaty by tacking on to it an equally authoritative reasoned commentary. The result would be obscurum per obscurius, a remedy worse than the disease."

The alternatives before Parliament on Monday next will be either, by reading the Naval Prize Bill a second time, to bring about, in the teeth of protests from those best qualified to express an independent opinion upon the subject, the immediate ratification of the Convention and the Declaration, or to ask that before, this momentous step is taken the infinitely complex and delicate questions involved should be examined and passed upon by a Commission of representative experts. Which shall it be?

Your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, July I (1911).

Cf. a letter of July 7, 1911, supra, p. 36.

NAVAL PRIZE MONEY

Sir,—The existing enactments as to prize bounty are, it seems, unsuitable to present conditions of naval warfare, and are accordingly to be varied by a bill shortly to be introduced.

May I venture to recommend that the Bill should contain merely the half-dozen clauses needed for this purpose, leaving untouched for subsequent uncontroversial passage, the Naval Prize Consolidation with Amendments Bill? This Bill, suggested and drafted by myself, in the spacious times of peace, in consultation with the Admiralty and other Government Departments, as also with the Judge of the Admiralty Division and the Law Officers (including the present Lord Chancellor), was twice mentioned in the King's Speech, and several times, after careful consideration, passed by the House of Lords, but still awaits the leisure of the Lower House. It deserved a better fate than to have been used, in 1911, as a corpus vile for facilitating the ratification of the Convention for an International Prize Court and of the Declaration of London; receiving, most fortunately, as so perverted, its coup de grace from the Lords. It should be passed as an artistic whole, apart from any contentious matter, account having, of course, been taken of recent legislation by which it may have been, here and there, affected.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, May 23 (1918).

* * * * *

SECTION 10

The Declaration of London

For incidental mentions of the Declaration in earlier sections see supra, pp. 22, 36, 39, 55, 58, 80, 90, 92, 148, 149, 154, 155, 156, 158, 163, 164, 174, 181, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196.

See also my paper upon Proposed Changes in the Law of Naval Prize, read to the British Academy on May 31, 1911, Transactions, vol. v., of which a translation appeared in the Revue de Droit International, N.S., t. xiii, pp. 336-355.

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Sir,—The questions put last night by Mr. M'Arthur need, perhaps, more fully considered answers than they received from Mr. McKinnon Wood.

With reference to the first answer, it may be worth while to point out that, in Art. 66 of the Declaration, the Powers undertake not only, as in the passage quoted, "to give the necessary instructions to their authorities and armed forces," but also "to take the measures which may be proper for guaranteeing the application of the rules Contained in the Declaration by their Courts, and, in particular, by their Courts of Prize." The "authentic commentary" upon the article in M. Renault's "Report" explains that the measures in question "may vary in different countries, and may or may not require the intervention of the Legislature."

The second answer lays down broadly that "the decisions of the British Prize Courts are founded on International Law, and not on municipal enactments." Our Prize Courts have, no doubt, on most points, decided in accordance with International Law, in the sense of the principles generally followed by civilised nations; but, on not a few points, in accordance with the British view of what is, or ought to be, International Law, in opposition to views persistently maintained by other countries—e.g. with reference to the moment from which a blockade-runner becomes liable to capture. The fact is that, whatever grandiloquent language may have been judicially employed by Lord Stowell in a contrary sense, it will now hardly be denied that a Prize Court sits by national, not international, authority, and is bound to take the view of International Law which, if any, is prescribed to it by the constitutionally expressed will of its own Government.

The Declaration of London is in many ways a great achievement; but one is glad to learn from Mr. McKinnon Wood's third answer that opportunity will be given for discussing all important points in connexion with its rules.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, March 30 (1909).

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Sir,—Both the Prize Court Convention of 1907 and its complement, the London Declaration of 1909, stand greatly in need of full and well-informed discussion before receiving the Parliamentary approval which ought to be a condition precedent to the ratification of either of them. It is well, therefore, that many Chambers of Commerce have called the attention of Government to the detriment to British interest which may in their opinion result from these agreements if ratified, although the representations thus made exhibit, in some cases, so little technical knowledge as to have been readily disposed of by the Foreign Secretary. For the same reason, I welcome the letter from Mr. Gibson Bowles, which appeared in The Times of yesterday, although it contains some statements the inaccuracy of which it may be desirable at once to point out.

1. The Declaration of Paris is neither implicitly nor explicitly adopted by the Declaration of London, "as a part of the common law of nations which can no longer be disputed." The later makes no mention of the earlier one, and M. Benault's rapport (as to the interpretative authority of which opinions may well differ) applies the words quoted, not to the Paris Declaration as a whole, but to one only of its articles. Mr. Bowles's statement that "the Declaration of London, if adopted, would reaffirm, and its ratification would in effect, for the first time ratify, the Declaration of Paris" cannot be supported.

2. Mr. Bowles asserts it to be "an unquestioned doctrine of the Law of Nations that war abrogates and annuls treaty obligations between belligerents." One would have supposed it to be common knowledge that large classes of treaties are wholly unaffected by war. Such are, for instance, what are called conventions transitoires, because their effect is produced once for all, as in the case of cessions of territory; and, notably, treaties entered into for the regulation of the conduct of war, such as the Geneva Convention, many of The Hague Conventions of 1907, and the Declaration of Paris itself, which Mr. Bowles appears to think would ipso facto cease to be obligatory between its signatories on their becoming belligerent.

It is a pleasure to be able to agree with Mr. Bowles in his wish that the Naval Prize Bill, if reintroduced, should be rejected, though I would rather say "withdrawn." You have already allowed me (on July 10) to point out that if the Convention and Declaration are to be effectively discussed in Parliament they should be disentangled from that Bill, into which the Convention, and, by implication, the Declaration, have been incongruously thrust. This practically non-contentious Consolidation Bill, after several times securing the approval of the House of Lords, has hitherto for several years awaited the leisure of the House of Commons, but was suddenly reintroduced last Session, apparently as an unobtrusive vehicle for the new and highly debatable matter contained in the two above-mentioned documents. May I now repeat my suggestion that "the debatable questions arising under the Convention of 1907 and the Declaration of 1909 should first be threshed out in discussions on a Bill dealing with these questions only; and that the decision, if any, thus arrived at should be subsequently inserted, freed from hypothesis, in the Consolidation Bill"?

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, December 28 (1910).

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Sir,—I have read Professor Westlake's letters upon the Declaration of London with the attention due to anything written by my very learned friend, but, although myself opposed to the ratification alike of the Prize Court Convention and of its complement, the Declaration, do not at present wish to enter upon the demerits of either instrument.

There is, however, a preliminary question upon which, with your permission, I should like to say a few words. My friend justly observes that in dealing with the Declaration "the first necessity is to know what it is that we have before us"; and he devotes his letter of January 31 to maintaining that the Declaration must be read as interpreted by the explanations of it given to the full Conference by the Drafting Committee, of which M. Renault was president. Professor Westlake supports his opinion by a quotation from the reply of the Foreign Office in November last to the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce (Miscell. 1910, No. 4, p. 21). I may mention that a similar reply had been given, a year previously, by Mr. McKinnon Wood to a question in the House of Commons. The source of these replies is doubtless to be found in a paragraph of the Report, addressed on March 1, 1909, to Sir Edward Grey, of the British Delegates to the London Conference, which runs as follows:—

"It should be borne in mind that, in accordance with the principles and practice of Continental jurisprudence, such a Report is considered an authoritative statement of the meaning and intention of the instrument which it explains, and that consequently foreign Governments and Courts, and no doubt also the International Prize Court, will construe and interpret the provisions of the Declaration by the light of the Commentary given in the Report." (Miscell. 1909, No. 4, p. 94.)

It is desirable to know upon what authority this statement rests. I am aware of none. The nearest approach to an assertion of anything like it occurred at The Hague Conference of 1899, when the "approval" accorded to "the work of the Second Committee, as embodied in the articles voted and in the interpretative Report which accompanies them" was alleged by M. de Martens to amount to an acceptance of the Report "comme un commentaire interpretatif authentique des articles votes." (Miscell. 1899, No. 1, p. 165.) The drafting Report presented to the Geneva Conference of 1906 is merely said to have been "adopted" (Actes, p. 286); and M. Renault's Report to the Conference of London was similarly merely "accepted," although he presented it as containing

"Un commentaire precis, degage de tout controverse, qui, devenu commentaire officiel par l'approbation de la Conference, soit de nature a guider les autorites diverses, administratives, militaires, judiciaires, qui pourront avoir a l'appliquer." (Miscell. 1909, No. 5, p. 344.)

It would seem that in each of these cases the adoption of the Report, and even a suggestion or two for a change in its phraseology, amounted to nothing more than an expression of opinion on the part of the Delegates to the Conference that the Report contained explanations which had satisfied themselves, and might satisfy their Governments, that the Convention which they were about to forward to those Governments might safely be accepted.

So far as Governments are concerned, the adoption of a Report by their Delegates is res inter alios acta. An "authentic interpretation" of a contract can be given only by the parties to it, who, in the case of a treaty, are the States concerned. If these States desire to give to the report of a drafting committee the force of an authentic interpretation of their contract, they can surely do so only by something amounting to a supplementary convention. Writers upon international law naturally throw but little light upon questions to which the somewhat novel practice of argumentative drafting Reports has given rise; but I may cite Professor Ullmann, of Vienna, as saying:—

"Eine authentische Interpretation kann nur die durch Kontrahenten selbst, in einem gemeinschaftlichen, ihren Willen ausser Zweifel setzenden Acte (einem Nachtrags-oder Erlauterungsvertrage), erfolgen" (Volkerrecht, p. 282);

and Professor Fiore, of Naples, to the effect that what is called "authentic interpretation" is not

"interpretazione propriamente detta, ma una dichiarazione di quello che fu gia concordato, o un nuovo trattato" (Diritto Internazionale, ss. 1, 118);

and that

"il trattato non puo essere interpretato che dalle stesse Parti (i.e. Stati) contrahenti; e per la validita dell' atto e indispensabile che la relativa convenzione di interpretazione abbia gli stessi requisiti ... di ogni altra convenzione tra Stato e Stato" (Il Dir. Int. Codif., Sec. 816).

I would submit that such a Report as that which accompanies the Declaration of London has no claim to the sort of interpretative authority which has been attributed to it; nor is it desirable that the requisite steps should be taken for giving it that authority. It would be calamitous should a practice be introduced of attempting to cure the imperfect expression of a treaty by tacking on to it an equally authoritative reasoned commentary, likely, as in the present case, to be enormously longer than the test to which it relates.

It is a wholly different question whether Governments or Courts would be inclined to take notice of such a Report, among other facts antecedent to a Convention, or Declaration, which they might be called upon to construe. A British Court would not, I conceive, be so inclined. On the probable inclinations of Continental Courts, and of an International Prize Court, should one be instituted, further expert information would seem to be called for.

The fact is that the vitally important questions of theory and practice raised by the Convention and the Declaration need calmer and better instructed discussion than they have yet received. Ought they not to be referred to a Royal Commission, on which should be placed representatives of the Navy and Merchant Service, of the corn trade, and of the Colonies, together with international lawyers, in touch with the views of their Continental colleagues?

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, February 16 (1911).

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Sir,—Professor Westlake, replying in The Times of to-day to the arguments by which I had endeavoured to show that the Report made to the Conference of London has no pretensions to be treated as an authentic interpretation of the Declaration prepared by the Conference, still maintains that "the essential question will be, what the agreement was that the Conference arrived at." I had maintained, on the contrary, that the essential question will be, What is the agreement entered into by the Powers, as evidenced by their ratifications? anything outside of the ratified agreement being res inter alios acta. I should not be justified in asking you to allow me to repeat the contents of my letter of Monday last in support of this view. The pleadings are, I think, exhausted. "Therefore let a jury come."

I should like, however, to point out that I did not, as my friend seems to think, attribute the acceptance of the Report to the delegates "singly." It was, no doubt accepted by all present without protest. My colleague will, I am sure, pardon me if I add that I cannot concur in his exegesis of my citations from Ullmann and Fiore.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, February 25 (1911).

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Sir,—It is satisfactory that so high an authority as Mr. Arthur Cohen distinctly accedes to the view that the Declaration of London ought not to be ratified as it stands. I should, however, be sorry were his suggestion accepted that the Declaration and the argumentative report which accompanies it might be ratified together. The result would be obscurum per obscurius, a remedy worse than the disease.

I shall ask leave to add that, if Mr. Cohen will take the trouble to look again at my letters of February 10 and 25, he will cease to suppose it possible that in writing "the pleadings are, I think, exhausted, &c.," I meant to convey that no further discussion of the merits or demerits of the Declaration was required. On the contrary I expressly limited myself to a consideration of the preliminary question, whether interpretative authority would rightly be attributed to the report in question, stating that, while opposed to the ratification alike of the Prize Court Convention and of the Declaration, I did not, for the present, wish to enter upon the demerits of either instrument; and ended my first letter by suggesting the reference to a Royal Commission of "the vitally important questions of theory and practice raised by the Convention and the Declaration," as needing "calmer and better instructed discussion than they have yet received."

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, March 1 (1911).

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Sir,—After Tuesday's debate in the House of Lords it may be hoped that not even "the man in the street" will suppose the Declaration of London to be anything more than an objectionable draft, by which no country has consented to be bound. Every day of the war makes more apparent our debt to the House of Lords for having, four years ago, prevented the British Government from ratifying either the International Prize Court Convention or this Declaration, which, while misleadingly professing that its provisions "correspond in substance with the generally recognised principles of international law," contains, interspersed with truisms familiar to all concerned with such matters, a good many undesirable novelties.

This being so, it was surely unfortunate that our Government, with a view apparently to saving time and trouble, decided, in the early days of the war, to adopt the Declaration en bloc as a statement of prize law "during the present hostilities," subject, however, to "certain additions and modifications"; to which it, of course, retained the power of making additions. This power has been so freely exercised, and large portions of the Declaration, not thereby affected, have proved to be so inapplicable to modern conditions, as disclosed by the war, that the document, so far from providing reliable guidance, is now a mere source of hopeless confusion.

To put an end to this confusion, I venture to suggest that, in concert with our Allies, the Declaration should be finally consigned to oblivion. Either let its place be taken by some clear and simple statement of unquestioned prize law, for the use of commanders and officials (something like a confidential document in the drafting of which I had a hand some years ago, but, of course, brought up to date), or let established principles take care of themselves, certain doubtful points only being dealt with, from time to time, by Orders in Council.

While heartily concurring in Lord Portsmouth's description of the unratified "Declaration" as "rubbish," I regret that he seems to relegate to the same category even those generally ratified "Hague Conventions" which, as far as they go, mark a real advance upon previously accepted rules. Still less acceptable is his advice to "sweep away juridical niceties" in the conduct of hostilities. Did he intend thus to describe the whole fabric of the rules by which international law has endeavoured, with considerable success, to restrain barbarity in warfare?

I must mention that this letter was written before seeing this morning the letter of Mr. Gibson Bowles, my worthy ally in attacks upon the Declaration.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, December 3 (1915).

THE DECLARATION OF LONDON

Sir,—You have allowed me, in a good many letters, to criticise the Declaration of London, both in its original inception and in its subsequent applications. Thanks to the House of Lords, the Declaration, which erroneously professed to "correspond in substance with the generally recognised principles of International Law," has remained unratified, and therefore diplomatically of no effect.

Its admirers have, however, too long preserved it, perhaps sub spe rati, in a state of suspended animation, using it by way of, as they supposed, a convenient handbook of maritime law for the purposes of the present war, though subject to such variations as might from time to time be found convenient by the Allies. The mistake thus made soon became apparent. The elaborate classification of contraband had to be at once thrown overboard, and most of the remaining provisions of the Declaration proved to be inapplicable to modern warfare.

In December last I accordingly wrote as follows:—

"To put an end to this confusion, I venture to suggest that, in concert with our Allies, the Declaration should be finally consigned to oblivion. Either let its place be taken by some clear and simple statement of unquestioned prize law, for the use of commanders and Officials, ... or established principles take care of themselves, certain doubtful points only being dealt with from time to time by Orders in Council."

I need hardly say that to anyone holding the views thus expressed, yesterday's Order in Council must be most satisfactory; getting rid, as it does for good and all, of the unfortunate Declaration, leaving the application of established principles to those acquainted with them and promulgating authoritative guidance on specific novel questions.

I may perhaps add a word or two on the undesirability of describing as "Declarations" documents which, being equipped with provisions for ratification, although they may profess to set out old law, differ in no respect from other conventions. Also, as to the need for greater caution on the part of our representatives than has been shown by their acceptance of various craftily suggested anti-British suggestions, such as were several embodied in the Declaration in question, and notably that of the notorious cl. 23 (h) of The Hague Convention iv., the interpretation of which has exercised the ingenuity of the Foreign Office and, more recently, of the Court of Appeal.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Brighton, July 9 (1916).

On July 7, 1916, an Order in Council was made, revoking all Orders by which the provisions of the Declaration had been adopted, or modified, for the duration of the war; stating the intention of the Allies to exercise their belligerent rights at sea in strict accordance with the law of nations; but dealing specifically with certain doubtful points. The Order was accompanied by a memorandum, drawn up by the British and French Governments, explaining how their expectation that in the Declaration they would find "a suitable digest of principles and compendium of working rules" had not been realised. See also Lord Robert Cecil in the House of Commons on August 23, with reference to the Zamora case, [1916] 2 Ch. c. 77.

On misuses of the term "Declaration" cf. supra, pp. 90, 91, 92.

GERMANY WRONG AGAIN

Sir,—The new German Note handed on Thursday last to the representatives of the neutral Powers supports its allegation that the four Allied Powers "have trampled upon right and torn up the treaties on which it was based" by the following statement:—

"Already in the first weeks of the war England had renounced the Declaration of London, the contents of which her own delegates had recognised as binding in international law."

It is surely notorious that the delegates of a Power, by agreeing to the draft of a treaty, give to it no international validity, which results only when the treaty has been ratified by their Government. The Declaration of London has, most fortunately, never been ratified by the Government of Great Britain.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant, T. E. HOLLAND. Oxford, January 13 (1917).



INDEX

Absolute contraband. See Contraband Abstention, 129 Acquiescence, State duty of, 129, 130, 133, 136 Actaeon, the, 176, 179 Acts of Parliament, 61, 63 Admiralty Manual of Prize Law, 156, 159, 192 Aerial warfare, 61 Air, opposite views as to rights over, 64, 65 Aircraft in war, 69 Alabama, the, 131, 183 Alexander, Mrs., the cotton of, 153 Alien enemies, civil disabilities of, 47, 49, 205 Allanton, the, 158, 161, 162, 163 Ancipitis usus, articles, 148 Angarie, Droit d', 170 Appam, the, 146 Arabia, the, 152 Arbitration, 1-6, 184 treaties, general, 6, 7 treaties, limited, ib. cases fit for, 5 the Hague tribunal of, 5 Armaments, limitation of, 184 Armed civilians, 77 Neutralities, the, 83 Army, duties of, 77 Article 23 (h), 47, 49, 206, 207 restricting application, 146 Aspirations, 99 Assassination, 93 Asturias, the, 60 Asylum to belligerent warships, 129, 143 Atalanta, the, 160 Aube, Admiral, 116 Authentic interpretation, 107, 196, 199, 201, 205

Baden-Powell, Sir G., 81, 85, 87 Baker, Sir Sherston, 85 Balfour, Mr. A.J., 13, 15, 73, 74, 173 Balloons, projectiles from, 30, 62 Base of operations, neutral duty as to, 129, 134, 144, 145 Baty, Dr. T., 161 Bays, 166, 167 Belligerents, lawful, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79 Beresford, Lord Charles, 118 Bermuda, the, 160 Bills criticised, 36-40, 47, 192 Birkenhead, Lord, 135 Bismarck, Prince, 170 Bliss, Sir H., 150 Blockade, belligerent, 29, 83, 156 fictitious, 57, 59 pacific, 9-14, 17 Bluntschli's reply to Von Moltke, 26 Bombardment, 62 of open coast towns, 30, 62 from the air, 112, 123 Bondholders, foreign, vindication of rights of, 15 Bowles, Mr. Gibson, 54, 87, 89, 90, 92, 141, 173, 177, 178, 198 Brandschatz, 117 Brassard, effect of a, 79 Bright, Sir Charles, 171, 172 British Academy, author's paper at, 174 British Manual of Military Law, 74 Handbooks on War on Land, 75, 76 Brodrick, Mr., 75 Brown v. United States, 45 Brusa, Prof., 130 Brussels Conference, the, of 1874, 68, 74, 77, 114, 172 Bullets, expanding, 22, 94, 96 explosive, 22, 94, 95 in savage warfare, 94 Bundesrath, the, 29, 157, 160 Butler, General B.F., 153 Bynkershoek, 45, 71, 165, 166

Cable-cutting, 30, 168-173 Cables, submarine, 168 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., 189 Captors, unqualified, 71, 73, 162, 163 Carson, Sir Edward, 127 Cavell, Miss, case of, 79 Calchas, the, 151, 152, 153 Cecil, Lord Robert, 8, 207 Channel tunnel, 42 Chavasse, ex parte, 137 Civilians armed, position of, 77, 78, 79 Churchill, Mr. Winston, 106 Claims, competitive, 17 Clarke, Sir Edward, 124 Clode, Mr., 112 Closed localities, 50 Clothing, use of enemy, 75 Coal, 176 conditional contraband, 149 for belligerent fleet, 131, 134 Coast fishing vessels, 30 Codification of laws of war, 22, 23 Cohen, Mr. Arthur, 47, 203 Coltman, Mr., 85 Commencement of war, 41 Commercen, the, 159 Commissioning on the High Seas, 90 Commissions of enquiry, 4 Compromise, the, between belligerent and neutral rights, 133, 136, 164, 169 Conditional contraband. See Contraband Conduct of warfare between belligerents, 50 Conflict of Laws, 34, 35 Continuous voyages, 29, 157, 162, 183 "Contraband, a happy little," 153 Contraband of war, what it is, 130, 134, 159, 175 absolute and conditional, 147, 151, 152, 154, 158 British proposal to abolish doctrine of, 163, 184, 185 coal, how far, 132, 134, 149, 176 cotton, how far, 151, 152, 177 food-stuffs, how far, 176, 185 Japanese rules as to, 149, 155, 156 misuse of the term, 134 no neutral duty to prohibit export of, 113, 140 Russian rules as to, 154, 176 the Declaration of London as to, 164 the two constituents of, 159 Contractual debts, 21 Contributions, 102, 118 Conventions. See Geneva, Hague, &c. and Legislation, 36 "transitoires," 198 Conversion. See Transformation Convoy, 31 Cotton, 177 as contraband, 149, 151, 152 Court of International Justice, a permanent, 2, 191 Criticism of Bills, 36-40, 192 Customs Consolidation Act, 1853, 132

Danger zone, a, 59 Dardanelles, closing of, 55, 58, 80, 90, 92 "Declaration," misuse of the term, 90, 92, 206 Declaration, the, of London, 22, 36, 39, 80, 92, 147, 149, 154, 155, 158, 161, 163, 164, 181, 191, 193-207 provisional adoption of, as modified, 154, 204 rejection of, 206, 207 Declaration, the, of Paris, 22, 26, 57, 59, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87, 89, 156, 198 accession to, of Spain and Mexico, 81, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91 Declaration, the, of St. Petersburg, 22, 27, 91, 95, 96, 97 von Moltke upon, 25 Declaration of war, 10, 41, 43 Declarations, mistaken view as to their not needing ratification, 90, 91 the three, of the Hague in 1899. See Hague De Horsey, Admiral, 118, 164 De Joinville, Prince, 117 De Martens, Prof., 162, 166, 176, 200 Deposit of delict, 158 Despatches, enemy, 156, 158, 160 Destination, 8, 155, 156 Destruction of neutral prizes, 22, 173-181 Dickenson, Mr. Lowes, 125 Direct U.S. Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., 166 Disguise, 75, 76 Distinctive marks, 77, 79 Doelwijk, the, 161 Drago doctrine, the, 20 Droit d'angarie, the, 170 Dum-dum bullet. See Bullets Durward, the, 60

Embargo, 11 Enemy, who is an ?, 401[E] disabilities of, 47, 49, 206 goods in neutral bottoms, 83 in occupied territory, 102 merchant vessels at outbreak, 45, 49 property on land, 102 property at sea, 29, 104, 184 resident at outbreak, 44 service, 157, 158, 186 "Englishman's Home, An," the play, 77 Enquiry, international Commissions of, 1, 3, 4, 6 Evans, Sir Samuel, 70

False colours, 30, 43, 76 Fauchille, M., 47, 64, 65 Felicity, the, 164, 166, 167, 175, 177, 179 Fiore, Prof., 201 Fishing vessels, 31 Flag of truce, 76 Food-stuffs, 148, 174 how far contraband, 148, 176, 185 Food, Royal Commission on, 148, 174, 177 Foreign Enlistment Acts, the, 131, 134, 138, 139, 141, 143 Foreign Enlistment Bills, new, 39 Foreign soldiers, 45 Forster, Arnold-, Mr., 45 Fox, the, 176, 177 Fram, the, 137 Francs-tireurs, 79 "Freedom of the seas," 51, 97 French Government Manual for Land Warfare, 117 Friendly methods of settlement, 1

Gases, harmful, whether employment of, legitimate, 22, 96, 97 Geffken, Prof., 13 General principles of justice and equity, the, 187, 189, 190, 193 Geneva Convention Bill, 36 Geneva Conventions, the, 22, 34, 67, 98, 100 application of, to maritime warfare, 30, 98 Gentili, A., 170 Germany. Cf. Hague Conventions proclamation by, of a danger zone, 59 wrong as to Declaration of London, 207 Giffen, Sir R., 13 Gladstone, Mr., 134 Goeben and Breslau, the, 91 Golden Rocket, the, 85 Good offices, 1, 2, 3 Government authority, as a protection, 72 Government Bills and International Conventions, 36-40, 192, 195, 204 Granville, Lord, 82, 85, 131, 170, 177 Greek coast, blockade of, 13 Guerilla warfare, 73 Gundel, General de, 48 Grotius, 45, 148, 155, 166, 168, 169

Haabet, the, 160 Hague Conventions, the, of 1889, 1, 2, 3, 6, 30, 61, 74, 75, 94, 102, 105, 107, 120, 184 of 1907, 1, 6 applicable only between contracting Powers, 69 No. i., 2, 3, 6 No. ii., 21, 22 No. iii., 22, 36, 44 No. iv., 22, 45, 60, 61, 67, 75, 76, 77, 96, 105, 107, 122, 168, 206 No. v., 22, 68, 75, 80, 90, 135, 168 No. vi., 22, 45, 70 No. vii., 22, 162 No. viii., 22, 45, 164 No. ix., 22, 68, 122 No. x., 22, 100, 130 No. xi., 22, 158 No. xii., 22, 36, 190, 194, 195, 197, 204 No. xiii., 22, 129, 143, 146 Hague Declarations, the, 22, 30, 61, 62, 63, 64, 96 Hague Reglements, the, as to war on land, 75, 76, 78, 93, 95, 100 Hague Tribunal, the, 5 reference to, not obligatory, 25 Haldane, Mr. R.B., 45 Hall, Mr. W.E., on pacific blockade, 13 Harcourt, Sir W., 74 Hardinge, Sir C., 152 Herbert, Mr. Arnold, 182, 184 Holland, Sir T.E., references to writings of, 8, 9, 20, 23, 35, 44, 47, 50, 52, 66, 75, 97, 113, 122, 164, 168, 180, 192, 196 Honour and vital interests clause, the, 4, 5, 6 Horses, wounded, 98, 100 Horsey, Adml., 118, 164, 166 Hostile assistance, 88, 157, 160, 186 Huebner, 190

Ikaria, the, 60 Imina, the, 160 Immediate effects of outbreak of war, the, 45 Institut de Droit International, the, 11, 12, 16, 23, 24, 30, 43, 44, 48, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 104, 105, 108, 121, 130, 162, 163, 164, 167, 168, 172, 174, 176, 182, 185, 190 its Manuel des lois de la guerre maritime, 163 its Manuel des lois de la guerre sur terre, 23, 24, 25, 27, 108 Instructions, national, on laws of war on land, 75, 76 on laws of war at sea: British, 156, 180 French, 179 Japanese, 148, 149, 150, 155, 156, 157, 173 Russian, 154, 173, 174, 176, 177, 179 United States, 179 International, the, 169 International Court of Appeal, an, 184 International Justice, a Permanent Court of, 2 International Law, the nature and authority of, 66, 67, 77, 86, 114, 115, 116, 119, 127, 169, 188 International Prize Court, proposal for an, 23, 181-191

Jackson, Colonel, 66, 68 James, Captain, 114 Jenks, Mr., 106, 108, 110 Jonge Margaretha, the, 159 Just cause of war, 83 "Justice and equity, general principles of," 187, 189, 190, 193

Kent, Chancellor, 45 Kleen, Mr., 130, 133 Knight-Commander, the, 173, 174 Kohler, Mr., 47 Kowshing, the case of the, 41, 43 "Kriegsbrauch," the, 68, 80

Lambermont, Baron, 77 Lammasch, Prof., 125 Lansdowne, Marquess of, 58, 133, 136, 149, 169, 173 Lawful belligerents, 69, 78 League of Nations, the, 1, 2, 7, 9, 191 Lehr, Prof., 102 Leucade, the, 176 Lincoln, President, 74 Lieber's Instructions, 74, 75 Localities closed to hostilities, 52 London, Conference of, 181, 190, 191 London, Declaration of, 22, 55, 58, 92, 181, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196-207 Lyons, Lord, 169

MacDonell, Prof., 172 McKenna, Mr., 78 Mahan, Admiral, 97 Mail steamers and bags, 30 Malacca, the case of the, 81, 162, 163 Mandates, 8 Manning, Mr., 45 Manual of military law, the British, 107 Manuals of warfare on land, 105 at sea, 105 Manuel des Lois de la guerre maritime, the, of Institut, 23 Manual des Lois de la guerre sur terre, 23, 24, 174 Marais, ex parte, 106 Martens, de, Prof., 126 Martial law, 105-112 Maurice, Colonel, 42 Mcomini and others v. Governor &c. of Natal, 107 Means of injuring, 94 Measures short of war, 1-21 Mediation. See Good offices Menam, blockade of the, 10 Mercantile Marine in war, 81, 84, 87 Merchant ships, visit of, 60 Militia, 77 Minerva, the, 91 Mines, 164 Moltke, von, on conduct of war, 24 Monroe doctrine, the, 17, 20 Moray Firth, the, 189 Morley, Lord, 58, 74 "Most favoured nation" clause, 17 Moewe, the, 70 "Murder," 70, 71, 72, 84 Mutiny Acts, the, 109

National Instructions, 75, 76 Naval bombardments of open coast towns, 30, 112, 123 Naval manoeuvres of 1888, the, 113, 123 Naval war code, a British, 30, 31, 32 Naval warfare, 22 Naval Prize (Consolidation) Bill, the, 36, 191-196, 198 object of, 194,195 rejection of, 196 Naval Prize money, 195 Neutral conduct, the criterion of, 125 Neutral duties, as classified by the author, 129 Neutral hospitality, 143 Neutral States and individuals, their liabilities distinguished, 129-135 Neutral territory, passage through, 90 Neutral trade, the four inconveniences, to, 159 Neutralisation, the term, 53, 54 Neutrality, correlative to belligerency, 10, 16, 19 British proclamations of, 130, 135-143 Neutrals, methods of warfare affecting, 164-181 Non-combatants, 72, 74 Novoe Vremya, the, 176

Occupied territory, right of the invader in, 80, 100 not yet occupied, 77 Oppenheim, Prof., 47 Orozembo, the, 160 "Ottoman Empire, ancient rule of the," 56

Pacific blockade, 10 Palmerston, Lord, 12 Panama Canal, the, 50 Paquete Habana, the, 30 Paris. See Declaration of Paris, Treaty of, 53, 54, 56, 81, 87, 89, 155 "Pas de Code Naval, pas de Cour des Prises," 187 Passage, 64, 90 Peace talk, 125 Peaceful settlement of disputes, the Conventions for, of 1899, 2, 3, 6 of 1907, 2, 6 are non-obligatory, 173 Perels, Prof., 16 Permanent Court of International Justice, a, 191 Peterburg, the, 162 Peterhoff, the, 20, 149, 160 Petition of Right, the, 106, 108, 109 Pike, Mr., 98, 100 "Piracy," 70, 71, 84 Poison, 96 Pope's Note, the, 51 Port, enemy ships in, 49 Porter v. Freudenberg, 49 Portsmouth, Lord, 205 Pourtugael, den Beer, Prof., 68 Pre-emption, 148 Prevention, State duties of, 129, 131 Prisoners of war, 45, 106, 107 liabilities of, 106 Private International Law, 34 Privateers, 81, 84 restrictions on, 82 commissioned liners are not, 70 Private property at sea, 184 Prize Court, the Russian, 163 an international Court of Appeal, 23, 170-182 a settled prize law, must precede, 181, 183, 185, 190, 191, 193 a supreme, 181 Prize Law Consolidation Bill, 193, 194, 199 "Probable cause," 83 Proclamations of neutrality, the British, criticised, 135-143 "Professors," 119 Projectiles, from balloons, 22, 30, 62 for diffusion of gases, 22, 96, 97

"Quasi-enemy," 12

Radiotelegraphic stations, 168 Rae, Mr., 162 Ratification, 203 Receipts, 102 Reglements, the Hague. See Hague Renault, Prof., 172, 187, 190, 196, 198, 199 Report of the force of (see Authentic Interpretation) Reprisals, advantages of, 14, 19 how differing from war, 9, 12, 14, 19 opposite views as to, 16 species of, 12, 15, 19 United States, instructions as to, 29 belligerent, 97, 123 Requisitions, 102, 117 Restrictive clause, the, 69, 146 Retaliation, 97 Reward for, dead or alive, 93 R. v. Eyre, 110 Ridley, Sir E., 77 Roman Law terminology, 102 Roosevelt, Pres., 146 Rosebery, Lord, 158 Ross, Sir R., 78 Russian Prize Law, 162, 174, 176

Salisbury, Lord, 3, 15, 52, 54, 157 Santissima Trinidad, the, 137 Savage warfare, 94 Savannah, the, 85 Scott, Sir Walter, 77, 91 Scott, Sir William, 91 Search. See Visit and Search Second Peace Conference Conventions Bill, 37, 38, 39 Seely, Col., 63 Ship, a "mere moveable," 85 Shucking, Prof., 125 Siam, 10 Sinking. See Destruction Smith (Lord Birkenhead) and Sibley, on International Law in the Russo-Japanese War, 135 Spider, the, 113, 117 Spies, 72 Springbok, the, 29 Stephen, Sir Herbert, 124 Stewart, Mr. C., 104 Story, J., 159 Stowell, Lord, 85, 159, 160, 161, 166, 175, 177, 178, 180, 197 Straits, 52, 56 Submarine cables, 168, 169, 171, 188 Submarines, 69 Suez Canal, the, 50, 51, 52, 54 Superfluous injury, 94, 95 Suyematsu, Baron, 149 Swettenham, Sir James, 79 Sydenham, Lord, 104

Takahashi, Prof., 43 Terminology, 33 Territorial waters, 165, 166, 167 Tindal, le Chevalier, 122 Tirpitz, Admiral von, 70 Tocumaro, the, 60[D] Torpedoes, 164 Transformation into ships of war, 162 Treaties, who are the parties to, 202, 207 effect of war on, 18, 198 Treaty, the Hay-Pauncefote, 50 Twenty-three (h) clause, the, 47, 206 Twenty-four hours rule, the, 127, 144, 145 Ullmann, Prof., 47, 106, 201 Unarmed merchantmen, 72, 73 Undefended towns, 30, 67, 68 Uniform, 75 United States instructions for war on land, 23, 73, 107 naval war code, 23, 30, 31, 88 Naval War College, 8 ratification of Conventions, 75 views of, compared with British, 29, 31 Unqualified captors, 72, 73 Unratified Conventions, effect of, 40 Usufruct, 101

Vattel, 46, 119 Venezuela, 13, 18 Visit and search, 72, 83, 84, 159, 186 "Violations of law of nations," term misapplied, 140, 142 Voeux, 5, 99, 121, 122, 167, 180, 190 Volunteers, 77

War. See Reprisals Declaration of, 10, 41 legitimate object of, 25, 95 sub modo, 20, 55 written law of, 22 Washington, the Three Rules of, 86 Wellington, Duke of, 117 Westbury, Lord, 137 Westlake, Prof., 18, 41, 65, 183, 199, 202 Wilson, Pres., 72, 97, 127 Wolf, Mr., 58 Wood, Mackinnon, Mr., 196, 197, 200 Wounded and Sick. See Geneva Conventions horses, 98, 100

Yangtsze Insurance Association v. Indemnity Mutual Marine Company, 157 Younge, Mr., 118

Zamora, the, 207 Zone, a danger, 59



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[Transcriber's Note: The spelling and usage of non-English words and characters is occasionally inconsistent throughout the work. This etext preserves the usage in each instance as it appears in the printed book, except in cases of probable error as noted below.]

[Note A: Printed s'entiendrait in original.]

[Note B: Printed ressasi in original.]

[Note C: Printed principles in original.]

[Note D: Spelled Tokomaru where it appears in the text.]

[Note E: Misprinted in original—intended page unknown.]

THE END