"Certain questions will naturally arise as to whom exactly we should educate, and as to the nature of the education to be given. Our system would need to be gradually built up. We should begin by teaching the sons of the leading men, the heads of villages, and the heads of districts. They belong to a race very capable of learning and ready to learn. The teaching, in its early stages, would be devoted to purely elementary subjects, such as reading, writing, geography, and the English language. Later, and after these preliminary stages had been passed, a more advanced course would be instituted, including a training in technical subjects specially adapted to the requirements of those who inhabit the Valley of the Upper Nile. The principal teachers in the college would be British and the supervision of the arrangements would be vested in the Governor-General of the Soudan. I need not add that there would be no interference with the religion of the people.

"The fund required for the establishment of such a college is L100,000. Of this, L10,000 would be appropriated to the initial outlay, while the remaining L90,000 would be invested, and the revenue thence derived would go to the maintenance of the college and the support of the staff of teachers. It would be clearly impossible at first to require payment from the pupils, but as the college developed and the standard of its teaching rose, it would be fair to demand fees in respect of this higher education, which would thus support itself, and render the college independent of any further call upon the public. It is for the provision of this sum of L100,000 that I now desire to appeal, on behalf of a race dependent upon our mercy, in the name of Gordon, and in the cause of that civilisation which is the life of the Empire of Britain.

"I am authorised to state that Her Majesty the Queen has been graciously pleased to become the patron of the movement. His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has graciously consented to become vice-patron.

"I may state that a general council of the leading men of the country is in course of formation. Lord Hillingdon has kindly consented to accept the post of hon. treasurer. The Hon. George Peel has accepted to act as hon. secretary, and all communications should be addressed to him at 67, Lombard Street, London, E.C. Subscriptions should be paid to the Sirdar's Fund for the 'Gordon Memorial College' at Khartoum, Messrs Glyn, Mills, Currie, & Co., 67, Lombard Street, London, E.C.

"Enclosed herewith is a letter from the Marquis of Salisbury, in which he states that this scheme represents the only policy by which the civilising mission of this country can effectively be accomplished. His lordship adds that it is only to the rich men of this country that it is possible for me to look, yet I should be glad for this appeal to find its way to all classes of our people.

"I further enclose a letter from the Baroness Burdett-Coutts, whose devotion to the cause of Africa has been not the least of her magnificent services. I forward, besides, an important telegram from the Lord Mayor of Liverpool, and letters of great weight from the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, and the Lord Provost of Glasgow. I would venture to address myself to the other great municipalities of the Kingdom.

"Above all, it is in the hands of the Press of this country that I place this cause. I look with confidence to your support in the discharge of this high obligation.—I have the honour to remain, yours faithfully,

"(Signed) KITCHENER OF KHARTOUM."

Lords Salisbury and Rosebery, and many more distinguished personages, followed the example of the Sovereign and the Prince of Wales and became supporters of the proposed institution. In the Metropolis as well as in all the chief towns of the Kingdom the matter was taken up enthusiastically. An influential committee was formed. The subscriptions were showered in from home and abroad, wherever the English tongue was spoken and Gordon had been known. In less than a month the L100,000, and considerably more, were subscribed, and the establishment of the Memorial College assured.

Lieut.-Colonel C. S. B. Parsons, R.A., Governor of Kassala and the Red Sea littoral, to whom I have previously referred when we were advancing against Omdurman, was menacing the dervish outpost of Gedarif. Later on, when Ahmed Fadl was marching to reinforce his master the Khalifa, Colonel Parsons was leading his Egyptians, Abyssinian irregulars, and friendlies from Kassala up the head waters or khor of the Atbara, far to the southward, and thence to a tributary of the Blue Nile where the enemy had long had a garrison. The fifteen years' campaign against Mahdism was nigh over, but not quite concluded, with the victory of Omdurman. On receiving the check from the gunboats, Fadl and his dervishes retreated up the Blue Nile to where they had come from, their own country upon the borders of Abyssinia. News seems to have reached them of Colonel Parsons' advance, and it became a race for Gedarif. The Egyptians had a good start, and managed to reach and capture the place and occupy the two forts, one on either side of the river, or, what it is more frequently, the khor, before the dervishes got back. Fadl was a man of mettle and resolutely assaulted the town and forts of which he had so long been governor. A desperate action ensued, but Fadl was beaten off with a loss of 700, it is said, in killed and wounded. The casualties in Colonel Parsons' force were about 100. But the dervishes, though severely beaten, soon returned to attack the forts. With increased numbers they sat down before the place and began to harass sorely the Egyptian troops, cutting their communications with Kassala, whence by wire to Massowah over the Italian lines and up the Red Sea to Egypt the Sirdar was able to keep in touch with Colonel Parsons. They endeavoured again, on several occasions, to storm one or other of the forts, which were about half a mile apart, but happily they were invariably repulsed. Still they persisted in their tactics of worrying, evidently determined to recapture the place. At last matters grew so serious that Major-General Rundle was sent with a brigade of infantry and several batteries to deal with Ahmed Fadl's dervishes. Advancing up the Blue Nile in gunboats, the Egyptian force cleared the banks of all the many wandering armed bands of the enemy. Through the aid of the wily Abyssinian scouts, information was sent to and received from Colonel Parsons and a plan arranged for catching Fadl and his men between two attacking columns. Seventeen hundred men of the Omdurman force attacked the dervishes on one side, whilst Colonel Parsons' garrison assailed them from the other. The enemy were completely routed and scattered in all directions. Hundreds of dervishes were slain, and ultimately many who escaped were so closely pressed by friendlies and Abyssinians that they surrendered. A thousand fugitive Baggara or so vainly tried to make their way up the Blue Nile, in order to retire to their former country in Kordofan. They were caught crossing far up stream, near Rosaires, by Colonel Lewis, vigorously attacked, defeated, and finally scattered. Thus the last dervish army in the field was destroyed, and the country reclaimed to the side of peace, order, and civilised government.

The following are the official despatches of Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Grenfell, who commanded the British troops in Egypt, and of the Sirdar, relating to the battle of Omdurman:—

THE OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.

Headquarters, Cairo, September 16, 1898.

SIR,—1. I have the honour to forward a despatch from Major-General Sir H. Kitchener, K.C.B., Sirdar, describing the later phases of the Soudan Campaign, and the final action on 2nd September.

2. The Sirdar, in this despatch, recounts in brief, simple terms the events of the closing phase of one of the most successful campaigns ever conducted by a British General against a savage foe, resulting in the capture of Omdurman, the destruction of the dervish power in the Soudan, and the reopening of the waterway to the Equatorial Provinces.

3. The concentration of the army on the Atbara was carried out to the hour, and the arrangements for the transport of the force to the vicinity of the battle-field were made by the Sirdar and his staff with consummate ability. All difficulties were foreseen and provided for, and, from the start of the campaign to its close at Omdurman, operations have been conducted with a precision and completeness which have been beyond all praise; while the skill shown in the advance was equalled by the ability with which the army was commanded in the field.

The Sirdar's admirable disposition of the force, the accurate fire of the artillery and Maxims, and the steady fire discipline of the infantry, assisted by the gunboats, enabled him to destroy his enemy at long range before the bulk of the British and Egyptian force came under any severe rifle fire, and to this cause may be attributed the comparatively small list of casualties. Never were greater results achieved at such a trifling cost.

4. The heavy loss in killed and wounded in the 21st Lancers is to be deeply regretted. But the charge itself, against an overwhelming force of sword and spear men over difficult ground, and under unfavourable conditions, was worthy of the best traditions of British cavalry.

5. As regards the force employed, I can say with truth that never, in the course of my service, have I seen a finer body of troops than the British contingent of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and infantry placed at the disposal of the Sirdar, as regards physique, smartness, and soldierlike bearing. The appearance of the men speaks well for the present recruiting department, and was a source of pride to every Englishman who saw them.

6. While thoroughly endorsing the Sirdar's recommendations, I desire to call attention to the good work done by Major-General Henderson, C.B., and staff at Alexandria, who conducted the disembarkation of the force, and by my own staff at Cairo.

On Colonel H. Cooper, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut.-Colonel L. A. Hope, Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General, fell the brunt of the work in the despatch of the British Division to the front.

I also desire to acknowledge the services of Brevet-Colonel A. O. Green, Commanding Royal Engineer; Surgeon-General H. S. Muir, M.D., Principal Medical Officer; Lieut.-Colonel F. O. Leggett, Army Ordnance Department; Colonel F. Treffry, Army Pay Department; Veterinary-Captain Blenkinsop, and the junior officers of the various departments.

Major Williams, my C.R.A., was indefatigable in organising the mule transport for the 32nd and 37th Field Batteries.

7. I have received the greatest assistance from the Egyptian Railway Administration in the movements of the troops both going south and returning.

Thanks to the admirable system organised by Iskander Bey Fahmy, the traffic manager, all the services were rapidly and punctually carried out.

8. I am sending this despatch home by my Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant H. Grenfell, 1st Life Guards, who acted as Orderly Officer to Brigadier-General Honourable N. G. Lyttelton, C.B., commanding Second British Brigade in the Soudan.—I have, &c.,

FRANCIS GRENFELL, Lieutenant-General, Commanding in Egypt.

The despatch from Major-General Sir Herbert Kitchener, Sirdar, to Lieutenant-General Sir Francis Grenfell, commanding in Egypt, was as follows:—

Omdurman, September 5, 1898.

SIR,—It having been decided that an expeditionary force of British and Egyptian troops should be sent against the Khalifa's army in Omdurman, I have the honour to inform you that the following troops were concentrated at the North End of the Sixth Cataract, in close proximity to which an advanced supply depot had been previously formed at Nasri Island.

BRITISH TROOPS.—21st Lancers; 32nd Field Battery, Royal Artillery; 37th Howitzer Battery, Royal Artillery; 2 40-prs., Royal Artillery. Infantry Division:—1st Brigade: 1st Battalion Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Lincolnshire Regiment, 1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, 1st Battalion Cameron Highlanders, 6 Maxims, Detachment Royal Engineers. 2nd Brigade: 1st Battalion Grenadier Guards, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade, 4 Maxims, Detachment Royal Engineers.

EGYPTIAN TROOPS.—9 Squadrons, Cavalry; 1 Battery, Horse Artillery; 4 Field Batteries; 10 Maxims; 8 Companies, Camel Corps. 1st Brigade: 2nd Egyptian Battalion; 9th, 10th, and 11th Soudanese Battalions. 2nd Brigade: 8th Egyptian Battalion; 12th, 13th, and 14th Soudanese Battalions. 3rd Brigade: 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 15th Egyptian Battalions. 4th Brigade: 1st, 5th, 17th, and 18th Egyptian Battalions. Camel Transport.

On 24th August the troops began moving by successive divisions to Jebel Royan, where a depot of supplies and a British communication hospital of two hundred beds were established.

On 28th August, the army marched to Wadi el Abid, and on the following day proceeded to Sayal, from whence I despatched a letter to the Khalifa, warning him to remove his women and children, as I intended to bombard Omdurman unless he surrendered.

Next day the army marched to Sururab, and on September 1 reached the village of Egeiga, two miles south of the Kerreri hills, and within six miles of Omdurman. Patrols of the enemy's horsemen were frequently seen during the march falling back before our cavalry, and their outposts being driven in beyond Egeiga, our advanced scouts came in full view of Omdurman, from which large bodies of the enemy were seen streaming out and marching north.

At noon, from the slopes of Jebel Surgham, I saw the entire dervish army some three miles off advancing towards us, the Khalifa's black flag surrounded by his Mulazimin (body-guard) being plainly discernible. I estimated their numbers at 35,000 men, though, from subsequent investigation, this figure was probably under-estimated, their actual strength being between forty and fifty thousand. From information received, I gather that it was the Khalifa's intention to have met us with this force at Kerreri, but our rapid advance surprised him.

The troops were at once disposed around the village of Egeiga, which formed an excellent position with a clear field of fire in every direction, and shelter-trenches and zerebas were prepared.

At 2 p.m. our vedettes reported that the enemy had halted, and later on it was observed that they were preparing bivouacs and lighting fires. Information was received that the Khalifa contemplated a night attack on our position, and preparations to repel this were made, at the same time the Egeiga villagers were sent out to obtain information in the direction of the enemy's camp with the idea that we intended a night attack, and, this coming to the Khalifa's knowledge, he decided to remain in his position; consequently, we passed an undisturbed night in the zereba.

Meanwhile the gunboats, under Commander Keppel, which had shelled the dervish advanced camp near Kerreri on 31st August, proceeded at daylight on 1st September, towing the Howitzer Battery to the right bank, whence, in conjunction with the Irregulars under Major Stuart Wortley, their advance south was continued. After two forts had been destroyed and the villages gallantly cleared by the Irregulars, the Howitzers were landed in a good position on the right bank, from whence an effective fire was opened on Omdurman, and, after a few rounds, the conspicuous dome over the Mahdi's tomb was partially demolished, whilst the gunboats, steaming past the town, also effectually bombarded the forts, which replied with a heavy, but ill-directed fire.

At dawn on the following morning (2nd September), our mounted patrols reported the enemy advancing to attack, and by 6.30 a.m. the Egyptian Cavalry, which had been driven in, took up a position with the Horse Artillery, Camel Corps, and four Maxims on the Kerreri ridge on our right flank.

At 6.40 a.m. the shouts of the advancing dervish army became audible, and a few minutes later their flags appeared over the rising ground, forming a semi-circle round our left and front faces. The guns of the 32nd Field Battery opened fire at 6.45 a.m. at a range of two thousand eight hundred yards, and the dervishes, continuing to advance rapidly, delivered their attack with all their accustomed dash and intrepidity. In a short time the troops and Maxims on the left and front were hotly engaged, whilst the enemy's riflemen, taking up positions on the slopes of Jebel Surgham, brought a long-range fire to bear on the zereba, causing some casualties, and their spearmen, continually reinforced from the rear, made attempt after attempt to reach our lines.

Shortly after 8.0 a.m. the enemy's main attack was repulsed. At this period a large and compact body of dervishes was observed attempting to march round our right, and advancing with great rapidity they soon became engaged with our mounted troops on the Kerreri ridge. One of the gunboats which had been disposed to protect the river flanks at once proceeded down stream to afford assistance to the somewhat hardly-pressed mounted troops, and coming within close range of the dervishes inflicted heavy loss on them, upwards of 450 men being killed in a comparatively circumscribed area. The Artillery and Maxims on the left face of the zereba also co-operated, and the enemy was forced to retire again under cover of the hills.

All attacks on our position having failed, and the enemy having retired out of range, I sent out the 21st Lancers to clear the ground on our left front and head off any retreating dervishes from the direction of Omdurman. After crossing the slopes of Jebel Surgham they came upon a body of dervishes concealed in a depression of the ground; these they gallantly charged, but finding, too late to withdraw, that a much larger body of the enemy lay hidden, the charge was pressed home through them, and, after rallying on the other side, they rode back, driving off the dervishes, and remaining in possession of the ground. Considerable loss was inflicted on the enemy; but I regret to say that here fell Lieutenant R. Grenfell (12th Lancers) and twenty men.

Meanwhile I had ordered the army to follow in echelon of brigades from the left. At 9.30 a.m. the front brigades having reached the sand ridge running from the west end of Jebel Surgham towards the river, a halt was ordered to enable the rear brigades to get into position, and I then received information that the Khalifa was still present in force on the left slopes of Surgham; a change of front half-right of the three leading brigades was, therefore, ordered, and it was during this movement that Macdonald's brigade became hotly engaged, whilst taking up position on the right of the echelon.

Learning from General Hunter, who was with Macdonald's brigade, that he might require support, I despatched Wauchope's brigade to reinforce him, and ordered the remaining brigades to make a further change half-right.

No sooner had Macdonald repelled the dervish onslaught than the force, which had retired behind the Kerreri hills, emerged again into the plain and rapidly advanced to attack him, necessitating a further complete change of front of his brigade to the right. This movement was admirably executed, and now, supported by a portion of Wauchope's brigade on the right and by Lewis's brigade enfilading the attack on the left, he completely crushed this second most determined dervish charge.

Meantime Maxwell's and Lyttelton's brigades had been pushed on over the slopes of Jebel Surgham, and driving before them the dervish forces under the Khalifa's son, Osman Sheikh ed Din, they established themselves in a position which cut off the retreat on Omdurman of the bulk of the dervish army, who were soon seen streaming in a disorganised mass towards the high hills many miles to the west, closely pursued by the mounted troops, who cleared the right front and flanks of all hesitating and detached parties of the enemy.

The battle was now practically over, and Lyttelton's and Maxwell's brigades marched down to Khor Shambat, in the direction of Omdurman, which was reached at 12.30 p.m., and here the troops rested and watered. The remainder of Hunter's division and Wauchope's brigade reached the same place at 3 p.m.

At 2 p.m. I advanced with Maxwell's brigade and the 32nd Field Battery through the suburbs of Omdurman to the great wall of the Khalifa's enclosure, and, leaving two guns and three battalions to guard the approaches, the 13th Soudanese Battalion and four guns (32nd Field Battery) were pushed down by the north side of the wall to the river, and, accompanied by three gunboats which had been previously ordered to be ready for this movement, these troops penetrated the breaches in the wall made by the howitzers, marched south along the line of forts, and turning in at the main gateway found a straight road leading to the Khalifa's house and Mahdi's tomb; these were speedily occupied, the Khalifa having quitted the town only a short time before our entry, after a vain effort to collect his men for further resistance.

The gunboats continued up the river clearing the streets of dervishes, and, having returned to the remainder of the brigade left at the corner of the wall, these were pushed forward, and occupied all the main portions of the town. Guards were at once mounted over the principal buildings and Khalifa's stores, and after visiting the prison and releasing the European prisoners, the troops bivouacked at 7 p.m. around the town, after a long and trying day, throughout which all ranks displayed qualities of high courage, discipline, and endurance.

The gunboats and Egyptian Cavalry and Camel Corps at once started in pursuit south; but owing to the exhausted condition of the animals and the flooded state of the country, which prevented them from communicating with the gunboat carrying their forage and rations, they were reluctantly obliged to abandon the pursuit after following up the flying Khalifa for 30 miles through marshy ground. The gunboats continued south for 90 miles, but were unable to come in touch with the Khalifa, who left the river and fled westward towards Kordofan, followed by the armed friendly tribes who took up the pursuit on the return of the mounted troops.

Large stores of ammunition, powder, some sixty guns of various sorts, besides vast quantities of rifles, swords, spears, banners, drums, and other war materials, were captured on the battle-field and in Omdurman.

The result of this battle is the practical annihilation of the Khalifa's army, the consequent extinction of Mahdism in the Soudan, and the submission of the whole country formerly ruled under Egyptian authority. This has re-opened vast territories to the benefits of peace, civilisation, and good government.

On 4th September the British and Egyptian flags were hoisted with due ceremony on the walls of the ruined Palace of Khartoum, close to the spot where General Gordon fell, and this event is looked upon by the rejoicing populations as marking the commencement of a new era of peace and prosperity for their unfortunate country.

It would be impossible for any Commander to have been more ably seconded than I was by the General Officers serving under me. Major-Generals Hunter, Rundle, and Gatacre have displayed the highest qualities as daring and skilful leaders, as well as being endowed with administrative capabilities of a high order. It is in the hands of such officers that the Service may rest assured their best interests will, under all circumstances, be honourably upheld, and while expressing to them my sincere thanks for their cordial co-operation with me, I have every confidence in most highly recommending the names of these General Officers for the favourable consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

The manner in which the Brigadiers handled their respective brigades, their thorough knowledge of their profession, and their proved skill in the field, mark them out, one and all, as fitted for higher rank, and I have great pleasure in submitting their names for favourable consideration:—Brigadier-Generals N. G. Lyttelton and A. G. Wauchope; Lieutenant-Colonels J. G. Maxwell, H. A. Macdonald, D. F. Lewis and J. Collinson.

Macdonald's brigade was highly tested, bearing the brunt of two severe attacks delivered at very short intervals from different directions, and I am sure it must be a source of the greatest satisfaction to Colonel Macdonald, as it is to myself and the whole army, that the very great care he has for long devoted to the training of his brigade has proved so effectual, enabling his men to behave with the greatest steadiness under most trying circumstances, and repelling most successfully two determined dervish onslaughts.

I should also mention under this category the excellent services performed by Colonel R. H. Martin, commanding 21st Lancers; by Lieut.-Colonel Long, commanding the combined British and Egyptian Artillery; and by Lieut.-Colonel R. G. Broadwood, commanding the Egyptian Cavalry; as well as by Major R. J. Tudway, commanding the Camel Corps. I consider that these various arms could not have been more efficiently commanded than they were throughout the recent operations. The best result was, I believe, attained, and it is due to the skilful handling of their respective commands that the dervish defeat was so complete.

The Medical Department was administered with ability and skill by Surgeon-General Taylor, Principal Medical Officer, who was well assisted by Colonel M'Namara, whilst the medical organisation of the Egyptian Army fully maintained its previous excellent reputation under the direction of Lieut.-Colonel Gallwey and his staff. The general medical arrangements were all that could have been desired, and I believe the minimum of pain and maximum of comfort procurable on active service in this country was attained by the unremitting energy, untiring zeal, and devotion to their duty of the entire medical staff.

Owing to the long line of communications by rail, river, and desert, the work of maintaining a thoroughly efficient supply and transport system, both by land and water, was arduous in the extreme, and that a large British and Egyptian force was brought up to within striking distance of Khartoum, amply supplied with all its requirements, reflects the greatest credit on the supply and transport system. I wish to cordially thank the officers of the Supply, Transport and Railway Departments for the satisfactory results which have attended their labours.

I consider that the excellent ration which was always provided kept the men strong and healthy and fit to endure all the hardships of an arduous campaign, enabling them, at a critical moment, to support the exceptional fatigue of continuous marching and fighting for some fourteen hours during the height of a Soudan summer.

The Intelligence Department were, as usual, thoroughly efficient, and their forecasts of the intentions and actions of the enemy were accurate. Colonel Wingate and Slatin Pacha worked indefatigably, and, with their staff, deserve a prominent place amongst those to whom the success of the operations is due.

The excellent service performed by the gunboats under Commander Keppel and his subordinate officers of the Royal Navy is deserving of special mention. These gunboats have been for a long time past almost constantly under fire; they have made bold reconnaissances past the enemy's forts and rifle pits, and on the 1st and 2nd September, in conjunction with the Irregular levies under Major Stuart Wortley, and the Howitzer Battery, they materially aided in the capture of all the forts on both banks of the Nile, and in making the fortifications of Omdurman untenable. In bringing to notice the readiness of resource, daring, and ability of Commander Keppel and his officers, I wish also to add my appreciation of the services rendered by Engineer E. Bond, Royal Navy, and the engineering staff, as well as of the detachments of the Royal Marine Artillery and the gun crews, who have gained the hearty praise of their commanders.

The Rev. R. Brindle, the Rev. J. M. Simms, the Rev. A. W. B. Watson, and the Rev. O. S. Watkins won the esteem of all by their untiring devotion to their sacred duties and by their unfailing and cheerful kindness to the sick and wounded at all times.

To all my personal staff my thanks are specially due for the great assistance they at all times rendered me.

In conclusion, I have great pleasure in expressing my appreciation of the services rendered by the detachments of the Royal Engineers, Army Ordnance Corps, and Telegraph and Postal Departments.

The names of a large number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men who had been brought to the Sirdar's notice for good service were appended to the despatch.

Two other documents call for notice, the Queen's message and the Sirdar's general order to his army after the victory.

"From the Queen to the Sirdar, Khartoum.—I congratulate you and all your brave troops under fire on the brilliant success which you have achieved. I am grieved for the losses which have been sustained, but trust the wounded are doing well.—VICTORIA."

"The Sirdar congratulates all the troops upon their excellent behaviour during the general action to-day, resulting in the total defeat of the Khalifa's forces and worthily avenging Gordon. The Sirdar regrets the loss that has occurred, and, while warmly thanking the troops, wishes to place on record his admiration for their courage, discipline, and endurance.

"(Signed) H. M. L. RUNDLE."

Long lists of honours and promotions were subsequently published in the Gazette. Of these, the more prominent officers who received such recognition of their distinguished services were as follows: The Sirdar was raised to the peerage as Lord Kitchener of Khartoum. In addition thereto the dignity G.C.B. was conferred upon the Sirdar, and Sir Francis Grenfell. Major-Generals W. F. Gatacre, A. Hunter, and H. M. L. Rundle were created K.C.B.'s, and the dignity of Companion of the Bath was granted to Surgeon-General William Taylor, Colonel V. Hatton, Colonel L. C. Money, Colonel T. E. Verner, Colonel W. H. M'Namara, R.A.M.C., Lieut.-Col. R. A. Hope, Lieut.-Col. Collingwood, Lieut.-Col. D. F. Lewis, Lieut.-Col. J. Collinson, Lieut.-Col. W. E. G. Forbes, Lieut.-Col. M. Q. Jones, Lieut.-Col. F. R. South, Lieut.-Col. R. H. Martin, Lieut.-Col. W. G. C. Wyndham, and Commander C. R. Keppel, R. N. Colonel F. R. Wingate was made a Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George, and a like dignity was conferred upon Colonel R. Slatin Pasha. Distinguished Service Orders were granted to the Rev. R. Brindle, Lieut.-Col. C. V. F. Townshend, Lieut.-Col. G. A. Hughes, Lieut.-Col. C. J. Blomfield, Lieut.-Col. F. Lloyd, Major E. J. M. Stuart Wortley, Major E. M. Wilson, R.A.M.C., Major G. Cockburn, Major Hon. C. Lambton, Major N. E. Young, Major C. E. Laurie, and Major F. J. Maxse, Captain C. C. Fleming, R.A.M.C., Lieutenant G. C. M. Hall, Lieutenant F. Hubbard. The Khedive conferred the Medjidieh and Osmanlieh orders on a large number of officers. Others, whose names did not appear in the order list, figured in that of army promotions. Victoria Crosses were given to Captain P. A. Kenna, 21st Lancers, Lieutenant R. H. L. J. de Montmorency, 21st Lancers, Private Thomas Byrne, 21st Lancers (for turning back in the charge and rescuing Lieutenant Molyneux), Captain N. M. Smyth, 2nd Dragoon Guards.

Lieut.-Col. H. A. Macdonald, C.B., D.S.O., was made an extra A.D.C. to the Queen.

The Sirdar on his return to Lower Egypt met with an enthusiastic reception. Lord Cromer, Sir Francis Grenfell and all the notables in Cairo met him and the troops turned out to escort him to his residence. He was entertained in Cairo at a grand banquet. When he visited England even a heartier and grander welcome was extended to the victor of Omdurman and the destroyer of Mahdism. The public acclaimed him, and honours and dignities were showered upon him ere he returned to resume his self-imposed task of reconstructing the Soudan.

Colonel Hector A. Macdonald alone seems as yet to have had extended to him scant military recognition of his invaluable services. The post of A.D.C. to Her Majesty is a coveted dignity, but a mere honorary office, carrying neither pay nor emolument. Indeed it is the other way, for the accessories required to bedeck the person will cost at least L25. But the fact cannot be forgotten, or cried down, that Colonel Macdonald saved the situation. He fought a single-handed battle against tremendous odds and won. First he faced the Khalifa and fought him to a finish, and then faced about and served Sheikh Ed Din's unbeaten dervishes in much the same fashion. For reasons that could be given, and which reflect no discredit upon the other brigadier, Colonel Lewis' force was not moved promptly up to Macdonald's support. Honour lists and promotion lists still keep cropping up, and possibly the military authorities are yet deliberating what is the right thing to do in Macdonald's case. In the Scotch press, and particularly in that of the Far North, there has been much adverse comment on the ungenerous treatment accorded their countryman. The Highlanders, as is their nature, write and speak passionately of the matter, and pertinently ask if the authorities wish no more Highland recruits. From the paper of his own district, the Dingwall North Star, I quote the following lines:—

"In glen and clachan, England's tardy debt The clansmen's pride will adequately pay: Round Nor'land hearths when lamplit nights are long, Thy fame shall ever live in many a tale and song."

The battle of Omdurman was not the only occasion in which Colonel Macdonald has exhibited magnificent tactical skill combined with soldierly dash and undaunted courage. It is not so long since the Atbara was fought, and in half a score of engagements before that he quitted himself equally well. He was deservedly promoted from the ranks, and to Field-Marshal Lord Roberts is due the credit of having discovered and properly appreciated the gallant Highlandman. His record is one for any man to be proud of, for to his own hand he owes his present distinguished position. I again quote from the North Star:—

"Colonel Macdonald was born at Rootfield, in the parish of Urquhart, in the county of Ross and Cromarty, and on the property of Mr Mackenzie of Allangrange. He began life as a stable-boy with Bailie Robertson, of the National Hotel, Dingwall, when tenant of the farm of Kinkell, Conon Bridge. At the age of seventeen he went to Inverness and became an apprentice draper with Mr William Mackay, late of the Clan Tartan Warehouse. In this capacity he served two years, but finding mercantile life distasteful to him, he enlisted in the 92nd Regiment. Here his qualities procured for him rapid promotion. He successively and successfully discharged the duties of drill-instructor, pay-sergeant, and other non-commissioned offices, and held the rank of colour-sergeant at the commencement of the Afghan campaign, wherein he repeatedly so greatly distinguished himself.

"Macdonald's first engagement with an enemy was at Jagi Thanni. On that occasion General Roberts, escorted by the 9th Lancers and 5th Punjaub Cavalry, advanced from Ali Kheyl to Kushi, and, while passing by Jagi Thanni, he was attacked by about 2000 Mangals and Machalgah Ghilzais, who there lay in ambush. Fortunately, early intimation of the Mangals' hostile intentions reached Fort Karatiga, a mile or two off, and a party of 45 men of the 3rd Sikhs, under Jemander Shere Mahomed Khan, was at once sent out to reconnoitre, and, as firing was soon afterwards heard in the direction the party had gone, Colour-Sergeant Macdonald promptly turned out with 18 men of his own regiment, and overtaking the Sikhs, he took over command of the whole, and, gallantly leading his little force across a difficult river and up a steep hill, he boldly attacked and dislodged the enemy from a strong position on the crest, but not before four of the Sikhs were killed, and Deputy-Surgeon-General Townsend, who rode near General Roberts, severely wounded. The enemy's loss here was about 30 killed. Macdonald's brilliant services on this occasion averted something like a disaster. In a Divisional Order, Roberts wrote:—'The above non-commissioned officer and a native officer, with a handful of soldiers, drove before them a large body of Mangals, who had assembled to stop the road, ... the great coolness, judgment, and gallantry with which they behaved.' In his despatch, dated Cabul, 15th October, and published in the Gazette, General Roberts further said:—'Meanwhile, a warm engagement had for some time been carried on in the direction of Karatiga, and presently large numbers of the enemy were seen retreating before a small detachment of the 92nd Highlanders and 3rd Sikhs, which had been sent out from Karatiga, and which was, with excellent judgment and boldness, led up a steep spur commanding the defile. The energy and skill with which this party was handled reflected the highest credit on Colour-Sergeant Hector Macdonald, 92nd Highlanders, and Jemander Shere Mahomed, 3rd Sikhs. But for their excellent services on this occasion, it might probably have been impossible to carry out the programme of our march.' In the same Gazette was published another despatch from Sir F. Roberts, dated Cabul, 20th October, in which he says:—'Colour-Sergeant H. Macdonald, a non-commissioned officer, whose excellent and skilful management of a small detachment when opposed to immensely superior numbers in the Hazardarakht defile was mentioned in my despatch of the 16th instant, here again distinguished himself.' This refers to his conduct at Charasiab, at the close of which action our brave countryman was sent for by Roberts, who publicly complimented and thanked him personally for 'the ability and intelligence with which he handled the party under his command' at the battle. Macdonald's commission was conferred on the recommendation of General Roberts, that distinguished officer having witnessed repeated proofs of his valour and capacity."

In 1885 Colonel Macdonald joined the then reorganised Egyptian Constabulary and received rapid promotion. From these, on other changes being made, he passed into the Khedivial army, drilling and training new Soudanese levies. So thorough a soldier is too valuable to be longer left in the Soudan now that peace is assured.



CHAPTER XV.

THE FASHODA AFFAIR.—A RED BRITISH LINE THROUGH AFRICA.

France is following in the footsteps of Spain. A fatality dogs her schemes of empire and colonisation. In truth she has no colonies—they are but military possessions. She has set her face, alone and in conjunction with others, in America, Asia, and Africa to hoop our enterprises in with bands of iron. Failure attended her policy across the Atlantic, in India, in Burmah, and but the other day at Fashoda. Her object in that last instance was to connect her possessions in West and East Africa, so that the red British lines which are steadily extending from North and South Africa should never be joined. France is the largest holder of territory upon the Dark Continent, and she probably regarded that fact as the best justification for her subtle move, through the Marchand and Abyssinian Missions, to add still more to her dominions. She had been permitted to hoop us about at Bathurst and Sierra Leone upon the West Coast and has all but completed the same process round Ashantee and the Niger countries, not to speak of elsewhere. Madagascar she had grabbed without a shadow of excuse, but time and South African civilisation will make it a bigger Cuba. Already her failures at government in that vast African island are grievous. Less than five years ago, to use a phrase I have employed elsewhere, property and life were ridiculously safe in that country. But then the Hovas and Prime Minister Rainilaiarivony ruled the land. Other changes predicted have come about there. The one native who showed honesty and courage in successfully opposing them at Tamatave the French subsequently executed. The Queen and Prime Minister were banished. Speaking English, the chief foreign language spoken, has been tabooed. Natives who are heard using it, or suspected of employing our mother tongue, are thrust into prison and kept there, pour encourager les autres, until they promise to discontinue speaking it. Association of natives with English or Americans renders them marked persons. The Protestant missions are regarded as centres of treason and enmity to French authority. Quickly, as foretold, has come about their reward(?) for non-interference politically in the early days of French intrigue. Had they insisted, with the British Government of a bygone day, in saving the island for the Malagasy, they would have succeeded. Our commerce has also had to suffer, for the French instruct the natives that they must only buy articles of French manufacture. The native who purchases British or American goods soon discovers, from the severe handling he receives through the local officials, that he has made a serious mistake. Robbery and lawlessness are rife, and in many places neither life nor property is safe beyond rifle-shot of the French garrisons. The facts are notorious and are in possession of the Foreign Office in Downing Street.

It had leaked out a day or two after the battle that the Sirdar intended accompanying the expedition to Fashoda. The troops ordered to proceed up the Nile with him were paraded outside Omdurman on the morning of the 8th of September. These were 600 men of the 11th Soudanese under Major Jackson, 600 men of the 13th Soudanese under Major Smith Dorrian, 100 men of the Cameron Highlanders under Captain the Hon. A. D. Murray, and Captain Peake's battery of 12 1/2-pounder Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns. At the same time the force that was to be sent across to reoccupy and assist in rebuilding the ruined Government buildings in Khartoum also turned out for inspection. Nothing was left to chance. Care was taken that only those fit and well should proceed on the gunboats and barges to Fashoda. Provision was made that the work of reconstruction should go on in his absence, and that Khartoum and Omdurman should be left in a proper state of defence. A great air of official mystification and secrecy prevailed respecting everything that happened at that time. Particulars were difficult to glean of the actual condition of affairs up the Blue and White Niles. Even the plans for the removal of the military headquarters and the re-establishment of the central authority in Khartoum were sealed against us. As the telegraph service was in the Sirdar's hands, much of the pains bestowed to keep news from us was surely unnecessary. But the Sirdar has a way of bestowing confidences on no one—simply issuing orders when the occasion arrives.

Since my return to England a reference to the correspondence disclosed in the official despatches or Fashoda Blue-book proves the correctness of the information that reached me even at that early stage. From the summary of the documents which appeared in the Daily Telegraph of 10th October, we learn that "before the battle of Omdurman Lord Salisbury had given instructions to the Sirdar through Lord Cromer," as follows:—

"It is desirable that you should be placed in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the line of action to be followed in the event of Khartoum being occupied at an early date by the forces now operating in the Soudan under the command of Sir Herbert Kitchener.

"Her Majesty's Government do not contemplate that after the occupation of Khartoum any further military operations on a large scale, or involving any considerable expense, will be undertaken for the occupation of the provinces to the south. But the Sirdar is authorised to send two flotillas, one up the White and the other up the Blue Nile.

"You are authorised to settle the composition of these two forces in consultation with the Sirdar.

"Sir Herbert Kitchener should in person command the White Nile flotilla as far as Fashoda, and may take with him a small body of British troops, should you concur with him in thinking such a course desirable.

"The officer in command of the Blue Nile flotilla is authorised to go as far as the foot of the cataract, which is believed to commence about Rosaires. He is not to land troops with a view to marching beyond the point on the river navigable for steamers. Should he, before reaching Rosaires, encounter any Abyssinian outposts, he is to halt, report the circumstance, and wait for further instructions.

"In dealing with any French or Abyssinian authorities who may be encountered, nothing should be said or done which would in any way imply a recognition on behalf of Her Majesty's Government of a title to possession on behalf of France or Abyssinia to any portion of the Nile Valley."

Although everybody engaged in the Fashoda expedition was repeatedly warned not to disclose anything about it, and to forget all they had seen or heard, I was enabled very shortly after the event to wire, day by day, the whole story of the enterprise. It was General Grant, who, during the Civil War in the United States of America, terribly vexed at the newspaper correspondents, on one occasion vowed he would send them all away and not have a press-man in his army. "Then, General," said the American journalist addressed, "may I ask what are you going to do without soldiers, every man of them can speak and write?" General Grant saw the absurdity of the position and smiled, and there was an end of the matter. It was, perhaps, a choice of one of two evils, either accepting and making the best of the situation to allow the trained journalists to remain, or to prepare to meet a tremendous inundation of wild letter-writing from all ranks that would find its way into the public press and do incalculable harm. "Other times, other manners," and those modern generals discredit themselves who fail to recognise at the close of the nineteenth century that the schoolmaster and the press must be reckoned with.

The information given me by the reis of the "Tewfikieh" proved accurate in almost every detail. I confess that, at the time, knowing the Arab indifference to exactness in dates, I did not credit his assertion that Marchand had reached Fashoda six weeks before the dervishes attacked him. Floating down stream in a small steam launch, aluminum row-boats, and other craft, the Frenchmen arrived off Fashoda on the 10th of July. In 1892-93 the French Government had begun sending military or quasi-scientific missions from the west and east African coasts to obtain treaties and pre-emption claims to territory in the interior. That the French flag should wave from sea to sea was their confessed desire. Their incentive was to forestall and annoy Great Britain and render worthless the blood and treasure our country might spend in smashing the dervishes. Major Marchand set out from the west coast or French Congo in 1896, with a small body of Europeans and about 500 Senegalese troops. With indomitable zeal and courage he pushed east, reaching the vast basin lands of the Bahr el Ghazal after sore hardships and the loss of many of his men, chiefly from sickness. The spirit that animated the leader and his followers may be gathered from the following lines which were written some time ago by a non-commissioned officer of Senegalese Rifles to his relatives.

"We have no rest, not even for a single day, as a moment's delay might render all our exertions useless. All that we shall have done will be wasted if the English or others occupy our route when we want to pass. When you read this letter we shall either be on the Nile or our bones will be slowly whitening in the Egyptian brushwood under a torrid sun. I verily believe that if we are destroyed I shall retain regret for our failure in another world."

Fashoda is 444 miles by river south of Omdurman. It is situated upon the west bank, on a low headland which at high Nile becomes an island. Before the Mahdist rising, Fashoda was a fortified Egyptian station with a garrison of 1000 men, and a native population of nearly 4000. The place was enclosed within a ditch and a sun-dried brick wall. From its position it commanded the passage of the Nile, which was less than half a mile in width. The dervishes allowed the place to fall into ruins, only maintaining a very small garrison—less than 100 men—to raid for grain to supply Omdurman with, and to collect revenue from the native boats. Like the rest of the Soudan, the Shilluk country, in which Fashoda is situated, had suffered terribly and been sadly depopulated. The country of the Shilluk negroes used to extend for several hundred miles northward down the left bank of the Nile from the Bahr el Ghazal. It was but a strip, ten miles or so in width, their nearest neighbours, with whom they were usually at war, being the Baggara Arabs. Like so many other riverain tracts susceptible of cultivation, it once teemed with people, the villages along the banks appearing to be one continuous row of dwellings. Helped by the Shilluks, Major Marchand had no difficulty in capturing Fashoda. The old fortification was built upon the only accessible strip of dry land, at high Nile, available for miles along the bank in that vicinity. Seen from the river, the works consisted of a rectangular mud-wall about 200 yards in length, protected by horse-shoe bastions at the corners. The Khalifa being as usual in need of supplies sent out a small foraging expedition many weeks before our arrival on the scene. Starting in the steamers "Safieh" and "Tewfikieh," they collected grain and cattle, shipping them down to Omdurman. Learning that Europeans had been seen at Fashoda, part of the force proceeded there, and engaged the French, attacking them by land and water. The date was the 25th of August. Behaving with great steadiness, and helped by Shilluks, after a stiff fight the dervishes were driven off, after losing a number of men, by Marchand's little garrison. "If they had had cannon," said the dervish skipper to me, "they fired so well that they would have sunk our steamers." The dervish captains then ran their boats down stream to collect their followers and return to assault the position. About 100 miles north the "Safieh" stopped to collect the raiders, who numbered about a thousand with four brass guns.

At six o'clock on the morning of the 10th September, the Sirdar set out from Omdurman with his expeditionary force. The troops were embarked upon the gunboats "Sultan," "Sheik," "Fatah," and barges towed by these vessels. Colonel Wingate, Major Lord Edward Cecil, Captain J. K. Watson, A.D.C., and other officers, accompanied the General on the stern-wheel steamer "Dal," which had for armament several Maxims. A Union Jack, as well as an Egyptian flag, was hoisted on the boat. Abundance of ammunition and two months' provisions for the force were carried on the steamers and tows. The steamers went along very leisurely, going only by daylight. In the afternoon, or towards sunset, the flotilla made fast to some suitable bank. The troops then formed a sort of camp, and parties went out with saws and axes to cut timber for fuel for the boilers. The hard gummy mimosa and sunt, when there is not too much sap in it, burns fiercely with a glow almost equal to ordinary coal. South of Omdurman, the river still being in full flood, the Nile had overspread the low banks for miles. There were places where it resembled a lake, two to six miles wide, dotted with islands. Landing was not always easily effected, for the banks were frequently marshy. There was plenty of good sizable wood to be had all along the river, the only difficulty being to reach and cut it. More than once, in order to "fill up" the vessels for next day's steaming, the Camerons and Soudanese soldiers laboured far into the night, hewing and carrying timber for fuel by candle-light and the electric beam. Nearing Fashoda the Nile in places ran through channels but 400 yards in width. The water was deep and relatively clear, with a current of but two miles or less an hour. Unfortunately, it rained heavily nearly every night, and the troops quartered upon the barges got drenched to the skin, the water pouring, in so many shower-baths, through the cracked boarded coverings. It is a peculiarity of most tropical climates, that Jupiter Pluvius does most of his work between the hours of sunset and sunrise. The natives met with as a rule were disposed to be friendly. Those with whom the men talked would not quite credit the statement that the Khalifa had been defeated, his army destroyed, and that he had run away. On Saturday the 17th September, the gunboat "Abu Klea" caught up with and joined the flotilla.

During the same night, dervish deserters, blacks, and Arabs came in. They stated that a short way further up there was a camp of the enemy. On Sunday morning, 18th September, when near Kaka, some 65 miles north of Fashoda, the dervish steamer "Safieh" was sighted, lying at the east bank close by the enemy's camp. The "Sultan" forged ahead and began shelling the enemy with all her guns, using the Maxims as well. With great alacrity the dervishes on shore replied, if indeed they did not fire first. A few shots also came from the "Safieh." With their rifled guns from behind screens of bushes the enemy bravely stood up, making excellent practice at the gunboats. The "Sultan" had several very narrow escapes, shells passing close over her bows and stern. When the other gunboats got up, what with cannon, quick-firing guns, and Maxims brought to bear upon the dervish camp, it was speedily wrecked and torn. The enemy bolted into the bush, leaving over 200 dead and wounded behind, including several Baggara and the chief Emir. A few shells from the "Sultan" had hulled and shattered the "Safieh," so the victory was complete. Detachments were landed from the gunboats and the dervishes driven still further afield. Their camp was looted and burned, and the "Safieh" and several nuggars temporarily repaired and sent down to Omdurman. It was found that the patch put upon the "Safieh's" boiler by chief-engineer Benbow in 1885 was intact. That steamer went to rescue Sir Charles Wilson's party who were wrecked on their return from Khartoum. Near Shabluka she was attacked by a dervish fort and hulled. Lord Charles Beresford, who was in command, stuck to the vessel after the boiler blew up, and during the night it was repaired. On Sunday, 18th September, the Sirdar despatched a Shilluk runner to go by land with a letter to Major Marchand telling him of the approach of the Egyptian flotilla. Next morning a reply was brought out to the "Dal" when it was within sight of Fashoda by an officer in a row-boat flying the French flag, that the garrison would receive him as a friendly visitor. Major Marchand furthermore declared that by treaty the territory belonged to France and he had communicated the fact to his Government, sending his despatches through Abyssinia. Precise details of what had been done were included.

It was 10 a.m. of the 19th September when the expedition reached Fashoda and saw the French flag flying over the fort. A Senegalese sentry was walking beneath the tricolor, and a row of these black riflemen's heads peeped from the walls and trenches. All of them had evidently been turned out under arms. Apparently there were about 300 people—not more—in the fortification. Steaming close in without being hailed, the vessels hove to opposite the works. A row-boat manned by Senegalese pushed from the shore and made for the "Dal." From the stern staff drooped the French flag, and by the tiller sat Major Marchand and an officer, M. Germain. The Major was dressed in a suit of white ducks. Below the medium height, of spare habit, with something like Dundreary side whiskers, he looked elderly and worn, almost twice his years, for he is still a young man. As he stepped aboard the steamer, he was received at the side. He and his companion shook hands with the Sirdar and the other members of the headquarters staff. A relatively brief conference ensued, at which the Sirdar stated the object of his mission and his official instructions to recover the lost provinces for Egypt. He intended, he said, to occupy and hold them. Major Marchand intimated that he had established a prior claim for his Government, and had entered into treaties with the local rulers securing rights for France to the country along the Nile south and through the Bahr el Ghazal. He had established posts at Meshra er Rek and elsewhere in that region. Without express orders to the contrary from his Government, he would not abandon the old Egyptian fort, nor concede an inch of the territory he had acquired. The Sirdar said he meant to land, and although he would avoid a collision if possible with the Major and his party, yet he would not be dissuaded from carrying out his orders because it might be unpleasant. Would, he asked, the Major oppose him with force; his means were inadequate to do so with any hope of success. Major Marchand replied, "No," he was not in a position to justify any attempt to contend with arms against the strong flotilla and land army that could be brought against him by the Sirdar. Still, he would neither yield nor withdraw without the order of his Government. The Sirdar stated he was not adverse to letting the two Governments settle the matter, meantime they as soldiers could remain on amicable terms. In the course of an hour or so he would land his troops and occupy a position as near the fort as possible. Major Marchand protested, but said that he, under the circumstances, would have to accept the situation.

Refreshments are always in order on board a ship where the Royal Navy is in command. Over a friendly glass of champagne Marchand and the Sirdar chatted on topics of general interest. The Major intimated that he was rather short of ammunition and stores. He had sent his steam launch south to try and bring up supplies and reinforcements from his other stations. The doctor was anxious to obtain the assistance and advice of some of the British medical staff as to the best treatment of beri-beri or sleeplessness sickness, which had appeared among them. Several of the mission had succumbed to that weird disease. It is not unknown in the United Kingdom, a case having recently occurred at Richmond Asylum, Dublin. After spending about half an hour on board, Major Marchand and M. Germain, accompanied by Colonel Wingate and Commander Keppel, went ashore together in the row-boat. Landing at the fort, the party were received by the garrison with military honours. The two British officers were shown every courtesy, and escorted over the works, which had been considerably strengthened. A morass or small lagoon cut the fortification off in rear from the mainland. It was a position which could not easily have been carried by assault, but was indefensible against cannon. The Senegalese Tirailleurs forming the garrison were paraded for their inspection. There appeared to be about 120 of them, all stalwart, soldierly fellows, beside whom the Frenchmen looked shrunken and diminutive. In addition to the Senegalese, or rather natives of Timbuctoo, for such they were, about 150 Shilluks and nondescript natives made up the remainder of the garrison. Including Major Marchand there were nine Europeans, or five commissioned and four non-commissioned officers. Of four others who had succumbed on the way, two died of beri-beri, one was killed by a fall from a tree, and a third by a crocodile. The Nile in that vicinity was found to be teeming with animal life. Not only crocodiles but hippopotami were seen by those on board the flotilla.

Eventually the five steamers crept as close inshore towards the north end of the fort as the shallow overflown land admitted. Colonel Wingate and Commander Keppel having returned on board, all the troops were ordered to disembark. The steamers were made fast to the banks, and planks were placed ashore. They were of little use, for officers and men had to flounder and wade through the shallows before they reached firm ground 300 yards from the bank. Four of the guns of Peake's battery were also landed. The force having been formed up was marched a short distance to the south. It was halted behind and exactly covering the French position from the land side, the flanks overlapping and enclosing the old line of Egyptian works. A tall flag-pole which was brought ashore was set up on a ruined bastion in line with the French tricolor and about 300 yards behind it. Then the Sirdar and staff came and stood around the pole. An instant later, the order having been given, the Egyptian flag was hoisted to the top, and the Soudanese bands played a few bars of the Khedivial anthem. Ere the music ceased, the Sirdar, setting the example, called for three cheers for His Highness the Khedive. The British flag, the Union Jack, was meanwhile flying inshore from the "Dal." None of the French officers attended the ceremony, but the Senegalese and the natives watched the proceedings with great interest. In fact, as many of the soldiers of the 11th and 13th Soudanese battalions were Shilluks, there had been numerous greetings and interchanges of courtesy between them. The worthy old Lieutenant Ali Gaffoon, a Shilluk, who had been in his youth a sheikh and soldier, and who had fought in Mexico for Maximilian, and since entered the Khedive's service, soon had crowds of his countrymen and countrywomen flocking to see him. Immediately after the flag was hoisted, Major Jackson was appointed commandant of the Fashoda district, and left with a garrison of the 11th Soudanese battalion and four guns of Captain Peake's battery. A large quantity of stores of various kinds was landed for their use. Meanwhile E Company of the Cameron Highlanders and the rest of the troops returned on board ship. The bands and pipers again played as the troops marched away, the Highlandmen stepping off to the tune of the "Cameron Men." E Company of the Camerons numbered exactly 100 rank and file under five officers: Captain Hon. A. Murray, Lieutenants Hoare, Cameron, Alderson, and Surgeon-Captain Luther.

The fraternisation of the Soudanese soldiers and the Shilluks became thorough. An informal reception of the natives, sheikhs, and headmen, some of whom were attended by their wives, was held by the Sirdar ashore and afterwards on board the "Dal." It was observed that, although hundreds of natives were seen, they were only brought forward in batches of less than a dozen to be presented. Besides, a considerable interval always elapsed before the arrival of the succeeding groups. Ali Gaffoon and his countrymen-comrades in the ranks, with pardonable tribal pride, were adverse to bringing their relatives and friends forward until the natives put on some clothes. For that purpose they had borrowed or got together about a dozen Arab dresses of kinds, wherewith to cover the bodies and limbs of the unsophisticated Shilluks. The national costume for men is a state of nudity, but they occasionally sprinkle their bodies with red or grey ashes. The women usually wear scant leather or thong aprons. When the Sirdar ascertained the true cause of the delay, time pressing, he intimated he would waive for the nonce their putting on of ceremonial attire. "Let them all come as they are," and they did. They evinced the liveliest interest and pleasure in all they saw and heard in camp and aboard ship. The chiefs declared they had signed no treaty with the French nor conceded any of their country. All of them asserted that they were subjects of the Khedive, to whom they renewed their allegiance forthwith. The French mission had been short of food and they had helped them only by giving supplies. Incidentally it may be stated that the Shilluk country is exceedingly fertile. At one time it was the most densely populated region of the Soudan for its acreage, containing a population of over 2,000,000 souls, living under an ancient dynasty of kings. From 1884 the Shilluks repeatedly warred with the dervishes. In 1894 they rose again and fought for a long time before their Queen was slain and they were put down. On that occasion the Mahdists behaved with more than usual ferocity, putting thousands to the sword. Strange to say, great numbers of Shilluks, like other Soudan blacks, fought against us under the Khalifa's banners. The moment, however, they were captured, with great readiness they enlisted in the Khedivial army. Latterly so many deserters and prisoners brought by their friends offered themselves as soldiers, that only the smartest and strongest were chosen.

That afternoon the "Dal" and two of the gunboats left Fashoda and steamed away up the Nile towards Sobat. Before leaving, the Sirdar sent a formal written document to Major Marchand, protesting against any usurpation by another Power of the rights of Great Britain and Egypt to the Nile Valley. He stated that he would refuse to recognise in any way French authority in the country. There was found to be large quantities of grass weed and sudd in the Nile at no great distance from Fashoda. In several places the clear channels were less than 150 yards wide. As the steamers made southing, the river became narrower and the obstacles to navigation more serious—floating islands of weeds and banked sudd blocking the fairway, leaving it but 50 yards or less in width. It is about 62 miles from Fashoda to the Sobat river, that Abyssinian tributary to the Nile. There was formerly an Egyptian station and fort on the neck of land at the junction of the two rivers. Other stations were also held by Khedivial troops further up the river in the old days before the Mahdi's rebellion. It was on the 20th September, the date as officially given, that the flotilla reached Sobat. The place was overgrown with bush, as compared with what had formerly been the case. Only a few natives were seen upon the mainland and islands, and they were friendly disposed. The Sobat, though but 150 yards or so wide, is 30 feet deep when in flood. Its yellow stream runs at two knots an hour, the current driving far into the wider and slacker waters of the Nile, which is about three-quarters of a mile wide at that point. The banks were accessible, and a landing of the troops was much more easily effected than had been the case at Fashoda. As soon as the soldiers and the two remaining guns of Captain Peake's battery were got ashore, the Egyptian flag was formally hoisted and greeted. It was the Sirdar who directed the whole proceedings. The ceremonial observance attending the re-occupation was precisely similar to that which had taken place at Fashoda. Major Smith Dorian was placed in command of the post and district. Three companies of the 13th Soudanese were left as a garrison together with the two Maxim-Nordenfeldt guns. A gunboat was also detailed to proceed a little way up the Sobat and the Bahr el Ghazal.

Next morning the vessels having been filled up with fuel, the Sirdar, with the Camerons and the remainder of the troops not detached for garrison duty, steamed away back towards Omdurman. No news had penetrated to that remote region about the overthrow of the dervishes and very little was known about the passing mission under Major Marchand. The same day, 21st September, Fashoda was reached, and a short stay was made. All was quiet and the two flags were flying just as the Sirdar had left them. But the place had been transformed all the same. A military camp had arisen that looked like a village. Tukals and shelters covered the clearing behind the French lines. Trenches also had been dug and Marchand's party were completely hemmed in from the landward side as well as by water, the gunboats controlling the river. The Shilluks had all gone over and put themselves under Major Jackson and the Khedivial flag. A sort of bazaar had been started and the country was already making for peace. There was universal rejoicing at the downfall of the Khalifa. A determination was expressed of promptly dealing with him or Osman Digna, should either of them pass that way. The new twin-screw gunboats "Sultan" and "Sheik" had nine days' rations for troops put aboard. They were then detached, being ordered to remain behind for patrol duty. Their instructions were to keep the river and banks clear of all armed bands of dervishes, and, if necessary, afford assistance to the posts at Sobat and Fashoda. They were also bidden to prevent the transport of war material, or conveyance of reinforcements, except by accredited Khedivial officers. The Sirdar in a note informed Major Marchand that he had prohibited the transport of all war material upon the Nile. Thereafter the Sirdar resumed the journey downstream. The long and fertile island of Abba—it extends for 20 miles—was passed without seeing anything of the fugitive Khalifa and his followers. It was to Abba island the Mahdi went, and it was there the rebellion first broke out. Subsequently it was ascertained that Abdullah and Osman Digna with their retainers sought shelter in the heavy woods opposite Abba island, and they were stated to be in hiding there at the end of December 1898. The Sirdar and headquarters got back to Omdurman on the 25th of September.

Popular feeling ran very high at home when it was ascertained that, despite repeated notification, the French had tried to grasp the fruits of the British victory over the dervishes. A Liberal statesman had, years before, declared, that any attempt on the part of France to occupy the Upper Nile valley lands would be regarded as an unfriendly act by this country. Conservative statesmen had endorsed that official pronouncement; yet, in face of these declarations, the thing had been done with every evidence of a fine contempt for British feeling and self-respect. The enemies of England in Egypt and elsewhere were sniggering. Our diplomatic and military chiefs were making unusual efforts to keep the Marchand affair a profound secret. At every stage down the Nile from Omdurman to Cairo, the Camerons and all who had been to Fashoda and Sobat were officially warned to keep the matter a profound secret. The case I thought was too serious to be left hidden in the breasts of a few where the issues involved were so tremendous. So I openly set myself to learning what had happened, and wiring every scrap of information for publication. Several officers were sent down from Omdurman with special despatches. Long before they arrived even in Cairo, cypher messages extending to many folios had been forwarded day after day direct from Khartoum to Downing Street.

The Sirdar reached Cairo on the 6th of October and left for England on the 21st of the same month. By that time much had happened. The official despatches had been published in a Parliamentary paper and there were ominous preparations for war in both France and Great Britain. Fleets were being got ready for sea and feverish activity prevailed in Gallic and British arsenals. The insistence of the Parisian Ministers in seeking to have other questions discussed side by side with the demand for the evacuation of Fashoda and their dilatory tactics but increased the feeling of irritation in the United Kingdom. Statesmen seemed to be undecided and diplomacy, as usual, revolving in a circle. Happily, this country was never better prepared for war, and that in the end, as has so often been the case, proved the best advocate for peace. It would be uncharitable to emphasise the fact of the French Government slipping away from one after another of the positions they had taken up in reference to the whole question. That being Frenchmen they felt acutely the false moves they had made goes without saying. Whilst war was impending and the French Government seemed bent upon driving our Government to that point, the anti-British Pashas and the Gallic set in Egypt were jubilant. The Turkish Pashas and Beys were openly chuckling and romancing about unheard-of things. It is in Egypt, as it is in Armenia and was in the Balkans: the Turk is the enemy of good government and freedom for the people. A check to British policy and rule meant to them a possible return of the old corrupt days when they did as they liked, treating fellaheen and negroes as slaves. Had Great Britain in this instance yielded a jot of her just rights to the intriguing and bellicose spirit of French officialism Egypt would have been made an impossible place for our countrymen to remain in. Being in Cairo and Alexandria at the time I was privately assured by scores of my countrymen, men in business and in public offices, that they would be obliged to quit Egypt if France succeeded in her pretensions to the Nile Valley. Petty annoyances, tyranny, all manner of injustice and even violence would be resorted to, to force them to leave and to drive British interests to the wall.

I avail myself again of the excellent synopsis of the official despatches dealing with the Fashoda incident, which appeared in the Daily Telegraph. The Parliamentary papers in question were issued on the 9th of October last. The official papers opened with a despatch from Sir Edmund Monson to the Foreign Secretary, bearing date December 10, 1897. Therein the British Ambassador says:—

"The despatches which I have recently addressed to your lordship respecting the reports of the massacre of the Marchand Expedition, and the comments made in connection with this rumoured disaster by the French Press, will have already shown your lordship how necessary it has become to remind the French Government of the views held by that of Her Majesty as to their sphere of influence in the Upper Nile Valley; and it has been with great satisfaction that I have found myself so promptly authorised to make a communication upon the subject to M. Hanotaux. Made in the way in which it has been suggested by your lordship, I see no reason why this communication should prejudice the chances of our coming to a satisfactory arrangement upon the question with which we are dealing in connection with the situation in West Africa."

Sir Edmund Monson enclosed in the despatch a copy of a note he had addressed to M. Hanotaux, at that period French Minister of Foreign Affairs, as follows:—

"The other point to which it is necessary to advert is the proposed recognition of the French claim to the northern and eastern shores of Lake Chad. If other questions are adjusted, Her Majesty's Government will make no difficulty about this condition. But in doing so they cannot forget that the possession of this territory may in the future open up a road to the Nile; and they must not be understood to admit that any other European Power than Great Britain has any claim to occupy any part of the Valley of the Nile. The views of the British Government upon this matter were plainly stated in Parliament by Sir Edward Grey some years ago during the Administration of the Earl of Rosebery, and were formally communicated to the French Government at the time. Her Majesty's present Government entirely adhere to the language that was on this occasion employed by their predecessors."

To this M. Hanotaux replied:—

"In any case the French Government cannot, under present circumstances, refrain from repeating the reservations which it has never failed to express every time that questions relating to the Valley of the Nile have been brought forward. Thus, in particular, the declarations of Sir Edward Grey, to which the British Government has referred, gave rise to an immediate protest by our representative in London, the terms of which he repeated and developed in the further conversations which he had at the Foreign Office on the subject. I myself had occasion, in the sitting of the Senate on April 5, 1895, to make, in the name of the Government, declarations to which I consider that I am all the more justified in referring from the fact that they have called forth no reply from the British Government."

The speech to which M. Hanotaux refers is published at length in an appendix, and, so far from being a reply to Sir Edward Grey, it gives the French position completely away.

"I now come, gentlemen," he said, "to the question of the Upper Nile. I will explain the situation to the Senate in a few words; for I think it will be useful to complete the explanations which M. de Lamarzelle has already given on this subject. Between the country of the lakes and the point of Wady Halfa, on the Nile, extends a vast region, measuring twenty degrees of latitude, or 2000 kilometres, that is, more than the breadth of Western Europe from Gibraltar to Dunkirk. In this region there is at this moment, perhaps, not a single European; in any case, there does not exist any power derived, by any title, from a European authority. It is the country of the Mahdi! Now, gentlemen, it is the future of this country which fills with an uneasiness, which we may describe as at least premature, the minds of a certain number of persons interested in Africa. The Egyptians who occupied this vast domain for a considerable time have moved to the north. Emin Pasha himself was compelled to withdraw. The rights of the Sultan and the Khedive alone continue to exist over the regions of the Soudan and of Equatorial Africa."

That is to say, after the Mahdi, who was the de facto ruler, the authority over the whole basin of the Upper Nile reverted to the Khedive and the Sultan as his suzerain, which is exactly the position taken up by Lord Salisbury in his despatch of September 9, 1898.

Major Marchand has had various titles conferred upon him, and in the penultimate despatch contained in the papers he is described by Lord Salisbury as "a French explorer who is on the Upper Nile in a difficult position." To M. Delcasse, however, is reserved the honour of giving him an official designation. On September 7 the French Foreign Minister, in an interview with Sir E. Monson, after handsomely complimenting the British Government on the victory of Omdurman, expressed his anxiety about a possible meeting of the Sirdar and M. Marchand.

"Should he (M. Marchand) be met with, his Excellency said that he had received instructions to be most careful to abstain from all action which might cause local difficulties, and that he had been enjoined to consider himself as an 'emissary of civilisation' without any authority whatever to decide upon questions of right, which must properly form the subject of discussion between Her Majesty's Government and that of the French Republic.

"M. Delcasse therefore begged me to inform your lordship of this fact, and expressed the hope that the commander of Her Majesty's naval forces on the river might be instructed to take no steps which might lead to a local conflict with regard to such questions of right."

It may be remarked, in passing, that this view of the position of the emissary of civilisation does not tally with that which M. Marchand subsequently gave to the Sirdar, to whom he stated "that he had received precise orders for the occupation of the country and the hoisting of the French flag over the Government buildings at Fashoda, and added that, without the orders of his Government, which, however, he expected, would not be delayed, it was impossible for him to retire from the place."

The instructions given by Lord Salisbury, through Lord Cromer, to the Sirdar, have been given elsewhere in this chapter.

On September 11 our Ambassador informed M. Delcasse of the advance of the Sirdar up the Nile, and on the 18th the French Foreign Minister stated further:—

"As a matter of fact, there is no Marchand Mission. In 1892 and 1893 M. Liotard was sent to the Upper Ubanghi as Commissioner, with instructions to secure French interests in the north-east. M. Marchand had been appointed one of his subordinates, and received all his orders from M. Liotard. There could be no doubt that for a long time past the whole region of the Bahr-el-Ghazal had been out of the influence of Egypt."

Sir E. Monson left M. Delcasse in no doubt as to the view Her Majesty's Government took of the situation. Of the interview referred to, he reports to Lord Salisbury as follows, under date September 22:—

"Although his Excellency made two or three allusions to the reasons for which, in his opinion, the French might consider that the region in question was open to their advance, he himself volunteered the suggestion that discussion between us would be inopportune.

"In this I, of course, concurred, reminding him of the terms of your lordship's telegram of the 9th inst.; but I told him, as emphatically as I could, that I looked upon the situation at Fashoda, if M. Marchand had occupied that town, as very serious, inasmuch as Her Majesty's Government would certainly not acquiesce in his remaining there, nor would they consent to relinquishing the claims of Egypt to the restoration of all the country latterly subject to the Khalifa, which had heretofore been a portion of her territory. I felt it to be my duty, I said, to speak with extreme frankness, and to assure him that on this point no compromise would be possible.

"M. Delcasse listened to me with grave attention, but his reply was chiefly to the effect that if the two Governments discussed the matter with calmness and a sincere desire to avoid a conflict, there could be no doubt of our arriving at a peaceable and satisfactory solution. France does not desire a quarrel. In saying this he could speak with absolute certainty. All his colleagues in the Government are, like himself, anxious for good relations with England. If this anxiety is reciprocated on the other side of the Channel (and the tone of the English Press inspires him with doubts of this) there can be no danger.

"I replied that Her Majesty's Government have no desire to pick a quarrel with France, but that nothing could be gained by my concealing from him the gravity of the situation as I regarded it, or the fixed determination of Her Majesty's Government to vindicate claims of the absolute justice of which they hold that there can be no question. I, of course, avoided the use of any expression which might sound like a menace, but short of this I did my best to make my declaration of the impossibility of the French being allowed to remain at Fashoda as clear and distinct as could be expressed in words."

On 25th September, the day the expedition returned from Fashoda to Omdurman, Mr Rennell Rodd, who during the absence of Lord Cromer in Europe was in charge of affairs in Egypt, telegraphed to Lord Salisbury the following despatch, which had been received from the Sirdar:—

"I found at Fashoda, whence I have just returned, M. Marchand with 8 officers and 120 men. The French flag had been hoisted over the old Government buildings in which they were located. I sent a letter announcing my approach on the day before my arrival at Fashoda. On the following morning, September 19, a reply was brought to me from M. Marchand by a small rowing-boat carrying the French flag. It stated that he had arrived at Fashoda on July 10, having been instructed by his Government to occupy the Bahr-el-Ghazal up to the confluence of the Bahr-el-Jebel, and also the Shilluk country on the left bank of the White Nile as far as Fashoda. It went on to say that he had concluded a treaty with the Shilluk chiefs by which they placed the country under the protection of France, and that he had sent this treaty to his Government for ratification by way of Abyssinia, as well as by the Bahr-el-Ghazal. He described his fight with the dervishes on August 25, and stated that, in anticipation of a second and more serious attack, he had sent his steamer south for reinforcements, but that our arrival had prevented a further attack.

"When we arrived at Fashoda, M. Marchand and M. Germain came on board our steamer, and I at once informed them that the presence of a French party at Fashoda and in the Nile valley must be considered as a direct infringement of the rights of Egypt and of the British Government, and I protested in the strongest terms against the occupation of Fashoda by M. Marchand and his party, and the hoisting of the French flag in the dominions of his Highness the Khedive. M. Marchand stated, in reply, that he had received precise orders for the occupation of the country and the hoisting of the French flag over the Government buildings at Fashoda, and added that, without the orders of his Government, which, however, he expected would not be delayed, it was impossible for him to retire from the place. I then inquired of him whether, in view of the fact that I was accompanied by a superior force, he was prepared to resist the hoisting of the Egyptian flag at Fashoda. He hesitated, and replied that he could not resist. The Egyptian flag was then hoisted, about 500 yards south of the French flag, on a ruined bastion of the old Egyptian fortifications, commanding the only road which leads into the interior from the French position. The latter is entirely surrounded to the north by impassable marshes.

"Before leaving for the south I handed to M. Marchand a formal written protest on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and Egypt against any occupation of any part of the Nile valley by France, as being an infringement of the rights of those Governments. I added that I could not recognise the occupation by France of any part of the Nile valley.

"I left at Fashoda a garrison of one Soudanese battalion, four guns, and a gunboat under Major Jackson, whom I appointed Commandant of the Fashoda district, and I proceeded to Sobat, where the flag was hoisted and a post established on September 20. We did not see or hear anything of the Abyssinians on the Sobat, but were informed that their nearest post was about 350 miles up that river. The Bahr-el-Jebel being entirely blocked by floating weed, I gave orders for a gunboat to patrol up the Bahr-el-Ghazal in the direction of Meshra-er-Rek. As we passed Fashoda on the return journey north, I sent M. Marchand a letter stating that all transport of war material on the Nile was absolutely prohibited, as the country was under military law. The chief of the Shilluk tribe, accompanied by a large number of followers, has come into Major Jackson's camp. He entirely denies having made any treaty with the French, and the entire tribe express the greatest delight at returning to allegiance to us.

"M. Marchand is in want of ammunition and supplies, and any that may be sent to him must take months to arrive at their destination. He is cut off from the interior, and is quite inadequately provided with water transport. Moreover, he has no following in the country, and nothing could have saved his expedition from being annihilated by the dervishes if we had been a fortnight later in crushing the Khalifa."

The gist of this despatch was communicated to the French Government, accompanied by a notification that the Sirdar's "language and proceedings" had the complete approval of Lord Salisbury. M. Delcasse was evidently at his wits' end to escape from an impasse which was chiefly of his own creation.

In an interview with Sir E. Monson on September 27 he wished to put off a final decision till he had received the despatches which M. Marchand had forwarded in duplicate by way of the French Congo and Abyssinia respectively.

"To gain time, M. Delcasse," writes our Ambassador, "wished that I should request your lordship to consent to a telegram being sent by the French agent at Cairo to Khartoum, to be forwarded from thence up the Nile to Fashoda. The telegram would contain instructions to M. Marchand to send at once one of the French officers serving on his mission to Cairo with a copy of his above-mentioned report, so that the French Government might learn its contents as soon as possible. They were, of course, ready to bear all the expense.

"Stress was laid by M. Delcasse upon the great desire entertained at Paris to prevent any serious difficulty from arising; at the same time, he felt convinced, especially in view of the conduct of the Sirdar at Fashoda, acting as he undoubtedly was under instructions, that Her Majesty's Government were as anxious as the French Government to avoid a conflict.

"I told M. Delcasse in reply that I must conclude from the language which he had held that the French Government had decided that they would not recall M. Marchand before receiving his report, and I asked if I was right in this conclusion. I pointed out to his Excellency that M. Marchand himself is stated to be desirous of retiring from his position, which appeared to be a disagreeable one. Such being the case, I must urgently press him to tell me whether he refused at once to recall M. Marchand.

"After considering his reply for some few minutes, his Excellency said that he himself was ready to discuss the question in the most conciliatory spirit, but I must not ask him for the impossible.

"I pointed out that your lordship's telegram of the 9th inst., which I had communicated to him at the time, had made him aware that Her Majesty's Government considered that there could be no discussion upon such questions as the right of Egypt to Fashoda."

To this Lord Salisbury replied next day:

"Her Majesty's Government cannot decline to assist in forwarding a message from the French Agent in Egypt to a French explorer who is on the Upper Nile in a difficult position, and your Excellency is authorised to inform M. Delcasse that Her Majesty's Acting Agent at Cairo will be instructed to transmit to Omdurman immediately any such message, and at the same time to request Sir H. Kitchener to forward it thence to its destination by any opportunity which may be available.