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The local rulers finding themselves unable to cope with the rebellion, and seeing its proportions swelling every day, appealed to Yedo for help. The shogun at this time was Iemitsu, the son of the preceding shogun, and grandson of Ieyasu. He possessed many of the good qualities of his grandfather, and is looked upon, with the exception of Ieyasu, as the greatest of the Tokugawa line. He had imbibed all the prejudices of his predecessors against foreigners and against the religion of the foreigners. He feared that this rebellion was begun at their instigation, and would be carried on with their encouragement and help. He prepared therefore for a sharp and desperate struggle, which he was determined should be carried out to the bitter end.
Itakura Naizen was sent down as commander-in-chief, and given full powers. Under his direction the siege of the castle, in which the rebels were gathered, was commenced on the 31st of December, 1637. The daimyos of Kyushu, on the demand of the government, sent additional troops, so that the besieging army amounted to 160,000 men. Yet with all this force, urged on by an ambition to end this rebellion, no serious effect had yet been produced on the castle. The attacks which had been made had produced no breach in its walls. We have no information concerning the progress of affairs among the inmates. It must be remembered that a part of the rebels were samurai farmers, who were inured to arms, and who knew perfectly that neither consideration nor mercy would be shown them or their families in case the castle were taken. The remainder of the besieged force were the Christian insurgents, who had been driven to this rebellion by their cruel persecution. Nothing could be worse than what they had already endured, and they had no expectation that if they were beaten in this contest any pity would be shown to them. Despair made the attitude of both divisions of the rebels one of determined resistance, and their obstinacy led the besiegers to put forth every effort.
Pleasure Yacht.
Pleasure Yacht.
Merchant Vessel.
One step which they took in this matter led to much discussion and to the widening of the breach between the Dutch and the Portuguese. On the 11th of January, 1638, the besiegers applied to the Dutch at Hirado for a supply of gunpowder, which request was complied with, and at the same time an apology was tendered that no larger quantity could be sent. Again, on the 15th of February a request for cannon to be used in the siege was received, and the guns were sent. Mr. Koeckebacker says: "We gave the largest and most uniform guns in our possession."(218) Finally, on the 19th of February, Mr. Koeckebacker was asked to send one of the Dutch ships(219) then at Hirado to the assistance of the besiegers. The de Ryp was accordingly sent, and Mr. Koeckebacker himself accompanied her. The guns which had been first sent were mounted as a land battery, and the guns of the de Ryp from her anchorage in the bay were trained on the castle. It was a new experience for the Japanese to see cannon used in the siege of a castle, but the effect was much less than had been expected. No practicable breach was made, and the final result seemed as far off as ever. "During the fifteen days from the 24th of February to the 12th of March, there were thrown into the camp of the enemy four hundred and twenty-six cannon balls from the twenty guns of the ship de Ryp."(220)
In the meantime the Japanese officers began to feel that it was not a dignified proceeding to call upon a foreign nation to help them to put down a local rebellion. Even the insurgents had shot an arrow into the imperial camp to which a letter was attached, deriding them for calling for assistance when there were so many courageous soldiers in Japan. Whatever may have been the cause, the Dutch received notice on the 12th of March that their ship was no longer required, and accordingly they returned to Hirado. The castle was taken by assault on the 12th of April, 1638, after a siege which had lasted one hundred and two days, and about seven months from the breaking out of the rebellion. By special orders from Yedo the insurgents captured in the castle were to the last man, woman, and child put to death.(221) The father of Shiro, the young leader, was crucified, and Shiro himself was decapitated, and his head exposed for seven days on the great pier at Nagasaki. The daimyo, whose misgovernment had brought on this rebellion in Amakusa, was stripped of most of his territories, and he was so intensely hated in what remained to him that he committed hara-kiri. The daimyo of Arima, whose misconduct and neglect had driven the samurai farmers into their fatal rising, was also permitted to take his own life.
The help, which the Dutch rendered in this siege, exposed them to much vituperation. Naturally, the Jesuit historians have taken a very unfavorable view of the Dutch share in this sad transaction. Dr. Geerts in his defence of the Dutch argues: "Koeckebacker did no more than any one else of any nationality would probably have done in the same difficult position.... His endeavor was to preserve from decline or destruction the interests intrusted to him, and this was done at the smallest possible price.... Moreover, the letters of Koeckebacker clearly show that the Japanese government did not ask the aid of the Dutch in the persecution of Christians, as has often been asserted by foreign authors, who have not taken the trouble to inform themselves thoroughly on the subject, but they requested the guns and the aid of the Dutch vessel for the purpose of subduing rebellious subjects.... There could be no valid reason for Koeckebacker to refuse the pressing request for aid, and consequently he agreed to give assistance, as every wise man would have done in his place.... Koeckebacker did not take part in the general massacre which followed on the 11th of April, when the fortress of the rebels was taken by the imperial troops, as he left with his ship for Hirado on the 12th of March, leaving the guns behind in Arima. Had it been in his power to prevent such a general massacre after the fortress had been taken, and the rebels were prisoners, he would no doubt have done so."(222)
This frightful termination to the rebellion, followed as it was by severe and persistent measures against Christians everywhere, was apparently the death-blow to the church in the empire. No further efforts were made, either by the daimyos of provinces or by the heads of the church, to make open headway against the determined efforts of the government. Whatever was done was in secret, and every means was tried on the part of those who still clung to the Christian belief, and especially of those who were still daring enough to try to minister to them, to conceal their locality and their identity.(223)
The history of Christianity in Japan from this time downward was that of a scattered and dismembered remnant struggling for existence. A long line of edicts reaching to modern times was directed against "the corrupt sect," repeating again and again the directions for its suppression. The kirishitan bugyo, or Christian inquisitor, had his office in Yedo, and under him was a numerous and active corps of assistants. Inouye Chikugo-no-Kami for a long time held this position. A place is still pointed out called Karishitan Zaka, or Christian Valley, where once stood the house in which were confined a number of the foreign priests. Here may be seen the grave of Father Chiara, who had under torture abjured his faith, and remained a prisoner for forty years, dying 1685.(224) Professor Dixon says that "there are two bamboo tubes inserted in sockets in front of the tomb, which I have never found empty, but always full of flowers in bloom. No one knows who offer these flowers, but they must be descendants of the Doshin Christians, or believers in Christianity, or worshippers of Koshin." Here also was confined Father Baptiste Sidotti, a Sicilian Jesuit who ventured to enter Japan in 1707 with the purpose of resuming the work of the Jesuits which the persecution had interrupted.
And yet with all this vigilance and severity on the part of the government, what was the amazement of the Christian world to learn that the old faith still survived! In the villages around Nagasaki there were discovered in 1865,(225) not only words and symbols which had been preserved in the language, but even communities where had been kept alive for more than two centuries the worship bequeathed to them by their ancestors. We shall have occasion hereafter to refer to this interesting memento of the Christianity of the seventeenth century.
CHAPTER XII. FEUDALISM IN JAPAN.
Ieyasu was not only a general of eminent abilities, who had from his youth been accustomed to the responsibility and management of great campaigns, but he was a statesman who knew how to secure the advantage to be obtained from victories and conquests. After the decisive battle of Sekigahara, when the control of the empire became fixed in his hands, we hear little more of him as a general, excepting in the battle at Osaka, when the fortunes of Hideyori were finally and definitely settled. The common conception of Ieyasu is not that of a great commander like Hideyoshi, but rather of an organizer and law-maker, who out of confused and dismembered provinces and principalities of the empire constructed a firm and abiding state.(226) After his settlement of the dissensions at home, and his admirable adjustment of the outstanding difficulties with Korea and China, which we have already traced, we shall find Ieyasu principally engaged in framing a government which should be suited to the peculiar wants and founded on the historical antecedents of the country.
Ieyasu.
There was one characteristic of Ieyasu which has not received sufficient attention. Although not a great scholar in any sense, even in the age in which he lived, he was more familiar than most men of affairs of his day with the Chinese classical writings, and was in the more leisurely periods of his life a noted patron of learned men. The Chinese classics were said to have been brought to Japan at an early period, even before the first introduction of Buddhism. But the period was too early and the condition of the country too rude to make the reading and study of the philosophical and political writings of Confucius and Mencius an essential part of the education of the people. The culture which Buddhism brought with it, accompanied with a knowledge of the writing and reading of the Chinese letters, was all that obtained any currency during the disturbed and warlike ages of Japanese history. But when peace was at last established by the supremacy of Ieyasu, and the active Japanese intellect had some other employment than fighting, then learning took a great start. And as the only idea which the Japanese possessed of learning was that which prevailed in China and was imbedded in the Chinese writings, they naturally turned to them for thought and systematic training.
Fortunately Ieyasu was a man who appreciated at its full value the effect of learning on the character of his people. He caused the Confucian classics(227) to be printed at a press which he patronized in Fushimi, and this was said to be the first time these works had ever been printed in Japan. He gathered scholars about him at Fushimi, at Yedo, and after his retirement at Shizuoka (Sumpu). He favored education and encouraged the daimyos to establish schools where the children of their retainers could be taught not only military accomplishments but the elements of a good education. The Chinese classics were made the essentials of such an education, and the chief duty of a school was to teach the pupils to read and write and understand the works which their venerable and learned neighbor had furnished them.
Mixing Ink For Writing.
Unfortunately this movement in behalf of learning was hampered by the impracticable nature of the Chinese written language. Instead of a few characters representing sounds, like European alphabets, it consists of thousands of symbols, each representing an idea. The pupil must therefore spend years in learning to make, and know and read the mere signs of language. And in the modern necessities of printing,(228) the compositor must handle not less than 4,000 or 5,000 Chinese characters, besides the Japanese kana and other needful marks. The kana here mentioned were the result of a promising effort which was made to simplify the Chinese written language by expressing it in symbols representing sounds. Forty-seven kana letters—by repetition extended to fifty—each representing a syllable, are used to express Japanese words.
Styles Of Letters: (Chinese Proverb: Hiroku koriwo aisuruwo jintoyu. To love universally is true humility.) 1. Kaisho (book letters). 2. Ditto. 3. Gyosho (script letters). 4. Ditto. 5. Hirasaua (Japanese script).
Japanese Syllabary.
The castle of Yedo was reconstructed and enlarged after the battle of Sekigahara, while Ieyasu continued to reside at Fushimi. The Jesuit fathers, who accompanied the Father Provincial on his visit to Ieyasu, assert that 300,000 men were employed in this work. Very much of the ground where the present city of Tokyo now stands, was then, according to old maps, covered with water. In excavating the moat which surrounds the castle, and the canals connecting this moat with the Sumida-gawa, immense quantities of earth were obtained, which were used to fill up lagoons and to reclaim from the shallow bay portions which have now become solid land. This work of building the castle and fitting the city for the residence of a great population, was carried on by many of the successors of Ieyasu. The third shogun, Iemitsu, the grandson of Ieyasu, made great improvements both to the castle and the city, so that the population and position of Yedo in no long time placed it as the chief city of the empire.(229)
The task to which Ieyasu devoted himself during the years of his residence at Yedo was that of consolidating and settling the feudal system of the empire. The daimyos had for centuries been so accustomed to conduct themselves independently, and to govern each his own province in his own way, that they might be expected to resent any efforts to restrict their action. Fortunately Ieyasu was a mild and temperate man, who, while he could act with firmness, was most considerate of the feelings and motives of others. After the decisive victory of Sekigahara he readily and cordially made terms with his enemies, and did not show himself rapacious in exacting from them undue penalties for their hostility. To the daimyo of Satsuma, as we have already seen, he restored the entire territory which Taiko Sama had given him. The daimyo of Choshu was allowed to keep two of the provinces out of the ten which he had acquired by conquest, yet these two made him still one of the richest and most powerful princes in the empire. With others he dealt in the same liberal spirit, so that out of the old proud daimyos whom he spared and permitted to continue in their holdings, he created for himself a body of fast friends.
But it must be remembered that the end Ieyasu had in view was to establish a system which should continue loyal to his successors, and to a line of successors who should be of his own family. Hence out of the confiscated territories, and out of those which were in part vacated as a fine on the former holders, and out of those which had become vacant by natural causes, he carved many fiefs with which he endowed members of his own family and those retainers who were closely affiliated with him. He had twelve children,(230) nine sons and three daughters. The daughters were married to three daimyos. The oldest of his sons, Nobuyasu, had died at an early age. His second son, Hideyasu, had been adopted by Taiko Sama, and to him Ieyasu gave the province of Echizen as his fief. The third son, Hidetada, who shared with his father the command of the forces at the battle Sekigahara, had married a daughter of Taiko Sama, and succeeded his father as shogun. On his youngest three sons he bestowed the rich provinces of Owari, Kii, and Mito, and constituted the families to which they gave rise as the Go-san-ke, or the three honorable families. In case of a failure in the direct line, the heir to the shogunate was to be chosen from one of these families.
Without undertaking to give a detailed account of the feudal system as modified and established by Ieyasu, it will be sufficient to give the classes of daimyos as they continued to exist under the Tokugawa shogunate.(231) It must be understood that feudalism existed in Japan before the time of Ieyasu. It can be traced to the period when Yoritomo obtained from the emperor permission to send into each province a shiugo who should be a military man, and should act as protector of the kokushu or governor, who was always a civilian appointed by the emperor. These military protectors were provided with troops, for the pay of whom Yoritomo got permission from the emperor to levy a tax. Being active men, and having troops under their command, they gradually absorbed the entire authority, and probably in most cases displaced the kokushu, who only represented the powerless government at Kyoto. Under the disturbed times which followed the fall of the house of Yoritomo these shiugo became the hereditary military governors of the provinces, and usurped not only the functions but the name of kokushu. They became a class of feudal barons who, during the interval when no central authority controlled them, governed each one his own province on his own responsibility. Even after the establishment of a central authority, and continuously down to the abolition of feudalism, the government of the people was in the hands of the daimyo of each province. The assessment of taxes, the construction of roads and bridges, the maintenance of education, the punishment of crime, the collection of debts, the enforcement of contracts, and indeed the whole circle of what was denominated law were in the hands of the local government. In truth, in Japan as in other feudal countries there was scarcely such a thing as law in existence. The customs that prevailed, the common-sense decisions of a magistrate, the final determinations of the daimyo, were authoritative in every community. And in all these each province was in a great degree a law unto itself.
The classes of daimyos as arranged and established by Ieyasu were not altered by his successors, although the number included under each class was liable to minor changes. Before Ieyasu's time there were three classes of daimyos, viz.: eighteen kokushu, who may be termed lords of provinces, thirty-two ryoshu or lords of smaller districts, and two hundred and twelve joshu or lords of castles, that is two hundred and sixty-two in all. The distinction between the first two was one of rank, but the third differed from the others in the fact that the assessment in each case was less than 100,000 koku of rice. The number of kokushu daimiates was increased by the addition of Kii and Owari, to which Ieyasu appointed two of his sons as daimyos. A third son he appointed daimyo of Mito, which was already of the kokushu rank. He vacated this place by compelling the previous holder to accept in place of it another daimiate of equivalent value.
Ieyasu divided all daimyos into two distinct classes, the fudai and the tozama. The term fudai was used to designate those who were considered the vassals of the Tokugawa family. The tozama daimyos were those who were considered as equal to the vassals of the Tokugawa family, but who were not in fact vassals. Of the former there were originally one hundred and seventy-seven, and of the latter eighty-six.(232) Twenty-one of the fudai daimyos were relatives of the shogun's family, of whom three, as has been stated, were the "honorable families." All the others, numbering eighteen, bore the name of Matsudaira, one of the family names of Ieyasu, derived from a small village in the province of Mikawa, where Ieyasu was born. This was allowed to them as a special honor.
We give here the classification of the daimyos as enumerated by M. Appert(233) in his list for the epoch about 1850:
1. Go-san-ke (three honorable families) 3 2. Fudai daimyos (vassals of Tokugawa family) 137 3. Tozama daimyos (equal to vassals) 99 4. Kamon (all the other branches of Tokugawa family) 18 5. Daimyos, not classified 6 Total 263
The five leading tozama daimyos were Kaga, Sendai, Aizu, Choshu, and Satsuma, and although they ranked after the go-san-ke, they had some superior advantages. They were classed as kyakubun, or guests, and whenever they paid a visit to the capital of the shogun, they were met by envoys and conducted to their residences.
Besides these daimyos of different classes, Ieyasu established an inferior kind of feudal nobility, which was termed hatamoto. This means literally under the flag. They had small holdings assigned to them, and their income varied very greatly. Mr. Gubbins, in his paper, puts the number at about 2,000. It was the custom to employ the members of this minor class of aristocracy very largely in filling the official positions in the shogun's government. Indeed, it was held as a common maxim, that the offices should be filled by poor men rather than by rich.(234) The gokenin, numbering about 5,000, were still another class who were inferior to the hatamoto. They had small incomes, and were mostly employed in subordinate positions. Beneath these again stood the ordinary fighting men, or common samurai, who were the retainers of the daimyos and of the shogun. They were the descendants of the soldiers of the time of Yoritomo, who appointed shiugo to reside with a company of troops in each province, for the purpose of keeping the peace. They had already grown to claim a great superiority over the common people, and Ieyasu encouraged them in this feeling of superciliousness. The people were divided into four classes, arranged in the following order: samurai, farmers, artisans, and merchants. And in his Legacy Ieyasu thus expresses himself(235): "The samurai are masters of the four classes. Farmers, artisans, and merchants may not behave in a rude manner towards samurai ... and a samurai is not to be interfered with in cutting down a fellow who has behaved to him in a manner other than is expected." Again he says(236): "A girded sword is the living soul of a samurai."
The authority coming from so high and so revered a source did not grow less during the centuries of feudalism which followed. The samurai did not fail to use all the privileges which were allowed them by Ieyasu's testamentary law. Especially in the large cities where great numbers of them were gathered, and where idleness led them into endless evil practices, the arrogance and overbearing pride of the samurai made them an intolerable nuisance. Nevertheless it must be allowed that nearly all that was good, and high-minded, and scholarly in Japan was to be found among the ranks of the feudal retainers. It is to them that the credit must be given of the great changes and improvements which have been initiated since Japan was opened up to foreigners. They were the students who went out into the world to learn what western science had to teach them. They have been pioneers in a return to a central authority and to the experiment of a representative government, and to the principles of freedom and toleration to which the country is committed. To them Japan owes its ancient as well as its modern system of education. Its old stores of literature, it is true, are not due to them, but surely all its modern development in newspapers, magazines, history, political science, and legal and commercial codes, is to be traced to the adaptability and energy of the old samurai class.
Sword-Maker.
The samurai had the privilege of carrying two swords; the principal one (katana) was about four feet long, nearly straight, but slightly curved toward the point, the blade thick and ground to a keen though blunt edge. It was carried in a scabbard thrust through the obi or belt on the left side, with the edge uppermost. Besides the katana the samurai carried also a short sword about nine and a half inches long, called wakizashi. The blade of the sword was fastened to the hilt by a pin of wood and could be readily detached. On the part of the blade inserted in the hilt, the maker's name was always inscribed, and it was a special matter of pride when he was one of the famous sword-smiths of Japan. The most noted makers were Munechika, Masamune, Yoshimitsu, and Muramasa, who ranged from the tenth down through the fourteenth century. The quality of the Japanese sword has been a matter of national pride, and the feats which have been accomplished by it seem almost beyond belief. To cleave at one blow three human bodies laid one upon another; to cut through a pile of copper coins without nicking the edge, were common tests which were often tried.(237)
Sword, Spears, And Matchlock.
It was an essential part of the education of a young samurai that he should be trained thoroughly in martial exercises. The latter part of every school day was given up to this kind of physical training. He was taught to ride a horse, to shoot with the bow, to handle the spear, and especially to be skilled in the etiquette and use of the sword.(238) They went through again and again the tragic details of the commission of hara-kiri, and had it impressed on their youthful imaginations with such force and vividness, that when the time for its actual enactment came they were able to meet the bloody reality without a tremor and with perfect composure.(239)
The foundation of the relations between the feudal chiefs and their retainers lay in the doctrine of Confucius. The principles which he lays down fitted in admirably to the ideas which the historical system of Japanese feudalism had made familiar. They inculcated absolute submission of the son to the father, of the wife to her husband, and of the servant to his master, and in these respects Japanese feudalism was a willing and zealous disciple. On these lines Ieyasu constructed his plans of government, and his successors enthusiastically followed in his footsteps.
Daibutsu At Kamakura.
In religious belief the nation by the time of Ieyasu was largely Buddhistic. Through ten centuries and a half the active propagation of this faith had been going on, until now by far the greater number of the population were Buddhists. In his Legacy Ieyasu expresses a desire to tolerate all religious sects except the Christian. He says: "High and low alike may follow their own inclinations with respect to religious tenets which have obtained down to the present time, except as regards the false and corrupt school (Christianity). Religious disputes have ever proved the bane and misfortune of the empire, and should determinedly be put a stop to."(240)
While he was therefore tolerant towards all the different sects of Buddhism and towards the old Shinto faith of the country, he particularly patronized the Jodo sect to which his ancestors had been attached, and to which he charges his posterity to remain faithful.(241) In the archives of the Buddhist temple Zojoji at Shiba in Tokyo was preserved an account written by the head priest of the time, how Ieyasu, in 1590, visited the temple and took it under his patronage, saying,(242) "For a general to be without an ancestral temple of his own is as though he were forgetful of the fact that he must die.... I have now come to beg of you to let me make this my ancestral temple here." So that from the time of Ieyasu the Jodo was the authorized sect to which the court of the shoguns was especially attached, and to this is to be attributed the fact that its temples and monasteries in Tokyo have always been of the most majestic and gorgeous character.(243)
Ieyasu did not long hold the office of shogun, which the emperor had conferred upon him in 1603. It is not easy to understand why a man, who was only sixty-three years of age and who was still in vigorous health, should wish to throw off the responsibilities of office and retire to private life. We must remember, however, that it was the custom of his country, consecrated by the usage of the imperial house and of the shoguns and regents who had preceded him. Morever, though he surrendered to his son the title of shogun, he retained in his own hands a large part of the power which he had hitherto exercised.
It may be supposed that he was anxious to establish the succession of the shogunate unquestionably in his own family. For this purpose he deemed it wise to initiate a successor while he still had the influence and the power to compel the acquiescence of the feudal lords of the empire. Acting upon these considerations Ieyasu, in 1605, retired in favor of his third son Hidetada. He received from the emperor the title of sei-i-tai-shogun, which his father had held. Ieyasu took up his residence at Sumpu(244) (now Shizuoka), which was situated on Suruga bay, one hundred and fourteen miles from the shogun's capital. Here he maintained a court and practically in all important matters governed the country. He was free, however, from the petty details of the administration, and devoted himself as an amateur to a literary life, to the collection and printing of books, and to the encouragement and patronage of literary men, in which he delighted.
In the meantime important events had been taking place which had great influence on the history of Japan. The contest between the Spanish on the one hand, and the Dutch and English on the other, was not confined to the Atlantic, but broke out in the Pacific, where the Portuguese and Spaniards had so long been predominant. A preliminary to the opening of trade with the Dutch were the arrival of William Adams and his extraordinary experiences in Japan. As we learn from his own letters,(245) he was born near Rochester in England, 1574, and when twelve years old was apprenticed to Nicholas Diggins as a pilot. With him he served for twelve years, then took service as pilot major of a fleet of five sail, which was about to be despatched by the "Indish Companie" to take part in the trade of the East Indies. This fleet had a rough time, and with fevers and scurvy and want of food a great part of the crews of the five vessels died. They sailed by the way of the straits of Magellan, then northward past Chili, and westward across the broad Pacific. Two of the ships turned back at the straits and returned to Holland. A third vessel was captured by the Spaniards, and the pinnace of a fourth was seized by eight men, and run into some island on their way, supposed to be one of the Sandwich Islands, and there wrecked, and the eight men probably eaten. The two vessels still remaining were the Hope and the Charity. The former of these was never more heard of. The sole remaining vessel was the Charity, of which Jaques Maihore was the master, and William Adams was the pilot. Sickness, especially the scurvy, which was the frightful scourge on board the vessels of that day, had reduced the crew, so that only four were able to walk, of whom Adams was one, and four more could creep on their knees.
In this condition they reached, on the eleventh of April, 1600, the northeastern coast of the island of Kyushu, landing in the province of Bungo, whose prince in earlier days had been the friend and patron of the Portuguese Jesuits. They were kindly received, the governor of the district furnishing a guard to protect their property—too late however for the preservation of much of it—and a house in which the sick could be cared for. In a few days a Portuguese Jesuit and other Portuguese arrived from Nagasaki, through whom the Dutch could communicate with the natives. The national and religious animosity between the strangers and their interpreters could not fail, however, to manifest itself. The Portuguese tried to create the impression that the refugees were pirates and unworthy of protection and help.
In accordance with the usual custom, word was immediately sent to Ieyasu (whom Adams calls the emperor), who at this time was at the castle of Osaka. He sent boats to Bungo, by which Adams and one of the crew were conveyed to his castle. Adams gives an interesting account of his reception, of the questions asked concerning his country, and its relations to the Spanish and Portuguese. He took occasion to explain, that the object of the Dutch in entering the East was purely that of trade, that they had in their own country many commodities which they would be glad to exchange for the products of the eastern nations.
After this interview Adams was kept thirty-nine days in prison, expecting to suffer the punishment of crucifixion, which he understood was the common mode of disposing of such characters. He found afterwards that the Portuguese had been using means to poison the mind of Ieyasu by representing them as dangerous characters, and recommending that all the refugees should be put to death as a warning to others. But he tells us(246) that Ieyasu answered them, that "we as yet had done to him nor to none of his lands any harm or dammage [and it was] against Reason and Justice to put us to death. If our countreys had warres the one with the other, that was no cause that he should put us to death."
While Adams was thus kept in prison, the Charity had been brought to Sakai, near to Osaka. Finally he was set at liberty, and suffered to revisit his ship, where he found the captain and remnant of the crew. The goods and clothing on board had been stolen by the natives, which Ieyasu tried to recover for them. But everything had been so scattered that it was impossible to regain it, "savinge 50,000 Rs in reddy money was commanded to be geven us" [as compensation]. After this settlement they were ordered to sail with their ship to the "land of Quanto and neere to the citie Eddo," whither Ieyasu was about to proceed by land. Here they had a mutiny among their men, which ended in the entire disbanding of the crew, and the dividing up among them the money which they had received for their goods. Each man was left to shift for himself. The captain got permission to sail in a Japanese junk to Patan, where he hoped to meet Dutch vessels.
Adams himself was kept about the shogun's court, and was made useful in various ways. His first achievement was to build a vessel of about eighteen tons burthen, which gained him great favor, in which he made several short voyages. Then in 1609, by command of the shogun, he built another ship of one hundred and twenty tons burthen, which also was a successful venture. For it so happened that the governor of Manila was on his way to Nova Spania(247) in a large ship of one thousand tons burthen, and was wrecked on the east coast of Japan, in the province of Shimosa. The governor and those of his comrades who were saved from the shipwreck were sent on to Acapulco in the ship which Adams had just built. In the year following, the governor, in recognition of their kindness to him, sent back to the Japanese government a much larger vessel as a present, the original being sent to and retained at Manila.
Adams was a straightforward, honest fellow, and commended himself to Ieyasu by usefulness not only in such matters as building ships, but in furnishing information concerning foreign affairs, which at this time were pressing on the government. In order to render him more content, Ieyasu gave him a small holding at Hemi, near the present town of Yokosuka, a few hours' sail from Yedo. He himself speaks of this property as "a living like unto a lordship in England, with eighty or ninety husbandmen, that be as my slaves or servants."(248) He probably also had a residence in Yedo, for there is to this day a street called An-jin-cho, or Pilot Street, near Nihonbashi, which is popularly believed to have been the street in which Adams lived. He himself says that he was known among the Japanese as "An-gin Sama," or Mr. Pilot. To console himself for the loss of his wife and children left in England, he married a Japanese wife, who, with several children, is mentioned by Captain Cocks in the visit above referred to. Notwithstanding his frequent endeavors to get back to England, he was never able to return, but after much important service both to the Dutch and English, to which we shall refer below, he died May 6, 1620.(249)
The first appearance of the Dutch after Adams' shipwreck, as above described, was in 1609, when the Red Lion and the yacht Griffon arrived at Hirado. They were well received by the daimyo, and a deputation was sent to Yedo to visit the shogun. Adams, in his second letter, speaks of their being "received in great friendship, making conditions with the emperor (shogun) yearly to send a ship or two." They were given a letter addressed to the "King of Holland," with which they went back, arriving home July, 1610. This letter, among other things, promises, "that they (your subjects), in all places, countries, and islands under mine obedience, may traffic and build homes serviceable and needful for their trade and merchandises, where they may trade without any hindrance at their pleasure, as well in time to come as for the present, so that no man shall do them any wrong. And I will maintain and defend them as mine own subjects."(250)
In accordance with this agreement the first vessel to arrive was a small yacht in July, 1611. A deputation from this vessel also went to visit the shogun and the retired shogun. It so chanced that a Portuguese party had preceded them by a few days. These deputations met at the court of Ieyasu. By the assistance of Adams, who was ready to do a favor to his old friends, the Dutch were kindly welcomed by the ex-shogun's court, and in spite of the hostility, or perhaps aided by the hostility, of the Portuguese, they received from him a patent for continued trade. As given in Kaempfer in translation it is as follows:
"All Dutch ships that come into my empire of Japan, whatever place or port they may put into, we do hereby expressly command all and every one of our subjects not to molest the same in any way, nor to be a hindrance to them; but, on the contrary, to show them all manner of help, favor and assistance. Every one shall beware to maintain the friendship, in assurance of which we have been pleased to give our imperial word to these people; and every one shall take care that our commands and promises be inviolably kept.
"Dated (in Japanese equivalent to) August 30, 1611."(251)
This was the authority on which the Dutch trade in Japan began, and under which, with many changes and vicissitudes, it continued to the time when the country was opened by treaty to foreign nations.
The effort made by English merchants to open a trade with the Japanese was made only a little after this time. Indeed, it is said that the report brought back by the Dutch in the Red Lion concerning Adams' presence and influence in Japan, gave the impulse which started an expedition under Captain John Saris in January, 1611. Saris was an old adventurer in the East, and therefore fitted to encounter the varied experiences of his proposed trip. He carried a letter from James I., then king of England, to Ieyasu the retired shogun. At Bantam on his way he found that Adams' first letter,(252) contained in the collection of his letters, and dated October 22, 1611, had just been received by the English merchants. It encouraged Saris to push on in his expedition. He arrived at Hirado, June, 1613, where the daimyo welcomed him and immediately sent off a special messenger to the shogun's court to summon Adams to their aid. He came at once, and by his advice Captain Saris with a party set out to pay his respects to the retired shogun. He gives an interesting account(253) of this journey and visit, which resulted in a charter of privileges(254) for the London East India Company to trade in any port of the empire. Having arranged to his great satisfaction this important matter he returned to Hirado, where he established a factory to serve as the basis for future English trade. In this, however, he encountered no little opposition from the Dutch traders, who had a factory in the same place. For while these enterprising nations, who had been allies in the days of the Armada, could combine very readily in opposition to the Spanish and Portuguese, it was not easy for either of them to look on complacently while the other secured for itself superior advantages in the matter of trade. Captain Saris tried to come to some agreement with his rivals, so that the prices of commodities might be kept up, but he was compelled to see the Dutch factory, in order to crowd him out of the field, putting the goods which they had for sale at prices which were ruinous to both. Having established matters, however, on as satisfactory a footing as he could arrange, and having left his comrade, Captain Cocks, in charge of the English factory, he sailed for home.
The subsequent events in the history of English trade with Japan may as well be traced here. The relations of the English and Dutch in the East grew steadily more inimical. Perhaps this was due to the increasing rivalry in trade and navigation which prevailed between them at home. In 1617 the London East India Company fitted out an expedition of five large vessels. This fleet arrived in the East in the summer of the following year. After much hostile skirmishing in which the Dutch obtained the permanent advantage, and the English commander was about to retire, word was brought to them from Europe that a peace had been arranged between the two countries. The English and Dutch vessels accordingly sailed to Japan, where they took a hand at trade; because in those days ships always were sent to the East prepared either to fight or trade as the case required. But this amicable arrangement did not last many years. The massacre at the Spice Islands in 1623, for which Cromwell afterward exacted an indemnity, ended all attempts at co-operation in the East. Soon after this the English company withdrew entirely from the Japanese trade, having lost in the effort forty thousand pounds. The Dutch were thus left without a rival, and we shall see on what conditions and at what sacrifices they continued to maintain their monopoly.
During the period of Ieyasu's retirement, which lasted from 1605 until his death in 1616, he devoted himself, as we have seen, to the consolidation of his family dynasty and to such literary occupations as his leisure allowed. He was a patron of the art derived from Korea, which then was popular in Japan, of printing with movable types.(255) This art fell into disuse afterwards, but during Ieyasu's retirement in Sumpu he interested himself in printing with blocks as well as by the new method. When he died he was engaged in seeing through the press an edition of an important Chinese work.
He left behind him a document, called the Legacy of Ieyasu, which to those desirous of studying the character and motives of the founder of the Tokugawa dynasty possesses a supreme interest. Some doubt has been thrown by Japanese critics on the authenticity of this composition. It has been asserted that it was not the work of Ieyasu and therefore not worthy of the reverence in which it has been held. But whether the Legacy(256) was originally composed by him or approved and sanctioned by him, matters little for our purpose. It dates from the time of the founding of the Tokugawa shogunate, and has been an unimpeachable authority during all its history. One of the singular features in the disposition of the Legacy, to which Professor Grigsby directs attention, was the secrecy in which it was kept. The original was preserved in Kyoto and was never seen, while an authenticated copy was kept at the shogun's court in Yedo, and once a year was open to the inspection of all above a certain rank. To us it seems unaccountable that a body of so-called laws, by which the conduct of men was to be guided, should be kept secret from them. But it must be remembered that in those days there were no such things as laws in the sense we now understand the term. There were magistrates who heard causes and complaints, but their decisions were based not on laws which had been enacted by the government, but upon prevailing custom and upon the innate sense of justice which was assumed to be present in the mind of every man. Whatever laws or rules therefore were in existence were not for the information of the people, but for the guidance of the magistrates.
The Legacy of Ieyasu consists of one hundred chapters, arranged without any attempt at logical order. Each chapter treats of a single, separate subject, and is usually of a very moderate length. As Professor Grigsby has pointed out: "Sixteen chapters consist of moral maxims and reflections; fifty-five are connected with politics and administrations; twenty-two refer to legal matters, and in seven Ieyasu relates episodes of his own personal history." The moral maxims are quoted chiefly from the works of the Chinese sages, Confucius and Mencius. While the collection on the whole has a military aspect, and plainly encourages and promotes the well-being of a military class, yet we see in it the mild and peaceful nature of Ieyasu. The fifteenth chapter says: "In my youth my sole aim was to conquer and subjugate inimical provinces and to take revenge on the enemies of my ancestors. Yuyo teaches, however, that 'to assist the people is to give peace to the empire,' and since I have come to understand that the precept is founded on sound principle, I have undeviatingly followed it. Let my posterity hold fast this principle. Any one turning his back upon it is no descendant of mine. The people are the foundation of the empire."
His estimate of the social relations is given in the forty-sixth chapter, in which he says: "The married state is the great relation of mankind. One should not live alone after sixteen years of age, but should procure a mediator and perform the ceremony of matrimonial alliance. The same kindred, however, may not intermarry. A family of good descent should be chosen to marry into; for when a line of descendants is prolonged, the foreheads of ancestors expand. All mankind recognize marriage as the first law of nature."
The old custom of servants and retainers following their masters to death, and committing suicide in order to accompany them, is referred to in the seventy-fifth chapter.(257) It is not improbable that some exhibition of this custom occasionally was seen in the days of Ieyasu, for he very sternly condemns it thus: "Although it is undoubtedly an ancient custom for a vassal to follow his lord to death, there is not the slightest reason in the practice.... These practices are strictly forbidden, more especially to primary retainers, and also to secondary retainers even to the lowest. He is the opposite of a faithful servant who disregards this prohibition; his posterity shall be impoverished by the confiscation of his property, as a warning to those who disobey the laws."(258)
It is not necessary to follow in detail the line of Tokugawa shoguns. Few of them impressed themselves in any marked manner on the history of their country. Iemitsu, the third shogun, who was a grandson of Ieyasu, was a man of great ability, and left many marks of his talents upon the empire. Under his administration the capital made great advances. He bound the daimyos to his house by requiring them to maintain residences in Yedo under the surveillance of the government. His mausoleum is placed with that of his grandfather amid the august glories of Nikko. Tsunayoshi (1681-1709) during his incumbency was more than usually interested in the peaceful prosperity of his country, and is gratefully remembered for his patronage of education and letters. But on the whole they were content to fill the office of shogun in a perfunctory manner, and to leave to subordinates the duty of governing.
Japan reached the acme of her ancient greatness during the Tokugawa dynasty. The arts which have given her such a deservedly high rank attained their greatest perfection. Keramics and lacquer, which are her most exquisite arts, achieved a degree of excellence to which we can now only look back with hopeless admiration. Metal-work, as shown in the manufacture of bronze and in the forging and mounting of swords, was scarcely less notable. The still higher art of painting, which came to Japan from China, rose during the Tokugawa period to the rank which it still holds in the estimation of the artistic world.
The best evidence, however, of the civilization of a people is found in their social condition. To learn the true culture of a nation it is necessary to study their education and literature, their laws and system of government, and their morals and religion. In some of these particulars it is still difficult to obtain an adequate knowledge of Japan. But gradually they are being revealed to us. The laws and legal precedents(259) which prevailed during the Tokugawa period have been unearthed from the archives of the Department of Justice and are being published in the Transactions of the Asiatic Society.
The medical and scientific advancement of Japan in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was not co-ordinate with her progress in the arts. They were hampered with the old Chinese notions about a male principle and a female principle which were conceived to prevail in nature, and with the five elements to which the human organs were supposed to correspond. Fortunately nature has ways of healing diseases in spite of theories and drugs. To this benign principle must be assigned the fact that the human race has survived the surgery and medicaments of mediaeval Europe as well as mediaeval China and Japan. In one particular the medical art of Japan seems to have been differently, perhaps better, conducted than in Europe. It is narrated by the Japanese annalists,(260) that if a physican made a mistake in his prescription or in his directions for taking the medicine he was punished by three years' imprisonment and a heavy fine; and if there should be any impurity in the medicine prescribed or any mistake in the preparation, sixty lashes were inflicted besides a heavy fine.
Oban. Gold Coin, 1727.
Three peculiar modes of medical practice deserve notice. The first was acupuncture, which consisted in inserting a thin needle through the skin into the muscles beneath. A second was the cauterization by moxa(261) (Japanese mogusa). This was effected by placing over the spot a small conical wad of the fibrous blossoms of mugwort (Artemisia vulgaris latifolia). The cone was kindled at the top and slowly burned till it was consumed. A painful blister was produced on the spot, which was believed to have a wholesome effect in the case of many complaints. A third mode of treatment is the practice of massage (amma), which western nations have borrowed, and which in Japan it has long been the exclusive privilege of the blind to apply.
Cauterizing With Moxa.
Many of the improved notions of western medicine were introduced by the Dutch, and this accounts for the unprecedentedly rapid advance which this science has made since the opening of the country.
CHAPTER XIII. COMMODORE PERRY AND WHAT FOLLOWED.
The most potent cause which led to the breaking down of the Tokugawa Shogunate, was the attitude which the empire had assumed toward foreign nations. There were other causes which co-operated with this, but none which were capable of such far-reaching and revolutionary effects. We have seen that this attitude was due to the fears entertained concerning the designs of the Portuguese and the Spanish. These fears may have been unfounded, but they were none the less real and operative. Such fears may have been stimulated by the Dutch, who had no reason to deal tenderly with the fanatical enemies of the independence and religion of their country. The spirit of trade with large profits was at the bottom of the great enterprises which were sent out from Europe to the East and West Indies during the seventeenth century.
The rivalry between the Dutch and Portuguese resulted in the banishment of the latter, and the establishment of the Dutch at Nagasaki in 1640. They occupied the little artificial island of Deshima, about three acres in extent, where were erected their houses, their offices and stores, and where for more than two hundred years their trade was conducted. And this, together with a like limited arrangement with the Chinese, was the sole foreign intercourse allowed with Japan.
It is plain now that this seclusion was a great mistake. It would have been of inestimable value to this enterprising and progressive people, to have kept in the race for improvement with the other nations of the world. They would not at this late day be compelled, under a dreadful strain of resources, to provide themselves with the modern appliances of civilization. Long since they would have tried the experiments with which they are now engaged, and would have found a way through the intricacies of politics to a free and stable government. To Ieyasu and his successors the way of safety seemed to be, to shut themselves up and sternly deny admittance to the outside world, while they continued to work out their destiny in their own way.
With whatever shortcomings the Dutch are to be charged in their intercourse with Japan, the world owes a great debt of gratitude to them for what they accomplished. Whatever was known concerning Japanese history and civilization down to the times of Commodore Perry, came chiefly from the Dutch. And not less than the debt of the rest of the world is that of Japan herself. Although the influence of the government was always exerted against the admission of foreign ideas, not a few of the seeds of western civilization were by them planted in a fertile soil and bore abundant fruit. To Kaempfer and Baron von Siebold particularly we must always look for our knowledge of the Japan of the days of its seclusion. Many efforts were made at successive times to open intercourse by the representatives of different nations. The Russians were the most persistent, and their attempts did not cease until the imprisonment of Captain Galowin in 1811. In comparatively recent times numerous essays were made resulting in disappointment. The American brig Morrison in 1837, the British surveying ship Saramang in 1845, Captain Cooper in 1845, Commodore Biddle in 1848, Admiral Cecille in 1848, Commander Glynn in 1849, and Commander Matheson in the same year, all made efforts to communicate with the government, but were rebuffed. It is plain that affairs were rapidly verging towards a point when the isolation of Japan must be given up.
Several causes contributed to the creation of a special interest in the United States of America, concerning the opening of negotiations with Japan. One of these was the magnitude to which the whale fishery had attained, and the large financial investments(262) held in this industry by American citizens. A second cause was the opening of China to foreign trade as a result of the opium war. But the most active cause was the discovery of gold in California in 1848, and the consequent development of that state as a centre of trade. It was an early scheme to run a line of steamers from San Francisco to the newly opened ports of China. To Hongkong the distance is about 6,149 nautical miles, and if a steamer is to traverse the whole distance without a break, she must carry an enormous load of coal. The only remedy lay in establishing a coaling station on the Japanese islands, and this could only be effected when Japan abandoned her policy of seclusion and entered with a free heart into the comity of nations.
The interest of the government and people of the United States at last eventuated in the expedition under Commodore Matthew C. Perry. He had for a long time been convinced of the importance and feasibility of such an undertaking, and when he was summoned to take charge of it he made the most thorough preparation for his task.
At his suggestion the government procured all available books, maps, and charts, and he made himself master of every conceivable detail. From manufacturing establishments he secured models of railways, telegraphic lines, and other interesting industrial equipments. He realized the necessity of taking with him such a naval force that its appearance in Japanese waters would produce a profound impression upon the government. And knowing that all his predecessors, who had sought access by way of Nagasaki, had been repelled, he resolved to avoid it and its Portuguese and Dutch traditions and venture boldly into the bay of Yedo.
As soon as it was known that a diplomatic expedition was to be despatched to Japan under the command of Commodore Perry he was deluged with applications, both from England and America, to be permitted to join it.
But Perry resolutely declined all these enterprising offers. In his long career as a naval officer he had seen the danger of admitting on board men-of-war persons who were not under the authority of the commander. From such dangers he meant to be free. He therefore refused to take on board the ships of his squadron any but regularly accredited officers and men over whom he exercised legitimate control. He even made it a rule that if any of the officers kept diaries during the progress of the expedition, they should be the property of the Navy Department and could not be published without its permission and authority.
Commodore Perry carried with him a friendly letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan,(263) who is therein addressed as "Great and Good Friend." The letter pointed out the contiguity of the two countries and the importance of their friendship and commercial intercourse; it announced that Commodore Perry had been sent to give assurance of the friendly sentiment of the President, and to arrange for privileges of trade, for the care of shipwrecked sailors, and for the appointment of a convenient port where coal and other supplies might be obtained by the vessels of the United States.
After some provoking delays and disappointments the expedition sailed from Norfolk on the 24th of November, 1852,(264) proceeding by the way of the cape of Good Hope to the China sea. There taking on board Dr. S. Wells Williams as interpreter, and visiting several ports in China, the Bonin islands, and the Ryukyu islands, they sailed to Japan. The squadron, led by the Susquehanna and followed by the Mississippi, the Plymouth, and the Saratoga, entered Yedo bay, July 8, 1853.(265)
Commodore M. C. Perry.
The Japanese government had been warned of the preparation and coming of this expedition by the Dutch. Eager to maintain their position with the government the King of the Netherlands addressed to the Shogun a letter in 1844 suggesting the relaxation of the laws excluding foreign nations from trade. But in the following year he received an answer declining to make any changes.
With all the warning, however, which the government had received and the preparations which had been made for the momentous occasion, the appearance of the squadron at the entrance of Yedo bay was an intense surprise. Two large steam frigates—the Susquehanna and the Mississippi—and two sloops-of-war—the Plymouth and the Saratoga,—although much inferior to the squadron promised, composed such an array as had never before made its appearance in Yedo bay. As they plowed through the peaceful waters, in full view of the white-capped peak of Fuji-yama, every height and vantage ground along the shore seemed alive with troops and with wondering and alarmed inhabitants. The vessels came to anchor off the village of Uraga, which is not far from the present site of the dockyards at Yokosuka.
The account(266) of the preliminary negotiations conducted by Commodore Perry with the officers of the government is interesting, as showing the efforts made by them to send him to Nagasaki, and his absolute refusal to go thither or conduct his business through the Dutch or Chinese. When there seemed no other way, consent was given to receive, through an officer of adequate rank, the letter from the President of the United States to the Emperor of Japan. When he had formally delivered this letter, he took his departure with an intimation that he would return at a future day and receive the answer.(267)
There can be no doubt that the display of force which Commodore Perry took care to make in all his transactions with the Japanese officials at the same time that he was careful to convey assurances of his friendly purposes and objects, produced a deep impression on the government with which he had to deal. It is useless to deny that it was on this display of force that Commodore Perry largely relied for the success of his expedition. That he was prepared to use force had it been necessary we may feel sure.(268) But the instructions of his government and his own sense of international justice bound him to exhaust every peaceful resource before resorting to measures of coercion.
The government of the shogun was greatly troubled by this responsibility so suddenly laid upon it. They knew not what would be the result of their refusal to enter upon negotiations when Perry returned. The seclusion in which they had kept themselves so long had cut them off from a knowledge of the relations in which the nations of the world stood to each other. Notwithstanding Commodore Perry's protestations of friendliness, they were afraid of his great ships and their powerful armaments. Should they, as they might easily do, make their way up the bay till they were within gunshot of the capital, what resistance could the government show, or how could it prevent them from battering down the castle and all the daimyos' residences.
The sentiment of loyalty to the emperor and opposition to the shogun, which had been growing up so insidiously and had now become really formidable, was a source of the greatest perplexity to the Yedo government. Should they proceed with their negotiations and make a treaty with the Americans, this anti-shogun sentiment was ready to manifest itself against them with terrible effect. If they refused to negotiate, then they must be ready to meet the invaders of their soil with their miserable obsolete armor and with hearts that two hundred years of peace had rendered more obsolete than their armor.
The first thing to be done was to consult the daimyos and learn to what extent they could rely on their co-operation. The daimyo of Mito,(269) a descendant of the famous Mitsukuni, seemed to have inherited one at least of the opinions of his ancestor. He advocated the observance of a greater reverence for the emperor at Kyoto, and criticised the assumption of imperial powers by the shogun. At the same time he was an ardent foreign-hater, and in 1841 had been placed in confinement because he had melted down the bells of the Buddhist temples of his domains, and cast cannon for their protection. But now he was pardoned and appointed to take measures for the defence of the country. On the 15th of July—the American squadron was still in the bay, for it left on the 17th—the daimyo of Mito sent in to the government a memorial(270) setting forth his decisive views on the subject. He gave ten reasons against a treaty and in favor of war. We give them here in Mr. Nitobe's translation:
"1. The annals of our history speak of the exploits of the great, who planted our banners on alien soil; but never was the clash of foreign arms heard within the precincts of our holy ground. Let not our generation be the first to see the disgrace of a barbarian army treading on the land where our fathers rest.
"2. Notwithstanding the strict interdiction of Christianity, there are those guilty of the heinous crime of professing the doctrines of this evil sect. If now America be once admitted into our favor, the rise of this faith is a matter of certainty.
"3. What! Trade our gold, silver, copper, iron, and sundry useful materials for wool, glass, and similar trashy little articles! Even the limited barter of the Dutch factory ought to have been stopped.
"4. Many a time recently have Russia and other countries solicited trade with us; but they were refused. If once America is permitted the privilege, what excuse is there for not extending the same to other nations?
"5. The policy of the barbarians is first to enter a country for trade, then to introduce their religion, and afterward to stir up strife and contention. Be guided by the experience of our forefathers two centuries back; despise not the teachings of the Chinese Opium War.
"6. The Dutch scholars say that our people should cross the ocean, go to other countries and engage in active trade. This is all very desirable, provided they be as brave and strong as were their ancestors in olden time; but at present the long-continued peace has incapacitated them for any such activity.
"7. The necessity of caution against the ships now lying in the harbor (i.e., Perry's squadron) has brought the valiant samurai to the capital from distant quarters. Is it wise to disappoint them?
"8. Not only the naval defence of Nagasaki but all things relating to foreign affairs have been entrusted to the two clans of Kuroda and Nabeshima. To hold any conference with a foreign power outside of the port of Nagasaki—as has been done this time at Uraga—is to encroach upon their rights and trust. These powerful families will not thankfully accept an intrusion into their vested authority.
"9. The haughty demeanor of the barbarians now at anchorage has provoked even the illiterate populace. Should nothing be done to show that the government shares the indignation of the people, they will lose all fear and respect for it.
"10. Peace and prosperity of long duration have enervated the spirit, rusted the armor, and blunted the swords of our men. Dulled to ease, when shall they be aroused? Is not the present the most auspicious moment to quicken their sinews of war?"
The government sent to all the daimyos copies of the American letter to the shogun, and asked for their opinions concerning the course to be pursued. Many answers were immediately received. They almost unanimously declared against the opening of the country. Some advocated the alternative suggested in the letter itself, to open the country temporarily and try the experiment for three years, or five years, or ten years. In the meantime the defences of the country and new and improved arms and armaments could be perfected. The government did indeed busy itself during Perry's absence in hurrying forward defensive preparations. The line of forts which still are visible in the shallow water of the bay opposite Shinagawa, the southern suburb of the capital, were hastily constructed. Bells from monasteries and metal articles of luxury were melted down and cast into cannon. Lessons were given and became quickly fashionable in the use of European small-arms and artillery. The military class from the various clans flocked to Yedo and Kyoto in large numbers, expecting to be called upon to defend their country against the impudent intrusion of the barbarians.
During this busy time of perplexity and preparation the Shogun Ieyoshi,—the twelfth of the Tokugawa dynasty—died August 25, 1853. His son Iesada succeeded him as the thirteenth shogun. The death of the reigning shogun did not produce any marked effect upon the policy of the government. Long before this time the custom of abdication, and the habits of luxury and effeminacy in which the family of the shogun was reared, had dragged the house down to the usual impotent level. The government was conducted by a system of bureaucracy which relieved the titular shoguns from all responsibility and allowed them to live in profitless voluptuousness. So that one died and another reigned in his stead without causing more than a ripple upon the surface of current events.
Shortly after the departure of the American squadron from Yedo bay, the Russian Admiral Pontiatine appeared in the harbor of Nagasaki, and made application for a national agreement to open ports for trade, to adjust the boundary line between the two nations across the island of Saghalien, and to live in neighborly intimacy. English vessels were also in Chinese waters watching the Russians, and the war, usually called the Crimean war, actually broke out in the spring of 1854. A visit from these vessels might therefore be expected at any time.
Commodore Perry during the interval between his two visits to Japan sailed to the ports of China where the Taiping rebellion was then in action. The confusion and insecurity occasioned by this uprising rendered the presence of the squadron most acceptable to the American merchants.
On the 13th of February, 1854, he made his appearance a second time in Yedo bay with a fleet of seven ships, viz., three steam frigates and four sloops-of-war. Three additional vessels were to join, and did join, the fleet in Yedo bay. So that when the fleet was all mustered there were ten fully armed vessels, comprising such an array as had never before appeared in Japanese waters.
After some haggling about the place where the negotiations should be conducted, it was finally settled that the place of meeting should be at Kanagawa, near the village (now the city) of Yokohama. Here after much deliberation and discussion, proposals and amendments, banquets and presents, a treaty was agreed upon. The signing and exchange took place on the 31st of March, 1854. It was immediately sent to Washington for ratification.
As this was the first formal treaty(271) made with any western country we give a synopsis of its provisions.
Art. I. Peace and amity to exist between the two countries.
Art. II. The port of Shimoda to be opened immediately and the port of Hakodate to be opened in one year, and American ships to be supplied with necessary provisions in them.
Art. III. Shipwrecked persons of either nation to be cared for, and expenses to be refunded.
Art. IV. Shipwrecked and other persons not to be imprisoned but to be amenable to just laws.
Art. V. Americans at Shimoda and Hakodate not to be subject to confinement; free to go about within defined limits.
Art. VI. Further deliberation to be held between the parties to settle concerning trade and matters requiring to be arranged.
Art. VII. Trade in open ports to be subject to such regulations as the Japanese government shall establish.
Art. VIII. Wood, water, provisions, coal, etc., to be procured only through appointed Japanese officers.
Art. IX. If at any future day privileges in addition to those here enumerated are granted to any other nation, the same to be allowed to Americans.
Art. X. Ships of the United States not to resort to other ports than Shimoda and Hakodate except in stress of weather.
Art. XI. Consuls or agents of the United States to reside at Shimoda.
Art. XII. The ratification of this treaty to be exchanged within eighteen months.
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As might have been expected, as soon as this treaty with the United States had been signed there was a rush of other nations to obtain similar terms. Admiral Sir John Sterling, acting in behalf of the government of Great Britain, negotiated a treaty which was signed at Nagasaki on the 15th of October, 1854. Admiral Pontiatine negotiated a similar treaty for Russia, which was signed at Shimoda on the 7th of February, 1855. A treaty with the Netherlands was signed on the 30th of January, 1856.
None of these were in any general sense commercial treaties, providing for trade and making regulations by which it might be conducted. They were rather preliminary conventions, making arrangements for vessels to obtain necessary provisions, and stipulating for the protection of those suffering shipwreck, and for vessels driven under stress of weather to take shelter in the harbors of Japan. They each provided for admission to two ports: The American treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate; the English treaty to Nagasaki and Hakodate; the Russian treaty to Shimoda and Hakodate.
All these treaties contained what is called "the most favored nation clause," so that where the privileges granted to any one nation were in excess of those granted previously to others, these privileges were also without further negotiation extended to the nations that had already made treaties.
These dealings with foreign nations produced the most intense excitement throughout the empire. The old sentiment of hostility to foreign intercourse showed itself in unmistakable intensity. The song of the Black Ship, by which term the vessels of foreign nations were designated, was heard everywhere. Two distinct parties came into existence called the Jo-i party, who wished to expel the barbarians; and the Kai-koku party, who were in favor of opening the country.(272) The members of the latter party were principally connected with the shogun's government, and had become impressed with the folly of trying to resist the pressure of the outside world. The Jo-i party was made up of the conservative elements in the country, who clung to the old traditions of Japan that had matured during the two centuries of the Tokugawa rule. Besides these conservatives there was also a party who nourished a traditional dislike to the Tokugawa family, and was glad to see it involved in difficulties which were sure to bring down upon it the vengeance of the nation. These were chiefly found among the southwestern daimiates such as Satsuma, Choshu, Hizen, and Tosa. The daimyo of Mito(273) although connected with the shogun's family was bitterly hostile to the policy of holding any friendly relations with foreigners. He was therefore regarded as the head of the Jo-i party, and many of the disaffected samurai rallied about him as their champion and leader.
It was charged against the shogun that in making treaties with foreign nations he had transcended the powers(274) that rightly belonged to him. He was not the sovereign of Japan and never had been. He was only the chief executive under the emperor, and was not even next in rank to the emperor. It was impossible, therefore, that treaties made by the shogun and not ratified by his sovereign should be regarded by the Japanese as legitimate and binding.
The question of the legality of the treaties which the shogun had made was an important one, and interested not only the Japanese themselves but the foreigners whose privileges under these treaties were at stake. There is no doubt that Commodore Perry as well as all the subsequent negotiators, believed that in making treaties with the shogun they were dealing with a competent authority. The precedents occurring in the history of Japan seemed all to bear in this direction. The Portuguese and the Spanish had dealt with the shogun and never with the emperor. The Dutch had received from Ieyasu the privileges of trade and had ever since continued under the shogun's protection. Captain Saris in his negotiations in 1614 received written assurances of protection and privileges of trade from the shogun.
It was because the shogun's power had become weakened, and there had grown up an active sentiment against him, that the question in reference to his legitimate authority arose. "Had the treaty" (with Perry) "been concluded when the power of Yedo was at its former height, it is probable that no questions would have been asked."(275)
According to the terms of the treaty made with the United States it was provided that a consul should be appointed "to reside at Shimoda at any time after the expiration of eighteen months from the signing the treaty." In execution of this provision the United States government sent out Townsend Harris, who arrived in August, 1856. After some hesitation he was allowed to take up his residence at Shimoda. He was a man of great patience and tact, and gradually urged his way into the confidence of the government. He became the counsellor and educator of the officials in everything pertaining to foreign affairs. He was received December 7, 1857, by the shogun with the ceremony due to his new rank of plenipotentiary which he had then received.(276) In a despatch, dated July 8, 1858, he tells of a severe illness which he had suffered; how the shogun sent two physicians to attend him, and when a bulletin was sent to Yedo that his case was hopeless, the physicians "received peremptory orders to cure me, and if I died they would themselves be in peril."
The principal effort of Mr. Harris was the negotiation of a commercial treaty which should make provision for the maintenance of trade in specified ports of Japan. The treaties already made by Japan with foreign nations only provided for furnishing vessels with needed supplies, and for the protection of vessels driven by stress of weather and of persons shipwrecked on the Japanese islands. It remained to agree upon terms, which should be mutually advantageous, for the regular opening of the ports for trade and for the residence at these ports of the merchants engaged in trade.
The excitement occasioned by the steps already taken rendered the shogun's government exceedingly reluctant to proceed further in this direction. It was only after much persuasion, and with a desire to avoid appearing to yield to the appearance of force(277) with which the English were about to urge the negotiation of a commercial treaty, that at last, on the 17th of June, 1857, a treaty "for the purpose of further regulating the intercourse of American citizens within the empire of Japan" was duly concluded. The port of Nagasaki was to be opened in addition to those already stipulated. American citizens were to be permitted to reside at Shimoda and Hakodate for the purpose of supplying the wants of the vessels which visited there.
This does not seem to have been adequate, for only about a year later a further treaty, revoking that of June, 1857, was arranged. It was signed at Yedo on the 29th of July, 1858. Equivalent treaties were negotiated by other nations, and it is under the terms of these that the intercourse between Japan and the nations of Europe and America is still conducted. They provided for the opening of the ports of Ni-igata and Hyogo, and for the closing of Shimoda, which had been found unsuitable, and the opening in its place of Kanagawa.(278) They fixed dates for the opening of the cities of Yedo and Osaka, and provided for the setting apart of suitable concessions in each of them for residence and trade. They provided that all cases of litigation in which foreigners were defendants should be tried in the consular court of the nation to which the defendant belonged, and all cases in which Japanese citizens were defendants should be tried in Japanese courts. They fixed the limits within which foreigners at any of the treaty ports could travel, but permitted the diplomatic agent of any nation to travel without limitation. They prohibited the importation of opium. Commercial regulations were attached to the treaties and made a part of them, which directed that a duty of five per centum should be paid on all goods imported into Japan for sale, except that on intoxicating liquors a duty of thirty-five per centum should be exacted. All articles of Japanese production exported were to pay a duty of five per centum, except gold and silver coin and copper in bars. These trade regulations stipulated that five years after the opening of Kanagawa the export and import duties should be subject to revision at the desire of either party. The treaties themselves provide that on and after 1872 either of the contracting parties may demand a revision of the same upon giving one year's notice of its desire.
These stipulations in reference to a revision of the treaties, and especially of the tariff of duties to be paid on imported goods, have been a source of great anxiety and concern to the Japanese government. The small duty of five per centum, which it has been permitted to collect on the goods imported, is scarcely more than enough to maintain the machinery of collection. And while the initiative is given to it to ask for a revision of the treaties, it has never yet been able to obtain the consent of the principal nations concerned to any change in the original hard terms.
Another provision in the treaties which has been the occasion of endless debate is that which requires all foreigners to remain under the jurisdiction of the consuls of their respective countries. It is claimed on the part of the Japanese that this provision, which was reasonable when the treaties were first made, is no longer just or necessary. The laws have been so far perfected, their judges and officers have been so educated, and the machinery of their courts have been so far conformed to European practice that it is no longer reasonable that foreigners residing in Japan should be under other than Japanese jurisdiction. It is earnestly to be hoped that these sources of irritation between Japan and the treaty powers may speedily be removed, and that the efforts of this progressive race to fall into line in the march of civilization may be appreciated and encouraged.
Any one who reads the diplomatic correspondence covering this period will see how serious were the troubles with which the country was called upon to deal. He will realize also how almost impossible it was for the diplomatic representatives of the western powers to comprehend the difficulties of the situation or know how to conduct the affairs of their legations with justice and consideration.
A succession of murders and outrages occurred, which awakened the fears of the foreign residents. It is plain enough now that this state of things was not so much due to the want of effort on the part of the government to carry out its agreements with foreign nations, as to the bitter and irreconcilable party hatred which had sprung up in consequence of these efforts. The feudal organization of the government, by which the first allegiance was due to the daimyo, rendered the condition of things more demoralized. It was an old feudal custom, whenever the retainers of a daimyo wished to avenge any act without committing their lord, they withdrew from his service and became ronins. Most of the outrages which occurred during the years intervening between the formation of the treaties and the restoration were committed by these masterless men. Responsibility for them was disclaimed by the daimyos, and the government of Yedo was unable to extend its control over these wandering swash-bucklers. There was no course for the foreign ministers to pursue but to hold the shogun's government responsible for the protection of foreigners and foreign trade. This government, which was called the bakufu,(279) had made the treaties with the foreign powers, as many claimed, without having adequate authority, and had thus assumed to be supreme in matters of foreign intercourse. It was natural therefore that the representatives of the treaty powers should look to the bakufu for the security of those who had come hither under the sanction of these treaties.
It was in consequence a bloody time through which the country was called to pass. The prime minister and the head of the bakufu party was Ii Kamon-no-kami,(280) the daimyo of Hikone in the province of Mino. On account of the youth of the shogun he was created regent. He was a man of great resolution and unscrupulous in the measures by which he attempted to carry out the policy to which he was committed. By his enemies he was called the "swaggering prime minister (bakko genro)." Assured that the foreign treaties could not be abrogated without dangerous collisions with foreign nations, he sought to crush the opposition which assailed them. The daimyo of Mito, who had been the head of the anti-foreign party at Yedo, he compelled to resign and confined him to his private palace in his province. Numerous other persons who had busied themselves with interfering with his schemes and in promoting opposition in Kyoto, he also imprisoned.
Suddenly on the 23d of March, 1860, Ii Kamon-no-kami was assassinated as he was being carried in his norimono from his yashiki outside the Sakurada gate to the palace of the shogun.
The assassins were eighteen ronins of the province of Mito, who wished to avenge the imprisonment of their prince. They carried the head of the murdered regent to the Mito castle, and after exhibiting it to the gloating eyes of the prince, exposed it upon a pike at the principal gate.
The death of the regent was an irreparable blow to the government. There was no one who could take his place and assume his role. His loss must be reckoned as one of the principal events which marked the decadence of the shogun's power.
CHAPTER XIV. REVOLUTIONARY PRELUDES.
The outrages which now succeeded each other with terrible frequency were not confined to the native members of the opposing parties. Foreigners, who were so essentially the cause of the political disturbances in Japan, were particularly exposed to attacks. On the 14th of January, 1861, Mr. Heusken, the secretary and interpreter of the American legation, when riding home at night from the Prussian legation in Yedo, was attacked by armed assassins and mortally wounded. The object of this murder is supposed to have been the desire of one of the ministers of foreign affairs to take revenge on Mr. Heusken,(281) for his activity in promoting foreign intercourse.
The weakness and the fears of the government were shown by the warning, which they sent to the foreign ministers to avoid attending the funeral of Mr. Heusken, lest further outrages might be committed. They did attend, however, and no disturbances occurred. It only remains to mention that Mr. Harris subsequently made an arrangement with the government for the payment of an indemnity(282) of $10,000 to the mother of Mr. Heusken, who was then living at Amsterdam in Holland.
The next circumstance which awakened universal attention was an attack made on the British legation, on the night of the 5th of July, 1861. At this time the British minister occupied as a legation the buildings of the temple Tozenji, situated at Takanawa in the city of Yedo. It was guarded by a company of Japanese troops, to whom the government had entrusted its protection. Mr. Alcock had just returned by an overland journey from Nagasaki, and with a number of other Englishmen was domiciled in the legation. The attacking party consisted of fourteen ronins belonging to the Mito clan, who had banded themselves together to take vengeance on the "accursed foreigners." Several of the guards were killed, and Mr. Oliphant,(283) the secretary of legation, and Mr. Morrison, H. B. M's consul at Nagasaki, were severely wounded. On one of the party who was captured was found a paper,(284) which set forth the object of the attack and the names of the fourteen ronins who had conspired for its accomplishment.
That the government regarded such outrages with alarm is certain. They took the earliest opportunity to express their distress that the legation under their protection had thus been invaded. They assured Mr. Alcock with the most pitiable sincerity that "they had no power of preventing such attacks upon the legation, nor of providing against a renewal of the same with a greater certainty of success." "They could not," they said, "guarantee any of the representatives against these attempts at assassination, to which all foreigners in Japan were liable, whether in their houses or in the public thoroughfares."(285) They pretended to punish, and yet were afraid openly to punish the persons engaged in this attack.(286) They promised to do what they could for the protection of the foreign representatives; but their measures necessarily consisted in making the legations a kind of prison where the occupants were confined and protected.
And yet, with all these assurances of danger, the foreign representatives seem to have been singularly ignorant of the real difficulties with which the government had to deal. This was due, no doubt, to the want of candor on the part of the Japanese officials in not explaining frankly and fully to them the political complications which existed between the governments of Yedo and Kyoto. They represented a widespread discontent to have grown up since the negotiation of the treaties, owing to the increased price of provisions, the derangement of the currency, and the danger of famine. In view of these pressing difficulties they asked for the postponement of the time fixed by the treaties for opening a port on the western coast and Hyogo on the Inland sea, and for the establishment of definite concessions in the cities of Yedo and Osaka. These modifications of the treaties were finally accepted, and it was arranged that the opening of the ports named above should be postponed for a period of five years from the first of January, 1863.
This postponement of the opening of the ports was the chief reason for sending to foreign countries their first embassy. This set out from Yokohama in January, 1862, and visited the United States, then England, and the other treaty powers. They were everywhere received with the utmost kindness and distinction. The immediate object of their mission was, as we have seen, accomplished. The opening of additional ports was deferred on condition that in those already opened the obstacles which had been put in the way of trade should be removed.
But, besides the attainment of this end, the visit of the embassy to foreign capitals and countries produced a salutary influence both on the foreigners whom they met and on the influential personages of which it consisted. The former learned to their surprise that they had a cultivated, intelligent, and clever race to deal with, whose diplomatists,(287) although inexperienced in European politics, were not unqualified to enter the courts of western capitals. But the revelation to the Japanese envoys was still greater and more surprising. For the first time they saw the terrible armaments of western powers, and realized the futility of attempting to make armed resistance to their measures. But they encountered on every hand not hatred and aversion, but the warmest interest and kindness,(288) and a desire to render them every courtesy. Instead of barbarians, as they had been taught to regard all foreigners, they found everywhere warm-hearted and intelligent friends who were anxious to see their country treated with justice and consideration.
On the 26th of June, 1862, a year after the first, a second attack was made upon the British legation. Lieutenant-Colonel Neale was at this time charge d'affaires, and had just removed from Yokohama and resumed the occupancy of the temple of Tozenji. The government took the precaution to establish guards, who daily and nightly made their rounds to protect the buildings. Besides this there was a guard detailed from the British fleet to render the legation more secure. The officials persisted in claiming that only one person, Ito Gumpei, was engaged in the attack, and that it was a matter of private revenge for an insult which one of the English guards had put upon him. Two of these guards were killed in the attack, and Ito Gumpei the assassin escaped to his own house, where he was permitted to commit hara-kiri. There was probably no plot on the part of those whose duty it was to protect the legation. But the uncertainty which hung over the affair, and the repetition of the violence of the preceding year led Colonel Neale to abandon his residence at Yedo and return to Yokohama. An indemnity of L10,000 was demanded and finally paid for the families of the two members of the guard who had been murdered.
In the meantime the relations between the courts at Kyoto and Yedo had become more and more strained. The efforts at reconciliation, such as the marriage between the young shogun and the sister of the emperor in 1861, produced no permanent effect. The disease was too deep-seated and serious to be affected by such palliations. Shimazu Saburo, the uncle(289) and guardian of the young daimyo of Satsuma, came in 1862 to Kyoto with the avowed purpose of advising the emperor in this emergency. He was accompanied by a formidable body of Satsuma troops, and on these he relied to have his advice followed.
On his way thither he had been joined by a body of ronins who were contemplating the accomplishment of some enterprise which should be notable in the expulsion of foreigners. They imagined that the powerful head of the Satsuma clan would be a suitable leader for such an enterprise. They approached him therefore and humbly petitioned to be received under his standard. Not quite satisfied to have such a band of reckless ruffians under his command, he, however, scarcely dared to refuse their petition. He therefore permitted them to join his escort and march with him to Kyoto.
The emperor's court, although bitterly hostile to the liberal policy which prevailed at Yedo, were alarmed by the desperate allies which Shimazu was bringing with him. He presented their memorial to the emperor, and favored their wishes to use all the force of the country to dislodge the hated foreigner from its soil. Other powerful daimyos were collected at the same time at the imperial capital, and its peaceful suburbs resounded with the clank of warlike preparations. The most notable of these was the daimyo of Choshu, who at this time was joined with the Satsuma chief in the measures against the shogun's government.
Shimazu continued his journey to Yedo in the summer of 1862, where he endeavored to impress on the bakufu the necessity of taking measures to pacify the country. It is safe to say that his suggestions were coldly received, and he was made to feel that he was in an enemy's camp. It is said that the shogun refused to receive him personally, but referred him, for any business which he had to present, to the council. It is certain, therefore, when he left Yedo in September, 1862, with his train and escort, he was in no amiable frame of mind. And it was in this condition of irritation that he became the chief actor in an event which was the saddest of all the collisions between the Japanese and the foreigners.
The Satsuma train left Yedo on the morning of the 14th of September by way of the Tokaido, which runs through Kawasaki and skirts the village of Kanagawa. It consisted of a semi-military procession of guards on foot and on horseback, of norimonos, in which the prince and his high military and civil attendants were carried, of led-horses for them to ride when they desired, and of a long straggling continuation of pack-horses and men carrying the luggage of the train. It was said to contain not less than eight hundred samurai in attendance on their master.
The etiquette of the road for such trains was well settled in feudal Japan. The right of way was always accorded to the daimyo, and all unmilitary persons or parties were required to stand at the side of the road while the train was passing, to dismount if on horseback, and to bow to the daimyo's norimono as it was carried past. It may be supposed that the samurai in attendance upon the incensed Shimazu were in no humor to have these rules trifled with, and especially would not deal very tenderly with any foreigners who might fall in their way.
On the afternoon of the day on which the Satsuma train left Yedo, a small riding party left Yokohama for the village of Kawasaki, on a visit to the temple at that place. It consisted of one lady and three gentlemen, one of whom was Mr. Charles L. Richardson, who had for many years been a merchant at Shanghai, but who was visiting Japan previous to his return to England. A few miles north of the village of Kanagawa they encountered the head of the train, and for some distance passed successive parts of it. They were either ignorant of the etiquette which required them to withdraw during the passage of such a cavalcade, or underrated the danger of disregarding it.
Presently they came upon the troop which had special charge of the norimono in which the prince was carried. It was surrounded by a formidable body of retainers, armed with swords and spears. The reckless riders paid little heed to their scowling looks, and rode carelessly on, sometimes even threading their way through the interstices of the straggling train. When they were nearly opposite to the prince's norimono, which they were about to pass without dismounting or saluting, they were so alarmed by the evidences of danger that one of the gentlemen called out to Mr. Richardson who was riding ahead, "Don't go on, we can turn into a side road." The other also exclaimed, "For God's sake let us have no row." Richardson, who was foolhardy and ignorant of those with whom he had to deal, answered, "Let me alone, I have lived fourteen years in China and know how to manage these people." Suddenly a soldier from the centre of the procession rushed upon them with a heavy two-handed sword and struck Richardson a fatal blow on his side under the left arm. Both the other gentlemen were also severely wounded, and the lady had her bonnet knocked off by a blow aimed at her, but escaped unhurt. They all started at full speed towards home, riding over the Japanese guards who undertook to interfere. All except Richardson reached Kanagawa without further hurt; he after riding a few rods fell from his horse and died from the effect of his terrible wound.(290) |
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