380. The initial combat order of any commander or subordinate is based upon his definite plan for executing the task confronting him.

Whenever possible the formation of the plan is preceded by a personal reconnaissance of the terrain and a careful consideration of all information of the enemy.

381. The combat order gives such information of the enemy and of neighboring or supporting friendly troops as will enable subordinates to understand the situation.

The general plan of action is stated in brief terms, but enough of the commander's intentions is divulged to guide the subsequent actions of the subordinates.

Clear and concise instructions are given as to the action to be taken in the combat by each part of the command. In this way the commander assigns tasks, fronts, objectives, sectors or areas, etc., in accordance with his plan. If the terms employed convey definite ideas and leave no loopholes, the conduct of subordinates will generally be correspondingly satisfactory.

Such miscellaneous matter relating to special troops, trains, ammunition, and future movements of the commander is added as concerns the combat itself.

Combat orders should prescribe communication, reconnaissance, flank protection, etc., when some special disposition is desired or when an omission on the part of a subordinate may reasonably be feared.

382. When issuing orders, a commander should indicate clearly what is to be done by each subordinate, but not how it is to be done. He should not encroach upon the functions of a subordinate by prescribing details of execution unless he has good reason to doubt the ability or judgment of the subordinate, and can not substitute another.

Although general in its terms, an order must be definite and must be the expression of a fixed decision. Ambiguity or vagueness indicates either vacillation or the inability to formulate orders.

383. Usually the orders of a commander are intended for, and are given to, the commanders of the next lower units, but in an emergency a commander should not hesitate to give orders directly to any subordinate. In such case he should promptly inform the intermediate commander concerned.

Communication.

384. Communication is maintained by means of staff officers, messengers, relay systems, connecting files, visual signals, telegraph, or telephone.

385. The signal corps troops of the division establish lines of information from division to brigade headquarters. The further extension of lines of information in combat by signal troops is exceptional.

386. Each regiment, employing its own personnel, is responsible for the maintenance of communication from the colonel back to the brigade and forward to the battalions. For this purpose the regiment uses the various means which may be furnished it. The staff and orderlies, regimental and battalion, are practiced in the use of these means and in messenger service. Orderlies carry signal flags.

387. Connection between the firing line and the major or colonel is practically limited to the prescribed flag, arm, and bugle signals. Other means can only be supplemental. Company musicians carry company flags and are practiced in signaling.

388. The artillery generally communicates with the firing line by means of its own staff officers or through an agent who accompanies some unit in or near the front. The infantry keeps him informed as to the situation and affords him any reasonable assistance. When the infantry is dependent upon the artillery for fire support, perfect coordination through this representative is of great importance.



COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE.

389. Combat reconnaissance is of vital importance and must not be neglected. By proper preliminary reconnaissance, deployments on wrong lines, or in a wrong direction, and surprises may generally be prevented.

390. Troops deployed and under fire can not change front and thus they suffer greatly when enfiladed. Troops in close order formation may suffer heavy losses in a short time if subjected to hostile fire. In both formations troops must be protected by proper reconnaissance and warning.

391. The difficulty of reconnaissance increases in proportion to the measures adopted by the enemy to screen himself.

The strength of the reconnoitering party is determined by the character of the information desired and the nature of the hostile screen. In exceptional cases as much as a battalion may be necessary in order to break through the hostile screen and enable the commander or officer in charge to reconnoiter in person.

A large reconnoitering party is conducted so as to open the way for small patrols, to serve as a supporting force or rallying point for them, and to receive and transmit information. Such parties maintain signal communication with the main body if practicable.

392. Each separate column moving forward to deploy must reconnoiter to its front and flank and keep in touch with adjoining columns. The extent of the reconnaissance to the flank depends upon the isolation of the columns.

393. Before an attack a reconnaissance must be made to determine the enemy's position, the location of his flanks, the character of the terrain, the nature of the hostile field works, etc., in order to prevent premature deployment and the resulting fatigue and loss of time.

It will frequently be necessary to send forward a thin skirmish line in order to induce the enemy to open fire and reveal his position.

394. It will frequently be impossible to obtain satisfactory information until after the action has begun. The delay that may be warranted for the purpose of reconnaissance depends upon the nature of the attack and the necessity for promptness. For example, in a meeting engagement, and sometimes in a holding attack, the reconnaissance may have to be hasty and superficial, whereas in an attack against an enemy carefully prepared for defense there will generally be both time and necessity for thorough reconnaissance.

395. In defense, reconnaissance must be kept up to determine the enemy's line of advance, to ascertain his dispositions, to prevent his reconnaissance, etc.

Patrols or parties posted to prevent hostile reconnaissance should relieve the main body of the necessity of betraying its position by firing on small bodies of the enemy.

396. Reconnaissance continues throughout the action.

A firing or skirmish line can take care of its front, but its flanks are especially vulnerable to modern firearms. The moral effect of flanking fire is as great as the physical effect. Hence, combat patrols to give warning or covering detachments to give security are indispensable on exposed flanks. This is equally true in attack or defense.

397. The fact that cavalry patrols are known to be posted in a certain direction does not relieve infantry commanders of the responsibility for reconnaissance and security.

To be surprised by an enemy at short range is an unpardonable offense.

398. The commander of a battalion on a flank of a general line invariably provides for the necessary reconnaissance and security on that flank unless higher authority has specifically ordered it. In any event, he sends out combat patrols as needed.

Where his battalion is on a flank of one section of the line and a considerable interval lies between his battalion and the next section, he makes similar provision.

399. Battalion commanders in the first line establish patrols to observe and report the progress or conduct of adjoining troops when these can not be seen.



FIRE SUPERIORITY.

PURPOSE AND NATURE.

400. In a decisive battle success depends on gaining and maintaining fire superiority. Every effort must be made to gain it early and then to keep it.

Attacking troops must first gain fire superiority in order to reach the hostile position. Over open ground attack is possible only when the attacking force has a decided fire superiority. With such superiority the attack is not only possible, but success is probable and without ruinous losses.

Defending troops can prevent a charge only when they can master the enemy's fire and inflict heavy losses upon him.

401. To obtain fire superiority it is necessary to produce a heavy volume of accurate fire. Every increase in the effectiveness of the fire means a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of the enemy's fire.

The volume and accuracy of fire will depend upon several considerations:

(a) The number of rifles employed. On a given front the greatest volume of fire is produced by a firing line having only sufficient intervals between men to permit the free use of their rifles. The maximum density of a firing line is therefore about one man per yard of front.

(b) The rate of fire affects its volume; an excessive rate reduces its accuracy.

(c) The character of the target influences both volume and accuracy. Larger dimensions, greater visibility, and shorter range increase the rate of fire; greater density increases the effect.

(d) Training and discipline have an important bearing on the rate or volume of fire, but their greatest influence is upon accuracy.

The firing efficiency, of troops is reduced by fatigue and adverse psychological influences.

(e) Fire direction and control improve collective accuracy. The importance of fire direction increases rapidly with the range. Control exerts a powerful influence at all ranges.

FIRE DIRECTION AND CONTROL.

Opening Fire.

402. Beyond effective ranges important results can be expected only when the target is large and distinct and much ammunition is used.

Long-range fire is permissible in pursuit on account of the moral effect of any fire under the circumstances. At other times such fire is of doubtful value.

403. In attack, the desire to open fire when losses are first felt must be repressed. Considerations of time, target, ammunition, and morale make it imperative that the attack withhold its fire and press forward to a first firing position close to the enemy. The attacker's target will be smaller and fainter than the one he presents to the enemy.

404. In defense, more ammunition is available, ranges are more easily determined, and the enemy usually presents a larger target. The defender may therefore open fire and expect results at longer ranges than the attacker, and particularly if the defenders intend a delaying action only.

If the enemy has a powerful artillery, it will often be best for the defending infantry to withhold its fire until the enemy offers a specially favorable target. Vigorous and well-directed bursts of fire are then employed. The troops should therefore be given as much artificial protection as time and means permit, and at an agreed signal expose themselves as much as necessary and open fire.

405. In unexpected, close encounters a great advantage accrues to the side which first opens rapid and accurate fire with battle sight.

Use of Ground.

406. The position of the firers must afford a suitable field of fire.

The ground should permit constant observation of the enemy, and yet enable the men to secure some cover when not actually firing.

Troops whose target is for the moment hidden by unfavorable ground, either move forward to better ground or seek to execute cross fire on another target.

407. The likelihood of a target being hit depends to a great extent upon its visibility. By skillful use of ground, a firing line may reduce its visibility without loss of fire power. Sky lines are particularly to be avoided.

Choice of Target.

408. The target chosen should be the hostile troops most dangerous to the firers. These will usually be the nearest hostile infantry. When no target is specially dangerous, that one should be chosen which promises the most hits.

409. Frequent changes of target impair the fire effect. Random changes to small, unimportant targets impair fire discipline and accomplish nothing. Attention should be confined to the main target until substantial reason for change is apparent.

410. An opportunity to deliver flanking fire, especially against artillery protected in front by shields, is an example warranting change of target and should never be overlooked. Such fire demoralizes the troops subjected to it, even if the losses inflicted are small. In this manner a relatively small number of rifles can produce important results.

The Range.

411. Beyond close range, the correct setting of the rear sight is of primary importance, provided the troops are trained and well in hand. The necessity for correct sight setting increases rapidly with the range. Its importance decreases as the quality of the troops decrease, for the error in sight setting, except possibly at very long ranges, becomes unimportant when compared with the error in holding and aiming.

412. In attack, distances must usually be estimated and corrections made as errors are observed. Mechanical range finders and ranging volleys are practicable at times.

In defense, it is generally practicable to measure more accurately the distances to visible objects and to keep a record of them for future use.

Distribution of Fire and Target.

413. The purpose of fire superiority is to get hits whenever possible, but at all events to keep down the enemy's fire and render it harmless. To accomplish this the target must be covered with fire throughout its whole extent. Troops who are not fired upon will fire with nearly peace-time accuracy.

The target is roughly divided and a part is assigned to each unit. No part of the target is neglected. In attack, by a system of overlapping in assigning targets to platoons, the entire hostile line can be kept under fire even during a rush.

Observation.

414. The correctness of the sight setting and the distribution of fire over the target can be verified only by careful observation of the target, the adjacent ground, and the effect upon the enemy.

415. Observation only can determine whether the fire fight is being properly conducted. If the enemy's fire is losing in accuracy and effect, the observer realizes that his side is gaining superiority. If the enemy's fire remains or becomes effective and persistent, he realizes that corrective measures are necessary to increase either volume or accuracy, or both.

Discipline.

416. Discipline makes good direction and control possible and is the distinguishing mark of trained troops.

417. The discipline necessary in the firing line will be absent unless officers and noncommissioned officers can make their will known to the men. In the company, therefore, communication must be by simple signals which, in the roar of musketry, will attract the attention and convey the correct meaning.

Expenditure of Ammunition.

418. In attack the supply is more limited than in defense. Better judgment must be exercised in expenditure. Ordinarily, troops in the firing line of an attack can not expect to have that day more ammunition than they carry into the combat, except such additions as come from the distribution of ammunition of dead and wounded and the surplus brought by reinforcements.

419. When a certain fire effect is required, the necessary ammunition must be expended without hesitation. Several hours of firing may be necessary to gain fire superiority. True economy can be practiced only by closing on the enemy before first opening fire and thereafter suspending fire when there is nothing to shoot at.

Supporting Artillery.

420. Artillery fire is the principal aid to the infantry in gaining and keeping fire superiority, not only by its hits, but by the moral effect it produces on the enemy.

421. In attack, artillery assists the forward movement of the infantry. It keeps down the fire of the hostile artillery and seeks to neutralize the hostile infantry by inflicting losses upon it, destroying its morale, driving it to cover, and preventing it from using its weapons effectively.

In defense, it ignores the hostile artillery when the enemy's attack reaches a decisive stage and assists in checking the attack, joining its fire power to that of the defending infantry.

422. Troops should be accustomed to being fired over by friendly artillery and impressed with the fact that the artillery should continue firing upon the enemy until the last possible moment. The few casualties resulting from shrapnel bursting short are trifling compared with those that would result from the increased effectiveness of the enemy's infantry fire were the friendly artillery to cease firing.

Casualties inflicted by supporting artillery are not probable until the opposing infantry lines are less than 200 yards apart.

423. When the distance between the hostile infantry lines becomes so short as to render further use of friendly artillery inadvisable, the commander of the infantry firing line, using a preconcerted signal,[3] informs the artillery commander. The latter usually increases the range in order to impede the strengthening of the enemy's foremost line.

[Footnote 3: With a 4-foot white and red regimental signal flag.]

Fire of Position.

424. Infantry is said to execute fire of position when it is posted so as to assist an attack by firing over the heads, or off the flank, of the attacking troops and is not itself to engage in the advance; or when, in defense, it is similarly posted to augment the fire of the main firing line.

Machine guns serve a like purpose.

In a decisive action, fire of position should be employed whenever the terrain permits and reserve infantry is available.



DEPLOYMENT.

425. Troops are massed preparatory to deployment when the nature of their deployment can not be foreseen or it is desirable to shorten the column or to clear the road. Otherwise, in the deployment of large commands, whether in march column, in bivouac, or massed, and whether forming for attack or for defense, they are ordinarily first formed into a line of columns to facilitate the extension of the front prior to deploying.

The rough line or lines of columns thus formed enable troops to take advantage of the terrain in advancing and shorten the time occupied in forming the firing line.

426. In deploying the division each brigade is assigned a definite task or objective. On receipt of his orders, the brigade commander conducts his brigade in column or in line of regiments until it is advisable that it be broken into smaller columns. He then issues his order, assigning to each regiment its task, if practicable. In a similar manner the regimental commanders lead their regiments forward in column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing the regimental order. It is seldom advisable to break up the battalion before issuing orders for its deployment.

427. Each subordinate commander, after receiving his order for the action, should precede his command as far as possible, in order to reconnoiter the ground personally, and should prepare to issue his orders promptly.

428. Each commander of a column directs the necessary reconnaissance to front and flank; by this means and by a judicious choice of ground he guards against surprise.

429. The premature formation of the firing line causes unnecessary fatigue and loss of time, and may result in a faulty direction being taken. Troops once deployed make even minor changes of direction with difficulty, and this difficulty increases with the length of the firing line.

430. In the larger units, when the original deployment is found to be in the wrong direction, it will usually be necessary to deploy the reserve on the correct front and withdraw and assemble the first line.

431. To gain decisive results, it will generally be necessary to use all the troops at some stage of the combat. But in the beginning, while the situation is uncertain, care should be taken not to engage too large a proportion of the command. On the other hand, there is no greater error than to employ too few and to sacrifice them by driblets.

432. When it is intended to fight to a decision, fire superiority is essential. To gain this, two things are necessary: A heavy fire and a fire well directed and controlled. Both of these are best obtained when the firing line is as dense as practicable, while leaving the men room for the free use of their rifles.

If the men are too widely separated, direction and control are very difficult, often impossible, and the intensity of fire is slight in proportion to the front occupied.

433. In an attack or stubborn defense the firing line should have a density of one man per yard of front occupied.

Where the tactical situation demands the holding of a line too long to be occupied throughout at this density, it is generally better to deploy companies or platoons at one man per yard, leaving gaps in the line between them, than to distribute the men uniformly at increased intervals.

434. A relatively thin firing line may be employed when merely covering the movements of other forces; when on the defensive against poor troops; when the final action to be taken has not yet been determined; and, in general, when fire superiority is not necessary.

435. The length of the firing line that the whole force may employ depends upon the density of the line and the strength in rear required by the situation.

Supports and reserves constitute the strength in rear.

In a decisive attack they should be at least strong enough to replace a heavy loss in the original firing line and to increase the charging line to a density of at least one and one-half men per yard and still have troops in rear for protection and for the other purposes mentioned above.

436. In the original deployment the strength of the reserve held out by each commander comprises from one-sixth to two-thirds of his unit, depending upon the nature of the service expected of the reserve.

A small force in a covering or delaying action requires very little strength in rear, while a large force fighting a decisive battle requires much. Therefore, depending upon circumstances, the original deployment, including the strength in rear, may vary from 1 to 10 men per yard. Against an enemy poorly disciplined and trained, or lacking in morale, a thinner deployment is permissible.

437. The density of the whole deployment increases with the size of the command, because the larger the command the greater the necessity for reserves. Thus, a battalion acting alone may attack with two men per yard of front, but a regiment, with three battalions, may only double the front of the one battalion.

438. By the assignment of divisions or larger units to parts of a line of battle several miles long, a series of semi-independent battle, or local combat, districts are created.

The general deployment for a long line of battle comprising several battle districts is not directly considered in these regulations. The deployments treated of herein are those of the infantry within such districts.

The density of deployment in these districts may vary greatly, depending upon the activity expected in each. Within these battle districts, as well as in smaller forces acting alone, parts of the line temporarily of less importance may be held weakly, in order to economize troops and to have more at the decisive point.

439. The front that a unit may occupy when deployed depends also upon whether its flanks are secured. If both flanks are secured by other troops, the unit may increase its front materially by reducing its reserve or supports. If only one flank is so secured, the front may still be somewhat increased, but the exposed flank must be guarded by posting the supports or reserve toward that flank.

Natural obstacles that secure the flanks have practically the same effect upon deployment.

440. Except when assigned as supports or reserve, regiments in the brigade, battalions in the regiment, and companies in the battalion are, when practicable, deployed side by side.

441. In the deployment, battalions establish the firing line, each furnishing its own support.

In each unit larger than the battalion a reserve is held out, its strength depending upon circumstances. In general, the reserve is employed by the commander to meet or improve conditions brought about by the action of the firing line. It must not be too weak or too split up. It must be posted where the commander believes it will be needed for decisive action, or where he desires to bring about such action. When necessary, parts of it reenforce or prolong the firing line.



ATTACK.

442. An attack is bound to succeed if fire superiority is gained and properly used.

To gain this superiority generally requires that the attack employ more rifles than the defense; this in turn means a longer line, as both sides will probably hold a strong firing line.

443. With large forces, a direct frontal attack gives the attacker little opportunity to bring more rifles to bear. However, if the enemy is unduly extended, a frontal attack may give very decisive results.

444. Owing to the difficulty of control and the danger of the parts being defeated in detail, wide turning movements are seldom allowable except in large forces.

445. If the attack can be so directed that, while the front is covered, another fraction of the command strikes a flank more or less obliquely (an enveloping attack) the advantages gained are a longer line and more rifles in action; also a converging fire opposed to the enemy's diverging fire.

446. An envelopment of both flanks should never be attempted without a very decided superiority in numbers.

447. The enveloping attack will nearly always result locally in a frontal attack, for it will be met by the enemy's reserve. The advantage of envelopment lies in the longer concentric line, with its preponderance of rifles and its converging fire.

448. Cooperation between the frontal and enveloping attacks is essential to success. Both should be pushed vigorously and simultaneously, and ordinarily both should move simultaneously to the charge; but at the final stage of the attack conditions may sometimes warrant one in charging while the other supports it with fire.

The envelopment of a flank is brought about with difficulty when made by troops already deployed in another direction or by their reserves. The two attacks should be deployed at a suitable distance apart, with the lines of attack converging in rear of the hostile position. The troops that are to make the enveloping attack should deploy in the proper direction at the start and should be given orders which enable them to gain their point of deployment in the most direct and practical manner.

The enveloping attack is generally made the stronger, especially in small forces.

DEPLOYMENT FOR ATTACK.

449. Where open terrain exposes troops to hostile artillery fire it may be necessary to make the deployment 2 miles or more from the hostile position.

The foreground should be temporarily occupied by covering troops. If the enemy occupies the foreground with detachments, the covering troops must drive them back.

450. To enable large forces to gain ground toward the enemy, it may sometimes be cheaper and quicker in the end to move well forward and to deploy at night. In such case the area in which the deployment is to be made should, if practicable, be occupied by covering troops before dark.

The deployment will be made with great difficulty unless the ground has been studied by daylight. The deployment gains little unless it establishes the firing line well within effective range of the enemy's main position. (See Night Operations.)

451. Each unit assigned a task deploys when on its direction line, or opposite its objective, and when it has no longer sufficient cover for advancing in close order. In the firing line, intervals of 25 to 50 yards should be maintained as long as possible between battalions. In the larger units it may be necessary to indicate on the map the direction or objective, but to battalion commanders it should be pointed out on the ground.

452. The reserve is kept near enough to the firing line to be on hand at the decisive stage. It is posted with reference to the attack, or to that part of the attacking line, from which the greater results are expected; it is also charged with flank protection, but should be kept intact.

Supports are considered in paragraphs 225 to 228, inclusive, and 298 to 302, inclusive.

ADVANCING THE ATTACK.

453. The firing line must ordinarily advance a long distance before it is justified in opening fire. It can not combat the enemy's artillery, and it is at a disadvantage if it combats the defender's long-range rifle fire. Hence it ignores both and, by taking full advantage of cover and of the discipline of the troops, advances to a first firing position at the shortest range possible.

Formations for crossing this zone with the minimum loss are considered in paragraphs 212 to 220, inclusive. These and other methods of crossing such zones should be studied and practiced.

454. The best protection against loss while advancing is to escape the enemy's view.

455. Each battalion finds its own firing position, conforming to the general advance as long as practicable and taking advantage of the more advanced position of an adjacent battalion in order to gain ground.

The position from which the attack opens fire is further considered in paragraphs 306 to 308, inclusive.

456. It will frequently become necessary for infantry moving to the attack to pass through deployed artillery. This should be done so as to interfere as little as possible with the latter's fire, and never so as to cause that fire to cease entirely. As far as practicable, advantage should be taken of intervals in the line, if any. An understanding between artillery and infantry commanders should be had, so as to effect the movement to the best advantage.

457. In advancing the attack, advanced elements of the firing line or detachments in front of it should not open fire except in defense or to clear the foreground of the enemy. Fire on the hostile main position should not be opened until all or nearly all of the firing line can join in the fire.

THE FIRE ATTACK.

458. At the first firing position the attack seeks to gain fire superiority. This may necessitate a steady, accurate fire for a long time. The object is to subdue the enemy's fire and keep it subdued so that the attacking troops may advance from this point to a favorable place near the enemy from which the charge may be made. Hence, in the advance by rushes, sufficient rifles must be kept constantly in action to keep down the enemy's fire; this determines the size of the fraction rushing.

459. To advance without fire superiority against a determined defense would result in such losses as to bring the attack to a standstill or to make the apparent success barren of results.

460. Diminution of the enemy's fire and a pronounced loss in effectiveness are the surest signs that fire superiority has been gained and that a part of the firing line can advance.

461. The men must be impressed with the fact that, having made a considerable advance under fire and having been checked, it is suicidal to turn back in daylight.

If they can advance no farther, they must intrench and hold on until the fall of darkness or a favorable turn in the situation develops.

Intrenching is resorted to only when necessary. Troops who have intrenched themselves under fire are moved forward again with difficulty.

462. Supports and reserves occupying intrenchments vacated by the firing line should improve them, but they must not be held back or diverted from their true missions on this account.

463. Paragraphs 309 to 317, inclusive, deal more in detail with the conduct of the fire attack.

THE CHARGE.

464. Fire superiority beats down the enemy's fire, destroys his resistance and morale, and enables the attacking troops to close on him, but an actual or threatened occupation of his position is needed to drive him out and defeat him.

The psychological moment for the charge can not be determined far in advance. The tactical instinct of the responsible officer must decide.

465. The defenders, if subjugated by the fire attack, will frequently leave before the charge begins. On the other hand, it may be necessary to carry the fire attack close to the position and follow it up with a short dash and a bayonet combat. Hence the distance over which the charge may be made will vary between wide limits. It may be from 25 to 400 yards.

The charge should be made at the earliest moment that promises success; otherwise the full advantage of victory will be lost.

466. The commander of the attacking line should indicate his approval, or give the order, before the charge is made. Subordinate commanders, usually battalion commanders, whose troops are ready to charge signal that fact to the commander. It may be necessary for them to wait until other battalions or other parts of the line are ready or until the necessary reserves arrive.

At the signal for the charge the firing line and nearby supports and reserves rush forward. See paragraphs 318 and 319.

The charge is made simultaneously, if possible, by all the units participating therein, but, once committed to the assault, battalions should be pushed with the utmost vigor and no restraint placed on the ardor of charging troops by an attempt to maintain alignment.

467. Before ordering the charge the commander should see that enough troops are on hand to make it a success. Local reserves joining the firing line in time to participate in the charge give it a strong impetus. Too dense a mass should be avoided.

468. The line should be strengthened by prolongation, if practicable, and remaining troops kept in formation for future use; but rather than that the attack should fail, the last formed body will be sent in, unless it is very apparent that it can do no good.

469. To arrive in the hostile position with a very compact firing line and a few formed supports is sufficient for a victory, but an additional force kept well in hand for pursuit is of inestimable value.

470. A premature charge by a part of the line should be avoided, but if begun, the other parts of the line should join at once if there is any prospect of success. Under exceptional conditions a part of the line may be compelled to charge without authority from the rear. The intention to do so should be signaled to the rear.

471. Confidence in their ability to use the bayonet gives the assaulting troops the promise of success.

472. If the enemy has left the position when the charging troops reach it, the latter should open a rapid fire upon the retreating enemy, if he is in sight. It is not advisable for the mixed and disordered units to follow him, except to advance to a favorable firing position or to cover the reorganization of others.

473. The nearest formed bodies accompanying or following the charge are sent instantly in pursuit. Under cover of these troops order is restored in the charging line. If the captured position is part of a general line or is an advanced post, it should be intrenched and occupied at once.

The exhaustion of officers and men must not cause the neglect of measures to meet a counterattack.

474. If the attack receives a temporary setback and it is intended to strengthen and continue it, officers will make every effort to stop the rearward movement and will reestablish the firing line in a covered position as close as possible to the enemy.

475. If the attack must be abandoned, the rearward movement should continue with promptness until the troops reach a feature of the terrain that facilitates the task of checking and reorganizing them. The point selected should be so far to the rear as to prevent interference by the enemy before the troops are ready to resist. The withdrawal of the attacking troops should be covered by the artillery and by reserves, if any are available.

See Night Operations.

PURSUIT.

476. To reap the full fruits of victory a vigorous pursuit must be made. The natural inclination to be satisfied with a successful charge must be overcome. The enemy must be allowed no more time to reorganize than is positively unavoidable.

477. The part of the reserve that is still formed or is best under control is sent forward in pursuit and vigorously attacks the enemy's main body or covering detachments wherever found.

The artillery delivers a heavy fire upon the retreating enemy; the disordered attacking troops secure the position, promptly re-form, and become a new reserve.

478. If the captured position is a section of the general line, the breach should be heavily occupied, made wider, and strongly secured by drawing on all reserves in the vicinity.

479. After the pursuit from the immediate battle field, pursuit by parallel roads is especially effective where large commands are concerned.

480. Artillery and cavalry are very effective in pursuit.

ATTACK OF FORTIFICATIONS.

481. Few modifications enter into the problem of attacking fortifications. Such as are to be considered relate chiefly to the greater time and labor of advancing, the more frequent use of darkness and the use of hand grenades to augment the fire.

482. If the enemy is strongly fortified and time permits, it may be advisable to wait and approach the charging point under cover of darkness. The necessary reconnaissance and arrangements should be made before dark. If the charge is not to be made at once, the troops intrench the advanced position, using sand bags if necessary. Before daylight the foreground should be cleared of obstacles.

483. If the distance is short and other conditions are favorable, the charge may be made without fire preparation. If made, it should be launched with spirit and suddenness at the break of day. (See Night Operations.)

484. In siege operations troops are usually advanced to the charging point by sapping. This method, however, presupposes that an early victory is not necessary or that it is clearly inadvisable to attempt more direct methods.

HOLDING ATTACK.

485. The holding attack must be vigorous enough to hold the enemy in position and must present a front strong enough to conceal the secondary nature of the attack.

The holding attack need have comparatively little strength in rear, but conceals the fact by a firing line not distinguishable from that of a decisive attack.

486. Supports and reserves are kept at short distances. Their strength is less if the object is merely to hold the enemy fast than if the object is, in addition, to compel him to use up reserves.

487. Holding attacks which may later develop into decisive attacks should be correspondingly strong in rear.

488. All feint attacks should employ dense firing lines. Their weakness is in rear and is concealed.



DEFENSE.

POSITIONS AND INTRENCHMENTS.

489. The first requirement of a good position is a clear field of fire and view to the front and exposed flanks to a distance of 600 to 800 yards or more. The length of front should be suitable to the size of the command and the flanks should be secure. The position should have lateral communication and cover for supports and reserves. It should be one which the enemy can not avoid, but must attack or give up his mission.

A position having all these advantages will rarely, if ever, be found. The one should be taken which conforms closest to the description.

490. The natural cover of the position should be fully utilized. In addition, it should be strengthened by fieldworks and obstacles.

The best protection is afforded by deep, narrow, inconspicuous trenches. If little time is available, as much as practicable must be done. That the fieldworks may not be needed should not cause their construction to be omitted, and the fact that they have been constructed should not influence the action of a commander, if conditions are found to be other than expected.

491. When time and troops are available the preparations include the necessary communicating and cover trenches, head cover, bombproofs, etc. The fire trenches should be well supplied with ammunition.

The supports are placed close at hand in cover trenches when natural cover is not available.

492. Dummy trenches frequently cause the hostile artillery to waste time and ammunition and to divert its fire.

493. The location, extent, profile, garrison, etc., of fieldworks are matters to be decided by the infantry commanders. Officers must be able to choose ground and properly intrench it. (See Intrenchments.)

494. In combat exercises, when it is impracticable to construct the trenches appropriate to the exercise, their trace may be outlined by bayonets, sticks, or other markers, and the responsible officers required to indicate the profile selected, method and time of construction, garrisons, etc.

DEPLOYMENT FOR DEFENSE.

495. The density of the whole deployment depends upon the expected severity of the action, the character of the enemy, the condition of the flanks, the field of fire, the terrain, and the available artificial or natural protection for the troops.

496. If exposed, the firing line should be as dense in defense as in attack. If the firing line is well intrenched and has a good field of fire, it may be made thinner.

Weaker supports are permissible. For the same number of troops the front occupied on the defensive may therefore be longer than on the offensive, the battalions placing more companies in the firing line.

497. If it is intended only to delay the enemy, a fairly strong deployment is sufficient, but if decisive results are desired, a change to the offensive must be contemplated and the corresponding strength in rear provided. This strength is in the reserve, which should be as large as the demands of the firing line and supports permit. Even in a passive defense the reserve should be as strong as in the attack, unless the flanks are protected by other means.

498. Supports are posted as close to the firing line as practicable and reinforce the latter according to the principles explained in the attack. When natural cover is not sufficient for the purpose, communicating and cover trenches are constructed. If time does not permit their construction, it is better to begin the action with a very dense firing line and no immediate supports than to have supports greatly exposed in rear.

499. The reserve should be posted so as to be entirely free to act as a whole, according to the developments. The distance from firing line to reserve is generally greater than in the attack. By reason of such a location the reserve is best able to meet a hostile enveloping attack; it has a better position from which to make a counter attack; it is in a better position to cover a withdrawal and permit an orderly retreat.

The distance from firing line to reserve increases with the size of the reserve.

500. When the situation is no longer in doubt, the reserve should be held in rear of the flank which is most in danger or offers the best opportunity for counterattack. Usually the same flank best suits both purposes.

501. In exceptional cases, on broad fronts, it may be necessary to detach a part of the reserve to protect the opposite flank. This detachment should be the smallest consistent with its purely protective mission.

502. The commander assigns to subordinates the front to be occupied by them. These, in turn, subdivide the front among their next lower units in the firing line.

503. An extended position is so divided into sections that each has, if practicable, a field of fire naturally made distinct by the terrain.

Unfavorable and unimportant ground will ordinarily cause gaps to exist in the line.

504. The size of the unit occupying each section depends upon the latter's natural strength, front, and importance. If practicable, battalions should be kept intact and assigned as units to sections or parts of sections.

505. Where important dead space lies in front of one section, an adjoining section should be instructed to cover it with fire when necessary, or machine guns should be concealed for the like purpose.

506. Advanced posts, or any other form of unnecessary dispersion, should be avoided.

507. Unless the difficulty of moving the troops into the position be great, most of the troops of the firing line are held in rear of it until the infantry attack begins. The position itself is occupied by a small garrison only, with the necessary outguards or patrols in front.

508. Fire alone can not be depended upon to stop the attack. The troops must be determined to resort to the bayonet, if necessary.

509. If a night attack or close approach by the enemy is expected, troops in a prepared position should strengthen the outguards and firing line and construct as numerous and effective obstacles as possible. Supports and local reserves should move close to the firing line and should, with the firing line, keep bayonets fixed. If practicable, the front should be illuminated, preferably from the flanks of the section.

510. Only short range fire is of any value in resisting night attacks. The bayonet is the chief reliance. (See Night Operations.)

COUNTERATTACK.

511. The passive defense should be assumed only when circumstances force it. Only the offensive wins.

512. An active defense seeks a favorable decision. A favorable decision can not be expected without counterattack.

513. A passive defense in a position whose flanks are not protected by natural obstacles is generally out of the question.

514. Where the defense is assumed with a view to making a counterattack, the troops for the counterattack should be held in reserve until the time arrives for such attack. The defensive line should be held by as few troops as possible in order that the force for the offensive may be as large as possible.

The force for the counterattack should be held echeloned in rear of the flank which offers it the greatest advantage for the proposed attack.

515. The counterattack should be made vigorously and at the proper time. It will usually be made:

By launching the reserve against the enemy's flank when his attack is in full progress. This is the most effective form of counterattack.

Straight to the front by the firing line and supports after repulsing the enemy's attack and demoralizing him with pursuing fire.

Or, by the troops in rear of the firing line when the enemy has reached the defensive position and is in disorder.

516. Minor counterattacks are sometimes necessary in order to drive the enemy from important positions gained by him.

DELAYING ACTION.

517. When a position is taken merely to delay the enemy and to withdraw before becoming closely engaged, the important considerations are:

The enemy should be forced to deploy early. The field of fire should therefore be good at distances from 500 to 1,200 yards or more; a good field of fire at close range is not necessary.

The ground in rear of the position should favor the withdrawal of the firing line by screening the troops from the enemy's view and fire as soon as the position is vacated.

518. A thin firing line using much ammunition will generally answer the purpose. Supports are needed chiefly to protect the flanks.

The reserve should be posted well in rear to assist in the withdrawal of the firing line.

519. Artillery is especially valuable to a delaying force.



MEETING ENGAGEMENTS.

520. Meeting engagements are characterized by the necessity for hasty reconnaissance, or the almost total absence of reconnaissance; by the necessity for rapid deployment, frequently under fire; and usually by the absence of trenches or other artificial cover. These conditions give further advantages to the offensive.

521. The whole situation will usually indicate beforehand the proper general action to be taken on meeting the enemy.

522. Little fresh information can be expected. The boldness, initiative, and determination of the commander must be relied upon.

523. A meeting engagement affords an ideal opportunity to the commander who has intuition and quick decision and who is willing to take long chances. His opponent is likely to be overcautious.

524. The amount of information that the commander is warranted in awaiting before taking final action depends entirely upon his mission. One situation may demand a blind attack; another may demand rapid, partial deployment for attack, but careful and time-consuming reconnaissance before the attack is launched.

525. A great advantage accrues to the side which can deploy the faster. The advantage of a close-order formation, favoring rapid deployment, becomes more pronounced with the size of the force.

526. The first troops to deploy will be able to attack with longer firing lines and weaker supports than are required in the ordinary case. But if the enemy succeeds in deploying a strong, defensive line, the attack must be strengthened accordingly before it is wasted.

527. If the situation warrants the advance, the leading troops seek to deploy faster than the enemy, to reach his flanks, check his deployment, and get information. In any event, they seek to cover the deployment of their own troops in rear—especially the artillery—and to seize important ground.

528. The commander of a long column which meets the enemy should be with the advance guard to receive information promptly and to reconnoiter. If he decides to fight, the advance guard must hold the enemy while the commander formulates a plan of action, issues the necessary orders, and deploys the main body. Meantime, the column should be closing up, either in mass or to form line of columns, so that the deployment, when determined upon, may be made more promptly.

529. The action of the advance guard, prior to the receipt of orders, depends upon the situation. Whether to attack determinedly or only as a feint, or to assume the defensive, depends upon the strength of the advance guard, the terrain, the character of the hostile force encountered, and the mission and intentions of the commander of the whole.

530. If the enemy is beforehand or more aggressive, or if the advance guard is too weak, it may be necessary to put elements of the main body into action as fast as they arrive, in order to check him. This method should be avoided; it prevents the formation and execution of a definite plan and compels piecemeal action. The best results are obtained when the main body is used as a whole.



WITHDRAWAL FROM ACTION.

531. The withdrawal of a defeated force can generally be effected only at a heavy cost. When it is no longer possible to give the action a favorable turn and the necessity for withdrawal arises, every effort must be made to place distance and a rear guard between the enemy and the defeated troops.

532. Artillery gives especially valuable assistance in the withdrawal. The long-range fire of machine guns should also be employed. Cavalry assists the withdrawal by charging the pursuing troops or by taking flank positions and using fire action.

533. If an intact reserve remains it should be placed in a covering position, preferably on a flank, to check the pursuit and thus enable the defeated troops to withdraw beyond reach of hostile fire.

The covering position of the reserve should be at some distance from the main action, but close enough to bring the withdrawing troops quickly under the protection of its fire. It should have a good field of fire at effective and long ranges and should facilitate its own safe and timely withdrawal.

534. If the general line is divided, by terrain or by organization, into two or more parts, the firing line of the part in the least danger from pursuit should be withdrawn first. A continuous firing line, whose parts are dependent upon one another for fire support, should be withdrawn as a whole, retiring by echelon at the beginning of the withdrawal. Every effort must be made to restore the organizations, regain control, and form column of march as soon as the troops are beyond the reach of hostile fire.

As fast as possible without delaying the march, companies, and the larger units should be re-formed, so that the command will again be well in hand.

535. The commander of the whole, having given orders for withdrawal, should go to the rear, select a rendezvous point, and devote himself to the reorganization of his command.

The rendezvous point is selected with regard to the natural channels of movement approximately straight to the rear. It should be distant from the battle field and should facilitate the gathering and protection of the command.

SUMMARY.

536. 1. Avoid combats that offer no chance of victory or other valuable results.

2. Make every effort for the success of the general plan and avoid spectacular plays that have no bearing on the general result.

3. Have a definite plan and carry it out vigorously. Do not vacillate.

4. Do not attempt complicated maneuvers.

5. Keep the command in hand; avoid undue extension and dispersion.

6. Study the ground and direct the advance in such a way as to take advantage of all available cover and thereby diminish losses.

7. Never deploy until the purpose and the proper direction are known.

8. Deploy enough men for the immediate task in hand; hold out the rest and avoid undue haste in committing them to the action.

9. Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain.

10. In a decisive action, gain and keep fire superiority.

11. Keep up reconnaissance.

12. Use the reserve, but not until needed or a very favorable opportunity for its use presents itself. Keep some reserve as long as practicable.

13. Do not hesitate to sacrifice the command if the result is worth the cost.

14. Spare the command all unnecessary hardship and exertion.



MISCELLANEOUS.

MACHINE GUNS.

537. Machine guns must be considered as weapons of emergency. Their effectiveness combined with their mobility renders them of great value at critical, though infrequent, periods of an engagement.

538. When operating against infantry only, they can be used to a great extent throughout the combat as circumstances may indicate, but they are quickly rendered powerless by efficient field artillery and will promptly draw artillery fire whenever they open. Hence their use in engagements between large commands must be for short periods and at times when their great effectiveness will be most valuable.

539. Machine guns should be attached to the advance guard. In meeting engagements they will be of great value in assisting their own advance, or in checking the advance of the enemy, and will have considerable time to operate before hostile artillery fire can silence them.

Care must be taken not to leave them too long in action.

540. They are valuable to a rear guard which seeks to check a vigorous pursuit or to gain time.

541. In attack, if fire of position is practicable, they are of great value. In this case fire should not be opened by the machine guns until the attack is well advanced. At a critical period in the attack, such fire, if suddenly and unexpectedly opened, will greatly assist the advancing line. The fire must be as heavy as possible and must be continued until masked by friendly troops or until the hostile artillery finds the machine guns.

542. In the defense, machine guns should be used in the same general manner as described above for the attack. Concealment and patient waiting for critical moments and exceptional opportunities are the special characteristics of the machine gun service in decisive actions.

543. As part of the reserve, machine guns have special importance. If they are with the troops told off to protect the flanks, and if they are well placed, they will often produce decisive results against a hostile turning movement. They are especially qualified to cover a withdrawal or make a captured position secure.

544. Machine guns should not be assigned to the firing line of an attack. They should be so placed that fire directed upon them is not likely to fall upon the firing line.

545. A skirmish line can not advance by walking or running when hostile machine guns have the correct range and are ready to fire. Machine-gun fire is not specially effective against troops lying on the ground or crawling.

546. When opposed by machine guns and without artillery to destroy them, infantry itself must silence them before it can advance.

An infantry command that must depend upon itself for protection against machine guns should concentrate a large number of rifles on each gun in turn and until it has silenced it.

AMMUNITION SUPPLY.

547. The method of supply of ammunition to the combat trains is explained in Field Service Regulations.

548. The combat train is the immediate reserve supply of the battalion, and the major is responsible for its proper use. He will take measures to insure the maintenance of the prescribed allowance at all times.

In the absence of instructions, he will cause the train to march immediately in rear of his battalion, and, upon separating from it to enter an engagement, will cause the ammunition therein to be issued. When emptied, he will direct that the wagons proceed to the proper rendezvous to be refilled. Ordinarily a rendezvous is appointed for each brigade and the necessary number of wagons sent forward to it from the ammunition column.

549. When refilled, the combat wagons will rejoin their battalions, or, if the latter be engaged, will join or establish communication with the regimental reserve.

550. Company commanders are responsible that the belts of the men in their companies are kept filled at all times, except when the ammunition is being expended in action. In the firing line the ammunition of the dead and wounded should be secured whenever practicable.

551. Ammunition in the bandoleers will ordinarily be expended first. Thirty rounds in the right pocket section of the belt will be held as a reserve, to be expended only when ordered by an officer.

552. When necessary to resupply the firing line, ammunition will be sent forward with reenforcements, generally from the regimental reserve.

Men will never be sent back from the firing line for ammunition. Men sent forward with ammunition remain with the firing line.

553. As soon as possible after an engagement the belts of the men and the combat wagons are resupplied to their normal capacities. Ammunition which can not be reloaded on combat wagons will be piled up in a convenient place and left under guard.

MOUNTED SCOUTS.

554. The mounted scouts should be thoroughly trained in patrolling and reconnaissance. They are used for communication with neighboring troops, for patrolling off the route of march, for march outposts, outpost patrols, combat patrols, reconnaissance ahead of columns, etc. Their further use is, in general, confined to escort and messenger duty. They should be freely used for all these purposes, but for these purposes only.

555. When infantry is acting alone, or when the cavalry of a mixed command has been sent to a distance, the mounted scouts are of special importance to covering detachments and should be used to make the reconnaissance which would otherwise fall to cavalry.

556. In reconnaissance, scouts should be used in preference to other troops as much as possible. When not needed for mounted duty, they should be employed for necessary dismounted patrolling.

557. Battalion staff officers should be specially trained in patrolling and reconnaissance work in order that they may be available when a mounted officer's patrol is required.

NIGHT OPERATIONS.

558. By employing night operations troops make use of the cover of darkness to minimize losses from hostile fire or to escape observation. Night operations may also be necessary for the purpose of gaining time. Control is difficult and confusion is frequently unavoidable.

It may be necessary to take advantage of darkness in order to assault from a point gained during the day, or to approach a point from which a daylight assault is to be made, or to effect both the approach and the assault.

559. Offensive and defensive night operations should be practiced frequently in order that troops may learn to cover ground in the dark and arrive at a destination quietly and in good order, and in order to train officers in the necessary preparation and reconnaissance.

Only simple and well-appointed formations should be employed.

Troops should be thoroughly trained in the necessary details—e.g., night patrolling, night marching, and communication at night.

560. The ground to be traversed should be studied by daylight and, if practicable, at night. It should be cleared of hostile detachments before dark, and, if practicable, should be occupied by covering troops.

Orders must be formulated with great care and clearness. Each unit must be given a definite objective and direction, and care must be exercised to avoid collision between units.

Whenever contact with the enemy is anticipated, a distinctive badge should be worn by all.

561. Preparations must be made with secrecy. When the movement is started, and not until then, the officers and men should be acquainted with the general design, the composition of the whole force, and should be given such additional information as will insure cooperation and eliminate mistakes.

During the movement every precaution must be taken to keep secret the fact that troops are abroad.

Unfriendly guides must frequently be impressed. These should be secured against escape, outcry, or deception.

Fire action should be avoided in offensive operations. In general, pieces should not be loaded. Men must be trained to rely upon the bayonet and to use it aggressively.

562. Long night marches should be made only over well-defined routes. March discipline must be rigidly enforced. The troops should be marched in as compact a formation as practicable, with the usual covering detachments. Advance and rear guard distances should be greatly reduced. They are shortest when the mission is an offensive one. The connecting files are numerous.

563. A night advance made with a view to making an attack by day usually terminates with the hasty construction of intrenchments in the dark. Such an advance should be timed so as to allow an hour or more of darkness for intrenching.

An advance that is to terminate in an assault at the break of day should be timed so that the troops will not arrive long before the assault is to be made; otherwise the advantage of partial surprise will be lost and the enemy will be allowed to reenforce the threatened point.

564. The night attack is ordinarily confined to small forces, or to minor engagements in a general battle, or to seizure of positions occupied by covering or advanced detachments. Decisive results are not often obtained.

Poorly disciplined and untrained troops are unfit for night attacks or for night operations demanding the exercise of skill and care.

Troops attacking at night can advance close to the enemy in compact formations and without suffering loss from hostile artillery or infantry fire. The defender is ignorant of the strength or direction of the attack.

A force which makes a vigorous bayonet charge in the dark will often throw a much larger force into disorder.

565. Reconnaissance should be made to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to study the terrain to be traversed. Officers who are to participate in the attack should conduct this reconnaissance. Reconnaissance at night is especially valuable. Features that are distinguishable at night should be carefully noted, and their distances from the enemy, from the starting point of the troops, and from other important points should be made known.

Preparations should have in view as complete a surprise as possible. An attack once begun must be carried to its conclusion, even if the surprise is not as complete as was planned or anticipated.

566. The time of night at which the attack should be made depends upon the object sought. If a decisive attack is intended, it will generally yield the best results if made just before daylight. If the object is merely to gain an intrenched position for further operations, an earlier hour is necessary in order that the position gained may be intrenched under cover of darkness.

567. The formation for attack must be simple. It should be carefully effected and the troops verified at a safe distance from the enemy. The attacking troops should be formed in compact lines and with strong supports at short distances. The reserve should be far enough in rear to avoid being drawn into the action until the commander so desires. Bayonets are fixed, pieces are not loaded.

Darkness causes fire to be wild and ineffective. The attacking troops should march steadily on the enemy without firing, but should be prepared and determined to fight vigorously with the bayonet.

In advancing to the attack the aim should be to get as close as possible to the enemy before being discovered, then to trust to the bayonet.

If the assault is successful, preparations must be made at once to repel a counterattack.

568. On the defense, preparations to resist night attacks should be made by daylight whenever such attacks are to be feared.

Obstacles placed in front of a defensive position are especially valuable to the defense at night. Many forms of obstacles which would give an attacker little concern in the daytime become serious hindrances at night.

After dark the foreground should be illuminated whenever practicable and strong patrols should be pushed to the front.

When it is learned that the enemy is approaching, the trenches are filled and the supports moved close to the firing line.

Supports fix bayonets, but do not load. Whenever practicable and necessary they should be used for counterattacks, preferably against a hostile flank.

The defender should open fire as soon as results may be expected. This fire may avert or postpone the bayonet combat, and it warns all supporting troops. It is not likely that fire alone can stop the attack. The defender must be resolved to fight with the bayonet.

Ordinarily fire will not be effective at ranges exceeding 50 yards.

A white rag around the muzzle of the rifle will assist in sighting the piece when the front sight is not visible.

See paragraphs 450, 482, 483, 509, 510.

INFANTRY AGAINST CAVALRY.

569. A cavalry charge can accomplish little against infantry, even in inferior numbers, unless the latter are surprised, become panic-stricken, run away, or can not use their rifles.

570. A charge from the front is easily checked by a well-directed and sustained fire.

If the charge is directed against the flank of the firing line, the supports, reserves, or machine guns should stop it. If this disposition is impracticable, part of the line must meet the charge by a timely change of front. If the flank company, or companies, in the firing line execute platoons right, the successive firing lines can ordinarily break a charge against the flank. If the cavalry line passes through the firing line, the latter will be little damaged if the men retain their presence of mind. They should be on the watch for succeeding cavalry lines and leave those that have passed through to friendly troops in rear.

571. Men standing are in the best position to meet a charge, but other considerations may compel them to meet it lying prone.

572. In a melee, the infantryman with his bayonet has at least an even chance with the cavalryman, but the main dependence of infantry is rifle fire. Any formation is suitable that permits the free use of the necessary number of rifles.

Ordinarily there will be no time to change or set sights. Fire at will at battle sight should be used, whatever the range may be. It will usually be unwise to open fire at long ranges.

573. An infantry column that encounters cavalry should deploy at once. If attacked from the head or rear of the column, and if time is pressing, it may form a succession of skirmish lines. Infantry, by deploying 50 or 100 yards in rear of an obstacle, may check cavalry and hold it under fire beyond effective pistol range.

In any situation, to try to escape the issue by running is the worst and most dangerous course the infantry can adopt.

574. In attacking dismounted cavalry, infantry should close rapidly and endeavor to prevent remounting. Infantry which adopts this course will not be seriously checked by delaying cavalry.

Every effort should be made to locate and open fire on the led horses.

INFANTRY AGAINST ARTILLERY.

575. A frontal attack against artillery has little chance of succeeding unless it can be started from cover at comparatively short range. Beyond short range, the frontal fire of infantry has little effect against the artillery personnel because of their protective shields.

Machine guns, because their cone of fire is more compact, will have greater effect, but on the other hand they will have fewer opportunities and they are limited to fire attack only.

As a rule, one's own artillery is the best weapon against hostile artillery.

576. Artillery attacked in flank by infantry can be severely damaged. Oblique or flank fire will begin to have decisive effect when delivered at effective range from a point to one side of the artillery's line of fire and distant from it by about half the range. Artillery is better protected on the side of the caisson.

577. Guns out of ammunition, but otherwise secure against infantry attack, may be immobilized by fire which will prevent their withdrawal, or by locating and driving off their limbers. Or they may be kept out of action by fire which will prevent the receipt of ammunition.

578. Artillery when limbered is helpless against infantry fire. If caught at effective range while coming into action or while limbering, artillery can be severely punished by infantry fire.

In attacking artillery that is trying to escape, the wheel horses are the best targets.

ARTILLERY SUPPORTS.

579. The purpose of the artillery support is to guard the artillery against surprise or attack.

Artillery on the march or in action is ordinarily so placed as to be amply protected by the infantry. Infantry always protects artillery in its neighborhood.

580. The detail of a support is not necessary except when the artillery is separated from the main body or occupies a position in which its flanks are not protected.

The detail of a special support will be avoided whenever possible.

581. The formation of an artillery support depends upon circumstances. On the march it may often be necessary to provide advance, flank, and rear protection. The country must be thoroughly reconnoitered by patrols within long rifle range.

582. In action, the formation and location of the support must be such as to gain and give timely information of the enemy's approach and to offer actual resistance to the enemy beyond effective rifle range of the artillery's flanks. It should not be close enough to the artillery to suffer from fire directed at the artillery. In most cases a position somewhat to the flank and rear best fulfills these conditions.

583. The support commander is charged only with the protection of the artillery. The tactical employment of each arm rests with its commander. The two should cooperate.

INTRENCHMENTS.

(Plate V.)

584. Ordinarily, infantry intrenches itself whenever it is compelled to halt for a considerable time in the presence of the enemy.

Infantry charged with a resisting mission should intrench whenever there is any likelihood that the cover constructed will be of use.

585. Except in permanent fortifications or in fortifications prepared long in advance, the infantry plans and constructs the field works that it will occupy.

When performing their duties in this connection officers should bear in mind that profile and construction are simple matters compared with location and correct tactical use.

586. Intrenchments enable the commander to hold a position with the least possible number of men and to prolong his line or increase his reserve.

They are constructed with a view to giving cover which will diminish losses, but they must not be so built or placed as to interfere with the free use of the rifle. Fire effect is the first consideration.

587. The trace of a fire trench or of a system of fire trenches depends upon the ground and the proposed density of the entire firing line. The trenches are laid out in company lengths, if possible.

Adjoining trenches should afford each other mutual support. The flanks and important gaps in the line should be protected by fire trenches echeloned in rear. (Fig. 6).

588. To locate the trace, lie on the ground at intervals and select the best field of fire consistent with the requirements of the situation.

A profile should be selected which will permit the fire to sweep the foreground, require the minimum of labor and time, and permit the best concealment. No fixed type can be prescribed. The type must be selected with due regard to the terrain, the enemy, time, tools, materials, soil, etc.

589. Hasty cover. With the intrenching tool, troops can quickly throw up a low parapet about 3 feet thick which will furnish considerable cover against rifle fire, but scarcely any against shrapnel. Such cover is frequently of value to an attack that is temporarily unable to continue. In time, and particularly at night, it may be developed into a deep fire or cover trench.

590. Fire trenches should be placed and constructed so as to give a good field of fire and to give the troops protection behind a vertical wall, preferably with some head or overhead cover. They should be concealed or inconspicuous in order to avoid artillery fire or to decrease its accuracy. They should have natural or artificial communication with their supports, but in establishing the trace this is a secondary consideration.

The simplest form of fire trench is deep and narrow and has a flat, concealed parapet. (Fig. 1.) In ordinary soil, and on a basis of two reliefs and tasks of 5 feet, it can be constructed in about two hours with intrenching tools.

This trench affords fair cover for troops subjected to fire, but not actually firing. When it is probable that time will permit elaboration, the simple trench should be planned with a view to developing it ultimately into a more complete form. (Figs. 2 and 3.) Devices should be added to increase the security of the trench and the comfort of the men.

Where the excavated earth is easily removed, a fire trench without parapet may be the one best suited to the soil and other conditions affecting the choice of profile. (Fig. 4.) The enemy's infantry, as well as his artillery, will generally have great difficulty in seeing this type of trench.

In very difficult soil, if the time is short, it may be necessary to dig a wider, shallower trench with a higher parapet.



Head cover, notches, and loop holes are of value to troops when firing, but many forms weaken and disclose the location of the parapet. Filled sandbags kept in the trench when the men are not firing may be thrown on the parapet to form notches or loopholes when the troops in the trench open fire and concealment of the trench is no longer necessary or possible.

By the use of observation stations the maximum rest and security is afforded the troops. Stations are best located in the angles of traverses or at the end of the trench.

591. Where the nature of the position makes it advisable to construct traverses at regular intervals it is generally best to construct a section of trench for each squad, with traverses between squads. (Fig. 5.)

592. Cover trenches are placed as closely as practicable to their respective fire trenches. Where natural cover is not available, each fire trench should have artificial cover in rear for its support—either a cover trench of its own or one in common with an adjoining fire trench.

The cover trench is simple and rectangular in profile. Concealment is indispensable. It is generally concealed by the contour of the ground or by natural features, but to guard against hostile searching fire overhead cover is frequently advisable.

Cover trenches should be made as comfortable as possible. It will often be advisable to make them extensive enough to provide cooking and resting facilities for the garrisons of the corresponding fire trenches.

593. Communicating trenches are frequently necessary in order to connect fire trenches with their corresponding cover trenches where natural, covered communication is impracticable. They are generally rectangular in profile, deep, and narrow. They are traversed or zigzagged to escape enfilade.

Returns or pockets should be provided for use as latrines, storerooms, dressing stations, passing points for troops, etc.

Cover from observation while passing through the trench may insure against loss as effectively as material cover from the enemy's fire.

Communicating ways, naturally or artificially screened from the enemy's view, sometimes provide sufficient cover for the passage of troops.

594. Dummy trenches frequently draw the enemy's attention and fire and thus protect the true fire trench.

Any type is suitable which presents to the enemy the appearance of a true trench imperfectly concealed.

595. When it is uncertain whether time will permit the completion of all the work planned, work should proceed with due regard to the order of importance of the several operations. Ordinarily the order of importance will be:

1. Clearing foreground to improve the field of fire and construction of fire trench.

2. Head or overhead cover; concealment.

3. Placing obstacles and recording ranges.

4. Cover trenches for supports and local reserves.

5. Communicating trenches.

6. Widening and deepening of trenches; interior conveniences.

See paragraph 568.

MINOR WARFARE.

596. Minor warfare embraces both regular and irregular operations.

Regular operations consist of minor actions involving small bodies of trained and organized troops on both sides.

The tactics employed are in general those prescribed for the smaller units.

597. Irregular operations consist of actions against unorganized or partially organized forces, acting in independent or semi-independent bodies. Such bodies have little or only crude training and are under nominal and loose leadership and control. They assemble, roam about, and disperse at will. They endeavor to win by stealth or by force of superior numbers, employing ambuscades, sudden dashes or rushes, and hand-to-hand fighting.

Troops operating against such an enemy usually do so in small units, such as platoons, detachments, or companies, and the tactics employed must be adapted to meet the requirements of the situation. Frequently the enemy's own methods may be employed to advantage.

In general, such operations should not be undertaken hastily; every preparation should be made to strike suddenly and to inflict the maximum punishment.

598. In general, the service of information will be insufficient; adequate reconnaissance will rarely be practicable. March and bivouac formations must be such as to admit of rapid deployment and fire action in any direction.

599. In the open country, where surprise is not probable, troops may be marched in column of squads preceded, within sight, by a squad as an advance party.

600. In close country, where surprise is possible, the troops must be held in a close formation. The use of flank patrols becomes difficult. Occasionally, an advance party—never less than a squad—may be sent out. In general, however, such a party accomplishes little, since an enemy intent on surprise will permit it to pass unmolested and will fall upon the main body.

Under such conditions, especially when the road or trail is narrow, the column of twos or files is a convenient formation, the officers placing themselves in the column so as to divide it into nearly equal parts. If rushed from a flank, such a column will be in readiness to face and fire toward either or both flank, the ranks being back to back; if rushed from the front, the head of the column may be deployed, the rest of the column closing up to support it and to protect its flanks and rear. In any event, the men should be taught to take some form of a closed back-to-back formation.

601. The column may often be broken into two or more approximately equal detachments separated on the march by distances of 50 to 100 yards. As a rule the detachments should not consist of less than 25 men each. With this arrangement of the column, it will rarely be possible for an enemy to close simultaneously with all of the detachments, one or more being left unengaged and under control to support those engaged or to inflict severe punishment upon the enemy when he is repulsed.

602. The site for camp or bivouac should be selected with special reference to economical and effective protection against surprise. Double sentinels are posted on the avenues of approach and the troops sleep in readiness for instant action. When practicable, troops should be instructed in advance as to what they are to do in case of attack at night.

603. Night operations are frequently advisable. With the small forces employed, control is not difficult. Irregular troops rarely provide proper camp protection, and they may frequently be surprised and severely punished by a properly conducted night march and attack.

PATROLS.

604. The following paragraphs on patrols are placed here for convenience. They relate in particular to the conduct of the patrol and its leader, and apply to patrols employed in covering detachments as well as in combat reconnaissance.

605. A patrol is a detachment sent out from a command to gain information of the country or of the enemy, or to prevent the enemy from gaining information. In special cases patrols may be given missions other than these.

606. The commander must have clearly in mind the purpose for which the patrol is to be used in order that he may determine its proper strength, select its leader, and give the latter proper instructions.