"In the garden of a house in the main street, bodies of two women were observed, and in another house, the body of a boy of sixteen with two bayonet wounds in the chest. In Sempst a similar condition of affairs existed. Houses were burning and in some of them were the charred remains of civilians. In a bicycle shop a witness saw the burned corpse of a man. Other witnesses speak of this incident. Another civilian, unarmed, was shot as he was running away. As will be remembered, all the arms had been given up some time before by the order of the burgomaster.

"At Weerde four corpses of civilians were lying in the road. It was said that these men had fired upon the German soldiers; but this is denied. The arms had been given up long before. Two children were killed in the village of Weerde, quite wantonly as they were standing in the road with their mother. They were three or four years old and were killed with the bayonet. A small barn burning close by formed a convenient means of getting rid of bodies. They were thrown into the flames from the bayonets. It is right to add that no commissioned officer was present at the time. At Eppeghem, on August 25th, a pregnant woman who had been wounded with a bayonet was discovered in the convent. She was dying. On the road six dead bodies of laborers were seen.

"At Boortmeerbeek a German soldier was seen to fire three times at a little girl five years old. Having failed to hit her, he subsequently bayoneted her. He was killed with the butt end of a rifle by a Belgian soldier who had seen him commit this murder from a distance. At Herent the charred body of a civilian was found in a butcher's shop, and in a handcart twenty yards away was the dead body of a laborer. Two eye witnesses relate that a German soldier shot a civilian and stabbed him with a bayonet as he lay. He then made one of these witnesses, a civilian prisoner, smell the blood on the bayonet. At Haecht the bodies of ten civilians were seen lying in a row by a brewery wall. In a laborer's house, which had been broken up, the mutilated corpse of a woman of thirty to thirty-five was discovered."

Concerning the treatment of women and children in general, the report continues: "The evidence shows that the German authorities, when carrying out a policy of systematic arson and plunder in selected districts, usually drew some distinction between the adult male population on the one hand and the women and children on the other. It was a frequent practice to set apart the adult males of the condemned district with a view to the execution of a suitable number—preferably of the younger and more vigorous—and to reserve the women and children for milder treatment. The depositions, however, present many instances of calculated cruelty, often going the length of murder, toward the women and children of the condemned area.

"At Dinant sixty women and children were confined in the cellar of a convent from Sunday morning till the following Friday, August 28th, sleeping on the ground, for there were no beds, with nothing to drink during the whole period, and given no food until Wednesday, when somebody threw into the cellar two sticks of macaroni and a carrot for each prisoner. In other cases the women and children were marched for long distances along roads, as, for instance, the march of the women from Louvain to Tirlemont, August 28th, the laggards pricked on by the attendant Uhlans. A lady complains of having been brutally kicked by privates. Others were struck at with the butt end of rifles. At Louvain, at Liege, at Aerschot, at Malines, at Montigny, at Andenne, and elsewhere, there is evidence that the troops were not restrained from drunkenness, and drunken soldiers cannot be trusted to observe the rules or decencies of war, least of all when they are called upon to execute a preordained plan of arson and pillage. From the very first women were not safe. At Liege women and children were chased about the streets by soldiers.

"Witnesses recount how a great crowd of men, women and children from Aerschot were marched to Louvain, and then suddenly exposed to a fire from a mitrailleuse and rifles. 'We were all placed,' recounts a sufferer, 'in Station Street, Louvain, and the German soldiers fired on us. I saw the corpses of some women in the street. I fell down, and a woman who had been shot fell on top of me.' Women and children suddenly turned out into the streets, and, compelled to witness the destruction of their homes by fire, provided a sad spectacle to such as were sober enough to see.

"A humane German officer, witnessing the ruin of Aerschot, exclaimed in disgust: 'I am a father myself, and I cannot bear this. It is not war but butchery.' Officers as well as men succumbed to the temptation of drink, with results which may be illustrated by an incident which occurred at Campenhout. In this village there was a certain well-to-do merchant (name given) who had a cellar of good champagne. On the afternoon of the 14th or 15th of August three German cavalry officers entered the house and demanded champagne. Having drunk ten bottles and invited five or six officers and three or four private soldiers to join them, they continued their carouse, and then called for the master and mistress of the house.

"'Immediately my mistress came in,' says the valet de chambre, 'one of the officers who was sitting on the floor got up, and, putting a revolver to my mistress' temple, shot her dead. The officer was obviously drunk. The other officers continued to drink and sing, and they did not pay any great attention to the killing of my mistress. The officer who shot my mistress then told my master to dig a grave and bury my mistress. My master and the officer went into the garden, the officer threatening my master with a pistol. My master was then forced to dig the grave and to bury my mistress in it. I cannot say for what reason they killed my mistress. The officer who did it was singing all the time.'

"In the evidence before us there are cases tending to show that aggravated crimes against women were sometimes severely punished. One witness reports that a young girl who was being pursued by a drunken soldier at Louvain appealed to a German officer, and that the offender was then and there shot. Another describes how an officer of the Thirty-second Regiment of the Line was led out to execution for the violation of two young girls, but reprieved at the request or with the consent of the girls' mother. These instances are sufficient to show that the maltreatment of women was no part of the military scheme of the invaders, however much it may appear to have been the inevitable result of the system of terror deliberately adopted in certain regions. Indeed, so much is avowed. 'I asked the commander why we had been spared,' says a lady in Louvain, who deposes to having suffered much brutal treatment during the sack. He said: 'We will not hurt you any more. Stay in Louvain. All is finished.' It was Saturday, August 29th, and the reign of terror was over.

"The Germans used men, women and children of Belgium as screens for advancing infantry, as is shown in the following: Outside Fort Fleron, near Liege, men and children were marched in front of the Germans to prevent the Belgian soldiers from firing. The progress of the Germans through Mons was marked by many incidents of this character. Thus, on August 22d, half a dozen Belgian colliers returning from work were marching in front of some German troops who were pursuing the English, and in the opinion of the witnesses, they must have been placed there intentionally. An English officer describes how he caused a barricade to be erected in a main thoroughfare leading out of Mons, when the Germans, in order to reach a crossroad in the rear, fetched civilians out of the houses on each side of the main road and compelled them to hold up white flags and act as cover.

"Another British officer who saw this incident is convinced that the Germans were acting deliberately for the purpose of protecting themselves from the fire of the British troops. Apart from this protection, the Germans could not have advanced, as the street was straight and commanded by the British rifle fire at a range of 700 or 800 yards. Several British soldiers also speak of this incident, and their story is confirmed by a Flemish witness in a side street."

The French Government also appointed a commission, headed by M. Georges Payelle. This body made an investigation of outrages committed by German officers and soldiers in Northern France. Its report showed conditions that outstripped in horror the war tactics of savages. It makes the following accusations:

"In Rebais, two English cavalrymen who were surprised and wounded in this commune were finished off with gunshots by the Germans when they were dismounted and when one of them had thrown up his hands, showing thus that he was unarmed.

"In the department of the Marne, as everywhere else, the German troops gave themselves up to general pillage, which was carried out always under similar conditions and with the complicity of their leaders. The Communes of Heiltz-le-Maurupt, Suippes, Marfaux, Fromentieres and Esternay suffered especially in this way. Everything which the invader could carry off from the houses was placed on motor lorries and vehicles. At Suippes, in particular, they carried off in this way a quantity of different objects, among these sewing machines and toys. A great many villages, as well as important country towns, were burned without any reason whatever. Without doubt, these crimes were committed by order, as German detachments arrived in the neighborhood with their torches, their grenades, and their usual outfit for arson.

"At Marfaux nineteen private houses were burned. Of the Commune of Glannes practically nothing remains. At Somme-Tourbe the entire village has been destroyed, with the exception of the Mairie, the church and two private buildings. At Auve nearly the whole town has been destroyed. At Etrepy sixty-three families out of seventy are homeless. At Huiron all of the houses, with the exception of five have been burned. At Sermaize-les-Bains only about forty houses out of 900 remain. At Bignicourt-sur-Saultz thirty houses out of thirty-three are in ruins.

"At Suippes, the big market town which has been practically burned out, German soldiers carrying straw and cans of petrol have been seen in the streets. While the mayor's house was burning, six sentinels with fixed bayonets were under orders to forbid anyone to approach and to prevent any help being given.

"All this destruction by arson, which only represents a small proportion of the acts of the same kind in the Department of Seine-et-Marne, was accomplished without the least tendency to rebellion or the smallest act of resistance being recorded against the inhabitants of the localities which are today more or less completely destroyed. In some villages the Germans, before setting fire to them made one of their soldiers fire a shot from his rifle so as to be able to pretend afterward that the civilian population had attacked them, an allegation which is all the more absurd since at the time when the enemy arrived, the only inhabitants left were old men, sick persons, or people absolutely without any means of aggression.



THE HORRORS OF GERMAN RULE IN FRANCE Forcibly removing French civilians from Lille to German labor colonies. Families were ruthlessly separated and led away into slavery often worse than death.



Copyright Underwood and Underwood, N. Y. A FIGHT IN A CLOUD OF GAS The Germans had sent over gas and in this spot it lingered. Then the infantry advanced and here, amid the British wire entanglements, the foes meet. Both sides in gas masks, they struggle amid the "poisonous vapor, and when the bayonet fails they fight, like the pair in the foreground, to bring death by tearing away their opponent's mask.

"Numerous crimes against the person have also been committed. In the majority of the communes hostages have been taken away; many of them have not returned. At Sermaize-les-Bains, the Germans carried off about one hundred and fifty people, some of whom were decked out with helmets and coats and compelled, thus equipped, to mount guard over the bridges.

"At Bignicourt-sur-Saultz thirty men and forty-five women and children were obliged to leave with a detachment. One of the men—a certain Emile Pierre—has not returned nor sent any news of himself. At Corfelix, M. Jacqet, who was carried off on the 7th of September with eleven of his fellow-citizens, was found five hundred meters from the village with a bullet in his head.

"At Champuis, the cure, his maid-servant, and four other inhabitants who were taken away on the same day as the hostages of Corfelix had not returned at the time of our visit to the place.

"At the same place an old man of seventy, named Jacquemin, was tied down in his bed by an officer and left in this state without food for three days. He died a little time after. At Vert-la-Gravelle a farm hand was killed. He was struck on the head with a bottle and his chest was run through with a lance. The garde champetre Brulefer of le Gault-la-Foret was murdered at Maclaunay, where he had been taken by the Germans. His body was found with his head shattered and a wound on his chest.

"At Champguyon, a commune which has been fired, a certain Verdier was killed in his father-in-law's house. The latter was not present at the execution, but he heard a shot and next day an officer said to him, 'Son shot. He is under the ruins.' In spite of the search made the body has not been found among them. It must have been consumed in the fire.

"At Sermaize, the roadmaker, Brocard, was placed among a number of hostages. Just at the moment when he was being arrested with his son, his wife and his daughter-in-law in a state of panic rushed to throw themselves into the Saulx. The old man was able to free himself for a moment and ran in all haste after them and made several attempts to save them, but the Germans dragged him away pitilessly, leaving the two wretched women struggling in the river. When Brocard and his son were restored to liberty, four days afterward, and found the bodies, they discovered that their wives had both received bullet wounds in the head.

"At Triaucourt the Germans gave themselves up to the worst excesses. Angered doubtless by the remark which an officer had addressed to a soldier, against whom a young girl of nineteen, Mlle. Helene Proces, had made complaint of on account of the indecent treatment to which she had been subjected, they burned the village and made a systematic massacre of the inhabitants. They began by setting fire to the house of an inoffensive householder, M. Jules Gand, and by shooting this unfortunate man as he was leaving his house to escape the flames. Then they dispersed among the houses in the streets, firing off their rifles on every side. A young man, seventeen years, Georges Lecourtier, who tried to escape, was shot. M. Alfred Lallemand suffered the same fate. He was pursued into the kitchen of his fellow-citizen Tautelier, and murdered there, while Tautelier received three bullets in his hand.

"Fearing, not without reason, for their lives, Mlle. Proces, her mother and her grandmother of seventy-one and her old aunt of eighty-one, tried to cross the trellis which separates their garden from a neighboring property with the help of a ladder. The young girl alone was able to reach the other side and to avoid death by hiding in the cabbages. As for the other women, they were struck down by rifle shots. The village cure collected the brains of the aunt on the ground on which they were strewn and had the bodies carried into Proces' house. During the following night, the Germans played the piano near the bodies.

"While the carnage raged, the fire rapidly spread and devoured thirty-five houses. An old man of seventy and a child of two months perished in the flames. M. Igier, who was trying to save his cattle, was pursued for 300 meters by soldiers, who fired at him ceaselessly. By a miracle this man had the good fortune not to be wounded, but five bullets went through his clothing."

This summary merely hints at the atrocities that were perpetrated. And these are the crimes that France and Belgium will remember after indemnities have been paid, after borders have been re-established and after generations shall have past. The horrors of blazing villages, of violated womanhood, of mutilated childhood, of stark and senseless butcheries, will flash before the minds of French and Belgian men and women when Germany's name shall be mentioned long after the declaration of peace.

Schrecklichkeit had its day. It took its bloody toll of the fairest and bravest of two gallant nations. It ravaged Poland as well and wreaked its fiendish will on wounded soldiers on the battle-fields.

But Schrecklichkeit is dead. Belgium and France have shown that murder and rape and arson can not destroy liberty nor check the indomitable ambitions of the free peoples of earth.

The lesson to Germany was taught at a terrible cost to humanity, but it was taught in a fashion that nations hereafter who shall dream of emulating the Hun will know in advance that frightfulness serves no end except to feed the lust for destruction that exists only in the most debased and brutish of men.



CHAPTER VII

THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE MARNE

France and civilization were saved by Joffre and Foch at the first battle of the Marne, in September, 1914. Autocracy was destroyed by Foch at the second battle of the Marne, in July, 1918.

This in a nutshell embraces the dramatic opening and closing episodes of the World War on the soil of France. Bracketed between these two glorious victories were the agonies of martyred France, the deaths and life-long cripplings of millions of men, the up-rooting of arrogant militarism, the liberation of captive nations.

The first battle of the Marne was wholly a French operation. The British were close at hand, but had no share in the victory. Generals Gallieni and Manoury, acting under instructions from Marshal Joffre, were driven by automobile to the headquarters of the British commander, Sir John French, in the village of Melun. They explained in detail General Joffre's plan of attack upon the advancing German army. An urgent request was made that the British army halt its retreat, face about, and attack the two corps of von Kluck's army then confronting the British. Simultaneously with this attack General Manoury's forces were to fall upon the flank and the rear guard of von Kluck along the River Ourcq. This operation was planned for the next day, September 5th. Sir John French replied that he could not get his tired army in readiness for battle within forty-eight hours. This would delay the British attack in all probability until September 7th.

Joffre's plan of battle, however, would admit of no delay. The case was urgent; there was grave danger of a union between the great forces headed by the Crown Prince and those under von Kluck. He resolved to go ahead without the British, and ordered Manoury to strike as had been planned.

He fixed as an extreme limit for the movement of retreat, which was still going on, the line of Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-Francois, and the region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if the troops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack before reaching it, as soon as there was a possibility of bringing about an offensive disposition, permitting the co-operation of the whole of the French forces. On September 5 it appeared that this desired situation existed.



Copyright Underwood and Underwood, N.Y. GENERAL PERSHING AND MARSHAL JOFFRE The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces chatting with the veteran Marshal of France, the hero of the first battle of the Marne.



MARSHAL FERDINAND FOCH, GENERALISSIMO OF THE ALLIED ARMIES No leader could command greater confidence than the brilliant strategist to whom was mainly due the great victory of the Marne in the first autumn of the war. He also directed the French offensive on the Somme in 1916 and in November, 1917, he was chosen as the French representative and subsequently chairman of the Central Military Committee appointed to assist the Supreme Allied War Council. Marshal Foch was formerly for five years lecturer on strategy and tactics at the Ecole de Guerre. At the close of the war he said to the Allied armies: "You have won the greatest battle in history and saved the most sacred cause—the liberty of the world,"



THE FIRST GERMAN DASH FOR PARIS

The First German army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued its endeavor to envelop the French left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reached the region of Chauffry, to the south of Rebais and of Esternay. It aimed then at cutting Joffre off from Paris, in order to begin the investment of the capital.

The Second army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergeres, and Vertus.

The Third and Fourth armies reached to Chalons-sur-Marne and Bussy-le-Repos. The Fifth army was advancing on one side and the other from the Argonne as far as Triacourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. The Sixth and Seventh armies were attacking more to the east.

The French left army had been able to occupy the line Sezanne, Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps. This was precisely the disposition which the General-in-Chief had wished to see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it, and ordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from his right two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisions of cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his center.

On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies a message ordering them to attack.

"The hour has come," he wrote, "to advance at all costs, and to die where you stand rather than give way."

If one examines the map, it will be seen that by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck was exposing his right to the offensive action of the French left. This is the starting point of the victory of the Marne.

On the evening of September 5th the French left army had reached the front Penchard-Saint-Souflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second and Fourth army corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. But in spite of this pressure the French held their ground. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and being reinforced prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th the French established themselves on the Aisne.

Why did the German forces which were confronting the French, and on the evening before attacking so furiously, retreat on the morning of the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to the north to face the French left, the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the now rested British, who had immediately faced around toward the north, and to those of the French armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on September 8th and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it was to effect.

On the 6th the British army set out from the line Rozcy-Lagny and that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Chauteau-Thierry—the town that was to become famous for the American stand in 1918—taking in flank the German forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, the French left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval.

The role of the French army, which was operating to the right of the British army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left. It had on its right to support the center, which, from September 7th, had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it.

On the 7th, it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and a million cartridges. On the 12th it established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with the French center, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste.

The French center consisted of a new army created on August 29th and of one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated, on August 29th to September 5th, from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front Sezanne-Mailly.

The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line Humbauville-Chateau-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy.

The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 19th to pierce the French center to the west and to the east of Fere-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of the new French army, which retired as far as Gouragancon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant-Connantre.

Despite this retreat General Foch, commanding the army of the center, ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then, with the divisions which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sezanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold maneuver, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat. This marked Foch as the most daring and brilliant strategist of the war.

On the 11th the French crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of them in disorder. On the 12th they were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. The reserve army of the center, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained, and the two French center armies were solidly established on the ground gained.

To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them from the French center. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant success for the French artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the Sixteenth German army corps.

On the 10th inst., the Eighth and Fifteenth German army corps counter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th French progress continued with new successes, and on the 12th the French were able to face round toward the north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th.

The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before the two French armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of the French right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by the left and center.

Such was this seven days' battle, in which more than two millions of men were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road to its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversary which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of one articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of intention and method animating the supreme command.

To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to meet the whole Germany army. Under their pressure the German retreat at certain times had the appearance of a rout.

In spite of the fatigue of the poilus, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery, the French took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, and thousands of prisoners. One German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery.

In that great battle the spectacular rush of General Gallieni's army defending Paris, was one of the dramatic surprises that decided the issue. In that stroke Gallieni sent his entire force forty miles to attack the right wing of the German army. In this gigantic maneuver every motor car in Paris was utilized, and the flying force of Gallieni became the "Army in Taxicabs," a name that will live as long as France exists.

General Clergerie, Chief of Staff to Gallieni told the story for posterity. He said:

"From August 26, 1914, the German armies had been descending upon Paris by forced marches. On September 1st they were only three days' march from the advanced line of the intrenched camp, which the garrison were laboring desperately to put into condition for defense. It was necessary to cover with trenches a circuit of 110 miles, install siege guns, assure the coming of supplies for them over narrow-gauge railways, assemble the food and provisions of all kinds necessary for a city of 4,000,000 inhabitants.

"But on September 3d, the intelligence service, which was working perfectly, stated, about the middle of the day, that the German columns, after heading straight for Paris, were swerving toward the southeast and seemed to wish to avoid the fortified camp.

"General Gallieni and I then had one of those long conferences which denoted grave events; they usually lasted from two to five minutes at most. The fact is that the military government of Paris did little talking—it acted. The conference reached this conclusion: 'If they do not come to us, we will go to them with all the force we can muster.' Nothing remained but to make the necessary preparations. The first thing to do was not to give the alarm to the enemy. General Manoury's army immediately received orders to lie low and avoid any engagement that was not absolutely necessary." Then care was taken to reinforce it by every means. All was ready at the designated time.

In the night of September 3d, knowing that the enemy would have to leave only a rear guard on one bank of the Ourcq, General Gallieni and General Clergerie decided to march against that rear guard, to drive it back with all the weight of the Manoury army, to cut the enemy's communications, and take full advantage of his hazardous situation. Immediately the following order was addressed to General Manoury:

Because of the movement of the German armies, which seem to be slipping in before our front to the southeast, I intend to send your army to attack them in the flank, that is to say, in an easterly direction. I will indicate your line of march as soon as I learn that of the British army. But make your arrangements now so that your troops shall be ready to march this afternoon and to begin a general movement east of the intrenched camp tomorrow.

At ten in the morning a consultation was held by Generals Gallieni, Clergerie, and Manoury, and the details of the plan of operations were immediately decided. General Joffre gave permission to attack and announced that he would himself take the offensive on the 6th. On the 5th, at noon, the army from Paris fired the first shot; the battle of the Ourcq, a preface to the Marne, had begun.

General Clergerie then told what a precious purveyor of information he had found in General von der Marwitz, cavalry commander of the German first army, who made intemperate use of the wireless telegraph and did not even take the trouble to put into cipher his dispatches, of which the Eiffel Tower made a careful collection. "In the evening of September 9th," he said, "an officer of the intelligence corps brought me a dispatch from this same Marwitz couched in something like these terms: 'Tell me exactly where you are and what you are doing. Hurry up, because XXX.' The officer was greatly embarrassed to interpret those three X's. Adopting the language of the poilu, I said to him, 'Translate it, "I am going to bolt."' True enough, next day we found on the site of the German batteries, which had been precipitately evacuated, stacks of munitions; while by the roadside we came upon motors abandoned for the slightest breakdown, and near Betz almost the entire outfit of a field bakery, with a great store of flour and dough half-kneaded. Paris and France were saved.

"Von Kluck could not get over his astonishment. He has tried to explain it by saying he was unlucky, for out of a hundred governors not one would have acted as Gallieni did, throwing his whole available force nearly forty miles from his stronghold. It was downright imprudence."



CHAPTER VIII

JAPAN IN THE WAR

On August 15, 1914, the Empire of Japan issued an ultimatum to Germany. She demanded the evacuation of Tsing-tau, the disarming of the warships there and the handing over of the territory to Japan for ultimate reversion to China. The time limit for her reply was set at 12 o'clock, August 24th. To this ultimatum Germany made no reply, and at 2.30 P. M., August 23d, the German Ambassador was handed his passports and war was declared.

The reason for the action of Japan was simple. She was bound by treaty to Great Britain to come to her aid in any war in which Great Britain might be involved. On August 4th a note was received from Great Britain requesting Japan to safeguard British shipping in the Far East. Japan replied that she could not guarantee the safety of British shipping so long as Germany was in occupation of the Chinese province of Tsing-tau. She suggested in turn that England agree to allow her to remove this German menace. The British Government agreed, on the condition that Tsing-tau be subsequently returned to China.

The Japanese Government in taking this stand was acting with courage and with loyalty. Toward individual Germans she entertained no animosity. She had the highest respect for German scholarship and German military science. She had been sending her young men to German seats of learning, and had based the reorganization of her army upon the German military system. But she did not believe that a treaty was a mere "scrap of paper," and was determined to fulfill her obligations in the treaty with England.

It seems to have been the opinion of the highest Japanese military authorities that Germany would win the war. Japan's statesmen, however, believed that Germany was a menace to both China and Japan and had lively recollections of her unfriendly attitude in connection with the Chino-Japanese war and in the period that followed. Germany had been playing the same game in China that she had played in the Mediterranean and which had ultimately brought about the war.

The Chino-Japanese war had been a great Japanese triumph. One of Japan's greatest victories had been the capture of Port Arthur, but the joy caused in Japan had not ended before it was turned into mourning because of German interference. Germany had then compelled Japan to quit Port Arthur, and to hand over that great fort to Russia so that she herself might take Kiao-chau without Russia's objection.

Japan had never forgotten or forgiven. The German seizure of Kiao-chau had led to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur, the British occupation of Wei-hai-wei and French occupation of Kwan-chow Bay. The vultures were swooping down on defenseless China. This had led to the Boxer disturbance of 1910, where again the Kaiser had interfered.

Japan, who recognized that her interests and safety were closely allied with the preservation of the territorial integrity of China, had proposed to the powers that she be permitted to send her troops to the rescue of the beleaguered foreigners, but this proposition was refused on account of German suspicion of Japan's motives. Later on, during the Russo-Japanese war, Russia was assisted in many ways by the German Government.

Furthermore, the popular sympathy with the Japanese was strongly with the Allies. It was the Kaiser who started the cry of the "yellow peril," which had deeply hurt Japanese pride. Yet, even with this strong feeling, it was remarkable that Japan was willing to ally herself with Russia. She knew very well that after all the greatest danger to her liberties lay across the Japan Sea. Russian autocracy, with its militarism, its religious intolerance, its discriminating policy against foreign interests in commerce and trade, was the natural opponent of liberal Japan.

The immediate object of Japan in joining hands with England was to destroy the German menace in the Pacific. Before she delivered her ultimatum the Germans had been active; ignoring the rights of Japan while she was still neutral they had captured a Russian steamer within Japanese jurisdiction, as well as a number of British merchant vessels, and even a few Japanese ships had been intercepted by German cruisers. This was the disturbance to general peace in the Far East, which had prompted England to request Japan's assistance.

Japan, when she entered the war, was at least twice as strong as when she began the war with Russia. She had an army of one million men, and a navy double the size of that which she had possessed when the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. As soon as war was declared she proceeded to act. A portion of her fleet was directed against the German forces in the Pacific, one squadron occupying Jaluit, the seat of government of the Marshall Islands, on October 3d, but her main forces were directed against the fortress of Tsing-tau.

The Germans had taken great pride in Tsing-tau, and had made every effort to make it a model colony as well as an impregnable fortress. They had built costly water works, fine streets and fine public buildings. They had been making great preparations for a state of siege, although it was not expected that they would be able to hold out for a long time. There were hardly more than five thousand soldiers in the fortress, and in the harbor but four small gunboats and an Austrian cruiser, the Kaiserin Elizabeth. As Austria was not at war with Japan the authorization of Japan was asked for the removal of the Kaiserin Elizabeth to Shanghai, where she could be interned. The Japanese were favorable to this proposition, but at the last moment instructions arrived from Vienna directing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to ask for his passports at Tokio and the commander of the Kaiserin Elizabeth to assist the Germans in the defense of Tsing-tau. The Germans also received orders to defend their fortress to the very last. A portion of the German squadron, under Admiral von Spee, had sailed away before the Japanese attack, one of these being the famous commerce raider, the Emden.

On the 27th of August the Japanese made their first move by taking possession of some of the small islands at the mouth of the harbor of Kiao-chau. From these points as bases they swept the surrounding waters for mines, with such success that during the whole siege but one vessel of their fleet was injured by a mine. On the 2d of September they landed troops at the northern base of the peninsula upon which Tsing-tau was situated, with the object of cutting off the fortress from the mainland.

The heavy rains which were customary at that season prevented much action, but airplanes were sent which dropped bombs upon the wireless station, electric power station and railway station of Kiao-chau, and upon the ships in the harbor. On September 13th General Kamio captured the railway station of Kiao-chau which stands at the head of the bay. This placed him twenty-two miles from Tsing-tau itself. On September 27th he captured Prince Heinrich Hill giving him a gun position from which he could attack the inner forts. On the 23d a small British force arrived from Wei-hai-wei to co-operate with the Japanese.



THE GERMAN GIBRALTAR IN THE FAR EAST WHICH FELL TO THE JAPANESE

The combined forces then advanced until they were only five miles from Tsing-tau. The German warships were bombarding the Japanese troops fiercely, and were being replied to by the Japanese squadron in the mouth of the harbor. The great waste of German ammunition led General Kamio to the opinion that the Germans did not contemplate a long siege. He then determined on a vigorous assault.

Before the attack was made he gave the non-combatants an opportunity of leaving, and on the 15th of October a number of women and children and Chinese were allowed to pass through the Japanese lines. On October 31st the bombardment began, and the German forts were gradually silenced. On November 2d the Kaiserin Elizabeth was sunk in the harbor.

The Allied armies were pushing their way steadily down, until, on November 6th, their trenches were along the edge of the last German redoubts. At 6 o'clock on that day white flags were floating over the central forts and by 7.30 Admiral Waldeck, the German Governor, had signed the terms of capitulation.

Germany's prize colony on the continent of Asia had disappeared. The survivors, numbering about three thousand, were sent to Japan as prisoners of war. Japanese losses were but two hundred and thirty-six men killed. They had, however, lost one third-class cruiser, the Takachiho, and several smaller crafts. The whole expedition was a notable success. It had occupied much less time than either Japan or Germany had expected, and the news was received in Germany with a universal feeling of bitterness and chagrin.

After the Japanese capture of Kiao-chau Japan's assistance to the Allies, while not spectacular, was extremely important, and its importance increased during the last two years of the war. Her cruiser squadrons did continuous patrol duty in the Pacific and in the China Sea and even in the Indian Ocean. She occupied three groups of German Islands in the South Sea, assisted in driving German raiders from the Pacific, and by her efficiency permitted a withdrawal of British warships to points where they could be useful nearer home. She patrolled the Pacific coast of North and South America, landed marines to quell riots at Singapore, and finally entered into active service in European waters by sending a destroyer squadron to the assistance of the Allies in the Mediterranean.

But while the aid of Japan's navy was important to the Allies, her greatest assistance to the Allied cause was what she did in supplying Russia with military supplies. The tremendous struggle carried on by Russia's forces during the first years prevented an easy German victory, and was only made possible through the assistance of Japan. Enormous quantities of guns, ammunition, military stores, hospital and Red Cross supplies, were sent into Russia, with skilled officers and experts to accompany them.

In the last year of the war Japan once more came prominently in the public eye in connection with the effort made by the Allies to protect from the Russian Bolsheviki vast stores of ammunition which had been landed in ports of Eastern Siberia. She was compelled to land troops to do this and to preserve order in localities where her citizens were in danger. Upon the development of the Czecho-Slovak movement in Eastern Siberia a Japanese force, in association with troops from the United States and Great Britain, was landed to protect the Czecho-Slovaks from Bolsheviki treachery. These troops succeeded in their object, and throughout the latter period of the war kept Eastern Siberia friendly to the Allied cause. In this campaign there was but little blood shed. The expedition was followed by the strong sympathy of the allied world which was full of admiration for the loyalty and courage of the Czecho-Slovaks and their heroic leaders.



CHAPTER IX

CAMPAIGN IN THE EAST

Long before the declaration of war the German military experts had made their plans. They recognized that in case of war with Russia, France would come to the rescue of its ally. They hoped that Italy, and felt sure that England, would remain neutral, but, no doubt, had provided for the possibility that these two nations would join the ranks of their foes. They recognized that they would be compelled to fight against greatly superior numbers, but they had this advantage, that they were prepared to move at once, while England was unprepared, and Russia, with enormous numbers, was so unprovided with railroad facilities that it would take weeks before her armies would be dangerous.

Their plan of campaign, then, was obvious. Leaving in the east only such forces as were necessary for a strong defense, they would throw the bulk of their strength against the French. They anticipated an easy march to Paris, and then with France at their mercy they would gather together all their powers and deal with Russia. But they had underestimated both the French power of resistance, and the Russian weakness, and in particular they had not counted upon the check that they were to meet with in gallant Belgium.

The Russian mobilization was quicker by far than had been anticipated. Her armies were soon engaged with the comparatively small German forces, and met with great success.

To understand the Russian campaign one must have some knowledge of the geography of western Russia. Russian Poland projects as a great quadrilateral into eastern Germany. It is bounded on the north by East Prussia, on the south by Galicia, and the western part reaches deep into Germany itself. The land is a broad, level plain, through which from south to north runs the River Vistula. In the center lies the capital, Warsaw, protected by a group of fortresses. The Russian army, therefore, could not make a direct western advance until it had protected its flanks by the conquest of East Prussia on the north, and Galicia on the south.

By the beginning of the third week in August the first Russian armies were ready. Her forces were arranged as follows: Facing East Prussia was the Army of the Niemen, four corps strong; the Army of Poland, consisting of fifteen army corps, occupied a wide front from Narev on the north to the Bug Valley; a third army, the Army of Galicia, directed its line of advance southward into the country between Lemberg and the River Sareth. The fortresses protecting Warsaw, still further to the east, were well garrisoned, and in front of them to the west were troops intended to delay any German advance from Posen. The Russian commander-in-chief was the Grand Duke Nicholas, uncle of the late Czar, and one of the most admirable representatives of the Russian at his best; a splendid soldier, honest, straightforward, and patriotic, he was the idol of his men. He had with him a brilliant staff, but the strength of his army lay in its experience. They had learned war in the bitter school of the Manchurian campaign.

The German force on the frontier was not less than five hundred thousand men, and they were arranged for defense. Austria, in Galicia, had gathered nearly one million men under the auspices of Frederick. The first movement of these armies took place in East Prussia. The Army of the Niemen had completed its mobilization early in August, and was under the command of General Rennenkampf, one of the Russian leaders in Manchuria. In command of the German forces was General von Francois, an officer of Huguenot descent.

The first clash of these armies took place on the German frontier near Libau, on August 3d. Two days later, the Russians crossed the frontier, drove in the German advance posts, and seized the railway which runs south and east of the Masurian Lakes. The German force fell back, burning villages and destroying roads, according to their usual plan. On the 7th of August the main army of Rennenkampf crossed the border at Suwalki, advancing in two main bodies: the Army of the Niemen moving north from Suwalki, the Army of the Narev marching through the region of the Masurian Lakes. In the lake district they advanced toward Boyen, and then directed their march toward Insterburg.

To protect Insterburg, General van Francois made his first stand at Gumbinnen, where, on the 16th of August, the first important battle of this campaign took place. The result was the defeat and retirement of the Germans, and von Francois was forced to fall back on Koenigsberg.

Meantime, the Army of the Narev, under General Samsonov, was advancing through the country west of the Masurian Lakes. On the 20th his vanguard came upon a German army corps, strongly entrenched at the northwest end of the lakes. The Germans were defeated, and fled in great disorder toward Koenigsberg, abandoning their guns and wagons. Many prisoners were taken, and the Russians found themselves masters of all of East Prussia except that inside the Koenigsberg line. They then marched on Koenigsberg, and East Prussia was for a moment at the mercy of the conqueror.

Troops were left to invest Koenigsberg, and East Prussia was overrun with the enemy. The report as to the behavior of these troops met with great indignation in Germany; but better information insists that they behaved with decorum and discretion. The peasantry of East Prussia, remembering wild tales of the Cossacks of a hundred years before, fled in confusion with stories of burning and slaughter and outrage.

Germany became aroused. To thoroughly understand the effect of the Russian invasion of East Prussia, one must know something of the relations of that district with the German Empire. Historically, this was the cradle of the Prussian aristocracy, whose dangerous policies had alarmed Europe for so many decades. The Prussian aristocracy originated in a mixture of certain west German and Christian knights, with a pagan population of the eastern Baltic plain. The district was separate from Poland and never fell under the Polish influence. It was held by the Teutonic knights who conquered it in a sort of savage independence. The Christian faith, which the Teutonic knights professed to inculcate, took little root, but such civilization as Germany itself had absorbed did filter in. The chief noble of Borussia, the governing Duke, acquired in time the title of King, and it was here, not in Berlin, nor in Brandenburg, that the Hohenzollern power originated.



THE FURY OF A COSSACK CHARGE Some of the most bitter fighting of the war took place on the snow-covered heights of the Carpathians when Russia's armies struggled with the foe. Here is illustrated a charge by Cossacks on an Austrian battery. There is nothing in warfare quite like the furious onslaught of the little men of the steppes on their wiry ponies.



HIDE AND SEEK IN THE BALTIC A Zeppelin flying over a British submarine in the stormy sea.



THE EASTERN FIGHTING ZONE

East Prussia, therefore, had a sentimental importance in the eyes of the Prussian nobility. The Prussian Royal House, in particular, had toward this country an especial regard. Moreover, it was regarded by the Germans as a whole as their rampart against the Slav, a proof of the German power to withstand the dreaded Russian. That this sacred soil should now be in the hands of a Cossack army was not to be borne. The Kaiser acted at once.

Large forces were detached from the west and sent to the aid of the eastern army. A new commander was appointed. He was General von Hindenburg, a veteran of the Franco-Prussian War who had been for some years retired. After his retirement he devoted his time to the study of East Prussia, especially the ground around the Masurian Lakes. He became more familiar with its roads, its fields, its marshes, its bogs than any of the peasants who spent their lives in the neighborhood of the lakes. Before his retirement, in the annual maneuvers, he had often rehearsed his defense against Russian invaders. Indeed report, perhaps unfounded, described his retirement to the displeasure of the Emperor William at being badly worsted in one of these mimic combats. He had prevented the country from being cleared and the swamps from being drained, arguing that they were worth more to Germany than a dozen fortresses. A man of rugged strength, his face suggesting power and tenacity, he was to become the idol of the German people.

His chance had come. His army consisted of remnants of the forces of von Francois and large reinforcements sent him from the west. In all, perhaps, he had with him 150,000 men, and he had behind him an admirable system of strategic railways.

The Russian High Command was full of confidence. Rennenkampf had advanced with the Army of the Niemen toward Koenigsberg, whose fall was reported from time to time, without foundation. Koenigsberg was in fact impregnable to armies no stronger than those under Rennenkampf's command. Samsonov with the Army of the Narev, had pushed on to the northeastern point of the lakes, and defeated the German army corps at Frankenau. Misled by his success, he decided to continue his advance through the lake region toward Allenstein. He marched first toward Osterode, in the wilderness of forest, lake and marsh, between Allenstein and the Lower Vistula. His force numbered 200,000 men, but the swamps made it impossible to proceed in mass. His column had to be temporarily divided, nor was he well informed as to the strength of his enemy. On Wednesday, the 26th of August, his advance guards were everywhere driven in. As he pushed on he discovered the enemy in great numbers, and late in the day realized that he was facing a great army.

Von Hindenburg had taken a position astride the railway from Allenstein to Soldau, and all access to his front was barred by lakes and swamps. He was safe from frontal attack, and could reinforce each wing at pleasure. From his right ran the only two good roads in the region, and at his left was the Osterode railway. On the first day he stood on the defensive, while the Russians, confident of victory, attacked again and again. Some ground was won and prisoners captured, and the news of a second victory was sent to western Europe.

The battle continued, however, until the last day of August and is known as the battle of Tannenberg, from a village of that name near the marshes. Having worn down his enemy, von Hindenburg counter-attacked. His first movement was on his right. This not only deceived Samsonov and led him to reinforce his left, but also enabled von Hindenburg to seize the only good road that would give the Russian army a chance of retreat. Meanwhile the German general was hurrying masses of troops northeastward to outflank the Russian right. While the Russians were reinforcing one flank, he was concentrating every man he could upon the other. Then his left swept southward, driving in and enveloping the Russian right, and Samsonov was driven into a country full of swamps and almost without roads.

To thoroughly understand the plight of the Russian army one must have some idea of the character of the Masurian Lake district. It was probably molded by the work of ice in the past. Great glaciers, in their progress toward the sea, have ground out hundreds of hollows, where are found small pools and considerable lakes. From these glaciers have been dropped patches of clay which hold the waters in wide extents of marsh and bog. The country presents a monotonous picture of low, rounded swells and flats, interspersed with stunted pine and birch woods. The marshes and the lakes form a labyrinth, difficult to pass even to those familiar with the country. The Masurian region is a great trap for any commander who has not had unlimited acquaintance with the place. Causeways, filled with great care, and railroads permit an orderly advance, but in a confused retreat disaster at once threatens.

This was the ground that von Hindenburg knew so well. The Russians resisted desperately, but their position could not be held. Disaster awaited them. They found their guns sinking to the axle-trees in mire. Whole regiments were driven into the lakes and drowned. On the last day of battle, August 31st, Samsonov himself was killed, and his army completely destroyed. Fifty thousand prisoners were taken with hundreds of guns and quantities of supplies. Von Hindenburg had attained the triumph of which he had so long dreamed.

It was an immensely successful example of that enveloping movement characteristic of German warfare, a victory recalling the battle of Sedan, and it was upon a scale not inferior to that battle.

The news of this great triumph reached Berlin upon the anniversary of the battle of Sedan, and on the same day that the news came from the west that von Kluck had reached the gates of Paris and it had a profound effect upon the German mind. They had grown to believe that the Germans were a sort of superman; these wonderful successes confirmed them in this belief.

No longer did they talk of a mere defense in the east; an advance on Warsaw was demanded and von Hindenburg was acclaimed the greatest soldier of his day. The Emperor made him Field Marshal, and placed him in command of the Teutonic armies in the east.

But von Hindenburg was not satisfied. The remnant of the defeated army had fled toward Narev, and without losing a moment von Hindenburg set off in pursuit. Rennenkampf, all this time, strange to say, had made no move, and at the news of Samsonov's disaster he abandoned the siege of Koenigsberg and retreated toward the Niemen. At Gumbinnen he fought a rear-guard action with the German left, but had made up his mind that the Niemen must be the Russian line of defense. Von Hindenburg, following, crossed the Russian frontier and in the wide forests near Augustovo there was much fighting.



LEADING GERMAN GENERALS Von Hindenburg, Chief of the German General Staff; von Ludendorff, Strategist of the General Staff; von Moltke, dismissed by the Kaiser for incompetency; von Mackensen, Commander in the East; Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, Army Commander in the West.



Photo by Press Illustrated Service. THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF von Mackensen, von Moltke, Crown Prince Wilhelm, von Francois, von Falkenhayn, von Beseler, von Bethmann-Hollweg, von Bulow, Duke Albrecht, Ludendorf, von Einem, von Hindenburg, von Heeringen, Crown Prince Rupprecht, von Kluck, von Haeseler, von Tirpitz, Kaiser Wilhelm II, von Emmich

This action, described as the first battle of Augustovo, was only a rear-guard action, the Russians desiring merely to delay the enemy for a day or two. German reports, however, described it as a victory only second in importance to Tannenberg. Von Hindenburg then occupied Suwalki. He apparently had become over confident, and hardly realized that Rennenkampf was continually being reinforced by the Russian mobilization.

The Russian High Command understood the situation very well. Their aim was to keep von Hindenburg busy on the Niemen, while their armies in the south were overwhelming the fleeing Austrians. Von Hindenburg was deceived, and continued his advance until he got into serious trouble. His movement had begun on September 7th; his army consisted of the four corps with which he had won Tannenberg, and large reinforcements from Germany, including at least one guards battalion, and a number of Saxons and Bavarians. The country is one vast mixture of marsh and lake and bog. The roads are few, and advance must therefore be slow and difficult. Rennenkampf made no attempt to delay him beyond a little rear-guard fighting. The German army reached the Niemen on September 21st, and found behind it the Russian army in prepared positions, with large reinforcements from Vilna.

The river at this point was wide and deep, and hard to cross. The battle of the Niemen Crossings was an artillery duel. The Russians quietly waited in their trenches to watch the Germans build their pontoon bridges. Then their guns blew the bridges to pieces. Thereupon von Hindenburg bombarded the Russian lines hoping to destroy the Russian guns. On Friday, the 26th, his guns boomed all day; the Russians made no reply. So on the morning of the 27th he built bridges again, and again the Russians blew them to pieces. On the 28th he gave the order for retreat.

He realized that the game wasn't worth the candle; he might easily be kept fighting on the Niemen for months, while the main armies of the Russians were crossing Austria. Von Hindenburg conducted the retreat with a skill which came to him naturally from his knowledge of the marshes.

Rennenkampf followed him closely, keeping up persistent attacks through the woods and marshes. The path of the retreating army lay through the forest of Augustovo, a country much like that around the Masurian Lakes, and there the Germans suffered heavy losses. Von Hindenburg managed, however, to get the bulk of his forces back across the frontier and continued his retreat to the intrenchments on the Masurian Lakes.

The Germans lost 60,000 men in killed, wounded and prisoners, and von Hindenburg handed over the command of the German armies in East Prussia to General von Schubert, and hastened south to direct the movement to relieve the Austrians at Cracow.

But quite as important as the campaign in East Prussia was the struggle in Galicia. When the war began the Germans contemplated merely defense in their own domain; such offense as was planned was left to the Austrians farther south.

Galicia is a long, level country lying north of the Carpathian Mountains, and in this country Austria-Hungary had gathered together a force of hardly less than one million men. A quarter of these lay in reserve near the mountains; the remaining three-quarters was divided into two armies; the first, the northern army, being under the command of General Dankl, the second was that of von Offenberg. The base of the first army was Przemysl; that of the second was Lemberg.

The first army, it was planned, was to advance into Russian territory in the direction of Lublin. The second army, stationed southeast of the first army, was to protect it from any Russians who might strike in upon the south. The first army, therefore, contained more picked material than the second, which included many troops from the southern parts of the empire, including certain disaffected contingents. The first army made its advance as soon as possible, and entered Russian territory on the 11th of August. It went forward with very little loss and against very little resistance. The Russian forces which were against it were inferior in number, and fell back towards the Bug. The Austrians followed, turning somewhat toward the east, when their advance was checked by news of catastrophe in their rear. On the 14th of August the Russian army under General Ruzsky crossed the frontier, and advanced toward the Austrian second army.

The Russian army was in far greater strength than had been expected, and when its advance was followed by the appearance upon the right flank of von Offenberg's command, of yet another Russian army, under Brussilov, the Austrian second army found itself in great danger. Ruzsky advanced steadily from August 14th until, on the 21st, it was not more than one day's advance from the outer works of Lemberg, and the third Russian army under Brussilov was threatening von Offenberg's right flank.

Von Offenberg, underestimating the strength of the enemy, undertook to give battle. The first outpost actions were successful for the Austrians, and helped them in their blunder. On the 24th of August the two Russian armies effected a junction, and their Austrian opponents found themselves threatened with disaster. An endeavor was made to retreat, but the retreat turned into a rout. On the 28th Tarnopol was captured by the Russians, and the Austrian army found itself compelled to fall back upon defense positions to the south and east of Lemberg itself.

The attack of the Russian armies was completely successful. The Austrian army was driven from its positions, and on September 4th the Austrians evacuated Lemberg and the Russian forces took possession of the town. The Austrians fled. The population welcomed the conquerors with the greatest enthusiasm. An immense quantity of stores of every kind were captured by the Russians together with at least 100,000 prisoners. There was no looting, nor any kind of outrage. The Russian policy was to make friends of the inhabitants of Galicia.

But there was no halt after Lemberg. Brussilov divided his army, and sent his left wing into the Carpathian passes; his center and right moved west toward Przemysl; while Ruzsky moved northwest to reinforce the Russian army on the Bug. Meanwhile the position of Dankl's army was perilous in the extreme. There were two possible courses, one to fall back and join the remnants of von Offenberg's army, the other to attack at once, before the first Russian army could be reinforced, and if victorious to turn on Ruzsky.

Dankl's army was now very strong. He had received reinforcements, not only from Austria but from Germany. On the 4th of September he attacked the Russian center; his attack was a failure, although he outnumbered the Russians. The battle continued until the tenth.

Everywhere the Austrians were beaten, and driven off in ignominious retreat. The whole Austrian force fled southward in great disorder; a part directed its flight toward Przemysl, others still farther west toward Cracow. Austria had been completely defeated. Poland was clear of the enemy. The Russian flag flew over Lemberg, while the Russian army was marching toward Cracow. The Russian star was in the ascendant.

But the Austrian armies had not been annihilated. An army of nearly a million men cannot be destroyed in so short a time. The Austrian failure was due in part to the disaffection of some of the elements of the army, and in part to the poor Austrian generalship. They had underestimated their foe, and ventured on a most perilous plan of campaign.

Russian generalship had been most admirable, and the Russian generals were men of ability and experience. Brussilov had seen service in the Turkish War of 1877. Ruzsky was a professor in the Russian War Academy. In the Japanese war he had been chief of staff to General Kaulbars, the commander of the Second Manchurian army. Associated with him was General Radko Dmitrieff, an able officer with a most interesting career. General Dmitrieff was born in Bulgaria, when it was a Turkish province. He graduated at the Military School at Sofia, and afterwards at the War Academy at Petrograd. On his return to Bulgaria he commanded a regiment in the Serbian-Bulgarian war. Later he became mixed up in the conspiracy against Prince Alexander, and was forced to leave Bulgaria. For ten years he served in the Russian army, returning to Bulgaria on the accession of Prince Ferdinand. Later on he became Chief of the General Staff, and when the Balkan war broke out he commanded one of the Bulgarian armies, won several important victories, and became a popular hero of the war. Disgusted with the political squabbles which followed the war, he returned to Russia as a general in the Russian army. With men like these in command, the Russian Empire was well served.

After the decisive defeat of the Austrian army under General Dankl, certain changes were made in the Russian High Command. General Ruzsky was made commander of the center, which was largely reinforced. General Ivanov was put in command of the armies operating in Galicia with Dmitrieff and Brussilov as his chief lieutenants. Brussilov's business was to seize the deep passes in the Carpathians and to threaten Hungary. Dmitrieff's duty was to press the Austrian retreat, and capture the main fortresses of central Galicia.

There are two great fortresses on the River San, Jaroslav and Przemysl, both of them controlling important railroad routes. Jaroslav on the main line from Lemberg to Cracow, Przemysl with a line which skirts the Carpathians, and connects with lines going south to Hungary. Jaroslav was fortified by a strong circle of intrenchments and was looked to by Austria for stout resistance. The Austrians were disappointed, for Ivanov captured it in three days, on the 23d of September. Dmitrieff found Przemysl a harder nut to crack. It held out for many months, while operations of greater importance were being carried on by the Russian armies. The plans of the Russian generals in some respects were not unlike the plan previously suggested as that of the German High Command. At the beginning of the war they had no desire to carry on a powerful offensive against Germany. The expedition into East Prussia was conducted more for political than for military purposes. The real offensive at the start was to be against Austria. The Russian movements were cautious at first, but the easy capture of Lemberg, the fall of Jaroslav, and the demoralization of the Austrian armies, encouraged more daring strategy. With the Germans stopped on the north, little aid to the Austrians could come from that source. The Grand Duke Nicholas was eager to strike a great blow before the winter struck in, so his armies swept to the great Polish city of Cracow. The campaign against Austria also had a political side.

Russia had determined upon a new attitude toward Poland. On August 15th the Grand Duke Nicholas, on behalf of the Czar, had issued a proclamation offering self-government to Russian Poland. Home rule for Poland had long been a favorite plan with the Czar. Now he promised, not only to give Russian Poland home rule, but to add to it the Polish peoples in Austria and Germany. This meant that Austria and Germany would have to give up Galicia on the one hand, and Prussian Poland on the other, if they should lose the war. In the old days Poland had been one of the greatest kingdoms in Europe, with a proud nobility and high civilization. She was one of the first of the great Slav peoples to penetrate the west. Later she had protected Europe against Tartar invasion, but internal differences had weakened her, and, surrounded by enemies, she had first been plundered, and later on divided between Austria, Russia and Prussia. Never had the Poles consented to this destruction of their independence. Galicia had constantly struggled against Austria; Prussian Poland was equally disturbing to the Prussian peace, and Russia was only able to maintain the control of her Polish province by the sword.

Of the three the Pole was probably more inclined to keep on friendly terms with Russia, also a Slav people. The policy of the Czar encouraged this inclination and produced disaffection among the Poles in Galicia and in Posen. Moreover, it gave Russia the sympathy of the world which had long regarded the partition of Poland as a political crime. It encouraged the Czecho-Slavs and other dissatisfied portions of the Austrian Empire.

The results were seen immediately in the demoralization of the Austrian armies where considerable numbers of Czecho-Slovak troops deserted to the Russian army, and later in the loyalty to Russia of the Poles, and their refusal, even under the greatest German pressure, to give the German Empire aid.



CHAPTER X

THE STRUGGLE FOR SUPREMACY ON THE SEA

Captain Mahan's thesis that in any great war the nation possessing the greater sea power is likely to win, was splendidly illustrated during the World War.

The great English fleets proved the insuperable obstacle to the ambitious German plans of world dominion. The millions of soldiers landed in France from Great Britain, and its provinces, the millions of Americans transported in safety across the water, and the enormous quantities of supplies put at the disposal of the Allies depended, absolutely, upon the Allied control of the sea routes of the world. With a superior navy a German blockade of England would have brought her to terms in a short period, and France, left to fight alone, would have been an easy victim. The British navy saved the world.

Germany had for many years well understood the necessity of power upon the sea. When the war broke out it was the second greatest of the sea powers. Its ships were mostly modern, for its navy was a creation of the past fifteen years, and its development was obviously for the purpose of attacking the British supremacy. The father of this new navy was a naval officer by the name of von Tirpitz, who, in 1897, had become the German Naval Minister. With the aid of the Emperor he had aroused among the Germans a great enthusiasm for maritime power, and had built up a navy in fifteen years, which was second only to the English navy.

Von Tirpitz was an interesting character. In appearance he looked like an old sea-wolf who had passed his life on the wave, but such a thought would be a mistake. The great admiral's work was done on land; he was an organizer, a diplomatist, and a politician. He created nothing new; in all its details he merely copied the English fleet. He is tall, heavily built, with a great white beard, forked in the middle. He is a man of much dignity, with a smile which has won him renown. He might have been Chancellor of the Empire but he preferred to devote himself to the navy, to prove that the future of Germany is on the seas. His glories are the Lusitania, the fleet safely anchored at Kiel, and the long rows of innocent victims of the submarine.

He was born in 1850 at Kustrion on the Ildor, when the German navy was only a little group of worthless boats. In 1865 he entered the School of Cadets, in 1869 he was gazetted lieutenant, in 1875 he was lieutenant-commander with a reputation as an able organizer. In 1891 he was appointed Chief of Staff at Kiel. This was his opportunity, and he set himself at the task of creating and protecting the submarine division of the navy. As time went on he grew in importance. In 1898 he became Assistant Secretary of State at the Admiralty in Berlin. Two years later he became vice-admiral. His admirers recognized his powers, and he was called the master. In 1899 a patent of nobility was conferred upon him. In 1902 he gained permission to build 13,000-ton war ships, and the following year he was made admiral. In 1907 enormous appropriations were made at his desire for the enlargement of the fleet. In 1908 Emperor William conferred on him the Order of the Black Eagle. In 1914 the Kiel Canal was completed under his direction, and he informed the Emperor that the fleet was ready. It is only fair to add that in all his plans he had the active support of his Imperial Master. The Kaiser, too, had dreamed a dream. Von Tirpitz admired the English. His children had been brought up in England, as was also his wife. He imitated the English, but on the day of the declaration of war he absolutely forbade his family to talk English, and he made a bonfire of his fine scientific library of English books. The Kaiser treated Von Tirpitz as his friend, asked his advice, and followed his counsel. His son, Sub-Lieutenant Wolf Von Tirpitz, studied at Oxford, and is on the most friendly terms with many English gentlemen of importance. He was on board the Mainz, which was sunk off Helgoland in August, 1916. In full uniform he swam for twenty minutes, before being picked up by one of the boats of the cruiser Liverpool. He was a lucky prisoner of war. The German battleships and cruisers which represent the toil of von Tirpitz for more than half a century, lay hidden away in the shelter of the Kiel Canal during the war to be ingloriously surrendered at its end. His name will remain linked with that of the Lusitania.



DRIVING THE GERMAN COMMERCE RAIDERS OFF THE SEAS The British light cruiser, "Highflyer," sinking the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" off the West Coast of Africa early in the war. The commerce-destroyer was attacking a British steamer when the cruiser came up and sent her to the bottom. Inserts show both ships.



Copyright International Film Service. ESCAPING A TORPEDO BY RAPID MANEUVERING This destroyer escaped a torpedo from a hunted submarine by quickly turning. Generally the torpedo travels at about fifteen feet under water.

The German High Sea Fleet, at the beginning of the war, consisted of forty-one battleships, seven battle cruisers, nine armored cruisers, forty-nine light cruisers, one hundred and forty-five destroyers, eighty torpedo boats, and thirty-eight submarines. Under the direction of Von Tirpitz the navy had become democratic and had drawn to it many able men of the middle class. Its training was highly specialized and the officers were enthusiasts in their profession. The navy of Austria-Hungary had also expanded in recent years under the inspiration of Admiral Montecuculi. At the outbreak of the war the fleet comprised sixteen battleships, two armored and twelve light cruisers, eighteen destroyers, eighty-five torpedo boats and eleven submarines. The Allies were much more powerful. The French navy had in the matter of invention given the lead to the world, but its size had not kept pace with its quality. At the beginning of the war France had thirty-one battleships, twenty-four armored cruisers, eight light cruisers, eighty-seven destroyers, one hundred and fifty-three torpedo boats and seventy-six submarines. Russia, after the war with Japan, had begun the creation of a powerful battle fleet, which had not been completed when war was declared. At that time she had on the Baltic four dreadnaughts, ten armored cruisers, two light cruisers, eighty destroyers and twenty-four submarines, and a fleet of about half the strength in the Black Sea.

The English fleet had reached a point of efficiency which was unprecedented in its history. The progress of the German sea power had stimulated the spirit of the fleet, and led to a steady advance in training and equipment. The development of armament, and of battleship designing, the improvement in gunnery practice, the revision of the rate of pay, the opening up of careers from the lower deck, and the provision of a naval air service are landmarks in the advance. In the navy estimates of March, 1914, Parliament sanctioned over 51,000,000 Pounds for a naval defense, the largest appropriation for the purpose ever made. The home fleet was arranged in three units, the first fleet was divided into four battle squadrons, together with the flagship of the commander-in-chief. The first squadron was made up of eight battleships, the second squadron contained eight, the third eight and the fourth four. Attached to each fleet was a battle cruiser squadron, consisting of four ships in the first fleet, four in the second, four in the third and five in the fourth.

The fourth also contained a light cruiser squadron, a squadron of six gunboats for mine sweeping, and four flotillas of destroyers, each with a flotilla cruiser attached. The second fleet was composed of two battle squadrons, the first containing eight pre-dreadnaughts, and the second six. Attached to this fleet were also two cruiser squadrons, a mine layer squadron of seven vessels, four patrol flotillas, consisting of destroyers and torpedo boats, and seven flotillas of submarines. A third fleet contained two battle squadrons, mainly composed of old ships, with six cruiser squadrons. The English strength, outside home waters, consisted of the Mediterranean fleet, containing three battle cruisers, four armored cruisers, four ordinary cruisers and a flotilla of seventeen destroyers, together with submarines and torpedo boats. In eastern waters there were a battleship, two cruisers, and four sloops. In the China squadron there were one battleship, two armored cruisers, two ordinary cruisers, and a number of gunboats, destroyers, submarines, and torpedo boats. In New Zealand there were four cruisers. The Australian fleet contained a battle cruiser, three ordinary cruisers, three destroyers and two submarines. Other cruisers and gunboats were stationed at the Cape, the west coast of Africa, and along the western Atlantic. At the outbreak of the war two destroyers were purchased from Chile, and two Turkish battleships, building in England, were commandeered by the government.

It is evident that the union of France and Britain made the Allies easily superior in the Mediterranean Sea, so that France was able to transport her African troops in safety, and the British commerce with India and the East could safely continue. The main field of the naval war, therefore, was the North Sea and the Baltic, where Germany had all her fleet, except a few naval raiders. The entrance to the Baltic was closed to the enemy by Denmark, which, as a neutral, was bound to prevent an enemy fleet from passing. Germany, however, by means of the Kiel Canal, could permit the largest battle fleet to pass from the Baltic to the North Sea. The German High Sea Fleet was weaker than the British home fleet by more than forty per cent, and the German policy, therefore, was to avoid a battle, until, through mine layers and submarines, the British power should have been sufficiently weakened. The form of the German coast made this plan easily possible. The various bays and river mouths provided safe retreat for the German ships, and the German fleet were made secure by the fortifications along the coast. On July the 29th, 1914, at the conclusion of the annual maneuvers, instead of being demobilized as would have been usual, the Grand Fleet of Great Britain sailed from Portland along the coast into the mists, and from that moment dominated the whole course of the war.

From the 4th of August, the date of the declaration of war, the oceans of the world were practically rid of enemy war ships, and were closed to enemy mercantile marine. Although diplomacy had not yet failed, the masters of the English navy were not caught napping. The credit for this readiness has been given to Mr. Winston Churchill, one of the first Lords of the Admiralty, who had divined the coming danger. When the grand fleet sailed it seemed to disappear from English view. Occasionally some dweller along the coast might see an occasional cruiser or destroyer sweeping by in the distance, but the great battleships had gone. Somewhere, in some hidden harbor, lay the vigilant fleets of England.