This deprivation of jury rights in Wyoming is not only an United States interference with woman's political rights, but also an interference with her industrial rights. It is a well-known fact that some women earned their first independent dollar by sitting in the jury box. And whatever interferes with woman's industrial rights helps to send her down to those depths where want of bread has forced so many women: into the gutters of shame. This is a question of morality as well as of industrial and political rights. Every infringement of a person's political rights, touches a hundred other rights adversely. Let me show you one good that has come to woman through her ballot in Wyoming. The payment of men and women teachers has been equalized by direct statute, for political power always benefits the parties holding it.

Let us look at a few other ways in which the United States has touched the rights of women where protection has been secured her by legislation outside of itself. One instance that has come to my knowledge since I have been in your city, is in the case of pensions for colored women. The United States not only secured the ballot to the black male citizen outside of State authority, but it has touched the family relation with its powerful hand. It has assumed that the woman with whom a colored soldier was living at the time of his death was his wife, notwithstanding he may have lived for many years in recognized married relations with another woman, and become the father of children by her during this period. In one case coming under the cognizance of our Washington lawyer, Mrs. Lockwood, a pension was, by United States authority, thus granted to a woman living with such colored soldier at the time of his death, although she had no other claim upon it. This soldier, during the period of slavery, had been married in his master's house to another woman by a regularly ordained clergyman, and by that wife had become the father of five or six children. This woman was his lawful widow, according to State and church law. These children were his lawful children, according to State and church law, but the United States stepped in, and made this married woman an outcast, and left her children in the world with the brand of illegitimacy. The women of the Territories of Wyoming and Utah are not secure in their political rights, because the women of the Nation have none. Scarcely a session of Congress but some politician introduces a bill to disfranchise the women of these Territories.

In regard to the religious aspects of this Utah question. I care for it only so far as it touches woman's political rights, although I do know that woman's political wrongs and her religious wrongs have been very closely intermingled in the past. I recall a Papal Bull of Urban II., in the 12th century, which compelled priests to discard their wives, making of thousands of women in England, wives who were not wed; of children, offspring who had no recognized fathers. We of the National Woman Suffrage Association have nothing to do with the religious rights of women in Utah, except in so far as they intermingle with and touch woman's political rights. But the Utah question, which now comes up again, is not simply a religious question. The Government is continuously striving to destroy the political rights of the women of this Territory. Its Governor is a United States officer, and in his last report to the Secretary of the Interior, he so far transcended the duties of his office as to suggest the disfranchisement of Utah women. Almost every session of Congress sees some bill of similar import introduced.

The General Government did not confer this right, did not secure even the exercise of it. The territorial Legislature, the same as in Wyoming, secured to women the exercise of the right of suffrage; the United States, according to its own theory, has no authority to interfere with this right, because, according to that theory, it has nothing at all to do with the suffrage question. Yet it proposes to disfranchise those women as a punishment for their religious belief; it proposes to make social outcasts of them, as it has already done with the wives of some of its black soldier voters.

Looking back through history we find no act of the Romish Church more vile than that which compelled its priests to disown their wives and legitimate children—none which so utterly demoralized society, and destroyed its tens of thousands of women. And although, as a body of reformers, I again say we do not touch religion except where it, and politics together, infringe upon the rights of women, I do not hesitate to say for myself individually, that I have no faith in any form of religion, be it what it may, Christian, Mohammedan, Buddhist, that receives revelation only through some man; or farther than that, I will say, I have no faith in any form of religion that does not place man and woman on an exact equality of religious rights. Two forms of religion of the present day which have risen through woman, or as revelations to her, namely the Shaker and the Spiritual, do give us equality of religious rights, for man and woman. But I call your attention to the inconsistency of United States laws, and their especial injustice to women by interference with those rights secured them by State or Territorial laws, as in case of the colored soldier's wife; as in case the assumption that the United States had a right to prohibit the exercise of the suffrage by a woman in New York, although New York itself did not interfere; as in case of the virtual prohibition by the United States of jury rights to the women of Wyoming; as in case of the presumptuous suggestion of the Governor of Utah that its women should be disfranchised; as in case of such bills so often introduced in Congress.

I know something of the opinion of the women of the Nation, and I know they intend to be recognized as citizens secured in the exercise of all the powers and rights of citizens. If this security has not come under the XIV. Amendment, it must come under a XVI., for woman intends to possess "equal personal rights and equal political privileges with all other citizens." She asks for nothing outside the power of the United States, she asks for nothing outside the duty of the United States to secure. Politicians may as well look this fact squarely in the face and become wise after the wisdom of the world, for in just so far as they ignore and forget the women of the country, in just so far will they themselves be ignored and forgotten by future generations.

The following review of this important case is from the January number, 1876, of the Central Law Journal, St. Louis, Missouri:

WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN ITS LEGAL ASPECT—A REVIEW OF THE CASE OF MINOR vs. HAPPERSETT, 21 WALLACE, U. S. REPORTS.

As a rule, respect should undoubtedly be paid to judicial decisions. When the court of last resort has considered and passed upon a question of law, especially if it be one involving a consideration of constitutional power, as well as of private right, it is eminently proper that its conclusion should not be disturbed, unless for reasons of the gravest import. But cases present themselves at times, in which criticism is not only justified, but is demanded; and it is only through its aid that the ultimate truth of any question can be reached and its principles be correctly established. Nor can courts of justice take exception to such criticism, since the reports abound with evidences of the fact that there is no judicial immunity from error; and we believe that if the glamour of supposed legal impeccability, that shrouds the judiciary in the eyes of many, could be removed, a public service would be accomplished. In the case under consideration an important question of constitutional law was involved, the construction of which affected not only the plaintiff therein, but the entire class of persons to which she belonged, while the decision extends it still further, and makes it applicable to every citizen of the United States. Thus, while the particular case may be ended, the entire community has an interest in the conclusion announced. It is not our purpose to consider the subject of suffrage as an abstract right; with this aspect of it we have nothing to do in this article. We shall treat it solely as a legal right. Under a government of law, indeed, there are, properly speaking, no abstract rights. All rights, of person or of property, are legal rights, and it shall be our purpose to show that the right of Federal suffrage is recognized in the Constitution of the United States, and certainly no one will deny its practical exercise during nearly ninety years. An inspection of the Opinion will show that the whole matter was summed up in the question, whether suffrage is a right or privilege appertaining to citizenship of the United States, for if it be, then the plaintiff's suit was rightly brought. The opinion, which was delivered by the Chief Justice, states the matter as follows:

It is contended that the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri, which confine the right of suffrage and registration therefor to men, are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and therefore void. The argument is, that as a woman, born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is a citizen of the United States and of the State in which she resides, she has the right of suffrage, as one of the privileges and immunities of her citizenship, which the State can not by its laws or Constitution abridge.

And on page 170:

If the right of suffrage is one of the necessary privileges of a citizen of the United States, then the Constitution and laws of Missouri confining it to men are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, as amended, and consequently void. The direct question is therefore presented, whether all citizens are necessarily voters. The Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens. For that definition we must look elsewhere. In this case we need not determine what they are, but only whether suffrage is necessarily one of them. It certainly is nowhere made so in express terms. The United States has no voters in the State, of its own creation. The elective officers of the United States are all elected directly or indirectly by State voters.

We had supposed that if there was any question that now, at least, might be regarded as finally settled, both by the late appeal to arms, and by the Constitutional Amendments, it was that of the subordination of State to National authority, over any and all subjects in which the rights and privileges of citizens of the United States are involved. If the amendments do not cover this ground, then they are worse than useless. And yet this decision is a blow at all that constitutes us a Nation. To declare that the United States has no voters—that its officers are all elected by State voters, is to completely reverse the order of things, and subordinate the citizens of the United States to State authority. It will be observed that this decision goes far beyond the ground hitherto and ordinarily claimed by the advocates of what are called "States' Rights."

It has usually been supposed that the States possessed the authority to regulate the exercise of the franchise by the Federal voter, but never before was the right itself denied as appurtenant to Federal citizenship. But now the franchise itself is declared to be non-existent—Federal officers are elected by State voters. The subject itself is wholly withdrawn from Federal supervision and control. Even the amendments can not confer authority over a matter that has no existence. If, then, the United States has no voters in the States, it can properly have nothing to do with the subject of elections. If the citizen of the United States has no right to vote except as a citizen of a State, his Federal citizenship is, of course, subordinated to his State citizenship. It logically follows that much of the recent legislation on this subject by Congress is destitute of authority. If members of the House of Representatives are elected by State voters, as here declared, there is no reason why the States may not, at their pleasure, recall their representatives, or refuse to elect them, as in 1860 the Southern States claimed it to be their right to do; and if a sufficient number can be united in such a movement, the Federal Government will be completely at their mercy. It may also well be doubted how far the Southern States are bound by legislation in which they had no part. Notwithstanding the provision of the XIV. Amendment, that neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; it (as held by the Supreme Court in two cases in 13th Wallace, Chief Justice Chase dissenting), contracts for the sale or hire of slaves effected before emancipation are valid, upon the ground that to take away the remedy for their enforcement would be to impair their obligation, how much less can the owner of a slave be deprived of his property, which forms the subject-matter of that contract, without compensation? If his contract can not be impaired, surely the thing to which that contract relates can not be taken from him, except upon compensation. Chief Justice Chase was of the opinion that the above quoted provision of the XIV. Amendment could be sustained only upon the ground that the XIII. Amendment wiped out everything, contracts as well as slavery. Yet the Court held all such contracts to be valid. And see, in this connection, the case of Wilkinson vs. Leland, 2d Peters, 657. It is idle to say that these suppositions are visionary. What has happened once, may occur again. It can hardly be questioned that if in 1860 the seceding States could have pointed to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States such as this, the whole face of affairs might have been different, and the "erring sisters" permitted to "go in peace"! The "lost cause" may not be "lost," after all.

But to resume: The Court tells us in its opinion in this case, that "there can not be a Nation without a people," but it seems there may be a Nation without voters! Now the people of the United States may not have a very profound knowledge of their institutions, but their intelligence certainly rises to the level of comprehending that a republican government can not be established or maintained without voters. It would be a manifest absurdity to say that in a government created by the people, they are not voters. Inasmuch, then, as it is admitted by the Court, if the right of suffrage be a privilege of the citizen of the United States, that the State Constitution and laws confining it to men are in violation of the Constitution of the United States and, consequently, void; as contended for by the plaintiff in this case, we have really only to examine this single point: Does the Constitution of the United States recognize the right of suffrage as belonging to its citizens?

Future generations will look with astonishment at the fact that such a question could be asked seriously. Not only was the subject debated in the convention that framed the instrument, but one of its ablest members, Alexander Hamilton, in the fifty-second number of the Federalist, says:

The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded as a fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper for the same reason; and for the additional reason, that it would have rendered too dependent on the State Governments that branch of the Federal Government which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rule, would probably have been as dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State; because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States; because, being fixed by the State Constitutions, it is not alterable by the State Governments, and it can not be feared that the people of the States will alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the Federal Constitution.

Again, in the XV. Amendment, suffrage is recognized as an existing right of Federal citizenship. It is not created by that Amendment. It was already existing. The language is:

The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

A right must exist before it can be denied. There can be no denial of a thing that has no existence. If it should be said the XV. Amendment relates only to the negro, we reply that this would be no answer, even if true, which may be doubted; but the point we are now discussing is the statement of the Court that the United States has no voters in the States of its own creation, or in other words, that Federal suffrage does not exist; we have shown that this a mistake, it being recognized in the Constitution; and as the argument of the Court was based on its non-existence it consequently falls to the ground. This really disposes of the case, but we will notice other points. The Court says:

After the adoption of the XIV. Amendment, it was deemed necessary to have a XV: ... The XIV. Amendment had already provided that no State should make or enforce any law which should abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States. If suffrage was one of these privileges or immunities, why amend the Constitution to prevent its being denied on account of race, etc.? Nothing is more evident than that the greater must include the less, and if all were already protected, why go through with the form of amending the Constitution to protect a part?

It is sometimes perilous in argument to ask questions—we will answer the Court in its own words. In the Slaughter-house cases, the Court then said:

A few years' experience satisfied the thoughtful men who had been the authors of the other two amendments, that, notwithstanding the restraints of those articles on the States, and the laws passed under the additional powers granted to Congress, these were inadequate for the protection of life, liberty, and property, without which freedom to the slave was no boon. They were in all those States denied the right of suffrage. The laws were administered by the white man alone. It was urged that a race of men distinctively marked as was the negro, living in the midst of another and dominant race, could never be fully secured in their person and their property without the right of suffrage. Hence the XV. Amendment, which declares that the right of a citizen of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The negro having, by the XIV. Amendment, been declared to be a citizen of the United States, is thus made a voter in every State of the Union. (16 Wallace, 71.)

For the present argument, it is immaterial whether this result is effected by the XIV., or XV. Amendment, or both. The point is, that the Supreme Court here declares the negro to be a voter in every State of the Union, by virtue of one or both amendments. He is made a voter (a Federal voter) by the law of the United States, and not by the State law. Being made a citizen of the United States, he is thus made a voter in every State of the Union. This is the very gist of the matter. The whole principle is summed up in these few words. The franchise is an incident of the status, or condition of citizenship. Freedom alone was not enough. The XIII. Amendment made the negro free, but citizenship was additionally necessary before he became a voter. As soon as that was achieved, in that moment the franchise followed; to be enjoyed, in the same manner as by other citizens. If ever a suitor was entitled to rely with confidence upon judicial utterances of great principles of law, Mrs. Minor was thus entitled, in her case. She was a citizen of the United States by birth; admitted to be possessed of every qualification but that of sex. Her counsel appeared before this court and quoted its very language above given, and asked the court to be consistent with its own teachings. But no. There was no great and powerful party to back her demand, as in the case of the negro. She was merely a private individual, and the court contented itself with saying that the right of suffrage when granted would be protected! To which it may be replied, if women ever vote, they will protect themselves; but, if their right should subsequently be denied by the State, the Supreme Court, according to its own rulings in this case, could give no protection, since it declares the right to be wholly within the control of each State. But why should the court require the women citizens of the United States to produce a special grant of the right, when it required nothing of the kind from the negro? Are there two laws in this country, one for the negro, and another for woman? Does the Constitution of the United States recognize or permit class distinctions to be made between its citizens? Yet by this decision, the negro is placed above the woman. He is her superior. His position is above her. For our own part, we decline to accept any such construction of that instrument, knowing that the time will ultimately come when some claim similar to that of Mrs. Minor will meet with proper recognition. To make its inconsistency still greater, the court in this case declares that "allegiance and protection are reciprocal obligations. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection," yet in this case that protection is denied. While the negro, then, is thus declared to be a voter, by reason of his citizenship, in every State of the Union, there is no law either of the State or of the Nation, which in terms or by words confers the ballot upon him. The XV. Amendment does not confer it, but treats it as a right already existing, and forbids its deprivation. Likewise the State law assumes its existence, and makes no change, except to conform to the new condition of the negro's citizenship. There is no change in the State laws, except the omission of a word—the word "white"—from the clause "white male citizens," in the State Constitution. But who ever heard of a right being conferred by omission? And yet this change of a single word by the State was an acknowledgment by it of the supremacy of Federal law touching this subject; and was designed to make the State law conform to the Federal law, which declares (XIV. Amendment) that "no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." This conformity extends, however, only so far as to embrace the negro citizen of the United States, leaving the far larger class of women citizens of the United States still under ban of disfranchisement, in plain violation of the amendment. Under these circumstances, in the case under consideration, the Supreme Court of the United States was asked to interpose its authority, and effect by its decree that which the State should have done, and declare that the word "male" must be dropped, as well as the word "white."

Had this been done, the State law in its entirety would have conformed to the paramount law of the United States, while as it is, it conforms only in part. We are told that slavery was abolished in Massachusetts, not by an enactment expressly adopted for the purpose, but by a decision of the Supreme Court in 1781, that its existence was inconsistent with the declaration in the Bill of Rights that "all men are born free and equal." (Bradford's History of Mass., 11, 227; Draper's Civil War, 1, 318; Story on Const., 11, p. 634, note.) So far, however, from interfering, as it was its plain duty to have done, to protect this class of United States citizens, the court has gone further than perhaps it intended, and possibly destroyed the rights of another class, for the decision, by declaring that the United States has no voters, virtually renders the XV. Amendment of no effect. There is nothing upon which it can operate. There being no voters, there is of course no "right to vote," to be "protected." So that every citizen of the United States is left completely at the mercy of the State.

We will now consider that clause of the Constitution of the United States in which, as Hamilton said, the right of suffrage is defined and established for the citizens of the United States; which, nevertheless, has most strangely been regarded as conferring upon the States authority to disfranchise them. Article 1, sec. 2. "The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature." The section, it will be seen, consists of two clauses, but there is not a word as to the sex of the elector. He or she must be one of the people, or citizens—that is all. The "People" elect. They vote in their respective States, of course; or, to use the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "when they act, they act in their States." (4 Wheaton, 403.) This first clause, then, fixes the class of persons to whom belong this right of suffrage—Federal suffrage—not State suffrage. It would be absurd in the Federal Constitution to undertake to deal with State suffrage, and it attempts nothing of the kind. The right of Federal suffrage, then, attaches or belongs to this class. The subsequent clause is subordinate to this, and relates not to the right, but to the exercise of it by the voter. In other words, it prescribes the qualifications of the elector, as to how he shall exercise the right; the time, place, and manner of voting, and the age at which the right shall be enjoyed. As to all these matters, which are included in the subject of "qualifications," instead of laying down a uniform rule, to be applicable all over the Union, the convention thought it best to adopt the regulations on this subject already in force in the several States. When the Federal elector, therefore, comes to vote for United States officers, he finds that he must simply conform to the regulations laid down by the State for State voters. But this confers upon the State no authority over the Federal elector's right of suffrage; far less does it give the State authority to deprive the Federal elector of this right, under pretense of laying down for its own citizens an arbitrary and impossible condition. In the nature of things, a republican government could not part with this right of suffrage. As Hamilton says, such right is justly regarded as a fundamental article in such government. To part with it, would be to part with its chiefest attribute of sovereignty, and nothing of the kind was done, or intended.

Except so far, then, as this decision makes it so, there is not a particle of authority vested in the States to deny this right of Federal suffrage to the citizen of the United States. The regulation of the exercise of the franchise is within their control, as above stated, but the right itself is not theirs to give or to withhold. The right to vote for Federal officers is wholly distinct from the right to vote for State officers; but the fact of these two rights being blended in one and the same person, and being usually exercised at the same time, has given rise to the whole difficulty. In consequence of the fact of the election being conducted by State officers, the State providing all the machinery for voting, etc., we have become accustomed, from long habit, to associate in our minds the one franchise with the other, and thus confound rights that are wholly separate and distinct.

We notice, in conclusion, the remark of the court touching the non-assertion heretofore of this right by any one of the class now claiming to be entitled to it, and the intimation, or insinuation, that if the right really existed, it would have been claimed before, etc. It is true that Mrs. Minor's case is of "first impression," in the Supreme Court of the United States; but we fail to see that this fact has anything to do with the principle involved, or that there can be any such thing as a "limitation" of rights that are fundamental. If the right exists, and has a constitutional recognition, the time of its assertion has nothing to do with it. Only weak minds will be influenced by a fallacy like this. Because the women of a former day did not see and feel the necessity of making this claim, is no reason why those who do now see and feel that necessity should have that claim denied. "Time has no more connection with, nor influence upon principle, than principle has upon time. The wrong which began a thousand years ago, is as much a wrong as if it began to-day; and the right which originates to-day, is as much a right as if it had the sanction of a thousand years. Time, with respect to principles, is an eternal now. It has no operation upon them, it changes nothing of their nature and qualities." (Paine's Political Works, vol. 2, p. 328—Dissertation on Government.)

We are fully conscious that the subject upon which we have written is by no means exhausted; the point, especially in reference to bills of attainder, being wholly untouched. But the limits of a single article will not admit of a full discussion of the subject. Indeed, a treatise upon suffrage is one of the wants of the profession. We leave it, however, to the candid judgment of our readers, if we have not fully demonstrated the right of Federal suffrage to be a necessary privilege of a citizen of the United States, and, according to the court's own admission, such being the case, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief sought.

Thus closed woman's struggle for National protection of her civil and political rights under the XIV. Amendment. In the case of Myra Bradwell, which was commenced in September, 1869, two years before the others, Chief-Justice Chase, one of the best and wisest Judges that ever honored the American bench, dissented from the opinion of the Supreme Court: that the fact of United States citizenship did not secure to woman the right to practice law, and that a married woman rested under a special disability in regard to her civil rights, thus sustaining the action of Illinois in refusing to admit Mrs. Bradwell to the bar of that State.

The decision in the case of Mrs. Minor, that the political rights of women were wholly under the control of their respective States was still more emphatic and discouraging. Had Judge Chase lived, we have every reason to believe that in this case too, he would have dissented, and that his opinion would have had great weight in the general discussion. Although defeated at every point, woman's claim as a citizen of the United States to the Federal franchise is placed upon record in the highest court of the Nation, and there it will remain forever. As Milton so grandly says in Paradise Lost:

What though the field be lost? All is not lost: th' unconquerable will And courage never to submit or yield!

FOOTNOTES:

[164] The elections in New Hampshire were held in the spring in former years.

[165] An account of Mrs. Gardner's voting will be found in the Michigan chapter.

[166] WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN THE COURTS.—SHAKESPEARE REVIVED.

In the case of Hamlet vs. Rex, Shakespeare's reports, occurs the following:

SCENE—CHURCHYARD.—Enter two clowns with spades.

First Clown. Is she to be buried in Christian burial that wilfully seeks her own salvation?

Second Clown. I tell thee, she is; therefore make her grave straight. The crowner hath set on her and finds it Christian burial.

First Clown. How can that be, unless she drowned herself in her own defense?

Second Clown. Why,'tis found so.

First Clown. It must be so, se offendendo; it can not be else. For here lies the point. If I drown myself wittingly, it argues an act; and an act has three branches—it is to act, to do, and to perform. Argal, she drowned herself wittingly.

Second Clown. Nay, but hear you good man, deliver.

First Clown. Give me leave. Here lies the water. Good. Here stands the man. Good. If the man goes to this water and drowns himself, it is nil he, will he, he goes. Mark you that. But if the water come to him and drown him, he drowns not himself. Argal, he that is not guilty of his own death shortens not his own life.

Second Clown. But is this law?

First Clown. Ay, marry is't, crowner quest law.

It hardly needed any better authority than the above to convince simple-minded people of the truth of the observation made by Blackstone that "law is the perfection of human reason." But if law is great, those who expound it are greater.

The woman suffrage trial came on. The judges endeavored to follow the arguments as far as possible, and to religiously earn their salaries by the attention given, if no more. The arguments were finally finished, and the women of the country waited expectantly to hear their legal status defined.

It took just one week for the united judicial wisdom of this District to consider this case in all its bearings, and then the decision came. It was about as follows:

SCENE—DISTRICT COURT-ROOM.—Enter Judges with law books.

First Judge. Women are voters but they can't vote. Voting is a privilege and not a natural right, and must be conferred; it has clearly been conferred by the supreme law of the land, therefore women can not vote. A little voting is a good thing, but too much voting is injurious to public interests, as is instanced in our large cities. If women vote, there would be more voting than at present, consequently women are not entitled to vote. The Constitution gives women the right to vote. The organic law of the district does not. The latter, of course, is void where it conflicts with the former, therefore can not women vote. Congress has clearly recognized woman's right to the ballot, wily or nily. But the ballot must come to the woman, not she to the ballot, or else the law is violated. Congress must go further, and point out to women how the ballot must come to her, or else will she not be given Christian reception at the polls who willfully seek to vote thereat. Therefore can not women vote.

Second Judge. Women are men, but men are not women. The former include the latter, but the latter won't be included. That is to say, the law regards men as women but not males as females. It is not every right which can be exercised, as society will not admit of it. The law, which is above society, says women shall vote, but society has not acceded, and hence this court can not interfere. Therefore, I concur that women can not vote.

Third Judge. I do not know but that the better way would have been for Congress to have done otherwise than it did. Why it did as it did is a question. But it did. It might have done more, or less, or both. It might have done otherwise. In either case it would have done so. And then it would have been. But as it is, it is perhaps as well as if it should have been. Therefore can not women vote.

Plaintiffs' Attorneys. But is this law?

The Three Judges. Verily is't the law of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

This parody was written by J. W. Knowlton, son-in-law of Mr. Riddle.

[167] A report of this trial will be found in the California chapter.

[168] WHEREAS, Complaint has this day been made by —— on oath before me, William C. Storrs, commissioner, charging that Susan B. Anthony, on or about the fifth day of November, 1872, at the city of Rochester, N. Y., at an election held in the eighth ward of the city of Rochester aforesaid, for a representative in the Congress of the United States, did then and there vote for representative in Congress in the United States, without having a lawful right to vote and in violation of Section 19 of an act of Congress approved May 31, 1870, entitled "An act to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in the several States of this Union and for other purposes."

[169] The following ladies voted: Mrs. Hannah Anthony Mosher, Mrs. Mary S. Hebard, Mrs. Nancy M. Chapman, Mrs. Jane M. Cogswell, Mrs Martha N. French, Mrs. Margaret Leyden, Mrs. Lottie Bolles Anthony, Mrs. Hannah Chatfield, Mrs. Susan M. Hough, Mrs. Sarah Truesdale, Mrs. Mary Pulver, Mrs. Rhoda De Garmo, Mrs. Guelma Anthony McLean, Miss Mary S. Anthony, Miss Ellen T. Baker. The following ladies registered but were not allowed to vote: Mrs. Amy Post, Mrs. Mary Fish Curtis, Mrs. Dr. Dutton, Mrs. Charlotte Wilbur Griffing, Mrs. Dr. Wheeler, Mrs. Allen, Mrs. Lathrop.

[170] Ex-President Fillmore, Hon. Charles Sedgwick, Hon. E. G. Lapham, David Wright, Esq., of Auburn.

[171] INDICTMENT AGAINST SUSAN B. ANTHONY—DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN AND FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.—At a stated session of the District Court of the United States of America, held in and for the Northern District of New York, at the City Hall, in the city of Albany, in the said Northern District of New York, on the third Tuesday of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, before the Honorable Nathan K. Hall, Judge of the said Court, assigned to keep the peace of the said United States of America, in and for the said District, and also to hear and determine divers Felonies, Misdemeanors and other offenses against the said United States of America, in the said District committed. Brace Millerd, James D. Wasson, Peter H. Bradt, James McGinty, Henry A. Davis, Loring W. Osborn, Thomas Whitbeck, John Mullen, Samuel G. Harris, Ralph Davis, Matthew Fanning, Abram Kimmey, Derrick B. Van Schoonhoven, Wilhelmus Van Natten, James Kenney, Adam Winne, James Goold, Samuel S. Fowler, Peter D. R. Johnson, Patrick Carroll, good and lawful men of the said District, then and there sworn and charged to inquire for the said United States of America, and the body of said District, do, upon their oaths, present, that Susan B. Anthony now or late of Rochester, in the county of Monroe, with force and arms, etc., to wit: at and in the first election district of the eighth ward of the city of Rochester, in the county of Monroe, in said Northern District of New York, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, heretofore, to wit: on the fifth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two, at an election duly held at and in the first election district of the said eighth ward of the city of Rochester, in said county and in said Northern District of New York, which said election was for Representatives in the Congress of the United States, to wit: a Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of New York at large, and a Representative in the Congress of the United States for the twenty-ninth Congressional District of the State of New York, said first election district of said eighth ward of said city of Rochester, being then and there a part of said twenty-ninth Congressional District of the State of New York, did knowingly, wrongfully, and unlawfully vote for a Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of New York at large, and for a Representative in the Congress of the United States for said twenty-ninth Congressional District, without a lawful right to vote in said election district (the said Susan B. Anthony being then and there a person of the female sex), as she, the said Susan B. Anthony then and there well knew, contrary to the form of the statute of the United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the United States of America and their dignity.

Second Count—And the jurors aforesaid upon their oaths aforesaid do further present that said Susan B. Anthony, now or late of Rochester, in the county of Monroe, with force and arms, etc., to wit: at and in the first election district of the eighth ward of the city of Rochester, in the county of Monroe, in said Northern District of New York, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, heretofore, to wit: on the fifth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two, at an election duly held at and in the first election district of the said eighth ward, of said city of Rochester, in said county, and in said Northern District of New York, which said election was for Representatives in the Congress of the United States, to wit: a Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of New York at large, and a Representative in the Congress of the United States for the twenty-ninth Congressional District of the State of New York, said first election district of said eighth ward, of said city of Rochester, being then and there a part of said twenty-ninth Congressional District of the State of New York, did knowingly, wrongfully and unlawfully vote for a candidate for Representative in the Congress of the United States for the State of New York at large, and for Representative in the Congress of the United States for said twenty-ninth Congressional District, without having a lawful right to vote in said election district (the said Susan B. Anthony being then and there a person of the female sex), as she, the said Susan B. Anthony then and there well knew, contrary to the form of the statute of the United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the United States of America and their dignity.

RICHARD CROWLEY, Attorney of the United States for the Northern District of New York.

(Endorsed). Jan. 24, 1873. RICHARD CROWLEY, Pleads not guilty. U. S. Attorney.

[172] See Appendix.

[173] See Appendix.

[174] Thousands of copies were published in pamphlet form, with the Court report of the trial, and circulated throughout the country.

[175] See Appendix.

[176] To the same effect see former decisions in Massachusetts: Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass., 25; Com. vs. Knapp, 10 Pic., 496; and see also State vs. Snow, 18 Maine, 346; Doss vs. Com., 1 Grattan, 557; Peo. vs. McFall, 1 Wheeler Crim. Rec., 108, note; Holder vs. The State, 5 Georgia, 443; State vs. Allen, 1 McCord, 525; State vs. Jones, 5 Alabama, 666; Armstrong vs. The State, 4 Blackford, 247; Patterson vs. The State, 2 English, 59.

[177] Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9th Wheaton, 221, Ch. J. Marshall. Ogden vs. Saunder, 12 Wheaton, 332, Ch. J. Marshall.

[178] More recent investigation shows that this clause was originated by Mr. Jefferson in 1784. See The Nation for May 4, 1882, and authorities there referred to. See Bancroft's "History of the United States." Vol. II, p. 115.



CHAPTER XXVI.

AMERICAN WOMAN SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION.

Circular Letter—Cleveland Convention—Association Completed—Henry Ward Beecher, President—Convention in Steinway Hall, New York—George William Curtis Speaks—The First Annual Meeting held in Cleveland—Mrs. Tracy Cutler, President—Mass meeting in Steinway Hall, New York, 1871—State Action Recommended—Moses Coit Tyler Speaks—Mass Meetings in 1871 in Philadelphia, Washington, Baltimore, Pittsburgh—Memorial to Congress—Letters from William Lloyd Garrison and others—Hon. G. F. Hoar Advocates Woman Suffrage—Anniversary celebrated at St. Louis—Dr. Stone, of Michigan—Thomas Wentworth Higginson, President, 1872—Convention in Cooper Institute, New York—Two Hundred Young Women march in. Meeting in Plymouth Church—Letters from Louise May Alcott and Elizabeth Stuart Phelps—The Annual Meeting in Detroit—Julia Ward Howe, President—Letter from James T. Field—Mary F. Eastman Addresses the Convention. Bishop Gilbert Haven President for 1875—Convention Steinway Hall, New York—Hon. Charles Bradlaugh Speaks—Centennial Celebration, July 3d—Petition to Congress for a XVI. Amendment—Conventions in Indianapolis, Cincinnati, Washington, and Louisville.

It was during the summer of 1869 that the initiative steps in the formation of the American Woman Suffrage Association[179] were taken, and the following letter circulated:

BOSTON, August 5, 1869.

Many friends of the cause of woman suffrage desire that its interests may be promoted by the assembling and action of a convention devised on a truly National and representative basis for the organization of an American Woman Suffrage Association.

Without depreciating the value of Associations already existing, it is yet deemed that an organization at once more comprehensive and more widely representative than any of these is urgently called for. In this view, the Executive Committee of the New England Woman Suffrage Association has appointed the undersigned a Committee of Correspondence to confer by letter with the friends of woman suffrage throughout the country on the subject of the proposed convention.

We ask to hear from you in reply, at your earliest convenience. Our present plan is that the authority of the convention shall be vested in delegates, to be chosen and accredited by the Woman Suffrage Associations existing, or about to be formed, in the several States of the Union. The number of delegates to be sent by each Association and the precise time of the meeting of the convention can be determined as soon as we shall have received such answers to our present application as shall assure us of an active and generous co-operation in the measure proposed, on the part of the addressed.

LUCY STONE, CAROLINE M. SEVERANCE, T. W. HIGGINSON, JULIA WARD HOWE, GEO. H. VIBBERT.

Soon after, the following call was issued:

The undersigned, being convinced of the necessity for an American Woman Suffrage Association, which shall embody the deliberate action of the State organizations, and shall carry with it their united weight, do hereby respectfully invite such organizations to be represented in a Delegate Convention, to be held at Cleveland, Ohio, November 24th and 25th, A.D., 1869.

The proposed basis of this Convention is as follows:

The delegates appointed by existing State organizations shall be admitted, provided their number does not exceed, in each case, that of the Congressional delegation of the State. Should it fall short of that number, additional delegates may be admitted from local organizations, or from no organization whatever, provided the applicants be actual residents of the States they represent. But no votes shall be counted in the Convention except of those actually admitted as delegates. (Signed)

John Neal, Maine; Nathaniel White, Armenia S. White, William T. Savage, New Hampshire; James Hutchinson, Jr., Vermont; William Lloyd Garrison, Lydia Maria Child, David Lee Child, George F. Hoar, Julia Ward Howe, Gilbert Haven, Caroline M. Severance, James Freeman Clarke, Abby Kelly Foster, Stephen S. Foster, Frank B. Sanborn, Phebe A. Hanaford, Massachusetts; Elizabeth B. Chase, T. W. Higginson, Rowland G. Hazard, Rhode Island; H. M. Rogers, Seth Rogers, Marianna Stanton, Connecticut; George William Curtis, Lydia Mott, Henry Ward Beecher, Frances D. Gage, Samuel J. May, Celia Burleigh, W. H. Burleigh, Aaron M. Powell, Anna C. Field, Gerrit Smith, E. S. Bunker, New York; Lucy Stone, Henry B. Blackwell, John Gage, Portia Gage, Antoinette B. Blackwell, A. J. Davis, Mary F. Davis, New Jersey; Mary Grew, Pennsylvania; Thomas Garret, Fielder Israel, Delaware; Hannah M. Tracy Cutler, A. J. Boyer, Margaret V. Longley, J. J. Belleville, Miriam M. Cole, S. Bolton, Ohio; Amanda Way, George W. Julian, Laura Giddings Julian, Lizzie M. Boynton, Indiana; Mary A. Livermore, C. B. Waite, Myra Bradwell, James B. Bradwell, Sharon Tyndale, J. P. Weston, Robert Collyer, Joseph Haven, Illinois; Moses Coit Tyler, James A. B. Stone, Mrs. H. L. Stone, Michigan; Lilie Peckham, Augusta J. Chapin, Wisconsin; Amelia Bloomer, Iowa; Mrs. S. B. Stearns, Minnesota; Charles Robinson, Mrs. C. I. H. Nichols, John Ekin, D.D., J. P. Root, Kansas; Mrs. W. T. Hazard, Isaac H. Sturgeon, Mrs. Beverly Allen, James E. Yeatman, Mary E. Beede, J. C. Orrick, Mrs. George D. Hall, Missouri; Guy W. Wines, Charles J. Woodbury, Tennessee; Mary Atkins Lynch, Louisiana; Elizabeth C. Wright, Texas; Grace Greenwood, Dist. Columbia; A. K. Safford, Arizona; J. A. Brewster, California: Hon. G. C. Jones, Dowagiac, Hon. William S. Farmer, Eau Claire, Hon. T. W. Ferry, of Grand Haven; Hon. S. H. Blackman, Paw Paw, Rev. J. Straub, Lansing, and S. H. Brigham, editor of the Lansing Republican, Michigan; Mrs. Austin Adams, and Edna T. Snell, of Dubuque, Miss Mattie E. Griffiths, Prof. and Mrs. Belle Mansfield, Mt. Pleasant, T. M. Mills, Ed. Des Moines State Register, Ex-Gov. and Mrs. B. F. Gue, and Hon. Mr. and Mrs. Pomeroy, Ft. Dodge, Iowa; Mrs. J. C. Burbank, Mrs. Smith (State Librarian), Rev. J. Marvin, and Capt. Russell Blakely, of St. Paul, Mrs. Elliott, of Minneapolis, Mr. and Mrs. A. Knight, of St. Peter, Minnesota; Rev. H. Eddy, pastor of the First Presbyterian Church of Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Mrs. E. O. G. Willard, of Chicago, Illinois.

The first American Woman Suffrage Convention assembled at Case Hall, Cleveland, O., on Wednesday morning, November 24th. The attendance from the city was very large; the vast hall being well filled, both floor and balcony. The Convention was called to order by Mrs. Lucy Stone. Twenty-one States were represented—eighteen by regularly accredited delegates; thus making it truly National. Great harmony pervaded all the deliberations of the Committees and the discussions of the Convention.

On motion of F. B. Sanborn, of Massachusetts, Judge J. B. Bradwell, of Chicago, was chosen temporary Chairman, and on motion of Mrs. Lucy Stone, Mrs. Mary F. Davis, of New Jersey, was elected temporary Secretary. Upon taking the chair, Judge Bradwell returned his thanks for the honor conferred upon him. It was unnecessary for him to speak at length in regard to the object of the meeting; it had been stated in the call read by Mrs. Stone. He said they were met for the formation of an American Woman Suffrage Association, which shall be represented in every State of this great Nation; and not only every State, but every city, town, and county from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and from the Gulf of Mexico to Canada. On motion of Mr. Sanborn a Committee on Credentials[180] was appointed by the President. All State delegations were requested to report their names to the Committee, and also to fill any vacancies which might exist, if persons were present from their respective States.

Pending the report of the Committee on Credentials, Mrs. Lucy Stone presented letters from several persons[181] who had been unable to attend the Convention, but desired to give expression to their sympathy with its object. In a few preliminary remarks she expressed the pleasure she felt at the sight of such a large and intelligent audience at the first session of the Convention, which many had supposed would be but merely a business meeting. It was an evidence of the increasing interest which is being felt upon the subject of woman suffrage. She alluded to the Convention held in this city sixteen years ago, and was glad to see several familiar faces which were present on that occasion. Mrs. H. M. Tracy Cutler, of Cleveland, delivered an eloquent appeal for women.

Judge Bradwell said that under the laws in some States the right of woman to a certain degree of citizenship is acknowledged. Foreign-born women may be naturalized, and even without the consent of their husbands. In all probability Vermont will soon confer upon woman the right of suffrage. In that State the women considerably outnumber the men, and if some of them should move to the West, they might say, "We voted and were citizens in Vermont, and, under the XIV. Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, we claim the right to vote here."

Mrs. C. G. Ames, of California, alluded to a case which occurred in San Francisco. A woman was informed that she might be protected through the courtesy of the consul, but that she had no claim to protection as a citizen of the Government.

The Committee on Credentials presented the names of delegates[182] who were already present as entitled to seats in the Convention. Other names were added as they were reported to the Convention during the session.

There were also in attendance persons from Virginia, Mississippi, and Nebraska, who conferred with the Chairman of the Committee on credentials with reference to their admission to the body of delegates. They were all bona fide residents in the States they represented, but they seemed so undecided in reference to the question of woman suffrage, finding it hardly possible to tell whether they were for it or against it, that it was thought not best for them to propose themselves as self-constituted delegates. Near the close of the Convention, those from Nebraska and Virginia sought the Chairman of the Committee to say that if another convention were to be held, they could heartily and conscientiously take seats as delegates; for if they had any doubts as to the justice and utility of woman suffrage in the outset, they had been wholly removed by the arguments to which they had listened. Twenty-one States were thus represented in the Convention, making it truly National.

On motion of Mr. Blackwell, the President was authorized to appoint a committee,[183] consisting of one from each State on the permanent organization of the Convention. Pending the announcement of the committee, Mrs. Julia Ward Howe, of Boston, delivered an address to the Convention, replete with the noblest wisdom and the soundest morality. Her utterance was both prophetic and hortatory. She cautioned women not to do injustice to others, while seeking justice for themselves; advised them that they must prepare for the new responsibilities they coveted; and that they would better learn to command, by learning well how to serve. She closed her grand and inspiring address with this sentence: "Oh! of all the names given to us to warn off the demon and invoke the angel, let us hold fast to this word—service!"

The Convention reassembled at two o'clock, the hall being filled in every part. Before proceeding to business, the President invited to seats upon the platform, Stephen S. Foster, Miss Susan B. Anthony, Rev. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Andrew Jackson Davis, Mrs. Leland, of Wisconsin; Mr. and Mrs. John Gage, of Vineland, New Jersey, all of whom he designated as faithful veteran laborers in the good cause. He also invited all officers of Woman Suffrage Associations, members of the press and the clergy without distinction of sex or color.

The proceedings were opened with an impressive prayer by Rev. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, of New Jersey. The Committee on Permanent Organization reported the list of officers[184] of the Convention, which was adopted. The announcement of the name of T. W. Higginson as President was received with loud applause. On taking the Chair, he spoke substantially as follows:

Ladies and Gentlemen and Fellow Citizens: I feel truly grateful to the members of this Convention for the honor they have done me by choosing me for this responsible position. I take it not as a personal compliment to myself, but as a graceful act of courtesy on the part of the West, which is so largely represented, to the East, which is but slightly represented—perhaps our California friends would rather hear us say from the great central Keystone States of the Nation, to the little border States on the Atlantic coast. It is eminently fit and proper that this Convention should select for its place of meeting the great State of Ohio, which takes the lead in the woman suffrage movement, as well as in other good things. It was the first to organize a State Woman Suffrage Association, and the first in which a committee of the Legislature recommended extending to woman the right of suffrage. It is befitting, then, that this Convention should desire Ohio as the stepping stone from which an American Suffrage Association shall rise into existence.



My own State is but a small one. At the commencement of the war it was hardly thought worth while to attempt to raise troops in Rhode Island, for if they should be able to muster a regiment it would be necessary to go out of the State to find room to drill. But regiments were raised and they stood side by side with those of Ohio during the great struggle, and your record is theirs. Rhode Island, too, stands shoulder to shoulder with Ohio in the cause of woman suffrage. The call for this Convention was signed by the representatives of twenty-five States; that for, the Woman's Rights Convention, in 1850, was signed by those of but six, yet Ohio and Rhode Island were two of that number. I do not blush at the smallness of my State, but I rejoice in its prominence in this movement. I am glad to claim her as the only State which stands as a unit in the Senate of the United States in favor of giving the ballot to woman. Messrs. Sprague and Anthony, the Senators from that State, agree upon this point, although if they ever agreed upon any other matter, I never heard of it.

Fellow-delegates and citizens, we have come together as supporters of a grand reformatory movement, and there is but one plain course for us to pursue. Some years ago I attended a meeting of progressive Friends, in Pennsylvania. The subject of Woman's Rights came up for discussion, and opinions were expressed pro and con, when suddenly there came striding up the aisle an awkward boy, half-witted and about half-drunk. He stepped to the platform, flung his cap to the floor, and said that he wanted to give his testimony. "I don't know much about this subject or any other, but my mother was a woman!" The boys in the galleries laughed, and the Quakers, sitting with their hats on their heads, looking as solemn as if the funeral of the whole human race was being held and they were the chief mourners, did not relax a muscle of their faces, but thought I to myself, "That overgrown boy, drunk or sober, has solved the whole question." Women may doubt and hesitate, uncertain whether they want to vote or not, but men have only one position to take—to withdraw their opposition, and leave it to the women to decide for themselves.

Many intelligent and respectable ladies fear a conspiracy against their freedom—imagining that at times of elections detachments of police would seize and rudely drag the weak, fainting sisters to the polls against their will. They seem to regard the matter in the same light as a boy who went to the theatre night after night, but invariably went to sleep. Upon being asked what he went for, he replied: "Why I've got to go because I've a season ticket." And so some women seem to think that the right of suffrage will be like the boy's season ticket, and they must vote whether they will or not. When we can not drive men to the polls, when there is no law to compel them to serve or save their country at the ballot-box, if they stay away from selfishness or indifference, it is not likely that we will be more successful with the women. No compulsion is intended. We will lay before woman the great responsibility that rests upon her, her sacred duty as a wife and mother, we will open up to her a career of the highest usefulness in the world, in which she may more perfectly than ever before fulfill the destiny for which she is created, and then she may individually accept the ballot or not, according to the dictates of her own conscience. All men can do is to take down the barriers and say to her: "Vote, if you please." It is to give more dignity and sacredness to woman; to enlarge and not limit her field of usefulness; but not to take her out of her appropriate sphere. It says to the wife: "Do all you can to save your sons and husbands at home, strew around them its most hallowed influences; but if you fail there, you have another chance at the ballot-box to abolish, by your votes, the liquor-sellers that are dragging them down to ruin."

I would earnestly recommend to this Convention the importance of efficient and perfect organization, and not only in this body, but throughout the country. In the judgment of those who called this meeting, the great movement for woman suffrage is too far advanced to be further prosecuted only by local and accidental organizations. In most of the States, State Associations are of but recent origin, and in many they do not exist at all. The efforts hitherto made were all well and useful in their way, but not enough to meet the demands of the present. It is the aim to establish this Association on a national representative basis, embracing all the States in the Union. We seek this because we need it. The enterprise is too vast to be left to hasty or accidental organizations only. We want something solid and permanent. The Congress of the United States rests upon a narrower basis than does the organization at which we aim. That represents but half the people of the country while this is for all. It is eminently needful that we give the greatest care and deliberations to the work. We must have the counsel of various minds, laying aside local differences. We are of different habits and opinions, and do not think alike on all subjects. Upon many questions we "agree to differ," but on this great question we are, and must be, all united. Efficient organization will be a powerful aid in helping forward the grandest reform that was ever launched upon the human race. With this understanding I accept the position of President of this Convention, losing my own individuality as one of its members. In conclusion, I ask your patience with my short-comings and your co-operation in conducting its proceedings.

Mrs. Cutler read a courteous communication from H. S. Stevens Esq., kindly offering to furnish carriages free to those members of the Convention who may wish to see the city, during their stay. Col. Higginson said that in the early days of woman suffrage, he had seen a rivalry among livery stable keepers to furnish carriages to take persons engaged in the movement out of town, and he regarded this offer as in singular contrast to that. On motion of Mrs. Lucy Stone, the Committee on Permanent Organization of the Convention was also charged with the duty of preparing a basis of organization, constitution, and by-laws for a National Woman Suffrage Association, and to report a list of officers for the same. The President invited all local Woman Suffrage organizations to make themselves known through their members present, and to participate in the deliberations of the Convention. The following resolution, offered by Mrs. Lucy Stone, was adopted.

Resolved, That the members of the Associated Press, now in session in this city, be invited to attend this Convention and take part in its proceedings, and that Mr. Boyer, Mr. F. B. Sanborn, and Mrs. Cole, of Dayton, be a Committee to convey the invitation to that body.

A telegram was received from GRACE GREENWOOD, as follows:

To T.W. HIGGINSON, President of the Woman's Suffrage Convention:

Kept at home by illness. God speed the cause.

GRACE GREENWOOD.

Brief speeches were made by Rev. Mrs. Hanaford, of Massachusetts; Mary F. Davis and Lucy Stone, of New Jersey; and Giles B. Stebbins, of Michigan, who introduced the following resolution, which was unanimously carried:

Resolved, That the National Labor Congress, representing five hundred thousand of the workingmen of our country, at its late session at Philadelphia, by recognizing the equal membership and rights of men and women, of white and colored alike, showed a spirit of broad and impartial justice worthy of all commendation, and we hail its action as a proof of the power of truth over prejudice and oppression, which must be of signal benefit to its members, in helping that self-respect, intelligence, and moral culture by which the fair claims of labor are to be gained and the weaker truly ennobled and elevated.

Mr. H. B. BLACKWELL presented the following:

CONSTITUTION OF THE AMERICAN WOMAN SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION.

PREAMBLE: The undersigned, friends of woman suffrage, assembled in delegate Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, November 24th and 25th, 1869, in response to a call widely signed and after a public notice duly given, believing that a truly representative National organization is needed for the orderly and efficient prosecution of the suffrage movement in America, which shall embody the deliberate action of State and local organizations, and shall carry with it their united weight, do hereby form the American Woman Suffrage Association.

ARTICLE I.

NAME: This Association shall be known as the American Woman Suffrage Association.

ARTICLE II.

OBJECT: Its object shall be to concentrate the efforts of all the advocates of woman, suffrage in the United States for National purposes only, viz:

SEC. 1. To form auxiliary State Associations in every State where none such now exist, and to co-operate with those already existing, which shall declare themselves auxiliary before the first day of March next, the authority of the auxiliary Societies being recognized in their respective localities, and their plan being promoted by every means in our power.

SEC. 2. To hold an annual meeting of delegates for the transaction of business and the election of officers for the ensuing year; also, one or more national conventions for the advocacy of woman suffrage.

SEC. 3. To publish tracts, documents, and other matter for the supply of State and local societies and individuals at actual cost.

SEC. 4. To prepare and circulate petitions to State Legislatures, to Congress, or to constitutional conventions in behalf of the legal and political equality of woman; to employ lecturers and agents, and to take any measures the Executive Committee may think fit, to forward the objects of the Association.

ARTICLE III.—ORGANIZATION.

SEC. 1. The officers of this Association shall be a President, eight Vice-Presidents at Large, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Foreign Corresponding Secretary, two Recording Secretaries, and a Treasurer, all of whom shall be ex-officio members of the Executive Committee from each State and Territory, and from the District of Columbia, as hereinafter provided.

SEC. 2. Every President of an auxiliary State society shall be ex-officio a vice-president of this Association.

SEC. 3. Every chairman of the Executive Committee of an auxiliary State society shall be ex-officio a member of the Executive Committee of this Association.

SEC. 4. In cases where no auxiliary State society exists, a suitable person may be selected by the annual meeting, by the Executive Committee, as Vice-President or member of the Executive Committee, to serve only until the organization of said State Association.

SEC. 5. The Executive Committee may fill all vacancies that may occur prior to the next annual meeting.

SEC. 6. All officers shall be elected annually at any annual meeting of delegates, on the basis of the Congressional representation of the respective States and Territories, except as above provided.

SEC. 7. No distinction on account of sex shall ever be made in the membership or in the selection of officers of this Society; but the general principle shall be that one half of the officers shall, as nearly as convenient, be men, and one half women.

SEC. 8. No money shall be paid by the Treasurer except under such restrictions as the Executive Committee may provide.

SEC. 9. Five members of the Executive Committee, when convened by the Chairman, after fifteen days written notice previously mailed to each of its members, shall constitute a quorum. But no action thus taken shall be final, until such proceedings shall have been ratified in writing by at least fifteen members of the Committee.

SEC. 10. The Chairman shall convene a meeting whenever requested to do so by five members of the Executive Committee.

ARTICLE IV.

This Association shall have a branch office in every State in connection with the office of the auxiliary State Society therein, and shall have a central office at such place as the Executive Committee may determine.

ARTICLE V.

This Constitution may be amended at any annual meeting, by a vote of three-fifths of the delegates present therein.

ARTICLE VI.

Any person may become a member of the American Woman Suffrage Association by signing the Constitution and paying the sum of $1 annually, or life members by paying the sum of $10, which membership shall entitle the individual to attend the business meetings of delegates and participate in their deliberations.

ARTICLE VII.

Honorary members may be appointed by the annual meeting or by the Executive Committee, in consideration of services rendered.

The officers of the Association were then appointed:

President—Henry Ward Beecher.

Vice Presidents at Large—T. W. Higginson, Mary A. Livermore, William Lloyd Garrison, Mrs. W. T. Hazard, George W. Curtis, Celia M. Burleigh, George W. Julian, Margaret V. Longley.

Chairman of Executive Committee—Lucy Stone.

Foreign Corresponding Secretary—Julia Ward Howe.

Corresponding Secretary—Myra Bradwell.

Recording Secretaries—Henry B. Blackwell, Amanda Way.

Treasurer—Frank B. Sanborn.

Vice-Presidents—Maine, Rev. Amory Battles; New Hampshire, Armenia S. White; Vermont, Hon. C. W. Willard; Massachusetts, Caroline M. Severance; Rhode Island, Rowland G. Hazard; Connecticut, Seth Rogers; New York, Oliver Johnson; New Jersey, Antoinette Brown Blackwell; Pennsylvania, Robert Purvis; Delaware, Mrs. Hanson Robinson; Ohio, Dr. H. M. Tracy Cutler; Indiana, Lizzie M. Boynton; Illinois, C. B. Waite; Wisconsin, Rev. H. Eddy; Michigan, Moses Coit Tyler; Minnesota, Mrs. A. Knight; Kansas, Hon. Charles Robinson; Iowa, Amelia Bloomer; Missouri, Hon. Isaac H. Sturgeon; Tennessee, Hon. Guy W. Wines; Florida, Alfred Purdie; Oregon, Mrs. General Rufus Saxton; California, Rev. Charles G. Ames; Virginia, Hon. J. C. Underwood; Washington Territory, Hon. Rufus Leighton; Arizona, Hon. A. K. P. Safford.

Executive Committee—Maine, Mrs. Oliver Dennett; New Hampshire, Hon. Nathaniel White; Vermont, Mrs. James Hutchinson, Jr.; Massachusetts, Rev. Rowland Connor; Rhode Island, Elizabeth B. Chace; Connecticut, Rev. Olympia Brown; New York, Mrs. Theodore Tilton; New Jersey, Mary F. Davis; Pennsylvania, Mary Grew; Delaware, Dr. John Cameron; Ohio, Andrew J. Boyer; Indiana, Rev. Charles Marshall; Illinois, Hon. J. B. Bradwell; Wisconsin, Lilie Peckham; Michigan, Lucinda H. Stone; Minnesota, Abby J. Spaulding; Kansas, Mrs. C. I. H. Nichols; Iowa, Belle Mansfield; Missouri, Mrs. Francis Minor; Tennessee, Rev. Charles J. Woodbury; Florida, Mrs. Dr. Hawkes; California, Mrs. Mary E. Ames; Virginia, Hon. A. M. Fretz; District of Columbia, Grace Greenwood.

The addresses of the evening were made by Judge Bradwell and Mary A. Livermore, of Illinois; Miriam M. Cole, of Ohio; Lilie Peckham, of Wisconsin; Frank B. Sanborn, editor of the Springfield, Mass., Republican; and Dr. Lees, of Leeds, England. At the Thursday morning session the attendance was large, and the interest in the Convention seemed to be increasing. The forenoon was devoted to a consideration of the basis of the National organization, its constitution and by-laws. The discussions[185] were earnest, temperate, in excellent spirit, every woman keeping within the five minutes' rule, and speaking to the point—a circumstance commented on pleasantly by the President. The articles of the Constitution and By-Laws were discussed seriatim, and adopted, and then the Constitution, as a whole, was adopted. A letter was presented by Mrs. Lucy Stone, from the proprietor of the Birch House, Water Street, offering to entertain a few delegates—free. She also read the following:

CLEVELAND, November 25, 1869.

To the Delegates of the Woman's National Convention:—The Faculty of the Homeopathic College hereby extend their most cordial invitation to your honorable body to visit the College. Conveyances for the same will be in readiness at any time desired. In this College, now in its twentieth annual session, woman, with the exception of one winter, has always been equal with man in privilege and honor, and here she shall always share an equal privilege and honor, so long as she is willing to conform to the same standard of culture.

Yours, most respectfully, T. P. WILSON, Dean. H. V. BIGGAR, Registrar.

Judge BRADWELL offered the following, which was adopted:

Resolved, That we urgently request all State and National Associations, formed for the purpose of aiding in giving suffrage to woman, to become auxiliary to, or co-operate with the American Woman's Suffrage Association, believing that by concert of action on the part of all Societies and Associations formed in the nation for this purpose, suffrage will sooner be extended to woman.

Able addresses were made during the afternoon by Rev. Charles Marshall, pastor of one of the Presbyterian churches of Indianapolis; Lizzie Boynton and Mrs. Swank, of Indiana; Lucy Stone, of New Jersey; Ex-Gov. Root, of Kansas; Mary E. Ames, of California; and Addie Ballou, of Minnesota. Rebecca Rickoff, of Cleveland, recited an original poem, "The Convict's Mother," with marked effect. During the entire session the hall was filled to its utmost limit. The Convention met for the closing session at an early hour. The hall was densely filled in every part, the man at the ticket-office having been literally inundated with "quarters." Mrs. Dr. Cutler occupied the chair. Mrs. STONE announced that she would go through the audience to get names of members of the Association, which any one could become on payment of a dollar.

Brief speeches were made by Mr. Bellville and Mr. Lamphear, of Ohio; Mr. Henry Blackwell, of New Jersey; and Rev. Rowland Connor, of Massachusetts, and then Mrs. Julia Ward Howe delivered a second address of remarkable power and unparalleled beauty. She spoke the day before as the prophet of the Convention—this evening, she spoke as its historian. Her address was faultless, peerless, perfect, and though read from a manuscript, moved the large audience deeply. Next followed Mrs. Celia Burleigh, of New York, a woman of rare grace and culture, with an address packed with thought and wisdom, uttered in the choicest language. Mrs. Caroline M. Severance, of Boston, succeeded her with another speech of like polish and impressiveness, and then the great congregation rose, and closed the interesting meetings of the two days with the singing of the grand old doxology, "Praise God from whom all blessings flow," after which the Convention adjourned sine die.

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A Mass Convention for the advocacy of Woman Suffrage, under the auspices of the American Woman Suffrage Association, was held at Steinway Hall, New York City, May 11th and 12th, 1870. Upon each of those days three sessions were held, and at each session the attendance was numerous and enthusiastic. The Convention was presided over by Rev. Henry Ward Beecher. Upon the platform were seated many earnest, active supporters, and advocates of the cause.[186]

The address of Rev. HENRY WARD BEECHER was as follows: Ladies and Gentlemen:—It is but a little while ago that the question whether a woman might, with modesty and propriety, appear upon the public platform to speak her sentiments upon moral and philanthropic questions, agitated the whole community. Although I do not regard myself as excessively conservative, I remember very well when the appointment of women, by the Anti-Slavery Society of New England, to act on committees with men, grievously shocked my prejudices; and I said to myself, "Well, where will this matter end?" I remember very well that when many persons, whose names are now quite familiar to the people, first began to speak on the anti-slavery question, I felt that if the diffidence and modesty and delicacy of woman had not been sacrificed, it had, at any rate, been put in peril; and that, although a few might survive, the perilous example would pervert and destroy the imitators and followers.

It was in the year 1856 that I first made a profession of my faith in Woman's Rights. During the Fremont campaign I had so far had my eyes opened and my understanding enlightened, as to see that if it is right for the people of Great Britain to put a politician at the head of their government, and she a woman—if, in all the civilized nations of the world, it is deemed both seemly and proper for women to be in public meetings and take part therein, provided they are duchesses or the ladies of lords—if it is right, in other words, for aristocracy to give to their women the right of public speech, then it is right, also, for democracy to give their women the right of public speech. Does any one question whether Lucy Stone may speak? or Mrs. Livermore? or Mrs. Stanton? There is not a city or town in the nation that does not hail their coming; and there are no persons so refined, and no persons so conservative as not to listen to them; and there are none that listen who do not always admit that women may speak. God does not give such gifts for nothing.

We are in a community that is constantly growing, expanding, developing. We do not believe that human nature has reached its limits. There are new combinations, new developments, taking place. Nor do we believe that men have reached the ultimatum of their practical efficiency, any more than women have. It is in the order of things, that having met, tried, and settled this question—the right of woman to public speech—we should meet the next question, the right of women to act. She has a right to think,—has she a right to practice? May she vote, or sit upon committees in matters pertaining to local or National interests? It is this question which is under discussion now. It seems wild and wandering to many, but not more wild and wandering than fifteen years ago, to the great majority of our citizens, seemed the question of woman's right to public speech. I venture to say that within the fifteen years next coming it will seem strange to the great mass of the people that it should have been considered of doubtful propriety for woman to exercise the privilege, or, I should rather say, the duty of suffrage.

And so within the last few years this question has risen up, to the suppression, I may say, of everything else; for everything else is conceded. I don't know what advanced step may be next proposed. If I did, I should propose it to-day—for this reason, that I notice that each advance becomes the acceptance of the disputed question immediately in its rear. When the doctrine of physiognomy—Lavater's doctrine—was first propounded, men laughed it to scorn, and contemned the idea that there could be anything true or noble in it, until phrenology came and asserted that the brain's proportional parts could be known, and that the mind could be outwardly ascertained, and then men said: "Oh, this phrenology is a humbug! Physiognomy is rational; we can see how a man can judge that way; there is something in physiognomy." So they swallowed physiognomy in order to be strong enough to combat phrenology. Animal magnetism, I believe, came up next; and the people ridiculed it as they had ridiculed those that had gone before. They now thought that there might be some sense in physiognomy and phrenology, but animal magnetism was preposterous. Then came mesmerism. "Why," people said, "this is nothing in the world but animal magnetism, in which, of course, there is some reason." Then came spiritualism. "Oh," people said, "that is nothing but mesmerism." So they admitted each anterior heresy for the sake of refuting the new one. And now, may a woman be an artist? May she sing in public? May she speak in public? "Well," said people, "she can sing, if she has the gift; there is no harm in that; but this delivering an oration, this is not woman's sphere." Then if we say, "Shall a woman vote?" they say, "Oh! vote! vote! Let her speak if she wants to speak; but as for voting, that will never do!"

Therefore, as I have said, if I could but see the next point ahead, I would immediately proclaim it, because then people would say, "Let women vote if they want to vote, but that is as far as we can go." I rejoice in your presence this morning. I, for one, need not assert that I am from my whole heart and conviction thoroughly of opinion that the nature of woman, the purity and sweetness of the family, the integrity and strength of the State, will all be advantaged when woman shall be, like man, a participator in public affairs.

* * * * *

Rev. JAMES FREEMAN CLARKE said—Ladies and gentlemen:—This is a very serious question, whichever way we look at it. I do not suppose that, if the women of the country were to be admitted to-day to vote, the consequences would appear to-day, or for some time to come, because women everywhere would vote very much as those around them are in the habit of voting. Young men growing up generally vote as their fathers and brothers are in the habit of voting—those with whom they are in the habit of communication; so it would be with women. They would probably, for some time to come, vote very much as their husbands, fathers, and brothers do now. The ultimate result, however, is of the greatest consequence; and nobody can tell exactly what it will be. I, for one, believe that it will be very beneficial, and it is for that reason that I am here to-day.

I believe, in the first place, that women ought to vote, because it seems to me that this is in the direction of all human progress, and in the direction of civilization. Civilization, thus far, has constantly occupied itself in bringing woman up to, and putting her by the side of man. In the barbarous stage of society, woman is the slave and tool of man; in the Asiatic age she is the plaything and ornament with which man amuses himself; but in Christendom there is a tendency to place woman side by side with man in everything, and just as far as it has been done we find the benefit of it. Woman ought to be made the companion of man in his great work of government. The reason why people think politics is a low and vulgar pursuit is that woman has never been in politics. Where man goes alone he is easily corrupted. Soldiers in the army are degraded, despite the patriotic nobleness of their motive, by the absence of woman, and men are degraded at the polls, as well as everywhere else, through not having women by their side.

I believe in this movement, not only because it is in the direction of all modern civilization, but because it is in accordance with the idea of American government, and the policy of American institutions. A State is saved by being faithful to its own idea, or lost by faithlessness to that idea. Now the American idea is faith in the people. We know perfectly well there are evils connected with republicanism, as there are with everything; but we have chosen the good of a republic with this great, broad basis of universal suffrage. People say, "Well, but there is no natural right to vote." We knew that very well before, because there is no voting in a state of nature. Voting is a social contrivance. Because it is not a natural right, is it any less unjust to deprive a large part of the people of it? There are no roads in a state of nature. For that reason, shall we say to a woman, "You shall not walk in the road?" Wherever the male and female qualities go together, we are better for it, and therefore it is our business to put them together in the government. Put away all the absurd restrictions on woman, and let her do what God intended her to do. Let us trust nature and God, and give to woman the opportunity to do whatever she is able to accomplish.

I have another reason for woman suffrage, and that is, that nothing can be said against it. Our good friend, Dr. Bushnell, has written a book in which he says that if woman is allowed to vote she must be allowed to govern; and, being a subject nature, she can not govern. In other words, as she is a subject nature, let her stay at home and govern her household all the time! People say she ought to influence gently and quietly, and not to govern by force. Now if there is anything which means influence and not force, except indirectly and secondarily, it is the ballot-box! We had an administration two years ago which had all the force of the country at command, and the people went to the ballot-box and destroyed it so completely that we have almost forgotten we ever had so bad a Government as that of Andrew Johnson.

All the strength and bravery and determination of this world are not so much confined to the male sex as some ornaments of that sex would have us believe. We want the women—the wives and sisters and mothers of the land, to help save our men from political corruption. It is what God has ordained, and the time is coming when it shall be effected.

Mrs. M. M. COLE read the following letter:

VINELAND, N. J., May 10, 1870.

MY DEAR FRIENDS: I once had a neighbor who was for years entirely crippled with rheumatism, and she, when asked, "How are you to-day?" invariably answered, "Better, I thank you, to-day than I was yesterday. Hope I shall be right smart to-morrow." So, friends, I could say, unasked, I am better this year than I was last, and I hope to keep on in this line until 1876, and be able then to stand with you once more upon the platform of equal rights, and shout "Hallelujahs" over the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment; over the crowning of my labors of twenty-five years, during which time I have not failed to ask for the right of suffrage for all citizens of this Republic, of sane mind and adult years, without regard to race, color, or sex.

"The good time coming is almost here."

Yours in faith,

FRANCES D. GAGE.

The President read a letter just received from Mr. Tilton:

NEW YORK, May 11, 1870.

Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, President of the American Woman Suffrage Association: Honored Sir: I am commissioned by the unanimous voice of the Union Woman Suffrage Society, now assembled in Apollo Hall, to present to yourself, and through you to the Association over which you are presiding in Steinway Hall, our friendly salutations, our hearty good will, and our sincere wishes for mutual co-operation in the cause of woman's enfranchisement.

Fraternally yours, THEODORE TILTON, President of the Union Woman Suffrage Society.

At his own desire the President was unanimously requested to make reply on the behalf of the American Woman Suffrage Association. Mr. Beecher remarked, "If there are two general associations for the same purpose, it is because we mean, in this great work, to do twice as much labor as one society could possibly do."

Rev. OSCAR CLUTE said: Every favored movement of civilization has been simply a recognition of the rights and privileges that inhere in humanity. Take for instance the idea of the divine right of kings—which has been so thoroughly scouted by our republicanism. The abandonment of that idea upon the part of our fathers was a great stride in the path of civilization. And at this time in almost all parts of the world something is being done toward giving the masses a clearer idea of those rights which inhere in them.

In our own country, the object of the woman suffrage reformers is, not to overturn anything already established that is good and pure and noble, but to extend to women those rights which inhere in them as human beings. It is not claimed for women that they shall have any advantage over men, but simply that they shall have the right to labor and receive their earnings. That they shall have such facilities of education as men enjoy. Give woman equal opportunities. Her sphere is, undoubtedly, to engage in such labor, to get such culture, and do such good work as she finds ready to her hands, and to help on in the cause of humanity. The ballot is the key that opens to woman all the avenues of labor and of culture. If all the avenues of education and labor were open to women, we should find them growing up with higher and nobler ambition than the girls of to-day. The laws at present in force are detrimental to the interests of women not only in regard to property, but to marriage itself. Some provision is necessary by which women themselves can bring their efforts to bear upon these laws, and the ballot is the only effective measure for the purpose.