Mr. ANTHONY: Mr. President, I am quite content that this experiment of female suffrage should be tried in this new Territory. I believe that female suffrage is coming with the other ameliorations and changes which have been tending for so many years in the same direction. I have not taken any part in the measures which have been agitated to hasten that event. I think it will come in its own good time; but I should do very great injustice to myself if I should allow it to be supposed that my opinion is based upon some of the arguments that have been made here. I do not believe that suffrage is a natural right. I believe it is a right that grows out of society, a political right, and that it is within the body-politic to decide upon its limits, its modifications, and its conditions. The only question in my mind is whether it is proper and expedient. I think that the XIV. Amendment has nothing whatever to do with it.

Mr. MORTON: Mr. President, the Senators from Rhode Island, Maine, and North Carolina have all said that the right to vote is not a natural right, but merely a political right. Is not that a distinction without a difference? If I have a natural right, I have a right to use the necessary and proper means to enforce that right; it is a part of it. To say that I have a natural right but have not the right to use the means for its protection is illogical; it makes nonsense of it. The natural and proper means to enforce any right are a part of it. The right of self-defense is one of the natural rights; everybody concedes it, and to take from me the natural and effective means of defending myself is to take from me the right itself. Government is the means of securing natural rights, and should depend upon the consent of the governed. Therefore the right to give or to withhold my consent is a part of the natural right. Let us come down to the substance and put away these shadowy distinctions. To say that I have the right of self-defense, but that I have no right to use the knife or any instrument necessary to protect my life against the assassin, is nonsense. So far as the right of government is concerned, the right to assent, to consent, or to dissent, the natural means under our system is the right to vote. You can not conceive any other. Therefore it is a part of the right and without it the other is worth nothing.

Mr. EDMUNDS: I wish to ask the Senator from Indiana whether persons under the age of twenty-one and eighteen years respectively have not all the natural rights that grown-up people have?

Mr. MORTON: I think I can answer that question very readily, if the Senator is through.

Mr. EDMUNDS: That is my only question at present.

Mr. MORTON: Every right must have some sort of regulation.

Mr. EDMUNDS: That does not answer the question.

Mr. MORTON: Wait until I get through. We have in our country, and I believe generally in Europe, certainly in England, agreed that twenty-one years is the age when men and women have come into the full possession of their understanding and are supposed to be so well informed that they can take upon themselves the government of their own fortunes and the control of their own property. The mere fact that this thing is to be regulated does not take away the right. The natural right to own and control property is regulated in that way. There must be some age fixed. We know the infant can not do it; we know the child ten years old has not the necessary knowledge of the world or strength of understanding; and we have agreed upon a certain age when men and women come to the possession of their understanding and are able to take care of their own rights, whatever they may be.

Mr. EDMUNDS: May I ask the Senator, after all, what his opinion is, whether a child of tender years, say ten years of age, has not every natural right that a man of seventy has?

Mr. MORTON: Certainly.

Mr. EDMUNDS: Morally, legally, and every other way?

Mr. MORTON: To my mind that furnishes no argument at all.

Mr. EDMUNDS: I am not arguing it.

Mr. MORTON: It is merely putting an extreme case to say that a woman twenty-five years of age shall not have the right to vote because if she votes the child in her arms has the right to vote. Is there any force in that?

Mr. EDMUNDS: I have not put any case at all. I am asking the Senator from Indiana, which he seems to be very unwilling to answer, whether a child of tender years has or has not, in his opinion, the same natural rights that a grown-up person has. That can be answered one way or the other without saying it is an argument.

Mr. MORTON: I suppose the child has the right, certainly the incipient right; but that amounts to nothing when you apply it to a child that has not the strength, the experience, the knowledge of the world, or the age to exercise it. The common sense of mankind in this and every other country fixes a certain age when men and women shall be regarded as mature and qualified to take care of themselves.

Mr. EDMUNDS: They do not fix the same age, let me suggest to the Senator.

Mr. MORTON: Now, Mr. President, unless we are prepared to deny the very fundamental doctrine upon which our Government is based, we must admit that women have the same rights that men have. The Senator from North Carolina will not deny that women have the same natural rights that men have. The Senator nods his assent. Then if that is so, they have the same natural right to use the means necessary to protect those rights that men have. That right, so far as men are concerned, is the ballot.

Mr. MERRIMON: Natural means.

Mr. MORTON: Whatever means are necessary and proper to the protection of a natural right are natural means.

Mr. BAYARD: Did the Senator from Indiana answer the Senator from Vermont in the affirmative or negative?

Mr. MORTON: I tried to answer him.

Mr. BAYARD: I merely ask the question. He says now very triumphantly to the Senator from North Carolina that the rights of men and women are the same, their natural rights are the same.

Mr. MORTON: Yes.

Mr. BAYARD: I ask are the rights of children different from those of men?

Mr. MORTON: I think not, but I do not think there is any force in that argument, as I said before. There is a certain common sense and a certain practical regulation of natural rights all the world over.

Mr. EDMUNDS: But is it the common sense of men alone, let me suggest to the Senator. The children may differ with us; they generally do on such questions.

Mr. MORTON: I will not spend any time on that argument.

Mr. EDMUNDS: I think that is wise.

Mr. MORTON: To say that the mature woman has not the right to vote because the child in her arms must have the same right, comes so near making nonsense of the whole business that I dismiss it, and come back to the other statement, that women having the same natural rights that men have, have the right to the use the same means for their protection; and as the means under our form of government for the protection of the natural rights of men is the right to vote, women should have the same right and power accorded to them. The whole theory of natural rights is mere trash unless you shall give women the right and the power to protect them. The Declaration of Independence says that governments are instituted for that purpose, and that they must depend upon the consent of the governed; and as the women are one-half of the governed, they have a right to give one-half of the consent.

The Senator from North Carolina says that the women of the country have consented to our form of government, because they have not dissented. They have no power to refuse their consent. They may remonstrate and scold about it, but that amounts to nothing; their consent one way or the other means nothing except so far as their influence may be concerned. There were four and a half million of slaves who did not remonstrate against their bondage. Why? They had no means of doing it, and if they had had it would not have amounted to anything. Would the Senator argue from that, that they had no natural rights, or that they were consenting to their bondage? When you take into consideration the fact that men have all "political power and all the other sources of influence and power over women," it is not very strange perhaps that a majority of them are not asking for the right of suffrage. Some women at least are asking for it; I know that very many women all over the country believe they have the right to vote and ought to vote who never go near a political meeting and never sign petitions or anything of that kind. I would be willing to-day to submit the question to the votes of the women of the United States whether they should have that privilege or not. But suppose that a majority do not want the ballot, how does that affect the rights of the minority who do want it? One woman can not consent for another.

I believe women will never have their rights in this country, will never enjoy the same means for taking care of themselves and making an honest living in the world, until they have the right to vote. As soon as they have that right you will find they will be placed upon an equality with men. The Senator from California refers to the fact, and it is a notorious fact, that in every State in this Union, women are paid only about one-half for the same quantity and the same kind of labor that men receive. Does any man say that there is any sense or any justice in that distinction? Will that ever be remedied until woman has the right to vote? It never will.

I believe, Mr. President, in every point of view the right of suffrage should be extended to woman. I maintain that it is a God-given right to take part in the administration of that government which controls their earthly destinies and interests. I believe it is for the interest of the men, for the interest of children, for the interest of our country, for the interest of the race.

Mr. EDMUNDS: I could name a dozen instances all of which show that in all the States of this Union, speaking as a general rule, as it is in Great Britain and in almost all other civilized countries, the law, instead of discriminating against womanhood, discriminates in its favor in every respect whatever except the political respect of voting. That is a fact that no man can truthfully deny who has studied the history of society or who knows anything about the history of legislation in civilized States. Therefore, it does not do to say that the right to vote, the privilege of voting, or the duty of voting—because I use those phrases as not having the peculiar meaning that the Senator from California imputes to them, is essential to the protection of the female sex as such, because, as I have said, the protection that the law gives them is now in all respects, where their rights or privileges come in collision with the rest of society, greater than is extended to men.

The Senator from Indiana insists—and he has a perfect right to do so, of course—that the right to vote is a natural right, and, therefore, if females are excluded from voting, as they are by the constitutions and laws of the various States, it is an infringement upon natural right, and that that infringement ought to be abolished. Of course, his conclusion is correct if his premises are true; but is the right to vote a natural right? Can the Senator refer me to the work of any writer upon natural or municipal law from the beginning of the world to the year 1860, which maintains, or asserts, or insinuates, or suggests that the right to vote in a political community is a natural right?

Mr. MORTON: I do not call to mind any author.

Mr. EDMUNDS: No; the Senator does not. With candor he says so, because the Senator, learned in history as he is, knows, as the rest of us know, that there is no such thing. He knows that in all the discussions and all the turmoils of society where the rights of men and women in political respects, the rights of society at large, have been discussed and turned over and over and all manner of experiments in government tried and suggested, it never has been suggested that the right to participate in the government of a political community is a natural right belonging to every human being.

Mr. MORTON: I ask the Senator, if there are natural rights, do not the natural and necessary means to protect those rights become a part of them? What is the right worth if that be denied?

Mr. EDMUNDS: I answer no, in the broad sense in which the Senator has put it. If he asks of me as to a state of nature, without being organized into any social or political community whatever, then I answer yes, and every man is what the civil writers called in old times a barbarian; and he is invested, upon his own judgment and in his own right, with the power of defending and affirming whatever natural rights he has against all comers, exactly as a nation stands in respect to another nation; no man has a right to impose upon him any restraint; no man has a right to demand from him any concession; he is absolutely independent; and when his rights or claims come in conflict with those of anybody else he "fights it out" or runs away. So far, there is natural right, no doubt, but I hope the Senator has not gone back quite so far from the present condition of the world as to wish to discuss questions of that kind. That is not what he means. What he means by natural rights no doubt is what organized communities recognize as things of natural right, and those are things which are inherent in the person but are regulated and limited and restrained according to the rights and necessities of all the other persons in the community. In an organized society the right of self-defense is not a natural right in the broad sense, so that under all circumstances A B or C D has a right to defend himself against all aggression. An officer may come to arrest me on a warrant issued by a court irregularly. I have not the right to slay the officer because he takes me on the warrant. My place to resist is not by my natural force, not by raising a mob, but by going to the court that issued the warrant and showing that it had been issued contrary to law. And yet on the Senator's notion every time a man is brought under the law, if he does not agree with the law, his business is to fight. The community can not get along in that way. There is no such right as that in society.

Mr. STEWART: I ask the Senator what right, whether it be a natural right or an acquired right, has one man to govern another, or has society to govern the individual?

Mr. EDMUNDS: What right?

Mr. STEWART: Is it a natural or acquired right?

Mr. EDMUNDS: No man has a natural right to govern another, or an acquired right, or a political right, or a civil right that I know of, unless he is appointed the guardian of somebody. Of course, of that the Senator has not any experience; certainly not on the side of being a ward.

Mr. STEWART: Then what right has society, the body of men, to govern an individual? Is it a natural right or an acquired right?

Mr. EDMUNDS: Suppose I should answer the Senator and say I do not know?

Mr. STEWART: What right have they to take from him his freedom in his savage state to do as he pleases? And if they have a right to take it from him, what right have they to say he shall not participate with them equally in the regulations that shall be made for his government? If they have a right to govern him, he has a right, whether it be natural or not, to have a voice in it, if the principle of equality and fair play is one of the fundamental principles that should govern mankind.

Mr. EDMUNDS: I see the Senator's point. The substance of it is, if I correctly understand him, that if society has a right to govern him, he has a right to govern society, and that makes equality; and if the majority has a right to control him, he has a right to control the majority, and there is equality! Very well. I leave the Senator, with his point, to enjoy it.

Now, let us return to the subject. It is perfectly plain that the right to vote is one which society, as it is organized, is to determine by its fundamental laws. Society does determine, in the State of Vermont, if you please, that voting must only be exercised by males above the age of twenty-one years, those who are not in the penitentiary, those who are not in the lunatic asylums, those who are not idiots, and so on. The laws of Indiana may provide the same thing, or may declare that the age shall be twenty, or may declare as the Roman law used to do, that it shall be twenty-five, and so on; or it may declare as the Constitution of the United States does as to the age of Senators and as to the age of the President of the United States. On the argument of Senators in favor of this amendment to this bill, there would exist no right whatever in constituted society to make any limitation upon the free exercise of political rights to vote and hold office in respect to age. Why say a man can not be a member of the Senate until he is thirty years of age? Who can say he is not just as good at twenty-nine?

The Senator from Indiana says that common sense teaches that we must put some limitation on this. So it does; and common sense has taught that it is left to each political community to determine what are the qualifications and limitations upon the privilege of exercising political rights; and it has always been so, and it always will be so, because when the Senator proposes to say that the other sex may vote—which I admit he has a perfect right to say, and society may so say—he does not undertake to say that ladies of seventeen, instead of eighteen, shall vote, because they come of age in my State at eighteen, and do in many of the States—the Senator does not propose to say that all ladies of seventeen shall vote; and yet it is impossible to say that there is any distinction in respect to intelligence as a matter of right, any philosophical distinction between one year and another. True, as the Senator says, you may run it down so far that at last you have reached a condition of infancy, and there everybody says the child is not wise enough to vote, is not wise enough to do anything without having guardianship and tutelage. But if you put it upon the ground of natural right, the child has just as good a right to say to you that he shall be the judge of it, as you have to say to him that you must be; and this shows that the notion of any natural right of anybody of any age to participate in the government of society is an absolute absurdity. It is one of those figments of the imagination that have crawled into some people's brains within a very few years, and will go out again as other delusions do.

Then when you come to the XIV. Amendment it is equally obvious that that has nothing to do with the subject. If anybody had thought it related to suffrage when the XV. Amendment was passed, nobody would have voted for it, because on that theory the right to vote did exist in all colored persons, females as well as males; and yet nobody of any party or any creed pretended at that time when we proposed the XV. Amendment that we had guaranteed the right to vote by the XIV. Nobody suspected it; nobody suggested it; and nobody believed in it, and very few people do now, for the simple reason that the XIV. Amendment was directed, as everybody knows, by its language, by its history, by its relation to other laws, to what are called civil rights; but I am not going to define what they are, because to do so takes time. So, Mr. President, the XV. Amendment was passed in order to secure a right to vote without regard to race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

Then you come to the real question which is involved here; and that is the propriety of providing that females, twenty-one years of age, not idiots, not lunatics, not in the penitentiary—standing upon the same limitations that men do in these respects—are to vote. That presents a fair question, one that we have a perfect right to pass upon; and I have only said what I have in order to show that we had not better run crazy over the idea that we were dealing with natural and inalienable rights, and that we were violating human rights if we happened to say no, or that we were vindicating human rights in the sense now spoken of if we should say yes. We are merely considering a question of political expediency, as confessedly we have the power in governing the Territories to let anybody vote we choose. We can put the whole concern in Pembina, if we think it wise, into the hands of the madmen up there, and I do not know but that they are in the majority, for I certainly know nothing about it.... If no other Senator wishes to make any remarks, I move to lay the bill upon the table.

Mr. SARGENT: I ask for the yeas and nays on that motion.

Mr. HAGER: I hope the Senator from Vermont will withdraw his motion. I desire to make a few remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Clayton in the chair). The motion is not debatable.

Mr. HAGER: I ask the Senator to withdraw the motion for a few minutes.

Mr. EDMUNDS: If the Senator will renew it when he finishes his remarks, I will do so.

Mr. HAGER: Very well.

Mr. EDMUNDS: I withdraw the motion.

Mr. HAGER: Mr. President, it seems to me strange that a question of so much importance as that raised by this amendment appears to be, from the positions taken by Senators on the floor, should be presented upon this bill, which, if amended as proposed, will not confer the right of suffrage upon females throughout the country; and for us to undertake to legislate upon this question in regard to a distant Territory where perhaps there are few or no women, unless they be of the Indian race, is to me a very astonishing thing.... If suffrage should be extended to females let it come up as a distinct, independent proposition by itself, and then every Senator can take his position in regard to a question which affects the whole country, and not a distant Territory merely. That is the way, in my opinion, to get at it.... Inasmuch as in the wisdom of the Government and people of the United States the right to the elective franchise has been conferred upon the black race in this country, I see no reason on the ground of qualification why it should not be conferred upon females.... But I am unwilling to legislate by piecemeal in this manner. If there is any good in it; if, as the Senator from Indiana says, as a matter of right women should be entitled to the franchise, that right should be co-extensive with the whole country, and not be limited to the little Territory of Pembina, which is not yet organized.

Mr. EDMUNDS.—I renew the motion to lay the bill on the table.

Mr. SARGENT.—On that motion I ask for the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. RAMSEY.—I should like to appeal to the Senator from Vermont to withdraw the motion for five minutes.

Mr. STEWART.—We will not lay it on the table.

Mr. RAMSEY.—Very well; let the vote be taken. The question being taken by yeas and nays, resulted—yeas, 24; nays, 24; as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Bayard, Buckingham, Conkling, Conover, Cooper, Davis, Edmunds, Frelinghuysen, Hager, Hamilton of Maryland, Howe, Ingalls, Johnston, Jones, MeCreery, Merrimon, Morrill of Maine, Norwood, Ransom, Scott, Sherman, Wadleigh, Washburn, and Wright—24.

NAYS—Messrs. Bogy, Boreman, Boutwell, Carpenter, Chandler, Clayton, Ferry of Michigan, Flanagan, Gilbert, Harvey, Hitchcock, Logan, Mitchell, Morton, Patterson, Pratt, Ramsey, Sargent, Spencer, Sprague, Stewart, Tipton, West, and Windom—24.

ABSENT—Messrs. Alcorn, Allison, Anthony, Brownlow, Cameron, Cragin, Dennis, Dorsey, Fenton, Ferry of Connecticut, Goldthwaite, Gordon, Hamilton of Texas, Hamlin, Kelly, Lewis, Morrill of Vermont, Oglesby, Pease, Robertson, Saulsbury, Schurz, Stevenson, Stockton, and Thurman—25.

So the motion was not agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CLAYTON in the chair.)—The question is on the amendment of the Senator from California [Mr. SARGENT], upon which the yeas and nays have been ordered.

Mr. BAYARD.—Mr. President, it would seem scarcely credible that in the Senate of the United States an abrupt and sudden change in so fundamental a relation as that borne by the two sexes to our system of Government should be proposed as an "experiment," and that it should be gravely recommended that a newly organized Territory under act of Congress should be set aside for this "experiment," which is in direct, grossly irreverent disregard of all that we have known as a rule, our great fundamental rule, in organizing a government of laws, whether colonial, State, or Federal, in this country.

I frankly say, Mr. President, that which strikes me most forcibly is the gross irreverence of this proposition, its utter disregard of that Divine will by which man and woman were created different, physically, intellectually, and morally, and in defiance of which we are now to have this poor, weak, futile attempt of man to set up his schemes of amelioration in defiance of every tradition, of every revelation, of all human experience, enlightened as it has been by Divine permission. It seems to me that to introduce so grave a subject as this, to spring it here upon the Senate without notice in the shape of an amendment to a pending measure, to propose thus to experiment with the great laws that lie at the very foundation of human society, and to do it for the most part in the trivial tone which we have witnessed during this debate, is not only mortifying, but it renders one almost hopeless of the permanence of our Government if this is to be the example set by one of the Houses of Congress, that which claims to be more sedate and deliberate, if it proposes in this light and perfunctory way to deal with questions of this grave nature and import. Sir, there is no time at present for that preparation which such a subject demands at the hands of any sensible man, mindful of his responsibilities, who seeks to deal with it.

This is an attempt to disregard laws promulgated by the Almighty Himself. It is irreverent legislation in the simplest and strongest sense of the word. Nay, sir, not only so, but it is a step in defiance of the laws of revealed religion as given to men. If there be one institution which it seems to me has affected the character of this country, which has affected the whole character of modern civilization, the results of which we can but imperfectly trace and but partly recognize, it is the effect of the institution of Christian marriage, the mysterious tie uniting the one man and the one woman until they shall become one and not two persons. It is an institution which is mysterious, which is beyond the reach and the understanding of man, but he certainly can best exhibit his sense of duty and proper obligation when he reverently shall submit to and recognize its wisdom. All such laws as proposed by this amendment are stumbling-blocks, and are meant to be stumbling-blocks in the way of that perfect union of the sexes which was intended by the law of Christian marriage.

Suffrage is a political franchise; it is not a right; because the word "right" is used in reference to voting in the XIV. Amendment to the Constitution, that does not make it a right. It is in the very nature of government a political privilege confided, according to the exigency, the expediency, by the wisdom of those who control the government, to a certain class. If this right to vote be what the Senator from Indiana declares it to be, a natural and inalienable right, then you have no more right to deny it to a person who is under the age of twenty-one than you have to deny it to a person who is over the age of twenty-one years. Sir, the difference is radical. Voting is no right; it is a privilege granted, a franchise which is granted to certain classes, more or less extended according to the supposed expediency which shall control the minds of those who frame the constitution of government for a people. There is no wrong done, so far as the abnegation of a right is involved, by denying this to certain classes of a community, whether on account of age or sex or any other supposed causes of disqualification. In this country the whole foundation of our institutions has been that the male sex when arrived at years of supposed discretion alone should take part in the political control of the country.

It is not necessary for me to speak now of other influences than those that come from politics; it is not necessary for me to dwell upon the actual and potential influences that control the fate of men and of nations. We all know they are not those most apparent. We all know it is the passions, the affections, the sympathies, and desires of the human heart and human ambition that control the vote, and not the vote that controls them. And now you propose to try an "experiment" upon a community composed of your own fellow-citizens, which is in defiance of all human experience, all suggestions of philosophy, of your own laws, and of every lesson you should have drawn from every civilized nation that has preceded you.

Under the operation of this Amendment, what will become of the family hearthstone around which cluster the very best influences of human education? You will have a family with two heads—a "house divided against itself." You will no longer have that healthful and necessary subordination of wife to husband, and that unity of relationship which is required by a true and a real Christian marriage. You will have substituted a system of contention and difference warring against the laws of nature herself, and attempting by these new fangled, petty, puny, and most contemptible contrivances, organized in defiance of the best lessons of human experience, to confuse, impede, and disarrange the palpable will of the Creator of the world. I can see in this proposition for female suffrage the end of all that home life and education which are the best nursery for a nation's virtue. I can see in all these attempts to invade the relations between man and wife, to establish differences, to declare those to be two whom God hath declared to be one, elements of chaotic disorder, elements of destruction to all those things which are, after all, our best reliance for a good and a pure and an honest government.

As I said, Mr. President, I rose simply to express my astonishment that a measure of this kind could have received the assent which it apparently has received from the Senate of the United States in the vote just recorded. The subject is too broad, it is too deep, it is too serious to attempt to discuss it unprepared and within the time which is allotted to me. I sincerely hope that if this subject is to be acted upon, it will be after long, serious, severe, close consideration. Let all sides of the subject be viewed in all its vastness and far-reaching consequences. Let Senators consider the results, and let at least their aims in this matter be something higher than mere political and partisan considerations, which I fear have animated much of the discussion to which we have listened. Mr. President, I trust sincerely that the vote just taken, indicating the refusal of the Senate to lay this bill upon the table, may not indicate the will of the Senate in respect of this Amendment. We have no right to subject this or any other portion of our fellow-citizens to so sad, so untoward, so unhappy an experiment as is here proposed. I have sat in this Chamber, and seen laws leveled with the most serious and cruel penalties against a class of people practicing polygamy in our Territories. What will this law do? Will it not in fact sever those relations to which I have referred as being essential for the virtue and safety of a State? What is your State unless it is founded upon virtuous and happy homes? And where can there be a virtuous and happy home unless a Christian marriage shall have consecrated it?

No, Mr. President, I trust that this Amendment will not be adopted, that we shall not trifle in this way with the happiness of a large portion of our fellow-citizens, that we shall not set what I must consider this indecorous example of government; and I trust that the vote of the Senate most emphatically will stop here, and I trust stop permanently even the suggestion of granting the political franchise of voting to the women of America. They do not need it, sir. I can not, of course, speak for all, but I know that I can speak the sentiment of many when I say that to them the proposition is abhorrent to take them from the retirement where their sway is so admitted, so beneficent, so elevating, and to throw them into another sphere for which they are totally unfitted and where all that at present adorns and protects them must be taken away by the rough and vulgar contact with those struggles which men are much better fitted to meet. No, sir; the relations of the sexes as they exist to-day under the laws of this country have produced happy and stable government, or at least are not responsible for the evil features which we witness. The best protection for the women of America is in the respect and the love which the men of America bear to them. Every man conversant with the practical affairs of life knows that the fact, that the mere fact that it is a woman who seeks her rights in a court of justice alone gives her an advantage over her contestant which few men are able to resist, I would put it to any who has practiced law in the courts of this country; let him stand before a jury composed only of men, let the case be tried only by men; let all the witnesses be men; and the plaintiff or the defendant be a woman, and if you choose to add to that, even more unprotected than women generally are, a widow or an orphan, and does not every one recognize the difficulty, not to find protection for her rights, but the difficulty to induce the men who compose the juries of America to hold the balance of justice steadily enough to insure that the rights of others are not invaded by the force of sympathy for her sex? These are common every-day illustrations. They could be multiplied ad infinitum.

Mr. President, there never was a greater mistake, there never was a falser fact stated than that the women of America need any protection further than the love borne to them by their fellow-countrymen. Every right, every privilege, many that men do not attempt, many that men can not hope for, are theirs most freely. Do not imperil the advantages which they have, do not attempt in this hasty, ill-considered, shallow way to interfere with the relations which are founded upon the laws of nature herself. Depend upon it, Mr. President, man's wisdom is best shown by humble attention, by humble obedience to the great laws of nature; and those discoveries which have led men to their chiefest enjoyment and greatest advantages have been from the great minds of those who did lay their ears near the heart of nature, listened to its beatings, and did not attempt to correct God's handiwork by their own futile attempts at improvement.

Mr. STEWART.—Mr. President, I listened to the speech of the Senator from Delaware with great attention; I appreciate his feelings on the subject; and it has occasioned me to have some reflection upon this subject during the time he was speaking. I want to call the attention of the Senator from Delaware and of the Senate and of the country to a few facts in regard to this matter of woman's rights, and to see whether it has not been well to change some of the ancient order of things. There was a time among our Anglo-Saxon fathers when it was seriously discussed in the law-books what size the whip should be with which a husband could properly chastise his wife. If it was no larger than the thumb, I believe no action would lie. Those were the good old times, and those times you can see illustrated to-day all over the world where savages——

Mr. SARGENT.—That was when we were near to nature.

Mr. STEWART.—Yes; that was when man held sway, and when God's law of man's supremacy was omnipotent! Then harmony was preserved. If you will go out into my State and see the Indian women carrying the loads on their backs and the men riding on horses, and the women doing the work, you will see the harmony of the supremacy of man! Now, I undertake to say that there is no surer criterion of the civilization of any nation than the position which woman occupies; and the less dependent she is, the more she has to do with the management of society, the more she is regarded as an individual, the higher that society stands; but where she depends exclusively on man and man's justice, there you have absolute barbarism. Do you think that women have been less loyal to their husbands, do you think that virtue has been less protected in this country since the rights of women were vindicated by the law, since they were entitled to hold property? Have they not been as good wives as they were formerly? Has society been injured thereby? Show me the nation that elevates its women and acknowledges their rights and protects them by the law and severs them in point of protection from the caprice or the sympathy of men—show me that nation, and that nation shall be first. It is one of the evidences of the advance of civilization in America that woman does occupy the position she does here; and it is idle to say that society will be destroyed by recognizing her as having rights to protect.

It is very well for women who chance to have kind husbands and luxurious homes, under the flattery of their husbands, to sneer at their less fortunate sisters who are debarred every right. It is very well for those who have luxury and power and wealth to trample upon the unfortunate that cry for bread and for help. It is very easy to philosophize about laws and say that women are not fit for this place and not fit for that; that it is indelicate, and all that kind of thing, to allow her to earn an honest living or to have a place in a Department where she can do work; it is very well for us to say, "Here, we will give her only half pay for the same labor;" but they who serve and they who suffer feel it differently. How is the voice of women on this subject to be heard? Shall it be heard from that class only who are satisfied with their protection, or shall the voice of the weak and the starving be heard? There is no way for it to be heard. We see it daily. You talk about degradation. One of the great sources of the degradation of this country, one of the great sources of the breaking up of families and destroying society is your low groggeries and your gambling-houses and your places of resort for bad men, that are tolerated in spite of your laws and will be so long as men only vote. The women suffer by these things; and that consideration alone has often made me hesitate upon this question. I do believe that if the good women of America could speak to-day they would reform many evils that we wink at or allow to exist because we want the votes of the parties who are committing these sins against society. I say let the women have a voice; and when it is said that this is ill-considered, that this is not the proper time, and that this is too serious a business to be considered by the Senate of the United States on this bill, I tell you society is marching on to it, and as I remarked before, it will not be ten years before there will be no voice in this Senate against female suffrage. It is necessary for women, if they are to be protected in society and not to be the prey of man, that they shall have the ballot to protect themselves. It is the only thing in a free government that can protect any one; and whether it is a natural right or an artificial right it is nonsense to discuss. It is a necessary right; it is necessary to freedom; it is necessary to equal rights; it is necessary to protection; it is necessary for every class to have the ballot if we are to have a square deal.

Mr. BOREMAN.—I had not intended to utter a word. I supposed the bill would pass upon the report which was made by the committee. I am inclined now to think that if it had not been for the unfortunate, if I may say so, amendment offered by my friend from California [Mr. Sargent] it would have passed long since. But this question of woman suffrage is one upon which all our friends probably do not desire to vote either one way or the other, and it is a very convenient way to get rid of voting on the question directly to lay this bill on the table. Fortunately that question has been settled for the present, and I am glad the Senate has seen fit not to lay the bill on the table.

Mr. EDMUNDS.—The Senator speaks about people not wishing to vote on the amendment directly; and as I made the motion to lay on the table I assume that he refers to me. I beg to disabuse his mind on that subject, inasmuch as I am opposed to the amendment and am perfectly free to vote against it, and in doing so I suppose I represent, according to the latest advices I have, a very large majority of the people of Vermont.

Mr. BOREMAN.—I agree with the Senator from Vermont on the subject of woman suffrage myself.

Mr. EDMUNDS.—Then I hope the Senator will not suggest that I am trying to dodge the question by moving to lay the bill on the table.

Mr. BOREMAN.—Not at all. I did not allude to the Senator who made the motion; and the remark I made was more intended to be playful than serious. I simply thought that probably the bill had enough friends to pass it if that subject was not mooted. I may be mistaken. However, I shall be glad to have a vote on the bill either with or without woman suffrage incorporated in it. I shall vote against incorporating it, but if it is put there I shall nevertheless be gratified to have the bill passed. I feel no interest in it except as representing what I believe to be the interests and wishes of those to be affected by it. I think the circumstances are such as to justify Congress in organizing the Territory, else as representing the committee I should not have reported the bill. That is all I desire to say.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Anthony in the chair).—The question is on the amendment of the Senator from California [Mr. Sargent], upon which the yeas and nays have been ordered.

The Secretary proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JOHNSON (when his name was called).—On this question I am paired with the Senator from Alabama [Mr. Spencer]. If he were here he would vote "yea" and I should vote "nay."

Mr. BOGY (after having first voted in the negative).—I rise to withdraw my vote. At the time I voted I forgot that I was paired with the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Dorsey]. I should have voted "nay" and he would have voted "yea."

The PRESIDING OFFICER.—The vote will be withdrawn if there be no objection.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine (after having first voted in the negative).—It occurs to me that I am paired with the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Oglesby). If he were here he would vote "yea" and I should vote "nay." I ask leave to withdraw my vote.

The PRESIDING OFFICER.—Leave will be granted if there is no objection.

The roll-call having been concluded, the result was announced—yeas 19, nays 27; as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Anthony, Carpenter, Chandler, Conover, Ferry of Michigan, Flanagan, Gilbert, Harvey, Mitchell, Morton, Patterson, Pratt, Sargent, Sprague, Stewart, Tipton, Washburn, West, and Windom—19.

NAYS—Messrs. Allison, Bayard, Boreman, Boutwell, Buckingham, Clayton, Conkling, Cooper, Davis, Edmunds, Frelinghuysen, Hager, Hamilton of Maryland, Hitchcock, Jones, Kelly, McCreery, Merrimon, Morrill of Vermont, Norwood, Ramsey, Ransom, Saulsbury, Scott, Sherman, Wadleigh, and Wright—27.

ABSENT—Messrs. Alcorn, Bogy, Brownlow, Cameron, Cragin, Dennis, Dorsey, Fenton, Ferry of Connecticut, Goldthwaite, Gordon, Hamilton of Texas, Hamlin, Howe, Ingalls, Johnson, Lewis, Logan, Morrill of Maine, Oglesby, Pease, Robertson, Schurz, Spencer, Stevenson, Stockton, and Thurman—27.

So the amendment was rejected.

The PRESIDING OFFICER.—The question now is on ordering the bill to be engrossed for a third reading.

Mr. MORTON called for the yeas and nays; and they were ordered.

Mr. EDMUNDS.—I ask the chairman of the committee if the clause still stands in the bill which authorizes all the male inhabitants of that Territory to vote at the first election?

Mr. BOREMAN.—I think the Senator is mistaken about that.

Mr. EDMUNDS.—I am not asking whether I am mistaken or not; I am asking if the clause remains as it stood reported by the committee?

Mr. BOREMAN.—Yes, sir.

Mr. EDMUNDS.—That is enough for me.

Mr. RAMSEY.—There is nothing new in that.

The question being taken by yeas and nays, resulted—yeas 19, nays 29; as follows:

YEAS—Messrs. Bogy, Boreman, Chandler, Clayton, Ferry of Michigan, Flanagan, Harvey, Hitchcock, Jones, Kelly, Logan, Mitchell, Patterson, Pratt, Ramsey, Sherman, Tipton, Wadleigh, and Windom—19.

NAYS—Messrs. Anthony, Bayard, Boutwell, Buckingham, Carpenter, Conkling, Conover, Davis, Edmunds, Frelinghuysen, Gilbert, Hager, Hamilton of Maryland, Ingalls, Johnson, McCreery, Merrimon, Morrill of Maine, Morrill of Vermont, Norwood, Ransom, Sargent, Saulsbury, Scott, Sprague, Stewart, Washburn, West, and Wright—29.

ABSENT—Messrs. Alcorn, Allison, Brownlow, Cameron, Cooper, Cragin, Dennis, Dorsey, Fenton, Ferry of Connecticut, Golthwaite, Gordon, Hamilton of Texas, Hamlin, Howe, Lewis, Morton, Oglesby, Pease, Robertson, Schurz, Spencer, Stevenson, Stockton, and Thurman—25.

So the bill was rejected.

Though the measure was lost, and the women sad under repeated disappointments, yet the progress was noted with gratitude. In 1866 only nine Senators voted in favor of woman's enfranchisement after a three days' discussion of the measure. In 1874, after eight years of education, nineteen voted aye to the proposition.

The seventh Washington Convention was held January 14th and 15th, 1875, in Lincoln Hall as usual. Mrs. Stanton opened the proceedings by stating that owing to the death of the President of the association, Martha C. Wright, the duties of presiding officer devolved upon her. After paying a well-merited tribute to her noble coadjutor, she said that many of their noblest friends had passed away. Among them Dr. Harriot K. Hunt, Hon. Gerrit Smith, and Rev. Beriah Green.

This meeting comes at a most auspicious moment, when the entire Nation is wide awake to the rights of self-government now being trampled on in Louisiana. At such a crisis it would seem that liberty-loving statesmen might easily be converted to the idea of universal suffrage. On every principle that they now demand self-government for the people of Louisiana, they should extend the right of suffrage to the women of that State now in so unsettled a condition. The annual report and resolutions were discussed and speeches made by Miss Anthony and Mrs. Blake during the morning session. Letters were read from Robert Dale Owen, of Philadelphia, Rev. O. B. Frothingham, of New York, Paulina Wright Davis, of Providence, Dr. J. C. Jackson, of Dansville, N. Y., and Abby Smith, of Glastonbury, Conn. Miss Couzins' speech in the evening on the "Social Trinity" was a touching appeal for woman's moral, spiritual, and aesthetic influence on humanity at large. Miss Carrie Burnham made an interesting argument showing that the disabilities of women might be directly traced to papal decrees; to the canon rather than the civil law. Miss Lillie Devereux Blake made a strong appeal on the duty of enfranchising the women of the Nation before celebrating the coming Centennial. She thought it would be an act of justice that would glorify that day as it could be done in no other manner. Belva A. Lockwood, Marilla M. Ricker, Catharine Stebbins, Lavinia Dundore, and Dr. Clemence Lozier, all took part in the discussion of the resolutions.

3. Resolved, That as the duties of citizens are the outgrowth of their rights, a class denied the common rights of citizenship should be exempt from all duties to the State. Hence the Misses Smith, of Glastonbury, Conn., and Abby Kelly Foster, of Worcester, Mass., who refused to pay taxes because not allowed to vote, suffered gross injustice and oppression at the hands of State officials, who seized and sold their property for taxes.

4. Resolved, That to deny the right of suffrage to the women of the Nation, is a dangerous innovation on the rights of man, since the assumed power to deny the right to one class, is the implied power to deny it to all others; acting on this principle, New Hampshire abridges the rights of her citizens by forbidding Catholics to hold office; and Rhode Island abridges the rights of her citizens by forbidding foreigners to vote, except on a property qualification.

5. Resolved, That our thanks are due to the Hon. A. A. Sargent and the other eighteen Senators who voted for woman suffrage on the Pembina Bill, and to the 40,000 brave men who went to the polls and voted for woman suffrage in Michigan.

6. Resolved, That in the death of Martha C. Wright, the President of our National Association, Dr. Harriot K. Hunt, the first woman in the country who entered the medical profession, the Rev. Beriah Green, and the Hon. Gerrit Smith, steadfast advocates of woman suffrage, we have in the last year been called to mourn the loss of four most efficient and self-sacrificing friends of our movement—women and men alike true to the great principles of republican government.

WHEREAS, It is now proposed to celebrate our coming centennial birthday as a free Government, inviting the monarchies of the Old World to join in the festivities, while the women of the country have no share in its blessings; therefore,

Resolved, That the National Woman Suffrage Association will hold a convention in Philadelphia on July 4, 1876, to protest against such injustice unless Congress shall in the meantime secure to woman the rights, privileges, and immunities of American citizens.

Resolved, That we cordially invite all women in the Old World and the New, to co-operate with us in promoting the objects of the convention in 1876. As the enfranchisement of woman would be the most fitting way of celebrating this great event in our nation's history, women suffragists throughout the country should now make an united effort with Congress and all State Legislatures to act on this question, that when the old liberty bell rings in the dawn of the new century, we may all be free and equal citizens of a true republic.

MISS ANTHONY said that man neither supports woman nor protects her. The census reports show that two million women are entirely independent of men in regard to employments. Thousands of women do work outside the home from necessity. A million women are engaged in domestic service providing for their own necessities, and a million more are supporting their families and drunken husbands.

Letters were read from Dr. Mary Thomas, President of the Indiana Association, and from Clara Barton, then traveling in Italy, deploring the subject condition of women in foreign lands. The day after the Convention the ladies received their friends in the spacious parlors at Willard's Hotel. Congressmen, lawyers, clergymen, and many bright girls from the departments were among the guests. Nothing indicates the progress of a reform more readily than the cordial social recognition of its leaders. While pausing now and then to note the adverse winds we are compelled to encounter in the jealousies, discords, and divisions of friends, and in the ridicule and misrepresentation of enemies, a broader vision shows us that the great tidal waves of thought are all flowing in one direction.

May 11, 1875, the twenty-seventh anniversary of the suffrage movement was held in the new Masonic Temple, Twenty-third street, New York. This magnificent Hall for the first time echoed to the demands of woman for an equal share in the great interests of the world.

The convention was opened with prayer by the Rev. Olympia Brown, who referred most impressively to the coming Centennial, expressing the hope that the Fourth of July, 1876, might indeed be a day of jubilee, in which liberty and justice would be secured to the whole people. The resolutions[161] were discussed with great spirit by the various speakers.[162] An interesting letter was read from Isabella Beecher Hooker, giving some of her experiences and observations in France.

The Hall was crowded in the evening to listen to Mr. Frothingham. His address was an able exposition of the injustice of the heavy taxes laid on women. He read several extracts from the reports of William I. Bowditch, of Boston, in regard to the large number of women in Massachusetts holding property, and in closing, depicted with great feeling the constant sacrifices women were compelled to endure because they had no representation in the Government. After a song by the Hutchinsons, the large audience slowly dispersed.

At a business meeting next day the officers[163] for the year were chosen, and arrangements made to canvass Iowa if, as was proposed, an amendment to the Constitution extending the right of suffrage to the women of that State, should be submitted to the people.

All thoughts were now turned to the Centennial year, as to what new forms of agitation could be suggested; what onward steps of progress accomplished, for after the untiring labors of thirty years, the leaders in this movement naturally felt that the great event of the century could not pass without bringing some new liberty to woman.

FOOTNOTES:

[151] 2. Resolved, That the present attempts in our courts, by a false construction of the National Constitution, to exalt all men as sovereigns, and degrade all women as slaves, is to establish the most odious form of aristocracy known in the civilized world—that of sex.

3. Resolved, That women are "persons" and "citizens," possessed of all the legal qualifications of voters in the several States—age, property, and education—and by the XIV. Amendment of the National Constitution have been secured the right of suffrage.

4.: Resolved, That it is the duty of Congress, by appropriate legislation, to protect women in their exercise of this right.

5. Resolved, That women are citizens, first of the United States, and second of the States and Territories wherein they reside; hence we claim National protection of our inalienable rights, against all State authority.

6. Resolved, That States may regulate all local questions of property, taxation, etc., but the inalienable personal rights of citizenship must be declared by the Constitution, interpreted by the Supreme Court, protected by Congress, and enforced by the arm of the Executive.

7. Resolved, That the criminal prosecution of Susan B. Anthony by the United States, for the alleged crime of exercising the citizen's right of suffrage, is an act of arbitrary authority, unconstitutional, and a blow at the liberties of every citizen of this nation.

Business Committee:—Matilda Joslyn Gage, New York; Belva A. Lockwood, District of Columbia; Lillie Devereux Blake, New York; Mrs. Mary Henderson, Missouri; Mrs. Lavinia Dundore, Maryland; Edward M. Davis, Pennsylvania; Mrs. Mary A. Dobyns, Kentucky; Mrs. Anna C. Savery, Iowa; Miss Phebe Couzins, St. Louis; Mrs. Jane Graham Jones, Illinois; Mrs. Helen M. Barnard, District of Columbia; Rev. Olympia Brown, Connecticut; Robert Purvis, District of Columbia.

Finance Committee:—Mrs. Ellen C. Sargent, Belva A. Lockwood; Edward M. Davis, Ruth Carr Dennison, Helen M. Barnard.

Committee on Resolution:—Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Belva A. Lockwood, Lillie Devereux Blake, Matilda Joslyn Gage.

[152] WOMAN SUFFRAGE ANNIVERSARY.—NATIONAL WOMAN SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION.—The Twenty-fifth Woman Suffrage Anniversary will be held in Apollo Hall, New York, Tuesday, May 6, 1873. Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, who called the first Woman's Rights convention at Seneca Falls, 1848, will be present to give their reminiscences. That Convention was scarcely mentioned by the local press; now, over the whole world, equality for woman is demanded. In the United States, woman suffrage is the chief political question of the hour. Great Britain is deeply agitated upon the same topic; Germany has a princess at the head of its National Woman's Rights organization. Portugal, Spain, and Russia have been roused. In Rome an immense meeting, composed of the representatives of Italian democracy, was recently called in the old Coliseum; one of its resolutions demanded a reform in the laws relating to woman and a re-establishment of her natural rights. Turkey, France, England, Switzerland, Italy, sustain papers devoted to woman's enfranchisement. A Grand International Woman's Rights Congress is to be held in Paris in September of this year, to which the whole world is invited to send delegates, and this Congress is to be under the management of the most renowned liberals of Europe. Come up, then, friends, and celebrate the Silver Wedding of the Woman Suffrage movement. Let our Twenty-fifth Anniversary be one of power; our reform is everywhere advancing, let us redouble our energies and our courage.

MATILDA JOSLYN GAGE, Ch'n Ex. Com. SUSAN B. ANTHONY, Pres.

[153] Mrs. Elizabeth Avery Meriwether, Tennessee; Isabella Beecher Hooker, Connecticut; Francis Miller, Washington, D. C.; Sarah R. L. Williams, Toledo, Ohio; Mrs. C. M. Palmer, California; Carrie S. Burnham, Pennsylvania; Ellen C. Sargent, Washington; Le Grand Marvin, Buffalo, N. Y.; Carl Doerflinger, Wisconsin; Emily Pitts Stevens, editor of the Pioneer, San Francisco, Cal.; A. Jane Duniway, editor of the New Northwest, Portland, Oregon.

[154] WHEREAS, This being the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first combined effort of women for the recognition of their civil and political rights; and,

WHEREAS, The demands first publicly promulgated in an obscure village in the State of New York have now spread over the world; therefore,

Resolved, That while we congratulate women on the progress of this reform during a quarter of a century, we urge them not to grow discouraged or faint-hearted when obstacles arise in their attack upon hoary wrongs. We remind them that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, and that the nearer we come to victory the stronger will be the effort against us. But our cause is one of eternal justice, and must ultimately prevail.

Resolved, That Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton will evermore be held in grateful remembrance as the pioneers in this grandest reform of the age; that as the wrongs they attacked were broader and deeper than any other, so as time passes they will be revered as foremost among the benefactors of the race, and that we also hold sacred the memory of their co-laborers in the Convention of 1848.

WHEREAS, The underlying principle of our Government is equality of political rights, therefore,

Resolved, That in the prosecution and trial of Susan B. Anthony, a citizen of the United State, for having cast a ballot at the last election, the Government of the United States declares it is a crime to vote, thus attempting to undermine the very foundation of the Republic.

Resolved, That as in this trial Susan B. Anthony represents one-half of the people, the whole power of the United States is arrayed against the women of the nation—against law-abiding, tax-paying women citizens.

Resolved, That the trial of Susan B. Anthony, though ostensibly involving the political status of woman alone, in reality questions the right of every man to share in the Government; that it is not Susan B. Anthony, or the women of the Republic who alone are on trial to-day, but it is the Government of the United States, and that as the decision is rendered for or against the political rights of citizenship, so will the men of America find themselves free or enslaved.

Resolved, That the decisions of the courts in the case of Mrs. Bradwell, of Illinois, Mrs. Spencer and Mrs. Webster, of Washington; Mrs. Minor, of St. Louis; Miss Burnham, of Philadelphia, and others, are warnings to the people that their liberties are in danger.

Resolved, That it is because women are not voters, and, therefore, have no recognized political power, that the members of the Forty-second Congress, while raising their own salaries from $5,000 to $7,500, dared to reject an amendment to the same bill, which proposed to raise the salaries of the women employes of the Government from $900 to $1,200.

Resolved, That in the coming Centennial of our nation's birth it is mockery to ask woman to lend a helping hand without some pledge to right her wrongs; what cause has she for rejoicing unless the century shall round out with her enfranchisement, and the old liberty bell ring in equality for all.

Resolved, That the report of the Judiciary Committee of the Assembly of the State of New York in regard to a property suffrage qualification for women, is one of the signs of awakened thought toward our reform.

Resolved, That the rapid advance of Woman's Rights in foreign countries is a subject of gratulation, and as a matter of special cheer we call particular attention to the grand international Woman's Rights Congress, under the control of the liberals of Europe, to be held in Paris during the present year.

WHEREAS, The National Woman Suffrage Association has been requested to send delegates to the International Woman's Rights Congress to be held in Paris in October next; therefore,

Resolved, That this Association empower Ernestine L. Rose, Paulina Wright Davis, Mathilde F. Wendt, Jane Graham Jones, and Elizabeth Phelps Pearsall, to represent our woman suffrage movement in that congress.

[155] Mrs. Nettie C. Tabor, Cal.; Frances Ellen Burr, Hartford, Conn.; Mrs. Elizabeth B. Phelps, N. Y.; Mrs. E. Langdon, N. Y.; Jane B. Archibald, D. C.; Miss Jennie V. Jewell, D. C.; Mrs. Adeliah Gardiner, Baltimore; Kate C. Harris, Baltimore; Miss Laura Ewing, Baltimore; Phoebe W. Couzins; Edward M. Davis, Philadelphia; Matilda Joslyn Gage, Fayetteville, N. Y.; Lillie Devereux Blake, New York City; Ruth C. Dennison, D. C.; Sara Andrews Spencer, D. C.; Dr. Clemence S. Lozier, New York City; Belva A. Lockwood, Virginia L. Vaughn, James K. Wilcox, and the Hutchinson Family.

[156] Letters were received from Paulina Wright Davis, Providence, R. I.; Virginia L. Minor, St. Louis, Mo.; Hon. E. G. Lapham, Canandaigua, N. Y.; Vice-Pres. Henry Wilson, Natick, Mass.; John Van Vhoris, Rochester, N. Y.; Dr. James C. Jackson, Dansville, N. Y.; Hon. Henry R. Selden, Rochester, N. Y.; Hon. John A. Kasson, Iowa; Thomas Wentworth Higginson, Newport, R. I.; Ernestine L. Rose, London, England; Dr. Laura Ross Wolcott, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Carrie S. Burnham, Philadelphia, Pa.; Lewia C. Smith, Rochester, N. Y.; Asenath Coolidge, Watertown, N. Y.; Priscilla Holmes Drake, Alabama; Laura De Force Gordon, California; George F. Downing, Washington, D. C.; The Free Thinkers Club of Milwaukee; The Radical Democracy of Wisconsin.

[157] Resolved, That this convention, representing as it does all portions of our country, cordially sympathizes with the proposed efforts of the women of the District of Columbia to secure the practical enjoyment of their constitutional right to vote, as declared by the Supreme Court of said District, by the passage of an act of Congress amending the organic law of the District by striking out the word "male" from the seventh section of said act; and we earnestly request our senators and representatives to support a bill providing for such an amendment by speech and vote.

Resolved, That a committee of seven be appointed by the president of this convention to co-operate with the committee heretofore appointed by the women of the District of Columbia in their application to Congress for the passage of an act amendatory of the organic act of said District, as above indicated.

Resolved, That among the important events in our struggle for the equal rights of woman we place the trial of Miss Susan B. Anthony before Hon. Ward Hunt, a judge of the Supreme Court of the United States, at Canandaigua, New York, in June last, on an indictment for voting as a citizen at the general election in November, 1872; that the grossly partial course of Judge Hunt on that occasion, his seeming unacquaintance with the plainest rules of law, and his eagerness for the conviction of Miss Anthony, stand in marked contrast with the calm demeanor and clear apprehension of the facts and principles at issue which she exhibited on the trial, and their conduct respectively in this memorable contest affords proof that, though it may be possible that all women have not a constitutional right to be voters, it is very certain that some men are not fit to be judges.

Resolved, That waiving for the present moment the question whether or not Judge Hunt was correct in his decision concerning the constitutional right of women to vote for Federal officers, nevertheless, in the opinion of all sound lawyers and intelligent men, he committed a great outrage against Miss Anthony by assuming, without proof, that she voted for a candidate for Congress, and by arbitrarily refusing to allow the jury to pass upon the question of her innocence, and by peremptorily commanding them to render a verdict of guilty. That so plain is this to the minds of those who possess any clear knowledge of general principles of law, and of the ordinary duties of a criminal court, that Judge Hunt has shown by his conduct on that trial that he is too ignorant to fill his high position, or too arbitrary to be entrusted with its grave responsibilities; and, therefore, in either case, he ought to be impeached and removed from the bench.

Resolved, That by the death of John Stuart Mill, woman has lost a wise, brave friend. His great work for the enfranchisement of woman, and for the elevation of all mankind deserves the public thanks of this convention.

Resolved, That in Hon. John C. Underwood, lately removed from the bench by death, the women of his district have lost that rarest of public servants, a judge to whom the disfranchised could confidently look for justice.

Resolved, That by the death of John M. Morris, late editor of the Washington Chronicle, the cause of woman's freedom lost a tried and valued friend, whose faithfulness and judgment entitled him to the gratitude of the women of this Nation.

Miss Anthony submitted the following:

Resolved, That the thanks of the friends of woman suffrage are due to the Misses Smith, of Glastonbury, Connecticut, for their patriotic resistance to the tyranny of taxation without representation, and that all women tax payers through the country should follow their example.

Resolved, That the best means of agitating at the present hour is for all women to insist on their right of representation by actually presenting their votes at every election, and for all property-holding women to refuse to pay another dollar of tax until their right of representation is recognized.

PETERBORO, January 5, 1874

SUSAN B. ANTHONY—MY DEAR FRIEND: As I am suffering from an attack of vertigo, I answer your letter by the hand of my wife. Enclosed is my contribution toward defraying the expenses of your convention. Strong as is the Constitutional argument for woman suffrage, I nevertheless hope that your convention will not tolerate the idea of measuring the rights of woman by a man-made constitution. Have you heard of a State in which women and women only bear rule, and the constitution of which was made by women only? Perhaps there is such a flagrantly unjust state, either on this or some other planet. If so, deep is the injury done to its men. But deeper the insult added to this injury if, when the men complain of being excluded from the government, the women apply to the measurement of man's rights the yardstick of a woman-made constitution. Constitutions are useful in settling ten thousand subordinate questions. But the great questions of primary and inherent human rights are to be submitted to no lower decisions than those of God's immutable and everlasting justice.

With high regard, your friend, GERRIT SMITH.

GEN. BUTLER'S LETTER.

WASHINGTON, December 1.

MY DEAR MADAM: As a rule I have refused to take part in any convention in the District of Columbia about any matter which might come before Congress. I do not think it proper. I went far out of my way in this regard, having given evidence that I am most strongly committed to the legality, propriety and justice of giving the ballot to woman. I do not see how I can add anything to it by appearing on the platform in advocacy of any measure that may come before me as a Member of Congress, and I do not think my sense of propriety would over-balance such considerations. Hoping that your cause may succeed, I have the honor to be, very truly yours,

BEN. F. BUTLER.

[158] ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL WOMAN SUFFRAGE ASSOCIATION.—For more than a quarter of a century the representative women of this nation have held annual meetings, demanding the recognition of their rights as citizens of the United States. In halls of legislation and courts of justice, as well as in Conventions, woman's equality with man in all civil and political rights, privileges and immunities, has been debated and variously decided by popular opinion, statute law and judicial decree, without arriving at any permanent settlement of the question. And until the world learns that there should be but one code of laws and morals for man and woman, this question never can be settled. But the discussion has roused woman herself to new thought and action, and kindled in her an enthusiasm that the best interests of the nation demand should be wisely directed and controlled.

The fact that women are already voting, holding office and resisting taxation, that thousands are enrolling in the Grange movement and Temperance Crusade, that Woman Suffrage is to be voted upon in Michigan at the next election, should warn the Government that the hour for its action has come. It must now determine whether woman's transition from slavery to freedom shall be through reformation or revolution, whether she shall be permitted to express her interest in national questions through law by the direct power of the ballot, or outside of law by indirect and irresponsible power; and thus, by a blind enthusiasm, plunge the nation into anarchy.

For an earnest discussion of the duty of the hour, we invite all persons interested in woman's enfranchisement to meet in Irving Hall, New York, on the 14th and 15th of May.

SUSAN B. ANTHONY, President. ELIZABETH CADY STANTON, Chairman Ex. Com.

[159] The speakers at this Convention were Ernestine L. Rose, Martha C. Wright, O. B. Frothingham, Rev. Olympia Brown, Rev. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, Elizabeth B. Phelps, Carrie S. Burnham, Sarah Andrews Spencer, Frances V. Hallock, Amanda Deyo, Dr. J. Mix, Mrs. Helen M. Slocum, Dr. Clemence S. Lozier, Lillie Devereux Blake, Susan B. Anthony.

[160] Letters were received at this May Anniversary (1874) from Lucinda B. Chandler, Vineland, New Jersey; Mrs. C. C. Hussey, Report of New Jersey; Mary F. Davis, New Jersey; Catherine F. Stebbins, Michigan; Mary J. Channing, Paulina Wright Davis, Rhode Island; Alfred H. Love, Edward M. Davis, Sarah Pugh, Philadelphia; Lorenza Haynes, Theological School, St. Lawrence University, Canton, N. Y.; Sarah R. L. Williams, Toledo, Ohio; Harriet S. Brooks, Report for Illinois; Catharine V. Waite, Illinois; Lizzie Boynton Harbert, Iowa; Virginia L. Minor, Missouri; Annie L. Quinby, Kentucky; Sarah Burger Stearns, Duluth, Minnesota; Hon. Benj. F. Butler, Massachusetts; Mrs. C. H. Baker, Mrs. H. K. Clapp, Nevada; Sarah J. Wallis, California; Mrs. C. I. H. Nichols, Pomo, California; Mariana Thompson Folsom, Foxboro, Mass.; Emily P. Collins, La.; Mary K. Spalding, Atlanta, Ga.; Mrs. Matilda Joslyn Gage, New York; Mary L. Booth, Harper's Bazar, New York; Ann T. Greeley, Ellsworth, Me.; Mary Olney Brown, Olympia, Washington Territory.

[161] Resolved, That as complete individual development depends on the harmonious exercise of our three-fold nature, and undue power given to either deranges and undermines the whole being, so in the nation, a complete experiment of self-government can be made only by the equal recognition of the rights of all citizens, and in their homogeneous education into the laws of national life.

Resolved, That the decision of Chief Justice Waite, in the case of Virginia L. Minor of Missouri, that according to the Federal Constitution woman is a citizen, but not entitled to the right of suffrage, is more infamous and retrogressive in principle at this hour, than was Chief-Justice Tancy's decision in the Dred Scott case, that a black man was not a United States citizen, and therefore not entitled to the rights of a citizen of every State.

Whereas, By the recent decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Myra Bradwell of Illinois, and of Virginia L. Minor of Missouri, the Federal Constitution is declared powerless to protect the civil and political rights of woman.

Resolved, That it is the duty of Congress to take the necessary steps to secure an amendment to the Constitution that shall prohibit the several States from disfranchising citizens of the United States on account of sex.

Whereas, One of the strongest evidences of the degradation of disfranchised classes is the denial of their right to testify against their rulers in courts of justice (slaves could not testify against their masters; Chinamen in California to-day can not testify against white men, nor wives in cases of crim. con. against their husbands); therefore

Resolved, That the denial of Elizabeth R. Tilton's right to testify in the pending Brooklyn trial, is but proof of woman's need of the ballot in her own right for self-defence and self-protection.

Resolved, That as the proposition for woman's enfranchisement is to be submitted in Iowa, in 1876, the National Woman Suffrage Association will hold there 100 county conventions, and by lectures and the circulation of tracts, help the women of Iowa to make a thorough canvass of the State.

Resolved, That we congratulate the women of England for the large vote secured on the Woman's Disabilities Bill in the House of Commons. With a Queen on her throne, 400,000 women already voting, and her Premier in favor of the measure, England bids fair to take the lead in the complete enfranchisement of women.

[162] Rev. O. B. Frothingham, Matilda Joslyn Gage, Rev. Olympia Brown, Lillie Devereux Blake, Carrie S. Burnham, Mrs. Stanton, and Miss Anthony.

[163] Matilda Joslyn Gage, President; Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Vice-Presidents; Henrietta P. Westbrook, Recording Secretary; Isabella Beecher Hooker, Corresponding Secretary; Ellen Clark Sargent, Treasurer; Susan B. Anthony and fifteen others, Executive Committee.



CHAPTER XXV.

TRIALS AND DECISIONS.

Women voting under the XIV. Amendment—Appeals to the Courts—Marilla M. Ricker, of New Hampshire, 1870—Nannette B. Gardner, Michigan—Sarah Andrews Spencer, District of Columbia—Ellen Rand Van Valkenburgh, California—Catharine V. Waite, Illinois—Carrie S. Burnham, Pennsylvania—Sarah M. T. Huntingdon, Connecticut—Susan B. Anthony, New York—Virginia L. Minor, Missouri—Judges McKee, Jameson, Sharswood, Cartter—Associate Justice Hunt—Chief Justice Waite—Myra Bradwell—Hon. Matt. H. Carpenter—Supreme Court Decisions—Mrs. Gage's Review.

We have already shown in previous chapters that by a fair interpretation of the XIV. Amendment women were logically secured in their right to vote. Encouraged by the opinions of able lawyers and judges, they promptly made a practical test of this question by registering and voting during the State and Presidential elections of 1871 and '72. This transferred the discussion, for a time, from the platform and halls of legislation to the courts for final adjudication.

The first woman to offer her vote was Marilla M. Ricker, of Dover, New Hampshire, a young widow of large property. In March,[164] 1870, the day previous to the election, she made application to the selectmen for registry. No objection being made, and one of the Board, promising to put her name on the check-list, she departed, leaving with them several copies of a speech she had prepared in case of a refusal. On election day she appeared at the polls and offered a straight Republican ticket. It was received by the moderator and her name called, but on examination of the list it was found that the selectman had been false to his promise, and her vote was refused. Extended comments were made by the press of the State, Democrats generally sustaining her, while Republicans were bitter in opposition. Mrs. Ricker in the meantime prepared to sue the selectmen, but being strongly opposed by her republican friends, she silently submitted to the injustice, and thus lost the opportunity of being the first woman to prosecute the authorities for refusing the vote of a citizen on the ground of sex. However, she still enjoys the distinction of being the first woman to cast a vote under the XIV. Amendment, as the following spring she saw that her name was on the registry list, and her vote was received without opposition.

The next case was that of Nannette B. Gardner, in Detroit, Michigan. She registered her name in that city March 25, 1871, and voted,[165] unquestioned, April 3d. April 20th, of the same year, Sara Andrews Spencer and Sarah E. Webster, with seventy other women of the District of Columbia, marched in a body to the polls, but their votes were refused at the election as they had been previously refused registration. They immediately took steps to prosecute the Board of Inspectors, and suit was brought in the Supreme Court of the District at the general term, October, 1871. Albert G. Riddle and Francis Miller, able lawyers of the District, and well known advocates of woman suffrage, were retained by the plaintiffs, and in their defense made the following arguments:

Mr. RIDDLE said: May it please the Court; ... These plaintiffs, describing themselves as women, claim to be citizens of the United States and of this District, with the right of the elective franchise, which they attempted to exercise at the election of April 20th last past, and were prevented. They say that as registration was a prerequisite of the right to vote, they tendered themselves in due form, and demanded it, under the second section of the Act of May 31, 1870 (16th U.S. Stats., 140). That is the "Act to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote," etc., and authorizes a suit for refusing registration. They say, that being refused registration, they tendered their votes to the proper inspectors of said election, with proof of their attempt to register, citizenship, etc., as authorized by the third section of said Act, and their votes were refused; and, thereupon, Spencer brings her suit under said second section, against the registering officers, and Webster hers under the third section, which authorizes it, for rejecting her vote. The questions in both cases are identical and presented together.

To the declarations the defendants demur, and thereby raise the only questions we desire to have adjudicated. The defendants, by their demurrer, admit all the allegations of the plaintiffs, severally, but say, that as they are women, they are not entitled to vote in the District of Columbia. That the seventh section of the organic Act, the Constitution of the District, provides, "That all male citizens," etc., "shall be entitled to vote," etc., and that this word male excludes women, of course.

To this the plaintiffs reply that the language of the statute does exclude women, but they say that in the presence of the first section of the XIV. Amendment, which confers the elective franchise upon "all persons," this word "male" is as if unwritten, and that the statute, constitutionally, reads, "That all citizens shall be entitled to vote." For we contend, your honors, that although the Congress "has exclusive legislation in all cases over this District," it can legislate only, as could the States, from which it was taken. It must legislate in accordance with American ideas, and can exercise no power not granted by the Constitution; and that instrument certainly confers no power to limit the right of suffrage. And so we are at issue....

As the FIRST proposition of my brief, I contend, that under our system the right to vote is a natural right.

Obviously, government is of right or it is an usurpation. If of right, it sprang from some right older than itself; and this older right must have existed in persons (people), in each and all alike, male and female. And having this right, they used it to form for themselves a government. Of course, this supposes that all joined in and consented to the government having the power to dissent; for, to just the extent that a government got itself agoing without the free consent of its people, it is without right. The right of self-government, and from that springs our right to govern others, is a natural right. This is the primary idea of American politics, and the foundation of our Government. This was formulated in the second clause of our great Declaration, and no man has dared to deny it....

It follows, then, if the right of government is a natural right, and to be exercised alone by the ballot, that the right to vote is a natural right. This never has been and never can be successfully controverted....

I will read from the highest American authority upon our politico-constitutional questions, partly in support of my proposition that the right to vote is a natural right, and also to show that the assumed claim of one part of the people to exclude another from all share in the Government has the most doubtful and shadowy foundation in right, and to an American it needs no evidence to show that a portion of the people thus excluded are in a state of vassalage. I read from Story on the Constitution, volume 1st, commencing at

Sec. 578. The most strenuous advocate for universal suffrage has never yet contended that the right should be absolutely universal. No one has ever been sufficiently visionary to hold that all persons of every age, degree, and character, should be entitled to vote in all elections of all public officers. Idiots, infants, minors, and persons insane or utterly imbecile, have been, without scruple, denied the right as not having the sound judgment and discretion fit for its exercise. In many countries, persons guilty of crimes have also been denied the right as a personal punishment, or as a security to society. In most countries, females, whether married or single, have been purposely excluded from voting, as interfering with sound policy and the harmony of social life ... And yet it would be extremely difficult, upon any mere theoretical reasoning, to establish any satisfactory principle upon which the one-half of every society has thus been systematically excluded by the other half from all right of participating in government, which would not at the same time apply to and justify many other exclusions. If it be said that all men have a natural, equal, and inalienable right to vote, because they are all born free and equal; that they all have common rights and interests entitled to protection; and, therefore, have an equal right to decide, either personally or by their chosen representatives, upon the laws and regulations which shall control, measure, and sustain those rights and interests; that they can not be compelled to surrender, except by their free consent, what by the bounty and order of Providence belongs to them in common with all their race. What is there in these considerations which is not equally applicable to females as free, intelligent, moral, responsible beings, entitled to equal rights and interests and protection, and having a vital stake in all the regulations and laws of society? And, if an exception, from the nature of the case, could be felt in regard to persons who are idiots, infants, and insane, how can this apply to persons who are of more mature growth, and are yet deemed minors by the municipal law?

SEC. 580. If, then, every well-organized society has the right to consult for the common good of the whole; and if, upon the principle of natural law, this right is conceded by the very union of society, it seems difficult to assign any limit to this right which is compatible with the due attainment of the end proposed. If, therefore, any society shall deem the common good and interests of the whole society best promoted under the particular circumstances in which it is placed by a restriction of the right of suffrage, it is not easy to state any solid ground of objection to its exercise of such an authority. At least, if any society has a clear right to deprive females, constituting one-half of the whole population, of the right of suffrage (which, with scarcely an exception, has been uniformly maintained), it will require some astuteness to find upon what ground this exclusion can be vindicated, which does justify, or at least excuse, many other exclusions.

Sec. 581. Without laying any stress upon this theoretical reasoning which is brought before the reader, not so much because it solves all doubts and objections, as because it presents a view of the serious difficulties attendant upon the assumption of an original and inalienable right of suffrage, as originating in natural law, and independent of civil law, it may be proper to state that every civilized society has uniformly fixed, modified, and regulated the right of suffrage for itself according to its own free will and pleasure. Every constitution of government in these United States has assumed, as a fundamental principle, the right of the people of the State to alter, abolish, and modify the form of its own government according to the sovereign pleasure of the people. In fact, the people of each State have gone much further, and settled a far more critical question, by deciding who shall be the voters entitled to approve and reject the constitution framed by a delegated body under their direction. In the adoption of no State constitution has the assent been asked of any but the qualified voters; and women, and minors, and other persons not recognized as voters by existing laws, have been studiously excluded. And yet the constitution has been deemed entirely obligatory upon them as well as upon the minority, who voted against it. From this it will be seen how little, even in the most free of republican governments, any abstract right of suffrage, or any original and indefeasible privilege, has been recognized in practice.

This, remember, was written thirty years ago. Where would Story be now, if living? I beg also to read a single paragraph from the "Spirit of Laws," London edition, vol. I., p. 220:

"All the inhabitants of the several districts ought to have the right to vote at the election of the representatives," etc.

All of the inhabitants, says Montesquieu, ought to have the right to vote. Under such a rule I suppose my learned opponent would contend that a woman could not be an inhabitant, of course. I feel that I ought to apologize for presenting this point to this extent; it is so obvious, and rests on such broad and ample ground, that argument for it is without excuse, and I rest it here. So that if you consider this XIV. Amendment as a grant from the sovereign, then, like all such grants, you must take it most strongly against the grantor, and most favorable to the subject. And if, as I have shown, it is in favor of natural right, then must you construe it most strongly to extend that right. No court needs authority for these propositions.

The SECOND proposition of my brief is, that by the old common law of our English ancestors, the old storehouse of our rights and liberties, as well as the arsenal where we find weapons for their defense, woman always possessed this right of suffrage.

I will show by several English cases, by long usage, and general understanding, by principle and precedent, that the English woman both voted and held office; and I will show that not a single case, that not a single resolution of the House of Commons exists to the contrary; and that in all the now innumerable tomes of the common law, of judicial decision, commentary, or essay, but a single dictum exists to the contrary. And if I thus establish that the construction of the XIV. Amendment, for which I this day contend, is in favor of a common law right, is in accordance with its scope and spirit, every lawyer understands by how much I strengthen my position. And for the satisfaction of the court I am glad to state that this part of my argument will consist entirely of extracts from recent English text-writers, and a reference to two or three old cases. I read first from Mr. Anstey's Notes upon the Reform Act of Great Britain of 1867. The writer in his comment upon the words of the act, "every man of full age," etc., commences by showing that the term man in the act, as in Magna Charta and other statutes, is epicene—means both men and women. And he then goes on to show that to construe this phrase, "every man," to include every woman also, is in strict accordance with the common law from old times to the present. I read from p. 87:

That the rights in question (the right of suffrage) are not incompatible with the legal status of the woman, the following authorities seem to show. On the other hand, there can not be adduced any one authority against the position that the franchise of the shire and the borough were enjoyed by the female "resiants" equally with those of the male sex in times when "resiants," as such, and not as "tenants," had the franchise. The statutes by which the parliamentary franchise in counties was taken away from the "resiants" and vested in the "tenants," and at length restricted to those of freehold tenure (8 Hen., 6, c. 7; 18 Geo., 2, c. 18; 31 Geo., 2 c. 14), did not in any manner create or recognize any such distinction as that of the male and the female freeholders. Those acts had relation to tenure, not to sex. For the same reason, in all those boroughs where the "common right" prevailed, the suffrage would naturally be exercisable by the female no less than by the male "inhabitants" or "residants." It is believed that in not one of the boroughs where the suffrage was said to be regulated by "charter," or by "custom," or by "prescription" or even where it was regulated by a local act of Parliament, there can be found one instance of any provision or usage whatsoever whereby any voter was excluded from the enjoyment of the suffrage by reason of sex. That a woman may be a householder, or freeholder, or burgage tenant, parishioner, is plain enough. That she may answer the description of "a person paying scot and lot" within the "city of London," has been solemnly decided by the Court of King's Bench (Olive vs. Ingram, 7 Mod. 264, 267, 270, 271,) and that determination was expressly grounded by their Lordships "singly upon the foot of the common law, without regard to the usages of the parishes in London," which usage, nevertheless, had been also shown to be in favor of the same construction. In all cases, whether of statutory, of customary, or of common law qualification for the suffrage, the general rule is that which was laid down by the Court of King's Bench with respect to the choice of parochial officers under the first "Act for the Relief of the Poor," which directed them to be made from among the "substantial householders" of the place. The court held (Rex. vs. Stubbs, 2 T. R., 395)—overruling a dictum in Viner's Abridgment to the contrary—that a woman, being a "substantial householder," was properly chosen under that act to the office of overseer of the poor, notwithstanding the objections raised at the bar that it was a burthensome office and one of which, being once appointed to it, she would be called upon to perform duties some of which were above the bodily and mental powers, and others were inconsistent with the morality, or, at least, the decency of that sex.—(Id. 400.)

And so again on pages 90 and 91:

That there are some offices as to which it is the practice, by the "custom of England," to exclude them, is undoubtedly the fact. But it has been well said, as to these, that "there is a difference between being exempted and being incapacitated," and that "an excuse from acting, etc., is different from an incapacity of doing so. For it must not be forgotten, that it is upon the footing, not of disability, but of exemption, that those exclusions are vested, by the authorities which declare them." Thus, Whitelocke: "By the custom of England, women are not returned of juries, nor put into offices or commissions, nor eligible to serve in Parliament, or admitted to be members of the House of Peers; but, by reason of their sex, they are exempted from such employment. The omission of the electoral franchise from that enumeration [of exemption] is remarkable. If women were, at that time, considered to be excluded by any "custom of England" from the Parliamentary franchise, as well as from Parliament, it is scarcely conceivable that Whitelocke would have omitted to mention so important a fact. Singular to say, there is no trace of any such custom or usage in the reports or amongst the records, not even, so far as the author's researches have been successful, in the Journals of the House of Commons itself; and yet the right of the returning officer to reject the vote of a female elector when tendered at the polling-booth is always assumed to be an adjudged point. Mr. Oldfield appears to have been under the impression that the resolution of the House of Commons upon the occasion of the Westminster election, asserting the incapacity of an alien to vote in elections of members to serve in Parliament, extended to "women" also. If it were so, the incident would have no weight, for the enactment, which, according to a second resolution of the same date, was to be prepared for carrying into effect that intention, never received the sanction even of that House. But, in truth, no mention of "women" appears in either resolution. Nor was there, in that year, or at any other period, any resolution or determination of the House, so far as the author's information goes, directly impeaching the capacity of any female, in respect of her sex, to vote at an election to Parliament. He is aware that the House of Commons did, upon one remarkable occasion, deny the capacity of a female to be heard even as a witness at their bar; and that this extraordinary vote was obtained through the influence of Sir Edward Coke, the only text-writer who can be vouched for the position, that a woman's vote ought not to be received at a parliamentary election.