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22. About this time, the ambassadors, who had been sent to the kings, returned to Rome. As they brought no information of such a nature as called for any immediate declaration of war, (except against the Lacedaemonian tyrant, whom the Achaean ambassadors also represented as invading the sea-coast of Laconia, in breach of treaty,) Atilius, the praetor, was sent with the fleet to Greece, for the protection of the allies. It was resolved, that, as there was nothing to be apprehended from Antiochus at present, both the consuls should go to their provinces; and, accordingly, Domitius marched into the country of the Boians, by the shorter road, through Ariminum, and Quinctius through Liguria. The two armies of the consuls, proceeding by these different routes, spread devastation wide over the enemy's country. In consequence of which, first a few of their horsemen, with their commanders, then their whole senate, and at last all who possessed either property or dignity, to the number of one thousand five hundred, came over and joined the consuls. In both Spains, likewise, success attended the Roman arms during this year. For, in one, Caius Flaminius, after a siege, took Litabrum, a strong and opulent city, and made prisoner Corribilo, a powerful chieftain; and, in the other, Marcus Fulvius, the proconsul, fought two successful battles, with two armies of the enemy. He captured Vescelia and Holo, two towns belonging to the Spaniards, with many of their forts, and others spontaneously revolted to him. Then, advancing into the territory of Oretum, and having, there also, taken two cities, Noliba and Cusibis, he proceeded to the river Tagus. Here stood Toletum, a small city, but strong from its situation. While he was besieging this place, a numerous army of Vectonians came to relieve the Toletans, but he overthrew them in a general engagement, and having defeated the Vectonians, took Toletum by means of his works.
23. At this juncture the wars in which they were actually engaged, caused not so great anxiety in the minds of the senate, as the expectation of one with Antiochus, which had not yet commenced. For although, through their ambassadors, they had, from time to time, made careful inquiries into every particular, yet rumours, rashly propagated without authentic foundation, intermixed many falsehoods with the truth. Among the rest, a report was spread, that Antiochus intended, as soon as he should come into Aetolia, to send a fleet immediately into Sicily. The senate, therefore, though they had already despatched the praetor, Atilius, with a squadron to Greece, yet, considering that not only a military force, but also the influence of reputation, would be necessary towards securing the attachment of the allies, they sent into Greece, in quality of ambassadors, Titus Quinctius, Caius Octavius, Cneius Servilius, and Publius Villius; at the same time ordering, in their decree, that Marcus Baebius should lead forward his legions from Bruttium to Tarentum and Brundusium, so that, if occasion required, he might transport them thence into Macedonia. They also ordered, that Marcus Fulvius, the praetor, should send a fleet of thirty ships to protect the coast of Sicily; and that, whoever had the direction of that fleet, should be invested with supreme authority. To this commission was appointed Lucius Oppius Salinator, who had been plebeian aedile the year before. They likewise determined, that the same praetor should write to his colleague, Lucius Valerius, that "there was reason to apprehend that the ships of king Antiochus would pass over from Aetolia to Sicily; for which reason the senate judged it proper, that, in addition to the army which he then had, he should enlist tumultuary soldiers, to the number of twelve thousand foot and four hundred horse, with which he might be able to defend that coast of his province which lay next to Greece." This enlistment the praetor carried on, not only from Sicily, but from the circumjacent islands; and strengthened all the towns on the coast which lay opposite to Greece with garrisons. To the rumours already current, the arrival of Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, added confirmation, for he brought intelligence that king Antiochus had crossed the Hellespont with his army, and that the Aetolians were putting themselves into such a posture, that by the time of his arrival they would be in arms. Thanks were given to Eumenes, in his absence, and to Attalus, who was present; and there were decreed to him free lodgings and every accommodation; that he should be presented with two horses, two suits of horsemen's armour, vases of silver to a hundred pounds' weight, and of gold to twenty pounds.
24. As one messenger after another brought intelligence that the war was on the point of breaking out, it was judged expedient that consuls should be elected as soon as possible. Wherefore the senate passed a decree, that the praetor, Marcus Fulvius, should instantly despatch a letter to the consul, informing him, that it was the will of the senate that he should leave the command of the province and army to his lieutenant-generals, and return to Rome; and that, when on the road, he should send on before him an edict appointing the assemblies for the election of consuls. The consul complied with the letter; and having sent forward the edict, arrived at Rome. There was, this year also, a warm competition, three patricians suing for one place: Publius Cornelius Scipio, son to Cneius, who had suffered a disappointment the year before, Lucius Cornelius Scipio, and Cneius Manlius Vulso. The consulship was conferred on Publius Scipio, that it might appear that the honour had only been delayed, and not refused to a person of such character. The plebeian colleague, joined with him, was Manius Acilius Glabrio. Next day were created praetors, Lucius Aemilius Paulus, Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, Marcus Junius Brutus, Aulus Cornelius Mammula, Caius Livius, and Lucius Oppius; the two last, both of them, surnamed Salinator. This was the same Oppius who had conducted the fleet of thirty ships to Sicily. While the new magistrates were settling the distribution of their provinces, orders were despatched to Marcus Baebius to pass over, with all his forces, from Brundusium to Epirus, and to keep the army stationed near Apollonia; and Marcus Fulvius, city praetor, was commissioned to build fifty new quinqueremes.
25. Such were the precautions taken by the Roman people to guard against every attempt of Antiochus. At this time, Nabis did not procrastinate hostilities, but, with his utmost force, carried on the siege of Gythium; and, being incensed against the Achaeans, for having sent succours to the besieged, he ravaged their lands. The Achaeans would not venture to engage in war, until their ambassadors should come back from Rome, and acquaint them with the sentiments of the senate: but as soon as these returned, they summoned a council at Sicyon, and also sent deputies to Titus Quinctius to ask his advice. In the council, all the members were inclined to vote for an immediate declaration of war; but a letter from Titus Quinctius, in which he recommended waiting for the Roman praetor and fleet, caused some hesitation. While some of the principal members persisted in their first opinion, and others argued that they ought to follow the counsel of the person to whom they of themselves had applied for advice, the generality waited to hear the sentiments of Philopoemen. He was praetor of Achaia at the time, and surpassed all his contemporaries both in wisdom and influence. He first observed, that "it was a wise rule, established among the Achaeans, that their praetor, when he proposed a question concerning war, should not himself declare an opinion:" and then he desired them to "fix their determination among themselves as soon as possible;" assuring them, that "their praetor would faithfully and carefully carry their decrees into execution; and would use his best endeavours, that, as far as depended on human prudence, they should not repent either of peace or war." These words had more influence in inciting them to war, than if, by openly arguing in favour of it, he had betrayed an eager desire for the management of it. War was therefore unanimously resolved on: the time and mode of conducting it were left to the praetor without restriction. Philopoemen's own judgment, indeed, besides it being the opinion of Quinctius, pointed it out as best to wait for the Roman fleet, which might succour Gythium by sea; but fearing that the business would not endure delay, and that not only Gythium, but the party which had been sent to protect the city, would fall into the hands of the enemy, he drew out the ships of the Achaeans.
26. The tyrant also, with the view of cutting off any supplies that might be brought to the besieged by sea, had fitted out a small squadron, consisting of only three ships of war, with some barks and cutters, as his former fleet had been given up to the Romans, according to the treaty. In order to try the activity of these vessels, as they were then new, and, at the same time, to have every thing in fit condition for a battle, he put out to sea every day, and exercised both the rowers and marines in mock-fights; for he thought that all his hopes of succeeding in the siege depended on the circumstance of his cutting off all supplies by sea. The praetor of the Achaeans, in respect of skill for conducting operations on land, was equal to any of the most celebrated commanders both in capacity and experience, yet with naval affairs he was quite unacquainted. Being an inhabitant of Arcadia, an inland country, he was ignorant even of all foreign affairs, excepting that he had once served in Crete as commander of a body of auxiliaries. There was an old ship of four banks of oars, which had been taken eighty years before, as it was conveying Nicaea, the wife of Craterus, from Naupactum to Corinth. Led by the reputation of this ship, for it had formerly been reckoned a very famous vessel when in the king's fleet, he ordered it, though now quite rotten, and falling asunder through age, to be brought out from Aegium. The fleet sailed with this ship at its head, Tiso of Patrae, the commander, being on board it, when the ships of the Lacedaemonians from Gythium came within view. At the first shock, against a new and firm vessel, that old one, which before admitted the water through every joint, was shattered to pieces, and the whole crew were made prisoners. On the loss of the commander's ship, the rest of the fleet fled as fast as each could by means of its oars. Philopoemen himself made his escape in a light advice-boat, nor did he stop his flight until he arrived at Patrae. This untoward event did not in the least damp the spirit of a man so well versed in military affairs, and who had experienced so many vicissitudes of fortune. On the contrary, as he had failed of success in the naval line, in which he had no experience, he even conceived, thence, the greater hopes of succeeding in another, wherein he had acquired knowledge; and he affirmed, that he would quickly put an end to the tyrant's rejoicing.
27. Nabis, being both elated by this adventure, and entertaining a confident hope that he had not now any danger to apprehend from the sea, resolved to shut up the passages on the land also, by parties stationed in proper posts. With this view, he drew off a third part of his forces from the siege of Gythium, and encamped them at Pleiae, a place which commands both Leucae and Acriae, on the road by which the enemy's army seemed likely to advance. While his quarters were here, and very few of his men had tents, (the generality of them having formed huts of reeds interwoven, and which they covered with leaves of trees, to serve merely as a shelter,) Philopoemen, before he came within sight, resolved to surprise him by an attack of such a kind as he did not expect. He drew together some small ships in a remote creek, on the coast of the territory of Argos, and embarked on board them a body of light-armed soldiers, mostly targeteers, furnished with slings, javelins, and other light kinds of weapons. He then coasted along the shore, until he came to a promontory near Nabis's post. Here he landed; and made his way, by night, through paths with which he was well acquainted, to Pleiae, and while the sentinels were fast asleep, as being in no immediate apprehension, he set fire to the huts in every part of the camp. Great numbers perished in the flames before they could discover the enemy's arrival, and those who did discover it could give no assistance; so that nearly the whole was destroyed by fire and sword. From both these means of destruction, however, a very small number made their escape, and fled to the principal camp before Gythium. The enemy having been thus smitten with disaster, Philopoemen forthwith led on his forces to ravage the district of Tripolis, a part of the Lacedaemonian territory, lying next to the frontiers of the Megalopolitans, and carrying off thence a vast number of men and cattle, withdrew before the tyrant could send a force from Gythium to protect the country. He then collected his whole force at Tegea, to which place he summoned a council of the Achaeans and their allies; at which were present, also deputies from the Epirots and Acarnanians. Here it was resolved, that as the minds of his men were now sufficiently recovered from the shame of the disgrace suffered at sea, and those of the enemy dispirited, he should march directly to Lacedaemon; for he considered that by this measure alone could the enemy be drawn off from the siege of Gythium. On entering the enemy's country, he encamped the first day at Caryae; and, on that very day, Gythium was taken. Ignorant of that event, Philopoemen advanced to the Barbosthenes, a mountain ten miles from Lacedaemon. On the other side, Nabis, after taking possession of Gythium, set out, at the head of a body of light troops, marched hastily by Lacedaemon, and seized on a place called the Camp of Pyrrhus, which post he did not doubt that the Achaeans intended to occupy. From thence he proceeded to meet the enemy. From the length of their train in consequence of the narrowness of the road, they spread over a space of almost five miles. The line was closed by the cavalry and the greatest part of the auxiliaries, because Philopoemen expected that the tyrant would attack him in the rear with his mercenary troops, in whom he placed his principal confidence. Two unforeseen circumstances at once filled him with uneasiness: one, the post at which he aimed being pre-occupied; the other, the enemy having met him in front, where, as the road lay through very uneven ground, he did not see how the battalions could advance without the support of the light troops.
28. Philopoemen was possessed of an admirable degree of skill and experience, in conducting a march, and choosing his station; having made these points his principal study, not only in times of war, but likewise during peace. Whenever he was making a journey to any place and came to a defile where the passage was difficult, it was his practice, first, to examine the nature of the ground on every side. When journeying alone, he meditated within himself; if he had company, he asked them, "If an enemy should appear in that place, what course ought he to adopt, if they should attack him in front; what, if on this flank, or on that; what, if on the rear; for he might happen to meet them while his men were formed with a regular front, or when they were in the loose order of march, fit only for the road." He would proceed to examine, either in his own mind, or by asking questions, "What ground he himself would choose; what number of soldiers, or what kind of arms (which was a very material point) he ought to employ; where he should deposit the baggage, where the soldiers' necessaries, where the unarmed multitude; with what number and what kind of troops he should guard them, and whether it would be better to prosecute his march as intended, or to return back by the way he came; what spot, also, he should choose for his camp; how large a space he should enclose within the lines; where he could be conveniently supplied with water; where a sufficiency of forage and wood could be had; which would be his safest road on decamping next day, and in what form the army should march?" In such studies and inquiries he had, from his early years, so frequently exercised his thoughts, that, on any thing of the kind occurring, no expedient that could be devised was new to him. On this occasion, he first ordered the army to halt; then sent forward to the van the auxiliary Cretans, and the horsemen called Tarentines, each leading two spare horses; and, ordering the rest of the cavalry to follow, he seized on a rock which stood over a rivulet, from which he might be supplied with water. Here he collected together all the baggage with all the suttlers and followers of the army, placing a guard of soldiers round them; and then he fortified his camp, as the nature of the place required. The pitching of tents in such rugged and uneven ground was a difficult task. The enemy were distant not more than five hundred paces. Both drew water from the same rivulet, under escorts of light troops; but, before any skirmish took place, as usual between men encamped so near to each other, night came on. It was evident, however, that they must, unavoidably, fight next day at the rivulet, in support of the watering parties. Wherefore, during the night, Philopoemen concealed, in a valley remote from the view of the enemy, as great a number of targeteers as the place was capable of hiding.
29. At break of day, the Cretan light infantry and the Tarentine horse began an engagement on the bank of the rivulet. Telemnastus, a Cretan, commanded his countrymen; Lycortas of Megalopolis, the cavalry. The enemies' watering party also was guarded by Cretan auxiliaries and Tarentine horsemen. The fight was, for a considerable time, doubtful, as the troops on both sides were of the same kind and armed alike; but as the contest advanced, the tyrant's auxiliaries gained an advantage, both by their superiority of numbers, and because Philopoemen had given directions to his officers, that, after maintaining the contest for a short time they should betake themselves to flight, and draw the enemy on to the place of the ambuscade. The latter, pursuing the runaways, in disorderly haste, through the valley, were most of them wounded and slain, before they discovered their concealed foe. The targeteers had posted themselves in such order, as far as the breadth of the valley allowed, that they easily gave a passage to their flying friends, through openings in their ranks; then starting up themselves, hale, fresh, and in regular order, they briskly attacked the enemy, whose ranks were broken, who were scattered in confusion, and were, besides, exhausted with fatigue and wounds. The victory was no longer doubtful; the tyrant's troops instantly turned their backs, and flying with much more precipitation than they had pursued, were driven into their camp. Great numbers were killed and taken in the pursuit; and the consternation would have spread through the camp also, had not Philopoemen ordered a retreat to be sounded; for he dreaded the ground (which was rough and dangerous to advance on without caution) more than he did the enemy. Judging, both from the issue of the battle and from the disposition of the enemy's leader, in what apprehension he then was, he sent to him one of the auxiliary soldiers in the character of a deserter, to assure him positively, that the Achaeans had resolved to advance, next day, to the river Eurotas, which runs almost close to the walls, in order to intercept his way, so that the tyrant could have no retreat to the city when he required it, and to prevent any provisions being brought thence to the camp; and that they intended, at the same time, to try whether any could be prevailed on to desert his cause. Although the deserter did not gain entire credit, yet he afforded to one, who was full of apprehensions, a plausible pretext for leaving his camp. On the day following, he ordered Pythagoras, with the auxiliaries and cavalry, to mount guard before the rampart; and then, marching out himself with the main body of the army, as if intending to offer battle, he ordered them to return with all haste to the city.
30. When Philopoemen saw their army marching precipitately through a narrow and steep road, he sent all his cavalry, together with the Cretan auxiliaries, against the guard of the enemy, stationed in the front of their camp. These, seeing their adversaries approach, and perceiving that their friends had abandoned them, at first attempted to retreat within their works; but afterwards, when the whole force of the Achaeans advanced in order of battle, they were seized with fear, lest, together with the camp itself, they might be taken; they resolved, therefore, to follow the body of their army, which, by this time, had proceeded to a considerable distance in advance. Immediately, the targeteers of the Achaeans assailed and plundered the camp, and the rest set out in pursuit of the enemy. The road was such, that a body of men, even when undisturbed by any fear of a foe, could not, without difficulty, make its way through it. But when an attack was made on their rear, and the shouts of terror, raised by the affrighted troops behind, reached to the van, they threw down their arms, and fled, each for himself, in different directions, into the woods which lay on each side of the road. In an instant of time, the way was stopped up with heaps of weapons, particularly spears, which, falling mostly with their points towards the pursuers, formed a kind of palisade across the road. Philopoemen ordered the auxiliaries to push forward, whenever they could, in pursuit of the enemy, who would find it a difficult matter, the horsemen particularly, to continue their flight; while he himself led away the heavy troops through more open ground to the river Eurotas. There he pitched his camp a little before sun-set, and waited for the light troops which he had sent in chase of the enemy. These arrived at the first watch, and brought intelligence, that Nabis, with a few attendants, had made his way into the city, and that the rest of his army, unarmed and dispersed, were straggling through all parts of the woods; whereupon, he ordered them to refresh themselves, while he himself chose out a party of men, who, having come earlier into camp, were by this time, both recruited by food and a little rest; and, ordering them to carry nothing with them but their swords, he marched them out directly, and posted them in the roads which led from two of the gates, one towards Pherae, the other towards the Barbosthenes: for he supposed, that through these the flying enemy would make their retreat. Nor was he mistaken in that opinion; for the Lacedaemonians, as long as any light remained, retreated through the centre of the woods in the most retired paths. As soon as it grew dusk, and they saw lights in the enemy's camp, they kept themselves in paths concealed from view; but having passed it by, they then thought that all was safe, and came down into the open roads, where they were intercepted by the parties lying in wait; and there such numbers of them were killed and taken, that of the whole army scarcely a fourth part effected their escape. As the tyrant was now pent up within the city, Philopoemen employed the greatest part of thirty succeeding days in ravaging the lands of the Lacedaemonians; and then, after greatly reducing, and almost annihilating the strength of the tyrant, he returned home, while the Achaeans extolled him as equal in the glory of his services to the Roman general, and indeed, so far as regarded the war with Lacedaemon, even deemed him superior.
31. While the Achaeans and the tyrant were carrying on the war in this manner, the Roman ambassadors made a circuit through the cities of the allies; being anxious lest the Aetolians might seduce some of them to join the party of Antiochus. They took but little pains, in their applications to the Achaeans; because, knowing their animosity against Nabis, they thought that they might be safely relied on with regard to other matters. They went first to Athens, thence to Chalcis, thence to Thessaly; and, after addressing the Thessalians, in a full assembly, they directed their route to Demetrias, to which place a council of the Magnetians was summoned. There a more studied address required to be delivered; for a great many of the leading men were disaffected to the Romans, and entirely devoted to the interests of Antiochus and the Aetolians; because, at the time when accounts were received that Philip's son, who was a hostage, would be restored to him, and the tribute imposed on him remitted, among other groundless reports it had been given out, that the Romans also intended to restore Demetrias to him. Rather than that should take place, Eurylochus, a deputy of the Magnetians, and others of that faction, wished for a total change of measures to be effected by the coming of Antiochus and the Aetolians. In opposition to those, it was necessary to reason in such a manner, that, in dispelling their mistaken fear, the ambassadors should not, by cutting off his hopes at once, give any disgust to Philip, to whom more importance attached, in all respects, than to the Magnetians. They only observed to the assembly, that, "as Greece in general was under an obligation to the Romans for their kindness in restoring its liberty, so was their state in particular. For there had not only been a garrison of Macedonians in their capital, but a palace had been built in it, that they might have a master continually before their eyes. But all that had been done would be of no effect, if the Aetolians should bring thither Antiochus, and settle him in the abode of Philip, so that a new and unknown king should be set over them, in the place of an old one, with whom they had been long acquainted." Their chief magistrate is styled Magnetarch. This office was then held by Eurylochus, who assuming confidence from this powerful station, openly declared that he and the Magnetians saw no reason to dissemble their having heard the common report about the restoration of Demetrias to Philip; to prevent which, the Magnetians were bound to attempt and to hazard every thing; and, in the eagerness of discourse, he was carried to such an inconsiderate length, as to throw out, that, "at that very time Demetrias was only free in appearance; and that, in reality, all things were at the nod of the Romans." Immediately after this expression there was a general murmur of dissent in the assembly; some of whom showed their approbation, others expressed indignation at his presumption, in uttering it. As to Quinctius, he was so inflamed with anger, that, raising his hands towards heaven, he invoked the gods to witness the ungrateful and perfidious disposition of the Magnetians. This struck terror into the whole assembly; and one of the deputies, named Zeno, who had acquired a great degree of influence, by his judicious course of conduct in life, and by having been always an avowed supporter of the interests of the Romans, with tears besought Quinctius, and the other ambassadors, "not to impute to the state the madness of an individual. Every man," he said, "was answerable for his own absurdities. As to the Magnetians, they were indebted to Titus Quinctius and the Roman people, not only for liberty, but for every thing that mankind hold valuable or sacred. By their kindness, they were in the enjoyment of every blessing, for which they could ever petition the immortal gods; and, if struck with phrensy they would sooner vent their fury on their own persons, than violate the friendship with Rome."
32. His entreaties were seconded by the prayers of the whole assembly; on which Eurylochus retired hastily from the council, and passing to the gate through private streets fled away into Aetolia. As to the Aetolians, they now gave plainer indications of their intention to revolt every day; and it happened, that at this very time Thoas, one of their leading men, whom they had sent to Antiochus, returned, and brought back with him an ambassador from the king, named Menippus. These two, before the council met to give them audience, filled every one's ears with pompous accounts of the naval and land forces that were coming; "a vast army," they said, "of horse and foot was on its march from India; and, besides, that they were bringing such a quantity of gold and silver, as was sufficient to purchase the Romans themselves;" which latter circumstance they knew would influence the multitude more than any thing else. It was easy to foresee what effects these reports would produce in the council; for the Roman ambassadors received information of the arrival of those men, and of all their proceedings. And although the matter had almost come to a rupture, yet Quinctius thought it advisable, that some ambassadors of the allies should be present in that council, who might remind the Aetolians of their alliance with Rome, and who might have the courage to speak with freedom in opposition to the king's ambassador. The Athenians seemed to be the best qualified for this purpose, by reason of the high reputation of their state, and also from their long-standing alliance with the Aetolians. Quinctius, therefore, requested of them to send ambassadors to the Panaetolic council. At the first meeting, Thoas made a report of the business of his embassy. After him, Menippus was introduced, who said, that "it would have been best for all the Greeks, residing both in Greece and Asia, if Antiochus could have taken a part in their affairs, while the power of Philip was yet unbroken; for then every one would have had what of right belonged to him, and the whole would not have come under the dominion and absolute disposal of the Romans. But even as matters stand at present," said he, "provided you have constancy enough to carry into effect the measures which you have adopted, Antiochus will be able, with the assistance of the gods and the alliance of the Aetolians, to reinstate the affairs of Greece in their former rank of dignity, notwithstanding the low condition to which they have been reduced. But this dignity consists in a state of freedom which stands by its own resources, and is not dependent on the will of another." The Athenians, who were permitted to deliver their sentiments next after the king's ambassadors, omitting all mention of Antiochus, reminded the Aetolians of their alliance with Rome, and the benefits conferred by Titus Quinctius on the whole body of Greece; and admonished them, "not inconsiderately to break off that connexion by the undue precipitation of their counsels; that passionate and adventurous schemes, however flattering at first view, prove difficult in the execution, and disastrous in the issue; that as the Roman ambassadors, and among them Titus Quinctius, were within a small distance, it would be better, while all hostilities were as yet uncommenced, to discuss, in conference, any matters in dispute, than to rouse Europe and Asia to a dreadful war."
33. The multitude, ever fond of novelty, warmly espoused the cause of Antiochus, and gave their opinion, that the Romans should not even be admitted into the council; but, by the influence chiefly of the elder members, a vote was passed, that the council should give audience to the Romans. On being acquainted, by the Athenians, with this determination, Quinctius thought it desirable to go into Aetolia; for he thought that, "either he should be able to effect some change in their designs; or that it would be manifest to all mankind, that the blame of the war would lie on the Aetolians, and that the Romans would be warranted in taking arms by justice, and, in a manner, by necessity." On arriving there, Quinctius, in his discourse to the council, began with the first formation of the alliance between the Romans and the Aetolians, and enumerated how many times the faith of the treaty had been violated by them. He then enlarged a little on the rights of the states concerned in the dispute, and added, that, "notwithstanding, if they thought that they had any reasonable demand to make, it would surely be infinitely better to send ambassadors to Rome, whether they chose to argue the case or to make a request to the senate, than that the Roman people should enter the lists with Antiochus, while the Aetolians acted as marshals of the field; not without great disturbance to the affairs of the world, and to the utter ruin of Greece." That "no people would feel the fatal consequences of such a war sooner than the first promoters of it." This prediction of the Roman was disregarded. Thoas, and others of the same faction, were then heard with general approbation; and they prevailed so far, that, without adjourning the meeting, or waiting for the absence of the Romans, a decree was passed that Antiochus should be invited to vindicate the liberty of Greece, and decide the dispute between the Aetolians and the Romans. To the insolence of this decree, their praetor, Damocritus, added a personal affront: for on Quinctius asking him for a copy of the decree, without any respect to the dignity of the person to whom he spoke, he told him, that "he had, at present, more pressing business to despatch; but he would shortly give him the decree, and an answer, in Italy, from his camp on the banks of the Tiber." Such was the degree of madness which possessed, at that time, both the nation of the Aetolians and their magistrates.
34. Quinctius and the ambassadors returned to Corinth. The Aetolians, that they might appear to intend taking every step through Antiochus, and none directly of themselves, and, sitting inactive, to be waiting for the arrival of the king, though they did not, after the departure of the Romans, hold a council of the whole nation, yet endeavoured, by their Apocleti, (a more confidential council, composed of persons selected from the rest,) to devise schemes for setting Greece in commotion. It was well known to them all, that in the several states the principal people, particularly those of the best characters, were disposed to maintain the Roman alliance, and well pleased with the present state of affairs; but that the populace, and especially such as were not content with their position, wished for a general revolution. The Aetolians, at one day's sitting, formed a scheme, the very conception of which argued not only boldness, but impudence,—that of making themselves masters of Demetrias, Chalcis, and Lacedaemon. One of their principal men was sent to each of these places; Thoas to Chalcis, Alexamenus to Lacedaemon, Diodes to Demetrias. This last was assisted by the exile Eurylochus, whose flight, and the cause of it, have been mentioned above, because there was no other prospect of his restoration to his country. Eurylochus, by letter, instructed his friends and relations, and those of his own faction, to order his wife and children to assume a mourning dress: and, holding the badges of supplicants, to go into a full assembly, and to beseech each individual, and the whole body, not to suffer a man, who was innocent and uncondemned, to grow old in exile. The simple-minded were moved by compassion; the ill-disposed and seditious, by the hope of seeing all things thrown into confusion, in consequence of the tumults which the Aetolians would excite; and every one voted for his being recalled. These preparatory measures being effected, Diocles, at that time general of the horse, with all the cavalry, set out under pretext of escorting to his home the exile, who was his guest. Having, during that day and the following night, marched an extraordinary length of way, and arrived within six miles of the city at the first dawn, he chose out three troops, at the head of which he went on before the rest of the cavalry, whom he ordered to follow. When he came near the gate he made all his men dismount, and lead their horses by the reins, without keeping their ranks, but like travellers on a journey, in order that they might appear to be the retinue of the general, rather than a military force. Here he left one troop at the gate, lest the cavalry, who were coming up, might be shut out; and then, holding Eurylochus by the hand, conducted him to his house through the middle of the city and the forum, and through crowds who met and congratulated him. In a little time the city was filled with horsemen, and convenient posts were seized; and then parties were sent to the houses of persons of the opposite faction, to put them to death. In this manner Demetrias fell into the hands of the Aetolians.
35. At Lacedaemon, the city was not to be attempted by force, but the tyrant to be entrapped by stratagem. For though he had been stripped of the maritime towns by the Romans, and afterwards shut up within the walls of his city by the Achaeans, they supposed that whoever took the first opportunity of killing him would engross the whole thanks of the Lacedaemonians. The pretence which they had for sending to him, was, that he had long solicited assistance from them, since, by their advice, he had renewed the war. A thousand foot were put under the command of Alexamenus, with thirty horsemen, chosen from among the youth. These received a charge from Damocritus, the praetor, in the select council of the nation, mentioned above, "not to suppose that they were sent to a war with the Achaeans; or even on other business, which any one might ascertain to himself from his own conjectures. Whatever sudden enterprise circumstances might direct Alexamenus to undertake, that (however unexpected, rash, or daring) they were to hold themselves in readiness to execute with implicit obedience; and should understand that to be the matter, for the sole purpose of effecting which they had been sent abroad." With these men, thus pre-instructed, Alexamenus came to the tyrant, and, immediately on approaching him, filled him with hopes; telling him, that "Antiochus had already come over into Europe; that he would shortly be in Greece, and would cover the lands and seas with men and arms; that the Romans would find that they had not Philip to deal with: that the numbers of the horsemen, footmen, and ships, could not be reckoned; and that the train of elephants, by their mere appearance, would effectually daunt the enemy: that the Aetolians were prepared to come to Lacedaemon with their entire force, whenever occasion required; but that they wished to show the king, on his arrival, a numerous body of troops: that Nabis himself, likewise, ought to take care not to suffer his soldiers to be enervated by inaction, and dwelling in houses; but to lead them out, and make them perform their evolutions under arms, which, while it exercised their bodies, would also rouse their courage; that the labour would become lighter by practice, and might even be rendered not unpleasing by the affability and kindness of their commander." Thenceforward, the troops used frequently to be drawn out under the walls of the city, in a plain near the river Eurotas. The tyrant's life-guards were generally posted in the centre. He himself, attended by three horsemen at the most, of whom Alexamenus was commonly one, rode about in front, and went to view both wings to their extremities. On the right wing were the Aetolians; both those who had been before in his army as auxiliaries, and the thousand who came with Alexamenus. Alexamenus made it his custom to ride about with Nabis through a few of the ranks, offering such advice as seemed most suitable; then to join his own troops in the right wing; and presently after, as if having given the orders which the occasion might require, to return to the tyrant. But, on the day which he had fixed for the perpetration of the deed of death, after accompanying the tyrant for a little time, he withdrew to his own soldiers, and addressed the horsemen, sent from home with him, in these words: "Young men, that deed is now to be dared and done which you were ordered to execute valiantly under my guidance. Have your courage and your hands ready, that none may fail to second me in whatever he sees me attempt. If any one shall hesitate, and prefer any scheme of his own to mine, let him rest assured that there is no return to his home for him." Horror seized them all, and they well remembered the charge which they had received at setting out. The tyrant was now coming from the left wing. Alexamenus ordered his horsemen to rest their lances, and keep their eyes fixed on him; and in the mean time he himself recollected his spirits, which had been discomposed by the meditation of such a desperate attempt. As soon as the tyrant came near, he charged him; and driving his spear through his horse, brought the rider to the ground. The horsemen aimed their lances at him as he lay, and after many ineffectual strokes against his coat of mail, their points at length penetrated his body, so that, before relief could be sent from the centre, he expired.
36. Alexamenus, with all the Aetolians, hastened away, to seize on the palace. Nabis's life-guards were at first struck with horror, the act being perpetrated before their eyes; then, when they observed the Aetolian troops leaving the place, they gathered round the tyrant's body, where it was left, forming, instead of guardians of his life or avengers of his death, a mere group of spectators. Nor would any one have stirred, if Alexamenus had immediately called the people to an assembly, and, with his arms laid aside, there made a speech suitable to the occasion, and afterwards kept a good number of Aetolians in arms, without violence being offered to any one. Instead of which, by a fatality which ought to attend all designs founded in treachery, every step was taken that could tend to hasten the destruction of those who had committed it. The commander, shut up in the palace, wasted a day and a night in searching out the tyrant's treasures; and the Aetolians, as if they had stormed the city, of which they wished to be thought the deliverers, betook themselves to plunder. The insolence of their behaviour, and at the same time contempt of their numbers, gave the Lacedaemonians courage to assemble in a body, when some said, that they ought to drive out the Aetolians, and resume their liberty, which had been ravished from them at the very time when it seemed to be restored; others, that, for the sake of appearance, they ought to associate with them some one of the royal family, as the director of their efforts. There was a very young boy of that family, named Laconicus, who had been educated with the tyrant's children; him they mounted on a horse, and taking arms, slew all the Aetolians whom they met straggling through the city. They then assaulted the palace, where they killed Alexamenus, who, with a small party, attempted resistance. Others of the Aetolians, who had collected together round the Chalciaecon, that is, the brazen temple of Minerva, were cut to pieces. A few, throwing away their arms, fled, some to Tegea, others to Megalopolis, where they were seized by the magistrates, and sold as slaves. Philopoemen, as soon as he heard of the murder of the tyrant, went to Lacedaemon, where, finding all in confusion and consternation, he called together the principal inhabitants, to whom he addressed a discourse, (such as ought to have been made by Alexamenus,) and united the Lacedaemonians to the confederacy of the Achaeans. To this they were the more easily persuaded, because, at that very juncture, Aulus Atilius happened to arrive at Gythium with twenty-four quinqueremes.
37. Meanwhile, Thoas, in his attempt on Chalcis, had by no means the same good fortune as Eurylochus had in getting possession of Demetrias; although, (by the intervention of Euthymidas, a man of considerable consequence, who, after the arrival of Titus Quinctius and the ambassadors, had been banished by those who adhered to the Roman alliance; and also of Herodorus, who was a merchant of Cios, and who, by means of his wealth, possessed a powerful influence at Chalcis,) he had engaged a party, composed of Euthymidas's faction, to betray the city into his hands. Euthymidas went from Athens, where he had fixed his residence, first to Thebes, and thence to Salganea; Herodorus to Thronium. At a small distance, on the Malian bay, Thoas had two thousand foot and two hundred horse, with as many as thirty light transport ships. With these vessels, carrying six hundred footmen, Herodorus was ordered to sail to the island of Atalanta, that, as soon as he should perceive the land forces approaching Aulus and the Euripus, he might pass over from thence to Chalcis; to which place Thoas himself led the rest of his forces, marching mostly by night, and with all possible expedition.
38. Mictio and Xenoclides, who were now, since the banishment of Euthymidas, in possession of the supreme power, either of themselves suspected the matter, or received some information of it, and were at first so greatly terrified, that they saw no prospect of safety but in flight; but afterwards, when their fright subsided, and they considered that, by such a step, they would betray and desert not only their country, but the Roman alliance, they applied their minds to the following plan. It happened that, at that very time, there was a solemn anniversary festival, celebrated at Eretria, in honour of Diana Amarynthis, which was always attended by great numbers, not only of the natives, but also of the Carystians: thither they sent envoys to beseech the Eretrians and Carystians, "as having been born in the same isle, to compassionate their situation; and, at the same time, to show their regard to the friendship of Rome: not to suffer Chalcis to become the property of the Aetolians; that if they should possess Chalcis they would obtain possession of all Euboea: and to remind them, that they had found the Macedonians grievous masters, but that the Aetolians would be much more intolerable." The consideration of the Romans chiefly influenced those states, as they had lately experienced both their bravery in war, and their justice and liberality in success. Both states, therefore, armed, and sent the main strength of their young men. To these the people of Chalcis intrusted the defence of the walls, and they themselves, with their whole force, crossed the Euripus, and encamped at Salganea. From that place they despatched, first a herald, and afterwards ambassadors, to ask the Aetolians, for what word or act of theirs, friends and allies came thus to invade them. Thoas, commander of the Aetolians, answered, that "he came not to attack them, but to deliver them from the Romans; that they were fettered at present with a brighter chain indeed, but a much heavier one, than when they had a Macedonian garrison in their citadel." The men of Chalcis replied that "they were neither under bondage to any one, nor in need of the protection of any." The ambassadors then withdrew from the meeting, and returned to their countrymen. Thoas and the Aetolians (who had no other hopes than in a sudden surprise, and were by no means in a capacity to undertake a regular war, and the siege of a city so well secured against any attack from the land or the sea) returned home. Euthymidas, on hearing that his countrymen were encamped at Salganea, and that the Aetolians had retired, went back from Thebes to Athens. Herodorus, after waiting several days at Atalanta, attentively watching for the concerted signal in vain, sent an advice-boat to learn the cause of the delay; and, understanding that the enterprise was abandoned by his associates, returned to Thronium from whence he had come.
39. Quinctius, having been informed of these proceedings, came with the fleet from Corinth, and met Eumenes in the Euripus of Chalcis. It was agreed between them, that king Eumenes should leave there five hundred of his soldiers, for the purpose of a garrison, and should go himself to Athens. Quinctius proceeded to Demetrias, as he had purposed from the first, hoping that the relief of Chalcis would prove a strong inducement to the Magnetians to renew the alliance with Rome. And, in order that such of them as favoured his views might have some support at hand, he wrote to Eunomus, praetor of the Thessalians, to arm the youth; sending Villius forward to Demetrias, to sound the inclinations of the people: but not with a view to take any step in the business, unless a considerable number of them were disposed to revive the former treaty of amity. Villius, in a ship of five banks of oars, came to the mouth of the harbour, and the whole multitude of the Magnetians hastened out thither. Villius then asked, whether they chose that he should consider himself as having come to friends, or to enemies? Eurylochus, the Magnetarch, answered, that "he had come to friends; but desired him not to enter the harbour, but to suffer the Magnetians to live in freedom and harmony; and not to attempt, under the show of friendly converse, to seduce the minds of the populace." Then followed an altercation, not a conference, the Roman upbraiding the Magnetians with ingratitude, and forewarning them of the calamities impending over them; the multitude, on the other side, clamorously reproaching him, and reviling, sometimes the senate, sometimes Quinctius. Villius, therefore, unable to effect any part of his business, went back to Quinctius, who despatched orders to the Thessalian praetor, to lead his troops home, while himself returned with his ships to Corinth.
40. The affairs of Greece, blended with those of Rome, have carried me away, as it were, out of my course: not that they were in themselves deserving of a recital, but because they constituted the causes of the war with Antiochus. After the consular election, for thence I digressed, the consuls, Lucius Quinctius and Cneius Domitius, repaired to their provinces; Quinctius to Liguria, Domitius against the Boians. The Boians kept themselves quiet; nay, the senators, with their children, and the commanding officers of the cavalry, with their troops, amounting in all to one thousand five hundred, surrendered to the consul. The other consul laid waste the country of the Ligurians to a wide extent, and took some forts: in which expeditions he not only acquired booty of all sorts, together with many prisoners, but he also recovered several of his countrymen, and of the allies, who had been in the hands of the enemy. In this year a colony was settled at Vibo, in pursuance of a decree of the senate and an order of the people; three thousand seven hundred footmen, and three hundred horsemen, went out thither, conducted by the commissioners Quintus Naevius, Marcus Minucius, and Marcus Furius Crassipes. Fifteen acres of ground were assigned to each footman, double that quantity to a horseman. This land had been last in possession of the Bruttians, who had taken it from the Greeks. About this time two dreadful causes of alarm happened at Rome, one of which continued long, but was less active than the other. An earthquake lasted through thirty-eight days; during all which time there was a total cessation of business, amidst anxiety and fears. On account of this event, a supplication was performed of three days' continuance. The other was not a mere fright, but attended with the actual loss of many lives. In consequence of a fire breaking out in the cattle-market, the conflagration, among the houses near to the Tiber, continued through all that day and the following night, and all the shops, with wares of very great value, were reduced to ashes.
41. The year was now almost at an end, while the rumours of impending hostility, and, consequently, the anxiety of the senate, daily increased. They therefore set about adjusting the provinces of the magistrates elect, in order that they might be all the more intent on duty. They decreed, that those of the consuls should be Italy, and whatever other place the senate should vote, for every one knew that a war against Antiochus was now a settled point. That he, to whose lot the latter province fell, should have under his command,—of Roman citizens, four thousand foot and three hundred horse; and of the Latin confederates, six thousand foot and four hundred horse. The consul, Lucius Quinctius, was ordered to levy these troops, that no delay might be occasioned, but that the new consul might be able to proceed immediately to any place which the senate should appoint. Concerning the provinces of the praetors, also, it was decreed, that the first lot should comprehend the two jurisdictions, both that between natives, and that between them and foreigners; the second should be Bruttium; the third, the fleet, to sail wherever the senate should direct; the fourth, Sicily; the fifth, Sardinia; the sixth, Farther Spain. An order was also given to the consul Lucius Quinctius, to levy two new legions of Roman citizens, and of the allies and Latins twenty thousand foot and eight hundred horse. This army they assigned to the praetor to whom should fall the province of Bruttium. Two temples were dedicated this year to Jupiter in the Capitol; one of which had been vowed by Lucius Furius Purpureo, when praetor during the Gallic war; the other by the same, when consul. Quintus Marcius Ralla, duumvir, dedicated both. Many severe sentences were passed this year on usurers, who were prosecuted, as private persons, by the curule aediles, Marcus Tuccius and Publius Junius Brutus. Out of the fines imposed on those who were convicted, gilded chariots, with four horses, were placed in the recess of Jupiter's temple in the Capitol, over the canopy of the shrine, and also twelve gilded bucklers. The same aediles built a portico on the outside of the Triple Gate, in the Carpenters' Square.
42. While the Romans were busily employed in preparing for a new war, Antiochus, on his part, was not idle. Three cities detained him some time, Smyrna, Alexandria in Troas, and Lampsacus, which hitherto he had not been able either to reduce by force, or to persuade into a treaty of amity; and he was unwilling, on going into Europe, to leave these behind (as enemies). A deliberation also respecting Hannibal occasioned him further delay. First, the open ships, which the king was to have sent with him to Africa, were slowly prepared, and afterwards a consultation was set on foot whether he ought to be sent at all, chiefly by Thoas the Aetolian; who, after setting all Greece in commotion, came with the account of Demetrias being in the hands of his countrymen; and as he had, by false representations concerning the king, and multiplying, in his assertions, the numbers of his forces, exalted the expectations of many in Greece; so now, by the same artifices, he puffed up the hopes of the king; telling him, that "every one was inviting him with their prayers, and that there would be a general rush to the shore, from which the people could catch a view of the royal fleet." He even had the audacity to attempt altering the king's judgment respecting Hannibal when it was nearly settled. For he alleged, that "the fleet ought not to be weakened by sending away any part of it, but that if ships must be sent no person was less fit for the command than Hannibal, for he was an exile and a Carthaginian, to whom his own circumstances or his disposition might daily suggest a thousand new schemes. Then as to his military fame, by which, as by a dowry, he was recommended to notice, it was too splendid for an officer acting under a king. The king ought to be the grand object of view; the king ought to appear the sole leader, the sole commander. If Hannibal should lose a fleet or an army the amount of the damage would be the same as if the loss were incurred by any other general; but should success be obtained, all the honour would be ascribed to Hannibal, and not to Antiochus. Besides, if the war should prove so fortunate as to terminate finally in the defeat of the Romans, could it be expected that Hannibal would live under a king; subject, in short, to an individual; he who could scarcely bear subjection to his own country? That he had not so conducted himself from early youth, having embraced the empire of the globe in his hopes and aspirations, that in his old age he would be likely to endure a master. The king wanted not Hannibal as a general: as an attendant and a counsellor in the business of the war, he might properly employ him. A moderate use of such abilities would be neither unprofitable nor dangerous; but if advantages of the highest nature were sought through him, they, probably, would be the destruction both of the giver and the receiver."
43. There are no dispositions more prone to envy than those of persons whose mental qualifications are inferior to their birth and rank in life; because they are indignant both at the merit and the possessions of another. The design of the expedition, to be commanded by Hannibal, the only one thought of that could be of use, in the beginning of the war, was immediately laid aside. The king, highly flattered by the defection of Demetrias from the Romans to the Aetolians, resolved to delay no longer his departure into Greece. Before the fleet weighed anchor he went up from the shore to Ilium, to offer sacrifice to Minerva. Immediately on his return he set sail with forty decked ships and sixty open ones, followed by two hundred transports, laden with provisions and warlike stores. He first touched at the island of Imbrus; thence he passed over to Sciathus; whence, after collecting the ships which had been separated during the voyage, he proceeded to Pteleum, toe nearest part of the continent. Here, Eurylochus the Magnetarch, and other principal Magnetians from Demetrias, met him. Being greatly gratified by their numerous appearance, he carried his fleet the next day into the harbour of their city. At a small distance from the town he landed his forces, which consisted of ten thousand foot, five hundred horse, and six elephants; a force scarcely sufficient to take possession of Greece alone, much less to sustain a war with Rome. The Aetolians, as soon as they were informed of Antiochus's arrival at Demetrias, convened a general council, and passed a decree, inviting him into their country. The king had already left Demetrias, (for he knew that such a decree was to be passed,) and had advanced as far as Phalara on the Malian bay. Here the decree was presented to him, and then he proceeded to Lamia, where he was received by the populace with marks of the warmest attachment, with clapping of hands and shouting, and other signs by which the extravagant joy of the vulgar is testified.
44. When he came into the council he was introduced by Phaeneas, the praetor, and other persons of eminence, who, with difficulty, made way for him through the crowd. Then, silence being ordered, the king addressed himself to the assembly. He began with accounting for his having come with a force so much smaller than every one had hoped and expected. "That," he said, "ought to be deemed the strongest proof of the warmth of his good-will towards them; because, though he was not sufficiently prepared in any particular, and though the season was yet too early for sailing, he had, without hesitation, complied with the call of their ambassadors, and had believed that when the Aetolians should see him among them they would be satisfied that in him, even if he were unattended, they might be sure of every kind of support. But he would also abundantly fulfil the hopes of those, whose expectations seemed at present to be disappointed. For as soon as the season of the year rendered navigation safe, he would cover all Greece with arms, men, and horses, and all its coasts with fleets. He would spare neither expense, nor labour, nor danger, until he should remove the Roman yoke from their necks, and render Greece really free, and the Aetolians the first among its states. That, together with the armies, stores of all kinds were to come from Asia. For the present the Aetolians ought to take care that his men might be properly supplied with corn, and other accommodations, at reasonable rates."
45. Having addressed them to this purport, and with universal approbation, the king withdrew. After his departure a warm debate ensued between two of the Aetolian chiefs, Phaeneas and Thoas. Phaeneas declared his opinion, that it would be better to employ Antiochus, as a mediator of peace, and an umpire respecting the matters in dispute with the Roman people, than as leader in a war. That "his presence and his dignified station would impress the Romans with awe, more powerfully than his arms. That in many cases men, for the sake of avoiding war, voluntarily remit pretensions, which force and arms would never compel them to forego." Thoas, on the other hand, insisted, that "Phaeneas's motive was not a love of peace, but a wish to embarrass their preparations for war, with the view that, through the tediousness of the proceedings, the king's vigour might be relaxed and the Romans gain time to put themselves in readiness. That they had abundant proof from experience, after so many embassies sent to Rome, and so many conferences with Quinctius in person, that nothing reasonable could ever be obtained from the Romans in the way of negotiation; and that they would not, until every hope of that sort was out of sight, have implored the aid of Antiochus. That as he had appeared among them sooner than any had expected, they ought not to sink into indolence, but rather to petition the king, that since he had come in person, which was the great point of all, to support the rights of Greece, he would also send for his fleets and armies. For the king, at the head of an army, might obtain something, but without that could have very little influence with the Romans, either in the cause of the Aetolians, or even in his own." This opinion was adopted, and the council voted, that the title of general should be conferred on the king. They also nominated thirty distinguished men with whom he might deliberate on any business which he might think proper.—The council was then broken up, and all went home to their respective states.
46. Next day the king held a consultation with their select council, respecting the place from whence his operations should commence. They judged it best to make the first trial on Chalcis, which had lately been attempted in vain by the Aetolians; and they thought that the business required rather expedition than any great exertion or preparation. Accordingly the king, with a thousand foot, who had followed him from Demetrias, took his route through Phocis; and the Aetolian chiefs, going by another road, met at Cheronaea a small number of their young men whom they had called to arms, and thence, in ten decked ships, proceeded after him. Antiochus pitched his camp at Salganea, while himself, with the Aetolian chiefs, crossed the Euripus in the ships. When he had advanced a little way from the harbour, the magistrates and other chief men of Chalcis came out before their gate. A small number from each side met to confer together. The Aetolians warmly recommended to the others, "without violating the friendship subsisting between them and the Romans, to receive the king also as a friend and ally; for that he had crossed into Europe not for the purpose of making war, but of vindicating the liberty of Greece; and of vindicating it in reality, not in words and pretence merely, as the Romans had done. Nothing could be more advantageous to the states of Greece than to embrace the alliance of both, as they would then be always secure against ill-treatment from either, under the guarantee and protection of the other. If they refuse to receive the king, they ought to consider what they would have immediately to suffer; the aid of the Romans being far distant, and Antiochus, whom with their own strength they could not possibly resist, in character of an enemy at their gates." To this Mictio, one of the Chalcian deputies, answered that "he wondered who those people were, for the vindicating of whose liberty Antiochus had left his own kingdom, and come over into Europe. For his part he knew not any state in Greece which either contained a garrison, or paid tribute to the Romans, or was bound by a disadvantageous treaty, and obliged to submit to terms which it did not like. The people of Chalcis, therefore, stood not in need, either of any assertor of their liberty, which they already enjoyed, or of any armed protector, since, through the kindness of the Roman people, they were in possession of both liberty and peace. They did not slight the friendship of the king, nor that of the Aetolians themselves. The first instance of friendship, therefore, that they could give, would be to quit the island and go home; for, as to themselves, they were fully determined not only not to admit them within their walls, but not even to agree to any alliance, but with the approbation of the Romans."
47. When an account of this conference was brought to the king, at the ships where he had staid, he resolved for the present to return to Demetrias; for he had not come to them with a sufficient number of men to attempt any thing by force. At Demetrias he held another consultation with the Aetolians, to determine what was next to be done, as their first effort had proved fruitless. It was agreed that they should make trial of the Botians, Achaeans, and Amynander, king of the Athamanians. The Boeotianan nation they believed to have been disaffected to the Romans, ever since the death of Brachyllas, and the consequences which followed it. Philopoemen, chief of the Achaeans, they supposed to hate, and be hated by, Quinctius, in consequence of a rivalship for fame in the war of Laconia. Amynander had married Apama, daughter of a Megalopolitan, called Alexander, who, pretending to be descended from Alexander the Great, had given the names of Philip and Alexander to his two sons, and that of Apama to his daughter; and when she was raised to distinction, by her marriage to the king, Philip, the elder of her brothers had followed her into Athamania. This man, who happened to be naturally vain, then Aetolians and Antiochus persuaded to hope (as he was really of the royal family) for the sovereignty of Macedonia, on condition of his prevailing on Amynander and the Athamanians to join Antiochus; and these empty promises produced the intended effect, not only on Philip but likewise on Amynander.
48. In Achaia, the ambassadors of Antiochus and the Aetolians were admitted to an audience of the council at Aegium, in the presence of Titus Quinctius. The ambassador of Antiochus was heard prior to the Aetolians. He, with all that pomp and parade which is common among those who are maintained by the wealth of kings, covered, as far as the empty sound of words could go, both lands and seas (with forces). He said, that "an innumerable body of cavalry was coming over the Hellespont into Europe; some of them cased in coats of mail, whom they call Cataphracti; others discharging arrows on horseback; and, what rendered it impossible to guard against them, shooting with the surest aim even when their backs were turned, and their horses in full retreat. To this army of cavalry, sufficient to crush the forces of all Europe, collected into one body," he added another of infantry of many times its number; and to terrify them, repeated the names of nations scarcely ever heard of before: talking of Dahans, Medes, Elymaeans, and Cadusians. "As to the naval forces, no harbours in Greece were capable of containing them; the right squadron was composed of Sidonians and Tyrians; the left of Aradians and Sidetians, from Pamphylia.—nations which none others had ever equalled, either in courage, or skill in sea affairs. Then, as to money, and other requisites for the support of war, it was needless for him to speak. They themselves knew, that the kingdoms of Asia had always abounded in gold. The Romans, therefore, had not now to deal with Philip, or with Hannibal; the one a principal member of a commonwealth, the other confined merely to the limits of the kingdom of Macedonia; but with the great monarch of all Asia, and part of Europe. Nevertheless, though he had come from the remotest bounds of the East to give freedom to Greece, he did not demand any thing from the Achaeans, that could injure the fidelity of their engagements with the Romans, their former friends and allies. For he did not require them to take arms on his side against them; but only, that they should not join themselves to either party. That, as became common friends, they should wish for peace to both parties, and not intermeddle in the war." Archidamus, ambassador of the Aetolians, made nearly the same request: that, as was their easiest and safest way, they should stand neuter; and, as mere spectators of the war, wait for the decision of the fortunes of others, without any hazard to their own interests. He afterwards was betrayed, by the intemperance of language, into invectives, sometimes against the Romans in general, sometimes against Quinctius himself in particular; charging them with ingratitude, and upbraiding them, as being indebted to the valour of the Aetolians, not only for the victory over Philip, but even for their preservation; for, "by their exertions, both Quinctius himself and his army had been saved. What duty of a commander had he ever discharged? He used to see him, indeed, in the field, taking auspices; sacrificing, and offering vows, like an insignificant soothsaying priest; while he himself was, in his defence, exposing his person to the weapons of the enemy."
49. To this Quinctius replied, that "Archidamus had calculated his discourse for the numerous auditors, rather than for the persons to whom it was particularly addressed. For the Achaeans very well knew, that the bold spirit of the Aetolians consisted entirely in words, not in deeds; and was more displayed in their councils and assemblies than in the field. He had therefore been indifferent concerning the sentiments of the Achaeans, to whom he and his countrymen were conscious that they were thoroughly known; and studied to recommend himself to the king's ambassadors, and, through them, to their absent master. But, if any person had been hitherto ignorant of the cause which had united Antiochus and the Aetolians, it was easy to discover it from the language of their ambassadors. By the false representations made by both parties, and boasts of strength which neither possessed, they mutually puffed up each other; and were themselves puffed up with vain expectations: one party talking of Philip being vanquished by them, the Romans being protected by their valour, and the rest of what you have just heard; and that you, and the other states and nations, would follow their party. The king, on the other side, boasting of clouds of horsemen and footmen, and covering the seas with his fleets. The king," he added, "was exceedingly like a supper that I remember at the house of my host at Chalcis, who is both a man of worth, and an excellent conductor of a feast. Having been kindly entertained by him at midsummer, when we wondered how he could, at that time of the year, procure such plenty and variety of game, he, not being so vain-glorious as these men, told us, with a pleasant smile, that the variety was owing to the dressing, and that what appeared to be the flesh of many different wild animals, was entirely of tame swine. This may be aptly applied to the forces of the king, which were so ostentatiously displayed a while ago; that those various kinds of armour, and multitudinous names of nations, never heard of before, Dahans, and Medes, and Caducians, and Elymaeans, are nothing more than Syrians, a race possessed of such grovelling souls, as to be much fitter for slaves than for soldiers. I wish, Achaeans, that I could exhibit to your view the rapid excursions of this mighty monarch from Demetrias; first, to Lamia, to the council of the Aetolians; then to Chalcis. You should behold, in the royal camp, about the number of two small legions, and these incomplete. You should see the king, now, in a manner begging corn from the Aetolians, to be measured out to his soldiers; then, striving to borrow money at interest to pay them; again, standing at the gates of Chalcis, and presently, on being refused admittance, returning thence into Aetolia, without having effected any thing, except indeed the taking a peep at Aulis and the Euripus. Both Antiochus had done wrong in trusting to the Aetolians, and the Aetolians in trusting to the king's vain boastings. For which reason, you ought the less to be deceived by them, and rather to confide in the tried and approved fidelity of the Romans. For, with respect to your not interfering in the war, which they recommend as your best course, nothing, in fact, can be more contrary to your interest: for then, without gaining thanks or esteem, you will become the prize of the conqueror."
50. He was thought to have replied to both by no means unsuitably; and there was no difficulty in bringing an audience, prepossessed in his favour, to give their approbation to his discourse. In fact, there was no debate or doubt started, but all concurred in voting, that the nation of the Achaeans would regard, as their friends or foes, those who were judged to be such by the Roman people, and in ordering war to be declared against both Antiochus and the Aetolians. They also, by the direction of Quinctius, sent immediate succours of five hundred men to Chalcis, and five hundred to the Piraeus; for affairs at Athens were in a state not far from a civil war, in consequence of the endeavours, used by some, to seduce the venal populace, by hopes of largesses, to take part with Antiochus. But at length Quinctius was called thither by those who were of the Roman party; and Apollodorus, the principal adviser of a revolt, being publicly charged therewith by one Leon, was condemned and driven into exile. Thus, from the Achaeans also, the embassy returned to the king with a discouraging answer. The Boeotians made no definitive reply; they only said, that "when Antiochus should come into Boeotia, they would then deliberate on the measures proper to be pursued." When Antiochus heard, that both the Achaeans and king Eumenes had sent reinforcements to Chalcis, he resolved to act with the utmost expedition, that his troops might get the start of them, and, if possible, intercept the others as they came; and he sent thither Menippus with about three thousand soldiers, and Polyxenidas with the whole fleet. In a few days after, he marched himself, at the head of six thousand of his own soldiers, and a smaller number of Aetolians, as many as could be collected in haste, out of those who were at Lamia. The five hundred Achaeans, and a small party sent by king Eumenes, being guided by Xenoclides, of Chalcis, (the roads being yet open,) crossed the Euripus, and arrived at Chalcis in safety. The Roman soldiers, who were likewise about five hundred, came, after Menippus had fixed his camp under Salganea, at Hermaeus, the place of passage from Boeotia to the island of Euboea. They had with them Mictio, who had been sent from Chalcis to Quinctius, deputed to solicit that very reinforcement; and when he perceived that the passes were blocked up by the enemy, he quitted the road to Aulis, and turned away to Delium, with intent to pass over thence to Euboea.
51. Delium is a temple of Apollo, standing over the sea five miles distant from Tanagra; and the passage thence, to the nearest part of Euboea, is less than four miles. As they were in this sacred building and grove, sanctified with all that religious awe and those privileges which belong to temples, called by the Greeks asylums, (war not being yet either proclaimed, or so far commenced as that they had heard of swords being drawn, or blood shed any where,) the soldiers in perfect tranquillity, amused themselves, some with viewing the temple and groves; others with walking about unarmed, on the strand; and a great part had gone different ways in quest of wood and forage; when, on a sudden, Menippus attacked them in that scattered condition, slew many, and took fifty of them prisoners. Very few made their escape, among whom was Mictio, who was received on board a small trading vessel. Though this event caused much grief to Quinctius and the Romans, on account of the loss of their men, yet it seemed to add much to the justification of their cause in making war on Antiochus. Antiochus, when arrived with his army so near as Aulis, sent again to Chalcis a deputation, composed partly of his own people, and partly of Aetolians, to treat on the same grounds as before, but with heavier denunciations of vengeance: and, notwithstanding all the efforts of Mictio and Xenoclides to the contrary, he easily gained his object, that the gates should be opened to him. Those who adhered to the Roman interest, on the approach of the king, withdrew from the city. The soldiers of the Achaeans, and Eumenes, held Salganea; and the few Romans, who had escaped, raised, for the security of the place, a little fort on the Euripus. Menippus laid siege to Salganea, and the king himself to the fort. The Achaeans and Eumenes' soldiers first surrendered, on the terms of being allowed to retire in safety. The Romans defended the Euripus with more obstinacy. But even these, when they were completely invested both by land and sea, and saw the machines and engines prepared for an assault, sustained the siege no longer. The king, having thus got possession of the capital of Euboea, the other cities of the island did not even refuse to obey his authority; and he seemed to himself to have signalized the commencement of the war by an important acquisition, in having brought under his power so great an island, and so many cities conveniently situated.
BOOK XXXVI.
Manius Acilius Glabrio, the consul, aided by king Philip, defeats Antiochus at Thermopylae, and drives him out of Greece; reduces the Aetolians to sue for peace. Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica reduces the Boian Gauls to submission. Sea-fight between the Roman fleet and that of Antiochus, in which the Romans are victorious.
1. Publius Cornelius Scipio, son of Cneius, and Manius Acilius Glabrio, the consuls, on their assuming the administration, were ordered by the senate, before they settled any thing respecting their provinces, to perform sacrifices, with victims of the greater kinds, at all the shrines, where the Lectisternium was usually celebrated for the greater part of the year; and to offer prayers, that the business which the state had in contemplation, concerning a new war, might terminate prosperously and happily for the senate and people of Rome. At every one of those sacrifices, appearances were favourable, and the propitious omens were found in the first victims. Accordingly, the auspices gave this answer:—That, by this war, the boundaries of the Roman empire would be enlarged; and that victory and triumph were portended. When this answer was reported, the senate, having their minds now freed from superstitious fears, ordered this question to be proposed to the people; "Was it their will, and did they order, that war should be undertaken against king Antiochus, and all who should join his party?" And that if that order passed, then the consuls were, if they thought proper, to lay the business entire before the senate. Publius Cornelius got the order passed; and then the senate decreed, that the consuls should cast lots for the provinces of Italy and Greece; that he to whose lot Greece fell, should, in addition to the number of soldiers enlisted and raised from the allies by Quinctius for that province, pursuant to a decree of the senate, take under his command that army, which, in the preceding year, Marcus Baebius, praetor, had, by order of the senate, carried over to Macedonia. Permission was also granted him, to receive succours from the allies, out of Italy, if circumstances should so require, provided their number did not exceed five thousand. It was resolved, that Lucius Quinctius, consul of the former year, should be commissioned as a lieutenant-general in that war. The other consul, to whom Italy fell, was ordered to carry on the war with the Boians, with whichever he should choose of the two armies commanded by the consuls of the last year; and to send the other to Rome; and these were ordered to be the city legions, and ready to march to whatever place the senate should direct.
2. Things being thus adjusted in the senate, excepting the assignment of his particular province to each of the magistrates, the consuls were ordered to cast lots. Greece fell to Acilius, Italy to Cornelius. The lot of each being now determined, the senate passed a decree, that "inasmuch as the Roman people had, at that time, ordered war to be declared against king Antiochus, and those who were under his government, the consuls should command a supplication to be performed, on account of that business; and that Manius Acilius, the consul, should vow the great games to Jupiter, and offerings at all the shrines." This vow was made by the consul in these words, which were dictated by Publius Licinius, chief pontiff: "If the war, which the people has ordered to be undertaken against king Antiochus, shall be concluded agreeably to the wishes of the senate and people of Rome, then, O Jupiter, the Roman people will, through ten successive days, exhibit the great games in honour of thee, and offerings shall be presented at all the shrines, of such value as the senate shall direct. Whatever magistrate shall celebrate those games, and at whatever time and place, let the celebration be deemed proper, and the offerings rightly and duly made." The two consuls then proclaimed a supplication for two days. When the consuls had determined their provinces by lot, the praetors, likewise, immediately cast lots for theirs. The two civil jurisdictions fell to Marcus Junius Brutus; Bruttium, to Aulus Cornelius Mammula; Sicily, to Marcus Aemilius Lepidus; Sardinia, to Lucius Oppius Salinator; the fleet, to Caius Livius Salinator; and Farther Spain, to Lucius Aemilius Paullus. The troops for these were settled thus:—to Aulus Cornelius were assigned the new soldiers, raised last year by Lucius Quinctius, the consul, pursuant to the senate's decree; and he was ordered to defend the whole coast near Tarentum and Brundusium. Lucius Aemilius Paullus was directed to take with him into Farther Spain, (to fill up the numbers of the army, which he was to receive from Marcus Fulvius, propraetor,) three thousand new-raised foot and three hundred horse, of whom two-thirds should be Latin allies, and the other third Roman citizens. An equal reinforcement was sent to Hither Spain to Caius Flaminius, who was continued in command. Marcus Aemilius Lepidus was ordered to receive both the province and army from Lucius Valerius, whom he was to succeed; and, if he thought proper, to retain Lucius Valerius, as propraetor, in the province, which he was to divide with him in such a manner, that one division should reach from Agrigentum to Pachynum, and the other from Pachynum to Tyndarium, and the sea-coasts whereof Lucius Valerius was to protect with a fleet of twenty ships of war. The same praetor received a charge to levy two-tenths of corn, and to take care that it should be carried to the coast, and thence conveyed into Greece. Lucius Oppius was likewise commanded to levy a second tenth in Sardinia; but it was resolved that it should be transported, not into Greece, but to Rome. Caius Livius, the praetor, whose lot was the command of the fleet, was ordered to sail, at the earliest time possible, to Greece with thirty ships, which were ready, and to receive the other fleet from Atilius. The praetor, Marcus Junius, was commissioned to refit and arm the old ships which were in the dock-yards; and, for this fleet, to enlist the sons of freemen as crews.
3. Commissaries were sent into Africa, three to Carthage, and a like number to Numidia, to procure corn to be carried into Greece; for which the Roman people were to pay the value. And so attentive was the state to the making of every preparation and provision necessary for the carrying on of this war, that the consul, Publius Cornelius, published an edict, that "no senator, nor any who had the privilege of giving an opinion in the senate, nor any of the inferior magistrates, should go so far from the city of Rome as that they could not return the same day; and that five senators should not be absent from the city at the same time." A dispute which arose with the maritime colonies, for some time retarded Caius Livius, the praetor, when actively engaged in fitting out the fleet. For, when they were impressed for manning the ships, they appealed to the tribunes of the people, by whom the cause was referred to the senate. The senate, without one dissenting voice, resolved, that those colonies were not entitled to exemption from the sea-service. The colonies which disputed with the praetor on the subject of exemption were, Ostia, Fregenae, Castrumnovum, Pyrgi, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, and Sinuessa. The consul, Manius Acilius, then, by direction of the senate, consulted the college of heralds, "whether a declaration of war should be made to Antiochus in person, or whether it would be sufficient to declare it at some garrison town; whether they directed a separate declaration against the Aetolians, and whether their alliance and friendship ought not to be renounced before war was declared." The heralds answered, that "they had given their judgment before, when they were consulted respecting Philip, that it was of no consequence whether the declaration were made to himself in person, or at one of his garrisons. That, in their opinion, friendship had been already renounced; because, after their ambassadors had so often demanded restitution, the Aetolians had not thought proper to make either restitution or apology. That these, by their own act, had made a declaration of war against themselves, when they seized, by force, Demetrias, a city in alliance with Rome; when they laid siege to Chalcis by land and sea; and brought king Antiochus into Europe, to make war on the Romans." Every preparatory measure being now completed, the consul, Manius Acilius, issued an edict, that the "soldiers enlisted, or raised from among the allies by Titus Quinctius, and who were under orders to go with him to his province; as, likewise, the military tribunes of the first and third legions, should assemble at Brundusium, on the ides of May.[1]" He himself, on the fifth before the nones of May,[2] set out from the city in his military robe of command. At the same time the praetors, likewise, departed for their respective provinces.
[Footnote 1: 15th May.]
[Footnote 2: 3rd May.]
4. A little before this time, ambassadors came to Rome from the two kings, Philip of Macedonia and Ptolemy of Egypt, offering aid of men, money, and corn towards the support of the war. From Ptolemy was brought a thousand pounds' weight of gold, and twenty thousand pounds' weight of silver. None of this was accepted. Thanks were returned to the kings. Both of them offered to come, with their whole force, into Aetolia. Ptolemy was excused from that trouble; and Philip's ambassadors were answered, that the senate and people of Rome would consider it as a kindness if he should lend his assistance to the consul, Manius Acilius. Ambassadors came, likewise from the Carthaginians, and from king Masinissa. The Carthaginians made an offer of sending a thousand pecks[1] of wheat, and five hundred thousand of barley to the army, and half that quantity to Rome; which they requested the Romans to accept from them as a present. They also offered to fit out a fleet at their own expense, and to give in, immediately, the whole amount of the annual tribute-money which they were bound to pay for many years to come. The ambassadors of Masinissa promised, that their king should send five hundred thousand pecks of wheat, and three hundred thousand of barley, to the army in Greece, and three hundred thousand of wheat, and two hundred and fifty thousand of barley, to Rome; also five hundred horse, and twenty elephants, to the consul Acilius. The answer given to both, with regard to the corn, was, that the Roman people would make use of it, provided they would receive payment for the same. With regard to the fleet offered by the Carthaginians, no more was accepted than such ships as they owed by treaty; and, as to the money, they were told, that none would be taken before the regular days of payment.
[Footnote 1: Here is, doubtless, some word dropped in the original; so small a quantity could never have been deemed an object for one powerful state to offer to another. Commentators suppose it to have been one hundred thousand.]
5. While these things were occurring at Rome, Antiochus, during the winter season at Chalcis, endeavoured to bring over several of the states by ambassadors sent among them; while many of their own accord sent deputies to him; as the Epirots, by the general voice of the nation, and the Eleans from Peloponnesus. The Eleans requested aid against the Achaeans; for they supposed, that, since the war had been declared against Antiochus contrary to their judgment, the Achaeans would first turn their arms against them. One thousand foot were sent to them, under the command of Euphanes, a Cretan. The embassy of the Epirots showed no mark whatever of a liberal or candid disposition. They wished to ingratiate themselves with the king; but, at the same time, to avoid giving cause of displeasure to the Romans. They requested him, "not hastily to make them a party in the dispute, exposed, as they were, opposite to Italy, and in the front of Greece, where they must necessarily undergo the first assaults of the Romans. If he himself, with his land and sea forces, could take charge of Epirus, the inhabitants would eagerly receive him in all their ports and cities. But if circumstances allowed him not to do that, then they earnestly entreated him not to subject them, naked and defenceless, to the arms of the Romans." Their intention in sending him this message evidently was, that if he declined going into Epirus, which they rather supposed would be the case, they were not implicated with relation to the Roman armies, while they sufficiently recommended themselves to the king by their willingness to receive him on his coming; and that, on the other hand, if he should come, even then they would have hopes of being pardoned by the Romans, for having yielded to the strength of a prince who was present among them, without waiting for succour from them, who were so far distant. To this so evasive embassy, as he did not readily think of a proper answer, he replied, that he would send ambassadors to them to confer upon such matters as were of common concernment both to him and them.
6. Antiochus went himself into Boeotia, holding out ostensibly those causes of resentment against the Romans which I have already mentioned,—the death of Brachyllas, and the attack made by Quinctius on Coronea, on account of the massacre of the Roman soldiers; while the real ones were, that the former excellent policy of that nation, with respect both to public and private concerns, had, for several generations, been on the decline; and that great numbers were in such circumstances, that they could not long subsist without some change in affairs. Through multitudes of the principal Boeotians, who every where flocked out to meet him, he arrived at Thebes. There, notwithstanding that he had (both at Delium, by the attack made on the Roman troops, and also at Chalcis) already commenced hostilities, by enterprises of neither a trifling nor of a dubious nature, yet, in a general council of the nation, he delivered a speech of the same import with that which he delivered in the first conference at Chalcis, and that used by his ambassadors in the council of the Achaeans; that "what he required of them was, to form a league of friendship with him, not to declare war against the Romans." But not a man among them was ignorant of his meaning. However, a decree, disguised under a slight covering of words, was passed in his favour against the Romans. After securing this nation also on his side, he returned to Chalcis; and, having despatched letters, summoning the chief Aetolians to meet him at Demetrias, that he might deliberate with them on the general plan of operations, he came thither with his ships on the day appointed for the council. Amynander, likewise, was called from Athamania to the consultation; and Hannibal the Carthaginian, who, for a long time before, had not been asked to attend, was present at this assembly. The subject of their deliberation was in reference to the Thessalian nation; and every one present was of opinion, that their concurrence ought to be sought. The only points on which opinions differed were, that some thought the attempt ought to be made immediately; while others judged it better to defer it for the winter season, which was then about half spent, until the beginning of spring. Some advised to send ambassadors only; others, that the king should go at the head of all his forces, and if they hesitated, terrify them into compliance. |
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