But the glory and prosperity which Egypt had thus acquired were very short-lived. Within three years Babylonia asserted herself. In B.C. 605, the crown prince, Nebuchadnezzar, acting on behalf of his father, Nabopolassar, who was aged and infirm,[14212] led the forces of Babylon against the audacious Pharaoh, who had dared to affront the "King of kings," "the Lord of Sumir and Accad," had taken him off his guard, and deprived him of some of his fairest provinces. Babylonia, under Nabopolassar and Nebuchadnezzar, was no unworthy successor of the mighty power which for seven hundred years had held the supremacy of Western Asia. Her citizens were as brave; her armies as well disciplined; her rulers as bold, as sagacious, and as unsparing. Habakkuk's description of a Babylonian army belongs to about this date, and is probably drawn from the life—"Lo, I raise up the Chaldaeans, that bitter and hasty nation, which shall march through the breadth of the land, to possess the dwelling-places that are not theirs. They are terrible and dreadful; from them shall proceed judgment and captivity; their horses are swifter than leopards, and are more fierce than the evening wolves; and their horsemen shall spread themselves, and their horsemen shall come from far; they shall fly as the eagle that hasteth to eat. They shall come all for violence; their faces shall sup as the east wind, and they shall gather the captivity as the sand. And they shall scoff at kings, and princes shall be a scorn unto them; they shall derive every stronghold; for they shall heap dust, and take it."[14213] Early in the year B.C. 605 the host of Nebuchadnezzar appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, moving steadily along its reaches, and day by day approaching nearer and nearer to the great fortress in and behind which lay the army of Neco, well ordered with shield and buckler, its horses harnessed, and its horsemen armed with spears that had been just furbished, and protected by helmets and brigandines.[14214] One of the "decisive battles of the world" was impending. If Egypt conquered, Oriental civilisation would take the heavy immovable Egyptian type; change, advance, progress would be hindered; sacerdotalism in religion, conventionalism in art, pure unmitigated despotism in government would generally prevail; all the throbbing life of Asia would receive a sudden and violent check; Semitism would be thrust back; Aryanism, just pushing itself to the front, would shrink away; the monotonous Egyptian tone of thought and life would spread, like a lava stream, over the manifold and varied forms of Asiatic culture; crushing them out, concealing them, making them as though they had never been. The victory of Babylon, on the other hand, would mean room for Semitism to develop itself, and for Aryanism to follow in its wake; fresh stirs of population and of thought in Asia; further advances in the arts; variety, freshness, growth; the continuance of the varied lines of Oriental study and investigation until such time as would enable Grecian intellect to take hold of them, sift them, and assimilate whatever in them was true, valuable, and capable of expansion.

We have no historical account of the great battle of Carchemish. Jeremiah, however, beholds it in vision. He sees the Egyptians "dismayed and turned away back—their mighty ones are beaten down, and are fled apace, and look not back, since fear is round about them."[14215] He sees the "swift flee away," and the "mighty men" attempting to "escape;" but they "stumble and fall toward the north by the river Euphrates."[14216] "For this is the day of the Lord God of hosts, a day of vengeance, that He may avenge Him of His adversaries; and the sword devours, and it is satiate and made drunk with their blood, for the Lord God of hosts hath a sacrifice in the north country by the river Euphrates."[14217] The "valiant men" are "swept away"—"many fall—yea, one falls upon another, and they say, Arise and let us go again to our own people, and to the land of our nativity from the oppressing sword."[14218] Nor do the mercenaries escape. "Her hired men are in the midst of her, like fatted bullocks; for they also are turned back, and are fled away together; they did not stand because the day of their calamity was come upon them, and the time of their visitation."[14219] The defeat was, beyond a doubt, complete, overwhelming. The shock of it was felt all over the Delta, at Memphis, and even at distant Thebes.[14220] The hasty flight of the entire Egyptian host left the whole country open to the invading army. "Like a whirlwind, like a torrent, it swept on. The terrified inhabitants retired into the fortified cities,"[14221] where for the time they were safe. Nebuchadnezzar did not stop to commence any siege. He pursued Neco up to the very frontier of Egypt, and would have continued his victorious career into the Nile valley, had not important intelligence arrested his steps. His aged father had died at Babylon while he was engaged in his conquests, and his immediate return to the capital was necessary, if he would avoid a disputed succession.[14222] Thus matters in Syria had to be left in a confused and unsettled state, until such time as the Great King could revisit the scene of his conquests, and place them upon some definite and satisfactory footing.

On the whole, the campaign had, apparently, the effect of drawing closer the links which united Phoenicia with Egypt.[14223] Babylon had shown herself a fierce and formidable enemy, but had disgusted men more than she had terrified them. It was clear enough that she would be a hard mistress, a second and crueller Assyria. There was thus, on Nebuchadnezzar's departure, a general gravitation of the Syrian and Palestinian states towards Egypt, since they saw in her the only possible protector against Babylon, and dreaded her less than they did the "bitter and hasty nation."[14224] Neco, no doubt, encouraged the movement which tended at once to strengthen himself and weaken his antagonist; and the result was that, in the course of a few years, both Judaea and Phoenicia revolted from Nebuchadnezzar, and declared themselves independent. Phoenicia was still under the hegemony of Tyre, and Tyre had at its head an enterprising prince, a second Ithobal,[14225] who had developed its resources to the uttermost, and was warmly supported by the other cities.[14226] His revolt appears to have taken place in the year B.C. 598, the seventh year of Nebuchadnezzar.[14227] Nebuchadnezzar at once marched against him in person. The sieges of Tyre, Sidon, and Jerusalem were formed. Jerusalem submitted almost immediately.[14228] Sidon was taken after losing half her defenders by pestilence;[14229] but Tyre continued to resist for the long space of thirteen years.[14230] The continental city was probably taken first. Against this Nebuchadnezzar could freely employ his whole force—his "horses, his chariots, his companies, and his much people"—he could bring moveable forts close up to the walls, and cast up banks against them, and batter them with his engines, or undermine them with spade and mattock. When a breach was effected, he could pour his horse into the streets, and ride down all opposition. It is the capture of the continental city which Ezekiel describes when he says:[14231] "Thus saith the Lord God: Behold, I will bring upon Tyrus Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, a king of kings, from the north, with horses and with chariots, and with horsemen, and companies, and much people. He shall slay with the sword thy daughters in the field; and he shall make a fort against thee, and cast a mount against thee, and lift up the buckler against thee. And he shall set engines of war against thy walls, and with his axes he shall break down thy towers. By reason of the abundance of his horses, their dust shall cover thee; thy walls shall shake at the noise of the horseman, and of the wheels and of the chariots, when he shall enter into thy gates, as men enter into a city wherein is made a breach. With the hoofs of his horses shall he tread down all thy streets: he shall slay thy people by the sword, and thy strong garrisons shall go down to the ground. And they shall make a spoil of thy riches, and make a prey of thy merchandise; and they shall break down thy walls, and destroy thy pleasant houses: and they shall lay thy stones and thy timber and thy dust in the midst of the water." But the island city did not escape. When continental Phoenicia was reduced, it was easy to impress a fleet from maritime towns; to man it, in part with Phoenicians, in part with Babylonians, no mean sailors,[14232] and then to establish a blockade of the isle. Tyre may more than once have crippled and dispersed the blockading squadron; but by a moderate expenditure fresh fleets could be supplied, while Tyre, cut off from Lebanon, would find it difficult to increase or renew her navy. There has been much question whether the island city was ultimately captured by Nebuchadnezzar or no; but even writers who take the negative view[14233] admit that it must have submitted and owned the suzerainty of its assailant. The date of the submission was B.C. 585.

Thus Tyre, in B.C. 585, "fell from her high estate." Ezekiel's prophecies were fulfilled. Ithobal II., the "prince of Tyrus" of those prophecies,[14234] whose "head had been lifted up," and who had said in his heart, "I am a God, I sit in the seat of God, in the midst of the waters," who deemed himself "wiser than Daniel," and thought that no secret was hid from him, was "brought down to the pit," "cast to the ground," "brought to ashes upon the earth in the sight of all them that beheld him."[14235] Tyre herself was "broken in the midst of the seas."[14236] A blight fell upon her. For many years, Sidon, rather than Tyre, became once more the leading city of Phoenicia, was regarded as pre-eminent in naval skill,[14237] and is placed before Tyre when the two are mentioned together.[14238] Internal convulsion, moreover, followed upon external decline. Within ten years of the death of Ithobal, the monarchy came to an end by a revolution,[14239] which substituted for Kings Suffetes or Shophetim, "judges," officers of an inferior status, whose tenure of office was not very assured. Ecnibal, the son of Baslach, the first judge, held the position for no more than two months; Chelbes, the son of Abdaeus, who followed him, ruled for ten months; Abbarus, a high priest, probably of Melkarth, for three months. Then, apparently to weaken the office, it was shared between two, as at Carthage, and Mytgon (perhaps Mattan), together with Ger-ashtoreth, the son of Abd-elim, judged Tyre for six years. But the partisans of monarchy were now recovering strength; and the reign of a king, Balator, was intruded at some point in the course of the six years' judgeship. Judges were then abolished by a popular movement, and kings of the old stock restored. The Tyrians sent to Babylon for a certain Merbal, who must have been either a refugee or a hostage at the court of Neriglissar. He was allowed to return to Tyre, and, being confirmed in the sovereignty, reigned four years. His brother, Eirom, or Hiram, succeeded him, and was still upon the throne when the Empire of Babylon came to an end by the victory of Cyrus over Nabonidus (B.C. 538).

Phoenicia under the Babylonian rule was exceptionally weak. She had to submit to attacks from Egypt under Apries, which fell probably in the reign of Baal over Tyre, about B.C. 565. She had also to submit to the loss of Cyprus under Amasis,[14240] probably about B.C. 540, or a little earlier, when the power of Babylon was rapidly declining. She had been, from first to last, an unwilling tributary of the Great Empire on the Lower Euphrates, and was perhaps not sorry to see that empire go down before the rising power of Persia. Under the circumstances she would view any chance as likely to advance her interests, and times of disturbance and unsettlement gave her the best chance of obtaining a temporary independence. From B.C. 538 to B.C. 528 or 527 she seems to have enjoyed one of these rare intervals of autonomy. Egypt, content with having annexed Cyprus, did not trouble her; Persia, engaged in wars in the far East,[14241] made as yet no claim to her allegiance. In peace and tranquillity she pursued her commercial career, covered the seas with her merchant vessels, and the land-routes of trade with her caravans, repaired the damages inflicted by Nebuchadnezzar on her cities; maintained, if she did not even increase, her naval strength, and waited patiently to see what course events would take now that Babylon was destroyed, and a new and hitherto unknown power was about to assume the first position among the nations of the earth.



5. Phoenicia under the Persians (B.C. 528-333)

Phoenicia not claimed by Cyrus—Submits willingly to Cambyses—Takes part in his invasion of Egypt—Refuses to proceed against Carthage—Exceptional privileges enjoyed by the Phoenicians under the Persians—Government system of Darius advantageous to them—Their conduct in the Ionian revolt—In the expeditions of Mardonius and Datis—In the great expedition of Xerxes—Interruption of the friendly relations between Phoenicia and Persia—Renewal of amity— Services rendered to Persia between B.C. 465 and 392— Amicable relations with Athens—Phoenicia joins in revolt of Evagoras—Supports Tachos, king of Egypt—Declares herself independent under Tennes—Conquered and treated with great severity of Ochus—Sidonian dynasty of the Esmunazars.

The conquest of Babylon by Cyrus gave him, according to Oriental notions generally, a claim to succeed to the inheritance of the entire Babylonian empire; but the claim would remain dormant until it was enforced. The straggling character of the territory, which was shaped like a Greek {L}, ascending from Babylon along the course of the Euphrates to the Armenian mountains, and then descending along the line of the Mediterranean coast as far as Gaza or Raphia, rendered the enforcement of the claim a work of difficulty, more especially in the remote West, which was distant fifteen hundred miles from Persia Proper, and more than a thousand miles from Babylon. Cyrus, moreover, was prevented, first by wars in his immediate neighbourhood,[14242] and later on by a danger upon his north-eastern frontier,[14243] from taking the steps usually taken by a conqueror to establish his dominion in a newly-annexed region, and thus he neither occupied Syria with troops, nor placed it under the administration of Persian governors. The only step which, so far as we know, he took, implying that his authority reached so far, was the commission which he gave to Zerubbabel and the other chiefs of the Jewish nation to proceed from Babylonia to Judaea, and re-establish themselves, if they could, on the site of the destroyed Jerusalem.[14244] The return from the Captivity which followed was in some sense the occupation of a portion of the extreme West by a Persian garrison, and may be viewed as a step intended to be "preparatory towards obtaining possession of the entire sea-coast;"[14245] but it appears to have been an isolated movement, effected without active Persian support, and one whereby the neighbouring countries were only slightly affected.

That Phoenicia retained her independence until the reign of Cambyses is distinctly implied, if not actually asserted, by Herodotus.[14246] She saw without any displeasure the re-establishment in her neighbourhood of a nation with which her intercourse had always been friendly, and sometimes close and cordial. Tyre and Sidon vied with each other in their readiness to supply the returned exiles with the timber which they needed for the rebuilding of their temple and city; and once more, as in the days of Solomon, the Jewish axes were heard amid the groves of Lebanon, and the magnificent cedars of that favoured region were cut down, conveyed to the coast, and made into floats or rafts, which Phoenician mariners transported by sea to Joppa, the nearest seaport to Jerusalem.[14247] In return, the Jews willingly rendered to the Phoenicians such an amount of corn, wine, and oil as was equivalent in value to the timber received from them,[14248] and thus the relations between the two peoples were replaced on a footing which recalled the time of their closest friendship, nearly five hundred years previously.

On the death of Cyrus, and the accession of his son Cambyses, B.C. 529, the tranquillity which South-western Asia had enjoyed since the time of the wars of Nebuchadnezzar came to an end. Cyrus had, it is said, designed an expedition against Egypt,[14249] as necessary to round off his conquests, and Cambyses naturally inherited his father's projects. He had no sooner mounted the throne than he commenced preparations for an attack upon the ancient kingdom of the Pharaohs, which, under the dynasty of the Psamatiks, had risen to something of its early greatness, and had been especially wealthy and prosperous under the usurper Amasis.[14250] It was impossible to allow an independent and rival monarchy so close upon his borders, and equally impossible to shrink from an enterprise which had been carried to a successful issue both by Assyria and by Babylon. Persian prestige required the subjugation and absorption of a country which, though belonging geographically to Africa, was politically and commercially an integral part of that Western Asia over which Persia claimed a complete and absolute supremacy.

The march upon Egypt implied and required the occupation of the Mediterranean seaboard. No armies of any considerable size have ever attempted to traverse the almost waterless desert which separates the Lower Euphrates valley from the delta of the Nile. Light corps d'armee have no doubt occasionally passed from Circesium by way of Tadmor to Damascus, and vice versa;[14251] but the ordinary line of route pursued by conquerors follows the course of the Euphrates to Carchemish, then strikes across the chalky upland in the middle of which stands the city of Aleppo, and finally descends upon Egypt by way of the Orontes, the Coele-Syrian valley, and the plains of Sharon and Philistia.[14252] This was undoubtedly the line followed by Cambyses,[14253] and it necessarily brought him into contact with the Phoenicians. The contact was not an hostile one. It would have been madness on the part of the Phoenicians to have attempted any resistance to the vast host with which Cambyses, we may be sure, made his invasion, and it would have been folly on the part of Cambyses to employ force when he could better obtain his object by persuasion. It must have been a very special object with him to obtain the hearty co-operation of the Phoenician naval forces in the attack which he was meditating, since he would otherwise have had no fleet at all capable of coping with the fleet of Egypt. Neco had made Egypt a strong naval power;[14254] Apries had contented for naval supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean with Tyre;[14255] Amasis had made an expedition by sea against Cyprus, had crushed whatever resistance the Cyprians were able to offer, had permanently occupied the island,[14256] and added the Cyprian fleet to his own. Cambyses had as yet no ships, except such as he could procure from the Greek cities of Asia Minor, which were not likely to be very zealous in his service, since they had friends engaged upon the other side.[14257] Accordingly, the Persian monarch seems to have made friendly overtures to the Phoenician states, which were received with favour, and led to an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. Phoenicia surrendered the independence which it was impossible for her to maintain, and placed her fleet at the disposal of Persia.[14258] Persia spared her cities any occupation, imposed on her a light tribute, and allowed her that qualified independence which is implied in the retention of her native princes. From first to last under the Persian regime, Phoenician monarchs bear rule in the Phoenician cities,[14259] and command the contingents which the cities furnish to any combined Persian fleet.

The friendly arrangement concluded between Phoenicia and Persia was followed, very naturally, by a further accession to the Persian power. Cyprus, whose population was in great part Phoenician, had for centuries been connected politically in the closest manner with the Phoenician towns on the Asiatic mainland, especially with Tyre and Sidon. Her enslavement by Amasis must have been hateful to her, and she must have been only too glad to see an opportunity of shaking off the Egyptian yoke. Accordingly, no sooner did the Phoenicians of the mainland conclude the arrangement by which they became part and parcel of the Persian Empire than the Cyprians followed their example, and, revolting from Egypt, offered themselves of their own free will to Persia.[14260] Cambyses, it is needless to say, readily accepted them as his subjects.

The invasion of Egypt could now be taken in hand with every prospect of a successful issue. The march of the land army along the shore would be supported by a parallel movement on the part of a powerful fleet, which would carry its provisions and its water, explore the country in front, and give notice of the movements of the enemy, and of the place where they proposed to make a stand in force. When Egypt was reached the fleet would command all the navigable mouths of the Nile, would easily establish a blockade of all ports, and might even mount the Nile and take a part in the siege of Memphis. It would seem that all these services were rendered to the Persian monarch by the great fleet which he had collected, of which the Phoenician ships were recognised as the main strength. The rapid conquest of Egypt was in this way much facilitated, and Cambyses within a twelvemonth found himself in possession of the entire country within its recognised limits of the Mediterranean and "the tower of Syene."[14261]

But the Great King was not satisfied with a single, albeit a magnificent, achievement. He had accomplished in one short campaign what it took the Assyrians ten years, and Nebuchadnezzar eighteen years, to effect. But he now set his heart on further conquests. "He designed," says Herodotus,[14262] "three great expeditions. One was to be against the Carthaginians, another against the Ammonians, and a third against the long-lived Ethopians, who dwelt in that part of Lybia which borders upon the southern sea." The expedition against the Carthaginians is the only one of the three which here concerns us: it was to be entrusted to the fleet. Instead of conducting, or sending, a land force along the seaboard of North Africa, which was probably known to be for the most part barren and waterless, Cambyses judged that it would be sufficient to dispatch his powerful navy against the Liby-Phoenician colony, which he supposed would submit or else be subjugated. But on broaching this plan to the leaders of the fleet he was met with a determined opposition. The Phoenicians positively refused to proceed against their own colonists. They urged that they were bound to the Carthaginians by most solemn oaths, and that it would be as wicked and unnatural for them to execute the king's orders as for parents to destroy their own children.[14263] It was a bold act to run counter to the will of a despotic monarch, especially of one so headstrong and impetuous as Cambyses. But the Phoenicians were firm, and the monarch yielded. "He did not like," Herodotus says, "to force the war upon the Phoenicians, because they had surrendered themselves to the Persians, and because on the Phoenicians his entire sea-service depended." He therefore allowed their opposition to prevail, and desisted from his proposed undertaking.[14264]

This acquiescence in their wishes on the part of the Great King, and his abstinence from any attempt at compulsion, would seem to have paved the way for that thoroughly good understanding between the suzerain power and her dependency which characterises the relations of the two for the next century and a half, with the single exception of one short interval. "The navy of Phoenicia became a regular and very important part of the public power"[14265] of the Persian state. Complete confidence was felt by their Persian masters in the fidelity, attachment, and hearty good-will of the Phoenician people. Exceptional favour was shown them. Not only were they allowed to maintain their native kings, their municipal administration, their national laws and religion, but they were granted exceptional honours and exceptional privileges and immunities. The Great King maintained a park and royal residence in some portion of Phoenicia,[14266] probably in the vicinity of Sidon,[14267] and no doubt allowed his faithful subjects to bask occasionally in the sunshine of his presence. When the internal organisation of the empire was taken in hand, and something approaching to a uniform system of government established for revenue purposes, though Phoenicia could not be excused from contributing to the taxation of the empire, yet the burden laid upon her seems to have been exceptionally light. United in a satrapy—the fifth—with Syria, Cyprus, and Palestine, and taxed according to her population rather than according to her wealth, she paid a share—probably not more than a third or a fourth—of 350 talents,[14268] or an annual contribution to the needs of the empire amounting to no less than 30,000l. Persia, moreover, encouraged Phoenicia to establish an internal organisation of her own, and, under her suzerainty, Tyre, Sidon, and Aradus were united by federal bonds, and had a common council, which met at Tripolis, probably of three hundred members.[14269] This council debated matters in which Phoenicia generally was interested, and, in times of disturbance, decided questions of peace and war.

The reign of Darius Hystaspis (B.C. 521-486), the successor of Cambyses upon the Persian throne, introduced several changes into the Persian governmental system which were of advantage to the Phoenicians. Darius united the most distant parts of his empire by postal routes, along which at moderate intervals were maintained post-houses, with relays of horses,[14270] primarily for the use of the government, but at the service of the traveller or private trader when not needed for business of state. Phoenician commerce must have been much helped by these arrangements, which facilitated rapid communication, gave security to lines of route which had been previously infested with robbers, and provided resting-places for the companies of merchants and traders, not unlike the caravanserai of modern Turkey and Persia.

Darius also established throughout his vast empire a uniform coinage, based apparently on that which had previously prevailed in Lydia. His "darics," as they were called by the Greeks, were, in the first instance, gold coins of a rude type, a little heavier than our sovereigns, weighing between 123 and 124 grains troy.[14271] They bore the figure of an archer on the obverse, and on the reverse a very rough and primitive quadratum incusum. Darius must have coined them in vast abundance, since early in the reign of his successor a single individual of no great eminence had accumulated as many as 3,993,000 of them.[14272] Subsequently to the introduction of the gold darics, a silver coinage was issued, originally (we are told) in Egypt by a Persian satrap called Aryandes,[14273] but afterwards by the central government. The name of "daric" was extended to these coins also, which, however, were much larger and heavier than the gold coins, weighing as much as 235 grains, and corresponding to the Greek tetradrachm, and (nearly) to the Hebrew shekel. The establishment of this excellent circulating medium, and the wide extension which it almost immediately attained, must have given an enormous stimulus to trade, and have been found of the greatest convenience by the Phoenician merchants, who had no longer to carry with them the precious metal in bars or ingots, and to weigh their gold and silver in the balance in connection with every purchase that they made, but could effect both sales and purchases in the simple and commodious manner still in use among all civilised nations at the present day.

Under these circumstances we can well understand that the Phoenicians were thoroughly satisfied with the position which they occupied under the earlier Persian kings, and strove zealously to maintain and extend the empire to which they owed so much. Their fidelity was put to a crucial test after they had been subjects of Darius Hystaspis for a little more than twenty years, and had had about fourteen or fifteen years' experience of the advantages of his governmental system. Aristagoras of Miletus, finding himself in a position of difficulty, had lighted up the flames of war in Asia Minor, and brought about a general revolt of the Greeks in those parts against the Persian power—a revolt which spread on from the Greeks to the native Asiatics, and in a short time embraced, not only Ionia and AEolis, but Caria, Caunus, and almost the whole of Cyprus.[14274] The bulk of the Cyprian cities were Phoenician colonies, and the political connection between these cities and Phoenicia was so close and of such ancient date that the Phoenicians can scarcely have failed to be moved by their example and by their danger. A wave of sympathy might have been expected to sweep across the excitable people, and it would not have been surprising had they rushed headlong into rebellion with the same impetuosity as their Cyprian brethren. Had they done so the danger to Persia would have been very great, and the course of the world's history might perhaps have been differently shaped. The junction of the Phoenician fleet with the navies of Cyprus, Ionia, Caria, and AEolis would have transferred the complete sovereignty of the Eastern Mediterranean to the side of the rebels.[14275] The contagion of revolt would probably have spread. Lycia and Cilicia, always eager for independence,[14276] would probably have joined the malcontents; Pamphylia, which lay between them, would have followed their example; the entire seaboard of Asia Minor and Syria would have been lost; Egypt would, most likely, have seen in the crisis her opportunity, and have avenged the cruelties and insults of Cambyses[14277] by the massacre of her Persian garrison. Persia's prosperity would have received a sudden check, from which it might never have recovered; Greece would have escaped the ordeal of the invasion of Xerxes; and the character of the struggle between Europe and Asia would have been completely altered.

But the view which the Phoenicians took of their duties, or of their interests, led them to act differently. When the Persians, anxious to recover Cyprus, applied to the Phoenician cities for a naval force, to transport their army from Cilica to the island, and otherwise help them in the war, their request was at once complied with. Ships were sent to the Cilician coast without any delay;[14278] the Persian land force was conveyed in safety across the strait and landed on the opposite shore; the ships then rounded Cape St. Andreas and anchored in the bay opposite Salamis, where the Ionian fleet was drawn up in defence of the town.[14279] An engagement followed—the first, so far as we know, between Phoenicians and Greeks—wholly to the advantage of the latter.[14280] No complaint, however, is made of any lukewarmness, or want of zeal, on the part of the Phoenicians, who seem to have been beaten in fair fight by an enemy whom they had perhaps despised. Their ill fortune did not lead to any very serious result, since the Persian land force defeated the Cyprians, and thus Persia once more obtained possession of the island.

A year or two later the Phoenicians recovered their lost laurels. In B.C. 495 the Persians, having trampled out the flames of revolt in Cyprus, Caria, and Caunus, resolved on a great effort to bring the war to a close by attacking the Ionian Greeks in their own country, and crushing the head and front of the rebellion, which was the great and flourishing city of Miletus. Miletus lay on the southern shore of a deep bay—the Sinus Latmicus—which penetrated the western coast of Asia Minor in about Lat. 37 30', but which the deposits of the Maeander have now filled up.[14281] North-west of the town, at the distance of about a mile, was the small island of Lade, now a mere hillock on the flat alluvial plain. While the Persian land force advanced along the shore, and invested Milestus on the side towards the continent, a combined fleet of six hundred vessels[14282] proceeded to block the entrance to the bay, and to threaten the doomed city from the sea. This fleet was drawn from four only of the countries subject to Persia—viz. Phoenicia, Cilicia, Cyprus, and Egypt—whereof Phoenicia, we are told, "showed the greatest zeal,"[14283] and we may presume furnished by far the larger number of ships. On their arrival in Milesian waters the captains found a strong naval force collected to meet them, which rested upon the island of Lade, and guarded the approaches to the town. Miletus had summoned to her aid the contingents of her various allies—Chios, Lesbos, Samos, Teos, Priene, Erythrae, Phocaea, Myus—and had succeeded in gathering together a fleet amounting to above three hundred and fifty vessels.[14284] This time Phoenicia did not despise her foe. Before engaging, every effort was made to sow discord and dissension among the confederates, and induce the Greek captains to withdraw their squadrons, or at any rate to remain neutral in the battle.[14285] Considerable effect was produced by these machinations; and when at last the attack was made, two of the principal of the Greek allies[14286] drew off, and sailed homewards, leaving the rest of the confederates to their fate. Yet, notwithstanding this defection, the battle was stoutly contested by the ships which remained, especially those of the Chians,[14287] and though a very decisive and complete victory was ultimately gained by the Phoenicians and their allies, the cost of the victory was great. Persia regained her naval supremacy in the Eastern Mediterranean; Phoenicia re-established her claim to be considered the great sea power of the time; but she lost a large number of her best vessels and seamen, and she was taught the lesson that, to cope with Greeks, she must have a vast superiority of force upon her side—a superiority of not much less than three to one.

Miletus soon fell after the victory of Lade, and the Phoenician fleet was then employed for some time in chastising the islanders who had taken part in the revolt, and in reducing various towns upon the European shores of the Hellespont, the Propontis, and the Bosphorus, including Perinthus, Selymbria, and Byzantium.[14288] Miltiades, the destined hero of Marathon, narrowly escaped capture at the hands of the Phoenicians at this time, as he fled from his government in the Thracian Chersonese to Athens. The vessel which bore him just escaped into the harbour of Imbrus; but his son, Metiochus, who was on board a worse sailer, was less fortunate. The Phoenicians captured him, and, learning who he was, conveyed him to Darius at Susa, where he was well treated and became a naturalised Persian.[14289]

After the Ionian revolt had been completely put down and avenged, the states subject to Persia, and the Phoenicians among them, enjoyed a brief period of repose. But soon the restless spirit which possessed all the earlier Persian monarchs incited Darius to carry his warlike enterprises into "fresh fields and pastures new." From the eastern coast of the AEgean Sea he looked out towards a land possessing every attraction that soil or clime could offer, fertile, rich in minerals, and with many excellent harbours, well watered, abounding in corn and wine and oil, in wooded hillsides, and in productive plains. According to Herodotus,[14290] he had already explored the strength and weakness of the region by means of a commission of Persian nobles, who had surveyed all the shores of Greece from the decks of Phoenician ships. The result was that he coveted the possession of the land thus made known to him, and came to a fixed resolution that he would add it to his territories.

There were two modes by which Greece might be approached from Asia. Bridges of boats could be thrown across the Bosphorus or the Hellespont, mere salt rivers, scarcely more formidable than the streams of the Euphrates and the Tigris. In this way Europe could be invaded in force, and the army sent across the straits, could pursue its way along the shore till it reached the rich plains of Thessaly, and from Thessaly passed into Boetia, Attica, and the Peloponnese. Or a fleet, with a land force on board, might proceed from Asia Minor across the AEgean, where the numerous islands, scattered at short intervals, seemed to have been arranged by nature as stepping-stones, whereby the adventurous denizens of either continent might cross easily into the other; and a landing might be suddenly effected near the very heart of Greece without a tenth part of the trouble that must be taken if the other line of route were pursued. In either case the attendance of a fleet would be necessary. If the more circuitous route were pursued, a powerful squadron must attend the march of the army along the shore, to convey its supplies; if the direct route were preferred, a still larger fleet would be necessary for the conveyance, not only of the supplies, but of the army itself. Darius gave a trial to each of the two plans. In the year B.C. 492 he sent a fleet and army under Mardonius by way of the Hellespont and the European coast; but this expedition met with severe disasters, the fleet being shattered by a storm off Mount Athos, and the land force greatly damaged by a night attack on the part of the Thracians.[14291] Two years later he dispatched the famous expedition under Datis and Artaphernes, which took its course through the islands, and landed perhaps 200,000 men on the plain of Marathon,[14292] but being there defeated by Miltiades, returned hastily to Asia by the sea route. The fleets employed on both these occasions were numerous,[14293] and appear to have been collected from several of the Persian maritime states;[14294] the proportion which the several contingents bore one to another is not stated, but there can be little doubt that the Phoenicians contributed the greater number. We have no details of the conduct of the Phoenicians on either occasion, beyond a casual notice that in the expedition of Datis and Artaphernes one of their vessels plundered the temple of Delium on the Boeotian coast opposite Chalcis, carrying off from it an image of Apollo plated with gold.[14295] The superstition of Datis deprived them of this valuable booty; but we may safely conclude from the anecdote that, while rendering service to Persia, the keen-witted mariners took care not to neglect their own material interests.

In the third and greatest of the expeditions conducted by Persia against Greece, the Phoenicians are found to have played a very important and prominent part. Even before the expedition commenced, a call was made upon them in connection with it for services of an unusual character. The loss of the fleet of Mardonius off Mount Athos induced Xerxes to determine on cutting a ship-canal through the isthmus which joins Athos to the mainland; and his passion for great and striking achievements caused him to project the construction of a double bridge of boats across the Hellespont. Phoenician technical skill was invoked for the furtherance of both objects. At Athos they worked in conjunction with the maritime states generally, but showed an amount of engineering knowledge far in advance of their fellow-labourers. The others attempted to give perpendicular sides to their portions of the excavation, but found the sides continually fall in, and so (as Herodotus observes) "had double labour."[14296] The Phoenicians alone knew that the sides must be sloped at an angle, and, calculating the proper slope aright, performed their share of the task without mishap. At the Hellespont the Phoenicians had for co-partners the Egyptians only, and the two nations appear to have displayed an equal ability.[14297] Cables were passed from shore to shore, made taut by capstans and supported by an almost continuous line of boats; planks were then laid upon the cables, and covered with brushwood, while a thick layer of earth was placed upon the top. A solid causeway was thus formed, which was guarded on either side by bulwarks of such a height that the horses which crossed the bridge could not see over them; and thus the cavalry and the sumpter beasts passed from one continent to the other without a suspicion that they had ever had anything but terra firma under them. The structure served its purpose, but was not found strong enough to defy even for a year the forces of the winds and waves. Before the return of Xerxes, towards the close of B.C. 480, the autumnal gales had broken it up; and the army which accompanied him had to re-cross the strait in a number of separate ships.[14298]

The fleet which Xerxes collected to accompany his land army and take part in his great expedition amounted, it is said, to a total of 1207 vessels.[14299] Of these the Phoenician triremes were at once the most numerous and the best. While Egypt furnished 200 ships, Cyprus 150, Cilicia, Ionia, and the Hellespontine Greeks 100 each, and the other maritime nations, all together, 257, Phoenicia singly contributed no fewer than 300.[14300] The superiority of the Phoenician vessels was sufficiently shown, first by the regatta at Abydos, which was won by a Sidonian trireme;[14301] next, by the preference of Xerxes for Phoenician over other vessels;[14302] and, thirdly, by the position assigned them at Salamis, where care was taken to pit them against the Athenians,[14303] who were recognised as superior at sea to all the other Greeks. If the Phoenician prowess and naval skill did not succeed in averting defeat from the Persians, we must ascribe it first to the narrowness of the seas in which they had to engage the enemy; and, secondly, to the still greater prowess and skill of their principal antagonists, the Athenians, the Eginetans, and the Corinthians.

In the naval combats at Artemisium, the Egyptians, according to Herodotus,[14304] were considered to have borne off the palm on the Persian side; but Diodorus assigns that honour to the Sidonians.[14305] At Salamis the brunt of the conflict fell on the Phoenician contingent, which began the battle,[14306] and for some time forced the Athenian squadron to beat a retreat, but was ultimately overpowered and forced to take to flight, after suffering great losses. A large number of the ships were sunk; several were taken by the Greeks; comparatively few escaped from the battle without serious injury.[14307] Xerxes, however, who from his silver-footed throne on Mount AEgaleos surveyed the scene,[14308] but, amid the general turmoil and confusion, could ill distinguish the conduct of the several contingents, enraged at the loss of the battle, and regarding the Phoenicians as answerable for the unhappy result, since they formed the nucleus and chief strength of the fleet, laid the whole blame of the failure upon them, and, on some of the captains appearing before him to excuse themselves, had them beheaded upon the spot.[14309] At the same time he also threatened the other Phoenician commanders with his vengeance, and so alarmed them that, according to Diodorus,[14310] they quitted the fleet and sailed away to Asia.

This harsh and unjust treatment seems to have led to an estrangement between the Persians and the foremost of the naval nations subject to them, which lasted for fifteen years. The Persians naturally distrusted those whom they had injured, and were unwilling to call them in to their aid. The Phoenicians probably brooded over their wrongs, and abstained from volunteering an assistance which they were not asked to furnish. The war between Persia and Greece continued, and was transferred from Europe to Asia, but no Phoenicians are mentioned as taking part in it. The Phoenician ships retired from Samos on the approach of the Greek fleet under Leotychides.[14311] No Phoenicians fought at Mycale. None are heard of as engaged at Sestos, or Byzantium, or Eion, or Doriscus, or even Phaselis. It was not until—in B.C. 465—the war passed from the AEgean to the southern coast of Asia Minor, and their dependency, Cyprus, was threatened, that the Phoenicians again appeared upon the scene, and mustered in strength to the support of their Persian suzerain.

The Persian fleet which fought at the Eurymedon is said to have consisted of three hundred and forty vessels, drawn from the three subject nations of the Phoenicians, the Cyprians, and the Cilicians.[14312] It was under the command of Tithraustes, a son of Xerxes. Cimon, who led the fleet of the Athenians and their allies, attacked it with a force of 250 triremes, of which Athens had furnished the greater number. The battle was contested with extreme obstinacy on both sides; but at length the Athenians prevailed, and besides destroying a large number of the enemy's vessels, took as many as a hundred with their crews on board. At the same time a land victory was gained over the Persian troops. The double exploit was regarded as one of the most glorious in the annals of Greece, and was commemorated at Delos by a tablet with the following inscription:—[14313]

Since first the sea Europe from Asia severed, And Mars to rage 'mid humankind began, Never was such a blow as this delivered On land and sea at once by mortal man. These heroes did to death a host of Medes Near Cyprus, and then captured with their crews Five score Phoenician vessels; at the news All Asia groaned, hard hit by such brave deeds.

It is scarcely necessary to follow further in detail the services which Phoenicia rendered to Persia as her submissive and attached ally. For the space of about seventy-five years from the date of the engagement at the Eurymedon (B.C. 465-390), the Phoenicians continued to hold the first place among the Persian naval states, and to render their mistress effective help in all her naval enterprises. They protected Cyprus and Egypt from the Athenian attacks, bore their part in the war with Amyrtaeus and Inaros, and more than once inflicted severe blows upon the Athenian navy.[14314] It was his command of a Phoenician fleet amounting to nearly a hundred and fifty triremes which enabled Tissaphernes to play so influential a part in Asia Minor during the later years of the Peloponnesian war. It was the presence of their ships at Cnidus which, in B.C. 394, turned the scale between Athens and Sparta, enabling the Athenians to recover the naval supremacy which they had lost at AEgos-Potami. It was the appearance of a Phoenician fleet in Greek waters[14315] which, in the following year, gave an opportunity to the Athenians to rebuild their "Long Walls," alarmed Sparta for her own safety, and extorted from her fears—in B.C. 387—the agreement known as "the Peace of Antalcidas." Persia owed to her Phoenician subjects the glory of recovering complete possession of Asia Minor, and of being accepted as a sort of final arbiter in the quarrels of the Grecian states. From B.C. 465 to B.C. 392 Phoenicia served Persia with rare fidelity, never hesitating to lend her aid, and never showing the least inclination to revolt.

It was probably under these circumstances, when Athens owed the recovery of her greatness in no small measure to the Phoenicians, that those relations of friendship and intimacy were established between the two peoples of which we have evidence in several inscriptions. Phoenicians settled in Attica, particularly at Phalerum and the Piraeus, and had their own places of worship and interment. Six sepulchral inscriptions have been found, either in Athens itself or at the Piraeus,[14316] five of them bilingual,[14317] which mark the interment in Attic soil of persons whose nationality was Phoenician. They had monuments erected over them, generally of some pretension, which must have obtained as much respect as the native tombstones, since otherwise they could not have endured to our day. There is also at the Piraeus an altar,[14318] which a Phoenician must have erected and dedicated to a Phoenician god, whom he worshipped on Attic soil apparently without let or hindrance. The god's name is given as "Askum-Adar," a form which does not elsewhere recur, but which is thought to designate the god elsewhere called Sakon, who corresponded to the Grecian Hermes.[14319] Moreover, there is evidence of the Phoenicians having worshipped two other deities in their Attic abodes, one a god who corresponded to the Greek Poseidon and the Roman Neptune, the other the Babylonian and Assyrian Nergal. Among the lost orations of Deniarchus was one delivered by that orator on the occasion of the suit between the people of Phalerum and the Phoenician inhabitants of the place with respect to the priesthood of Poseidon;[14320] and a sepulchral monument at the Piraeus was erected to Asepta, daughter of Esmun-sillem, of Sidon, by Itten-bel, son of Esmun-sibbeh, high priest of the god Nergal.[14321] It appears further from the Greek inscription, edited by Boeckh,[14322] that about this time (B.C. 390-370) a decree was promulgated by the Council {bonle} of Athens whereby the relation of Proxenia was established between Strato (Abd-astartus), king of Sidon, and the Athenian people, and all Sidonians sojourning in Attica were exempted from the tax usually charged upon foreign settlers, from the obligation of the Choregia, and from all other contributions to the state.

The power of Persia began about this time to decline, and the Phoenicians seem to have wavered in their allegiance. In B.C. 406 or 405 Egypt shook off the Persian yoke, and established her independence under a native sovereign.[14323] Soon afterwards, probably in B.C. 392 or 391, Evagoras, a Cypriot Greek, who claimed descent from Teucer, inaugurated a revolution at Salamis in Cyprus, where he slew the Phoenician monarch, Abdemon, who held his throne under Persia, and, himself mounting the throne, proceeded to reduce to subjection the whole island.[14324] Vast efforts were made to crush him, but for ten years he defied the power of Persia, and maintained himself as an independent monarch.[14325] Even when finally he made his submission, it was under an express stipulation that he should retain his royal dignity, and be simply bound to pay his tribute regularly, and to render such obedience as subject kings commonly paid to their suzerain.[14326]

In the course of his resistance to Persia, it is beyond question that Evagoras received a certain amount of support from Phoenicia; but the circumstances under which the support was given was doubtful. According to Isocrates,[14327] he equipped a large fleet, and attacked the Phoenicians on the mainland with so much vigour as even to take the great city of Tyre by assault; but Diodorus says nothing of the attack, and it is conjectured that the contagion of revolt, which certainly affected, more or less, Cyprus, Cilicia, Caria, and some of the Syrian Arabs,[14328] spread also thus early to Phoenicia, and that "the surrender of Tyre was a voluntary defection."[14329] In that case, we must view Phoenicia, or at any rate a portion of it, as having detached itself from Persia, about B.C. 390, sixty years before the final break-up of the Empire.

But the disaffection of Phoenicia does not become open and patent until about thirty years later. The decline of Persia had continued. In B.C. 375 an attempt to recover Egypt, for which a vast armament had been collected under Pharnabazus and Iphicrates, completely failed.[14330] Nine years afterwards, in B.C. 366, the revolt of the satraps began. First Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, renounced his allegiance, and defended himself with success against Autophradutes, satrap of Lydia, and Mausolus, native king of Caria under Persia. Then Aspis, who held a part of Cappadocia, revolted and maintained himself by the help of the Pisidians, until he was overpowered by Datames. Next Datames himself, satrap of the rest of Cappadocia, understanding that the mind of the Persian king was poisoned against him, made a treaty with Ariobarzanes, and assumed an independent attitude in his own province. Finally, in B.C. 362, there seems to have been something like a general revolt of the western provinces, in which the satraps of Mysia, Phrygia, and Lydia, Mausolus prince of Caria, and the peoples of Lycia, Pisidia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, and Syria participated.[14331] Then, if not earlier, Phoenicia openly threw in her lot with the disaffected;[14332] refused her tribute like the others, and joined her forces with theirs. Nor, when the rebellion collapsed, did she at once return to her allegiance. When Tachos, native king of Egypt, in B.C. 361, having secured the services of Agesilaus and Chabrias, advanced boldly into Syria, with the object of enlarging his own dominions at the expense of Persia, he was received with favour by the Phoenicians, who were quite willing to form a portion of his empire. But the rebellion of Nectanebo forced Tachos to relinquish his projects,[14333] and the dominion over the Phoenician cities seems to have reverted to Persia without any effort on her part.

In this condition matters remained till about the year B.C. 351, when Sidon, feeling herself aggrieved by the conduct of the Persian authorities at Tripolis,[14334] where the general assembly of the Phoenicians held its meetings, boldly raised the standard of revolt against Persia under Tennes, or Tabnit II., and induced the Phoenicians generally to declare themselves independent. Alliance was at once formed with the Egyptian king, Nekht-nebf, or Nectanebo II., who sent a body of 4,000 Greek mercenaries, under Mentor the Rhodian, to the aid of Tennes.[14335] Hostilities commenced by the Phoenicians expelling or massacring the Persian garrisons, devastating the royal park or paradise, and burning the stores of forage collected for the use of the Persian cavalry.[14336] An attempt made by two satraps—Belesys of Syria and Mazaeus of Cilicia—to crush the revolt was completely defeated by Tennes, with the aid of Mentor and his Greeks, who gained a decisive victory over the satraps, and drove the Persians out of Phoenicia.[14337] Cyprus then joined the rebels. The nine principal cities made common cause, expelled the Persians, and declared themselves free states, under their respective native kings.[14338] Ochus, the Persian king, was at last roused to exert himself. Collecting an army of 300,000 foot and 30,000 horse, supported by 300 triremes and 500 transports or provision-ships,[14339] he proceeded to the west in person, determined to inflict condign punishment on the rebels, and to recover to the empire, not only Cyprus and Phoenicia, but also the long-lost Egypt.

Tennes, on his part, had done his best in the way of preparations for defence. He had collected a fleet of above a hundred ships—triremes and quinqueremes,[14340] the latter now heard of for the first time in Asiatic warfare. He had strengthened the fortifications of Sidon, surrounding the town with a triple ditch of great width and depth, and considerably raising the height of the walls.[14341] He had hired Greek mercenaries to the number of six thousand, raising thus the number in his service to ten thousand in all, had armed and drilled the most active and athletic of the citizens, and had collected vast stores of provisions, armour, and weapons. But the advance of the Persian monarch at the head of so large a force filled Tennes with dismay and despair. Successful resistance was, he thought, impossible; and with a selfishness and a cowardice that must ever make him rank among the most infamous of men, he resolved, if possible, to purchase his own pardon of the King by delivering to his vengeance the entire body of his fellow-countrymen. Accordingly, after handing over to him a hundred of the principal citizens, who were immediately transfixed with javelins, he concerted measures with Mentor for receiving the Persians within the walls. While the arrangements were proceeding, five hundred of the remaining citizens issued forth from one of the gates of the town, with boughs of supplication, as a deputation to implore the mercy of Ochus, but only to suffer the same fate as their fellow-townsmen. The Persians were then received within the walls; but the citizens, understanding what their fate was to be, resolved to anticipate it. They had already burnt their ships, to prevent any desertion. Now they shut themselves up, with their wives and children, in their houses, and applying the torch to their dwellings lighted up a general conflagration. More than forty thousand persons perished in the flames. Ochus sold the ruins at a high price to speculators, who calculated on reimbursing themselves by the treasures which they might dig out from among the ashes. As for Tennes, it is satisfactory to find that a just vengeance overtook him. The treachery which he had employed towards others was shown also to himself. Ochus, who had given him a solemn promise that he would spare his life, no sooner found that there was nothing more to be gained by letting him live, than he relentlessly put him to death.[14342]

No further resistance was made by the Phoenician cities. Ochus marched on against Egypt and effected its reconquest.[14343] The Cyprian revolt was put down by the Prince of Caria, Istricus.[14344] A calm, prelude to the coming storm, settled down upon Persia; and Phoenicia participated in the general tranquillity. The various communities, exhausted by their recent efforts, and disappointed with the result, laid aside their political aspirations, and fell back upon their commercial instincts. Trade once more flourished. Sidon rose again from her ashes, and recovered a certain amount of prosperity. She held the coast from Leontopolis to Ornithonpolis, and possessed also the dependency of Dor;[14345] but she had lost Sarepta to Tyre,[14346] which stepped into the foremost place among the cities on her fall, and retained it until destroyed by Alexander. The other towns which still continued to be of some importance were Aradus, and Gebal or Byblus. These cities, like Tyre and Sidon, retained their native kings,[14347] who ruled their several states with little interference from the Persians. The line of monarchs may be traced at Sidon for five generations, from the first Esmunazar, who probably reigned about B.C. 460-440, through three generations and four kings, to the second Strato, the contemporary of Alexander.[14348] The first Esmunazar was succeeded by his son, Tabnit, about B.C. 440. Tabnit married his sister, Am-Ashtoreth, priestess of Ashtoreth, and had issue, two sons, Esmunazar II., whose tomb was found near Sidon by M. de Voguee in the year 1855, and Strato I. Esmunazar II. is thought to have died about B.C. 400, and to have been succeeded by his brother Strato, the Proxenus of Athens, who reigned till B.C. 361. On Strato's death, his son, the second Tabnit—known to the Greeks as Tennes—mounted the throne, and reigned till B.C. 345, when he was put to death by Ochus. A second Strato, the son of Tennes, then became king, and retained his sovereignty till after the battle of Issus[14349] (B.C. 333).



6. Phoenicia in the time of Alexander the Great (B.C. 333-323)

Alexander's invasion of Asia—Preparations made to resist it, insufficient—What should have been done—Movements of Memnon in B.C. 333—His death—Paralysis of the Persian fleet—Attack on Phoenicia after Issus—Submission of all the cities but Tyre—Siege of Tyre—Fall of the city—Cruel treatment of the inhabitants.

The invasion of Asia by Alexander the Great, though it found the Persians unready, was by no means of the nature of a surprise. The design had been openly proclaimed by Philip in the year B.C. 338, when he forced the Grecian States to appoint him generalissimo of their armies, which he promised to lead to the conquest of the East.[14350] Darius Codomannus had thus ample warning of what he had to expect, and abundant opportunity to make the fullest preparations for defence. During the years B.C. 338 and 337, while Philip was still alive, he did do something towards organising defensive measures, collected troops and ships, and tried to foment discontent and encourage anti-Macedonian movements in Greece.[14351] But the death of Philip by the dagger of Pausanias caused him most imprudently to relax his efforts, to consider the danger past, and to suspend the operations, which he had commenced, until he should see whether Alexander had either the will or the power to carry into effect his father's projects. The events of the years B.C. 336 and 335, the successes of Alexander in Thrace, Illyria, and Boeotia,[14352] woke him from his fool's paradise to some sense of the realities of the situation. In B.C. 335 the preparations for defence were resumed. Orders were issued to the satraps of Phrygia and Lydia to draw together their troops towards the north-western corner of Asia Minor, and to take the offensive against the Macedonian force which had crossed the straits before Philip's death. The Persian garrisons in this quarter were strongly reinforced with troops of a good quality, drawn from the remoter provinces of the empire, as from Persia Proper, Media, Hyrcania, and Bactria. Notice was given to the Phoenicians to prepare a considerable fleet, and hold it in readiness for active service. Above all, Memnon the Rhodian was given a command on the Asiatic seaboard, and entrusted with a body of five thousand Greek mercenaries, which he was empowered to use at his discretion.[14353]

But these steps, though in the right direction, were quite inadequate under the circumstances. Everything that was possible should have been done to prevent Alexander from crossing to Asia in force. The fleet should not only have been commanded to hold itself in readiness, but should have been brought up. Four hundred or five hundred vessels,[14354] from Phoenicia, Cyprus, Egypt, Lycia, and Cilicia, should have been moved into the northern Egean and the Propontis, and have kept watch on every Grecian port. Alexander was unable to muster for the transport of his army across the Straits a larger number than 160 triremes.[14355] Persia should have met them with a fleet three times as large. Had Memnon been given from the first a free hand at sea, instead of satrapial power on land, it is quite conceivable that the invasion of Asia by Alexander might have proved as abortive an enterprise as the contemplated invasion of England by Napoleon.

As it was, the fleet of Persia, composed mainly of Phoenician vessels, did not appear in the northern Egean waters until some weeks after Alexander had transported his grand army into Asia, and fought at the Granicus, so that when it arrived it was of comparatively little service. Too late even to save Miletus, it had to be a tame spectator of the siege and capture of that important town.[14356] It was then withdrawn to Halicarnassus, where its presence greatly helped the defence, but not to the extent of wholly baffling the besiegers. Halicarnassus fell, like Miletus, after a while, being entered from the land side; but the fleet saved the troops, the stores, and the inhabitants.[14357]

During the early part of the ensuing year, B.C. 333, while Alexander was engaged in conquering the interior of Asia Minor, the Persian fleet under Memnon at last took the aggressive, and, advancing northwards, employed itself in establishing Persian influence over the whole of the Egean, and especially in reducing the important islands of Chios and Lesbos.[14358] Memnon was now in full command. Fortune smiled on him; and it seemed more than probable that the war would be, at least partially, transferred into Greece, where the Spartans only waited for Memnon's appearance to commence an anti-Macedonian movement. The presence of a powerful fleet in Greek waters, and Memnon's almost unlimited command of Persian gold, might in a short time have raised such a flame in Greece as to necessitate Alexander's return in order to extinguish it.[14359] The invasion of Asia might have been arrested in mid course; Alexander might have proved as powerless as Agesilaus to effect any great change in the relations of the two continents; but, at the critical moment, the sudden and unexpected death of the Rhodian chief cast all these hopes to the ground,[14360] and deprived Persia of her last chance of baffling the invader.

Thus, first by mismanagement and then by an unhappy accident, the Phoenicians were precluded from rendering Persia any effective service in the time of her great necessity. Wiser than Napoleon, Alexander would not contest the sovereignty of the seas with the great naval power of the day, and he even, when he once felt himself strongly lodged in Asia, disbanded his naval force,[14361] that so it might be impossible for disaster at sea to tarnish his prestige. He was convinced that Asia could be won by the land force which he had been permitted to disembark on its shores, and probably anticipated the transfer of naval supremacy which almost immediately followed on the victory of Issus. The complete defeat of the great army of Codomannus, and its retirement on the Euphrates,[14362] left the entire seaboard of Syria and Phoenicia open to him. He resolved at once to take advantage of the opportunity, and to detach from Persia the three countries of Phoenicia, Egypt, and Cyprus. If he could transfer to himself the navies of these powers, his maritime supremacy would be incontestable. He would render his communications with Macedonia absolutely secure. He would have nothing to fear from revolt or disturbance at home, however deeply he might plunge into the Asiatic continent. If the worst happened to him in Asia, he would have assured himself a safe return.

Accordingly, no sooner was the retreat of Darius upon the line of the Euphrates, and his abandonment of Syria, ascertained, than Alexander, after despatching a detachment of his army to Damascus, marched in person into Phoenicia.[14363] The Phoenicians were placed between two dangers. On the one hand, Alexander might ravage their territory, capture and pillage their cities, massacre or sell for slaves the greater portion of their citizens, and destroy their very existence as a people; on the other hand, Darius held as hostages for their fidelity the crews and captains of their triremes, which formed a portion of his fleet, and had on board a large number of their chief men, and even some of their kings.[14364] It was impossible, however, to temporise; a choice had necessarily to be made; and when Alexander entered Phoenicia, the cities, in almost every case, decided on submitting to him. First Strato, the son of Ger-astartus, king of Aradus, who was serving on board the Phoenician contingent to the Persian fleet, went out to meet Alexander, and surrendered into his hands the four cities of Aradus, Marathus, Sigon, and Mariamme.[14365] Then Byblus, whose king was also absent with the fleet, opened its gates to the Macedonians.[14366] Next Sidon, mindful of her recent wrongs, sent envoys to invite Alexander's approach, and joyfully embraced his cause.[14367] Even Tyre nominally made submission, and declared itself ready to obey Alexander's commands;[14368] and the transfer of Phoenicia to the side of Alexander might have been made without bloodshed, had the Macedonian monarch been content to leave their island city, which was their true capital, and their pride and glory, unmolested. But Alexander could not brook anything that in any degree savoured of opposition to his will. When therefore, on his expressing a wish to sacrifice to Melkarth in their island town, the Tyrians declined to receive him within the walls, and suggested that his pious design might be sufficiently accomplished by his making his intended offering in Palae-Tyrus, where there was a temple of the same god, which was older (they said) and more venerable than their own, Alexander's pride was touched, and he became violently enraged.[14369] Dismissing the envoys with angry threats, he at once began preparations for an attack upon the town.

The Tyrians have been accused of extreme rashness and folly in not making an unqualified submission to the demands preferred by Alexander,[14370] but the reproach scarcely appears to be deserved. They had on previous occasions resisted for years the entire power of Assyria, and of Babylon; they naturally deemed themselves only assailable by sea; their fortifications were of immense strength; and they possessed a navy much superior to any of which Alexander could boast at the time when he threatened them. Their own vessels were eighty in number; those of their kinsmen upon the continent were likewise eighty; Cyprus, which for centuries had been closely allied with them, and which was more than half Phoenician in blood, could furnish a hundred and twenty; Carthage, if she chose, could send to their aid, without any difficulty, as many as two hundred.[14371] Alexander had never been able to collect from the Greek states which owned his sway a fleet of more than one hundred and sixty sail; and, having disbanded this fleet, he could not readily have mustered from the cities and countries accessible to him, exclusive of Cyprus and Phoenicia, so many as a hundred.[14372] The Tyrians, when they took their resolution to oppose Alexander, had a right to expect that their kindred would either assist them, or at any rate not serve against them, and that thus they would be sure to maintain their supremacy at sea. As for Alexander's design to join the island Tyre to the continent by means of a mole, they cannot have had the slightest suspicion of it, since no work of the kind had ever previously been accomplished, or even attempted; for the demonstration of Xerxes against Salamis was not seriously intended.[14373] They naturally counted on the struggle being entirely by sea, and may well have thought that on their own element they would not be worsted. Even if the continental towns forsook them and went over to the enemy, why might they not do as they had done in Shalmaneser's time, defeat their unnatural countrymen, and retain their naval supremacy? Moreover, if they made a gallant fight, might not Persia be expected to second their efforts? Would she not attack Alexander from the flanks of Lebanon, intercept his supplies, cut off his foragers, and make his position untenable; the Tyrians could scarcely anticipate that Persia would sit with folded hands, a calm spectator of a seven months' siege, and do absolutely nothing.

Having determined on resistance to the demands of Alexander, the Tyrians lost no time in placing their city in a position to resist attack. They summoned their king, Azemilcus, from the Persian fleet, and required him to hasten home with the entire squadron which he commanded.[14374] They collected triremes and lighter vessels from various quarters. They distributed along the walls of the city upon every side a number of engines of war, constructed to hurl darts and stones, and amply provided them with missiles.[14375] The skilled workmen and engineers resident in the town were called upon not merely to furnish additional engines of the old type, but to exercise their ingenuity in devising new and unheard of structures.[14376] They armed all the young and vigorous among the people, and appointed them their several stations at the walls. Finally, to diminish the number of mouths to be fed, and to save themselves from distracting cares, they sent away to Carthage a number of their aged men, their women, and their children, who were readily received and supported by the rich and friendly colonists.[14377]

Meantime Alexander had taken his resolution. Either recollecting what Xerxes had threatened to do at Salamis, or prompted merely by his own inventive genius, he determined on the construction of a great mole, or embankment, which should be carried out from the Asiatic mainland across the half-mile of channel to the very walls of the recalcitrant city, and should thus join the island to the Syrian shore. The width of the embankment he fixed at two plethra, or nearly seventy yards.[14378] Material for the construction was abundant. The great city of Palae-Tyrus was close at hand, partly in ruins, and with many of the houses deserted by their inhabitants. Its walls would furnish abundance of stone, mortar, and rubble. Behind Palae-Tyrus lay the flanks of Lebanon, cultivated in orchards, while beyond were its dense and inexhaustible forests of fir, pine, and cedar. Human labour could be obtained to almost any extent, for the neighbourhood was populous, and Alexander's authority acknowledged by all. Accordingly the work, once commenced, for a while made fair progress. Piles were cut in the mountain, which were driven with much ease into the soft mud of the channel, which was shallow near the shore,[14379] and completely under the control of the Macedonians, since the Tyrian vessels could not approach it for fear of sticking in the ooze. Between the piles, towards the edge of the mole, were sunk stones, trunks of trees, and material of the more solid character, while the central part was filled up with rubble and rubbish of every sort and kind. Still, the operation was toilsome and tedious, even from the first, while the further that the mole was advanced into the sea, the more difficult and dangerous became its construction. The channel deepened gradually from a few feet towards the shore to eighteen or twenty,[14380] as it approached the island. The Tyrians in their vessels were soon able to act. In small boats at first, and afterwards in their triremes, they attacked and annoyed the workmen, perpetually hindered their work, and occasionally destroyed portions of it.[14381] Damage was also inflicted by the wind and waves; and the rate of progress became, in consequence, exceedingly slow. A strong current set through the channel, and this was continually working its way among the interstices of the mole, washing holes in its sides and face, and loosening the interior of the structure. When a storm arose, the surf broke over the top of the work, and did even greater damage, carrying portions of the outer casing into the sea.

To meet the assaults of the Tyrian ships upon the work, the Macedonians constructed two movable towers, well protected against torches and weapons by curtains made of raw hides,[14382] and advancing these upon the surface of the mole to the points most threatened, discharged from the engines which the towers contained darts and stones of a large size against the Tyrian sailors. Thus protected, the workmen were able to make sensible progress, and the Tyrians began to fear that, unless they could destroy the towers, the mole would ere long be completed. For the accomplishment of their purpose, they resolved to employ a fire-ship.[14383] Selecting one of the largest of their horse-transports, they stowed the hold with dry brushwood and other combustible materials; and erecting on the prow two masters, each with a projecting arm, attached to either a cauldron, filled with bitumen and sulphur, and with every sort of material apt to kindle and nourish flame. By loading the stern of the transport with stones of a large size, they succeeded in depressing it and correspondingly elevating the prow, which was thus prepared to glide over the smooth surface of the mole and bring itself into contact with the towers. In the fore part of the ship were deposited a quantity of torches, resin, and other combustibles. Watching an opportunity when the wind blew strongly from the seaward straight upon the mole, they towed the vessel at their best speed in the direction of the towers, set it on fire, and then, loosing their hawsers, allowed it to dash itself upon the work. The prow slid over the top a certain distance and then stopped. The arms projecting from the masts broke off at the sudden check,[14384] and scattered the contents of the cauldrons around. The towers caught fire and were at once in a blaze. The Macedonians found it impossible to extinguish the flames, since the Tyrian triremes, drawing close to the mole, prevented approach by flights of arrows and other missiles. "At the same time, the full naval force of the city, both ships and little boats, was sent forth to land men at once on all parts of the mole. So successful was this attack, that all the Macedonian engines were burnt—the outer woodwork which kept the mole together was torn up in many places—and a large part of the structure came to pieces."[14385] A heavy sea, moreover, accompanied the gale of wind which had favoured the conflagration, and penetrating the loosened work, carried the whole into deep waters.[14386]

Alexander had now seriously to consider what course he should take. Hitherto his attempt had proved an entire failure. Should he relinquish it? To do so would be to acknowledge himself baffled and defeated, to tarnish the prestige which he held so dear, and to cripple the plans that he had formed against Persia. It was simply impossible that Alexander, being the man he was, should so act. No—he must persevere—he must confront and overcome his difficulties—he must repair the damages that he had suffered, restore his lost works, and carry them out on a larger scale, and with more skill than before. He gave orders therefore for an enlargement and alteration of the mole, which he no longer carried across the strait in a direct line, but inclined to the south-west,[14387] so that it might meet the force of the prevalent wind, instead of exposing its flank to the violent gusts. He also commanded the construction of fresh towers and fresh engines, stronger and more in number than the former ones.[14388] But this alone would not, he felt, be enough. His designs had been frustrated hitherto solely from the fact that the Tyrians were masters of the sea; and it was plain to him that, so long as this state of things remained unaltered, it was next to impossible that he should succeed. The great desideratum—the one condition of success—was the possession of a powerful fleet. Such a fleet must be either built or collected. Leaving therefore the restoration of the mole and the engines to his generals, Alexander went in person to Sidon, and there set himself to gather together as large a fleet as he could. Most opportunely it happened that, either shortly before Alexander's arrival or immediately afterwards, the ships of Sidon, Aradus, and Byblus, which had been serving with the Persian naval force in the AEgean, had been required by their respective commanders to proceed homewards, and, to the number of eighty, had sailed into the harbour of Sidon.[14389] The kings had, in fact, deserted the Persian cause on hearing that their cities had submitted to Alexander, and readily placed their respective squadrons at his disposal. Further contingents were received from other quarters—from Rhodes ten triremes, from the seaports of Lycia the same number, from Soli and Mallus three, from Macedonia a single penteconter.[14390] The number of the vessels was thus brought up to one hundred and four; but even with such a fleet it would have been rash to engage the Tyrian navy; and Alexander would probably have had to build an additional squadron had he not received, suddenly and unexpectedly, the adhesion of the princes of Cyprus. Cyprus, being an island, was as yet in no danger, and might have been expected at least to remain neutral until the fate of Tyre was decided; but, for reasons that history has not recorded, the petty kings of the island about this time—some months after the battle of Issus—resolved to desert Persia, to detach themselves wholly from Tyre, and to place their navy at the disposal of the Macedonians.[14391] The number of their triremes amounted to 120; and Alexander, having now under his command a fleet of 224 sail, could no longer feel any doubt of being able to wrest the supremacy at sea from the unfortunate Tyrians.

Accordingly, after allowing his ships a period of eleven days for nautical practice, and placing on board a number of his bravest soldiers,[14392] Alexander sailed out from Sidon at the head of his entire fleet, and made straight for Tyre in order of battle. He himself in person commanded the right wing, the post of danger, since it held the open sea, and had under him the bulk of the Cyprian ships, with their commanders. Pnytagoras of Salamis and Craterus led the left wing, which was composed mainly of the vessels furnished by the Phoenician towns upon the mainland, and held its course at no great distance from the shore. The Tyrians, who had received no intelligence from without, saw with astonishment the great fleet, nearly three times as large as their own,[14393] bearing down upon them in orderly array, and challenging them to the combat. They had not now the spirit of ancient times, when no disparity of force dismayed them. Surprised and alarmed, they resolved to decline a battle, to remain within their ports, and to use their ships for blocking the entrances. Alexander, advancing from the north, when he saw the mouth of the Sidonian harbour, which faced northwards, strongly guarded, did not attempt to force it, but anchored his vessels outside, and established a blockade, the maintenance of which he entrusted to the Cyprian squadron. The next day he ordered the Phoenician ships to proceed southwards, and similarly block and watch the southern or Egyptian harbour.[14394] For himself, he landed upon the mole, and pitching his tent near the south-western corner, there established himself.[14395]

The mole had not advanced very much during his absence. Vast efforts had been made to re-establish it, but they had not been attended with any great success.[14396] Whole trees, torn up by the roots, and with their branches still adhering to them, had been dragged to the water's edge, and then precipitated into the strait;[14397] a layer of stones and mud had been placed upon them, to solidify them into a mass; on the top of this other trees had been placed, and the former process repeated. But the Tyrians had met the new tactics with new methods. They had employed divers to attach hooks to the boughs where they projected into the sea, and by sheer force had dragged the trees out from the superincumbent mass, bringing down in this way large portions of the structure.[14398] But with Alexander's coming, and the retirement of the Tyrian fleet, all this was altered. Alexander's workmen were no longer impeded, except from the town, and in a short time the mole was completed across the channel and carried up to the very foot of the defences. The new towers, which had replaced the burnt ones, were brought up close to the walls, and plied the new machines which Cyprian and Phoenician engineers had constructed for their new master.[14399] The battering of the wall began. Engines moreover of a large size were placed on horse-transports furnished by Sidon, and on the heavier and clumsier of the triremes, and with these attacks were made upon the town in various places, all round the circuit of the walls, which, if they did nothing else, served to distract the attention of the defenders. To meet such assailants the Tyrians had let down huge blocks of stone into the sea, which prevented the approach of the ships, and hindered those on board from using the battering ram. These blocks the Macedonians endeavoured to weigh up and remove by means of cranes; but their vessels were too unsteady for the purpose, whereupon they proceeded to anchor them. The Tyrians went out in boats well protected, and passing under the stems and sterns of the vessels, cut the cables, whereupon the Macedonians kept an armed watch upon the cables in boats of their own, which the Tyrians did not venture to attack. They were not, however, without resource even yet, since they contrived still to cut the cables by means of divers. At last the Macedonians bethought themselves of using chains for cables instead of ropes; these could not be cut, and the result was that at length they succeeded in dragging the stones away and obtaining access to the foot of the walls wherever they pleased.[14400]

Under these circumstances, threatened on every side, and feeling almost at the last gasp, the Tyrians resolved on a final desperate effort. They would make a bold attempt to recover the command of the sea. As the Macedonian fleet was divided, part watching the Sidonian and part the Egyptian harbour, they could freely select to contend with which portion they preferred. Their choice fell upon the Cyprian contingent, which was stationed to the north of the mole, keeping guard on the "Portus Sidonius." This they determined to attack, and to take, if possible, by surprise. Long previously they had spread sails along the mouth of the harbour, to prevent their proceedings inside it from being overlooked.[14401] They now prepared a select squadron of thirteen ships—three of them quinqueremes, three quadriremes, and seven triremes—and silently placing on board their best sailors and the best and bravest of their men-at-arms, waited till the hour of noon, when the Cyprian crews would be taking their mid-day meal, and Alexander might be expected, according to his general habit, to have retired to his tent on the opposite side of the mole. When noon came, still in deep silence, they issued from the harbour in single file, each crew rowing gently without noise or splash, or a word spoken, either by the boatswains or by anyone else. In this way they came almost close to the Cyprians without being perceived: then suddenly the boatswains gave out their cry, and the men cheered, and all pulled as hard as they could, and with splash and dash they drove their ships against the enemy's, which were inert, lying at anchor, some empty, others hurriedly taking their crews on board. The ships of three Cyprian kings—Pnytagoras, king of Salamis, Androcles, king of Amathus, and Pasicrates, king of Curium[14402]—were at once run down and sunk.[14403] Many others were disabled; the rest fled, pursued by the Tyrians, and sought to reach the shore. All would probably have been lost, had not Alexander returned from his tent earlier than usual, and witnessed the Tyrian attack. With his usual promptitude, he at once formed his plan. As only a portion of the Cyprian fleet had maintained the blockade, while the remainder of their ships were lying off the north shore of the mole with their crews disembarked, he set to work to man these, and sent them off, as each was got ready, to station themselves at the mouth of the harbour, and prevent any more of the Tyrian vessels from sallying forth. He then hurried to the southern side of the mole, where the Greco-Phoenician squadron kept guard, and manning a certain number of the vessels,[14404] sailed with them round the western shore of the island into the northern bay, where the Tyrians and the remnant of the Cyprian fleet were still contending. Those in the city perceived the movement, and made every effort to signal it to their sailors, but in vain. The noise and uproar of the battle prevented them from hearing until it was too late. It was not till Alexander had entered the northern bay that they understood, and turned and fled, pursued by his ships, which captured or disabled the greater number. The crews, however, and the men-at-arms, escaped, since they threw themselves overboard, and easily swam into the harbour.[14405]

This was the last attempt of the Tyrians by sea. They were now invested on every side, and hopelessly shut up within their defences. Still, however, they made a desperate resistance. On the side of the mole the Macedonians, having brought up their towers and battering-ram close to the wall, attacked it with much vigour, hurling against it great masses of stone, and by constant flights of darts and arrows driving the defenders from the battlements.[14406] At the same time the battering-rams were actively plied, and every effort made to effect a breach. But the Tyrians deadened the blows of the rams and the force of the stones by letting down from the walls leathern bags filled with sea-weed at the points assailed;[14407] while, by wheels which were set in rapid motion, they intercepted the darts and javelins wherewith they were attacked, and broke them or diverted them from their intended courses.[14408] When boarding-bridges were thrown from the towers to the top of the walls, and an attempt was made to pass troops into the town across them, they flung grappling hooks among the soldiers on the bridges, which caught in their bodies and lacerated them, or dragged their shields from their hands, or sometimes hauled them bodily into the air, and then dashed them against the wall or against the ground.[14409] Further, they made ready masses of red-hot metal, and hurled them against the towers and the scaling-parties.[14410] They also heated sand over fires and poured it from the battlements on all who approached the foot of the wall; this, penetrating between the armour and the skin, inflicted such intolerable pain that the sufferers were forced to tear off their coats of mail, whereupon they were easily transfixed by arrows or long lances.[14411] With scythes they cut the ropes and thongs by means of which the rams were worked;[14412] and at last, armed with hatchets, they sprang from the battlements upon the Macedonian boarding-bridges, and in a hand-to-hand combat defeated and drove back their assailants.[14413] Finally, when, despite of all their efforts, the outer wall began to give way, they constructed an inner wall to take its place, broader and stronger than the other.[14414]

Alexander, after a time, became convinced that his endeavours to take the city from the mole were hopeless, and turned his attention to the sea defences, north and south of the mole, which were far less strong than those which he had hitherto been attacking.[14415] He placed his best engines and his boarding-bridges upon ships, and proceeded to batter the sea walls in various places. On the south side, near the Egyptian harbour, he found a weak place, and concentrating his efforts upon it, he succeeded in effecting a large breach.[14416] He then gave orders for a general assault.[14417] The two fleets were commanded to force simultaneously the entrances to the two harbours; other vessels to make demonstrations against the walls at all approachable points; the army collected on the mole to renew its assaults; while he himself, with his trustiest soldiers, delivered the main attack at the southern breach.[14418] Two vessels were selected for the purpose. On one, which was that of Coenus, he embarked a portion of the phalanx; on the other, which was commanded by Admetus, he placed his bodyguard, himself accompanying it. The struggle was short when once the boarding-bridges were thrown across and rested on the battered wall. Fighting under the eye of their king, the Macedonians carried all before them, though not without important losses. Admetus himself, who was the first to step on to the wall, received a spear thrust, and was slain.[14419] But the soldiers who were following close behind him maintained their footing, and in a little time got possession of several towers, with the spaces between them. Alexander was among the foremost of those who mounted the breach,[14420] and was for a while hotly engaged in a hand-to-hand fight with the enemy. When those who resisted him were slain or driven off, he directed his troops to seize the royal palace, which abutted on the southern wall, and through it make their entrance into the town.[14421]

Meanwhile, the Greco-Phoenician fleet on the south side of the mole had burst the boom and other obstacles by which the Egyptian harbour was closed, and, attacking the ships within, had disabled some, and driven the rest ashore, thus gaining possession of the southern port and a ready access to the adjacent portion of the city.[14422] The Cyprians, moreover, on the north, had forced their way into the Sidonian harbour, which had no boom, and obtained an entrance into the town on that quarter.[14423] The defences were broken through in three places, and it might have been expected that resistance would have ceased. But the gallant defenders still would not yield. A large body assembled at the Agenorium, or temple of Agenor, and there made a determined stand, which continued till Alexander himself attacked them with his bodyguard, and slew almost the entire number. Others, mounting upon the roofs of the houses, flung down stones and missiles of all kinds upon the Macedonians in the street. A portion shut themselves up in their homes and perished by their own hands. In the streets and squares there was a terrible carnage. The Macedonians were infuriated by the length of the siege, the stubbornness of the resistance, and the fact that the Tyrians had in the course of the siege publicly executed, probably by way of sacrifice, a number of their prisoners upon the walls. Those who died with arms in their hands are reckoned at eight thousand;[14424] two thousand more, who had been made prisoners, were barbarously crucified by command of Alexander round the walls of the city.[14425] None of the adult free males were spared, except the few who had taken refuge with Azemilcus the king in the temple of Melkarth, which Alexander professed greatly to revere, and a certain number whom the Sidonians, touched at last with pity, concealed on board their triremes. The women, the children, and the slaves, to the number of thirty thousand,[14426] were sold to the highest bidder.

Having worked his will, and struck terror, as he hoped, into the hearts of all who might be thinking of resisting him, Alexander concluded the Tyrian episode of his career by a religious ceremony.[14427] Entering the city from the mole in a grand procession, accompanied by his entire force of soldiers, fully armed and arrayed, while his fleet also played its part in the scene, he proceeded to the temple of Melkarth in the middle of the town, and offered his much desired sacrifice to Hercules. A gymnastic contest and a torch race formed a portion of the display. To commemorate his victory, he dedicated and left in the temple the battering-ram which had made the first impression on the southern wall, together with a Tyrian vessel, used in the service of the god, which he had captured when he bore down upon the city from Sidon with his fleet. Over the charred and half-ruined remnants of the city, into which he had introduced a certain number of colonists, chiefly Carians,[14428] he placed as ruler a member of a decayed branch of the royal family, a certain Abd-elonim, whom the Greeks called Ballonymos.[14429]



7. Phoenicia under the Greeks (B.C. 323-65)

The Phoenicians faithful subjects of Alexander—At his death Phoenicia falls, first to Laomedon, then to Ptolemy Lagi—Is held by the Ptolemies for seventy years—Passes willingly, B.C. 198, under the Seleucidae—Relations with the Seleucid princes and with the Jews—Hellenisation of Phoenicia— Continued devotion of the Phoenicians generally to trade and commerce—Material prosperity of Phoenicia.

Phoenicia continued faithful to Alexander during the remainder of his career. Phoenician vessels were sent across the AEgean to the coast of the Peloponnese to maintain the Macedonian interest in that quarter.[14430] Large numbers of the mercantile class accompanied the march of his army for the purposes of traffic. A portion of these, when Alexander reached the Hydaspes and determined to sail down the course of the Indus to the sea, were drafted into the vessels which he caused to be built,[14431] descended the river, and accompanied Nearchus in his voyage from Patala to the Persian Gulf. Others still remained with the land force, and marched with Alexander himself across the frightful deserts of Beloochistan, where they collected the nard and myrrh, which were almost its only products, and which were produced in such abundance as to scent the entire region.[14432] On Alexander's return to Babylon, Phoenicia was required to supply him with additional vessels, and readily complied with the demand. A fleet of forty-eight ships—two of them quinqueremes, four quadriremes, twelve triremes, and thirty pentaconters, or fifty-oared galleys—was constructed on the Phoenician coast, carried in fragments to Thapsacus on the Euphrates, and there put together and launched on the stream of the Euphrates, down which it sailed to Babylon.[14433] Seafaring men from Phoenicia and Syria were at the same time enlisted in considerable numbers, and brought to Alexander at his new capital to man the ships which he was building there, and also to supply colonists for the coasts of the Persian Gulf and the islands scattered over its surface.[14434] Alexander, among his many projects, nourished an intention of adding to his dominions, at any rate, the seaboard of Arabia, and understood that for this purpose he must establish in the Persian Gulf a great naval power, such as Phoenicia alone out of all the countries under his dominion was able to furnish. His untimely death brought all these schemes to an end, and plunged the East into a sea of troubles.

In the division of Alexander's empire, which followed upon his death, Phoenicia was at first assigned, together with Syria, to Laemedon, and the two formed together a separate satrapy.[14435] But, after the arrangement of Triparadisus (B.C. 320), Ptolemy Lagi almost immediately attacked Laemedon, dispossessed him of his government, and attached it to his own satrapy of Egypt.[14436] Six years later (B.C. 314), attacked in his turn by Antigonus, Ptolemy was forced to relinquish his conquests,[14437] none of which offered much resistance excepting Tyre. Tyre, though no more than eighteen years had elapsed since its desolation by Alexander, had, like the fabled phoenix, risen again from its ruins, and through the recuperative energy of commerce had attained almost to its previous wealth and prosperity.[14438] Its walls had been repaired, and it was defended by its Egyptian garrison with pertinacity. Antigonus, who was master of the Phoenician mainland, established dockyards at Sidon, Byblus, and Tripolis, set eight thousand sawyers and labourers to cut down timber in Lebanon, and called upon the kings of the coast towns to build him a fleet with the least possible delay.[14439] His orders were carried out, and Tyre was blockaded by sea and land for the space of fifteen months, when the provisions failed and the town was forced to surrender itself.[14440] The garrison marched out with the honours of war, and Phoenicia became an appendage of the empire (for such it was) of Antigonus.