An account of the present results of comparative philology in reference to Persian is given by professor Max Mueller in Bunsen's Philosophy of History, vol. i. p. 110. E. T. The Persian theology brought to light by these investigations is discussed by A. Franck, in a paper, Les Doctrines Religieuses et Philosophiques de la Perse, in his Etudes Orientales, 1861; also in Dr. John Wilson's Parsi Religion, 1843; Martin Haug's Essays on the Parsis, 1861, founded on Burnouf's researches; and in archdeacon Hardwick's Christ and other Masters, part iv. ch. iii. (Hyde's Hist. Relig. Vet. Pers. 1700, is obsolete.)

2. The Sanskrit literature has been the subject of still more careful study by a series of learned men. See Donaldson's Cratylus, b. i. ch. ii. 36. 3d ed. Nearly the whole of the literature indirectly offers materials for a history of the alteration and deterioration of religious and ethical ideas, and of the relation of schools of philosophy to a national creed preserved by the priesthood and deposited in books esteemed sacred. The literary works can be placed in their relative order, though the absence of all chronological dates from the time of the contact of the Indians with the Greeks (third century B.C.), down to the visits of the Chinese Buddhist pilgrims in the fourth and seventh centuries A.D., whose works have been translated into French by A. Remusat and Stanislas Julien,(1055) and the Mahometan histories, renders the determination of absolute dates impossible. The following are the dates approximately given for the chief works of Sanskrit literature. The Vedas, especially the oldest, date from B.C. 1200 to 600. The Epic Poems, the Ramayana and Mahabharata, are perhaps of the third century B.C.; the laws of Manu, or more truly of the family which claimed descent from the mythical Manu, contain materials dating from several centuries B.C., but were put into their present form probably several centuries A.D.; the Bhagavat Gita, an episode in the Mahabharata bearing traces of a Christian influence, dates some centuries A.D. The Hindu drama is perhaps subsequent to 500 A.D. The Puranas carry on the literature to mediaeval times. Several of the systems of philosophy were probably constructed anterior to the Christian era; but the date at which they were put into their present form is undetermined.

The earlier literature is regarded as the most valuable for the study of the growth of religious ideas and institutions. The development or deterioration may be traced from the simple nature-worship of the Vedas, to the accumulation of legends which disgrace the modern creed. The causes which gave birth to mythology are no longer a matter of conjecture; the study of the Sanskrit language and literature having exhibited an historical instance of it. In this way the early Sanskrit literature becomes one of the most precious treasures to the mental philosopher who approaches his subject from the historical side.

The earliest Veda is in course of publication by professor Max Mueller. It has been partly translated by the late professor H. H. Wilson, and wholly by Langlois. Mr. M. Mueller has given the results of his studies of this early literature in his admirable work, the History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 1859; which is full of instruction for the philosopher who is inquiring concerning intellectual and religious history. Most of the other works named above have also been translated into European languages, viz. the Epic Poems,—the Ramayana, in Italian by Gorresio, and in French by H. Fauche, 1854; and Episodes from the Mahabharata by P. E. Foucaux, 1862;—also the Laws of Manu,(1056) in English by Sir W. Jones, and in French by A. Loiseleur Des-Lonchamps; the Bhagavat Gita by Wilkins, 1809, the text of which was edited by Schlegel, 1823; the 2d ed. by C. Lassen, 1846. One of the Puranas (the Vishnu) has been translated by Wilson; and part of the Bhagavat by Burnouf, who has also edited the text.

Concerning the systems of Hindu philosophy; see Ritter's History of Philosophy, E. T. vol. iv. b. xii. ch. v; Archer Butler's Lectures on Philosophy, vol. i. p. 243 seq.; Colebrooke's Essays on the Philosophy of the Hindus, 1837; Aphorisms of Hindu Philosophy, printed under the care of Dr. Ballantyne for the Benares government college; and Dr. R. Williams's Christianity and Hinduism, 1856. The work of the late archdeacon Hardwick, Christ and other Masters, also contains a brief account of three of the systems of philosophy, the Vedanta, founded on the sacred books, the Sankhya or atheistic, and the Yoga or mystic, together with a comparison of them with Christianity (part ii.). An explanation of a part of the Nyaya or Logical Philosophy, is given by Max Mueller in the Appendix to Dr. Thomson's Outlines of the Laws of Thought, 3d ed.

On the system of thought in Buddhism, on which the study of the Pali has thrown light, consult E. Burnouf's Introduction a l'Histoire du Buddhisme Indien; and Spence Hardy's Manual of Budhism, 1853. Also archdeacon Hardwick's work above named. The Hindu history, exhibiting its double movement, of philosophy on the one hand and of the Buddhist reformation on the other, has been thought to offer a distant analogy to the mental history of Europe in the double movement of the scholastic philosophy and the reformation.

The celebrated works of C. Lassen, Indische Alterthumskunde, 1844-47, and A. Weber, Indische Studien, 1850, are well known as sources of information in reference to the general subject. Also Dr. J. Muir has lately published (1858) Sanskrit Texts on the Origin and Progress of the Religion and Institutions of India. Several articles in reviews have appeared which contain much popular information; e.g. in the North British Review, Nov. 1858; Westminster Review, April 1860; Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1860. On the general subject of this note compare also Quinet, OEuvres, t. i. 1. 2, 3.



Note 4. p. 12. The Controversy Between Christians And Jews.

The history of the controversy of Christianity with Judaism is so connected in the writings of the early apologists with the contemporaneous one directed against Paganism, and in recent times so related in one of its aspects to rationalism, that these reasons seem sufficient, independently of the literary interest, to justify the insertion of a brief notice of it, and of the sources of information with respect to it.

The controversy with the Jew varies in different ages. We can distinguish three separate phases; (1) that which is seen in the early centuries, (2) in the middle ages, and early modern times, (3) the position which is taken up by the educated Jew at the present day. The sources for understanding the contest are, partly the Jewish writings, and partly those of Christians who have written against them.

1. In the early ages the controversy merely turned upon the question whether Jesus was the Christ. The Jews did not deny the fact of the Christian miracles, but explained them away; and the controversy accordingly turned on the interpretation of Jewish prophecy. This phase of the contest is seen in the New Testament, in the Apology of Justin Martyr against Trypho, to which a new kind of objection expressive of prejudice is added in the discourse which Celsus, as preserved in Origen (Contr. Cels. b. i. and ii.), puts into the mouth of the Jew whom he introduces. In reference to it, the commentators on these fathers, and especially Semisch's work on Justin Martyr (translated), and the works on the Jewish Talmudic literature and philosophy, may be consulted. The contest is continued at intervals in treatises by inferior writers; an account of which may be found in the sources of information hereafter given, and in Hagenbach's Dogmengesch. 144.

2. The second phase of the contest is seen in the middle ages, and in modern times till about 1700 A.D. It is marked by two lines of thought on the part of the Jewish writers; a system of defence of their own tenets by a method of scriptural interpretation; and the attack of calumny or of argument against Christianity. The former existed especially in Moorish Spain about the twelfth century, the golden age of Jewish literature. For a brief account of the theological literature of the Jewish nation at that time, and in the period which had intervened since the early ages, the writer may be permitted to refer to one of his own Sermons, and the references there given (Science in Theology, 1859, Sermon IV.); to which references add Beugnot's Les Juifs d'Occident, 1820, and the new work of De Los Rios on Spanish Literature. The movement included both a philosophical side in Maimonides, and a critical in Jarchi, Aben Ezra, Kimchi, &c.

The other movement, which was hostile to Christianity, was marked by a series of works, written by Jews for their own nation, and carefully hidden from the sight of Christians, probably for fear of persecution and suffering; which were given to the world by the learning of the foreign Hebrew scholars of the seventeenth century. The chief of these works are, the _Nizzachon Vetus_ of the twelfth century, first published in Wagenseil's _Tela Ignea Satanae_, 1681. In the thirteenth, the _Disputatio Jechielis cum Nicholao_, _Disputatio Nachmanidis cum fratre Paolo_, and the celebrated _Toldos Jeschu_ or Jewish view of Christ's life. About 1399 the Rabbin Lipmann wrote the second book _Nizzachon_, which was published by Hackspan, 1644; and also the _Carmen Memoriale_; and about 1580(1057) the Rabbin Isaac wrote the noted _Chissuk Emuna_, or _Munimen Fidei_. All these (with the exception of the second _Nizzachon_) are contained in Wagenseil. During the period one important defence of Christianity against the Jews appeared, the _Pugio Fidei_ by Raymund Martin, in Arragon, about 1278, which has been edited with an introduction by De Voisin 1651, and by Carpzov. Another defence was by Alphonso de Spina. _Fortalitium Fidei contra Judaeos, Saracenos_, 1487. In Eichhorn's _Geschichte _ der Literatur_, vol. vi. 26, another treatise is named by a writer called Hieronymus, 1552.

During the period just considered the contest with the Jews was carried on chiefly in Spain, or the few Jewish settlements of Lithuania. Henceforth it is chiefly seen in Germany and Holland, where the learned Dutch and German theologians of the seventeenth century were brought into contact with them, or were attracted to the study of the controversy by an interest in the newly awakened taste for Hebrew learning. This age supplies works of great value in gaining a knowledge of Jewish literature, some of which will be named below, and a few treatises, such as, one by Micraelius (De Messia, 1647); a brief notice by Hoornbeek, Summa Controv. 1653 (p. 65); an unfinished treatise by Hulsius, Theologia Judaica, 1653; and one by Cocceius, Jud. Respons. Consid. 1662. The activity of the Jews is seen in the fact that an unfair attack by Bentz, 1614, was answered in the Theriaca Judaica of the Jew Salomo Zebi, Hanover 1615, which again met with a Christian respondent in Wulferus, 1681. Also Limborch had a dispute with a Jew in his Amica Collatio cum Erudito Judaeo (Dr. Orobius), 1687. The controversy continued through the eighteenth century, probably outlasting its cause; for defences on the side of the Jews ceased. We meet with two works by Difenbach, Judaeus Convertendus, 1696, and Judaeus Conversus, 1709; Calvoer's Gloria Christi, 1710; Mornaeus' De Verit. Relig. Christianae, 1707; and, in England, Bp. Kidder's and Dr. Stanhope's Boyle Lectures, the former of which was the basis of the treatise, The Demonstration of the Messias, 1700; and C. Leslie's Short Method with the Jews. Catalogues of the writings, of which the above are the best known, may be found in J. A. Fabricius's Biblioth. Graec. (ed. 1715), vii. 125; and De Verit. Relig. Christianae, 1725, ch. xxxi; and Blasphemia Judaeorum, Id. ch. xxxvii; Walch's Biblioth. Theol. Selecta, vol. i. c. v. sect. 8. (1757); also in Bartollocci's Dictionary of Jewish Authors, 1678, and Imbonati's Dictionary of Christian Writers concerning the Jews, 1694; and especially in Wolff's Biblioth. Hebr., 1715, and De Rossi's Dizionario degli Autori Ebrei, 1802. For information concerning sources of Jewish theology and literature, it is enough to cite Hottinger's Historia Orientalis, Carpzov's Introductio, and Owen's Prelim. Exercitationes.

3. In the third phase of the controversy, viz. that which exists with the modern Jew, the controversy is a little changed. The old prejudices against Christianity are in a great degree made obsolete by the freedom of commercial intercourse, and the enjoyment of protection and civil liberty; and hence the contest takes two forms; either the continuation of the argument concerning the meaning of Jewish prophecy, or a discussion on the function of the Jewish religion in history. Sources for the former are found in the older books of evidence. A digest of the arguments concerning it is given in J. Fabricius (not the celebrated Fabricius), Consideratio Variarum Controversiarum, 1704, p. 41, and in Stapfer's Institut. Theolog. Polemic, vol. iii. 1-288, 1752; or in the modern works, Greville Ewing's Essays addressed to the Jews, and Dr. McCaul's Old Paths, 1837, and his Warburton Lectures, 1846. The condition of Jewish life and thought may he seen in Allen's Modern Judaism. The system of interpretation on which the controversy is conducted is either the ancient Messianic and allegorical of the Targums and Talmud, or the literal and grammatical introduced by the Spanish mediaeval commentators.(1058)

The other form of Jewish argument which Christians have to encounter is more novel, and, being confined to educated Jews, its influence is less wide, and does not actuate the stratum of Jewish life with which missionaries generally come into contact. It is based on modern rationalist speculations, and is seen in a work of Dr. Philippsohn, late rabbin at Magdeburg, Development of the Religious Idea in Judaism, Christianity, and Mahometanism, (translated both into English 1855, and also into French,) and in the writings of Salvador. Dr. Philippsohn regards the mission of Judaism to be, from first to last, to teach to the world the lesson of monotheism. He traces the struggle in the Jewish church between priestism and prophetism; and regards Christianity as an abnormal form of the latter, which has led the world away to Tritheism: and, so far from regarding the office of Judaism to be extinct, he considers that its mission is still to restore monotheism to the world. A comparison with the statement of the views of the Tuebingen school in Lect. VII. or the speculations of Mr. Mackay in Lect. VIII. will show how completely this argument is borrowed from the later forms of German historical criticism.

The views of Salvador in France (see p. 299) are too original to be regarded as typical of the views of a party. They reproduce the critical difficulties of Maimonides and Spinoza, which seem never to have found favour with the Jews; but the general similarity of the doctrinal part of Salvador's system to that just described is very observable.



Note 5. p. 12. The Contest Of Christianity With Mahometanism.

The contest of Christianity with Mahometanism, so far as it has been a struggle of argument and not of the sword, offers few remarkable points. In the first sweep of the Mahometan conquest, when the Christian nations succumbed both in the east and west, there was no field for a question of truth. It was only in Christian nations which were removed from peril, and yet sufficiently in contact to entertain the question of the claims of the Mahometan religion, that a consideration of its nature, regarded as a system of doctrine, could arise. Accordingly it is in Constantinople, or in Spain and the other parts of western Europe which came into connexion with the Moors, that works of this character appear.

The history may be conveniently arranged in three periods, each of which is marked by works of defence, some called forth by danger, a real demand, but subsiding into or connected with inquiries prompted only by literary tastes. The first is from the twelfth to the middle of the sixteenth century; the second during the seventeenth and eighteenth; the third during the present century.

1. A notice of the Mahometan religion exists in a work of J. Damascenus, in the eighth century; and Euthymius Zigabenus, a Byzantine writer of the twelfth: but the first important treatise written directly against it was in 1210, Richardi Confutatio, edited in 1543 by Bibliander from a Greek copy. The refutation of Averroes by Aquinas, about 1250, can hardly be quoted as an instance of a work against the Mahometan religion, being rather against its philosophy. A treatise exists by John Cantacuzene, written a little after 1350; which is to be explained probably by the circumstance that the danger from Mahometan powers in the east directed the attention of a literary man to the religion and institutions which they professed. Thus far the works were called forth by a real demand.

A series of treatises however commences about the time of the expulsion of the Moors from Spain, the cause of the existence of which is not so easy of explanation. Such are those in Spain by Alphonso de Spina, 1487, and by Turrecremata (see Eichhorn's Gesch. der Lit. vi.); by Nicholas de Cuza, published in 1543; in Italy about 1500 by Ludovicus Vives, and Volterranus; one by Philip Melancthon in reference to the reading of the Koran; and a collection of treatises, including those of Richardus, Cantacuzene, Vives, and Melancthon, published by Bibliander in 1543. Probably the first two of this list may have been the relic of the crusade of Christianity against the Moorish religion; the next two possibly were called forth by the interest excited in reference to Mahometans by reason of their conquests, or less probably by the influence of their philosophy at Padua (see Lect. III. p. 100 seq.). The two last are hardly to be explained, except by supposing them to be an offshoot of the Renaissance, and called forth by the largeness of literary taste and inquiry excited by that event.

2. When we pass into the seventeenth century, we find a series of treatises on the same subject, which must be explained by the cause just named, the newly acquired interest in Arabic and other eastern tongues. We meet however with others, called forth by the missionary exertions which had brought the Christians into contact with Mahometans in the east.

The treatise by Bleda, Defensio Fidei Christianae, 1610, stands alone, unconnected with any cause. It was partly a defence of the conduct of Christians towards the Mahometans. A real interest however belongs to the work of Guadagnoli in 1631. A catholic missionary, Hieronymo Xavier, had composed in 1596 a treatise in Persian against Mahometanism, in which the general principle of theism was laid down as opposed to the Mahometan doctrine of absorption; next the peculiar doctrines of Christianity stated; and lastly, a contrast drawn between the two religions. See Lee's Tracts on Christianity and Mahometanism (below, pref. p. 5 seq.).

This work was answered in 1621 by a Persian nobleman named Ahmed Ibn Zain Elebidin. The line adopted by him was, (1) to show that the coming of Mahomet was predicted in the Old Testament (Hab. iii. 3); (2) to argue that Mahomet's teaching was not more opposed to Christ's than his was to that of Moses, and that therefore both ought to be admitted, or both rejected; (3) to point out critically the discrepancies in the Gospels; (4) to attack the doctrines of the Trinity and Christ's deity. (Lee, pref. 41 seq.)

This work was answered (1631) by a treatise in Latin by P. Guadagnoli, dedicated to Pope Urban VIII. It is divided into four parts; (1) respecting the objections about the Trinity; (2) the Incarnation; (3) the authority of Scripture; (4) the claims of the Koran and of Mahomet. (Lee, pref. 108 seq. who also gives references (p. 113) to a few other writers, chiefly in the seventeenth century.)

The further works of defence produced in this century arose as it were accidentally. The lengthy summary of the Mahometan controversy in Hoornbeek's Summa Controversiarum, 1653, p. 75 seq. was either introduced merely to give completeness to the work as a treatise on polemic, or was called forth by considerations connected with missions, as is made probable by his work De Conversione Gentilium et Indorum. Le Moyne's publication on the subject in the Varia Sacra, vol. i. 1685, arose from the accidental discovery of an old treatise, Bartholomaei Edess. Confutatio Hagareni. A third work of this kind, Maracci's Criticism on the Koran, 1698, arose from the circumstance that the pope would not allow the publication of an edition of the Koran, without an accompanying refutation of each part of it. The work of Hottinger (Hist. Orient. b. i.), Pfeiffer's Theol. Judaica et Mahom. and Kortholt's De Relig. Mahom. 1663, form the transition into an independent literary investigation; which is seen in the literary inquiries concerning the life of Mahomet, as well as his doctrine, in Pocock, Prideaux 1697, Reland 1707, Boulainvilliers 1730, and the translation of the Koran by Sale 1734. A slightly controversial tone pervades some of them. The materials collected by them were occasionally used by deist and infidel writers (e.g. by Chubb), for instituting an unfavourable comparison between Christ and Mahomet.

The great literary historians of that period give lists of the previous writers connected with the investigation. See J. A. Fabricius, Biblioth. Graec. ed. 1715, vol. vii. p. 136; Walch, Biblioth. Theol. Sel. vol. i. chap. v. sect. 9. A summary of the arguments used in the controversy is given in J. Fabricius, Delectus Argumentorum, p. 41, &c. and Stapfer's Inst. Theol. Polem. iii. p. 289, &c.

3. In the present century the literature in reference to Mahometanism is, as in the former instances, twofold in kind. Part of it has been called forth by missionary contests in the east; part by literary or historic tastes, and the modern love of carrying the comparative method of study into every branch of history.

The first class is illustrated by the discussions at Shiraz in 1811, between the saintly Henry Martyn and some Persian Moollas. The controversy was opened by a tract, sophistical but acute, written by Mirza Ibrahim; (Lee, pp. 1-39); the object of which was to show the superiority of the standing miracle seen in the excellence of the Koran, over the ancient miracles of Christianity. Martyn replied to this in a series of tracts (Lee, p. 80 seq.), and was again met by Mohammed Ruza of Hamadan, in a much more elaborate work, in which, among other arguments, the writer attempts to show predictions of Mahomet in the Old Testament, and in the New applying to him the promise of the Paraclete (Lee, pp. 161-450). These tracts were translated in 1824, with an elaborate preface containing an account of the preceding controversy of Guadagnoli, by Professor S. Lee of Cambridge, Controversial Tracts on Christianity and Mahometanism, which is the work so frequently cited above. To complete the history it is necessary to add, that a discussion was held a few years ago between an accomplished Mahometan and Mr. French, a learned missionary at Agra.

The literary aspect of the subject, not however wholly free from controversy, was opened by White, in the Bampton Lectures for 1784; and abundant sources have lately been furnished. Among them are, Sprenger's Life of Mahomet, 1851, and Muir's, 1858. Also a new translation of the Koran by the Rev. J. M. Rodwell, where the Suras are arranged chronologically. The following ought also to be added, Dr. Macbride's Mahometan Religion Explained, 1857; Arnold on Mahometanism, 1859; Tholuck's Vermischte Schriften, i. (1-27); Die Wunder Mohammed's und der Character des Religionstifters; Dr. Stanley's Lectures on the History of the Eastern Church, lect. viii. and the references there given; Maurice's Religions of the World; and Renan's Etudes d'Histoire Religieuse. (Ess. iv.) The modern study has been directed more especially to attain a greater knowledge of Mahomet's life, character, and writings; the antecedent religious condition of Arabia;(1059) and the characteristics of Mahometanism, when put into comparison with other creeds, and when viewed psychologically in relation to the human mind.

The materials also for a study of the Mahometan form of philosophy, both in itself and in its relation to the religion, have been furnished by Aug. Schmoelders, Essai sur les Ecoles Philosophiques chez les Arabes, 1842. See also Ritter's Chr. Phil. iii. 665 seq.; iv. 1-181.



Note 6. p. 12. Unitarianism.

It may be useful to indicate the chief stages of the history of Unitarianism, and the sources of information with regard to it, as it bears a close analogy to some forms of free thought, such as deism,(1060) and connects itself more or less nearly with forms of rationalism which occur in the course of the history.

The first instance of it is in the early ages, either as a Jewish Gnostic sect, Ebionitism, or in some of the other forms of Gnosticism; passing in the east into Arianism, which lowered God, and in the west into Pelagianism, which elevated man. For this period see F. Lange, Geschichte und Lehrbegriff d. Unitarier vor d. Nicaenischen Synode, 1831; Hagenbach's Dogmengeschichte, 23; and the church histories which treat of this period.

In the middle ages the tendency may be considered to be mainly represented by Mahometanism, and hardly exists at all in the Christian church.

Its modern form arises at the time of the Reformation.

1. Originating in Italy, it exists as a doctrine in Switzerland and Germany from 1525-1560. See F. Trechsel's Die Protest. Antitrinitarier vor Faustus Socinus, 1844. The best known names are Servetus, Lelio Sozini, and Ochino.

2. It exists as a church at Racow in Poland, where the exiles found a refuge. Here Faustus Sozinus (1539-1603), nephew of Lelio, and J. Crellius, are the best known names. In 1609 Schmelz drew up the Socinian Formula, the Racovian Catechism. It was also here that the collection of Socinian writers, the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, 1626, was published. The history of the sect up to this point may be found in the Introduction to Rees's Translation of the Racovian Catechism, 1818. Also see Hallam's History of Literature, i. 554. ii. 335; Mosheim's Church History, sixteenth century, 2. P. ii. ch. iv; Hase's Church History (Engl. Transl.), 371, 2. The Socinians were driven out of Poland in 1658, by the influence of the Jesuits; and, passing into Holland, became absorbed in the church of the Remonstrants or Arminians.

3. The next stage of Socinianism is, as a doctrine, in England in the seventeenth century. In 1611 two persons, Hammont and Lewis, suffered martyrdom for it; and it spread widely during the Long Parliament. (See Dr. Owen's Vind. Evangel. pref.) The chief teacher was J. Biddle (1615-1662). The interest of it arises from its supposed parallelism to the Arminianism of Hales in the time of Charles I, and to the latitudinarian party of Whichcote and More in that of Charles II. But the parallel is not quite correct. The study of Arminius's writings (see J. Nicholls's translation, 1825,) shows that he was not a Pelagian,(1061) if even his successors were. But even Episcopius and Limborch hardly reached this point. Hales resembled Episcopius. Nor is the parallel much nearer with "the latitude men;" for Socinianism lacked their Platonizing tendency. The Arian tendency, which commenced at the end of the century, both in the church, in such writers as Whiston and Clarke, and among the presbyterians, offers a nearer parallel, in being, like Socinianism, Unitarian in tendency. On this period see Hagenbach's Dogmengesch. (Notes to 234.)

4. Its next form, was as a set of congregations in England in the eighteenth century, chiefly arising out of the presbyterians; marked by great names, such as Lardner, Lowman, Priestley.(1062) Shortly before the close of the century, it was introduced into America.

5. Its last form is a modification of the old Socinian view, formed under the pressure of evangelical religion on the one side and rationalist criticism on the other. The accomplished writers, Channing in America and Mr. J. Martineau in England, are the best types of this form. Priestley, Channing, and Martineau, are the examples of the successive phases of modern Unitarianism: Priestley, of the old Socinianism building itself upon a sensational philosophy; Channing, of the attempt to gain a larger development of the spiritual element; Martineau, of the elevation of view induced by the philosophy of Cousin, and the introduction of the idea of historical progress in religious ideas. In reference to this part of the history see E. Renan's Essay on Channing, Etudes de l'Hist. Relig. p. 357; E. Ellis's Half Century of Unitarian Controversy (in America), 1858; J. J. Taylor's Retrospect of Religious Life in England, 1845; Dr. Beard's Unitarianism in its Actual State; and other references given in the notes to H. B. Smith's translation of Hagenbach's Dogmengesch. New York, 1862. ii. p. 441.

In addition to the above references, materials for the history will be found in Sandius, Biblioth. Antitrin. 1684; Bock's Hist. Antitrin. 1774; Otto Foch's Der Socinianismus, &c. 1847; and an article in the North British Review, No. 60, for May 1859. The history of the controversial literature on the subject is given in Pfaff's Introd. in Hist. Theol. Lit. vol. ii. p. 320 seq.; and more fully in Walch's Biblioth. Theol. Select. vol. i. p. 902 seq. For a digest of the arguments used in the controversy, see Hoornbeek's Summa Controv. 1653, p. 440; J. Fabricius, Consid. Var. Controv. pp. 99-208; and Stapfer's Inst. Theol. Polem. vol. iii. c. 12.



Note 7. p. 24. Classification Of Metaphysical Inquiries.

(a) This first subdivision of Metaphysics into Psychology and Ontology is very neatly stated by Professor Mansel (art. Metaphysics in Encycl. Britann. 8th ed. p. 555, and p. 23 in the reprint of the article, 1860); Cfr. also Archer Butler's Lect. on Phil. vol. i. lect. i-iii.

(b) It must be understood, that when we pass here from a division of the inquiries concerning the mind to a supposed division of the mind itself, we imply only a division of states of consciousness or mental functions, not an absolute and real division of the mind itself. Distinctness of structure is only the inference; distinctness of function is a fact, given in the act of consciousness.

(c) The distinctness of the Will, as a faculty, from the emotions will be disputed by many. It is maintained by Maine de Biran, and the Eclectic school of France. Mr. Mill, Logic, vol. ii. b. vi. ch. ii, implies the contrary, and regards Will to be a particular state of feeling.

(d) The difference of the presentative from the representative consciousness is now generally understood, since the arguments of Sir W. Hamilton have been commonly known. See his edition of Reid, note B. p. 804; Discussions, Ess. ii. and Lect. on Metaphysics; Mansel's work above cited, p. 560, 584; Morell's Phil. of Relig. ch. ii.

(e) The separation of Intuition from Perception is a point much disputed. It is maintained by Schelling and by Cousin, and made familiar by Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, i. p. 168 seq. See also Morell's Philos. of Relig. ch. ii; Hist. of Phil. ii. p. 487 seq. Among English psychologists however, intuition is identified with perception; or if slightly distinguished, as by Mr. Mansel, it is made synonymous with every "presentative" act of consciousness, and thus includes the consciousness of our own minds, as well as the sensational consciousness usually denoted by the word "perception." With reference to the view intended on this subject in these lectures, see a note on p. 28.

(f) With reference to these schools, see Morell's Hist. of Philosophy (vol. i. Introduction); and Cousin's Cours de la Philosophie du 18me Siecle.

(g) This subdivision of the subject matter of Ontology is well stated by Mansel in the Encyc. Britann. above cited, 603, 613 seq. This work of Mr. Mansel is on the whole the clearest exposition of Psychology, studied from the side of consciousness, which has appeared. Mr. Morell's recent work on Psychology presents a view different from his former ones, and unites the physiological treatment of the inquiry; being borrowed partly from the recent speculations which the teaching of Herbert has induced in Germany. See Note 41.



Note 8. p. 28. Quotation From Guizot On Prayer.

The following eloquent remarks seem worth quoting, as illustrative of the instinct in the soul of man to perform the act of prayer; the natural outgoing of the human soul after the infinite Being. They are taken from Guizot, L'Eglise et la Societe Chretienne, 1861.

"Seul entre tous les etres ici-bas l'homme prie. Parmi ses instincts moraux, il n'y en a point de plus naturel, de plus universel, de plus invincible que la priere. L'enfant s'y porte avec une docilite empressee. Le vieillard s'y replie comme dans un refuge contre la decadence et l'isolement. La priere monte d'elle-meme sur les jeunes levres qui balbutient a peine le nom de Dieu et sur les levres mourantes qui n'ont plus la force de le prononcer. Chez tous les peuples, celebres ou obscurs, civilises ou barbares, on rencontre a chaque pas des actes et des formules d'invocation. Partout ou vivent des hommes, dans certaines circonstances, a certaines heures, sous l'empire de certaines impressions de l'ame, les yeux s'elevent, les mains se joignent, les genoux flechissent, pour implorer ou pour rendre graces, pour adorer ou pour apaiser. Avec transport ou avec tremblement, publiquement ou dans le secret de son coeur, c'est a la priere que l'homme s'adresse, en dernier recours, pour combler les vides de son ame ou porter les fardeaux de sa destinee; c'est dans la priere qu'il cherche, quand tout lui manque, de l'appui pour sa faiblesse, de la consolation dans ses douleurs, de l'esperance pour sa vertu." (p. 22.)

"Il y a, dans l'acte naturel et universel de la priere, une foi naturelle et universelle dans cette action permanente, et toujours libre, de Dieu sur l'homme et sur sa destinee." (p. 24.)

" 'Les voies de Dieu ne sont pas nos voies:' nous y marchons sans les connaitre; croire sans voir et prier sans prevoir, c'est la condition que Dieu a faite a l'homme en ce monde, pour tout ce qui en depasse les limites." (p. 25.)



Note 9. p. 31. On The Modern View Of The Historical Method In Philosophy.

It has been implied in the text, at this place, and also in the preface, that the "historic method of study" is the great feature of this century. The term is ambiguous. The meaning of it however is, that each problem ought to be approached from the historic side. Whether the problem be a fact of society, or of thought, or of morals, in each case the questions are asked—What are its antecedents? how did it happen? How came it that men accepted it?—This is a method exactly the reverse of that which was common in the last century. The question then was, Is a thing true? The question now is a preliminary one, How came it that it was thought to be true? It is probable that in many minds there is a slight tendency to pantheism in this method of study. The universe is looked at as ever in course of development; evil as "good in the making;" no fact as wholly bad; no thought as wholly false. But, without involving such a tendency, whatever is true in the method may be appropriated. It starts only with the assumption that the human race is in a state of movement; and that Providence has lessons to teach us if we watch this movement. It is the method of learning by experience of the past, a lesson for conduct in the future.

The method thus explained, however, is used for two different purposes. Either it is intended to be the preliminary process preparatory to discovery, or it is designed to take the place of discovery. In the former case, we ask why men have thought a thing true, for the purpose of afterwards discovering, by the use of other methods, what is true; in the latter we rest content with the historical investigation, and consider the attempt to discover absolute truth to be impossible; and regard the problem of philosophy to be, to gather up the elements of truth in the past. In the former case truth is absolute, though particular ages may have blindly groped after it; in the latter it is relative. In the former, the history of philosophy is the preliminary to philosophy; in the latter it is philosophy. In the former, philosophy is a science; in the latter it is a form of criticism. The former view is held by the school of Schelling and Cousin; the latter is an offshoot of that of Hegel. The former marked French literature until recent years; the latter is expressed in it at the present time; and is stated by no one so clearly as by Renan and Soberer. Most English writers will justly prefer the former view; but the explanation of the latter, given in the two passages which follow, is expressed with such clearness, and will be of so much use in explaining subsequent allusions in these lectures (especially Lect. VII. and VIII.), that it is desirable to print it here.

"Le trait caracteristique du 19e siecle est d'avoir substitue la methode historique a la methode dogmatique, dans toutes les etudes relatives a l'esprit humain. La critique litteraire n'est plus que l'expose des formes diverses de la beaute, c'est a dire des manieres dont les differentes familles et les differentes ages de l'humanite ont resolu le probleme esthetique. La philosophie n'est que le tableau des solutions proposees pour resoudre le probleme philosophique. La theologie ne doit plus etre que l'histoire des efforts spontanes tentes pour resoudre le probleme divin. L'histoire, en effet, est la forme necessaire de la science de tout ce qui est soumis aux lois de la vie changeante et successive. La science des langues, c'est l'histoire des langues; la science des litteratures et des philosophies, c'est l'histoire des litteratures et des philosophies; la science de l'esprit humain c'est, de meme, l'histoire de l'esprit humain, et non pas seulement l'analyse des rouages de l'ame individuelle. La psychologie n'envisage que l'individu, et elle l'envisage d'une maniere abstraite, absolue, comme un sujet permanent et toujours identique a lui-meme; aux yeux de la critique la conscience se fait dans l'humanite comme l'individu; elle a son histoire. Le grand progres de la critique a ete de substituer la categorie du devenir a la categorie de l'etre, la conception du relatif a la conception de l'absolu, le mouvement a l'immobilite. Autrefois, tout etait considere comme etant; on parlait de philosophie, de droit, de politique, d'art, de poesie, d'une maniere absolue; maintenant tout est considere comme en voie de se faire....... A ce point de vue de la science critique, ce qu'on recherche dans l'histoire de la philosophie, c'est beaucoup moins de la philosophie proprement dite que de l'histoire."—(E. Renan, Pref. to Averroes, p. vi.)

"Tout n'est que relatif, disions-nous tout a l'heure; il faut ajouter maintenant: tout n'est que relation. Verite importune pour l'homme qui, dans le fatal courant ou il est plonge, voudrait trouver un point fixe s'arreter un instant, se faire illusion sur la vanite des choses! Verite feconde pour la science qui lui doit une intelligence nouvelle de la realite, une intuition infiniment plus penetrante du jeu des forces qui composent le monde. C'est ce principe qui a fait de l'histoire une science et de toutes les sciences une histoire. C'est en vertu de ce principe qu'il n'y a plus de philosophie mais des philosophies qui se succedent, qui se completent en se succedant, et dont chacune represente avec un element du vrai, une phase du developpement de la pensee universelle. Ainsi la science s'organise elle-meme et porte en soi sa critique. La classification rationnelle des systemes est leur succession, et le seul jugement equitable et utile qu'on puisse passer sur eux est celui qu'ils passent sur eux-memes en se transformant. Le vrai n'est plus vrai en soi. Ce n'est plus une quantite fixe qu'il s'agit de degager, un objet rond ou carre qu'on puisse tenir dans la main. Le vrai, le beau, le juste meme se font perpetuellement; ils sont a jamais en train de se constituer, parce qu'ils ne sont autre chose que l'esprit humain, qui, en se deployant, se retrouve et se reconnait."—E. Scherer, (article on Hegel in Revue des Deux Mondes, Feb. 15, 1861.)



Lecture II.



Note 10. p. 46. Neo-Platonism.

On the nature and history of Neo-Platonism, see Ritter's History of Philosophy, E. T. vol. iv. b. xiii; Creuzer's Prolegomena to Plotinus; Tennemann's Manual of Philosophy, 200-222; Hase's Church History, 50, with the references which the two latter supply; Jules Simon's and Vacherot's works on the Ecole d'Alexandrie; B. Constant's Du Polytheisme, b. xv. Among English works, see Archer Butler's Lectures on Philosophy, vol. ii. 348 seq.; Lewes' History of Philosophy; Maurice's History of Philosophy (part ii.); Donaldson's History of Greek Literature, ch. 53 and 57; and an essay in R. A. Vaughan's Essays and Remains, 1858.

The mystic and oriental tendency which Neo-Platonism embodied is seen as early as Philo in the middle of the first century; but it was Ammonius Saccus (A.D. 163-243) who developed the new system about A.D. 200. The chief teachers of it were Plotinus (born 203), who introduced it at Rome; Porphyry (233-305), who however manifested more of the mystic Pythagorean spirit and less of the dialectical Platonic; Iamblichus, a generation later, who also inclined to theurgy; and in the fifth century Hypatia, killed 415; and Proclus (412-485), who taught at Athens. A growth of thought is perceptible in the successive members of the school. The sketches of several of the above-named writers in Smith's Biographical Dictionary are full of information, and furnished with useful references.



Note 11. p. 47. The Pseudo-Clementine Literature.

The Pseudo-Clementine literature consists of Homilies and Recognitions; the latter being in a Latin translation by Rufinus. It is published in Cotelerius's Sancti Patres, 1698, vol i.

A noble Roman, harassed by his doubts and eager for truth, travels to the east, and there learns Christian truth, which makes him happy. It is the former part of the narrative, viz. the doubts of Clemens before becoming a Christian, which is alluded to in the text, and is adduced by Neander, Kirchengeschichte, i. pp. 54-56, as an instance of the preparation for the reception of Christianity made by a sense of want in many hearts. But it is the latter part which is valuable in a literary point of view, on account of the light which the exposition of Christian doctrine contained in it throws upon the Judaizing Gnostics, being an attempt to reconcile Ebionitism with the teaching of St. Paul. Its interest in this point of view has caused it to be made the subject of several monographs by German theologians. A list of them, with an account of the phases of doctrine described, is given in Kurtz's Church History, E. T. 48, and in Hase's Church History, 35, 75, and 80. One of the most important of them is Schliemann's Die Clemetinen, 1844.



Note 12. p. 48. The Absence Of References To Christianity In Heathen Writers Of The Second Century.

Tzchirner has investigated this subject in an interesting dissertation, Graeci et Romani Scriptores cur rerum Christianarum raro meminerint; Opusc. Acad. p. 283. Lips. 1829, (translated in the Journal of Sacred Literature, Jan. 1853;) and has discussed the passages where mention is made of Christianity. The following is the substance of his inquiries.

Though the notices concerning Christianity in heathen writers are scanty, the silence of Eusebius gives good ground for inferring, that not many further notices existed concerning it in the works which are lost, than have been preserved to us. Perhaps a few passages may have been erased in which Christianity was blasphemed, even in that which is preserved.

The silence concerning Christianity during the first century is not surprising; because the Christians, if known at all, would be regarded as a Jewish sect, as in Acts xviii. 15; xxiii. 29; xxv. 19. In the third century they are both noticed and attacked. The inquiry therefore with regard to the silence about them, refers only to the period from about A.D. 80-180.

During this period, among the Greek writers who omit all mention of Christianity, are Dio Chrysostom; Plutarch (for the passage, Quaest. iv, 4. 3, about happiness consisting in hope, probably does not refer to them); OEnomaus, who wrote expressly to ridicule religion; Maximus Tyrius; and Pausanias: and among Latin ones, Juvenal, who several times mentions the Jews, but only indirectly refers to the Christians (Sat. i. 185-7), Aulus Gellius, and Apuleius; (for the opinion of Warburton, Div. Leg. b. ii. 4, that an allusion is intended, is now rejected,(1063) unless one perhaps exists in Met. ix. ed. Panck. ii. 195.)

Among those who name Christians we find,—

In Trajan's reign, Tacitus, who describes their persecution by Nero (Ann. xv. 44); Suetonius, who names them, Vit. Neron. ch. 16, and describes them as seditious, Vit. Claud. 25, if indeed the word Chresto in the paragraph is intended for Christo; and Pliny the younger, in the well-known letter to Trajan (Ep. x. 96).

In the reign of Hadrian we find, in a fragment of Hadrian's works in Vopiscus's Life of Saturninus (ch. viii.) a mention of them, comparing them with Serapid worshippers; and one quoted by Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. iv. 9, addressed to a proconsul of Asia. Also Arrian names them in two passages, in one describing them as obstinate, Diss. Epictet. b. iv. ch. vii. and in the other speaking either of them or of the Jews as βαπτισταί (b. ii. ch. ii.)

In the reign of the Antonines we find Galen stigmatising them for obstinacy (De Pulsuum Diff. b. iii. ch. iii.), and for believing without proof (b. ii. ch. iv.); and Marcus Aurelius himself inquires (Comment. b. xi. ch. iii), what can be the cause of their inflexibility. His two epistles which contain allusions to Christianity, one of them attributing his victory over the Marcomanni to the thundering legion, and the other stating that it is the business of the gods and not men to punish, are rejected as spurious.

In the same reign we find Crescens and Fronto, who are treated of elsewhere, Lect. II. p. 48; and Lucian (p. 49). Tzchirner denies the allusions supposed to lurk in many passages of Lucian examined by Krebsius and Eichstadt; but, independently of those in the Peregrinus, ch. xi-xiv, on which see Lect. II and Note 13, there remains one where Alexander the magician is said to exclude Christians and Epicureans from his magical rites. In the same reign we meet with Celsus; after which time the notices of Christianity are frequent; the account of which will be found in Lardner's Works, vol. viii.

If now we pass from the facts to the cause, and ask why the notices are so few, Tzchirner very properly answers, that the silence in the first century is explained, partly by the general poverty and retirement of the Christians, and partly by the circumstance named above, that they were included among Jews. But in the second century, when Christianity was so far known that several learned men abandoned heathenism for it, such as Quadratus, Melito, Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Minucius Felix; Tzchirner refers the silence chiefly to the fact that the opinions and position of the Christians prevented them from being considered worthy of attention by members of any of those schools of philosophy whose probable opinions in reference to it have been already explained in Lect. II. Celsus alone had the far-sightedness to apprehend danger from them, both philosophically and politically.



Note 13. p. 49. The Peregrinus Proteus Of Lucian.

The question of Lucian's intention to injure Christianity has been discussed and maintained by Krebsius in a Dissertation, De Malitioso Luciani Consilio Religionem Christianam scurrili dicacitate vanam et ridiculam reddendi, Opusc. Acad. p. 308 seq. The contrary view is maintained by Eichstadt in a dissertation, Lucianus num scriptis suis adjuvare voluerit Religionem Christianam, Jena, 1822. Krebsius is extravagant in interpreting many unimportant references in Lucian as relating to Christianity. See Tzchirner, Opusc. Acad. p. 290. Neander also states his opinion on the question, Kirchengesch. i. 269 seq.

The same subject has been discussed with great care and learning by Adolph Planck, dean of Heidenheim in Wuertemburg, Lucian und Christenthum, a contribution to the church history of the second century; originally published in the Studien und Kritiken, 1851, and translated in the American Bibliotheca Sacra, April and July, 1853. He there studies Lucian's tract, the Peregrinus, (1) in the character which it offers of Peregrinus as a Cynic, for the purpose of examining the probability of his death being a parody on Christian martyrdom; (2) in his character as a Christian, in order to exhibit Lucian's opinion of Christianity and of the traits of Christian life brought out; (3) with a view to ascertain the sources and amount of Lucian's knowledge of Christianity; discussing fully, by means of quotations, the evidence of Lucian's acquaintance with the early Christian literature.

The analysis of the Peregrinus Proteus is as follows: It professes to be a letter from Lucian to Cromius narrating Peregrinus's death. Peregrinus had gone to Olympia, with the pompous design of displaying his death before the assembly at the games. Lucian lets us hear the speeches, descriptive of Peregrinus's life, delivered before the decisive act. A certain Theagenes, an admirer of Peregrinus, delivers a bombastic eulogy, 3-7, repelling the charge of vanity imputed to him, and comparing his proposed death with that of Hercules, &c. Lucian opposes to this some invectives delivered by another, whose name he professes to have forgotten, which refer, 7-30, to the history of Peregrinus to which Theagenes had alluded; tracing his crimes, his journeys from land to land, his turning Christian in Syria, his expulsion for disobedience, his subsequent wanderings and crimes, and the universal contempt which he had brought upon himself. Theagenes replies to this speech; but Lucian preferred to go to see the wrestling-match. Afterwards however he heard Peregrinus pronounce his own eulogy, and boast of his sufferings on behalf of philosophy. Then, after most of the guests had left Elis, 35, &c. Peregrinus proceeded to erect his own funeral pile, and consumed himself on it. Lucian after seeing the end went away, and added a legend about the appearance of a hawk; which story he soon afterwards found had already gained credence. The moral which he draws is, that Cromius ought to despise such people, and impute their conduct to love of fame.

The passages of the work which have specific reference to Christianity are, 11-13, which describe Peregrinus's intercourse with the Christians; and 35-41, which describe his martyrdom. The references are to Dindorf's ed. Paris 1840.



Note 14. p. 51. The Work Of Celsus.

It is difficult to obtain an exact conception of the work of Celsus. This is due partly perhaps to its original form; for Origen himself complains (Cont. Cels. i. 40) of the want of order in Celsus; and partly to the fact that a mind like that of Origen did not follow his opponent step by step, but frequently grasped a general principle which enabled him to meet a group of objections dispersed through different parts of Celsus's work.

As it was desirable for the object of the lecture to present Celsus's views rather than analyse Origen's treatise, the writer endeavoured, when preparing it, to select materials from Origen for drawing out a sketch in systematic form, somewhat in the manner of Neander's remarks (Church History, i. 274), of Celsus's views, concerning (1) God and creation; (2) man's moral state; (3) the Hebrew and Christian religions in their sacred books and doctrines. But on the publication of Pressense's work (Hist. de l'Eglise, 2e serie, ii. pp. 104-142), he perceived the plan of arrangement there suggested to possess so much more life, that he adopted it in the text. Pressense considers that, by a careful study of the fragments of Celsus quoted by Origen, he is able to reproduce a picture of the whole work, as well as to gather his opinions. Such an arrangement must necessarily be hypothetical, like Niebuhr's treatment of Roman history, though extremely probable. It will be observed however, by noticing the references to Origen's work in the foot-notes of Pressense's text, and of Lecture II. in this volume, that the arrangement suggested for Celsus's treatise does not always coincide with the order in which Origen has quoted the parts of it. Also the references to the later books of Origen will be seen to be fewer than to the earlier; a circumstance which arises from the quotations from Celsus's work being fewer in those books, and from the thoughts of Origen in them being a continuation of those presented earlier. Pressense's arrangement has the disadvantage too of leaving out many of the critical difficulties which Celsus alleges in the scriptures; but he rightly points out that they are all corollaries from a philosophical principle. The reader may accordingly consult Neander for a systematic view of Celsus's opinions, and Pressense for a theory of the arrangement of his work.

It may be useful to give a brief statement of the order in which Celsus's objections occur in Origen's treatise, so as to show the manner in which the subject is there developed.

The first half of book i. is prefatory (ch. i-xl.); the second half, together with b. ii. contains the attack by the Jew on Christianity given in Lect. II. The early part of b. iii. (1-9) contains Origen's refutation of the Jew. The subsequent parts and remaining books give Origen's refutation of Celsus's own attack on Christianity. First, Celsus attacks the character of Christians in the remainder of b. iii. In b. iv. he returns to his attack on Judaism, and on the scriptures of the Old Testament, especially on many of the narratives; either regarding them as false, or as borrowed; and objecting to their anthropomorphic character; also objecting to the account of man's place in creation, and of divine interference. In b. v. he continues his attack on the doctrines of both religions, chiefly so far as he considers them to be untrue; and in b. vi. so far as he considers them to be borrowed, dragging to light the difference which existed between Judaism and Christianity. In b. vii. the subject of prophecy and some other doctrines, as well as the ethics of Christianity, are examined; and in b. viii, when the attack on Christianity is mainly over, a defence of paganism is offered by Celsus.

A detailed analysis of Origen's treatise, which is intricate, will be found in Schramm's Analysis Patrum, vol. iv. 1782. Pressense's view of Origen's arguments is given, Hist. vol. 2e Serie, t. ii. pp. 281-361. See also Lardner's Works, viii. 19. Hase (Church History, 51) refers to several German works which relate to Celsus.



Note 15. p. 56. The Charges Against Christians, And Causes Of Persecution, In The Second Century.

The learned Kortholt, Professor at Kiel, in his work, the Paganus Obtrectator, sive Liber de Calumniis Gentilium in Veteres Christianos (1703), has carefully collected references to the objections raised by the Pagans against Christianity. He has arranged them according to the subjects, irrespective of the chronological order in which they were respectively suggested; viz. (1) those which relate to the origin and nature of Christianity, such as its novelty, its alleged want of originality, &c.; (2) false charges about public worship; (3) false charges about life and morals. If we exclude on the one hand those charges which are gathered out of Celsus (in Origen), and on the other those from apologists later than the date of Porphyry, the charges between these limits, which are learned from the apologists Minucius Felix, Theophilus (ad Autolycum), and Tertullian, exhibit the objections which were encountered in Rome, Syria, and North Africa, respectively. They chiefly belong to the prejudices adduced in the second and third of the classes made by Kortholt. Among the more intelligible objections which belong to his first class, are found the charges of the novelty of Christianity (ch. i. in his book), the superstitious character of it (ix. and x.), and the want of cultivation in its supporters (xi.). Among the prejudices about public worship (class 2) in his work, we meet with the charge of ass-worship (in Tertullian and Minucius Felix, ch. xi.); sky and sun worship (ii. and iii.); priest and cross worship (iv, and vi.); and secret sacred rites (ix.). Among the false charges about life and morals (which form class 3), we meet with that of private and nocturnal meetings forbidden by law, and the Agapae (v.); Thyestean banquets (Theoph. and Tertull. ix.); secret insignia (xvi.); treason (vii.); and hatred of humanity (viii.).

All these charges will be seen to be such as mark the transition from a state of indifference to Christianity to that more distinct comprehension of its nature which afterwards existed. Their character indicates a moment when the new religion was forcing itself on public attention as a secret organization ramifying through the Roman world. In the main they resolved themselves into two heads; (1) the vulgar prejudices arising from ignorance; and (2) the alarm at the political danger arising from a vast secret society. The latter charges reappear in the works of later apologists; but the former are peculiar to this special period, between the time of Celsus and of Porphyry.

Among the vulgar prejudices thus named, the only two that need further mention are the charges of priest-worship and ass-worship. The former charge, named by Minucius Felix, ch. ix, and thus described here by a euphemism, may be seen in Kortholt, b. ii. ch. iv. p. 319; it probably arose from the homage paid to the bishop on bended knee at ordination. The latter, taken out of Minucius Felix (ch. ii.), and Tertullian (Apol. 16), is more singular and puzzling even after the discussions by older authors which Kortholt cites, b. ii. ch. i. p. 256, &c. But the fact of the charge has been corroborated by the recent discovery in excavations made in some substructions on the Palatine hill, of a graffito or pencil-scratching, in which a person is worshipping toward a cross, on which hangs suspended a human figure with the head of a horse, or perhaps wild ass, and underneath is the inscription "Alexamenus is worshipping God," Αλεξαμενος σεβετε [sic for σεβεται] Θεον. It can hardly be doubted that it is a pagan caricature of Christian worship, embodying the absurd prejudice which Minucius names. A brief account of it may be seen in the Edinburgh Review, No. 224, for October, 1859, p. 436, and more fully in Un Graffito Blasfemo nel Palazzo dei Cesari (Civilta Cattolica, serie iii. vol. iv. Roma, 1856). The difficulty that the inscription is in Greek, will be explained by the fact that the church of Rome was Greek as late as the time of the writings of the so-called Hippolytus.

The other great class of objections to Christianity, which consisted in imputing the charge of treason, expressed itself in deeds as well as words, and was made the ground of the public persecution of them.

We cannot wonder that the profession of Christianity exposed persons to the suspicion of treason. When we add the fact that Christians declined obstinately to conform to the practice which had grown up, of performing sacrifice to the honour of the reigning emperors as the impersonation of the dignity of the state; and when we consider the organization among Christians, the league of purpose which was evident among them, we can understand how fully they laid themselves open to the charge of treason, the "crimen laesae majestatis." Perhaps too at particular moments they were in danger of giving real ground for suspicion in reference to this point. The warnings of St. Paul and St. Peter give ground for inferring that there was danger of this even in their times. (Rom. xiii. 1 seq.; 1 Pet. ii. 13 seq.)

A greater difficulty than discovering plausible grounds which may have created the suspicion of treason is, to find the causes why a people so tolerant as the Romans should exhibit so persecuting a spirit against Christianity; but we must remember, first, that the idea as distinct from the practice of toleration was unknown; and secondly, that the practice of toleration was only supposed to be obligatory when the particular religion had been licensed.

The idea of man's universal rights, of universal religious freedom and liberty of conscience, was alien to the views of the whole ancient world. Indeed it is of quite modern introduction. It was not known even in Christendom, not even in the protestant part of it, till the seventeenth century. It was Milton who first enunciated the principle in its breadth. The idea of individualism, though long in spreading, was created in germ by two causes; viz.. the free spirit of independence introduced by the Teutonic system; and the idea of the sacredness of the individual soul introduced through Christianity. If the highest end of man be to live for eternity, not to live for society, the individual is invested with a new dignity; and we feel the impropriety of trespassing upon the sphere for which each man is personally responsible. In the ancient world however, where this idea was unknown, all the elements of life, religion, and morals, were made subordinate to the political. The state was supreme. Looked at accordingly from the ancient point of view, a defection from the religion of the state could not appear otherwise than as a crime against the state. The Romans did certainly exercise religious toleration to the religions of nations which they conquered; and in this way the religion of the Jews was a tolerated creed, a religio licita; but it was such for the Jews alone; and deviation from the state religion was, as we know from the great lawyers, unlawful. Though doubtless from the abundance of foreigners who crowded to Rome, many foreign religious practices became common, yet a special decree of the senate was necessary before any Roman citizen could be allowed to join in the observance of any such foreign rites. When we consider the free use made by the Christians, for the purposes of worship and burial, of the catacombs, by which the plain in the neighbourhood of Rome is honeycombed, we may conjecture that the vigilance of the imperial police cannot have been strictly exercised; yet occasionally severe laws were passed to repress the evil of the introduction of foreign sacred rites. We may thus accordingly understand the causes of the persecution of Christians, as we before understood the grounds of the prejudice against them.



Note 16. p. 61. Modern Criticism On The Book Of Daniel.

Some account of the modern criticism on the book of Daniel has been introduced into the text of Lect. II. (see pp. 60, 61,) and the chief recent writers on it have been enumerated (p. 60, note). Also the refutation of one argument used against the authenticity of the book, viz. that drawn from the occurrence of Greek words in it, was given in a note on p. 60.

The other arguments which have been advanced against it, in addition to those there named, are, (1) that the angelology and ascetic doctrines are too recent to be of the time of Daniel; (2) that the miracles are of a "grotesque" character, like those which belong to the apocryphal books; (3) that the measure of the golden statue of Dura, sixty cubits by six, is irreconcileable with any theory of proportion suited to the human figure, and still more so with the canon of Assyrian art, as seen in their sculpture, and can apply only to an obelisk; (4) that Daniel has made honourable mention of himself; (5) that the position of the book in the third part of the Jewish canon, the Cethubim or Hagiographa, shows that it was written later than the captivity.

The replies made to these objections are as follows: In reference to No. (1), it is denied that the angelology and asceticism necessarily prove a late period, by referring to traces of them in earlier Hebrew literature: No. (2) that the difficulty which has reference to the character of the miracles is only one of degree; and that the greatness of a miracle is no absolute ground for disbelief if miracles be once admitted: (3) the inferences about the statue are conceded, but reconciled with the text. As the word עלם (iii. 1) does not necessarily mean a statue (see Buxtorf's Lexicon, sub voc.), it is possible to conceive it to apply to an obelisk, the existence of which in Assyria is confirmed by recent excavations. (4) Daniel's honourable mention of himself is not improper when taken in its connexion. (5) The argument which relates to the third division of the canon is a difficulty common to several other books, and depends on the theory that the principle of arrangement of the three parts of the canon was founded on the date of composition, and not on the subject matter, which is disputed.

In reference to the definite character of the predictions in the book of Daniel, the difficulty stated in the text (p. 61), reply is easy. If the miraculous character of prophecy be admitted, the definite character, though a peculiarity, cannot be a difficulty. The definiteness too in this instance does not differ in kind, hardly even in degree, from the case of other prophecies, but must be admitted to be paralleled elsewhere, if the objector does not assail those equally by the same process. The pretence that the definite character ends at the reign of Antiochus is shown to be incorrect, by proving (1) that the prophecy about the Messiah (ix. 24-26) cannot refer to the Maccabean deliverers; and (2) that the fourth empire predicted is the Roman, which thus would be equally future even to a writer of the Maccabean era.

The further argument used in defence of the book, that the New Testament authenticates the authorship of Daniel, is necessarily only of value to those who admit, first, the authority of the New Testament, and who, secondly, allow that the New Testament writers never accommodate themselves on questions of criticism to the mental state of their hearers. The opponents of this view on the contrary assert, that the quotations in the New Testament only affirm the predicate, not the subject; the truth of the theological sentiment quoted, not the literary question of the authorship of the book from which it is quoted.

An instructive paper on the book of Daniel by Mr. Westcott appeared in Smith's Biblical Dictionary, from which a few of the references to authors on Daniel (p. 60, note) were taken; and another in Kitto's Biblical Encyclopaedia by the lamented Haevernick.



Note 17. p. 64. The Reply Of Eusebius To Hierocles.

In his book against Hierocles, Eusebius states (b. i.), that he refutes only that portion of the work which related to Apollonius of Tyana; referring to Origen's answer to Celsus for a reply to the remainder of it; and discusses only the parallel of Apollonius and Jesus Christ. In b. i. he gives an outline of the argument of his opponent, with quotations, and states his own opinion about Apollonius; throwing discredit on the veracity of the sources of the memoirs; and proceeds to criticise the prodigies attributed to him, arguing that the statements are incredible, or borrowed, or materially contradictory. Discussing each book in succession, he replies in b. i. to the statements respecting the early part of Apollonius's life; in b. ii. to that which concerned the journey into India; in b. iii. to that which related to his intercourse with the Brahmins; in b. iv. to his journey in Greece; in b. v. to his introduction to Vespasian in Egypt; in b. vi. and vii. to his miracles; and in b. viii. to his pretence to foreknowledge. He adds remarks on his death, and on the necessity of faith; and repeats his opinion respecting the character of Apollonius.



Note 18. p. 67. The Philopatris Of The Pseudo-Lucian.

This dialogue was held to be genuine by Fabricius; but Gesner disproved it, De Philopatride Lucianeo Dialogo Dissertatio, 1730. See also Neander's Church History, E. T. (Bohn) iii. 127, note.

The work hardly merits an analysis. Critias, looking ill, is met by Triepho. After a little banter, in which Triepho makes fun of the gods by whom Critias swears, and of their history ( 2-18), Critias confesses that the cause that has made him pale is the hearing bad news at an assembly of Christians. Having first heard two Christian sermons, the one by a coughing preacher, who was proclaiming release from debt, the other by a threadbare mountaineer preaching a golden age, he had afterwards been persuaded to go to a private Christian meeting; and it was the prediction which he there heard of woes to the state which had so much frightened him, 20-27. Triepho has not patience to hear him narrate the particulars. Another person enters, and the curtain falls.

The theology of the dialogue is, if viewed on its negative side, the ridicule of heathen mythology and of Christian doctrines and habits; and on its positive, the proclamation of one God as the object of worship. The work exhibits internal evidence of a knowledge of Christian practices, 20, &c., and Christian doctrines, such as the Trinity, 12; uses Christian phraseology, 18; and calls Christians by the name given by Julian, Galilaean, 12.



Note 19. p. 87. The Work Of Julian Against Christianity.

It has been already stated that our knowledge of the contents of Julian's lost book is obtained from Cyril's reply to it; the text of which is accordingly given in Spanheim's edition of Julian. It is supposed to have consisted of seven books; but Cyril replies only to three.

In the brief account given in the text of Lect. II. no attempt was made to form a hypothetical restoration of Julian's work from the fragments, such as that which Pressense has attempted with regard to Celsus; but only a few of Julian's principles were presented concerning the following subjects: (1) on God; (2) on the Hebrew, and (3) the Christian religion. A few hints however toward such a scheme, may not be uninteresting. If, as seems probable, Cyril took the statements of Julian in the order in which they stood in the now lost work, the plan of Julian's work may have been somewhat as follows.

He proposed to institute a comparison between the Hebrew and Christian religions and literature on the one hand, and the Greek on the other. If we may judge from the purport of b. i. of Cyril's work, Julian laid himself open to an attack by maintaining the superior antiquity of heathenism, forgetting that the Hebrew system was older than the Greek. At least Cyril establishes this elaborately, and argues the direct derivation of many parts of the heathen system from the Jews. The argument on Julian's part seems to have been conducted by an examination of successive points in the Hebrew history and system. In the beginning the Hebrew cosmogony suggested an argument for the superiority of the Platonic theory over the Mosaic. (Cyril. b. ii.) Next he successively attacked the account of Paradise as a fable; entering upon both the probability of the story (Id. b. iii.) and the moral features of the Deity brought out in the narrative. He seems also to have passed from the idea of creation to that of providence, and to have dwelt on the inferiority of the Hebrew scheme as a theory of providence, in having an absence of inferior deities beneath the supreme one; and resists the idea of the obligation of all men to embrace one creed, inasmuch as they do not possess one character. (Id. b. iv.) Next, turning to the Mosaic moral law, he argued against its originality, except in relation to the sabbath; and passing through several of the narratives of Jewish history, he pointed out characteristics of anger in the Jewish conception of Deity; and compared by instances the Greek legislators and kings with Jewish. (Id. b. v.) Next he seems to have passed from Judaism to Christianity, and attacked the miracles, and the Christian morals and practices; challenged the reasons for prophecy; and rallied the Christians on accepting a religion derived from so insignificant a nation as the Jews. (Id. b. vi.) He seems next to have returned to the comparison of Greek and Hebrew warriors, and of Greek and Jewish science, and the educational value of the two literatures; and reverted to the subject of Christianity, by representing it as a deviation from the very religion on which it depended. (Id. b. vii.) He continued this argument by the special example of prophecy, examining several instances wherein he contended that Christians had abandoned the Jewish sense of them. (Id. b. viii.) Next he seems to have continued a similar argument with regard to the Jewish typical system, and the utter dissimilarity of the Christian ideas from its purpose (Id. b. ix.); next to have assailed Christianity, by trying to show that there had been a similar development in Christianity itself, and a departure from its primitive form analogous to that which Christianity bore to Judaism, alleging, incorrectly, that St. John was the first to teach the divinity of Christ; and instanced examples, objectionable in practice, such as the worship of martyrs' tombs; and alleged against Christianity an eclectic spirit which had appropriated parts of the Jewish system but not the whole. (Id. b. x.)

The reader must however be apprised that the above scheme is entirely hypothetical. The objections of Julian are facts; the lacunae are filled up by conjecture.

The general spirit of Cyril's answer is the argumentum ad hominem; showing that the same faults, even if true, are equally true of the Greek scheme of religion.



Lecture III.



Note 20. p. 89. On The Legendary Work, Entitled "De Tribus Impostoribus."

Full particulars concerning the chapter in literary history which relates to this work, will be found in Prosper Marchand's Dictionnaire Historique, 1758 (vol. i. pp. 312-319), and more briefly in F. W. Genthe's De Imposturis Religionum breve Compendium, 1833. Both give lists of the earlier writers who have treated of the subject; among which the most useful will be found to be B. G. Struve, Dissertatio de Doctis Impostoribus, 1703 ( 9-23); De La Monnaie, Lettre sur le Pretendu Livre; and Calmet, Dictionnaire, article Imposteur.

The rumours concerning the existence of a book with the title "De Tribus Impostoribus" commence in the thirteenth century. About the sixteenth, more definite but still unsatisfactory statements appear respecting its existence. Its authorship has been attributed to above twenty distinguished persons; such as Frederick II, Boccaccio, Pomponatius, Bruno, Vanini, &c.; the reasons for which in each case are explained in Marchand. De La Monnaie however wrote, questioning the existence of the book. A reply to his letter respecting it was published in French at the Hague in 1716, which pretended to offer an analysis of the ancient work; the falsehood of which however is shown by the Spinozist philosophy contained in it. Genthe in his tract, besides a literary introduction in German, republishes the French tract just named; and also a second tract in Latin, equally a fabrication, bearing a slightly different title, De Imposturis Religionum, Lucianlike in its tone, which, by an allusion to Loyola ( 20), cannot be older than the sixteenth century, and is probably of German origin. Both writers conclude that the existence of the book in the middle ages was legendary. Renan (Averroes, pp. 280, and 272-300), and Laurent (La Reforme, pp. 345-8), coincide in this conclusion. The title was a mot, not a fact.

It is hardly necessary to state that the numerous writers who, like Kortholt, have adopted the title "De Tribus Impostoribus" for their books, have merely used the name in irony, and do not profess to give transcripts of the old work.



Lecture IV.



Note 21. p. 118. On Some Technical Terms In The History Of Unbelief.

There are a few terms, which are frequently used in reference to unbelief, of which it would be interesting to trace the meaning and history. A few notes in reference to this subject may both prevent ambiguity and throw some light on a chapter in the history of language. The words alluded to are the following: 1. INFIDEL; 2. ATHEIST; 3. PANTHEIST; 4. DEIST; 5. NATURALIST; 6. FREETHINKER; 7. RATIONALIST; 8. SCEPTIC.

1. INFIDEL.—This word began to be restricted as a technical term, about the time of the Crusades and throughout the middle ages, to denote Mahometan; as being par excellence the kind of unbelievers with which Christians were brought into contact. Perhaps the first instance of its use in the more modern sense, of disbeliever generally, is in the Collect for Good Friday, "all Jews, Turks, infidels, heretics;" which words were apparently inserted by the Reformers in the first Prayer Book (1547); the rest of the prayer, except these words, existing in the Latin Collect of the ancient Service-book from which it is translated. Ordinarily however, during the sixteenth century, it is found in the popular sense of unfaithful; a meaning which the increasing prevalence of Latin words was likely to bring into use. In writers of the seventeenth, the use of it in the sense of unbeliever becomes more common: an instance from Milton is cited in Richardson's Dictionary. In the beginning of the eighteenth century it becomes quite common in theological writers in its modern sense; and toward the end of the century was frequently appropriated to express the form of unbelief which existed in France; a use which probably arose from the circumstance that the French unbelievers did not adopt a special name for their tenets, as the English did, who had a positive creed, (Deism,) and not merely, like the French, a disintegration of belief.

2. ATHEIST.—This word needs little discussion. In modern times it is first applied by the theological writers of the sixteenth century, to describe the unbelief of such persons as Pomponatius; and in the seventeenth it is used, by Bacon (Essay on Atheism), Milton, (Paradise lost, b. vi.), and Bunyan (Pilgrim), to imply general unbelief, of which the disbelief in a Deity is the principal sign. Toward the end of the same century it is not unfrequently found, e.g. in Kortholt's De Tribus Impostoribus, 1680, to include Deism such as that of Hobbes, as well as blank Pantheism like Spinoza's, which more justly deserves the name. The same use is seen in Colerus's work against Spinoza, Arcana Atheismi Revelata. Tillotson (serm. i. on Atheism); and Bentley (Boyle Lectures) use the word more exactly; and the invention of the term Deism induced, in the writers of the eighteenth century, a more limited and exact use of the former term. But in Germany, Reimannus (Historia Univ. Atheismi, 1725, p. 437 seq.) and Buddeus (De Atheismo et Superstitione, 1723, ch. iii. 2), use it most widely, and especially make it include disbelief of immortality. Also Walch, Bibliotheca Theol. Selecta, 1757, uses it to include the Pantheism of Spinoza, (vol. i. p. 676, &c.) This transference of the term to embrace all kinds of unbelief has been well compared with the extension of the term βάρβαρος by the Greeks.(1064) The wide use of the term is partly to be attributed to the doubt which Christian men had whether any one could really disbelieve the being of a God,—an opinion increased by the Cartesian notions then common concerning innate ideas; and whether accordingly the term Atheist could mean anything different from Deist. Compare Buddeus's Isagoge, p. 1203, and the chapter "An dentur Athei" in his work De Atheismo. (ch. i.) By the time of Stapfer's work, Instit. Theol. Polem. 1744, the two terms were distinguished; see vol. ii. ch. vi. and vii. and cfr. p. 587.

The term was subsequently applied to describe the views of the French writers, such as D'Holbach, who did not see the necessity for believing in a personal first Cause. In more modern times it is frequently applied to such writers as Comte; whose view is indeed atheism, but differs from that of former times, in that it is the refusal to entertain the question of a Deity as not being discoverable by the evidence of sense and science, rather than the absolute denial of his existence. The Comtists also hold firmly the marks of order, law, mind, in nature, and not the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, as was the case with the atheists of France.

3. PANTHEIST.—One of the first uses of this word is by Toland in the Pantheisticon, 1720, where however it has its ancient polytheistic sense. It is a little later that it passes from the idea of the worship of the whole of the gods to the worship of the entire universe looked at as God.

This exacter application of it is more modern. It is now used to denote the disbelief of a personal first Cause: but a distinction ought to be made between the Pantheism like that of Averroes, which regards the world as an emanation, and sustained by an anima mundi; and that which, like the view of Spinoza, regards the sum total of all things to be Deity. This distinction was noticed and illustrated in p. 107. The account of the word in Krug's Philosoph. Lexicon is worth consulting.

4. DEIST.—One of the first instances of the use of this word occurs in Viret, Epistr. Dedicat. du 2. vol de l'Instruction Chretienne, 1563, quoted by Bayle, Dictionnaire, (note under the word Viret.) It is appropriated in the middle of the seventeenth century by Herbert to his scheme, and afterwards by Blount (Oracles of Reason, p. 99), to distinguish themselves from Atheists. In strict truth, Herbert calls himself a Theist; which slightly differs from the subsequent term Deist, in so far as it is intended to convey the idea of that which he thought to be the true worship of God. It is theism as opposed to error, rather than natural religion as opposed to revealed: whereas deism always implies a position antagonistic to revealed religion. But the distinction is soon lost sight of; and Nichols (1696) entitles his work against the deists, Conference with a Theist. Towards the close of the seventeenth century, and in the beginning of the eighteenth, the Christian writers sometimes even use Deist as interchangeable with Atheist, as shown above. It is also used as synonymous with one of the senses of the word Naturalist. See below, under the latter word; and cfr. Stapfer, Inst. Polem. vol. ii. p. 742, with p. 883.

5. NATURALIST.—This word is used in two senses; an objective and a subjective. Naturalism, in the former, is the belief which identifies God with nature; in the latter, the belief in the sufficiency of natural as distinct from revealed religion. The former is Pantheism, the latter Deism. In the former sense it is applied to Spinoza and others; e.g. in Walch's Biblioth. Theol. Select. i. 745 seq. In the latter sense it occurs as early as 1588 in France, in the writings of J. Bodin (Colloq. Heptapl. 31. Rem. 2); and towards the end of the seventeenth century both in Germany and England, e.g. in Kortholt's De Trib. Impost. 1680; and the Quaker, Barclay's Apologia, 1679, p. 28. At the end of the seventeenth century, and in the eighteenth, the name was applied in England to deists, (e.g. in Nichols's Conference with a Theist, pref. 15); and in Germany it became a commonly known word, owing to the spread of the Wolffian philosophy. Stapfer (Instit. Theol. Polem. 1744, vol. ii. p. 881), using Wolffian phraseology, divides this latter kind of naturalism into two kinds, viz. philosophical and theological. The philosophical kind maintains the sufficiency of natural religion, and disbelieves revealed; the theological kind holds the truth of revelation, but regards it as unnecessary, as being only a republication of natural religion. The adherent of the former is the "Naturalist" of Kant; the latter his "pure Rationalist" (Verg. Religion Innerhalb, &c.); the former the Deist, the latter the Rationalist, of a school like that of Wegscheider, &c. (See Lect. VI.)

Cfr. Bretschneider's Handbuch der Dogmatik; i. 72. note. Hahn, De Rationalismi Indole (quoted by Rose on Rationalism, 2d ed. Introd. p. 20) names writers who make a third kind of naturalism, viz. Pelagianism; but this is rare.

6. FREETHINKER.—This term first appears toward the close of the seventeenth century. It is used of Toland, "a candid Freethinker," by Molyneux, in a letter to Locke 1697 (Locke's Works, fol. ed. iii. 624); and Shaftesbury in 1709 speaks of "our modern free-writers," Works, vol. i. p. 65. But it was Collins in 1713, in his Discourse of Freethinking, who first appropriated the name to express the independence of inquiry which was claimed by the deists. The use of the word expressed the spirit of a nation like the English, in which, subsequently to the change of dynasty, freedom to think and speak was held to be every man's charter. Lechler has remarked the absence of a parallel word in other languages. The French expression Esprit fort, the title of a work of La Bruyere, does not convey quite the same idea as Freethinker. Esprit expresses the French liveliness, not the reflective self-consciousness of the English mind of the eighteenth century: the fort is a relic of the pride of feudalism; whilst the free of the English Freethinker implies the reaction against it. The English term smacks of democracy; the French carries with it the notion of aristocracy. (Lechler, Gesch. des Engl. Deismus, p. 458.) There is no word to express the English idea in foreign languages, except the literal translation of the English term. Even then, in French the expression la libre pensee has changed its meaning; since it is now frequently used to describe the struggle, good as well as evil, of the human mind against authority. It thus loses the unfavourable sense which originally belonged to the corresponding English expression.

7. RATIONALIST.—The history of the term is hard to trace. The first technical use of the adjective rational seems to have been about the seventeenth century, to express a school of philosophy. It had probably passed out of the old sense of dialectical (cfr. Brucker's Hist. Phil. iii. 60.), into the use just named; which we find in Bacon, to express rational philosophy, as opposed to empirical, (see a quotation from Bacon's Apophthegms in Richardson's Dictionary, sub voc.); or, as in North's Plutarch, 1657, p. 984, for intellectual philosophy as opposed to mathematical and moral. The word Rationalist occurs in Clarendon, 1646 (State Papers, vol. ii. p. 40), to describe a party of presbyterians who appealed only to "what their reason dictates them in church and state." Hahn (De Rationalismi Indole) states that Amos Comenius similarly used the term in 1661 in a depreciatory sense. The treatise of Locke on the Reasonableness of Christianity caused Christians and Deists to appropriate the term, and to restrict it to religion. Thus, by Waterland's time, it had got the meaning of false reasoning on religion. (Works, viii. 67.) And, passing into Germany, it appears to have become the common name to express philosophical views of religion, as opposed to supernatural. In this sense it occurs as early as 1708 in Sucro, quoted by Tholuck, Vermischt. Schriften, ii. pp. 25, 26, and in Buddeus, Isagoge, 1730, pp. 213 and 1151. It is also used often as equivalent to naturalism, or adherence to natural religion; with the slight difference that it rather points to mental than physical truth.

The name has often been appropriated to the Kantian or critical philosophy, in which rationalism was distinguished from naturalism in the mode explained under the latter word. (See Kant's Religion Innerhalb der Grenzen der Blossen Vernunft, pp. 216, 17.) During the period when Rationalism was predominant as a method in German theology, the meaning and limits of the term were freely discussed. The period referred to is that which we have called in Lect. VI. p. 230 the second subdivision of the first of the three periods, into which the history of German theology is there divided; viz. from 1790-1810; occupying the interval when the Wolffian philosophy had given place to the Kantian, and the philosophy of Fichte and Jacobi had not yet produced the revival under Schleiermacher. This form of rationalism also continued to exist during the lifetime of its adherents, contemporaneously with the new influence created by Schleiermacher. (See Lect. VI.) The discussion was not a verbal one only, but was intimately connected with facts. The rationalist theologians wished to define clearly their own position, as opposed on the one hand to deists and naturalists, and on the other to supernaturalists. The result of the discussion seemed to show the following parties: (1) two kinds of Supernaturalists, (α) the Biblical, such as Reinhardt, resembling the English divines of the eighteenth century;(1065) (β) the Philosophical, sometimes called Rational Supernaturalists, as the Kantian theologian Stauedlin: (2) two kinds of Rationalists, (α) the Supernatural Rationalists, like Bretschneider, who held on the evidence of reason the necessity of a revelation, but required its accordance with reason, when communicated; (β) the pure Rationalists, like Wegscheider, Roehr, and Paulus, who held the sufficiency of reason; and, while admitting revelation as a fact, regarded it as the republication of the religion of nature. It is this last kind which answers to the "theological naturalist," named above, under the word Naturalist. It is also the form which is called Rationalismus vulgaris (as being opposed to the later scientific), though the term is not admitted by its adherents. This rationalism stands distinguished from naturalism, i.e. from "philosophical naturalism" or deism, by having reference to the Christian religion and church; but it differs from supernaturalism, in that reason, not scripture, is its formal principle, or test of truth: and virtue, instead of "faith working by love," is its material principle, or fundamental doctrine. A further subdivision might be made of this last into the dogmatic (Wegscheider), and the critical (Paulus). Cfr. Bretschneider's Dogmatik, i. 81, and see Lect. VI. Also consult on the above account Kahnis, p. 168, and Lechler's Deismus, p. 193, note; Hagenbach's Dogmengesch. 279, note.

This account of the term being the result of the controversy as to the meaning of the words, it only remains to name some of the works which treated of it.

The dispute on the word Rationalism is especially seen at two periods, (1) about the close of the last century, when the supernaturalists, such as Reinhardt and Storr, were maintaining their position against rationalism. One treatise, which may perhaps be considered to belong to this earlier period, is J. A. H. Tittmann's Ueber Supernaturalismus, Rationalismus, und Atheismus, 1816; (2) in the disputes against the school of Schleiermacher, when supernaturalism was no longer thrown on the defensive. This was marked by several treatises on the subject, such as Stauedlin's Geschichte des Rationalismus und Supernaturalismus 1826, (see the definitions given in it, pp. 3 and 4;) Bretschneider's remarks in his Dogmatik (i. pp. 14, 71, 80 ed. 1838); and Historische Bemerkungen Ueber den Gebrauch der Ausdruecke Rational. und Supernat. (Oppositions-Schrift. 1829. 7. 1); A. Hahn, De Rationalismi qui dicitur Vera Indole, 1827, in which he reviews the attempts of Bretschneider and Stauedlin to give the historic use of the word; Roehr's Briefe Ueber Rationalismus, pp. 14-16; Paulus's Resultate aus den Neuesten Versuch des Supernat. Gegen den Rationalismus, 1830; Wegscheider's Inst. Theol. Christianae Dogmaticae (7th ed. 1833. 11, 12, pp. 49-67), which is full of references to the literature of the subject. The controversy was aggravated and in part was due to the translation of Mr. H. J. Rose's Sermons on Rationalism. He was answered by Bretschneider in a tract, in which that theologian entered upon the defence of the rationalist position. Mr. Rose (Introd. to 2d ed. 1829, p. 17) enters briefly upon the history of the name. Krug (Philos. Lexicon) also gives many instances of its use in German theology.

To complete the account it is only necessary to add, that it is made clear by Lectures VI. and VII. that if subsequent theological thought in Germany to the schools now described, be called Rationalism for convenience by English writers, the term is then used in a different sense from that in which it is applied in speaking of the older forms.

8. SCEPTIC.—This term was first applied specifically to one school of Greek philosophers, about B.C. 300, followers of Pyrrho of Elis (see Ritter's Hist. of Phil. E. T. iii. 372-398; Stauedlin's Geschichte des Scepticismus, vol. i; Tafel's Geschichte und Kritik des Skepticismus, 1836; Donaldson's Greek Lit. ch. xlvii. 5); and also to a revival of this school about A.D. 200. (See Ritter. Id. iii. 258-357; Donaldson, ch. lvi. 3.) The tenet was a general disbelief of the possibility of knowing realities as distinct from appearances. The term thus introduced, gradually became used in the specific sense of theological as distinct from philosophical scepticism, often with an indirect implication that the two are united. Walch restricts the name Sceptic to the latter kind. Writing about those who are called Indifferentists (Bibl. Theol. Select. i. 976), he subdivides them into two classes; viz. those who are indifferent through liberality, and those who are so through unbelief. The former are the "Latitudinarians," the latter the Sceptics above named. Cfr. also Buddeus, Isagoge, pp. 1208-10. In more recent times the term has gained a still more generic sense in theology, to express all kinds of religious doubt. But its use to express philosophical scepticism as distinct from religious has not died out. In this sense Montaigne, Bayle (cfr. Stauedlin's Gesch. des Scept. p. 204), Huet, Berkeley, Hume, and De Maistre, were Sceptics; i.e. sceptical of the certitude of one or more branches of the human faculties. Sometimes also it is used to express systems of philosophy which teach disbelief in the reality of metaphysical science; e.g. the positive school of Comte; but this is an ambiguous use of the term. For philosophical scepticism may be of two kinds; viz. the disbelief in the possibility of the attainment of truth by means of the natural faculties of man; and the disbelief of the possibility of its attainment by means of metaphysical, as distinct from physical, methods. The former is properly called Philosophical Scepticism, the latter not so. Pyrrho in ancient times, and Hume in modern, represent the former; the Positivists of modern times, and perhaps the Sophists of the fifth century B.C., represent the latter. It is hardly necessary to repeat that the philosophical scepticism proper of Berkeley and Hume must not be confounded with religious. They may be connected, as in Hume, or disconnected, as in Berkeley or De Maistre. See on this subject Morell's Hist. of Philos. i. p. 68, ii. ch. vi.