Finally, we have still to treat of the altered conceptions regarding the Old Testament which the creation of the New produced among the early-Catholic Fathers. In the case of Barnabas and the Apologists we became acquainted with a theory of the Old Testament which represented it as the Christian book of revelation and accordingly subjected it throughout to an allegorical process. Here nothing specifically new could be pointed out as having been brought by Christ. Sharply opposed to this conception was that of Marcion, according to which the whole Old Testament was regarded as the proclamation of a Jewish God hostile to the God of redemption. The views of the majority of the Gnostics occupied a middle position between the two notions. These distinguished different components of the Old Testament, some of which they traced to the supreme God himself and others to intermediate and malevolent beings. In this way they both established a connection between the Old Testament, and the Christian revelation and contrived to show that the latter contained a specific novelty. This historico-critical conception, such as we specially see it in the epistle of Ptolemy to Flora, could not be accepted by the Church because it abolished strict monotheism and endangered the proof from prophecy. No doubt, however, we already find in Justin and others the beginning of a compromise, in so far as a distinction was made between the moral law of nature contained in the Old Testament—the Decalogue—and the ceremonial law; and in so far as the literal interpretation of the latter, for which a pedagogic significance was claimed, was allowed in addition to its typical or Christian sense. With this theory it was possible, on the one hand, to do some sort of justice to the historical position of the Jewish people, and on the other, though indeed in a meagre fashion, to give expression to the novelty of Christianity. The latter now appears as the new law or the law of freedom, in so far as the moral law of nature had been restored in its full purity without the burden of ceremonies, and a particular historical relation to God was allowed to the Jewish nation, though indeed more a wrathful than a covenant one. For the ceremonial regulations were conceived partly as tokens of the judgment on Israel, partly as concessions to the stiffneckedness of the people in order to protect them from the worst evil, polytheism.

Now the struggle with the Gnostics and Marcion, and the creation of a New Testament had necessarily a double consequence. On the one hand, the proposition that the "Father of Jesus Christ is the creator of the world and the God of the Old Testament" required the strictest adherence to the unity of the two Testaments, so that the traditional apologetic view of the older book had to undergo the most rigid development; on the other hand, as soon as the New Testament was created, it was impossible to avoid seeing that this book was superior to the earlier one, and thus the theory of the novelty of the Christian doctrine worked out by the Gnostics and Marcion had in some way or other to be set forth and demonstrated. We now see the old Catholic Fathers engaged in the solution of this twofold problem; and their method of accomplishing it has continued to be the prevailing one in all Churches up to the present time, in so far as the ecclesiastical and dogmatic practice still continues to exhibit the inconsistencies of treating the Old Testament as a Christian book in the strict sense of the word and yet elevating the New above it, of giving a typical interpretation to the ceremonial law and yet acknowledging that the Jewish people had a covenant with God.

With regard to the first point, viz., the maintenance of the unity of the two Testaments, Irenaeus and Tertullian gave a most detailed demonstration of it in opposition to Marcion,[628] and primarily indeed with the same means as the older teachers had already used. It is Christ that prophesied and appeared in the Old Testament; he is the householder who produced both Old and New Testaments.[629] Moreover, as the two have the same origin, their meaning is also the same. Like Barnabas the early Catholic Fathers contrived to give all passages in the Old Testament a typical Christian sense: it is the same truth which we can learn from the prophets and again from Christ and the Apostles. With regard to the Old Testament the watchword is: "Seek the type" ("Typum quaeras").[630] But they went a step further still. In opposition to Marcion's antitheses and his demonstration that the God of the Old Testament is a petty being and has enjoined petty, external observances, they seek to show in syntheses that the same may be said of the New. (See Irenaeus IV. 21-36). The effort of the older teachers to exclude everything outward and ceremonial is no longer met with to the same extent in Irenaeus and Tertullian, at least when they are arguing and defending their position against the Gnostics. This has to be explained by two causes. In the first place Judaism (and Jewish Christianity) was at bottom no longer an enemy to be feared; they therefore ceased to make such efforts to avoid the "Jewish" conception of the Old Testament. Irenaeus, for example, emphasised in the most naive manner the observance of the Old Testament law by the early Apostles and also by Paul. This is to him a complete proof that they did not separate the Old Testament God from the Christian Deity.[631] In connection with this we observe that the radical antijudaism of the earliest period more and more ceases. Irenaeus and Tertullian admitted that the Jewish nation had a covenant with God and that the literal interpretation of the Old Testament was justifiable. Both repeatedly testified that the Jews had the right doctrine and that they only lacked the knowledge of the Son. These thoughts indeed do not attain clear expression with them because their works contain no systematic discussions involving these principles. In the second place the Church itself had become an institution where sacred ceremonial injunctions were necessary; and, in order to find a basis for these, they had to fall back on Old Testament commandments (see Vol. I., chap. 6, p. 291 ff.). In Tertullian we find this only in its most rudimentary form;[632] but in the course of the third century these needs grew mightily[633] and were satisfied. In this way the Old Testament threatened to become an authentic book of revelation to the Church, and that in a quite different and much more dangerous sense than was formerly the case with the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists.

With reference to the second point, we may remark that just when the decay of antijudaism, the polemic against Marcion, and the new needs of the ecclesiastical system threatened the Church with an estimate of the Old Testament hitherto unheard of, the latter was nevertheless thrust back by the creation and authority of the New Testament, and this consequently revived the uncertain position in which the sacred book was henceforth to remain. Here also, as in every other case, the development in the Church ends with the complexus oppositorum, which nowhere allows all the conclusions to be drawn, but offers the great advantage of removing every perplexity up to a certain point. The early-Catholic Fathers adopted from Justin the distinction between the Decalogue, as the moral law of nature, and the ceremonial law; whilst the oldest theologians (the Gnostics) and the New Testament suggested to them the thought of the (relative) novelty of Christianity and therefore also of the New Testament. Like Marcion they acknowledged the literal sense of the ceremonial law and God's covenant with the Jews; and they sought to sum up and harmonise all these features in the thought of an economy of salvation and of a history of salvation. This economy and history of salvation which contained the conception of a divine accommodation and pedagogy, and which accordingly distinguished between constituent parts of different degrees of value (in the Old Testament also), is the great result presented in the main work of Irenaeus and accepted by Tertullian. It is to exist beside the proof from prophecy without modifying it;[634] and thus appears as something intermediate between the Valentinian conception that destroyed the unity of origin of the Old Testament and the old idea which neither acknowledged various constituents in the book nor recognised the peculiarities of Christianity. We are therefore justified in regarding this history of salvation approved by the Church, as well as the theological propositions of Irenaeus and Tertullian generally, as a Gnosis "toned down" and reconciled with Monotheism. This is shown too in the faint gleam of a historical view that still shines forth from this "history of salvation" as a remnant of that bright light which may be recognised in the Gnostic conception of the Old Testament.[635] Still, it is a striking advance that Irenaeus has made beyond Justin and especially beyond Barnabas. No doubt it is mythological history that appears in this history of salvation and the recapitulating story of Jesus with its saving facts that is associated with it; and it is a view that is not even logically worked out, but ever and anon crossed by the proof from prophecy; yet for all that it is development and history.

The fundamental features of Irenaeus' conception are as follow: The Mosaic law and the New Testament dispensation of grace both emanated from one and the same God, and were granted for the salvation of the human race in a form appropriate to the times.[636] The two are in part different; but the difference must be conceived as due to causes[637] that do not affect the unity of the author and of the main points.[638] We must make the nature of God and the nature of man our point of departure. God is always the same, man is ever advancing towards God; God is always the giver, man always the receiver;[639] God leads us ever to the highest goal; man, however, is not God from the beginning, but is destined to incorruptibility, which he is to attain step by step, advancing from the childhood stage to perfection (see above, p. 267 f.). This progress, conditioned by the nature and destination of man, is, however, dependent on the revelation of God by his Son, culminating in the incarnation of the latter and closing with the subsequent bestowal of the Spirit on the human race. In Irenaeus therefore the place of the many different revelation-hypostases of the Valentinians is occupied by the one God, who stoops to the level of developing humanity, accommodates himself to it, guides it, and bestows on it increasing revelations of grace.[640] The fundamental knowledge of God and the moral law of nature, i.e., natural morality, were already revealed to man and placed in his heart[641] by the creator. He who preserves these, as for example the patriarchs did, is justified. (In this case Irenaeus leaves Adam's sin entirely out of sight). But it was God's will to bring men into a higher union with himself; wherefore his Son descended to men from the beginning and accustomed himself to dwell among them. The patriarchs loved God and refrained from injustice towards their neighbours; hence it was not necessary that they should be exhorted with the strict letter of the law, since they had the righteousness of the law in themselves.[642] But, as far as the great majority of men are concerned, they wandered away from God and fell into the sorriest condition. From this moment Irenaeus, keeping strictly to the Old Testament, only concerns himself with the Jewish people. These are to him the representatives of humanity. It is only at this period that the training of the human race is given to them; but it is really the Jewish nation that he keeps in view, and through this he differs very decidedly from such as Barnabas.[643] When righteousness and love to God died out in Egypt, God led his people forth so that man might again become a disciple and imitator of God. He gave him the written law (the Decalogue), which contains nothing else than the moral law of nature that had fallen into oblivion.[644] But when they made to themselves a golden calf and chose to be slaves rather than free men, then the Word, through the instrumentality of Moses, gave to them, as a particular addition, the commandments of slavery (the ceremonial law) in a form suitable for their training. These were bodily commandments of bondage which did not separate them from God, but held them in the yoke. The ceremonial law was thus a pedagogic means of preserving the people from idolatry; but it was at the same time a type of the future. Each constituent of the ceremonial law has this double signification, and both of these meanings originate with God, i.e., with Christ; for "how is Christ the end of the law, if he be not the beginning of it?" ("quomodo finis legis Christus, si non et initium eius esset") IV. 12. 4. Everything in the law is therefore holy, and moreover we are only entitled to blame such portions of the history of the Jewish nation as Holy Scripture itself condemns. This nation was obliged to circumcise itself, keep Sabbaths, offer up sacrifices, and do whatever is related of it, so far as its action is not censured. All this belonged to the state of bondage in which men had a covenant with God and in which they also possessed the right faith in the one God and were taught before hand to follow his Son (IV. 12, 5; "lex praedocuit hominem sequi oportere Christum"). In addition to this, Christ continually manifested himself to the people in the prophets, through whom also he indicated the future and prepared men for his appearance. In the prophets the Son of God accustomed men to be instruments of the Spirit of God and to have fellowship with the Father in them; and in them he habituated himself to enter bodily into humanity.[645] Hereupon began the last stage, in which men, being now sufficiently trained, were to receive the "testamentum libertatis" and be adopted as Sons of God. By the union of the Son of God with the flesh the agnitio filii first became possible to all; that is the fundamental novelty. The next problem was to restore the law of freedom. Here a threefold process was necessary. In the first place the Law of Moses, the Decalogue, had been disfigured and blunted by the "traditio seniorum". First of all then the pure moral law had to be restored; secondly, it was now necessary to extend and fulfil it by expressly searching out the inclinations of the heart in all cases, thus unveiling the law in its whole severity; and lastly the particularia legis, i.e., the law of bondage, had to be abolished. But in the latter connection Christ and the Apostles themselves avoided every transgression of the ceremonial law, in order to prove that this also had a divine origin. The non-observance of this law was first permitted to the Gentile Christians. Thus, no doubt, Christ himself is the end of the law, but only in so far as he has abolished the law of bondage and restored the moral law in its whole purity and severity, and given us himself.

The question as to the difference between the New Testament and the Old is therefore answered by Irenaeus in the following manner. It consists (1) in the agnitio filii and consequent transformation of the slaves into children of God; and (2) in the restoration of the law, which is a law of freedom just because it excludes bodily commandments, and with stricter interpretation lays the whole stress on the inclinations of the heart.[646] But in these two respects he finds a real addition, and hence, in his opinion, the Apostles stand higher than the prophets. He proves this higher position of the Apostles by a surprising interpretation of 1 Cor. XII. 28, conceiving the prophets named in that passage to be those of the Old Testament.[647] He therefore views the two Testaments as of the same nature, but "greater is the legislation which confers liberty than that which brings bondage" ("maior est legisdatio quae in libertatem, quam quae data est in servitutem"). Through the two covenants the accomplishment of salvation was to be hastened "for there is one salvation and one God; but the precepts that form man are numerous, and the steps that lead man to God are not a few;" ("una est enim salus et unus deus; quae autem formant hominem, praecepta multa et non pauci gradus, qui adducunt hominem ad deum"). A worldly king can increase his benefits to his subjects; and should it not also be lawful for God, though he is always the same, to honour continually with greater gifts those who are well pleasing to him? (IV. 9. 3). Irenaeus makes no direct statement as to the further importance which the Jewish people have, and in any case regards them as of no consequence after the appearance of the covenant of freedom. Nor does this nation appear any further even in the chiliastic train of thought. It furnishes the Antichrist and its holy city becomes the capital of Christ's earthly kingdom; but the nation itself, which, according to this theory, had represented all mankind from Moses to Christ, just as if all men had been Jews, now entirely disappears.[648]

This conception, in spite of its want of stringency, made an immense impression, and has continued to prevail down to the present time. It has, however, been modified by a combination with the Augustinian doctrine of sin and grace. It was soon reckoned as Paul's conception, to which in fact it has a distant relationship. Tertullian had already adopted it in its essential features, amplified it in some points, and, in accordance with his Montanist ideas, enriched it by adding a fourth stage (ab initio—Moses—Christ—Paraclete). But this addition was not accepted by the Church.[649]

3. Results to ecclesiastical Christianity.

As we have shown, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus had no strictly systematised theology; they formulated theological propositions because their opponents were theologians. Hence the result of their labours, so far as this was accepted by the Western Church of the third century, does not appear in the adoption of a systematic philosophical dogmatic, but in theological fragments, namely, the rule of faith fixed and interpreted in an antignostic sense[650]. As yet the rule of faith and theology nowhere came into collision in the Western Churches of the third century, because Irenaeus and his younger contemporaries did not themselves notice any such discrepancies, but rather imagined all their teachings to be expositions of the faith itself, and did not trouble their heads about inconsistencies. If we wish to form a notion as to what ideas had become universally prevalent in the Church in the middle of the third century let us compare Cyprian's work "Testimonia", written for a layman, with Novatian's work "De Trinitate".

In the "Testimonia" the doctrine of the two Testaments, as developed by Irenaeus, forms the framework in which the individual dogmas are set. The doctrine of God, which should have been placed at the beginning, has been left out in this little book probably because the person addressed required no instruction on the point. Some of the dogmas already belong to philosophical theology in the strict sense of the word; in others we have merely a precise assertion of the truth of certain facts. All propositions are, however, supported by passages from the two Testaments and thereby proved.[651] The theological counterpart to this is Novatian's work "De Trinitate". This first great Latin work that appeared in Rome is highly important. In regard to completeness, extent of Biblical proofs, and perhaps also its influence on succeeding times, it may in many respects be compared with Origen's work [Greek: peri archon]. Otherwise indeed it differs as much from that work, as the sober, meagre theology of the West, devoid of philosophy and speculation, differs in general from that of the East. But it sums up in classic fashion the doctrines of Western orthodoxy, the main features of which were sketched by Tertullian in his antignostic writings and the work against Praxeas. The old Roman symbol forms the basis of the work. In accordance with this the author gives a comprehensive exposition of his doctrine of God in the first eight chapters. Chapters 9-28 form the main portion; they establish the correct Christology in opposition to the heretics who look on Christ as a mere man or as the Father himself; the Holy Scriptures furnish the material for the proofs. Chapter 29 treats of the Holy Spirit. Chapters 30 and 31 contain the recapitulation and conclusion. The whole is based on Tertullian's treatise against Praxeas. No important argument in that work has escaped Novatian; but everything is extended, and made more systematic and polished. No trace of Platonism is to be found in this dogmatic; on the contrary he employs the Stoic and Aristotelian syllogistic and dialectic method used also by his Monarchian opponents. This plan together with its Biblical attitude gives the work great outward completeness and certainty. We cannot help concluding that this work must have made a deep impression wherever it was read, although the real difficulties of the matter are not at all touched upon, but veiled by distinctions and formulae. It probably contributed not least to make Tertullian's type of Christology the universal Western one. This type, however, as will be set forth in greater detail hereafter, already approximates closely to the resolutions of Nicaea and Chalcedon.[652] Novatian adopted Tertullian's formulae "one substance, three persons" ("una substantia, tres personae"), "from the substance of God" ("ex substantia dei"), "always with the Father" ("semper apud patrem"), "God and man" ("deus et homo"), "two substances" ("duae substantiae"), "one person" ("una persona"), as well as his expressions for the union and separation of the two natures adding to them similar ones and giving them a wider extension.[653] Taking his book in all we may see that he thereby created for the West a dogmatic vademecum, which, from its copious and well-selected quotations from Scripture, must have been of extraordinary service.

The most important articles which were now fixed and transferred to the general creed along with the necessary proofs, especially in the West, were: (1) the unity of God, (2) the identity of the supreme God and the creator of the world, that is, the identity of the mediators of creation and redemption, (3) the identity of the supreme God with the God of the Old Testament, and the declaration that the Old Testament is God's book of revelation, (4) the creation of the world out of nothing, (5) the unity of the human race, (6) the origin of evil from freedom, and the inalienable nature of freedom, (7) the two Testaments, (8) Christ as God and Man, the unity of his personality, the truth of his divinity, the actuality of his humanity, the reality of his fate, (9) the redemption and conclusion of a covenant through Christ as the new and crowning manifestation of God's grace to all men, (10) the resurrection of man in soul and body. But the transmission and interpretation of these propositions, by means of which the Gnostic theses were overthrown, necessarily involved the transmission of the Logos doctrine; for the doctrine of the revelation of God and of the two Testaments could not have prevailed without this theory. How this hypothesis gained acceptance in the course of the third century, and how it was the means of establishing and legitimising philosophical theology as part of the faith, will be shown in the seventh chapter. We may remark in conclusion that the religious hope which looked forward to an earthly kingdom of Christ was still the more widely diffused among the Churches of the third century;[654] but that the other hope, viz., that of being deified, was gaining adherents more and more. The latter result was due to men's increasing indifference to daily life and growing aspiration after a higher one, a longing that was moreover nourished among the more cultured by the philosophy which was steadily gaining ground. The hope of deification is the expression of the idea that this world and human nature do not correspond to that exalted world which man has built up within his own mind and which he may reasonably demand to be realised, because it is only in it that he can come to himself. The fact that Christian teachers like Theophilus, Irenaeus, and Hippolytus expressly declared this to be a legitimate Christian hope and held out a sure prospect of its fulfilment through Christ, must have given the greatest impulse to the spread and adoption of this ecclesiastical Christianity. But, when the Christian religion was represented as the belief in the incarnation of God and as the sure hope of the deification of man, a speculation that had originally never got beyond the fringe of religious knowledge was made the central point of the system and the simple content of the Gospel was obscured.[655]

Footnotes:

[Footnote 460: Authorities: The works of Irenaeus (Stieren's and Harvey's editions), Melito (Otto, Corp. Apol. IX.), Tertullian (Oehler's and Reiflerscheid's editions), Hippolytus (Fabricius', Lagarde's, Duncker's and Schneidewin's editions), Cyprian (Hartel's edition), Novatian (Jackson). Biographies of Bohringer, Die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen, 1873 ff. Werner, Der Paulinismus des Irenaeus, 1889. Noeldechen, Tertullian, 1890. Doellinger, "Hippolytus und Kallistus," 1853. Many monographs on Irenaeus and Tertullian.]

[Footnote 461: The following exposition will show how much Irenaeus and the later old Catholic teachers learned from the Gnostics. As a matter of fact the theology of Irenaeus remains a riddle so long as we try to explain it merely from the Apologists and only consider its antithetical relations to Gnosis. Little as we can understand modern orthodox theology from a historical point of view—if the comparison be here allowed—without keeping in mind what it has adopted from Schleiermacher and Hegel, we can just as little understand the theology of Irenaeus without taking into account the schools of Valentinus and Marcion.]

[Footnote 462: That Melito is to be named here follows both from Eusebius, H. E. V. 28. 5, and still more plainly from what we know of the writings of this bishop; see Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur, I. 1, 2, p. 24 ff. The polemic writings of Justin and the Antignostic treatise of that "ancient" quoted by Irenaeus (see Patr. App. Opp. ed. Gebhardt etc. I. 2, p. 105 sq.) may in a certain sense be viewed as the precursors of Catholic literature. We have no material for judging of them with certainty. The New Testament was not yet at the disposal of their authors, and consequently there is a gap between them and Irenaeus.]

[Footnote 463: See Eusebius, H. E. V. 13.]

[Footnote 464: Tertullian does indeed say in de praescr. 14: "Ceterum manente forma regulae fidei in suo ordine quantumlibet quaeras, et trades, et omnem libidinem curiositatis effundas, si quid tibi videtur vel ambiguitate pendere vel obscuritate obumbrari"; but the preceding exposition of the regula shows that scarcely any scope remained for the "curiositas," and the one that follows proves that Tertullian did not mean that freedom seriously.]

[Footnote 465: The most important point was that the Pauline theology, towards which Gnostics, Marcionites, and Encratites had already taken up a definite attitude, could now no longer be ignored. See Overbeck's Basler Univ.—Programm, 1877. Irenaeus immediately shows the influence of Paulinism very clearly.]

[Footnote 466: See what Rhodon says about the issue of his conversation with Appelles in Euseb., H. E. V. 13. 7: [Greek: ego de gelasas kategnon autou, dioti dedaskalos einai legon oun edei to didaskomenon hup' autou kratunein].]

[Footnote 467: On the old "prophets and teachers" see my remarks on the [Greek: Didache], c. 11 ff., and the section, pp. 93-137, of the prolegomena to my edition of this work. The [Greek: didaskaloi apostolikoi kai prophetikoi] (Ep. Smyrn. ap. Euseb., H. E. IV. 15. 39) became lay-teachers who were skilful in the interpretation of the sacred traditions.]

[Footnote 468: In the case of Irenaeus, as is well known, there was absolutely no consciousness of this, as is well remarked by Eusebius in H. E. V. 7. In support of his own writings, however, Irenaeus appealed to no charisms.]

[Footnote 469: See the passage already quoted on p. 63, note 1.]

[Footnote 470: Irenaeus and Tertullian scoffed at the Gnostic terminology in the most bitter way.]

[Footnote 471: Tertullian, adv. Prax. 3: "Simplices enim quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotae, quae major semper credentium pars est, quoniam et ipsa regula fidei a pluribus diis saeculi ad unicum et verum deum transfert, non intellegentes unicum quidem, sed cum sua [Greek: oikonomia] esse credendum, expavescunt ad [Greek: oikonomian]." Similar remarks often occur in Origen. See also Hippol., c. Noet 11.]

[Footnote 472: The danger of speculation and of the desire to know everything was impressively emphasised by Irenaeus, II. 25-28. As a pronounced ecclesiastical positivist and traditionalist, he seems in these chapters disposed to admit nothing but obedient and acquiescent faith in the words of Holy Scripture, and even to reject speculations like those of Tatian, Orat. 5. Cf. the disquisitions II. 25. 3: "Si autem et aliquis non invenerit causam omnium quae requiruntur, cogitet, quia homo est in infinitum minor deo et qui ex parte (cf. II. 28.) acceperit gratiam et qui nondum aequalis vel similis sit factori"; II. 26. 1: [Greek: Ameinon kai symphoroteron idiotas kai oligomatheis huparchein, kai dia tes agapes plesion genesthai tou Theou e polymatheis kai empeirous dokountas einai, blasphemous eis ton heauton heuriskesthai despoten], and in addition to this the close of the paragraph, II. 27. 1: Concerning the sphere within which we are to search (the Holy Scriptures and "quae ante oculos nostros occurrunt", much remains dark to us even in the Holy Scriptures II. 28. 3); II. 28. 1 f. on the canon which is to be observed in all investigations, namely, the confident faith in God the creator, as the supreme and only Deity; II. 28. 2-7: specification of the great problems whose solution is hid from us, viz., the elementary natural phenomena, the relation of the Son to the Father, that is, the manner in which the Son was begotten, the way in which matter was created, the cause of evil. In opposition to the claim to absolute knowledge, i.e., to the complete discovery of all the processes of causation, which Irenaeus too alone regards as knowledge, he indeed pointed out the limits of our perception, supporting his statement by Bible passages. But the ground of these limits, "ex parte accepimus gratiam," is not an early-Christian one, and it shows at the same time that the bishop also viewed knowledge as the goal, though indeed he thought it could not be attained on earth.]

[Footnote 473: The same observation applies to Tertullian, Cf. his point blank repudiation of philosophy in de praese. 7, and the use he himself nevertheless made of it everywhere.]

[Footnote 474: In point of form this standpoint is distinguished from the ordinary Gnostic position by its renunciation of absolute knowledge, and by its corresponding lack of systematic completeness. That, however, is an important distinction in favour of the Catholic Fathers. According to what has been set forth in the text I cannot agree with Zahn's judgment (Marcellus of Ancyra, p. 235 f.): "Irenaeus is the first ecclesiastical teacher who has grasped the idea of an independent science of Christianity, of a theology which, in spite of its width and magnitude, is a branch of knowledge distinguished from others; and was also the first to mark out the paths of this science."]

[Footnote 475: Tertullian seems even to have had no great appreciation for the degree of systematic exactness displayed in the disquisitions of Irenaeus. He did not reproduce these arguments at least, but preferred after considering them to fall back on the proof from prescription.]

[Footnote 476: The more closely we study the writings of Tertullian, the more frequently we meet with inconsistencies, and that in his treatment both of dogmatic and moral questions. Such inconsistencies could not but make their appearance, because Tertullian's dogmatising was only incidental. As far as he himself was concerned, he did not feel the slightest necessity for a systematic presentation of Christianity.]

[Footnote 477: With reference to certain articles of doctrine, however, Tertullian adopted from Irenaeus some guiding principles and some points of view arising from the nature of faith; but he almost everywhere changed them for the worse. The fact that he was capable of writing a treatise like the de praescr. haeret., in which all proof of the intrinsic necessity and of the connection of his dogmas is wanting, shows the limits of his interests and of his understanding.]

[Footnote 478: Further references to Tertullian in a future volume. Tertullian is at the same time the first Christian individual after Paul, of whose inward life and peculiarities we can form a picture to ourselves. His writings bring us near himself, but that cannot be said of Irenaeus.]

[Footnote 479: Consequently the spirit of Irenaeus, though indeed strongly modified by that of Origen, prevails in the later Church dogmatic, whilst that of Tertullian is not to be traced there.]

[Footnote 480: The supreme God is the Holy and Redeeming One. Hence the identity of the creator of the world and the supreme God also denotes the unity of nature, morality, and revelation.]

[Footnote 481: What success the early-Christian writings of the second century had is almost completely unknown to us; but we are justified in saying that the five books "adv. haereses" of Irenaeus were successful, for we can prove the favourable reception of this work and the effects it had in the 3rd and 4th centuries (for instance, on Hippolytus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Victorinus, Marcellus of Ancyra, Epiphanius, and perhaps Alexander of Alexandria and Athanasius). As is well known, we no longer possess a Greek manuscript, although it can be proved that the work was preserved down to middle Byzantine times, and was quoted with respect. The insufficient Christological and especially the eschatological disquisitions spoiled the enjoyment of the work in later times (on the Latin Irenaeus cf. the exhaustive examination of Loof: "The Manuscripts of the Latin translation of Irenaeus", in the "Studies of Church History" dedicated to Reuter, 1887). The old Catholic works written against heretics by Rhodon, Melito, Miltiades, Proculus, Modestus, Musanus, Theophilus, Philip of Gortyna, Hippolytus, and others have all been just as little preserved to us as the oldest book of this kind, the Syntagma of Justin against heresies, and the Memorabilia of Hegesippus. If we consider the criticism to which Tatian's Christology was subjected by Arethas in the 10th century (Oratio 5; see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2 p. 95 ff.), and the depreciatory judgment passed on Chiliasm from the 3rd century downwards, and if we moreover reflect that the older polemical works directed against heretics were supplanted by later detailed ones, we have a summary of the reasons for the loss of that oldest Catholic literature. This loss indeed makes it impossible for us to form an exact estimate of the extent and intensity of the effect produced by any individual writing, even including the great work of Irenaeus.]

[Footnote 482: People are fond of speaking of the "Asia Minor" theology of Irenaeus, ascribe it already to his teachers, Polycarp and the presbyters, then ascend from these to the Apostle John, and complete, though not without hesitation, the equation: John—Irenaeus. By this speculation they win simply everything, in so far as the Catholic doctrine now appears as the property of an "apostolic" circle, and Gnosticism and Antignosticism are thus eliminated. But the following arguments may be urged against this theory: (1) What we know of Polycarp by no means gives countenance to the supposition that Irenaeus learned more from him and his fellows than a pious regard for the Church tradition and a collection of historical traditions and principles. (2) The doctrine of Irenaeus cannot be separated from the received canon of New Testament writings; but in the generation before him there was as yet no such compilation. (3) The presbyter from whom Irenaeus adopted important lines of thought in the 4th book did not write till after the middle of the second century. (4) Tertullian owes his Christocentric theology, so far as he has such a thing, to Irenaeus (and Melito?).]

[Footnote 483: Marcion, as is well known, went still further in his depreciatory judgment of the world, and therefore recognised in the redemption through Christ a pure act of grace.]

[Footnote 484: See Molwitz, De [Greek: Anakephalaioseos] in Irenaei theologia potestate, Dresden, 1874.]

[Footnote 485: See, e.g., the Epistle to the Ephesians and also the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians.]

[Footnote 486: But see the remark made above, p. 220, note 1. We might without loss give up the half of the Apologies in return for the preservation of Justin's chief Antignostic work.]

[Footnote 487: According to the Gnostic Christology Christ merely restores the status quo ante, according to that of Irenaeus he first and alone realises the hitherto unaccomplished destination of humanity.]

[Footnote 488: According to the Gnostic conception the incarnation of the divine, i.e., the fall of Sophia, contains, paradoxically expressed, the element of sin; according to Irenaeus' idea the element of redemption. Hence we must compare not only the Gnostic Christ, but the Gnostic Sophia, with the Christ of the Church. Irenaeus himself did so in II. 20. 3.]

[Footnote 489: After tracing in II. 14 the origin of the Gnostic theologoumena to the Greek philosophers Irenaeus continues Sec. 7: "Dicemus autem adversus eos: utramne hi omnes qui praedicti sunt, cum quibus eadem dicentes arguimini (Scil. "ye Gnostics with the philosophers"), cognoverunt veritatem aut non cognoverunt? Et si quidem cognoverunt, superflua est salvatoris in hunc mundum descensio. Ut (lege "ad") quid enim descendebat?" It is characteristic of Irenaeus not to ask what is new in the revelations of God (through the prophets and the Logos), but quite definitely: "Cur descendit salvator in hunc mundum?" See also lib. III. praef.: "veritas, hoc est dei filii doctrina", III. 10. 3: "Haec est salutis agnitio quae deerat eis, quae est filii del agnitio ... agnitio salutis erat agnitio filii dei, qui et salus et salvator et salutare vere et dicitur et est." III. 11. 3: III. 12. 7: IV. 24.]

[Footnote 490: See II. 24. 3, 4: "Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est; sed secundum gratiam dei datur." Cf. what follows. Irenaeus has in various places argued that human nature inclusive of the flesh is capax incorruptibilitatis, and likewise that immortality is at once a free gift and the realisation of man's destiny.]

[Footnote 491: Book V. pref.: "Iesus Christus propter immensam suam dilectionem factus est quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse quod et ipse": III. 6. I: "Deus stetit in synagoga deorum ... de patre et filio et de his, qui adoptionem perceperunt, dicit: hi autem sunt ecclesia. Haec enim est synagoga dei," etc.; see also what follows III. 16. 3: "Filius dei hominis filius factus, ut per eum adoptionem percipiamus portante homine et capiente et compleciente filium dei." III. 16. 6: "Dei verbum unigenitus, qui semper humano generi adest, unitus et consparsus suo plasmati secundum placitum patris et caro factus, ipse est Iesus Christus dominus noster ... unus Iesus Christus, veniens per universam dispositionem et omnia in semetipsum recapitulans. In omnibus autem est et homo plasmatio dei, et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis, et verbum homo, universa in semetipsum recapitulans ... in semetipsum primatum assumens,.. universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore." III. 18. 1: "Quando incarnatus est filius homo et homo factus longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem praestans, ut quod perdideramus in Adam id est secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse dei, hoc in Christo Iesu reciperemus." Cf. the whole 18th chapter where the deepest thoughts of the Pauline Gnosis of the death on the cross are amalgamated with the Gnosis of the incarnation; see especially 18. 6, 7: "[Greek: Enosen oun ton anthropon to Theo. Ei gar me anthropos enikesen ten antipalon tou anthropou, ouk an dikaios enikethe ho echthros. Palin te, ei me ho Theos edoresato ten soterian, ouk an bebaios eschomen auten. Kai ei me sunenothe ho anthropos to Theo, ouk an edunethe metaschein tes aphtharsias. Edei gar ton mesiten Theou te kai anthropon dia tes idias pros hekaterous oikeiotetos eis philian kai homonoian tous amphoterous sunagogein; kai Theo men parastesai ton antropon anthropois de gnorisai ton Theon.] Qua enim ratione filiorum adoptionis eius participes esse possemus, nisi per filium eam quae est ad ipsura recepissemus ab eo communionem, nisi verbum eius communicasset nobis caro factum? Quapropter et per omnem venit aetatem, omnibus restituens eam quae est ad deum communionem." The Pauline ideas about sin, law, and bondage are incorporated by Irenaeus in what follows. The disquisitions in capp. 19-23 are dominated by the same fundamental idea. In cap. 19 Irenaeus turns to those who hold Jesus to be a mere man, "perseverantes in servitute pristinae inobedientiae moriuntur, nondum commixti verbo dei patris neque per filium percipientes libertatem ... privantur munere eius, quod est vita aesterna: non recipientes autem verbum incorruptionis perseverant in carne mortali, et sunt debitores mortis, antidotum vitae non accipientes. Ad quos verbum ait, suum munus gratiae? narrans: [Greek: Ego eipa, huioi hupsistou este pantes kai theoi; humeis de hos anthropoi apothneskete. Tauta legei pros tous me dexamenous ten dorean tes huiothesias, all' atimazontas ten sarkosin tes katharas genneseos tou logou tou Theou ... Eis touto gar ho logos anthropos] et qui filius dei est filius hominis factus est, [Greek: hina ho anthropos ton logon choresas kai ten huiothesian labon huios genetai Theou]. Non enim poteramus aliter incorruptelam et immortalitatem percipere, nisi adunati fuissemus incorruptelae et immortalitati. Quemadmodum autem adunari possumus incorruptelae et immortalitati, nisi prius incorruptela et immortalitas facta fuisset id quod et nos, ut absorbet*etur quod erat corruptibile ab incorruptela et quod erat mortale ab immortalitate, ut filiorum adoptionem perciperemus?" III. 21. 10: [Greek: Ei toinun ho protos Adam esche patera anthropon kai ek spermatos egennethe, eikos en kai deuteron Adam legein ex Ioseph gegennesthai. Ei de ekeinos ek ges elephthe, plastes de autou ho Theos, edei kai ton anakephalaioumenon eis auton hupo tou Theou peplasmenon anthropon ten auten ekeino tes genneseos echein homoioteta. Eis ti oun palin ouk elabe choun ho Theos, all' ek Marias energese ten plasin genesthai. Hina me alle plasis genetai mede allo to sozomenon e, all' autos ekeinos anakephalaiothe teroumenes tes homoiotetos]; III. 23. 1: IV. 38: V. 36: IV. 20: V. 16, 19-21, 22. In working out this thought Irenaeus verges here and there on soteriological naturalism (see especially the disquisitions regarding the salvation of Adam, opposed to Tatian's views, in III. 23). But he does not fall into this for two reasons. In the first place, as regards the history, of Jesus, he has been taught by Paul not to stop at the incarnation, but to view the work of salvation as only completed by the sufferings and death of Christ (See II. 20. 3: "dominus per passionem mortem destruxit et solvit errorem corruptionemque exterminavit, et ignorantiam destruxit, vitam autem manifestavit et ostendit veritatem et incorruptionem donavit"; III. 16. 9: III. 18. 1-7 and many other passages), that is, to regard Christ as having performed a work. Secondly, alongside of the deification of Adam's children, viewed as a mechanical result of the incarnation, he placed the other (apologetic) thought, viz., that Christ, as the teacher, imparts complete knowledge, that he has restored, i.e., strengthened the freedom of man, and that redemption (by which he means fellowship with God) therefore takes place only in the case of those children of Adam that acknowledge the truth proclaimed by Christ and imitate the Redeemer in a holy life (V. 1. 1.: "Non enim aliter nos discere poteramus quae sunt dei, nisi magister noster, verbum exsistens, homo factus fuisset. Neque enim alias poterat enarrare nobis, quae sunt patris, nisi proprium ipsius verbum ... Neque rursus nos aliter discere poteramus, nisi magistrum nostrum videntes et per auditum nostrum vocem eius percipientes, ut imitatores quidem operum, factores autem sermonum eius facti, communionem habeamus cum ipso", and many other passages). We find a combined formula in III. 5. 3: "Christus libertatem hominibus restauravit et attribuit incorruptelae haereditatem."]

[Footnote 492: Theophilus also did not see further, see Wendt, l.c., 17 ff.]

[Footnote 493: Melito's teaching must have been similar. In a fragment attributed to him (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2 p. 255 ff.) we even find the expression "[Greek: hai duo ousiai Christou]". The genuineness of the fragment is indeed disputed, but, as I think, without grounds. It is certainly remarkable that the formula is not found in Irenaeus (see details below). The first Syriac fragment (Otto IX. p. 419) shows that Melito also views redemption as reunion through Christ.]

[Footnote 494: The conception of the stage by stage development of the economy of God and the corresponding idea of "several covenants" (I. 10. 3: III. 11-15 and elsewhere) denote a very considerable advance, which the Church teachers owe to the controversy with Gnosticism, or to the example of the Gnostics. In this case the origin of the idea is quite plain. For details see below.]

[Footnote 495: It would seem from some passages as if faith and theological knowledge were according to Irenaeus simply related as the "is" and the "why." As a matter of fact, he did express himself so without being really able to maintain the relationship thus fixed; for faith itself must also to some extent include a knowledge of the reason and aim of God's ways of salvation. Faith and theological knowledge are therefore, after all, closely interwoven with each other. Irenaeus merely sought for a clear distinction, but it was impossible for him to find it in his way. The truth rather is that the same man, who, in opposition to heresy, condemned an exaggerated estimate of theoretical knowledge, contributed a great deal to the transformation of that faith into a monistic speculation.]

[Footnote 496: See 1. 10. 2: [Greek: Kai oute ho panu dunatos en logo ton en tais ekklesiais proestoton touton] (scil. than the regula sidei) [Greek: epei oudeis gar uper ton didaskalon oute ho asthenes en to logo elattosei ten paradosin. Mias gar kai tes autes pisteos ouses oute ho polu peri autes dunamenos eipein epleonasen, oute ho to oligon elattonese].]

[Footnote 497: See Bohringer's careful reviews of the theology of Irenaeus and Tertullian (Kirchengeschichte in Biographien, Vol. I. 1st section, 1st half (2nd ed.), pp. 378-612, 2nd half, pp. 484-739).]

[Footnote 498: To the proof from prescription belong the arguments derived from the novelty and contradictory multiplicity of the Gnostic doctrines as well as the proofs that Greek philosophy is the original source of heresy. See Iren. II. 14. 1-6; Tertull. de praescr. 7; Apolog. 47 and other places; the Philosophoumena of Hippolytus. On Irenaeus' criticism of Gnostic theology see Kunze, Gotteslehre des Irenaeus, Leipzig, 1891. p. 8 ff.]

[Footnote 499: See Irenaeus II. 1. 2-4: II. 31. 1. Tertull., adv. Marc. I. 2-7. Tertullian proves that there can be neither two morally similar, nor two morally dissimilar Deities; see also I. 15.]

[Footnote 500: See Irenaeus II. 13. Tertullian (ad Valent. 4) very appropriately defined the aeons of Ptolemy as "personales substantias extra deum determinatas, quas Valentinus in ipsa summa divinitatis ut sensus et affectus motus incluserat."]

[Footnote 501: See Irenaeus, l.c., and elsewhere in the 2nd Book, Tertull. adv. Valent. in several passages. Moreover, Irenaeus still treated the first 8 Ptolemaic aeons with more respect than the 22 following, because here at least there was some appearance of a Biblical foundation. In confuting the doctrine of aeons he incidentally raised several questions (II. 17. 2), which Church theologians discussed in later times, with reference to the Son and Spirit. "Quaeritur quemadmodum emissi sunt reliqui aeones? Utrum uniti ei qui emiserit, quemadmodum a sole radii, an efficabiliter et partiliter, uti sit unusquisque eorum separatim et suam figurationem habens, quemadmodum ab homine homo ... Aut secundum germinationem, quemabmodum ab arbore rami? Et utrum eiusdem substantiae exsistebant his qui se emiserunt, an ex altera quadam substantia substantiam habentes? Et utrum in eodem emissi sunt, ut eiusdem temporis essent sibi?... Et utrum simplices quidam et uniformes et undique sibi aequales et similes, quemadmodum spiritus et lumina emissa sunt, an compositi et differentes"? See also II. 17. 4: "Si autem velut a lumine lumina accensa sunt... velut verbi gratia a facula faculae, generatione quidem et magnitudine fortasse distabunt ab invicem; eiusdem autem substantive cum sint cum principe emissionis ipsorum, aut omnes impassibiles perseverant aut et pater ipsorum participabit passiones. Neque enim quae postea accensa est facula, alterum lumen habebit quam illud quod ante eam fuit." Here we have already a statement of the logical reasons, which in later times were urged against the Arian doctrine.]

[Footnote 502: See Iren. II. 17. 5 and II. 18.]

[Footnote 503: See Iren. II. 4. 2.]

[Footnote 504: Tertullian in particular argued in great detail (adv. Marc. I. 9-19) that every God must, above all, have revealed himself as a creator. In opposition to Marcion's rejection of all natural theology, he represents this science as the foundation of all religious belief. In this connection he eulogised the created world (I. 13) and at the same time (see also the 2nd Book) argued in favour of the Demiurge, i.e., of the one true God. Irenaeus urged a series of acute and weighty objections to the cosmogony of the Valentinians (see II. 1-5), and showed how untenable was the idea of the Demiurge as an intermediate being. The doctrines that the Supreme Being is unknown (II. 6), that the Demiurge is the blind instrument of higher aeons, that the world was created against the will of the Supreme God, and, lastly, that our world is the imperfect copy of a higher one were also opposed by him with rational arguments. His refutation of the last conception is specially remarkable (II. 7). On the idea that God did not create the world from eternal matter see Tertull., adv. Hermog.]

[Footnote 505: But this very method of argument was without doubt specially impressive in the case of the educated, and it is these alone of whom we are here speaking. On the decay of Gnosticism after the end of the 2nd century, see Renan, Origines, Vol. VII., p. 113 ff.]

[Footnote 506: See his arguments that the Gnostics merely assert that they have only one Christ, whereas they actually possess several, III. 16. 1, 8 and elsewhere.]

[Footnote 507: See Iren., I. 9 and elsewhere; Tertull., de praescr. 39, adv. Valent. passim.]

[Footnote 508: See Tertull., adv. Marc. II. 19, 21, 22: III. 5, 6, 14, 19: V. 1.; Orig. Comm. in Matth., T. XV. 3, Opp. III., p. 655: Comm. in ep. ad Rom., T. II. 12. Opp. IV., p. 494 sq.; Pseudo-Orig. Adamantius, De recta in deum fide; Orig. I. pp. 808, 817.]

[Footnote 509: For this reason Tertullian altogether forbade exegetic disputes with the Gnostics, see de praescr. 16-19: "Ego non ad scripturas provocandum est nec in his constituendum certamen, in quibus aut milla aut incerta victoria est aut parum certa."]

[Footnote 510: See Iren., III. 5. 1: III. 12. 6.]

[Footnote 511: See Iren., III. 14. 2: III. 15. 1; Tertull., de praescr. 25: "Scripturae quidem perfectae sunt, quippe a verbo dei et spiritu eius dictae, nos autem secundum quod minores sumus et novissimi a verbo dei et spiritu eius, secundum hoc et scientia niysteriorum eius indigenus."]

[Footnote 512: See Iren. II. 35. 2: IV. 34, 35 and elsewhere. Irenaeus also asserted that the translation of the Septuagint (III. 21. 4) was inspired. The repudiation of different kinds of inspiration in the Scriptures likewise involved the rejection of all the critical views of the Gnostics that were concealed behind that assumption. The Alexandrians were the first who again to some extent adopted these critical principles.]

[Footnote 513: See Iren. II. 10. 1: II. 27. 1, 2.]

[Footnote 514: See Iren. II. 25. I.]

[Footnote 515: Irenaeus appropriates the words of an Asia Minor presbyter when he says (IV. 31. 1): "De his quidem delictis, de quibus ipsae scripturae increpant patriarchas et prophetas, nos non oportere exprobare eis ... de quibus autem scripturae non inciepant (scil. delictis), sed simpliciter sunt positae, nos non debere fieri accusatores, sed typum quaerere."]

[Footnote 516: See, e.g., IV. 20. 12 where he declares the three spies whom Rahab entertained to be Father, Son. and Spirit.]

[Footnote 517: See Iren. IV. 22. 1.]

[Footnote 518: See Iren. III. 17. 3.]

[Footnote 519: Justin had already noted certain peculiarities of the Holy Scriptures as distinguished from profane writings. Tertullian speaks of two proprietates iudaicae literaturae in adv. Marc. III. 5. 6. But the Alexandrians were the first to propound any kind of complete theories of inspiration.]

[Footnote 520: See above p. 233, note 2, Kunze, l.c.]

[Footnote 521: See Iren, II. 26. 1, 13. 4: "Sic et in reliquis omnibus nulli similis erit omnium pater hominum pusillitati: et dicitur quidem secundum haec propter delectionem, sentitur autem super haec secundum magnitudinem." Irenaeus expressly says that God cannot be known as regards his greatness, i.e. absolutely, but that he can be known as regards his love, IV. 20. 1: "Igitur secundum magnitudem non est cognoscere deum, impossibile est enim mensurari patrem; secundum autem dilectionem eius—haec est enim quae nos per verbum eius perducit ad deum—obedientes ei semper discimus quoniam est tantus deus etc."; in IV. 20. 4 the knowledge of God "secundum dilectionem" is more closely defined by the words "per verbum eius Iesum Christum." The statements in Sec.Sec. 5 and 6 are, however, specially important: they who are pure in heart will see God. God's omnipotence and goodness remove the impossibility of man knowing him. Man comes to know him gradually, in proportion as he is revealed and through love, until he beholds him in a state of perfection. He must be in God in order to know God: [Greek: hosper hoi blepontes to phos entos eisi tou photos kai tes lamprotetos autou metechousin, houtos hoi blepontes ton Theon entos eisi tou Theou, metechontes autou tes lamprotetos. Kai dia touto ho achoretos kai akataleptos kai aoratos horomenon heauton ... tois pistois pareschen, hina zoopoiese tous chorountas kai blepontas auton dia pisteos]. See also what follows down to the words: [Greek: metoche Theou esti to ginoskein Theon kai apolauein tes chrestotetos autou], et homines igitur videbunt deum, ut vivant, per visionem immortales facti et pertingentes usque in deum. Sentences of this kind where rationalism is neutralised by mysticism we seek for in Tertullian in vain.]

[Footnote 522: See Iren., IV. 6. 4: [Greek: Edidaxen hemas ho kurios, hoti Theon eidenai oudeis dunatai, me ouchi Theou didaxantos, toutestin, aneu Theou me ginoskesthai ton Theon; auto de to ginoskesthai ton Theon thelema einai tou patros, Gnosontai gar auton hois an apokalupse ho huios].]

[Footnote 523: Iren. II. 6. 1, 9. 1, 27. 2: III. 25. 1: "Providentiam habet deus omnium propter hoc et consilium dat: consilium autem dans adest his, qui morum providentiam habent. Necesse est igitur ea quae providentur et gubernantur cognoscere suum directorem; quae quidem non sunt irrationalia neque vana, sed habent sensibilitatem perceptam de providentia dei. Et propter hoc ethnicorum quidam, qui minus illecebris ac voluptatibus servierunt, et non in tantum superstitione idolorum coabducti sunt, providentia eius moti licet tenuiter, tamen conversi sunt, ut dicererit fabricatorem huiuss universitatis patrem omnium providentem et disponentem secundum nos mundum." Tertull., de testim. animae; Apolog. 17.]

[Footnote 524: See Iren., IV. 6. 2; Tertull., adv. Marc. I, II.]

[Footnote 525: See Iren., V. 26. 2.]

[Footnote 526: See Iren., II. 1. I and the Hymn II. 30. 9.]

[Footnote 527: See Iren., III. 8. 3. Very pregnant are Irenaeus' utterances in II. 34. 4 and II. 30. 9: "Principari enim debet in omnibus et dominari voluntas dei, reliqua autem omnia huic cedere et subdita esse et in servitium dedita" ... "substantia omnium voluntas dei;" see also the fragment V. in Harvey, Iren., Opp. II. p. 477 sq. Because everything originates with God and the existence of eternal metaphysical contrasts is therefore impossible the following proposition (IV. 2, 4), which is proved from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, holds, good: "ex una substantia esse omnia, id est Abraham et Moysem et prophetas, etiam ipsum dominum."]

[Footnote 528: See Iren. II. 28. 4, 5: IV. 11. 2.]

[Footnote 529: Tertullian also makes the same demand (e.g. adv. Marc. II. 27); for his assertion "deum corpus esse" (adv. Prax. 7: "Quis enim negabil, deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie") must be compared with his realistic doctrine of the soul (de anima 6) as well as with the proposition formulated in de carne 11: "omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est." Tertullian here followed a principle of Stoic philosophy, and in this case by no means wished to teach that the Deity has a human form, since he recognised that man's likeness to God consists merely in his spiritual qualities. On the contrary Melito ascribed to God a corporeal existence of a higher type (Eusebius mentions a work of this bishop under the title "[Greek: ho peri ensomatou Theou logos],") and Origen reckoned him among the teachers who recognised that man had also a likeness to God in form (in body); see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1. 2, pp. 243, 248. In the second century the realistic eschatological ideas no doubt continued to foster in wide circles the popular idea that God had a form and a kind of corporeal existence. A middle position between these ideas and that of Tertullian and the Stoics seems to have been taken up by Lactantius (Instit. div. VII. 9, 21; de ira dei 2. 18.).]

[Footnote 530: See Iren., III. 25. 2; Tertull., adv. Marc. I. 23-28: II. 11 sq. Hippolytus briefly defined his doctrine of God in Phil. X. 32. The advance beyond the Apologists' idea of God consists not only in the thorough discussion of God's attributes of goodness and righteousness, but also in the view, which is now much more vigorously worked out, that the Almighty Creator has no other purpose in his world than the salvation of mankind. See the 10th Greek fragment of Irenaeus (Harvey, II. p. 480); Tertull., de orat. 4: "Summa est voluntatis dei salus eorum, quos adoptavit"; de paenit. 2: "Bonorum dei unus est titulus, salus hominum"; adv. Marc. II. 27: "Nihil tam dignum deo quam salus hominis." They had here undeniably learned from Marcion; see adv. Marc. I. 17. In the first chapters of the work de orat., however, in which Tertullian expounds the Lord's Prayer, he succeeded in unfolding the meaning of the Gospel in a way such as was never possible for him elsewhere. The like remark may be made of Origen's work de orat., and, in general, in the case of most authors who interpreted the Lord's Prayer in the succeeding period. This prayer kept alive the knowledge of the deepest meaning of the Gospel.]

[Footnote 531: Apol. 21: "Necesse et igitur pauca de Christo ut deo ... Jam ediximus deum universitatem hanc mundi verbo et ratione et virtute molitum. Apud vestros quoque sapientes [Greek: Logon], id est sermonem et rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis." (An appeal to Zeno and Cleanthes follows). "Et nos autem sermoni atque rationi itemque virtuti, per quae omnia molitum deum ediximus, propriam substantiam spiritum inscribimus, cui et sermo insit pronuntianti et ratio adsit disponenti et virtus praesit perficienti. Hunc ex deo prolatum didicimus et prolatione generatum et idcirco filium dei et deum dictum ex unitate substantiae, nam et deus spiritus (that is, the antemundane Logos is the Son of God). Et cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa; sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius nec separatur substantia sed extenditur (cf. adv. Prax. 8). Ita de spiritu spiritus et deo deus ut lumen de lumine accensum. Manet integra et indefecta materiae matrix, etsi plures inde traduces qualitatis mutueris: ita et quod de deo profectum est, deus est et dei filius et unus ambo. Ita et de spiritu spiritus et de deo deus modulo alternum numerum, gradu non statu fecit, et a matrice non necessit sed excessit. Iste igitur dei radius, ut retro semper praedicabatur, delapsus in virginem quandam et in utero eius caro figuratus nascitur homo deo mixtus. Caro spiritu instructa nutritur, adolescit, adfatur, docet, operatur et Christus est." Tertullian adds: "Recipite interim hanc fabulam, similis est vestris." As a matter of fact the heathen must have viewed this statement as a philosophical speculation with a mythological conclusion. It is very instructive to ascertain that in Hippolytus' book against Noetus "the setting forth of the truth" (c. 10 ff.) he begins with the proposition: [Greek: Theos eboulethe kosmon ktisai]. The Logos whose essence and working are described merely went forth to realise this intention.]

[Footnote 532: See Hagemann, Die roemische Kirche (1864), p. 172 ff.]

[Footnote 533: See my detailed exposition of the orthodox side of Tertullian's doctrine of the Trinity ("orthodox" in the later sense of the word), in Vol. IV. There it is also shown that these formulae were due to Tertullian's juristic bias. The formulae, "una substantia, tres personae", never alternates in his case with the others, "una natura, tres personae"; and so it remained for a long time in the West; they did not speak of "natures" but of "substances" ("nature" in this connection is very rare down to the 5th century). What makes this remarkable is the fact that Tertullian always uses "substance" in the concrete sense "individual substance" and has even expressed himself precisely on the point. He says in de anima 32: "aliud est substantia, aliud natura substantiae; siquidem substantia propria est rei cuiusque, natura vero potest esse communis. Suscipe exemplum: substantia est lapis, ferrum; duritia lapidis et ferri natura substantiae est. Duritia (natura) communicat, substantia discordat. Mollitia lanae, mollitia plumae pariant naturalia eorum, substantiva non pariant ... Et tune naturae similitudo notatur, cum substantiae dissimilitudo conspicitur. Men and animals are similar natura, but not substantia." We see that Tertullian in so far as he designated Father, Son, and Spirit as one substance expressed their unity as strongly as possible. The only idea intelligible to the majority was a juristic and political notion, viz., that the Father, who is the tota substantia, sends forth officials whom he entrusts with the administration of the monarchy. The legal fiction attached to the concept "person" aided in the matter here.]

[Footnote 534: See adv. Prax. 3: "Igitur si et monarchia divina per tot legiones et exercitus angelorum administratur, sicut scriptum est: Milies centies centena milia adsistebant ei, et milies centena milia apparebant ei, nec ideo unius esse desiit, ut desinat monarchia esse, quia per tanta milia virtutum procuratur: quale est ut deus divisionem et dispersionem pati videatur in filio et spiritu sancto, secundum et tertium sortitis locum, tam consortibus substantiae patris, quam non patitur in tot angelorum numero?" (!!) c. 4: "Videmus igitur non obesse monarchiae filium, etsi hodie apud filium est, quia et in suo statu est apud filium, et cum suo statu restituetur patri a filio." L.c.: "Monarchia in tot nominibus constituta est, in quot deus voluit."]

[Footnote 535: See Hippol., c. Noetum II. According to these doctrines the unity is sufficiently preserved (1) if the separate persons have one and the same substance, (2) if there is one possessor of the whole substance, i.e., if everything proceeds from him. That this is a remnant of polytheism ought not to be disputed.]

[Footnote 536: Adv. Prax. 8: "Hoc si qui putaverit, me [Greek: probolen] aliquam introducere id est prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quod facit Valentinus, primo quidem dicam tibi, non ideo non utatur et veritas vocabulo isto et re ac censu eius, quia et haeresis utitur; immo haeresis potius ex veritate accepit quod ad mendacium suum strueret"; cf. also what follows. Thus far then theologians had got already: "The economy is founded on as many names as God willed" (c. 4).]

[Footnote 537: See adv. Prax. 5.]

[Footnote 538: Tertull., adv. Hermog. 3: "fuit tempus, cum ei filius non fuit."]

[Footnote 539: Novatian (de trin. 23) distinguishes very decidedly between "factum esse" and "procedere".]

[Footnote 540: Adv. Prax. 2: "Custodiatur [Greek: oikonomias] sacramentum, quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, tres autem non statu, sed gradu, nec substantia, sed forma, nec potestate, sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et potestatis."]

[Footnote 541: See the discussions adv. Prax. 16 ff.]

[Footnote 542: Tertull., adv. Marc. III. 6: "filius portio plenitudinis." In another passage Tertullian has ironically remarked in opposition to Marcion (IV. 39): "Nisi Marcion Christum non subiectum patri infert."]

[Footnote 543: Adv. Prax. 9.]

[Footnote 544: See the whole 14th chap. adv. Prax. especially the words: "I am ergo alius erit qui videbatur, quia non potest idem invisibilis definiri qui videbatur, et consequens erit, ut invisibilem patrem intellegamus pro plenitudine maiestatis, visibilem vero filium agnoscamus pro modulo derivationis." One cannot look at the sun itself, but, "toleramus radium eius pro temperatura portionis, quae in terram inde porrigitur." The chapter also shows how the Old Testament theophanies must have given an impetus to the distinction between the Deity as transcendent and the Deity as making himself visible. Adv. Marc. II. 27: "Quaecunque exigitis deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quaecunque autem ut indigna reprehenditis, deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso, arbitro patris et ministro, miscente in semetipso hominem et deum in virtutibus deum, in pusillitatibus hominem, ut tantum homini conferat quantum deo detrahit." In adv. Prax. 29 Tertullian showed in very precise terms that the Father is by nature impassible, but the Son is capable of suffering. Hippolytus does not share this opinion; to him the Logos in himself is likewise [Greek: apathes] (see c. Noetum 15).]

[Footnote 545: According to Tertullian it is certainly an essential part of the Son's nature to appear, teach, and thus come into connection with men; but he neither asserted the necessity of the incarnation apart from the faulty development of mankind, nor can this view be inferred from his premises.]

[Footnote 546: See adv. Prax. 4. the only passage, however, containing this idea, which is derived from 1 Cor. XV.]

[Footnote 547: Cf. specially the attempts of Plotinus to reconcile the abstract unity which is conceived as the principle of the universe with the manifoldness and fulness of the real and the particular (Ennead. lib. III.-V.). Plotinus employs the subsidiary notion [Greek: merismos] in the same way as Tertullian; see Hagemann l.c. p. 186 f. Plotinus would have agreed with Tertullian's proposition in adv. Marc. III. 15: "Dei nomen quasi naturale divinitatis potest in omnes communicari quibus divinitas vindicatur." Plotinus' idea of hypostasis is also important, and this notion requires exact examination.]

[Footnote 548: Following the baptismal confession, Tertullian merely treated the Holy Ghost according to the scheme of the Logos doctrine without any trace of independent interest. In accordance with this, however, the Spirit possesses his own "numerus"—"tertium numen divinitatis et tertium nomen maiestatis",—and he is a person in the same sense as the Son, to whom, however, he is subordinate, for the subordination is a necessary result of his later origin. See cc. 2, 8: "tertius est spiritus a deo et filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus a frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus a flumine et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Nihil tamen a matrice alienatur a qua proprietates suas ducit. Ita trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a patre decurrens et monarchiae nihil obstrepit et [Greek: oikonomias] statum protegit"; de pudic. 21. In de praescr. 13 the Spirit in relation to the Son is called "vicaria vis". The element of personality in the Spirit is with Tertullian merely a result arising from logical deduction; see his successor Novatian de trin. 29. Hippolytus did not attribute personality to the Spirit, for he says (adv. Noet. 14): [Greek: Hena Theon ero, prosopa de duo, oikonomia de triten ten charin tou hagiou pneumatos; pater men gar eis, prosopa de duo, hoti kai ho huios, to de triton to hagion pneuma]. In his Logos doctrine apart from the express emphasis he lays on the creatureliness of the Logos (see Philos. X. 33: [Greek: Ei gar Theon se ethelese poiesai ho Theos, edunato; echeis tou logou to paradeigma]) he quite agrees with Tertullian. See ibid.; here the Logos is called before his coming forth "[Greek: endiathetos tou pantos logismos]"; he is produced [Greek: ek ton onton], i.e., from the Father who then alone existed; his essence is "that he bears in himself the will of him who has begotten him" or "that he comprehends in himself the ideas previously conceived by and resting in the Father." Cyprian in no part of his writings took occasion to set forth the Logos doctrine in a didactic way; he simply kept to the formula: "Christus deus et homo", and to the Biblical expressions which were understood in the sense of divinity and preexistence; see Testim. II. 1-10. Lactantius was still quite confused in his Trinitarian doctrine and, in particular, conceived the Holy Ghost not as a person but as "sanctificatio" proceeding from the Father or from the Son. On the contrary, Novatian, in his work de trinitate reproduced Tertullian's views. For details see Dorner Entwickelungsgeschichte I. pp. 563-634, Kahnis, Lehre vom heiligen Geiste; Hagemann, l.c., p. 371 ff. It is noteworthy that Tertullian still very frequently called the preexistent Christ dei spiritus; see de oral. I: "Dei spiritus et dei sermo et dei ratio, sermo rationis et ratio sermonis et spiritus, utrumque Iesus Christus." Apol. 21: adv. Prax. 26; adv. Marc. I. 10: III. 6, 16: IV. 21.]

[Footnote 549: See Zahn, Marcellus of Ancyra, pp. 235-244. Duncker, Des heiligen Irenaus Christologie, 1843.]

[Footnote 550: Zahn, l.c., p. 238.]

[Footnote 551: See Iren., II. 13. 8: II. 28. 4-9: II. 12. 2: II. 13. 2, and also the important passage II. 29. 3 fin.]

[Footnote 552: A great many passages clearly show that Irenaeus decidedly distinguished the Son from the Father, so that it is absolutely incorrect to attribute modalistic ideas to him. See III. 6. 1 and all the other passages where Irenaeus refers to the Old Testament theophanies. Such are III. 6. 2: IV. 5. 2 fin.: IV. 7. 4, where the distinction is particularly plain: IV. 17. 6: II. 28. 6.]

[Footnote 553: The Logos (Son) is the administrator and bestower of the divine grace as regards humanity, because he is the revealer of this grace, see IV. 6 (Sec. 7: "agnitio patris filius, agnitio autem filii in patre et per filium revelata"): IV. 5: IV. 16. 7: IV. 20. 7. He has been the revealer of God from the beginning and always remains so, III. 16. 6: IV. 13. 4 etc.: he is the antemundane revealer to the angel world, see II. 30. 9: "semper autem coexsistens filius patri, olim et ab initio semper revelat patrem et angelis et archangelis et potestatibus et virtutibus et omnibus, quibus vult revelari deus;" he has always existed with the Father, see II. 30. 9: III. 18. 1: "non tunc coepit filius dei, exsistens semper apud patrem"; IV. 20. 3, 7, 14. 1: II. 25. 3: "non enim infectus es, o homo, neque semper coexsistebas deo, sicut proprium eius verbum." The Logos is God as God, nay, for us he is God himself, in so far as his work is the work of God. Thus, and not in a modalistic sense, we must understand passages like II. 30. 9: "fabricator qui fecit mundum per semitipsum, hoc est per verbum et per sapientiam suam," or hymnlike statements such as III. 16. 6: "et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impassibilis passibilis et verbum homo" (see something similar in Ignatius and Melito, Otto, Corp. Apolog. IX, p. 419 sq.). Irenaeus also says in III. 6. 2: "filius est in patre et habet in se patrem," III. 6. 1.: "utrosque dei appellatione signavit spiritus, et eum qui ungitur filium et eum, qui ungit, id est patrem." He not only says that the Son has revealed the Father, but that the Father has revealed the Son (IV. 6. 3: IV. 7. 7). He applies Old Testament passages sometimes to Christ, sometimes to God, and hence in some cases calls the Father the creator, and in others the Son ("pater generis humani verbum dei", IV. 31. 2). Irenaeus (IV. 4. 2) appropriated the expression of an ancient "immensum patrem in filio mensuratum; mensura enim patris filius, quoniam et capit eum." This expression is by no means intended to denote a diminution, but rather to signify the identity of Father and Son. In all this Irenaeus adhered to an ancient tradition; but these propositions do not admit of being incorporated with a rational system.]

[Footnote 554: Logos and Sophia are the hands of God (III. 21. 10: IV. 20): also IV. 6. 6: "Invisibile filii pater, visibile autem patris filius." Judging from this passage, it is always doubtful whether Irenaeus, like Tertullian, assumed that transcendency belonged to the Father in a still higher sense than to the Son, and that the nature of the Son was more adapted for entering the finite than that of the Father (on the contrary see IV. 20. 7 and especially IV. 24. 2: "verbum naturaliter quidem invisibile"). But it ought not to have been denied that there are passages, in which Irenaeus hints at a subordination of the Son, and deduces this from his origin. See II. 28. 8 (the knowledge of the Father reaches further than that of the Son and the Father is greater than the Son); III. 6. 1 (the Son receives from the Father the sovereignty); IV. 17. 6 (a very important passage: the Father owns the name of Jesus Christ as his, first, because it is the name of his Son, and, secondly, because he gave it himself); V. 18. 21, 3 ("pater conditionem simul et verbum suum portans"—"verbum portatum a patre"—"et sic unus deus pater ostenditur, qui est super omnia et per omnia et in omnibus; super omnia pater quidem et ipse est caput Christi"—"verbum universorum potestatem habet a patre"). "This is not a subordination founded on the nature of the second person, but an inequality that has arisen historically," says Zahn (l.c., p. 241); but it is doubtful whether such a distinction can be imputed to Irenaeus. We have rather simply to recognise the contradiction, which was not felt by Irenaeus because, in his religious belief, he places Christ on a level with God, but, as a theologian, merely touched on the problem. So also he shows remarkable unconcern as to the proof of the unity of God in view of the distinction between Father and Son.]

[Footnote 555: Irenaeus very frequently emphasises the idea that the whole economy of God refers to mankind, see, e.g., I. 10. 3: [Greek: ekdiegeisthai ten pragmateian kai oikonomian tou Theou ten epi te anthropoteti genomenen], IV, 20. 7: "Verbum dispensator paternae gratiae factus est ad utilitatem hominum, propter quos fecit tantas dispositiones." God became a creator out of goodness and love; see the beautiful expression in IV. 20. 7: "Gloria dei vivens homo, vita autem hominis visio dei," or III. 20. 2: "Gloria hominis deus, operationes vero dei et omnis sapientias eius et virtutis receptaculum homo." V. 29. 1: "Non homo propter conditionem, sed conditio facta est propter hominem."]

[Footnote 556: Irenaeus speaks about the Holy Spirit in numerous passages. No doubt he firmly believes in the distinction of the Spirit (Holy Spirit, Spirit of God, Spirit of the Father, Spirit of the Son, prophetic Spirit, Wisdom) from the Father and Son, and in a particular significance belonging to the Spirit, as these doctrines are found in the regula. In general the same attributes as are assigned to the Son are everywhere applicable to him; he was always with the Father before there was any creation (IV. 20. 3; Irenaeus applies Prov. III. 19: VIII. 22 to the Spirit and not to the Son); like the Son he was the instrument and hand of the Father (IV. pref. 4, 20. 1: V. 6. 1.). That Logos and Wisdom are to be distinguished is clear from IV. 20. 1-12 and particularly from Sec. 12: IV. 7. 4: III. 17. 3 (the host in the parable of the Good Samaritan is the Spirit). Irenaeus also tried by reference to Scripture to distinguish the work of the Spirit from that of the Logos. Thus in the creation, the guidance of the world, the Old Testament history, the incarnation, the baptism of Jesus, the Logos is the energy, the Spirit is wisdom. He also alluded to a specific ministry of the Spirit in the sphere of the new covenant. The Spirit is the principle of the new knowledge in IV. 33. 1, 7, Spirit of fellowship with God in V. I. 1, pledge of immortality in V. 8. 1, Spirit of life in V. 18. 2. But not only does the function of the Spirit remain very obscure for all that, particularly in the incarnation, where Irenaeus was forced by the canon of the New Testament to unite what could not be united (Logos doctrine and descent of the Spirit upon Mary—where, moreover, the whole of the Fathers after Irenaeus launched forth into the most wonderful speculations), but even the personality of the Spirit vanishes with him, e.g., in III. 18. 3: "unguentem patrem et unctum filium et unctionem, qui est spiritus" (on Isaiah LXI. 1); there is also no mention of the Spirit in IV. pref. 4 fin., and IV. 1. 1, though he ought to have been named there. Father, Son, and Spirit, or God, Logos, and Sophia are frequently conjoined by Irenaeus, but he never uses the formula [Greek: trias], to say nothing of the abstract formulas of Tertullian. In two passages (IV. 20. 5: V. 36. 2) Irenaeus unfolded a sublime speculation, which is inconsistent with his usual utterances. In the first passage he says that God has shown himself prophetically through the Spirit (in the Old Testament), then adoptively through the Son, and will finally show himself paternally in the kingdom of heaven; the Spirit prepares man for the Son of God, the Son leads him to the Father, but the Father confers on him immortality. In the other passage he adopts the saying of an old presbyter (Papias?) that we ascend gradually through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the Father, and that in the end the Son will deliver up everything to the Father, and God will be all in all. It is remarkable that, as in the case of Tertullian (see above), it is 1 Cor. XV. 23-28 that has produced this speculation. This is another clear proof, that in Irenaeus the equality of Father, Son, and Spirit is not unconditional and that the eternity of Son and Spirit is not absolute. Here also we plainly perceive that the several disquisitions in Irenaeus were by no means part of a complete system. Thus, in IV. 38. 2, he inverts the relationship and says that we ascend from the Son to the Spirit: [Greek: Kai dia touto Paulos Korinthiois phesi: gala humas epotisa, ou Broma, oude gar edunasthe bastazein; toutesti, ten men kata anthropon parousian tou kuriou ematheteuthete, oudepou de to tou patros pneuma epanapauetai eph' humas dia ten humon astheneian]. Here one of Origen's thoughts appears.]

[Footnote 557: The opinions advanced here are, of course, adumbrations of the ideas about redemption. Noldechen (Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1885, p. 462 ff): "Die Lehre vom ersten Menschen bei den christlichen Lehrern des 2 Jahrhunderts."]

[Footnote 558: Here the whole 38th chapter of the 4th Book is to be examined. The following sentences are perhaps the most important: [Greek: Ei de legei tis ouk edunato ho Theos ap' arches teleion anadeixai ton anthropon, Gnoto, hoti to men Theo, aei kata ta auta onti kai agenneto huparchonti, hos pros heauton, panta dunata; ta de gegonta, katho metepeita geneseos archen idian esche, kata touto kai hustereisthai dei auta tou pepoiekotos; ou gar edunanto agenneta einai ta neosti gegennemena. Katho de me estin agenneta, kata touto kai husterountai tou teleiou. Katho de neotera, kata touto kai nepia, kata touto kai asunethe kai agumnasta pros ten teleian agogen]. The mother can no doubt give strong food to the child at the very beginning, but the child cannot stand it: [Greek: anthropos adunatos labein auto; nepios gar en], see also Sec. 2-4: "Non ab initio dii facti sumus, sed primo quidem homines, tunc demum dii, quamvis deus secundum simplicitatem bonitatis suae hoc fecerit, nequis eum putet invidiosum aut impraestantem." "Ego," inquit, "dixi, dii estis et filii excelsi omnes, nobis autem potestatem divinitatis baiulare non sustinentibus" ... "Oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere, post deinde vinci et absorbi mortale ab immortalitate et corruptibile ab incorruptibilitate, et fieri hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem dei, agnitione accepta boni et mali." Ibid.: [Greek: hupotage Theou aptharsia, kai paramone aptharsias doxa agennetos ... horasis Theou peripoietike aptharsias; aptharsia de eggus einai poiei Theou]. In this chapter Irenaeus contemplates the manner of appearance of the Logos (as man) from the point of view of a [Greek: sunnepiazein]. His conception of the capacity and destination of man enabled him to develop his ideas about the progressive training of the human race and about the different covenants (see below). On this point cf. also IV. 20. 5-7. The fact that, according to this way of looking at things, the Good and Divine appeared only as the destination of man—which was finally to be reached through divine guidance—but not as his nature, suggested both to Irenaeus and Tertullian the distinction between "natura" and "gratia" or between "substantia" and "fides et iustitia." In other words, they were led to propound a problem which had occurred to the Gnostics long before, and had been solved by them in a dualistic sense. See Irenaeus II. 29. 1: "Si propter substantiam omnes succedunt animae in refrigerium, et superfluum est credere, superflua autem et discessio salvatoris; si autem propter iustitiam, iam non propter id, quod sint animae sed quoniam sunt iustae ... Si enim natura et substantia salvat, omnes salvabuntur animae; si autem iustitia et fides etc." II. 34. 3: "Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiam dei datur," II. 34. 4. Tertullian adv. Marc. III. 15: "Christi nomen non ex natura veniens, sed ex dispositione." In Tertullian these ideas are not unfrequently opposed to each other in this way; but the relationship between them has by no means been made clear.]

[Footnote 559: On the psychology of Irenaeus see Bohringer, p. 466 f., Wendt p. 22. The fact that in some passages he reckoned the [Greek: pneuma] in man as the latter's inalienable nature (e.g. II. 33-5), though as a rule (like Tatian) he conceives it as the divine Spirit, is an evident inconsistency on his part. The [Greek: eikon] is realised in the body, the [Greek: homoiosis] is not given by nature, but is brought about by the union with the Spirit of God realised through obedience (V. 6. 1). The [Greek: homoiosis] is therefore subject to growth, and was not perfect at the beginning (see above, IV. 38. 4, where he opposes Tatian's opinion). It is clear, especially from V. 12. 2, that it is only the [Greek: pnoe], not the [Greek: pneuma], that is to be conceived as an original possession. On this point Irenaeus appealed to 1 Cor. XV. 45. It is plain from the 37th chapter of the 4th Book, that Irenaeus also views everything as ultimately dependent on man's inalienable freedom. Alongside of this God's goodness has scope for displaying itself in addition to its exercise at the creation, because it guides man's knowledge through counsel; see Sec. 1. On Matth. XXIII. 37 Irenaeus remarks: "veterem legem libertatis hominis manifestavit, quia liberum eum deus fecit ab initio, habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam ad utendum sententia dei voluntarie et non coactum a deo ... posuit in homine potestatem electionis quemadmodum in angelis (et enim angeli rationabiles), ut hi quidem qui obedissent iuste bonum sint possidentes, datum quidem a deo, servatum vero ab ipsis." An appeal to Rome II. 4-7 (!) follows. In Sec. 2 Irenaeus inveighs violently against the Gnostic doctrines of natural goodness and wickedness: [Greek: pantes tes autes eisi physeos]. In Sec. 4 he interprets the Pauline: "omnia licent, sed non omnia expediunt," as referring to man's inalienable freedom and to the way in which it is abused in order to work evil(!): "liberae sententiae ab initio est homo et liberae sententiae est deus, cuius ad similitudinem factus est." Sec. 5: "Et non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide, liberum et suae potestatis arbitrium hominis servavit (that is, respected) dominus, dicens: Secundum fidem tuam fiat tibi." Sec. 4: "deus consilium dat continere bonum, quod perficitur ex obedientia." Sec. 3: "[Greek: to autexousion tou anthropou kai to symbouleutikon tou Theou me biazomenou]." IV. 4. 3: "homo rationabilis et secundum hoc similis deo liber in arbitrio factus et suae potestatis, ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum aliquando autem palea fiat."]