[Footnote 299: The fullest account of the "history of the Romish Church down to the pontificate of Leo I." has been given by Langen, 1881; but I can in no respect agree (see Theol. Lit. Ztg. 1891, No. 6) with the hypotheses about the primacy as propounded by him in his treatise on the Clementine romances (1890, see especially p. 163 ff). The collection of passages given by Caspari, "Quellen zur Geschichte des Taufsymbols," Vol. III., deserves special recognition. See also the sections bearing on this subject in Renan's "Origines du Christianisme," Vols. V.-VII. especially VII., chaps. 5, 12, 23. Sohm in his "Kirchenrecht" I. (see especially pp. 164 ff., 350 ff., 377 ff.) has adopted my conception of "Catholic" and "Roman," and made it the basis of further investigations. He estimates the importance of the Roman Church still more highly, in so far as, according to him, she was the exclusive originator of Church law as well as of the Catholic form of Church constitution; and on page 381 he flatly says: "The whole Church constitution with its claim to be founded on divine arrangement was first developed in Rome and then transferred from her to the other communities." I think this is an exaggeration. Tschirn (Zeitschrift fuer Kirchengeschichte, XII. p. 215 ff.) has discussed the origin of the Roman Church in the 2nd century. Much that was the common property of Christendom, or is found in every religion as it becomes older, is regarded by this author as specifically Roman.]

[Footnote 300: No doubt we must distinguish two halves in Christendom. The first, the ecclesiastical West, includes the west coast of Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome together with their daughter Churches, that is, above all, Gaul and North Africa. The second or eastern portion embraces Palestine, Egypt, Syria, and the east part of Asia Minor. A displacement gradually arose in the course of the 3rd century. In the West the most important centres are Ephesus, Smyrna, Corinth, and Rome, cities with a Greek and Oriental population. Even in Carthage the original speech of the Christian community was probably Greek.]

[Footnote 301: Rome was the first city in the Empire, Alexandria the second. They were the metropolitan cities of the world (see the inscription in Kaibel, No. 1561, p. 407: [Greek: threpse m' Alexandreia, metoikon ethapse de Rhome, hai kosmou kai ges, o xene, metropoleis]). This is reflected in the history of the Church; first Rome appears, then Alexandria. The significance of the great towns for the history of dogma and of the Church will be treated of in a future volume. Abercius of Hieropolis, according to the common interpretation (inscription V. 7 f.) designates Rome as "queen." This was a customary appellation; see Eunap., vita Prohaer. p. 90: [Greek: he basileuousa Rhome].]

[Footnote 302: In this connection we need only keep in mind the following summary of facts. Up to the end of the second century the Alexandrian Church had none of the Catholic and apostolic standards, and none of the corresponding institutions as found in the Roman Church; but her writer, Clement, was also "as little acquainted with the West as Homer." In the course of the first half of the 3rd century she received those standards and institutions; but her writer, Origen, also travelled to Rome himself in order to see "the very old" church and formed a connection with Hippolytus; and her bishop Dionysius carried on a correspondence with his Roman colleague, who also made common cause with him. Similar particulars may also be ascertained with regard to the Syrian Church.]

[Footnote 303: See the proofs in the two preceding chapters. Note also that these elements have an inward connection. So long as one was lacking, all were, and whenever one was present, all the others immediately made their appearance.]

[Footnote 304: Ignatius already says that the Roman Christians are [Greek: apodiulismenoi apo pantos allotrion chromatos] (Rom. inscr.); he uses this expression of no others. Similar remarks are not quite rare at a later period; see, for instance, the oft-repeated eulogy that no heresy ever arose in Rome. At a time when this city had long employed the standard of the apostolic rule of faith with complete confidence, namely, at the beginning of the 3rd century, we hear that a lady of rank in Alexandria, who was at any rate a Christian, lodged and entertained in her house Origen, then a young man, and a famous heretic. (See Euseb., H. E. VI. 2. 13, 14). The lectures on doctrine delivered by this heretic and the conventicles over which he presided were attended by a [Greek: murion plethos ou monon hairetikon, alla kai hemetephon]. That is a very valuable piece of information which shows us a state of things in Alexandria that would have been impossible in Rome at the same period. See, besides, Dionys. Alex, in Euseb., H. E. VII. 7.]

[Footnote 305: I must here refrain from proving the last assertion. The possibility of Asia Minor having had a considerable share, or having led the way, in the formation of the canon must be left an open question (cf. what Melito says, and the use made of New Testament writings in the Epistle of Polycarp). We will, however, be constrained to lay the chief emphasis on Rome, for it must not be forgotten that Irenaeus had the closest connection with the Church of that city, as is proved by his great work, and that he lived there before he came to Gaul. Moreover, it is a fact deserving of the greatest attention that the Montanists and their decided opponents in Asia, the so-called Alogi, had no ecclesiastical canon before them, though they may all have possessed the universally acknowledged books of the Romish canon, and none other, in the shape of books read in the churches.]

[Footnote 306: See the Prolegg. of Westcott and Hort (these indeed give an opposite judgment), and cf. Harris, Codex Bezae. A study of the so-called Western text of the New Testament 1891. An exhaustive study of the oldest martyrologies has already led to important cases of agreement between Rome and the East, and promises still further revelations. See Duchesne, "Les Sources du Martyrologe Hieron." 1885. Egli, "Altchristliche Studien, Martyrien und Martyrologieen aeltester Zeit." 1887; the same writer in the "Zeitschrift fuer wissenschaftliche Theologie", 1891, p. 273 ff.]

[Footnote 307: On the relations between Edessa and Rome see the end of the Excursus.]

[Footnote 308: See my treatise "Die aeltesten christlichen Datirungen und die Anfange einer bischoflichen Chronographie in Rom." in the report of the proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 1892, pp. 617-658. I think I have there proved that, in the time of Soter, Rome already possessed a figured list of bishops, in which important events were also entered.]

[Footnote 309: That the idea of the apostolic succession of the bishops was first turned to account or appeared in Rome is all the more remarkable, because it was not in that city, but rather in the East, that the monarchical episcopate was first consolidated. (Cf. the Shepherd of Hermas and Ignatius' Epistles to the Romans with his other Epistles). There must therefore have been a very rapid development of the constitution in the time between Hyginus and Victor. Sohm, l.c., tries to show that the monarchical episcopate arose in Rome immediately after the composition of the First Epistle of Clement, and as a result of it; and that this city was the centre from which it spread throughout Christendom.]

[Footnote 310: See Pseudo-Cyprian's work "de aleat" which, in spite of remarks to the contrary, I am inclined to regard as written by Victor; cf. "Texte und Untersuchungen" V. I; see c. I of this writing: "et quoniam in nobis divina et paterna pietas apostolatus ducatum contulit et vicariam domini sedem caelesti dignatione ordinavit et originem authentici apostolatus, super quem Christus fundavit ecclesiam, in superiore nostro portamus."]

[Footnote 311: See report of the proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 1892, p. 622 ff. To the material found there must be added a remarkable passage given by Nestle (Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1893, p. 437), where the dates are reckoned after Sixtus I.]

[Footnote 312: Cf. the 8th book of the Apostolic Constitutions with the articles referring to the regulation of the Church, which in Greek MSS. bear the name of Hippolytus. Compare also the Arabian Canones Hippolyti, edited by Haneberg (1870) and commented on by Achelis (Texte und Untersuchungen VI. 4). Apart from the additions and alterations, which are no doubt very extensive, it is hardly likely that the name of the Roman bishop is wrongly assigned to them. We must further remember the importance assigned by the tradition of the Eastern and Western Churches to one of the earliest Roman "bishops," Clement, as the confidant and secretary of the Apostles and as the composer and arranger of their laws.]

[Footnote 313: See my proofs in "Texte und Untersuchungen," Vol. II., Part 5. The canons of the Council of Nicaea presuppose the distinction of higher and lower clergy for the whole Church.]

[Footnote 314: We see this from the Easter controversy, but there are proofs of it elsewhere, e.g., in the collection of Cyprian's epistles. The Roman bishop Cornelius informs Fabius, bishop of Antioch, of the resolutions of the Italian, African, and other Churches (Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 3: [Greek: elthon eis hemas epistolai Korneliou Rhomaion episkopou pros ... phabion, delousai ta peri tes Rhomaion sunodou, kai ta doxanta pasi tois kata ten Italian kai Aphriken kai tas autophi choras]). We must not forget, however, that there were also bishops elsewhere who conducted a so-called oecumenical correspondence and enjoyed great influence, as, e.g., Dionysius of Corinth and Dionysius of Alexandria. In matters relating to penance the latter wrote to a great many Churches, even as far as Armenia, and sent many letters to Rome (Euseb., H. E. VI. 46). The Catholic theologian, Dittrich—before the Vatican Decree, no doubt—has spoken of him in the following terms (Dionysius von Alexandrien, 1867, p. 26): "As Dionysius participated in the power, so also he shared in the task of the primateship." "Along with the Roman bishop he was, above all, called upon to guard the interests of the whole Church."]

[Footnote 315: This conception, as well as the ideas contained in this Excursus generally, is now entirely shared by Weingarten (Zeittafeln, 3rd. ed., 1888, pp. 12, 21): "The Catholic Church is essentially the work of those of Rome and Asia Minor. The Alexandrian Church and theology do not completely adapt themselves to it till the 3rd century. The metropolitan community becomes the ideal centre of the Great Church" ... "The primacy of the Roman Church is essentially the transference to her of Rome's central position in the religion of the heathen world during the Empire: urbs aeterna urbs sacra."]

[Footnote 316: This is also admitted by Langen (l.c., 184 f.), who even declares that this precedence existed from the beginning.]

[Footnote 317: Cf. chaps. 59 and 62, but more especially 63.]

[Footnote 318: At that time the Roman Church did not confine herself to a letter; she sent ambassadors to Corinth, [Greek: hoitines martures esontai metaxu humon kai hemon]. Note carefully also the position of the Corinthian community with which the Roman one interfered (see on this point Wrede, Untersuchungen zum I Clemensbrief, 1891.)]

[Footnote 319: In Ignatius, Rom. inscr., the verb [Greek: prokathemai] is twice used about the Roman Church ([Greek: prokathetai en] [to be understood in a local sense] [Greek: topoi khorion Rhomaion]—[Greek: prokathemene tes agapes] = presiding in, or having the guardianship of, love). Ignatius (Magn. 6), uses the same verb to denote the dignity of the bishop or presbyters in relation to the community. See, besides, the important testimony in Rom. II.: [Greek: allous edidaxate]. Finally, it must be also noted that Ignatius presupposes an extensive influence on the part of individual members of the Church in the higher spheres of government. Fifty years later we have a memorable proof of this in the Marcia-Victor episode. Lastly, Ignatius is convinced that the Church will interfeie quite as energetically on behalf of a foreign brother as on behalf of one of her own number. In the Epistle of Clement to James, c. 2, the Roman bishop is called [Greek: ho aletheias prokathezomenos].]

[Footnote 320: Euseb., H. E. IV. 23. 9-12; cf., above all, the words: [Greek: Ex arches humin ethos esti touto, pantas men adelphous poikios euergetein, ekklesiais te pollais tais kata pasan polin ephodia pempein ... patroparadoton ethos Rhomaion Romaioi diaphulattontes.] Note here the emphasis laid on [Greek: Romaioi].]

[Footnote 321: According to Irenaeus a peculiar significance belongs to the old Jerusalem Church, in so far as all the Christian congregations sprang from her (III. 12. 5: [Greek: autai phonai tes ekklesias, ex hes pasa escheken ekklesia tes archen autai phonai tes metropoleos ton tes kaines diathekes politon]). For obvious reasons Irenaeus did not speak of the Jerusalem Church of his own time. Hence that passage cannot be utilised.]

[Footnote 322: Iren. III. 3. i: "Sed quomiam valde longum est, in hoc tali volumine omnium ecclesiarum enumerare successiones, maximae et antiquissimae et omnibus cognitae, a gloriosissimis duobus apostolis Paulo et Petro Romae fundatae et constitutae ecclesiae, eam quam habet ab apostolis traditionem et annuutiatam hominibus fidem, per successiones episcoporum pervenientem usque ad nos indicantes confundimus omnes eos, qui quoquo modo vel per sibiplacentiam malam vel vanam gloriam vel per caecitatem et malam sententiam, praeterquam oportet, colligunt. Ad hanc enim ecclesiam propter potentiorem principalitatem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab his, qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quae est ab apostolis traditio." On this we may remark as follows: (1) The special importance which Irenaeus claims for the Roman Church—for he is only referring to her—is not merely based by him on her assumed foundation by Peter and Paul, but on a combination of the four attributes "maxima," "antiquissima" etc. Dionysius of Corinth also made this assumption (Euseb., II. 25. 8), but applied it quite as much to the Corinthian Church. As regards capability of proving the truth of the Church's faith, all the communities founded by the Apostles possess principalitas in relation to the others; but the Roman Church has the potentior principalitas, in so far as she excels all the rest in her qualities of ecclesia maxima et omnibus cognita etc. Principalitas = "sovereign authority," [Greek: authentia], for this was probably the word in the original text (see proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 9th Nov., 1893). In common with most scholars I used to think that the "in qua" refers to "Roman Church;" but I have now convinced myself (see the treatise just cited) that it relates to "omnem ecclesiam," and that the clause introduced by "in qua" merely asserts that every church, in so far as she is faithful to tradition, i.e., orthodox, must as a matter of course agree with that of Rome. (2) Irenaeus asserts that every Church, i.e., believers in all parts of the world, must agree with this Church ("convenire" is to be understood in a figurative sense; the literal acceptation "every Church must come to that of Rome" is not admissible). However, this "must" is not meant as an imperative, but == [Greek: anagke] == "it cannot be otherwise." In reference to principalitas == [Greek: authentia] (see I. 31. 1: I. 26. 1) it must be remembered that Victor of Rome (l.c.) speaks of the "origo authentici apostolatus," and Tertullian remarks of Valentinus when he apostatised at Rome, "ab ecclesia authenticae regulae abrupit" (adv. Valent. 4).]

[Footnote 323: Beyond doubt his "convenire necesse est" is founded on actual circumstances.]

[Footnote 324: On other important journeys of Christian men and bishops to Rome in the 2nd and 3rd centuries see Caspari, l.c. Above all we may call attention to the journey of Abercius of Hierapolis (not Hierapolis on the Meander) about 200 or even earlier. Its historical reality is not to be questioned. See his words in the epitaph composed by himself (V. 7 f.): [Greek: eis Rhomen hos epempsen emen basilean athresai kai basilissan idein chrusostolon chrusopedilon]. However, Ficker raises very serious objections to the Christian origin of the inscription.]

[Footnote 325: We cannot here discuss how this tradition arose; in all likelihood it already expresses the position which the Roman Church very speedily attained in Christendom. See Renan, Orig., Vol. VII., p. 70: "Pierre el Paul (leconcilies), voila le chef-d'oeuvre qui fondait la suprematie ecclesiastique de Rome dans lavenir. Une nouvelle qualite mythique lemplagait celle de Romulus et Remus." But it is highly probable that Peter was really in Rome like Paul (see 1 Clem. V., Ignatius ad Rom. IV.); both really performed important services to the Church there, and died as martyrs in that city.]

[Footnote 326: The wealth of the Roman Church is also illustrated by the present of 200,000 sesterces brought her by Marcion (Tertull., de praese. 30). The "Shepherd" also contains instructive particulars with regard to this. As far as her influence is concerned, we possess various testimonies from Philipp. IV. 22 down to the famous account by Hippolytus of the relations of Victor to Marcia. We may call special attention to Ignatius' Epistle to the Romans.]

[Footnote 327: See Tertullian, adv. Prax. I; Euseb., H. E. V. 3, 4. Dictionary of Christian Biography III., p. 937.]

[Footnote 328: Euseb, H.E. V. 24. 9: [Greek: epi toutois ho men tes Rhomaion proestos Biktor athroos tes Asias pases hama tais homorois ekklesiais tas paroikias apotemnein hosan heterodoxousas, tes koines henoseos peiratai, kai steliteuei ge dia grammaton, akoinonetous pantas arden tous ekeise anakerutton adelphous]. Stress should be laid on two points here: (1) Victor proclaimed that the people of Asia Minor were to be excluded from the [Greek: koine henosis], and not merely from the fellowship of the Roman Church; (2) he based the excommunication on the alleged heterodoxy of those Churches. See Heinichen, Melet. VIII, on Euseb., l.c. Victor's action is parallelled by that of Stephen. Firmilian says to the latter: "Dum enim putas, omnes abs te abstineri posse, solum te ab omnibus abstinuisti." It is a very instructive fact that in the 4th century Rome also made the attempt to have Sabbath fasting established as an apostolic custom. See the interesting work confuted by Augustine (ep. 36), a writing which emanates from a Roman author who is unfortunately unknown to us. Cf. also Augustine's 54th and 55th epistles.]

[Footnote 329: Irenaeus also (l.c. Sec. 11) does not appear to have questioned Victor's proceeding as such, but as applied to this particular case.]

[Footnote 330: See Tertull., de orat. 22: "Sed non putet institutionem unusquisque antecessoris commovendam." De virg. vel. I: "Paracletus solus antecessor, quia solus post Christum;" 2: "Eas ego ecclesias proposui, quas et ipsi apostolici viri condiderunt, et puto ante quosdam;" 3: "Sed nec inter consuetudines dispicere voluerunt illi sanctissimi antecessores." This is also the question referred to in the important remark in Jerome, de vir. inl. 53: "Tertullianus ad mediam aetatem presbyter fuit ecclesiae Africanae, invidia postea et contumeliis clericorum Romanae ecclesiae ad Montani dogma delapsus."]

[Footnote 331: Stephen acted like Victor and excluded almost all the East from the fellowship of the Church; see in addition to Cyprian's epistles that of Dionysius of Alexandria in Euseb., H. E. VII. 5. In reference to Hippolytus, see Philosoph. l. IX. In regard to Origen, see the allusions in de orat. 28 fin.; in Matth. XI. 9, 15: XII. 9-14: XVI. 8, 22: XVII. 14; in Joh. X. 16; Rom. VI in Isai. c. 1. With regard to Philosoph. IX. 12, Sohm rightly remarks (p. 389): "It is clear that the responsibility was laid on the Roman bishop not merely in several cases where married men were made presbyters and deacons, but also when they were appointed bishops; and it is also evident that he appears just as responsible when bishops are not deposed in consequence of their marrying." One cannot help concluding that the Roman bishop has the power of appointing and deposing not merely presbyters and deacons, but also bishops. Moreover, the impression is conveyed that this appointment and deposition of bishops takes place in Rome, for the passage contains a description of existent conditions in the Roman Church. Other communities may be deprived of their bishops by an order from Rome, and a bishop (chosen in Rome) may be sent them. The words of the passage are: [Greek: epi kallistou erxanto episkopoi kai presbuteroi kai diakonoi digamoi kai trigamoi kathistasthai eis klerous ei de kai tis en klero on gamoie, menein ton toiouton en to klero hos me hemartekota.]]

[Footnote 332: In the treatise "Die Briefe des romischen Klerus aus der Zeit der Sedisvacanz im Jahre 250" (Abhandlungen fur Weizsaecker, 1892), I have shown how the Roman clergy kept the revenue of the Church and of the Churches in their hands, though they had no bishop. What language the Romans used in epistles 8, 30, 36 of the Cyprian collection, and how they interfered in the affairs of the Carthaginian Church! Beyond doubt the Roman Church possessed an acknowledged primacy in the year 250; it was the primacy of active participation and fulfilled duty. As yet there was no recognised dogmatic or historic foundation assigned for it; in fact it is highly probable that this theory was still shaky and uncertain in Rome herself. The college of presbyters and deacons feels and speaks as if it were the bishop. For it was not on the bishop that the incomparable prestige of Rome was based—at least this claim was not yet made with any confidence,—but on the city itself, on the origin and history, the faith and love, the earnestness and zeal of the whole Roman Church and her clergy.]

[Footnote 333: In Tertullian, de praesc. 36, the bishops are not mentioned. He also, like Irenaeus, cites the Roman Church as one amongst others. We have already remarked that in the scheme of proof from prescription no higher rank could be assigned to the Roman Church than to any other of the group founded by the Apostles. Tertullian continues to maintain this position, but expressly remarks that the Roman Church has special authority for the Carthaginian, because Carthage had received its Christianity from Rome. He expresses the special relationship between Rome and Carthage in the following terms: "Si autem Italiae adiaces habes Romam, unde nobis quoque auctoritas praesto est." With Tertullian, then, the de facto position of the Roman Church in Christendom did not lead to the same conclusion in the scheme of proof from prescription as we found in Irenaeus. But in his case also that position is indicated by the rhetorical ardour with which he speaks of the Roman Church, whereas he does nothing more than mention Corinth, Philippi, Thessalonica, and Ephesus. Even at that time, moreover, he had ground enough for a more reserved attitude towards Rome, though in the antignostic struggle he could not dispense with the tradition of the Roman community. In the veil dispute (de virg. vel. 2) he opposed the authority of the Greek apostolic Churches to that of Rome. Polycarp had done the same against Anicetus, Polycrates against Victor, Proculus against his Roman opponents. Conversely, Praxeas in his appeal to Eleutherus (c. 1.: "praecessorum auctoritates"), Caius when contending with Proculus, the Carthaginian clergy when opposing Tertullian (in the veil dispute), and Victor when contending with Polycrates set the authority of Rome against that of the Greek apostolic Churches. These struggles at the transition from the and to the 3rd century are of the utmost importance. Rome was here seeking to overthrow the authority of the only group of Churches able to enter into rivalry with her those of Asia Minor, and succeeded in the attempt.]

[Footnote 334: De pudic. 21: "De tua nunc sententia quaero, unde hoc ius ecclesiae usurpes. Si quia dixerit Petro dominus: Super hanc petram aedificabo ecclesiam meam, tibi dedi claves regni caelestis, vel, Quaecumque alligaveris vel solveris in terra, erunt alligata vel soluta in coelis, id circo praesumis et ad te derivasse solvendi et alligandi potestatem?" Stephen did the same; see Firmilian in Cyprian ep. 75. With this should be compared the description Clement of Rome gives in his epistles to James of his own installation by Peter (c. 2). The following words are put in Peter's mouth: [Greek: klementa touton episkopon humin cheirontono, ho ten emen ton logon pisteuo kathedran ... dia auto metadidomi ten exousian tou desmeuein kai luein, hina peri pantos ou an cheirotonese epi ges estai dedogmatismenon en ouranois. desei gar ho dei dethenai kai lusei ho dei luthenai, hos ton tes ekklesias eidos kanona.]]

[Footnote 335: See Dionysius of Alexandria's letter to the Roman bishop Stephen (Euseb., H. E. VII. 5. 2): [Greek: Hai mentoi Suriai holai kai he Arabia, ois eparkeite hekastote kai ois nun epesteilate.]]

[Footnote 336: In the case of Origen's condemnation the decision of Rome seems to have been of special importance. Origen sought to defend his orthodoxy in a letter written by his own hand to the Roman bishop Fabian (see Euseb., H. E. VI. 36; Jerome, ep. 84. 10). The Roman bishop Pontian had previously condemned him after summoning a "senate;" see Jerome, ep. 33 (Doellinger, Hippolytus and Calixtus, p. 259 f.). Further, it is an important fact that a deputation of Alexandrian Christians, who did not agree with the Christology of their bishop Dionysius, repaired to Rome to the Roman bishop Dionysius and formally accused the first named prelate. It is also significant that Dionysius received this complaint and brought the matter up at a Roman synod. No objection was taken to this proceeding (Athanas., de synod.). This information is very instructive, for it proves that the Roman Church was ever regarded as specially charged with watching over the observance of the conditions of the general ecclesiastical federation, the [Greek: koine henosis]. As to the fact that in circular letters, not excepting Eastern ones, the Roman Church was put at the head of the address, see Euseb., H. E. VII. 30. How frequently foreign bishops came to Rome is shown by the 19th canon of Arles (A.D. 314): "De episcopis peregrinis, qui in urbem solent venire, placuit iis locum dari ut offerant." The first canon is also important in deciding the special position of Rome.]

[Footnote 337: Peculiar circumstances, which unfortunately we cannot quite explain, are connected with the cases discussed by Cyprian in epp. 67 and 68. The Roman bishop must have had the acknowledged power of dealing with the bishop of Arles, whereas the Gallic prelates had not this right. Sohm, p. 391 ff., assumes that the Roman bishop alone—not Cyprian or the bishops of Gaul—had authority to exclude the bishop of Arles from the general fellowship of the Church, but that, as far as the Gallic Churches were concerned, such an excommunication possessed no legal effect, but only a moral one, because in their case the bishop of Rome had only a spiritual authority and no legal power. Further, two Spanish bishops publicly appealed to the Roman see against their deposition, and Cyprian regarded this appeal as in itself correct. Finally, Cornelius says of himself in a letter (in Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 10): [Greek: ton loipon episkopon diadochous eis tous topous, en hois esan, cheirotonesantes apestalkamen]. This quotation refers to Italy, and the passage, which must be read connectedly, makes it plain (see, besides, the quotation in reference to Calixtus given above on p. 162), that, before the middle of the 3rd century, the Roman Church already possessed a legal right of excommunication and the recognised power of making ecclesiastical appointments as far as the communities and bishops in Italy were concerned (see Sohm, p. 389 ff.).]

[Footnote 338: Euseb., H. E. VII. 30. 19. The Church of Antioch sought to enter upon an independent line of development under Paul of Samosata. Paul's fall was the victory of Rome. We may suppose it to be highly probable, though to the best of my belief there is for the present no sure proof, that it was not till then that the Roman standards and sacraments, catholic and apostolic collection of Scriptures (see, on the contrary, the use of Scripture in the Didaskalia), apostolic rule of faith, and apostolic episcopacy attained supremacy in Antioch; but that they began to be introduced into that city about the time of Serapion's bishopric (that is, during the Easter controversy). The old records of the Church of Edessa have an important bearing on this point; and from these it is evident that her constitution did not begin to assume a Catholic form till the beginning of the 3rd century, and that as the result of connection with Rome. See the Doctrine of Addai by Phillips, p. 50: "Palut himself went to Antioch and received the hand of the priesthood from Serapion, bishop of Antioch. Serapion, bishop of Antioch, himself also received the hand from Zephyrinus, bishop of the city of Rome, from the succession of the hand of the priesthood of Simon Cephas, which he received from our Lord, who was there bishop of Rome 25 years, (sic) in the days of the Caesar, who reigned there 13 years." (See also Tixeront, Edesse, pp. 149, 152.) Cf. with this the prominence given in the Acts of Scharbil and Barsamya to the fact that they were contemporaries of Fabian, bishop of Rome. We read there (see Rubens Duval, Les Actes de Scharbil et les Actes de Barsamya, Paris, 1889, and Histoire d'Eclesse, p. 130): "Barsamya (he was bishop of Edessa at the time of Decius) lived at the time of Fabian, bishop of Rome. He had received the laying on of hands from Abschelama, who had received it from Palut. Palut had been consecrated by Serapion, bishop of Antioch, and the latter had been consecrated by Zephyrinus, bishop of Rome." As regards the relation of the State of Rome to the Roman Church, that is, to the Roman bishop, who by the year 250 had already become a sort of praefectus urbis, with his district superintendents, the deacons, and in fact a sort of princeps aemulus, cf. (1) the recorded comments of Alexander Severus on the Christians, and especially those on their organisation; (2) the edict of Maximinus Thrax and the banishment of the bishops Pontian and Hippolytus; (3) the attitude of Philip the Arabian; (4) the remarks of Decius in Cyp. ep. 55 (see above p. 124) and his proceedings against the Roman bishops, and (5) the attitude of Aurelian in Antioch. On the extent and organisation of the Roman Church about 250 see Euseb., H. E. VI. 43.]

[Footnote 339: The memorable words in the lately discovered appeal by Eusebius of Dorylaeum to Leo I. (Neues Archiv., Vol. XI., part 2, p. 364 f.) are no mere flattery, and the fifth century is not the first to which they are applicable: "Curavit desuper et ab exordio consuevit thronus apostolicus iniqua perferentes defensare et eos qui in evitabiles factiones inciderunt, adiuvare et humi iacentes erigere, secundum possibilitatem, quam habetis; causa autem rei, quod sensum rectum tenetis et inconcussam servatis erga dominum nostrum Iesum Christum fidem, nec non etiam indissimulatam universis fratribus et omnibus in nomine Christi vocatis tribuitis caritatem, etc." See also Theodoret's letters addressed to Rome.]



II. FIXING AND GRADUAL HELLENISING OF CHRISTIANITY AS A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE

CHAPTER IV.

ECCLESIASTICAL CHRISTIANITY AND PHILOSOPHY. THE APOLOGISTS.

1. Introduction.[340]

The object of the Christian Apologists, some of whom filled ecclesiastical offices and in various ways promoted spiritual progress,[341] was, as they themselves explained, to uphold the Christianity professed by the Christian Churches and publicly preached. They were convinced that the Christian faith was founded on revelation and that only a mind enlightened by God could grasp and maintain the faith. They acknowledged the Old Testament to be the authoritative source of God's revelation, maintained that the whole human race was meant to be reached by Christianity, and adhered to the early Christian eschatology. These views as well as the strong emphasis they laid upon human freedom and responsibility, enabled them to attain a firm standpoint in opposition to "Gnosticism," and to preserve their position within the Christian communities, whose moral purity and strength they regarded as a strong proof of the truth of this faith. In the endeavours of the Apologists to explain Christianity to the cultured world, we have before us the attempts of Greek churchmen to represent the Christian religion as a philosophy, and to convince outsiders that it was the highest wisdom and the absolute truth. These efforts were not rejected by the Churches like those of the so-called Gnostics, but rather became in subsequent times the foundation of the ecclesiastical dogmatic. The Gnostic speculations were repudiated, whereas those of the Apologists were accepted. The manner in which the latter set forth Christianity as a philosophy met with approval. What were the conditions under which ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek philosophy concluded the alliance which has found a place in the history of the world? How did this union attain acceptance and permanence, whilst "Gnosticism" was at first rejected? These are the two great questions the correct answers to which are of fundamental importance for the understanding of the history of Christian dogma.

The answers to these questions appear paradoxical. The theses of the Apologists finally overcame all scruples in ecclesiastical circles and were accepted by the Graeco-Roman world, because they made Christianity rational without taking from, or adding to, its traditional historic material. The secret of the epoch-making success of the apologetic theology is thus explained: These Christian philosophers formulated the content of the Gospel in a manner which appealed to the common sense of all the serious thinkers and intelligent men of the age. Moreover, they contrived to use the positive material of tradition, including the life and worship of Christ, in such a way as to furnish this reasonable religion with a confirmation and proof that had hitherto been eagerly sought, but sought in vain. In the theology of the Apologists, Christianity, as the religious enlightenment directly emanating from God himself, is most sharply contrasted with all polytheism, natural religion, and ceremonial. They proclaimed it in the most emphatic manner as the religion of the spirit, of freedom, and of absolute morality. Almost the whole positive material of Christianity is embodied in the story which relates its entrance into the world, its spread, and the proof of its truth. The religion itself, on the other hand, appears as the truth that is surely attested and accords with reason—a truth the content of which is not primarily dependent on historical facts and finally overthrows all polytheism.

Now this was the very thing required. In the second century of our era a great many needs and aspirations were undoubtedly making themselves felt in the sphere of religion and morals. "Gnosticism" and Marcionite Christianity prove the variety and depth of the needs then asserting themselves within the space that the ecclesiastical historian is able to survey. Mightier than all others, however, was the longing men felt to free themselves from the burden of the past, to cast away the rubbish of cults and of unmeaning religious ceremonies, and to be assured that the results of religious philosophy, those great and simple doctrines of virtue and immortality and of the God who is a Spirit, were certain truths. He who brought the message that these ideas were realities, and who, on the strength of these realities, declared polytheism and the worship of idols to be obsolete, had the mightiest forces on his side; for the times were now ripe for this preaching. What formed the strength of the apologetic philosophy was the proclamation that Christianity both contained the highest truth, as men already supposed it to be and as they had discovered it in their own minds, and the absolutely reliable guarantee that was desired for this truth. To the quality which makes it appear meagre to us it owed its impressiveness. The fact of its falling in with the general spiritual current of the time and making no attempt to satisfy special and deeper needs enabled it to plead the cause of spiritual monotheism and to oppose the worship of idols in the manner most easily understood. As it did not require historic and positive material to describe the nature of religion and morality, this philosophy enabled the Apologists to demonstrate the worthlessness of the traditional religion and worship of the different nations.[342] The same cause, however, made them take up the conservative position with regard to the historical traditions of Christianity. These were not ultimately tested as to their content, for this was taken for granted, no matter how they might be worded; but they were used to give an assurance of the truth, and to prove that the religion of the spirit was not founded on human opinion, but on divine revelation. The only really important consideration in Christianity is that it is revelation, real revelation. The Apologists had no doubt as to what it reveals, and therefore any investigation was unnecessary. The result of Greek philosophy, the philosophy of Plato and Zeno, as it had further developed in the empires of Alexander the Great and the Romans, was to attain victory and permanence by the aid of Christianity. Thus we view the progress of this development to-day,[343] and Christianity really proved to be the force from which that religious philosophy, viewed as a theory of the world and system of morality, first received the courage to free itself from the polytheistic past and descend from the circles of the learned to the common people.

This constitutes the deepest distinction between Christian philosophers like Justin and those of the type of Valentinus. The latter sought for a religion; the former, though indeed they were not very clear about their own purpose, sought assurance as to a theistic and moral conception of the world which they already possessed. At first the complexus of Christian tradition, which must have possessed many features of attraction for them, was something foreign to both. The latter, however, sought to make this tradition intelligible. For the former it was enough that they had here a revelation before them; that this revelation also bore unmistakable testimony to the one God, who was a Spirit, to virtue, and to immortality; and that it was capable of convincing men and of leading them to a virtuous life. Viewed superficially, the Apologists were no doubt the conservatives; but they were so, because they scarcely in any respect meddled with the contents of tradition. The "Gnostics," on the contrary, sought to understand what they read and to investigate the truth of the message of which they heard. The most characteristic feature is the attitude of each to the Old Testament. The Apologists were content to have found in it an ancient source of revelation, and viewed the book as a testimony to the truth, i.e., to philosophy and virtue; the Gnostics investigated this document and examined to what extent it agreed with the new impressions they had received from the Gospel. We may sum up as follows: The Gnostics sought to determine what Christianity is as a religion, and, as they were convinced of the absoluteness of Christianity, this process led them to incorporate with it all that they looked on as sublime and holy and to remove everything they recognised to be inferior. The Apologists, again, strove to discover an authority for religious enlightenment and morality and to find the confirmation of a theory of the universe, which, if true, contained for them the certainty of eternal life; and this they found in the Christian tradition.

At bottom this contrast is a picture of the great discord existing in the religious philosophy of the age itself (see p. 129, vol. I.). No one denied the fact that all truth was divine, that is, was founded on revelation. The great question, however, was whether every man possessed this truth as a slumbering capacity that only required to be awakened; whether it was rational, i.e., merely moral truth, or must be above that which is moral, that is, of a religious nature; whether it must carry man beyond himself; and whether a real redemption was necessary. It is ultimately the dispute between morality and religion, which appears as an unsettled problem in the theses of the idealistic philosophers and in the whole spiritual conceptions then current among the educated, and which recurs in the contrast between the Apologetic and the Gnostic theology. And, as in the former case we meet with the most varied shades and transitions, for no one writer has developed a consistent theory, so also we find a similar state of things in the latter;[344] for no Apologist quite left out of sight the idea of redemption (deliverance from the dominion of demons can only be effected by the Logos, i.e., God). Wherever the idea of freedom is strongly emphasised, the religious element, in the strict sense of the word, appears in jeopardy. This is the case with the Apologists throughout. Conversely, wherever redemption forms the central thought, need is felt of a suprarational truth, which no longer views morality as the only aim, and which, again, requires particular media, a sacred history and sacred symbols. Stoic rationalism, in its logical development, is menaced wherever we meet the perception that the course of the world must in some way be helped, and wherever the contrast between reason and sensuousness, that the old Stoa had confused, is clearly felt to be an unendurable state of antagonism that man cannot remove by his own unaided efforts. The need of a revelation had its starting-point in philosophy here. The judgment of oneself and of the world to which Platonism led, the self-consciousness which it awakened by the detachment of man from nature, and the contrasts which it revealed led of necessity to that frame of mind which manifested itself in the craving for a revelation. The Apologists felt this. But their rationalism gave a strange turn to the satisfaction of that need. It was not their Christian ideas which first involved them in contradictions. At the time when Christianity appeared on the scene, the Platonic and Stoic systems themselves were already so complicated that philosophers did not find their difficulties seriously increased by a consideration of the Christian doctrines. As Apologists, however, they decidedly took the part of Christianity because, according to them, it was the doctrine of reason and freedom.

The Gospel was hellenised in the second century in so far as the Gnostics in various ways transformed it into a Hellenic religion for the educated. The Apologists used it—we may almost say inadvertently—to overthrow polytheism by maintaining that Christianity was the realisation of an absolutely moral theism. The Christian religion was not the first to experience this twofold destiny on Graeco-Roman soil. A glance at the history of the Jewish religion shows us a parallel development; in fact, both the speculations of the Gnostics and the theories of the Apologists were foreshadowed in the theology of the Jewish Alexandrians, and particularly in that of Philo. Here also the Gospel merely entered upon the heritage of Judaism.[345] Three centuries before the appearance of Christian Apologists, Jews, who had received a Hellenic training, had already set forth the religion of Jehovah to the Greeks in that remarkably summary and spiritualised form which represents it as the absolute and highest philosophy, i.e., the knowledge of God, of virtue, and of recompense in the next world. Here these Jewish philosophers had already transformed all the positive and historic elements of the national religion into parts of a huge system for proving the truth of that theism. The Christian Apologists adopted this method, for they can hardly be said to have invented it anew.[346] We see from the Jewish Sibylline oracles how wide-spread it was. Philo, however, was not only a Stoic rationalist, but a hyper-Platonic religious philosopher. In like manner, the Christian Apologists did not altogether lack this element, though in some isolated cases among them there are hardly any traces of it. This feature is most fully represented among the Gnostics.

This transformation of religion into a philosophic system would not have been possible had not Greek philosophy itself happened to be in process of development into a religion. Such a transformation was certainly very foreign to the really classical time of Greece and Rome. The pious belief in the efficacy and power of the gods and in their appearances and manifestations, as well as the traditional worship, could have no bond of union with speculations concerning the essence and ultimate cause of things. The idea of a religious dogma which was at once to furnish a correct theory of the world and a principle of conduct was from this standpoint completely unintelligible. But philosophy, particularly in the Stoa, set out in search of this idea, and, after further developments, sought for one special religion with which it could agree or through which it could at least attain certainty. The meagre cults of the Greeks and Romans were unsuited for this. So men turned their eyes towards the barbarians. Nothing more clearly characterises the position of things in the second century than the agreement between two men so radically different as Tatian and Celsus. Tatian emphatically declares that salvation comes from the barbarians, and to Celsus it is also a "truism" that the barbarians have more capacity than the Greeks for discovering valuable doctrines.[347] Everything was in fact prepared, and nothing was wanting.

About the middle of the second century, however, the moral and rationalistic element in the philosophy and spiritual culture of the time was still more powerful than the religious and mystic; for Neoplatonism, which under its outward coverings concealed the aspiration after religion and the living God, was only in its first beginnings. It was not otherwise in Christian circles. The "Gnostics" were in the minority. What the great majority of the Church felt to be intelligible and edifying above everything else was an earnest moralism.[348] New and strange as the undertaking to represent Christianity as a philosophy might seem at first, the Apologists, so far as they were understood, appeared to advance nothing inconsistent with Christian common sense. Besides, they did not question authorities, but rather supported them, and introduced no foreign positive materials. For all these reasons, and also because their writings were not at first addressed to the communities, but only to outsiders, the marvellous attempt to present Christianity to the world as the religion which is the true philosophy, and as the philosophy which is the true religion, remained unopposed in the Church. But in what sense was the Christian religion set forth as a philosophy? An exact answer to this question is of the highest interest as regards the history of Christian dogma.

2. Christianity as Philosophy and as Revelation.

It was a new undertaking and one of permanent importance to a tradition hitherto so little concerned for its own vindication, when Quadratus and the Athenian philosopher, Aristides, presented treatises in defence of Christianity to the emperor.[349] About a century had elapsed since the Gospel of Christ had begun to be preached. It may be said that the Apology of Aristides was a most significant opening to the second century, whilst we find Origen at its close. Marcianus Aristides expressly designates himself in his pamphlet as a philosopher of the Athenians. Since the days when the words were written: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit" (Col. II. 8), it had constantly been repeated (see, as evidence, Celsus, passim) that Christian preaching and philosophy were things entirely different, that God had chosen the fools, and that man's duty was not to investigate and seek, but to believe and hope. Now a philosopher, as such, pleaded the cause of Christianity. In the summary he gave of the content of Christianity at the beginning of his address, he really spoke as a philosopher and represented this faith as a philosophy. By expounding pure monotheism and giving it the main place in his argument, Aristides gave supreme prominence to the very doctrine which simple Christians also prized as the most important.[350] Moreover, in emphasing not only the supernatural character of the Christian doctrine revealed by the Son of the Most High God, but also the continuous inspiration of believers—the new race (not a new school)—he confessed in the most express way the peculiar nature of this philosophy as a divine truth. According to him Christianity is philosophy because its content is in accordance with reason, and because it gives a satisfactory and universally intelligible answer to the questions with which all real philosophers have concerned themselves. But it is no philosophy, in fact it is really the complete opposite of this, in so far as it proceeds from revelation and is propagated by the agency of God, i.e., has a supernatural and divine origin, on which alone the truth and certainty of its doctrines finally depend. This contrast to philosophy is chiefly shown in the unphilosophical form in which Christianity was first preached to the world. That is the thesis maintained by all the Apologists from Justin to Tertullian,[351] and which Jewish philosophers before them propounded and defended. This proposition may certainly be expressed in a great variety of ways. In the first place, it is important whether the first or second half is emphasised, and secondly, whether that which is "universally intelligible" is to be reckoned as philosophy at all, or is to be separated from it as that which comes by "nature." Finally, the attitude to be taken up towards the Greek philosophers is left an open question, so that the thesis, taking up this attitude as a starting-point, may again assume various forms. But was the contradiction which it contains not felt? The content of revelation is to be rational; but does that which is rational require a revelation? How the proposition was understood by the different Apologists requires examination.

Aristides. He first gives an exposition of monotheism and the monotheistic cosmology (God as creator and mover of the universe, as the spiritual, perfect, almighty Being, whom all things need, and who requires nothing). In the second chapter he distinguishes, according to the Greek text, three, and, according to the Syriac, four classes of men (in the Greek text polytheists, Jews, Christians, the polytheists being divided into Chaldeans, Greeks, and Egyptians; in the Syriac barbarians, Greeks, Jews, Christians), and gives their origin. He derives the Christians from Jesus Christ and reproduces the Christian kerygma (Son of the Most High God, birth from the Virgin, 12 disciples, death on the cross, burial, resurrection, ascension, missionary labours of the 12 disciples). After this, beginning with the third chapter, follows a criticism of polytheism, that is, the false theology of the barbarians, Greeks, and Egyptians (down to chapter 12). In the 13th chapter the Greek authors and philosophers are criticised, and the Greek myths, as such, are shown to be false. In the 14th chapter the Jews are introduced (they are monotheists and their ethical system is praised; but they are then reproached with worshipping of angels and a false ceremonial). In the 15th chapter follows a description of the Christians, i.e., above all, of their pure, holy life. It is they who have found the truth, because they know the creator of heaven and earth. This description is continued in chapters 16 and 17: "This people is new and there is a divine admixture in it." The Christian writings are recommended to the emperor.

Justin.[352] In his treatise addressed to the emperor Justin did not call himself a philosopher as Aristides had done. In espousing the cause of the hated and despised Christians he represented himself as a simple member of that sect. But in the very first sentence of his Apology he takes up the ground of piety and philosophy, the very ground taken up by the pious and philosophical emperors themselves, according to the judgment of the time and their own intention. In addressing them he appeals to the [Greek: logos sophron] in a purely Stoic fashion. He opposes the truth—also in the Stoic manner—to the [Greek: doxais palaion].[353] It was not to be a mere captatio benevolentiae. In that case Justin would not have added: "That ye are pious and wise and guardians of righteousness and friends of culture, ye hear everywhere. Whether ye are so, however, will be shown."[354] His whole exordium is calculated to prove to the emperors that they are in danger of repeating a hundredfold the crime which the judges of Socrates had committed.[355] Like a second Socrates Justin speaks to the emperors in the name of all Christians. They are to hear the convictions of the wisest of the Greeks from the mouth of the Christians. Justin wishes to enlighten the emperor with regard to the life and doctrines ([Greek: bios kai mathemata]) of the latter. Nothing is to be concealed, for there is nothing to conceal.

Justin kept this promise better than any of his successors. For that very reason also he did not depict the Christian Churches as schools of philosophers (cc. 61-67). Moreover, in the first passage where he speaks of Greek philosophers,[356] he is merely drawing a parallel. According to him there are bad Christians and seeming Christians, just as there are philosophers who are only so in name and outward show. Such men, too, were in early times called "philosophers" even when they preached atheism. To all appearance, therefore, Justin does not desire Christians to be reckoned as philosophers. But it is nevertheless significant that, in the case of the Christians, a phenomenon is being repeated which otherwise is only observed in the case of philosophers; and how were those whom he was addressing to understand him? In the same passage he speaks for the first time of Christ. He introduces him with the plain and intelligible formula: [Greek: ho didaskalos Christos] ("the teacher Christ").[357] Immediately thereafter he praises Socrates because he had exposed the worthlessness and deceit of the evil demons, and traces his death to the same causes which are now he says bringing about the condemnation of the Christians. Now he can make his final assertion. In virtue of "reason" Socrates exposed superstition; in virtue of the same reason, this was done by the teacher whom the Christians follow. But this teacher was reason itself; it was visible in him, and indeed it appeared bodily in him.[358]

Is this philosophy or is it myth? The greatest paradox the Apologist has to assert is connected by him with the most impressive remembrance possessed by his readers as philosophers. In the same sentence where he represents Christ as the Socrates of the barbarians,[359] and consequently makes Christianity out to be a Socratic doctrine, he propounds the unheard of theory that the teacher Christ is the incarnate reason of God.

Justin nowhere tried to soften the effect of this conviction or explain it in a way adapted to his readers. Nor did he conceal from them that his assertion admits of no speculative demonstration. That philosophy can only deal with things which ever are, because they ever were, since this world began, is a fact about which he himself is perfectly clear. No Stoic could have felt more strongly than Justin how paradoxical is the assertion that a thing is of value which has happened only once. Certain as he is that the "reasonable" emperors will regard it as a rational assumption that "Reason" is the Son of God,[360] he knows equally well that no philosophy will bear him out in that other assertion, and that such a statement is seemingly akin to the contemptible myths of the evil demons.

But there is certainly a proof which, if not speculative, is nevertheless sure. The same ancient documents, which contain the Socratic and super-Socratic wisdom of the Christians, bear witness through prophecies, which, just because they are predictions, admit of no doubt, that the teacher Christ is the incarnate reason; for history confirms the word of prophecy even in the minutest details. Moreover, in so far as these writings are in the lawful possession of the Christians, and announced at the very beginning of things that this community would appear on the earth, they testify that the Christians may in a certain fashion date themselves back to the beginning of the world, because their doctrine is as old as the earth itself (this thought is still wanting in Aristides).

The new Socrates who appeared among the barbarians is therefore quite different from the Socrates of the Greeks, and for that reason also his followers are not to be compared with the disciples of the philosophers.[361] From the very beginning of things a world-historical dispensation of God announced this reasonable doctrine through prophets, and prepared the visible appearance of reason itself. The same reason which created and arranged the world took human form in order to draw the whole of humanity to itself. Every precaution has been taken to make it easy for any one, be he Greek or barbarian, educated or uneducated, to grasp all the doctrines of this reason, to verify their truth, and test their power in life. What further importance can philosophy have side by side with this, how can one think of calling this a philosophy?

And yet the doctrine of the Christians can only be compared with philosophy. For, so far as the latter is genuine, it is also guided by the Logos; and, conversely, what the Christians teach concerning the Father of the world, the destiny of man, the nobility of his nature, freedom and virtue, justice and recompense, has also been attested by the wisest of the Greeks. They indeed only stammered, whereas the Christians speak. These, however, use no unintelligible and unheard-of language, but speak with the words and through the power of reason. The wonderful arrangement, carried out by the Logos himself, through which he ennobled the human race by restoring its consciousness of its own nobility, compels no one henceforth to regard the reasonable as the unreasonable or wisdom as folly. But is the Christian wisdom not of divine origin? How can it in that case be natural, and what connection can exist between it and the wisdom of the Greeks? Justin bestowed the closest attention on this question, but he never for a moment doubted what the answer must be. Wherever the reasonable has revealed itself, it has always been through the operation of the divine reason. For man's lofty endowment consists in his having had a portion of the divine reason implanted within him, and in his consequent capacity of attaining a knowledge of divine things, though not a perfect and clear one, by dint of persistent efforts after truth and virtue. When man remembers his real nature and destination, that is, when he comes to himself, the divine reason is already revealing itself in him and through him. As man's possession conferred on him at the creation, it is at once his most peculiar property, and the power which dominates and determines his nature.[362] All that is reasonable is based on revelation. In order to accomplish his true destiny man requires from the beginning the inward working of that divine reason which has created the world for the sake of man, and therefore wishes to raise man beyond the world to God.[363]

Apparently no one could speak in a more stoical fashion. But this train of thought is supplemented by something which limits it. Revelation does retain its peculiar and unique significance. For no one who merely possessed the "seed of the Logos" ([Greek: sperma tou logou]), though it may have been his exclusive guide to knowledge and conduct, was ever able to grasp the whole truth and impart it in a convincing manner. Though Socrates and Heraclitus may in a way be called Christians, they cannot be so designated in any real sense. Reason is clogged with unreasonableness, and the certainty of truth is doubtful wherever the whole Logos has not been acting; for man's natural endowment with reason is too weak to oppose the powers of evil and of sense that work in the world, namely, the demons. We must therefore believe in the prophets in whom the whole Logos spoke. He who does that must also of necessity believe in Christ; for the prophets clearly pointed to him as the perfect embodiment of the Logos. Measured by the fulness, clearness, and certainty of the knowledge imparted by the Logos Christ, all knowledge independent of him appears as merely human wisdom, even when it emanates from the seed of the Logos. The Stoic argument is consequently untenable. Men blind and kept in bondage by the demons require to be aided by a special revelation. It is true that this revelation is nothing new, and in so far as it has always existed, and never varied in character, from the beginning of the world, it is in this sense nothing extraordinary. It is the divine help granted to man, who has fallen under the power of the demons, and enabling him to follow his reason and freedom to do what is good. By the appearance of Christ this help became accessible to all men. The dominion of demons and revelation are the two correlated ideas. If the former did not exist, the latter would not be necessary. According as we form a lower or higher estimate of the pernicious results of that sovereignty, the value of revelation rises or sinks. This revelation cannot do less than give the necessary assurance of the truth, and it cannot do more than impart the power that develops and matures the inalienable natural endowment of man and frees him from the dominion of the demons.

Accordingly the teaching of the prophets and Christ is related even to the very highest human philosophy as the whole is to the part,[364] or as the certain is to the uncertain; and hence also as the permanent is to the transient. For the final stage has now arrived and Christianity is destined to put an end to natural human philosophy. When the perfect work is there, the fragmentary must cease. Justin gave the clearest expression to this conviction. Christianity, i.e., the prophetic teaching attested by Christ and accessible to all, puts an end to the human systems of philosophy that from their close affinity to it may be called Christian, inasmuch as it effects all and more than all that these systems have done, and inasmuch as the speculations of the philosophers, which are uncertain and mingled with error, are transformed by it into dogmas of indubitable certainty.[365] The practical conclusion drawn in Justin's treatise from this exposition is that the Christians are at least entitled to ask the authorities to treat them as philosophers (Apol. I. 7, 20: II. 15). This demand, he says, is the more justifiable because the freedom of philosophers is enjoyed even by such people as merely bear the name, whereas in reality they set forth immoral and pernicious doctrines.[366]

In the dialogue with the Jew Trypho, which is likewise meant for heathen readers, Justin ceased to employ the idea of the existence of a "seed of the Logos implanted by nature" ([Greek: sperma logou emphuton]) in every man. From this fact we recognise that he did not consider the notion of fundamental importance. He indeed calls the Christian religion a philosophy;[367] but, in so far as this is the case, it is "the only sure and saving philosophy." No doubt the so-called philosophies put the right questions, but they are incapable of giving correct answers. For the Deity, who embraces all true being, and a knowledge of whom alone makes salvation possible, is only known in proportion as he reveals himself. True wisdom is therefore exclusively based on revelation. Hence it is opposed to every human philosophy, because revelation was only given in the prophets and in Christ.[368] The Christian is the philosopher,[369] because the followers of Plato and the Stoics are virtually no philosophers. In applying the title "philosophy" to Christianity he therefore does not mean to bring Christians and philosophers more closely together. No doubt, however, he asserts that the Christian doctrine, which is founded on the knowledge of Christ and leads to blessedness,[370] is in accordance with reason.

Athenagoras. The petition on behalf of Christians, which Athenagoras, "the Christian philosopher of Athens," presented, to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, nowhere expressly designates Christianity as a philosophy, and still less does it style the Christians philosophers.[371] But, at the very beginning of his writing Athenagoras also claims for the Christian doctrines the toleration granted by the state to all philosophic tenets.[372] In support of his claim he argues that the state punishes nothing but practical atheism,[373] and that the "atheism" of the Christians is a doctrine about God such as had been propounded by the most distinguished philosophers—Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics—who, moreover, were permitted to write whatsoever they pleased on the subject of the "Deity."[374] The Apologist concedes even more: "If philosophers did not also acknowledge the existence of one God, if they did not also conceive the gods in question to be partly demons, partly matter, partly of human birth, then certainly we would be justly expelled as aliens."[375] He therefore takes up the standpoint that the state is justified in refusing to tolerate people with completely new doctrines. When we add that he everywhere assumes that the wisdom and piety of the emperors are sufficient to test and approve[376] the truth of the Christian teaching, that he merely represents this faith itself as the reasonable doctrine,[377] and that, with the exception of the resurrection of the body, he leaves all the positive and objectionable tenets of Christianity out of account,[378] there is ground for thinking that this Apologist differs essentially from Justin in his conception of the relation of Christianity to secular philosophy.

Moreover, it is not to be denied that Athenagoras views the revelation in the prophets and in Christ as completely identical. But in one very essential point he agrees with Justin; and he has even expressed himself still more plainly than the latter, inasmuch as he does not introduce the assumption of a "seed of the Logos implanted by nature" [Greek: sperma logou emphuton]. The philosophers, he says, were incapable of knowing the full truth, since it was not from God, but rather from themselves, that they wished to learn about God. True wisdom, however, can only be learned from God, that is, from his prophets; it depends solely on revelation.[379] Here also then we have a repetition of the thought that the truly reasonable is of supernatural origin. Such is the importance attached by Athenagoras to this proposition, that he declares any demonstration of the "reasonable" to be insufficient, no matter how luminous it may appear. Even that which is most evidently true—e.g., monotheism—is not raised from the domain of mere human opinion into the sphere of undoubted certainty till it can be confirmed by revelation.[380] This can be done by Christians alone. Hence they are very different from the philosophers, just as they are also distinguished from these by their manner of life.[381] All the praises which Athenagoras from time to time bestows on philosophers, particularly Plato,[382] are consequently to be understood in a merely relative sense. Their ultimate object is only to establish the claim made by the Apologist with regard to the treatment of Christians by the state; but they are not really meant to bring the former into closer relationship to philosophers. Athenagoras also holds the theory that Christians are philosophers, in so far as the "philosophers" are not such in any true sense. It is only the problems they set that connect the two. He exhibits less clearness than Justin in tracing the necessity of revelation to the fact that the demon sovereignty, which, above all, reveals itself in polytheism,[383] can only be overthrown by revelation; he rather emphasises the other thought (cc. 7, 9) that the necessary attestation of the truth can only be given in this way.[384]

Tatian's[385] chief aim was not to bring about a juster treatment of the Christians.[386] He wished to represent their cause as the good contrasted with the bad, wisdom as opposed to error, truth in contradistinction to outward seeming, hypocrisy, and pretentious emptiness. His "Address to the Greeks" begins with a violent polemic against all Greek philosophers. Tatian merely acted up to a judgment of philosophers and philosophy which in Justin's case is still concealed.[387] Hence it was not possible for him to think of demonstrating analogies between Christians and philosophers. He also no doubt views Christianity as "reasonable;" he who lives virtuously and follows wisdom receives it;[388] but yet it is too sublime to be grasped by earthly perception.[389] It is a heavenly thing which depends on the communication of the "Spirit," and hence can only be known by revelation.[390] But yet it is a "philosophy" with definite doctrines ([Greek: dogmata]);[391] it brings nothing new, but only such blessings as we have already received, but could not retain[392] owing to the power of error, i.e., the dominion of the demons.[393] Christianity is therefore the philosophy in which, by virtue of the Logos revelation through the prophets,[394] the rational knowledge that leads to life[395] is restored. This knowledge was no less obscured among the Greek philosophers than among the Greeks generally. In so far as revelation took place among the barbarians from the remotest antiquity, Christianity may also be called the barbarian philosophy.[396] Its truth is proved by its ancient date[397] as well as by its intelligible form, which enables even the most uneducated person that is initiated in it[398] to understand it perfectly.[399] Finally, Tatian also states (c. 40) that the Greek sophists have read the writings of Moses and the prophets, and reproduced them in a distorted form. He therefore maintains the very opposite of what Celsus took upon him to demonstrate when venturing to derive certain sayings and doctrines of Christ and the Christians from the philosophers. Both credit the plagiarists with intentional misrepresentation or gross misunderstanding. Justin judged more charitably. To Tatian, on the contrary, the mythology of the Greeks did not appear worse than their philosophy; in both cases he saw imitations and intentional corruption of the truth.[400]

Theophilus agrees with Tatian, in so far as he everywhere appears to contrast Christianity with philosophy. The religious and moral culture of the Greeks is derived from their poets (historians) and philosophers (ad Autol. II. 3 fin. and elsewhere). However, not only do poets and philosophers contradict each other (II. 5); but the latter also do not agree (II. 4. 8: III. 7), nay, many contradict themselves (III. 3). Not a single one of the so-called philosophers, however, is to be taken seriously;[401] they have devised myths and follies (II. 8); everything they have set forth is useless and godless (III. 2); vain and worthless fame was their aim (III. 3). But God knew beforehand the "drivellings of these hollow philosophers" and made his preparations (II. 15). He of old proclaimed the truth by the mouth of prophets, and these deposited it in holy writings. This truth refers to the knowledge of God, the origin and history of the world, as well as to a virtuous life. The prophetic testimony in regard to it was continued in the Gospel.[402] Revelation, however, is necessary because this wisdom of the philosophers and poets is really demon wisdom, for they were inspired by devils.[403] Thus the most extreme contrasts appear to exist here. Still, Theophilus is constrained to confess that truth was not only announced by the Sibyl, to whom his remarks do not apply, for she is (II. 36): [Greek: en Ellesin kai en tois loipois ethnetin genomene prophetis], but that poets and philosophers, "though against their will," also gave clear utterances regarding the justice, the judgment, and the punishments of God, as well as regarding his providence in respect to the living and the dead, or, in other words, about the most important points (II. 37, 38, 8 fin.). Theophilus gives a double explanation of this fact. On the one hand he ascribes it to the imitation of holy writings (II. 12, 37: I. 14), and on the other he admits that those writers, when the demons abandoned them ([Greek: te psyche eknepsantes ex auton]), of themselves displayed a knowledge of the divine sovereignty, the judgment etc., which agrees with the teachings of the prophets (II. 8). This admission need not cause astonishment; for the freedom and control of his own destiny with which man is endowed (II. 27) must infallibly lead him to correct knowledge and obedience to God, as soon as he is no longer under the sway of the demons. Theophilus did not apply the title of philosophy to Christian truth, this title being in his view discredited; but Christianity is to him the "wisdom of God," which by luminous proofs convinces the men who reflect on their own nature.[404]

Tertullian and Minucius Felix.[405] Whilst, in the case of the Greek Apologists, the acknowledgment of revelation appears conditioned by philosophical scepticism on the one hand, and by the strong impression of the dominion of the demons on the other, the sceptical element is not only wanting in the Latin Apologists, but the Christian truth is even placed in direct opposition to the sceptical philosophy and on the side of philosophical dogmatism, i.e., Stoicism.[406] Nevertheless the observations of Tertullian and Minucius Felix with regard to the essence of Christianity, viewed as philosophy and as revelation, are at bottom completely identical with the conception of the Greek Apologists, although it is undeniable that in the former case the revealed character of Christianity is placed in the background.[407] The recognition of this fact is exceedingly instructive, for it proves that the conception of Christianity set forth by the Apologists was not an individual one, but the necessary expression of the conviction that Christian truth contains the completion and guarantee of philosophical knowledge. To Minucius Felix (and Tertullian) Christian truth chiefly presents itself as the wisdom implanted by nature in every man (Oct. 16. 5). In so far as man possesses reason and speech and accomplishes the task of the "examination of the universe" ("inquisitio universitatis"), conditioned by this gift, he has the Christian truth, that is, he finds Christianity in his own constitution, and in the rational order of the world. Accordingly, Minucius is also able to demonstrate the Christian doctrines by means of the Stoic principle of knowledge, and arrives at the conclusion that Christianity is a philosophy, i.e., the true philosophy, and that philosophers are to be considered Christians in proportion as they have discovered the truth.[408] Moreover, as he represented Christian ethics to be the expression of the Stoic, and depicted the Christian bond of brotherhood as a cosmopolitan union of philosophers, who have become conscious of their natural similarity,[409] the revealed character of Christianity appears to be entirely given up. This religion is natural enlightenment, the revelation of a truth contained in the world and in man, the discovery of the one God from the open book of creation. The difference between him and an Apologist like Tatian seems here to be a radical one. But, if we look more closely, we find that Minucius—and not less Tertullian—has abandoned Stoic rationalism in vital points. We may regard his apologetic aim as his excuse for clearly drawing the logical conclusions from these inconsistencies himself. However, these deviations of his from the doctrines of the Stoa are not merely prompted by Christianity, but rather have already become an essential component of his philosophical theory of the world. In the first place, Minucius developed a detailed theory of the pernicious activity of the demons (cc. 26, 27). This was a confession that human nature was not what it ought to be, because an evil element had penetrated it from without. Secondly, he no doubt acknowledged (I. 4: 16. 5) the natural light of wisdom in humanity, but nevertheless remarked (32. 9) that our thoughts are darkness when measured by the clearness of God. Finally, and this is the most essential point, after appealing to various philosophers when expounding his doctrine of the final conflagration of the world, he suddenly repudiated this tribunal, declaring that the Christians follow the prophets, and that philosophers "have formed this shadowy picture of distorted truth in imitation of the divine predictions of the prophets." (34) Here we have now a union of all the elements already found in the Greek Apologists; only they are, as it were, hid in the case of Minucius. But the final proof that he agreed with them in the main is found in the exceedingly contemptuous judgment which he in conclusion passed on all philosophers and indeed on philosophy generally.[410] (34. 5: 38. 5) This judgment is not to be explained, as in Tertullian's case, by the fact that his Stoic opinions led him to oppose natural perception to all philosophical theory—for this, at most, cannot have been more than a secondary contributing cause,[411] but by the fact that he is conscious of following revealed wisdom.[412] Revelation is necessary because mankind must be aided from without, i.e., by God. In this idea man's need of redemption is acknowledged, though not to the same extent as by Seneca and Epictetus. But no sooner does Minucius perceive the teachings of the prophets to be divine truth than man's natural endowment and the speculation of philosophers sink for him into darkness. Christianity is the wisdom which philosophers sought, but were not able to find.[413]

We may sum up the doctrines of the Apologists as follows: (1) Christianity is revelation, i.e., it is the divine wisdom, proclaimed of old by the prophets and, by reason of its origin, possessing an absolute certainty which can also be recognised in the fulfilment of their predictions. As divine wisdom Christianity is contrasted with, and puts an end to, all natural and philosophical knowledge. (2) Christianity is the enlightenment corresponding to the natural but impaired knowledge of man.[414] It embraces all the elements of truth in philosophy, whence it is the philosophy; and helps man to realise the knowledge with which he is naturally endowed. (3) Revelation of the rational was and is necessary, because man has fallen under the sway of the demons. (4) The efforts of philosophers to ascertain the right knowledge were in vain; and this is, above all, shown by the fact that they neither overthrew polytheism nor brought about a really moral life. Moreover, so far as they discovered the truth, they owed it to the prophets from whom they borrowed it; at least it is uncertain whether they even attained a knowledge of fragments of the truth by their own independent efforts.[415] But it is certain that many seeming truths in the writings of the philosophers were imitations of the truth by evil demons. This is the origin of all polytheism, which is, moreover, to some extent an imitation of Christian institutions. (5) The confession of Christ is simply included in the acknowledgment of the wisdom of the prophets; the doctrine of the truth did not receive a new content through Christ; he only made it accessible to the world and strengthened it (victory over the demons; special features acknowledged by Justin and Tertullian). (6) The practical test of Christianity is first contained in the fact that all persons are able to grasp it, for women and uneducated men here become veritable sages; secondly in the fact that it has the power of producing a holy life, and of overthrowing the tyranny of the demons. In the Apologists, therefore, Christianity served itself heir to antiquity, i.e., to the result of the monotheistic knowledge and ethics of the Greeks: "[Greek: Osa oun para pasikalos eiretai, hemon ton Christianon esti]" (Justin, Apol. II. 13). It traced its origin back to the beginning of the world. Everything true and good which elevates mankind springs from divine revelation, and is at the same time genuinely human, because it is a clear expression of what man finds within him and of his destination (Justin, Apol. I. 46: [Greek: hoi meta logou biosantes Christianoi eisi, kan atheoi enomisthesan, oion en Hellesi men Sokrates kai Erakleitos kai oi omoioi autois, en barbarois de Abraam k.t.l.], "those that have lived with reason are Christians, even though they were accounted atheists, such as Socrates and Heraclitus and those similar to them among the Greeks, and Abraham etc. among the barbarians"). But everything true and good is Christian, for Christianity is nothing else than the teaching of revelation. No second formula can be imagined in which the claim of Christianity to be the religion of the world is so powerfully expressed (hence also the endeavour of the Apologists to reconcile Christianity and the Empire), nor, on the other hand, can we conceive of one where the specific content of traditional Christianity is so thoroughly neutralised as it is here. But the really epoch-making feature is the fact that the intellectual culture of mankind now appears reconciled and united with religion. The "dogmas" are the expression of this. Finally, these fundamental presuppositions also result in a quite definite idea of the essence of revelation and of the content of reason. The essence of revelation consists in its form: it is divine communication through a miraculous inward working. All the media of revelation are passive organs of the Holy Spirit (Athenag. Supplic. 7; Pseudo-Justin, Cohort. 8; Justin, Dialogue 115. 7; Apol. I. 31, 33, 36; etc.; see also Hippolytus, de Christo et Antichr. 2). These were not necessarily at all times in a state of ecstasy, when they received the revelations; but they were no doubt in a condition of absolute receptivity. The Apologists had no other idea of revelation. What they therefore viewed as the really decisive proof of the reality of revelation is the prediction of the future, for the human mind does not possess this power. It was only in connection with this proof that the Apologists considered it important to show what Moses, David, Isaiah, etc., had proclaimed in the Old Testament, that is, these names have only a chronological significance. This also explains their interest in a history of the world, in so far as this interest originated in the effort to trace the chain of prophets up to the beginning of history, and to prove the higher antiquity of revealed truth as compared with all human knowledge and errors, particularly as found among the Greeks (clear traces in Justin,[416] first detailed argument in Tatian).[417] If, however, strictly speaking, it is only the form and not the content of revelation that is supernatural in so far as this content coincides with that of reason, it is evident that the Apologists simply took the content of the latter for granted and stated it dogmatically. So, whether they expressed themselves in strictly Stoic fashion or not, they all essentially agree in the assumption that true religion and morality are the natural content of reason. Even Tatian forms no exception, though he himself protests against the idea.

3. The doctrines of Christianity as the revealed and rational religion.

The Apologists frequently spoke of the doctrines or "dogmas" of Christianity; and the whole content of this religion as philosophy is included in these dogmas.[418] According to what we have already set forth there can be no doubt about the character of Christian dogmas. They are the rational truths, revealed by the prophets in the Holy Scriptures, and summarised in Christ ([Greek: christos logos kai nomos]), which in their unity represent the divine wisdom, and the recognition of which leads to virtue and eternal life. The Apologists considered it their chief task to set forth these doctrines, and hence they can be reproduced with all desirable clearness. The dogmatic scheme of the Apologists may therefore be divided into three component parts. These are: (A) Christianity viewed as monotheistic cosmology (God as the Father of the world); (B) Christianity as the highest morality and righteousness (God as the judge who rewards goodness and punishes wickedness); (C) Christianity regarded as redemption (God as the Good One who assists man and rescues him from the power of the demons).[419] Whilst the first two ideas are expressed in a clear and precise manner, it is equally true that the third is not worked out in a lucid fashion. This, as will afterwards be seen, is, on the one hand, the result of the Apologists' doctrine of freedom, and, on the other, of their inability to discover a specific significance for the person of Christ within the sphere of revelation. Both facts again are ultimately to be explained from their moralism.

The essential content of revealed philosophy is viewed by the Apologists (see A, B) as comprised in three doctrines.[420] First, there is one spiritual and inexpressibly exalted God, who is Lord and Father of the world. Secondly, he requires a holy life. Thirdly, he will at last sit in judgment, and will reward the good with immortality and punish the wicked with death. The teaching concerning God, virtue, and eternal reward is traced to the prophets and Christ; but the bringing about of a virtuous life (of righteousness) has been necessarily left by God to men themselves; for God has created man free, and virtue can only be acquired by man's own efforts. The prophets and Christ are therefore a source of righteousness in so far as they are teachers. But as God, that is, the divine Word (which we need not here discuss) has spoken in them, Christianity is to be defined as the Knowledge of God, mediated by the Deity himself, and as a virtuous walk in the longing after eternal and perfect life with God, as well as in the sure hope of this imperishable reward. By knowing what is true and doing what is good man becomes righteous and a partaker of the highest bliss. This knowledge, which has the character of divine instruction,[421] rests on faith in the divine revelation. This revelation has the nature and power of redemption in so far as the fact is undoubted that without it men cannot free themselves from the tyranny of the demons, whilst believers in revelation are enabled by the Spirit of God to put them to flight. Accordingly, the dogmas of Christian philosophy theoretically contain the monotheistic cosmology, and practically the rules for a holy life, which appears as a renunciation of the world and as a new order of society.[422] The goal is immortal life, which consists in the full knowledge and contemplation of God. The dogmas of revelation lie between the cosmology and ethics; they are indefinitely expressed so far as they contain the idea of salvation; but they are very precisely worded in so far as they guarantee the truth of the cosmology and ethics.

1. The dogmas which express the knowledge of God and the world are dominated by the fundamental idea that the world as the created, conditioned, and transient is contrasted with something self-existing, unchangeable and eternal, which is the first cause of the world. This self-existing Being has none of the attributes which belong to the world; hence he is exalted above every name and has in himself no distinctions. This implies, first, the unity and uniqueness of this eternal Being; secondly, his spiritual nature, for everything bodily is subject to change; and, finally, his perfection, for the self-existent and eternal requires nothing. Since, however, he is the cause of all being, himself being unconditioned, he is the fulness of all being or true being itself (Tatian 5: [Greek: katho pasa dunamis oraton te kai aoraton autos hupostasis en, sun auto ta panta]). As the living and spiritual Being he reveals himself in free creations, which make known his omnipotence and wisdom, i.e., his operative reason. These creations are, moreover, a proof of the goodness of the Deity, for they can be no result of necessities, in so far as God is in himself perfect. Just because he is perfect, the Eternal Essence is also the Father of all virtues, in so far as he contains no admixture of what is defective. These virtues include both the goodness which manifests itself in his creations, and the righteousness which gives to the creature what belongs to him, in accordance with the position he has received. On the basis of this train of thought the Apologists lay down the dogmas of the monarchy of God ([Greek: ton holon to monarchikon]), his supramundaneness ([Greek: to arreton, to anekphraston, to achoreton, to akatalepton, to aperinoeton, to asugkriton, to asymbibaston, to anekdiegeton]; see Justin, Apol. II. 6; Theoph. I. 3); his unity ([Greek: eis Theos]); his having no beginning ([Greek: anarchos, hoti agenetos]); his eternity and unchangeableness ([Greek: analloiotos kathoti athanatos]); his perfection ([Greek: teleios]); his need of nothing ([Greek: aprosdees]); his spiritual nature ([Greek: pneuma ho Theos]); his absolute causality ([Greek: autos hyparchon tou pantos he hypostasis], the motionless mover, see Aristides c. 1); his creative activity ([Greek: ktistes ton panton]); his sovereignty ([Greek: despotes ton holon]); his fatherhood ([Greek: pater dia to einai auton pro ton holon]) his reason-power (God as [Greek: logos, nous, pneuma, sophia]); his omnipotence ([Greek: pantokrator hoti autos ta panta kratei kai emperiechei]); his righteousness and goodness ([Greek: pater tes dikaiosunes kai pason ton areton chrestotes]). These dogmas are set forth by one Apologist in a more detailed, and by another in a more concise form, but three points are emphasised by all. First, God is primarily to be conceived as the First Cause. Secondly, the principle of moral good is also the principle of the world. Thirdly, the principle of the world, that is, the Deity, as being the immortal and eternal, forms the contrast to the world which is the transient. In the cosmology of the Apologists the two fundamental ideas are that God is the Father and Creator of the world, but that, as uncreated and eternal, he is also the complete contrast to it.[423]

These dogmas about God were not determined by the Apologists from the standpoint of the Christian Church which is awaiting an introduction into the Kingdom of God; but were deduced from a contemplation of the world on the one hand (see particularly Tatian, 4; Theophilus, I. 5, 6), and of the moral nature of man on the other. But, in so far as the latter itself belongs to the sphere of created things, the cosmos is the starting-point of their speculations. This is everywhere dominated by reason and order;[424] it bears the impress of the divine Logos, and that in a double sense. On the one hand it appears as the copy of a higher, eternal world, for if we imagine transient and changeable matter removed, it is a wonderful complex of spiritual forces; on the other it presents itself as the finite product of a rational will. Moreover, the matter which lies at its basis is nothing bad, but an indifferent substance created by God,[425] though indeed perishable. In its constitution the world is in every respect a structure worthy of God.[426] Nevertheless, according to the Apologists, the direct author of the world was not God, but the personified power of reason which they perceived in the cosmos and represented as the immediate source of the universe. The motive for this dogma and the interest in it would be wrongly determined by alleging that the Apologists purposely introduced the Logos in order to separate God from matter, because they regarded this as something bad. This idea of Philo's cannot at least have been adopted by them as the result of conscious reflection, for it does not agree with their conception of matter; nor is it compatible with their idea of God and their belief in Providence, which is everywhere firmly maintained. Still less indeed can it be shown that they were all impelled to this dogma from their view of Jesus Christ, since in this connection, with the exception of Justin and Tertullian, they manifested no specific interest in the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus. The adoption of the dogma of the Logos is rather to be explained thus: (1) The idea of God, derived by abstraction from the cosmos, did indeed, like that of the idealistic philosophy, involve the element of unity and spirituality, which implied a sort of personality; but the fulness of all spiritual forces, the essence of everything imperishable were quite as essential features of the conception; for in spite of the transcendence inseparable from the notion of God, this idea was nevertheless meant to explain the world.[427] Accordingly, they required a formula capable of expressing the transcendent and unchangeable nature of God on the one hand, and his fulness of creative and spiritual powers on the other. But the latter attributes themselves had again to be comprehended in a unity, because the law of the cosmos bore the appearance of a harmonious one. From this arose the idea of the Logos, and indeed the latter was necessarily distinguished from God as a separate existence, as soon as the realisation of the powers residing in God was represented as beginning. The Logos is the hypostasis of the operative power of reason, which at once preserves the unity and unchangeableness of God in spite of the exercise of the powers residing in him, and renders this very exercise possible. (2) Though the Apologists believed in the divine origin of the revelation given to the prophets, on which all knowledge of truth is based, they could nevertheless not be induced by this idea to represent God himself as a direct actor. For that revelation presupposes a speaker and a spoken word; but it would be an impossible thought to make the fulness of all essence and the first cause of all things speak. The Deity cannot be a speaking and still less a visible person, yet according to the testimony of the prophets, a Divine Person was seen by them. The Divine Being who makes himself known on earth in audible and visible fashion can only be the Divine Word. As, however, according to the fundamental view of the Apologists the principle of religion, i.e., of the knowledge of the truth, is also the principle of the world, so that Divine Word, which imparts the right knowledge of the world, must be identical with the Divine Reason which produced the world itself. In other words, the Logos is not only the creative Reason of God, but also his revealing Word. This explains the motive and aim of the dogma of the Logos. We need not specially point out that nothing more than the precision and certainty of the Apologists' manner of statement is peculiar here; the train of thought itself belongs to Greek philosophy. But that very confidence is the most essential feature of the case; for in fact the firm belief that the principle of the world is also that of revelation represents an important early-Christian idea, though indeed in the form of philosophical reflection. To the majority of the Apologists the theoretical content of the Christian faith is completely exhausted in this proposition. They required no particular Christology, for in every revelation of God by his Word they already recognised a proof of his existence not to be surpassed, and consequently regarded it as Christianity in nuce.[428] But the fact that the Apologists made a distinction in thesi between the prophetic Spirit of God and the Logos, without being able to make any use of this distinction, is a very clear instance of their dependence on the formulae of the Church's faith. Indeed their conception of the Logos continually compelled them to identify the Logos and the Spirit, just as they not unfrequently define Christianity as the belief in the true God and in his Son, without mentioning the Spirit.[429] Further their dependence on the Christian tradition is shown in the fact that the most of them expressly designated the Logos as the Son of God.[430]