[Footnote 685: We must here content ourselves with merely pointing out that the method of scientific Scriptural exegesis also led to historico-critical investigations, that accordingly Origen and his disciples were also critics of the tradition, and that scientific theology, in addition to the task of remodelling Christianity, thus began at its very origin the solution of another problem, namely, the critical restoration of Christianity from the Scriptures and tradition and the removal of its excrescences: for these efforts, strictly speaking, do not come up for consideration in the history of dogma.]

[Footnote 686: The theory that justified a twofold morality in the Church is now completely legitimised, but the higher form no longer appears as Encratite and eschatological, but as Encratite and philosophical. See, for example, Clement, Strom. III. 12. 82: VI. 13. 106 etc. Gnosis is the principle of perfection. See Strom. IV. 7. 54: [Greek: prokeitai de tois eis teleiosin speudousin he gnosis he logike hes themelios he agia trias pistis, agape, elpis].]

[Footnote 687: See the preface to the work [Greek: peri archon].]

[Footnote 688: From the conclusion of Hippolytus' Philosophoumena it is also evident how the Socratic [Greek: Gnothi seauton] was in that age based on a philosophy of religion and was regarded as a watchword in wide circles. See Clem. Paedag. III. 11. 1.]

[Footnote 689: See Gregory Thaumaturgus' panegyric on Origen, one of the most instructive writings of the 3rd century, especially cc. 11-18.]

[Footnote 690: Yet all excesses are repudiated. See Clem. Strom. IV. 22. 138: [Greek: Ouk egkrates outos eti, all' en hexei gegonen apatheias schema theion ependusasthai anamenon]. Similar remarks are found in Origen.]

[Footnote 691: In many passages of Clement the satisfaction in knowledge appears in a still more pronounced form than in Origen. The boldest expression of it is Strom. IV. 22. 136. This passage is quoted above on p. 328.]

[Footnote 692: See the beautiful prayer of the Christian Gnostic in Strom. IV. 23. 148.]

[Footnote 693: See Strom. IV. 26. 172: Origen's commentaries are continually interrupted by similar outbursts of feeling.]

[Footnote 694: On deification as the ultimate aim see Clem., Strom. IV. 23. 149-155: VII. 10. 56, 13. 82, 16. 95: [Greek: houtos ho to kurio peithomenos kai te dotheise di' autou katakolouthesas propheteia teleos ekteleitai kat' eikona tou didaskalou en sarki peripolon Theos]. But note what a distinction Clement makes between [Greek: ho Theos] and the perfect man in VII. 15. 88 (in contradistinction to the Stoic identification); Origen does this also.]

[Footnote 695: Gregory (l.c., c. 13) relates that all the works of the poets and philosophers were read in Origen's school, and that every part of these works that would stand the test was admitted. Only the works of atheists were excluded, "because these overpass the limits of human thought." However, Origen did not judge philosophers in such an unprejudiced manner as Clement, or, to speak more correctly, he no longer valued them so highly. See Bigg, l.c., p. 133, Denis l.c. Introd.]

[Footnote 696: See, for example, c. Cels. V. 43: VII. 47, 59 sq. He compared Plato and other wise men to those doctors who give their attention only to cultured patients.]

[Footnote 697: See, for example, c. Cels. VI. 2.]

[Footnote 698: C. Cels. V. 43.]

[Footnote 699: One of Origen's main ideas, which we everywhere meet with, particularly in the work against Celsus (see, for example, VI. 2) is the thought that Christ has come to improve all men according to their several capacities, and to lead some to the highest knowledge. This conception appears to fall short of the Christian ideal and perhaps really does so; but as soon as we measure it not by the Gospel but by the aims of Greek philosophy, we see very clearly the progress that has been attained through this same Gospel. What Origen has in his eye is mankind, and he is anxious for the amendment not merely of a few, but of all. The actual state of things in the Church no longer allowed him to repeat the exclamations of the Apologists that all Christians were philosophers and that all were filled with the same wisdom and virtue. These exclamations were naive and inappropriate even for that time. But he could already estimate the relative progress made by mankind within the Church as compared with those outside her pale, saw no gulf between the growing and the perfect, and traced the whole advance to Christ. He expressly declared, c. Cels. III. 78, that the Christianity which is fitted for the comprehension of the multitude is not the best doctrine in an absolute, but only in a relative, sense; that the "common man", as he expresses himself, must be reformed by the prospect of rewards and punishments; and that the truth can only be communicated to him in veiled forms and images, as to a child. The very fact, however, that the Logos in Jesus Christ has condescended so to act is to Origen a proof of the universality of Christianity. Moreover, many of the wonderful phenomena reported in the Holy Scriptures belong in his opinion to the veiled forms and images. He is very far from doing violence to his reason here; he rather appeals to mysterious powers of the soul, to powers of divination, visionary states etc. His standpoint in this case is wholly that of Celsus (see particularly the instructive disquisition in I. 48), in so far as he is convinced that many unusual things take place between heaven and earth, and that individual names, symbols etc. possess a mysterious power (see, for example, c. Cels. V. 45). The views as to the relationship between knowledge and holy initiation or sacramentum are those of the philosophers of the age. He thinks, however, that each individual case requires to be examined, that there can be no miracles not in accordance with nature, but that on the contrary everything must fit into a higher order. As the letter of the precepts in both Testaments frequently contains things contrary to reason (see [Greek: peri archon] IV. 2. 8-27) in order to lead men to the spiritual interpretation, and as many passages contain no literal sense at all (l.c. Sec. 12), so also, in the historical narratives, we frequently discover a mythical element from which consequently nothing but the idea is to be evolved (l.c. Sec. 16 sq.: "Non solum de his, quae usque ad adventum Christi scripta sunt, haec Spiritus sanctus procuravit, sed ... eadem similiter etiam in evangelistis et apostolis fecit. Nam ne illas quidem narrationes, quas per eos inspiravit, absque huiuscemodi, quam supra exposuimus, sapientiae suae arte contexuit. Unde etiam in ipsis non parva promiscuit, quibus historialis narrandi ordo interpolates, vel intercisus per impossibilitatem sui reflecteret atque revocaret intentionem legentis ad intelligentiae interioris examen.") In all such cases Origen makes uniform use of the two points of view, that God wished to present something even to the simple and to incite the more advanced to spiritual investigations. In some passages, however, the former point of view fails, because the content of the text is offensive; in that case it is only the second that applies. Origen therefore was very far from finding the literal content of Scripture edifying in every instance, indeed, in the highest sense, the letter is not edifying at all. He rather adopted, to its widest extent, the critical method employed by the Gnostics particularly when dealing with the Old Testament; but the distinction he made between the different senses of Scripture and between the various legitimate human needs enabled him to preserve both the unity of God and the harmony of revelation. Herein, both in this case and everywhere else, lies the superiority of his theology. Read especially c. Celsum I. 9-12. After appealing to the twofold religion among the Egyptians, Persians, Syrians, and Indians—the mythical religion of the multitude and the mystery-religion of the initiated—he lays down exactly the same distinction within Christianity, and thus repels the reproach of Celsus that the Christians were obliged to accept everything without examination. With regard to the mythical form of Christianity he merely claims that it is the most suitable among religions of this type. Since, as a matter of fact, the great majority of men have neither time nor talent for philosophy, [Greek: poia an alle beltion methodos pros to tois pollois boethesai heuretheie, tes apo tou Iesou tois ethnesi paradotheises] (l.c., 9). This thought is quite in the spirit of antiquity, and neither Celsus nor Porphyry could have any fault to find with these arguments in point of form: all positive religions have a mythical element; the true religion therefore lies behind the religions. But the novelty which neither Celsus nor Porphyry could recognise lies in the acknowledgment that the one religion, even in its mythical form, is unique and divine, and in the demand that all men, so far as they cannot attain the highest knowledge, must subject themselves to this mythical religion and no other. In this claim Origen rejected the ancient contrast between the multitude and the initiated just as he repudiated polytheism; and in this, if I see rightly, his historical greatness consists. He everywhere recognised gradations tending in the same direction and rejected polytheism.]

[Footnote 700: Bigg (l.c., p. 154) has rightly remarked: "Origen in point of method differs most from Clement, who not unfrequently leaves us in doubt as to the precise Scriptural basis of his ideas."]

[Footnote 701: Note, for example, Sec. 8, where it is said that Origen adopted the allegorical method from the Stoic philosophers and applied it to the Jewish writings. On Origen's hermeneutic principles in their relation to those of Philo see Siegfried, l.c., pp. 351-62. Origen has developed them fully and clearly in the 4th Book of [Greek: peri archon].]

[Footnote 702: See Overbeck, Theologische Literatur-Zeitung, 1878, Col. 535.]

[Footnote 703: A full presentation of Origen's theology would require many hundreds of pages, because he introduced everything worth knowing into the sphere of theology, and associated with the Holy Scriptures, verse by verse, philosophical maxims, ethical reflexions, and results of physical science, which would require to be drawn on the widest canvas, because the standpoint selected by Origen allowed the most extensive view and the most varied judgments. The case was similar with Clement before him, and also with Tertullian. This is a necessary result of "Scripture theology" when one takes it up in earnest. Tertullian assumes, for example, that there must be a Christian doctrine of dreams. Why? Because we read of dreams in the Holy Scriptures.]

[Footnote 704: In c. Cels. III. 61 it is said (Lommatzsch XVIII., p. 337): [Greek: epemphthe oun Theos logos katho men iatros tois hamartolois, katho de didaskalos theion musterion tois ede katharois kai meketi hamartanousin.] See also what follows. In Comment. in John I. 20 sq. the crucified Christ, as the Christ of faith, is distinguished from the Christ who takes up his abode in us, as the Christ of the perfect. See 22 (Lomm. I. p. 43): [Greek: kai makarioi ge hosoi deomenoi tou huiou tou Theou toioutoi gegonasin, hos meketi autou chrazein iatrou tous kakos hechontas therapeuontos, mede poimenos, mede apolutroseos, alla sophias kai logou kai dikaiosunes, he ei ti allo tois dia teleioteta chorein autou ta kallista dunamenois.] Read also c. Cels. II. 66, 69: IV. 15, 18: VI. 68. These passages show that the crucified Christ is no longer of any account to the Gnostic, and that he therefore allegorises all the incidents described in the Gospels. Clement, too, really regards Christ as of no importance to Gnostics except as a teacher.]

[Footnote 705: Comment, in Joh. I. 9, Lomm. I. p, 20. The "mysteries" of Christ is the technical term for this theology and, at bottom, for all theology. For, in respect of the form given to it, revelation always appears as a problem that theology has to solve. What is revealed is therefore either to be taken as immediate authority (by the believer) or as a soluble problem. One thing, accordingly, it is not, namely, something in itself evident and intelligible.]

[Footnote 706: See Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte, p. 136.]

[Footnote 707: To Origen the problem of evil was one of the most important; see Book III. of [Greek: peri archon] and c. Cels. VI. 53-59. He is convinced (1) that the world is not the work of a second, hostile God; (2) that virtues and the works arising from them are alone good in the proper sense of the word, and that nothing but the opposite of these is bad; (3) that evil in the proper sense of the word is only evil will (see c. Cels. IV. 66: VI. 54). Accordingly he makes a very decided distinction between that which is bad and evils. As for the latter he admits that they partly originate from God, in which case they are designed as means of training and punishment. But he saw that this conception is insufficient, both in view of individual passages of Holy Scripture and of natural experience. There are evils in the world that can be understood neither as the result of sin nor as means of training. Here then his relative, rational view of things comes in, even with respect to the power of God. There are evils which are a necessary consequence of carrying out even the best intentions (c. Cels. VI. 53: [Greek: ta kaka ek parakoloutheseos gegenetai tes pros ta proegoumena]): "Evils, in the strict sense, are not created by God; yet some, though but few in comparison with the great, well-ordered whole of the world, have of necessity adhered to the objects realised; as the carpenter who executes the plan of a building does not manage without chips and similar rubbish, or as architects cannot be made responsible for the dirty heaps of broken stones and filth one sees at the sites of buildings;" (l.c., c. 55). Celsus also might have written in this strain. The religious, absolute view is here replaced by a rational, and the world is therefore not the best absolutely, but the best possible. See the Theodicy in [Greek: peri archon] III. 17-22. (Here, and also in other parts, Origen's Theodicy reminds us of that of Leibnitz; see Denis, l.c., p. 626 sq. The two great thinkers have a very great deal in common, because their philosophy was not of a radical kind, but an attempt to give a rational interpretation to tradition.) But "for the great mass it is sufficient when they are told that evil has not its origin in God" (IV. 66). The case is similar with that which is really bad. It is sufficient for the multitude to know that that which is bad springs from the freedom of the creature, and that matter which is inseparable from things mortal is not the source and cause of sin (IV. 66, see also III, 42: [Greek: to kurios miaron apo kakias toiouton esti. Phusis de somatos ou miara ou gar he phusis somatos esti, to gennetikon tes miarotetos echei ten kakian]); but a closer examination shows that there can be no man without sin (III. 6l) because error is inseparable from growth and because the constitution of man in the flesh makes evil unavoidable (VII. 50). Sinfulness is therefore natural and it is the necessary prius. This thought, which is also not foreign to Irenaeus, is developed by Origen with the utmost clearness. He was not content with proving it, however, but in order to justify God's ways proceeded to the assumption of a Fall before time began (see below).]

[Footnote 708: See Mehlhorn, Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.)]

[Footnote 709: The distinction between Valentinus and Origen consists in the fact that the former makes an aeon or, in other words, a part of the divine pleroma, itself fall, and that he does not utilise the idea of freedom. The outline of Origen's system cannot be made out with complete clearness from the work [Greek: peri archon], because he endeavoured to treat each of the first three parts as a whole. Origen's four principles are God, the World, Freedom, Revelation (Holy Scripture). Each principle, however, is brought into relation with Christ. The first part treats of God and the spirits, and follows the history of the latter down to their restoration. The second part treats of the world and humanity, and likewise closes with the prospect of the resurrection, punishment in hell, and eternal life. Here Origen makes a magnificent attempt to give a conception of bliss and yet to exclude all sensuous joys. The third book treats of sin and redemption, that is, of freedom of will, temptation, the struggle with the powers of evil, internal struggles, the moral aim of the world, and the restoration of all things. A special book on Christ is wanting, for Christ is no "principle"; but the incarnation is treated of in II. 6. The teachers of Valentinus' school accordingly appear more Christian when contrasted with Origen. If we read the great work [Greek: peri archon], or the treatise against Celsus, or the commentaries connectedly, we never cease to wonder how a mind so clear, so sure of the ultimate aim of all knowledge, and occupying such a high standpoint, has admitted in details all possible views down to the most naive myths, and how he on the one hand believes in holy magic, sacramental vehicles and the like, and on the other, in spite of all his rational and even empirical views, betrays no doubt of his abstract creations. But the problem that confronts us in Origen is that presented by his age. This we realise on reading Celsus or Porphyry (see Denis l.c., p. 613: "Toutes les theories d'Origene, meme les plus imaginaires, represent l'etat intellectuel et moral du siecle ou il a paru"). Moreover, Origen is not a teacher who, like Augustine, was in advance of his time, though he no doubt anticipated the course of ecclesiastical development. This age, as represented by its greatest men, sought to gain a substructure for something new, not by a critical examination of the old ideas, but by incorporating them all into one whole. People were anxious to have assurance, and, in the endeavour to find this, they were nervous about giving up any article of tradition. The boldness of Origen, judged as a Greek philosopher, lies in his rejection of all polytheistic religions. This made him all the more conservative in his endeavours to protect and incorporate everything else. This conservatism welded together ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek culture into a system of theology which was indeed completely heterodox.]

[Footnote 710: The proof from prophecy was reckoned by Origen among the articles belonging to faith, but not to Gnosis (see for ex. c. Cels. II. 37); but, like the Apologists, he found it of great value. As far as the philosophers are concerned, Origen always bore in mind the principle expressed in c. Cels. VII. 46: [Greek: pros tauta d'emeis phesomen hoi meletesantes medeni apechthanesthai ton kalos legomenon; kan hoi hexo tes pisteos legousi kalos.] In that same place it is asserted that God in his love has not only revealed himself to such as entirely consecrate themselves to his service, but also to such as do not know the true adoration and reverence which he requires. But as remarked above, p. 338, Origen's attitude to the Greek philosophers is much more reserved than that of Clement.]

[Footnote 711: See, for ex., c. Cels. VI. 6, Comment in Johann. XIII. 59, Lomm. II., p. 9 sq.]

[Footnote 712: [Greek: Peri archon] preface.]

[Footnote 713: On Origen's exegetical method see Kihn, Theodor v. Mopsu. p. 20 ff., Bigg, l.c. p. 131 ff. On the distinction between his application of the allegorical method and that of Clement see specially p. 134 f. of the latter work.]

[Footnote 714: Origen noted several such passages in the very first chapter of Genesis. Examples are given in Bigg, p. 137 f.]

[Footnote 715: Bigg, l.c., has very appropriately named Origen's allegorism "Biblical alchemy".]

[Footnote 716: To ascertain the pneumatic sense, Origen frequently drew analogies between the domain of the cosmic and that of the spiritual. He is thus a forerunner of modern idealistic philosophers, for example, Drummond: "To Origen allegorism is only one manifestation of the sacramental mystery of nature" (Bigg, p. 134).]

[Footnote 717: See Hom in Luc. XXIX., Lomm. V., p. 193 sq.]

[Footnote 718: Since Origen does not, as a rule, dispute the literal meaning of the Scriptures, he has also a much more favourable opinion of the Jewish people and of the observance of the law than the earlier Christian authors (but see Iren. and Tertull.). At bottom he places the observance of the law quite on the same level as the faith of the simple Christians. The Apostles also kept the law for a time, and it was only by degrees that they came to understand its spiritual meaning. They were also right to continue its observance during their mission among the Jews. On the other hand, he considers the New Testament a higher stage than the Old both in its literal and its spiritual sense. See c. Cels. II. 1-4, 7, 75: IV. 31 sq: V. 10, 30, 31, 42 sq., 66: VII. 26.]

[Footnote 719: In opposition to the method for obtaining a knowledge of God, recommended by Alcinous (c. 12), Maximus Tyr. (XVII. 8), and Celsus (by analysis [apophat.], synthesis [kataphat.], and analogy), Origen, c. Cels. VII. 42, 44, appeals to the fact that the Christian knows God better, namely, in his incarnate Son. But he himself, nevertheless, also follows the synthetic method.]

[Footnote 720: In defining the superessential nature of the One, Origen did not go so far as the Basilidians (Philosoph. VII. 20, 21) or as Plotinus. No doubt he also regards the Deity as [Greek: epekeina tes ousias] (c. Cels. VII. 42-51; [Greek: peri archon] I. 1; Clement made a closer approach to the heretical abstractions of the Gnostics inasmuch as he still more expressly renounced any designation of God; see Strom. V. 12, 13), but he is not [Greek: buthos] and [Greek: sige], being rather a self-comprehending Spirit, and therefore does not require a hypostasis (the [Greek: nous]) before he can come to himself. Accordingly the human intellect is not incapable of soaring up to God as the later Neoplatonists assert; at least vision is by no means so decidedly opposed to thought, that is, elevated above it as something new, as is held by the Neoplatonists and Philo before them. Origen is no mystic. In accordance with this conception Origen and Clement say that the perfect knowledge of God can indeed be derived from the Logos alone (c. Cels VII. 48, 49: VI. 65-73; Strom. V. 12. 85: VI. 15. 122), but that a relative knowledge may be deduced from creation (c. Cels. VII. 46). Hence they also spoke of an innate knowledge of God (Protrept. VI. 68; Strom. V. 13. 78), and extended the teleological proof of God furnished by Philo ([Greek: peri archon] I. 1. 6; c. Cels I. 23). The relatively correct predicates of God to be determined from revelation are his unity (c. Cels I. 23), his absolute spirituality ([Greek: pneuma asomatos, aulos, aschematistos])—this is maintained both in opposition to Stoicism and anthropomorphism; see Orig. [Greek: peri archon] I. 1, Origen's polemic against Melito's conception of God, and Clem., Strom. V. 11. 68: V. 12. 82,—his unbegottenness, his immortality (this is eternity conceived as enjoyment; the eternity of God itself, however, is to be conceived, according to Clement, as that which is above time; see Strom. II. 2. 6), and his absolute causality. All these concepts together constitute the conception of perfection. See Fischer, De Orig. theologia et cosmologia, 1840.]

[Footnote 721: Orig. [Greek: peri archon] II. 1. 3.]

[Footnote 722: C. Cels V. 23.]

[Footnote 723: L.c.]

[Footnote 724: [Greek: Peri archon] II. 9. 1: "Certum est, quippe quod praefinito aliquo apud se numero creaturas fecit: non enim, ut quidam volunt, finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non est, nec comprehensio ulla nec circumscriptio esse potest. Quod si fuerit utique nee contineri vel dispensari a deo, quae facta sunt, poterunt. Naturaliter nempe quicquid infinitum fuerit, et incomprehensibile erit." In Matth., t. 13., c. 1 fin., Lomm. III., p. 209 sq.]

[Footnote 725: See above, p. 343, note 2.]

[Footnote 726: See c. Cels. II. 20.]

[Footnote 727: Clement also did so; see with respect to Origen [Greek: peri archon] II. 5, especially Sec. 3 sq.]

[Footnote 728: See Comment. in Johann. I. 40, Lomm. I. p. 77 sq. I cannot agree that this view is a rapprochement to the Marcionites (contrary to Nitzsch's opinion, l.c., p. 285). The confused accounts in Epiph., H. 43. 13 are at any rate not to be taken into account.]

[Footnote 729: Clement's doctrine of the Logos, to judge from the Hypotyposes, was perhaps different from that of Origen. According to Photius (Biblioth. 109) Clement assumed two Logoi (Origen indeed was also reproached with the same; see Pamphili Apol., Routh, Reliq. S., IV., p. 367), and did not even allow the second and weaker one to make a real appearance on earth; but this is a misunderstanding (see Zahn, Forschungen III., p. 144). [Greek: Legetai men]—these are said to have been the words of a passage in the Hypotyposes—[Greek: kai ho huios logos homonumos to patriko logo, all' ouch outos estin ho sarx genomenos, oude men ho patroos logos, alla dynamis tis tou Theou, oion apporoia tou logou autou nous genomenos tas ton anthropon kardias diapephoiteke]. The distinction between an impersonal Logos-God and the Logos-Christ necessarily appeared as soon as the Logos was definitely hypostatised. In the so-called Monarchian struggles of the 3rd century the disputants made use of these two Logoi, who formed excellent material for sophistical discussions. In the Strom. Clement did not reject the distinction between a [Greek: logos endiathetos] and [Greek: prophorikos] (on Strom. V. 1. 6. see Zahn, l.c., p. 145 against Nitzsch), and in many passages expresses himself in such a way that one can scarcely fail to notice a distinction between the Logos of the Father and that of the Son. "The Son-Logos is an emanation of the Reason of God, which unalterably remains in God and is the Logos proper." If the Adumbrationes are to be regarded as parts of the Hypotyposes, Clement used the expression [Greek: homoousios] for the Logos, or at least an identical one (See Zahn, Forschungen III., pp. 87-138 f.). This is the more probable because Clement, Strom. 16. 74, expressly remarked that men are not [Greek: meros theou kai to Theo homoousioi], and because he says in Strom. IV. 13. 91: [Greek: ei epi to katalusai thanaton aphikneitai to diapheron genos, ouch ho Christos ton thanaton katergesen, ei me kai autos autois homoousios lechtheie]. One must assume from this that the word was really familiar to Clement as a designation of the community of nature, possessed by the Logos, both with God and with men. See Protrept. 10. 110: [Greek: ho theios logos, ho phanerotatos ontos Theos, ho to despote ton holon exisotheis]). In Strom. V. I. 1 Clement emphatically declared that the Son was equally eternal with the Father: [Greek: ou men oude ho pater aneu huiou hama gar to pater huiou pater] (see also Strom. IV. 7. 58: [Greek: hen men to agenneton ho pantokrator, en de kai to progennethen di' ou ta panta egeneto], and Adumbrat. in Zahn, l.c., p. 87, where 1 John I. 1 is explained: "principium generationis separatum ab opificis principio non est. Cum enim dicit 'quod erat ab initio' generationem tangit sine principio filii cum patre simul exstantis." See besides the remarkable passage, Quis dives salv. 37: [Greek: Theo ta tes agapes mysteria, kai tote epopteuseis ton kolpon tou patros, hon ho monogenes huios Theos monos exegesato esti de kai autos ho Theos agape kai di' agapen hemin anekrathe kai to men arreton autou pater, to de hemin sympathes gegone meter agapesas ho pater ethelunthe, kai toutou mega semeion, hon autos egennesen ex autou kai ho techtheis ex agapes karpos agape]. But that does not exclude the fact that he, like Origen, named the Son [Greek: ktisma] (Phot., l.c.). In the Adumbrat. (p. 88) Son and Spirit are called "primitivae virtutes ac primo creatae, immobiles exsistentes secundum substantiam". That is exactly Origen's doctrine, and Zahn (l.c., p. 99) has rightly compared Strom. V. 14. 89: VI. 7. 58; and Epit. ex Theod. 20. The Son stands at the head of the series of created beings (Strom. VII. 2. 5; see also below), but he is nevertheless specifically different from them by reason of his origin. It may be said in general that the fine distinctions of the Logos doctrine in Clement and Origen are to be traced to the still more abstract conception of God found in the former. A sentence like Strom. IV. 25. 156 ([Greek: ho men oun Theos anapodeiktos on ouk estin epistemonikos, ho de huios sophia te esti kai episteme]) will hardly be found in Origen I think. Cf. Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 45 ff.]

[Footnote 730: See Schultz, l.c., p. 51 ff. and Jahrbuch fur protestantische Theologie I. pp. 193 ff. 369 ff.]

[Footnote 731: It is very remarkable that Origen [Greek: peri archon] I. 2. 1 in his presentation of the Logos doctrine, started with the person of Christ, though he immediately abandoned this starting-point "Primo illud nos oportere scire", so this chapter begins, "Quod aliud est in Christo deitatis eius natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia humana natura, quam in novissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscepit. Propter quod videndum primo est, quid sit unigenitus filius dei."]

[Footnote 732: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 2, 6.]

[Footnote 733: The expression was familiar to Origen as to Justin (see Dial. c. Tryph). See c. Cels. V. 39: [Greek: Kai deuteron oun legomen Theon istosan, hoti ton deuteron Theon ouk allo ti legomen, he ten periektiken pason areton areten kai ton periektikon pantos houtinosoun logou ton kata physin kai proegoumenos gegenemenon.]]

[Footnote 734: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 13 has been much corrupted by Rufinus. The passage must have been to the effect that the Son is indeed [Greek: agathos], but not, like the Father, [Greek: aparallaktos agathos].]

[Footnote 735: Selecta in Psalm., Lomm. XIII., p. 134; see also Fragm. comm. in ep. ad Hebr., Lomm. V., p. 299 sq.]

[Footnote 736: L.c.: "Sic et sapientia ex deo procedens, ex ipsa substantia dei generatur. Sic nihilominus et secundum similitudinem corporalis aporrhoeae esse dicitur aporrhoea gloriae omnipotentis pura quaedam et sincera. Quae utraeque similitudines (see the beginning of the passage) manifestissime ostendunt communionem substantiae esse filio cum patre. Aporrhoea enim [Greek: homoousios] videtur, id est, unius substantiae cum illo corpore, ex quo est vel aporrhoea vel vapor." In opposition to Heracleon Origen argues (in Joh. XIII. 25., Lomm. II., p. 43 sq.) that we are not homousios with God: [Greek: epistesomen de, ei me sphodra estin asebes homoousios te agenneto physei kai pammakaria einai legein tous proskunountas en pneumati to Theo.] On the meaning of [Greek: homoousios] see Zahn, Marcell., pp. 11-32. The conception decidedly excludes the possibility of the two subjects connected by it having a different essence; but it says nothing about how they came to have one essence and in what measure they possess it. On the other hand it abolishes the distinction of persons the moment the essence itself is identified with the one person. Here then is found the Unitarian danger, which could only be averted by assertions. In some of Origen's teachings a modalistic aspect is also not quite wanting. See Hom. VIII. in Jerem. no. 2: [Greek: To men hupokeimenon hen esti, tais de epinoiais ta polla onomata epi diaphoron]. Conversely, it is also nothing but an appearance when Origen (for ex. in c. Cels. VIII. 12) merely traces the unity of Father and Son to unity in feeling and in will. The charge of Ebionitism made against him is quite unfounded (see Pamphili Apol., Routh IV. p. 367).]

[Footnote 737: [Greek: Ouk estin ote ouk en], de princip. I. 2. 9; in Rom. I. 5.]

[Footnote 738: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 2-9. Comm. in ep. ad. Hebr. Lomm. V., p. 296: "Nunquam est, quando filius non fuit. Erat autem non, sicut de aeterna luce diximus, innatus, ne duo principia lucis videamur inducere, sed sicut ingenitae lucis splendor, ipsam illam lucem initium habens ac fontem, natus quidem ex ipsa; sed non erat quando noa erat." See the comprehensive disquisition in [Greek: peri archon] IV. 28, where we find the sentence: "hoc autem ipsum, quod dicimus, quia nunquam fuit, quando non fuit, cum venia audiendum est" etc. See further in Jerem. IX. 4, Lomm. XV., p. 212: [Greek: to apaugasma tes doxes ouchi hapax gegennetai, kai ouchi gennatai ... kai aei gennatai ho soter hupo tou patros]; see also other passages.]

[Footnote 739: See Caspari, Quellen, Vol. IV., p. 10.]

[Footnote 740: In [Greek: peri archon] IV. 28 the prolatio is expressly rejected (see also I. 2, 4) as well as the "conversio partis alicuius substantiae dei in filium" and the "procreatio ex nullis substantibus."]

[Footnote 741: L.c. I. 2. 2].

[Footnote 742: L.c. I. 2. 3].

[Footnote 743: De orat. 15: [Greek: Eteros kat' ousian kai hupokeimenon ho huios esti tou patros]. This, however, is not meant to designate a deity of a hybrid nature, but to mark the parsonal distinction.]

[Footnote 744: C. Cels. VIII. 12.: [Greek: duo te hypostasei pragmata]. This was frequently urged against the Monarchians in Origen's commentaries; see in Joh. X. 21: II. 6 etc. The Son exists [Greek: kat' idian tes ousias perigraphen]. Not that Origen has not yet the later terminology [Greek: ousia, hypostasis, hypokeimenon, prosopon]. We find three hypostases in Joh. II. 6. Lomm. I., p. 109, and this is repeatedly the case in c. Cels.]

[Footnote 745: In Joh. I. 22, Lomm. I., p. 41 sq.: [Greek: ho Theos men oun pante hen esti kai aploun ho de soter hemon dia ta polla]. The Son is [Greek: idea ideon, systema theorematon en auto](Lomm. I., p. 127).]

[Footnote 746: See the remarks on the saying: "The Father is greater than I," in Joh. XIII. 25, Lomm. II., p. 45 sq. and other passages. Here Origen shows that he considers the homoousia of the Son and the Father just as relative as the unchangeability of the Son.]

[Footnote 747: [Greek: Peri archon] II. 2. 6 has been corrupted by Rufinus; see Jerome ep. ad Avitum.]

[Footnote 748: See [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 13 (see above, p. 354, note 3).]

[Footnote 749: Athanasius supplemented this by determining the essence of the Logos from the redeeming work of Christ.]

[Footnote 750: See [Greek: peri archon] praef. and in addition to this Hermas' view of the Spirit.]

[Footnote 751: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 3. The Holy Spirit is eternal, is ever being breathed out, but is to be termed a creature. See also in Job. II. 6, Lomm. I., p. 109 sq.: [Greek: to hagion pneuma dia tou logou egeneto, presbuterou] (logically) [Greek: par' auto tou logou tugchanontos]. Yet Origen is not so confident here as in his Logos doctrine.]

[Footnote 752: See [Greek: peri archon] I. 3, 5-8. Hence Origen says the heathen had known the Father and Son, but not the Holy Spirit (de princip. I. 3: II. 7).]

[Footnote 753: L.c. Sec. 7.]

[Footnote 754: See Hom. in Num. XII. I, Lomm. X, p. 127: "Est haec trium distinctio personarum in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, quae ad pluralem puteorum numerum revocatur. Sed horum puteorum unum est fons. Una enim substantia est et natura trinitatis."]

[Footnote 755: [Greek: Peri archon] praef.]

[Footnote 756: From Hermas, Justin, and Athenagoras we learn how, in the 2nd century, both in the belief of uneducated lay-Christians and of the Apologists, Son, Spirit, Logos, and angels under certain circumstances shaded off into one another. To Clement, no doubt, Logos and Spirit are the only unchangeable beings besides God. But, inasmuch as there is a series which descends from God to men living in the flesh, there cannot fail to be elements of affinity between Logos and Spirit on the one hand and the highest angels on the other, all of whom indeed have the capacity and need of development. Hence they have certain names and predicates in common, and it frequently remains uncertain, especially as regards the theophanies in the Old Testament, whether it was a high angel that spoke, or the Son through the angel. See the full discussion in Zahn, Forschungen, III., p. 98 f.]

[Footnote 757: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 5.]

[Footnote 758: So also Clement, see Zahn, l.c.]

[Footnote 759: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 5. 2.]

[Footnote 760: It was of course created before the world, as it determines the course of the world. See Comm. in Matth. XV. 27, Lomm. III., p. 384 sq.]

[Footnote 761: See Comm. in Joh. XIII. 25, Lomm. II, p. 45: we must not look on the human spirit as [Greek: homoousios] with the divine one. The same had already been expressly taught by Clement. See Strom., II. 16. 74: [Greek: ho Theos oudemian echei pros hemas physiken schesin hos hoi ton haireseon ktistai thelousin]. Adumbr., p. 91 (ed. Zahn). This does not exclude God and souls having quodammodo one substance.]

[Footnote 762: Such is the teaching of Clement and Origen. They repudiated the possession of any natural, essential goodness in the case of created spirits. If such lay in their essence, these spirits would be unchangeable.]

[Footnote 763: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 10: "Quemadmodum pater non potest esse quis, si filius non sit, neque dominus quis esse potest sine possessione, sine servo, ita ne omnipotens quidem deus dici potest, si non sint, in quos exerceat potentatum, et deo ut omnipotens ostendatur deus, omnia subsistere necesse est." (So the Hermogenes against whom Tertullian wrote had already argued). "Nam si quis est, qui velit vel saecula aliqua vel spatia transisse, vel quodcunque aliud nominare vult, cum nondum facta essent, quae facta sunt, sine dubio hoc ostendet, quod in illis saeculis vel spatiis omnipotens non erat deus et postmodum omnipotens factus est." God would therefore, it is said in what follows, be subjected to a [Greek: prokope], and thus be proved to be a finite being. III. 5. 3.]

[Footnote 764: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 8.]

[Footnote 765: Here, however, Origen is already thinking of the temporary wrong development that is of growth. See [Greek: peri archon] I. 7. Created spirits are also of themselves immaterial, though indeed not in the sense that this can be said of God who can never attach anything material to himself.]

[Footnote 766: Angels, ideas (see Phot. Biblioth. 109), and human souls are most closely connected together, both according to the theory of Clement and Origen and also to that of Pantaenus before them (see Clem. eclog. 56, 57); and so it was taught that men become angels (Clem. Strom. VI. 13. 107). But the stars also, which are treated in great detail in [Greek: peri archon] I. 7, belong to the number of the angels. This is a genuinely Greek idea. The doctrine of the preexistence of human souls was probably set forth by Clement in the Hypotyposes. The theory of the transmigration of souls was probably found there also (Phot. Biblioth. 109). In the Adumbrat., which has been preserved to us, the former doctrine is, however, contested and is not found in the Stromateis VI. 16. I. sq.]

[Footnote 767: Phot. Biblioth. 109: [Greek: Klemes pollous pro tou Adam kosmous terateuetai]. This cannot be verified from the Strom. Orig., [Greek: peri archon] II. 3.]

[Footnote 768: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 5 and the whole 3rd Book. The Fall is something that happened before time began.]

[Footnote 769: The assumption of uncreated matter was decidedly rejected by Origen ([Greek: peri archon] II. 1, 2). On the other hand Clement is said to have taught it in the Hypotyposes (Phot., l.c.: [Greek: hulen archronon doxazei]); this cannot be noticed in the Strom.; in fact in VI. 16. 147 he vigorously contested the view of the uncreatedness of the world. He emphasised the agreement between Plato and Moses in the doctrine of creation (Strom. II. 16. 74 has nothing to do with this). According to Origen, matter has no qualities and may assume the most diverse peculiarities (see, e.g., c. Cels. III. 41).]

[Footnote 770: This conception has given occasion to compare Origen's system with Buddhism. Bigg. (p. 193) has very beautifully said: "Creation, as the word is commonly understood, was in Origen's views not the beginning, but an intermediate phase in human history. AEons rolled away before this world was made; aeons upon aeons, days, weeks, months and years, sabbatical years, jubilee years of aeons will run their course, before the end is attained. The one fixed point in this gigantic drama is the end, for this alone has been clearly revealed," "God shall be all in all." Bigg also rightly points out that Rom. VIII. and 1 Cor. XV. were for Origen the key to the solution of the problems presented by creation.]

[Footnote 771: The popular idea of demons and angels was employed by Origen in the most comprehensive way, and dominates his whole view of the present course of the world. See [Greek: peri archon] III. 2. and numerous passages in the Commentaries and Homilies, in which he approves the kindred views of the Greeks as well as of Hermas and Barnabas. The spirits ascend and descend; each man has his guardian spirit, and the superior spirits support the inferior ([Greek: peri archon] I. 6). Accordingly they are also to be reverenced ([Greek: therapeuesthai]); yet such reverence as belongs to a Gabriel, a Michael, etc., is far different from the adoration of God (c. Cels. VIII. 13).]

[Footnote 772: Clement wrote a special work [Greek: peri pronoias] (see Zahn, Forschungen III., p. 39 ff.), and treated at length of [Greek: pronoia] in the Strom.; see Orig. [Greek: peri archon] III. 1; de orat. 6 etc. Evil is also subject to divine guidance; see Clem., Strom. I. 17. 81-87: IV. 12. 86 sq. Orig. Hom. in Num. XIV., Lomm. X., p. 163: "Nihil otiosum, nihil inane est apud deum, quia sive bono proposito hominis utitur ad bona sive malo ad necessaria." Here and there, however, Origen has qualified the belief in Providence, after the genuine fashion of antiquity (see c. Gels. IV. 74).]

[Footnote 773: [Greek: Peri archon] II. 9. 2: "Recedere a bono, non aliud est quam effici in malo. Ceterum namque est, malum esse bono canere. Ex quo accidit, ut in quanta mensura quis devolveretur a bono, in tantam mensuram malitiae deveniret." In the passage in Johann. II. 7, Lomm. I., p. 115, we find a closely reasoned exposition of evil as [Greek: anupostaton] and an argument to the effect that [Greek: ta ponera] are—[Greek: me onta].]

[Footnote 774: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 5. 3: III. 6. The devil is the chief of the apostate angels (c. Cels. IV. 65). As a reasonable being he is a creature of God (l.c., and in Joh. II. 7, Lomm., l.c.).]

[Footnote 775: Origen defended the teleology culminating in man against Celsus' attacks on it; but his assumption that the spirits of men are only a part of the universal spirit world is, as a matter of fact, quite akin to Celsus' view. If we consider the plan of the work [Greek: peri archon] we easily see that to Origen humanity was merely an element in the cosmos.]

[Footnote 776: The doctrine of man's threefold constitution is also found in Clement. See Paedag. III. 1. 1; Strom V. 14. 94: VI. 16. 134. (quite in the manner of Plato). Origen, who has given evidence of it in all his main writings, sometimes calls the rational part spirit, sometimes [Greek: psyche logike], and at other times distinguishes two parts in the one soul. Of course he also professes to derive his psychology from the Holy Scriptures. The chief peculiarity of his speculation consists in his assumption that the human spirit, as a fallen one, became as it were a soul, and can develop from that condition partly into a spirit as before and partly into the flesh (see [Greek: peri archon] III. 4. 1 sq.: II. 8. 1-5). By his doctrine of the preexistence of souls Origen excluded both the creation and traducian hypotheses of the origin of the soul.]

[Footnote 777: Clement (see Strom. II. 22. 131) gives the following as the opinion of some Christian teachers: [Greek: to men kat' eikona eutheos kata ten genesin eilephenai ton anthropon, to kath' homoiosin de usteron kata ten peleiosin mellein apolambanein]. Orig. c. Cels. IV. 30: [Greek: epoiete d'o Theos ton anthropon kat' eikona Theos, all' ouchi kath' homoiosin ede].]

[Footnote 778: This follows from the fundamental psychological view and is frequently emphasised. One must attain the [Greek: sophorsyne].]

[Footnote 779: This is emphasised throughout. The goodness of God is shown first in his having given the creature reason and freedom, and secondly in acts of assistance, which, however, do not endanger freedom. Clem.; Strom. VI. 12, 96: [Greek: hemas ex hemon auton bouletai sozesthai].]

[Footnote 780: See above, p. 344, and p. 361, note 5. Origen continually emphasised the universality of sin in the strongest expressions: c. Cels. III. 61-66: VII. 50; Clem., Paed. III. 12. 93: [Greek: to examartanein pasin emphyton].]

[Footnote 781: See Clem., Strom. VII. 16. 101: [Greek: myrion goun onton kat' arithmon ha prassousin anthropoi schedon duo eisin archai pases hamartias, agnoia kai astheneia, ampho de eph' hemin, ton mete ethelonton manthanein mete au tes epithymias kratein]. Two remedies correspond to this (102): [Greek: he gnosis te kai he tes ek ton graphon martyrias enarges apodeixis] and [Greek: he kata logon askesis ek pisteos te kai phobou paidagogoumene], or otherwise expressed: [Greek: he theoria he epistemonike] and [Greek: he praxis] which lead to perfect love.]

[Footnote 782: Freedom is not prejudiced by the idea of election that is found here and there, for this idea is not worked out. In Clem., Strom. VI. 9. 76, it is said of the friend of God, the true Gnostic, that God has destined ([Greek: proorisen]) him to sonship before the foundation of the world. See VII. 17. 107.]

[Footnote 783: C. Cels. III. 69.]

[Footnote 784: It is both true that men have the same freedom as Adam and that they have the same evil instincts. Moreover, Origen conceived the story of Adam symbolically. See c. Cels. IV. 40; [Greek: peri archon] IV. 16; in Levit. hom. VI. 2. In his later writings, after he had met with the practice of child baptism in Caesarea and prevailed on himself to regard it as apostolic, he also assumed the existence of a sort of hereditary sin originating with Adam, and added it to his idea of the preexisting Fall. Like Augustine after him, he also supposed that there was an inherent pollution in sexual union; see in Rom. V. 9: VII. 4; in Lev. hom. VIII. 3; in Num. hom. 2 (Bigg, p. 202 f.).]

[Footnote 785: Nevertheless Origen assumes that some souls are invested with flesh, not for their own sins, but in order to be of use to others. See in Joh. XIII. 43 ad fin; II. 24, 25; in Matth. XII. 30.]

[Footnote 786: Origen again and again strongly urged the necessity of divine grace.]

[Footnote 787: See on this point Bigg, pp. 207 ff., 223 f. Origen is the father of Joachim and all spiritualists.]

[Footnote 788: See Knittel, Orig. Lehre von der Menschwerdung (Tuebinger Theologische Quartalschrift, 1872). Ramers, Orig. Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches, 1851. Schultz, Gottheit Christi, pp. 51-62.]

[Footnote 789: With regard to this point we find the same explanation in Origen as in Irenaeus and Tertullian, and also among the Valentinians, in so far as the latter describe the redemption necessary for the Psychici. Only, in this instance also, everything is more copious in his case, because he availed himself of the Holy Scriptures still more than these did, and because he left out no popular conception that seemed to have any moral value. Accordingly he propounded views as to the value of salvation and as to the significance of Christ's death on the cross, with a variety and detail rivalled by no theologian before him. He was, as Bigg (p. 209 ff.) has rightly noticed, the first Church theologian after Paul's time that gave a detailed theology of sacrifices. We may mention here the most important of his views. (1) The death on the cross along with the resurrection is to be considered as a real, recognisable victory over the demons, inasmuch as Christ (Col. II. 14) exposed the weakness of his enemies (a very frequent aspect of the matter). (2) The death on the cross is to be considered as an expiation offered to God. Here Origen argued that all sins require expiation, and, conversely, that all innocent blood has a greater or less importance according to the value of him who gives up his life. (3) In accordance with this the death of Christ has also a vicarious signification (see with regard to both these conceptions the treatise Exhort, ad martyr., as well as c. Cels. VII. 17: I. 31; in Rom. t. III. 7, 8, Lomm. VI., pp. 196-216 etc.). (4) The death of Christ is to be considered as a ransom paid to the devil. This view must have been widely diffused in Origen's time; it readily suggested itself to the popular idea and was further supported by Marcionite theses. It was also accepted by Origen who united it with the notion of a deception practised on the devil, a conception first found among the Basilidians. By his successful temptation the devil acquired a right over men. This right cannot be destroyed, but only bought off. God offers the devil Christ's soul in exchange for the souls of men. This proposal of exchange was, however, insincere, as God knew that the devil could not keep hold of Christ's soul, because a sinless soul could not but cause him torture. The devil agreed to the bargain and was duped. Christ did not fall into the power of death and the devil, but overcame both. This theory, which Origen propounded in somewhat different fashion in different places (see Exhort ad martyr. 12; in Matth. t. XVI. 8, Lomm. IV., p. 27; t. XII. 28, Lomm. III., p. 175; t. XIII. 8, 9, Lomm. III., pp. 224-229; in Rom. II. 13, Lomm. VI., p. 139 sq. etc.), shows in a specially clear way the conservative method of this theologian, who would not positively abandon any idea. No doubt it shows at the same time how uncertain Origen was as to the applicability of popular conceptions when he was dealing with the sphere of the Psychici. We must here remember the ancient idea that we are not bound to sincerity towards our enemies. (5) Christ, the God who became flesh, is to be considered as high priest and mediator between God and man (see de Orat. 10, 15). All the above-mentioned conceptions of Christ's work were, moreover, worked out by Origen in such a way that his humanity and divinity are necessary inferences from them. In this case also he is characterised by the same mode of thought as Irenaeus. Finally, let us remember that Origen adhered as strongly as ever to the proof from prophecy, and that he also, in not a few instances, regarded the phrase, "it is written", as a sufficient court of appeal (see, for example, c. Cels. II. 37). Yet, on the other hand, behind all this he has a method of viewing things which considerably weakens the significance of miracles and prophecies. In general it must be said that Origen helped to drag into the Church a great many ancient (heathen) ideas about expiation and redemption, inasmuch as he everywhere found some Bible passage or other with which he associated them. While he rejected polytheism and gave little countenance to people who declared: [Greek: eusebesteroi esmen kai Theon kai ta agalmata sebontes] (Clemens Rom., Hom. XI. 12), he had for all that a principal share in introducing the apparatus of polytheism into the Church (see also the way in which he strengthened angel and hero worship).]

[Footnote 790: See above, p. 342. note 1, on the idea that Christ, the Crucified One, is of no importance to the perfect. Only the teacher is of account in this case. To Clement and Origen, however, teacher and mystagogue are as closely connected as they are to most Gnostics. Christianity is [Greek: mathesis] and [Greek: mystagogia] and it is the one because it is the other. But in all stages Christianity has ultimately the same object, namely, to effect a reconciliation with God, and deify man. See c. Cels. III. 28: [Greek: Alla gar kai ten katabasan eis anthropinen physin kai eis anthropinas peristaseis dynamin, kai analabousan psychen kai soma anthropinon, heoron ek tou pisteuesthai meta ton theioteron symballomenen eis soterian tois pisteuousin orosin, ap' ekeinou erxato theia kai anthropine sunuphainesthai physis en e anthropine te pros to theioteron koinonia genetai theia ouk en mono to Iesou, alla kai pasi tois meta too pisteuein analambanousi bion, hon Iesous edidaxena].]

[Footnote 791: From this also we can very clearly understand Origen's aversion to the early Christian eschatology. In his view the demons are already overcome by the work of Christ. We need only point out that this conception must have exercised a most important influence on his frame of mind and on politics.]

[Footnote 792: Clement still advocated docetic views without reservation. Photius (Biblioth. 109) reproached him with these ([Greek: me sarkothenai ton logon alla doxai]), and they may be proved from the Adumbrat, p. 87 (ed Zahn): "fertur in traditionibus—namely, in the Acta of Lucius—quoniam Iohannes ipsum corpus (Christi), quod erat extrinsecus, tangens manum suam in profunda misisse et duritiam carnis nullo modo reluctatam esse, sed locum manui praebuisse discipuli," and likewise from Strom. VI. 9. 71 and III. 7. 59. Clement's repudiation of the Docetists in VII. 17. 108 does not affect the case, and the fact that he here and there plainly called Jesus a man, and spoke of his flesh (Paed. II. 2. 32: Protrept. X. 110) matters just as little. This teacher simply continued to follow the old undisguised Docetism which only admitted the apparent reality of Christ's body. Clement expressly declared that Jesus knew neither pain, nor sorrow, nor emotions, and only took food in order to refute the Docetists (Strom. VI. 9. 71). As compared with this, Docetism in Origen's case appears throughout in a weakened form; see Bigg, p. 191.]

[Footnote 793: See the full exposition in Thomasius, Origenes, p. 203 ff. The principal passages referring to the soul of Jesus are de princip. II. 6: IV. 31; c. Cels. II. 9. 20-25. Socrates (H. E. III. 7) says that the conviction as to Jesus having a human soul was founded on a [Greek: mystice paradosis] of the Church, and was not first broached by Origen. The special problem of conceiving Christ as a real [Greek: theanthropos] in contradistinction to all the men who only possess the presence of the Logos within them in proportion to their merits, was precisely formulated by Origen on many occasions. See [Greek: peri archon] IV. 29 sq. The full divine nature existed in Christ and yet, as before, the Logos operated wherever he wished (l.c., 30): "non ita sentiendum est, quod omnis divinitatis eius maiestas intra brevissimi corporis claustra conclusa est, ita ut omne verbum dei et sapientia eius ac substantialis veritas ac vita vel a patre divulsa sit vel intra corporis eius coercita et conscripta brevitatem nec usquam praeterea putetur operata; sed inter utrumque cauta pietatis debet esse confessio, ut neque aliquid divinitatis in Christo defuisse credatur et nulla penitus a paterna substantia, quae ubique est, facta putetur esse divisio." On the perfect ethical union of Jesus' soul with the Logos see [Greek: peri archon] II. 6. 3: "anima Iesu ab initio creaturae et deinceps inseparabiliter ei atque indissociabiliter inhaerens et tota totum recipiens atque in eius lucem splendoremque ipsa cedens facta est cum ipso principaliter unus spiritus;" II. 6. 5: "anima Christi ita elegit diligere iustitiam, ut pro immensitate dilectionis inconvertibiliter ei atque inseparabiliter inhaereret, ita ut propositi firmitas et affectus immensitas et dilectionis inexstinguibilis calor omnem sensum conversionis atque immutationis abscinderet, et quod in arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu iam versum sit in naturam." The sinlessness of this soul thus became transformed from a fact into a necessity, and the real God-man arose, in whom divinity and humanity are no longer separated. The latter lies in the former as iron in the fire II. 6. 6. As the metal capax est frigoris et caloris so the soul is capable of deification. "Omne quod agit, quod sentit, quod intelligit, deus est," "nec convertibilis aut mutabilis dici potest" (l.c.). "Dilectionis merito anima Christi cum verbo dei Christus efficitur." (II. 6. 4). [Greek: Tis mallon tes Iesou psyches e kan paraplesios kekolletai to kyrio; hoper ei houtos echei ouk eisi duo he psyche tou Iesou pros ton pases ktiseos prototokon Theon logon] (c. Cels. VI. 47). The metaphysical foundation of the union is set forth in [Greek: peri archon] II. 6. 2: "Substantia animae inter deum carnemque mediante—non enim possibile erat dei naturam corpori sine mediatore miscere—nascitur deus homo, illa substantia media exsistente, cui utique contra naturam non erat corpus assumere. Sed neque rursus anima illa, utpote substantia rationabilis, contra naturam habuit, capere deum." Even during his historical life the body of Christ was ever more and more glorified, acquired therefore wonderful powers, and appeared differently to men according to their several capacities (that is a Valentinian idea, see Exc. ex Theod. 7); cf. c. Cels. I. 32-38: II. 23, 64: IV. 15 sq.: V. 8, 9, 23. All this is summarised in III. 41: "[Greek: On men nomizomen kai pepeismetha archethen einai Theon kai huion Theou, outos ho autologos esti kai he autosophia kai he autoaletheia to de thneton autou soma kai ten anthropinen en auto psychen te pros ekeinon ou monon koinonia, alla kai henosei kai anakrasei, ta megista phamen proseilephenai kai tes ekeinou thetetos kekoinonekota eis Theon metabebekenai]." Origen then continues and appeals to the philosophical doctrine that matter has no qualities and can assume all the qualities which the Creator wishes to give it. Then follows the conclusion: [Greek: ei hugie ta toiauta, ti thaumaston, ten poioteta tou thnetou kata ton Iesoun somatos pronoia Theou boulethentos metabalein eis aitherion kai theian poioteta]; The man is now the same as the Logos. See in Joh. XXXII. 17, Lomm. II., p. 461 sq.; Hom. in Jerem. XV. 6, Lomm. XV., p. 288: [Greek: ei kai en anthropos, alla nun oudamos estin anthropos].]

[Footnote 794: In c. Cels. III. 28, Origen spoke of an intermingling of the divine and human natures, commencing in Christ (see page 368, note 1). See I. 66 fin.; IV. 15, where any [Greek: allattesthai kai metaplattesthai] of the Logos is decidedly rejected; for the Logos does not suffer at all. In Origen's case we may speak of a communicatio idiomatum (see Bigg, p. 190 f.).]

[Footnote 795: In opposition to Redepenning.]

[Footnote 796: This idea is found in many passages, especial in Book III, c. 22-43, where Origen, in opposition to the fables about deification, sought to prove that Christ is divine because he realised the aim of founding a holy community in humanity. See, besides, the remarkable statement in III. 38 init.]

[Footnote 797: A very remarkable distinction between the divine and human element in Christ is found in Clement Paed. I. 3. 7: [Greek: panta oninesin ho kurios kai panta ophelei kai hos anthropos kai hos Theos, ta men hamartemata hos Theos aphieis, eis de to me examartanein paidagogon hos anthropos].]

[Footnote 798: "Fides in nobis; mensura fidei causa accipiendarum gratiarum" is the fundamental idea of Clement and Origen (as of Justin); "voluntas humana praecedit". In Ezech. hom. I. c. II: "In tua potestate positum est, ut sis palea vel frumentum". But all growth in faith must depend on divine help. See Orig. in Matth. series 69, Lomm. IV., p. 372: "Fidem habenti, quae est ex nobis, dabitur gratia fidei quae est per spiritum fidei, et abundabit; et quidquid habuerit quis ex naturali creatione, cum exercuerit illud, accipit id ipsum et ex gratia dei, ut abundet et firmior sit in eo ipso quod habet"; in Rom. IV. 5, Lomm. VI., p. 258 sq.; in Rom. IX. 3, Lomm VII., p. 300 sq. The fundamental idea remains: [Greek: ho Theos hemas ex hemon auton bouletai sozesthai.]]

[Footnote 799: This is frequent in Clement; see Orig. c. Cels. VII. 46.]

[Footnote 800: See Clem, Strom. V. I. 7: [Greek: chariti sozometha, ouk aneu mentoi ton kalon ergon.]. VII. 7. 48: V. 12. 82, 13. 83: [Greek: eite to en hemin autexousiou eis gnosin aphikomenon tagathou skirta te kai peda huper ta eskammena, plen ou charitos aneu tes exairetou pteroutai te kai anistatai kai ano ton huperkeimenon airetai he psyche]; The amalgamation of freedom and grace. Quis cliv. salv. 21. Orig. [Greek: peri archon.] III. 2. 2: In bonis rebus humanum propositum solum per se ipsum imperfectum est ad consummationem boni, adiutorio namque divino ad perfecta quaeque peracitur. III. 2. 5, I. 18; Selecta in Ps. 4, Lomm. XI., p. 450: [Greek: to tou logikou agathon mikton estin ek te tes proaireseos autou kai tes sumpneouses theias dunameos to ta allista proelomeno]. The support of grace is invariably conceived as enlightenment; but this enlightenment enables it to act on the whole life. For a more detailed account see Landerer in the Jahrbucher fur deutsche Theologie, Vol. II, Part 3, p. 500 ff., and Worter, Die christliche Lehre von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf Augustin, 1860.]

[Footnote 801: This goal was much more clearly described by Clement than by Origen; but it was the latter who, in his commentary on the Song of Solomon, gave currency to the image of the soul as the bride of the Logos. Bigg (p. 188 f.): "Origen, the first pioneer in so many fields of Christian thought, the father in one of his many aspects of the English Latitudinarians, became also the spiritual ancestor of Bernard, the Victorines, and the author of the 'De imitatione,' of Tauler and Molinos and Madame de Guyon."]

[Footnote 802: See Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte I., p. 467.]

[Footnote 803: See e.g., Clem. Quis dives salv. 37 and especially Paedag. I. 6. 25-32; Orig. de orat. 22 sq.—the interpretation of the Lord's Prayer. This exegesis begins with the words: "It would be worth while to examine more carefully whether the so-called Old Testament anywhere contains a prayer in which God is called Father by anyone; for till now we have found none in spite of all our seeking ... Constant and unchangeable sonship is first given in the new covenant."]

[Footnote 804: See above, p. 339 f.]

[Footnote 805: See [Greek: peri archon] II. 11.]

[Footnote 806: See [Greek: peri archon] II. 10. 1-3. Origen wrote a treatise on the resurrection, which, however, has not come down to us, because it was very soon accounted heretical. We see from c. Cels V. 14-24 the difficulties he felt about the Church doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh.]

[Footnote 807: See Eusebius, H. E. VI. 37.]

[Footnote 808: Orig., Hom. II. in Reg. I., Lomm. XI., p. 317 sq.]

[Footnote 809: C. Cels. V. 15: VI. 26; in Lc. Hom. XIV., Lomm. V., p. 136: "Ego puto, quod et post resurrectionem ex mortuis indigeamus sacramento eluente nos atque purgante". Clem., Strom. VII. 6. 34: [Greek: phamen d' emeis agiazein to pur, ou ta krea, alla tas amartolous psychas, pur ou to pamphagon kai banauson, alla to phronimon legontes] (cf. Heraclitus and the Stoa), [Greek: to duknoumenon dia psychea tes dierchomenes to pur]. For Origen cf. Bigg, p. 229 ff. There is another and intermediate stage between the punishments in hell and regnum dei.]

[Footnote 810: See [Greek: peri archon] II. 10. 4-7; c. Cels. l.c.]

[Footnote 811: See [Greek: peri archon] I. 6. 1-4: III. 6. 1-8; c. Cels. VI. 26.]

[Footnote 812: On the seven heavens in Clem. see Strom. V. II. 77 and other passages. Origen does not mention them, so far as I know.]

[Footnote 813: c. Cels. l.c.]

[Footnote 814: We would be more justified in trying this with Clement.]

[Footnote 815: See Bornemann, In investiganda monachatus origine quibus de causis ratio habenda sit Origenis. Gottingae 1885.]

THE END