It has been said that originally also the Formula of Concord in its Torgau draft (Das Torgausche Buch, i.e., the draft preceding the Bergic Book=Formula of Concord) contained the three-concurring-causes doctrine of Melanchthon and the Synergists. As a matter of fact, however, the Torgau Book does not speak of three causes of conversion, but of three causes in those who are already converted,—a doctrine entirely in agreement with the Formula of Concord, which, as shown, plainly teaches that after conversion the will of man also cooperates with the Holy Spirit. In the Torgau Book the passage in question reads: "Thus also three causes concur to effect this internal new obedience in the converted. The first and chief cause is God Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.... The second is God's Word.... The third is man's intellect, enlightened by the Holy Spirit, which ponders and understands God's command [threat and promise], and our new and regenerate will, which is governed by the Holy Spirit, and now desires with a glad and willing heart (herzlich gern und willig), though in great weakness, to submit to, and obey, the Word and will of God." In the same sense, at the colloquy in AItenburg, 1568 to 1569, the Jena theologians also mentioned as a "third cause" "the mind of man, which is regenerated and renewed, and yields to, and obeys, the Holy Spirit and the Word of God (des Menschen Gemuet, so wiedergeboren und erneuert ist und dem Heiligen Geiste und Gottes Wort Folge tut und gehorsam ist)." (Frank 1, 214f.)

XV. The Flacian Controversy.

167. Flacius Entrapped by Strigel.

Matthias Flacius Illyricus, one of the most learned and capable theologians of his day and the most faithful, devoted, staunch, zealous, and able exponent and defender of genuine Lutheranism, was the author of the malignant controversy which bears his name. Flacius was born March 3, 1520, in Illyria hence called Illyricus. He studied in Basel, Tuebingen, and Wittenberg. At Wittenberg he was convinced that the doctrine of the Lutheran Church is in complete agreement with the Word of God. Here, too, he was appointed Professor of Hebrew in 1544. In April, 1549, he left the city on account of the Interim. He removed to Magdeburg where he became the energetic and successful leader of the opponents of the Interimists and Adiaphorists. He was appointed professor at the University of Jena, founded 1547, partly in opposition to Philippism. In December 1561, he and his adherents were banished from Jena. When the latter returned in 1567, he was not recalled. Persecuted by his enemies (especially Elector August of Saxony) and forsaken by his friends, he now moved from one place to another: from Jena to Regensburg, thence to Antwerp, to Frankfort-on-the-Main, to Strassburg (from where he was expelled in the spring of 1573), and again to Frankfort-on-the-Main, where he found a last asylum for himself and his family (wife and eight children), and where he also died in a hospital, March 11, 1575.

In the Adiaphoristic Controversy Flacius had time and again urged the Lutherans to die rather than deny and surrender the truth. And when in the controversy about original sin all shunned him and turned against him he gave ample proof of the fact that he himself was imbued with the spirit he had endeavored to kindle in others, being willing to suffer and to be banished and persecuted rather than sacrifice what he believed to be the truth.—The most important of his numerous books are: Catalogus Testium Veritatis, qui ante nostram aetatem reclamarunt Papae, 1556; Ecclesiastica Historia, or the so-called Magdeburg Centuries (Centuriones), comprising the history of the first thirteen centuries, and published 1559-1574; Clavis Scripturae, of 1567; and Glossa Novi Testamenti. Walther remarks: "It was a great pity that Flacius, who had hitherto been such a faithful champion of the pure doctrine, exposed himself to the enemies in such a manner. Henceforth the errorists were accustomed to brand all those as Flacianists who were zealous in defending the pure doctrine of Luther." (Kern und Stern, 34.)

The Flacian Controversy sprang from, and must be regarded as an episode of, the Synergistic Controversy, in which also some champions of Luther's theology (Amsdorf, Wigand, Hesshusius, and others) had occasionally employed unguarded, extreme, and inadequate expressions. Following are some of the immoderate and extravagant statements made by Flacius: God alone converts man, the Adamic free will not only not cooperating, "but also raging and roaring against it (sed etiam contra furente ac fremente)." (Preger 2, 212.) The malice of our free will is a "diabolical malice (nostra diabolica malitia carnis aut liberi arbitrii)." By original sin man is "transformed into the image of Satan (ad imaginem Satanae transformatus, eiusque charactere [foeda Satanae imagine] signatus)." (Gieseler 3, 2, 245.) By original sin "the substance of man is destroyed (substantiam hominis ablatam esse);" after the Fall original sin is the substance of man; man's nature is identical with sin; in conversion a new substance is created by God. In particular, the assertions concerning the substantiality of original sin gave rise to the so-called Flacian Controversy. After Strigel, at the second session of the disputation in Weimar, had dilated on the philosophical definitions of the terms "substance" and "accident" ("accidens, quod adest vel abest praeter subiecti corruptionem"), and had declared that original sin was an accident which merely impeded free will in its activity, Flacius, in the heat of the controversy, exclaimed: "Originale peccatum non est accidens. Original sin is not an accident, for the Scriptures call it flesh, the evil heart," etc. Thus he fell into the pitfall which the wily Strigel had adroitly laid for him. Though Flacius seemed to be loath to enter upon the matter any further, and protested against the use of philosophical definitions in theology, Strigel now was eager to entangle him still further, plying him with the question: "An negas peccatum originis esse accidens? Do you deny that original sin is an accident?" Flacius answered: "Lutherus diserte negat esse accidens. Luther expressly denies that it is an accident." Strigel: "Visne negare peccatum esse accidens? Do you mean to deny that sin is an accident?" Flacius: "Quod sit substantia, dixi Scripturam et Lutherum affirmare. I have said that Scripture and Luther affirm that it is a substance." (Luthardt, 213. 216.)

After the session in which the fatal phrase had fallen from his lips, Wigand and Musaeus expostulated with Flacius, designating (according to later reports of theirs) his statement as "this new, perilous, and blasphemous proposition of the ancient Manicheans (haec nova, periculosa et blasphema veterum Manichaeorum propositio)." (Planck 4, 611.) Flacius declared that, "in the sudden and pressing exigency, in the interest of truth, and against Pelagian enthusiasm, he had taken this expression [concerning the substantiality of original sin] from Luther's doctrine and books." (Preger 2, 324.) In the following (third) session, however, he repeated his error, declaring: I must stand by my statement that original sin is not an accident, but a substance, "because the testimonies of the Holy Scriptures which employ terms denoting substance (quae verbis substantialibus utuntur) are so numerous." (Planck 4, 610; Luthardt, 216.) Also later on Flacius always maintained that his doctrine was nothing but the teaching of the Bible and of Luther. As to Scripture-proofs, he referred to passages in which the Scriptures designate sin as "flesh," "stony heart," etc. Regarding the teaching of Luther, he quoted statements in which he describes original sin as "man's nature," "essence," "substantial sin," "all that is born of father and mother," etc. (Preger 2, 318.)

However, the palpable mistake of Flacius was that he took the substantial terms on which he based his theory in their original and proper sense, while the Bible and Luther employ them in a figurative meaning, as the Formula of Concord carefully explains in its first article, which decided and settled this controversy. (874, 50.) Here we read: "Also to avoid strife about words, aequivocationes vocabulorum, that is, words and expressions which are applied and used in various meanings, should be carefully and distinctly explained, as when it is said: God creates the nature of men, there by the term nature the essence, body, and soul of men are understood. But often the disposition or vicious quality of a thing is called its nature, as when it is said: It is the nature of the serpent to bite and poison. Thus Luther says that sin and sinning are the disposition and nature of corrupt man. Therefore original sin properly signifies the deep corruption of our nature as it is described in the Smalcald Articles. But sometimes the concrete person or the subject that is, man himself with body and soul in which sin is and inheres, is also comprised under this term, for the reason that man is corrupted by sin, poisoned and sinful, as when Luther says: 'Thy birth, thy nature, and thy entire essence is sin,' that is, sinful and unclean. Luther himself explains that by nature-sin, person-sin, essential sin he means that not only the words, thoughts, and works are sin, but that the entire nature, person and essence of man are altogether corrupted from the root by original sin." (875, 51f.)

168. Context in which Statement was Made.

In making his statement concerning the substantiality of original sin, the purpose of Flacius was to wipe out the last vestige of spiritual powers ascribed to natural man by Strigel, and to emphasize the doctrine of total corruption, which Strigel denied. His fatal blunder was that he did so in terms which were universally regarded as savoring of Manicheism. As was fully explained in the chapter of the Synergistic Controversy Strigel taught that free will, which belongs to the substance and essence of man, and hence cannot be lost without the annihilation of man himself, always includes the capacity to choose in both directions, that also with respect to divine grace and the operations of the Holy Spirit man is and always remains a liberum agens in the sense that he is able to decide in utramque partem; that this ability, constituting the very essence of free will, may be weakened and impeded in its activity, but never lost entirely. If it were lost, Strigel argued, the very substance of man and free will as such would have to be regarded as annihilated. But now man, also after the Fall, is still a real man, possessed of intellect and will. Hence original sin cannot have despoiled him of this liberty of choosing pro or con also in matters spiritual. The loss of original righteousness does not, according to Strigel, involve the total spiritual disability of the will and its sole tendency and activity toward what is spiritually evil. Moreover, despite original corruption, it is and remains an indestructible property of man to be able, at least in a measure, to assent to and to admit, the operations of the Holy Spirit, and therefore and in this sense to be converted "aliquo modo volens." (Planck 4, 667. 675. 681.)

It was in opposition to this Semi-Pelagian teaching that Flacius declared original sin to be not a mere accident, but the substance of man. Entering upon the train of thought and the phraseology suggested by his opponent, he called substance what in reality was an accident, though not an accident such as Strigel contended. From his own standpoint it was therefore a shrewd move to hide his own synergism and to entrap his opponent, when Strigel plied Flacius with the question whether he denied that original sin was an accident. For in the context and the sense in which it was proposed the question involved a vicious dilemma. Answering with yes or no, Flacius was compelled either to affirm Strigel's synergism or to expose himself to the charge of Manicheism. Instead of replying as he did, Flacius should have cleared the sophistical atmosphere by explaining: "If I say, 'Original sin is an accident,' you [Strigel] will infer what I reject, viz., that the corrupt will of man retains the power to decide also in favor of the operations of the Holy Spirit. And if I answer that original sin is not an accident (such as you have in mind), you will again infer what I disavow, viz., that man, who by the Fall has lost the ability to will in the spiritual direction, has eo ipso lost the will and its freedom entirely and as such." As it was, however, Flacius instead of adhering strictly to the real issue—the question concerning man's cooperation in conversion—and exposing the sophistry implied in the question put by Strigel, most unfortunately suffered himself to be caught on the horns of the dilemma. He blindly walked into the trap set for him by Strigel, from which also later on he never succeeded in fully extricating himself.

With all his soul Flacius rejected the synergism involved in Strigel's question. His blunder was, as stated, that he did so in terms universally regarded as Manichean. He was right when he maintained that original sin is the inherited tendency and motion of the human mind, will, and heart, not toward, but against God,—a direction, too, which man is utterly unable to change. But he erred fatally by identifying this inborn evil tendency with the substance of fallen man and the essence of his will as such. It will always be regarded as a redeeming feature that it was in antagonizing synergism and championing the Lutheran sola gratia that Flacius coined his unhappy proposition. And in properly estimating his error, it must not be overlooked that he, as will be shown in the following, employed the terms "substance" and "accident" not in their generally accepted meaning but in a sense, and according to a philosophical terminology, of his own.

169. Formal and Material Substance.

The terms "substance" and "accident" are defined in Melanchthon's Erotemata Dialectices as follows: "Substantia est ens, quod revera proprium esse habet, nec est in alio, ut habens esse a subiecto. Substance is something which in reality has a being of its own and is not in another as having its being from the subject." (C. R. 13, 528.) "Accidens est quod non per sese subsistit, nec est pars substantiae, sed in alio est mutabiliter. Accident is something which does not exist as such nor is a part of the substance, but is changeable in something else." (522.) Melanchthon continues: "Accidentium alia sunt separabilia ut frigus ab aqua, notitia a mente, laetitia, tristitia a corde. Alia accidentia sunt inseparabilia, ut quantitas seu magnitudo a substantia corporea, calor ab igni, humiditas ab aqua, non separantur... Et quia separabilia accidentia magis conspicua sunt, ideo inde sumpta est puerilis descriptio: Accidens est, quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem. Whatever is present or absent without the corruption of the subject is an accident." (C. R. 13, 523; Preger 2, 396. 407; Seeberg 4, 494.)

Evidently this last definition, which was employed also by Strigel, is ambiguous, inasmuch as the word "corruption" may signify an annihilation, or merely a perversion, or a corruption in the ordinary meaning of the word. In the latter sense the term applied to original sin would be tantamount to a denial of the Lutheran doctrine of total corruption. When Jacob Andreae, in his disputation with Flacius, 1571, at Strassburg, declared that accident is something which is present or absent without corruption of the subject, he employed the term in the sense of destruction or annihilation. In the same year Hesshusius stated that by original sin "the whole nature body and soul, substance as well as accidents, are defiled, corrupted, and dead," of course, spiritually. And what he understood by substance appears from his assertion: "The being itself, the substance and nature itself, in as far as it is nature, is not an evil conflicting with the Law of God.... Not even in the devil the substance itself, in as far as it is substance, is a bad thing, i.e., a thing conflicting with the Law." (Preger 2, 397.)

The Formula of Concord carefully and correctly defines: "Everything that is must be either substantia, that is, a self-existent essence, or accidens, that is, an accidental matter, which does not exist by itself essentially but is in another self-existent essence and can be distinguished from it." "Now, then, since it is the indisputable truth that everything that is, is either a substance or an accidens that is, either a self-existing essence or something accidental in it (as has just been shown and proved by testimonies of the church-teachers, and no truly intelligent man has ever had any doubts concerning this), necessity here constrains, and no one can evade it if the question be asked whether original sin is a substance, that is, such a thing as exists by itself, and is not in another, or whether it is an accidens, that is, such a thing as does not exist by itself, but is in another, and cannot exist or be by itself, he must confess straight and pat that original sin is no substance, but an accident." (877, 54; 57.)

Flacius, however, took the words "substance" and "accident" in a different sense. He distinguished between the material and formal substance, and the latter he regarded as man's true original essence. This essence he explained, consisted in the original righteousness and holiness of man, in the image of God or the will as truly free and in proper relation toward God. He said: "Ipsum hominem essentialiter sic esse formatum, ut recta voluntas esset imago Dei, non tantum eius accidens." (Seeberg 4, 494.) He drew the conclusion that original sin, by which the image of God (not the human understanding and will as such) is lost, cannot be a mere accident, but constitutes the very essence and substance of fallen man. He argued: The image of God is the formal essence of man, or the soul itself according to its best part, by original sin this image is changed into its opposite: hence the change wrought by original sin is not accidental, but substantial,—just as substantial and essential as when wine is changed into vinegar or fire into frost. What man has lost, said Flacius, is not indeed his material substance (substantia materialis), but his true formal substance or substantial form (substantia formalis or forma substantialis). Hence also original sin, or the corruption resulting from the Fall, in reality is, and must be designated, the formal substance or substantial form of natural man. Not all gifts of creation were lost to man by his Fall; the most essential boon, however, the image of God, was destroyed and changed into the image of Satan. "In homine," said Flacius, "et mansit aliquid, et tamen quod optimum in ratione et essentia fuit, nempe imago Dei, non tantum evanuit, sed etiam in contrarium, nempe in imaginem diaboli, commutatum est." The devil, Flacius continued, has robbed man of his original form (forma), the image of God, and stamped him with his own diabolical form and nature. (Luthardt 215; Gieseler 3, 2, 253.)

170. Further Explanations of Flacius.

The manner in which Flacius distinguished between material and formal substance appears from the tract on original sin (De Peccati Originalis aut Veteris Adami Appellationibus et Essentia), which he appended to his Clavis Scripturae of 1567. There we read: "In this disputation concerning the corruption of man I do not deny that this meaner matter (illam viliorem materiam) or mass of man created in the beginning has indeed remained until now, although it is exceedingly vitiated, as when in wine or aromas the spirituous (airy) or fiery substance escapes, and nothing remains but the earthy and watery substance; but I hold that the substantial form or the formal substance (formam substantialem aut substantiam formalem) has been lost, yea, changed into its opposite. But I do not speak of that external and coarse form (although it too, is corrupted and weakened very much) which a girl admires in a youth, or philosophy also in the entire man, according to which he consists of body and soul, has an erect stature two feet, hands, eyes, ears, and the like, is an animal laughing, counting, reasoning, etc.; but I speak of that most noble substantial form (nobilissima substantialis forma) according to which especially the heart itself or rather the rational soul, was formed in such a manner that his very essence might be the image of God and represent Him, and that his substantial powers, intellect and will, and his affections might be conformed to the properties of God, represent, truly acknowledge, and most willingly embrace Him." (Preger 2, 314; Gieseler 3, 2, 254.)

Again: "In this manner, therefore, I believe and assert that original sin is a substance, because the rational soul (as united with God) and especially its noblest substantial powers, namely, the intellect and will which before had been formed so gloriously that they were the true image of God and the fountain of all justice, uprightness, and piety, and altogether essentially like unto gold and gems, are now, by deceit of Satan, so utterly perverted that they are the true and living image of Satan, and, as it were, filthy or rather consisting of an infernal flame, not otherwise than when the sweetest and purest mass, infected with the most venomous ferment, is altogether and substantially changed and transformed into a lump of the same ferment." (Gieseler 3, 2, 254.) Original sin "is not a mere accident in man, but his inverted and transformed essence or new form itself, just as when a most wholesome medicine is changed into the most baneful poison." "The matter remains, but it receives a new form, namely, the image of Satan." "Man, who in his essential form was the image of God, has in his essential form become the image of Satan." "This change may be compared to the change which the golden image of a beautiful man undergoes when it is transformed into the image of a dragon, the matter at the same time being corrupted." (Preger 2, 214. 217. 325.)

Dilating on the substantiality of original sin, Flacius furthermore declared: "Original malice in man is not something different from the evil mind or stony heart itself, not something that destroys him spiritually as a disease consumes him bodily, but it is ruined and destroyed nature itself (sed est tantum ipsa perditissima et iam destructissima natura). Original malice was not, as many now think infused from without into Adam in such a way as when poison or some other bad substance is thrown or poured into good liquor, so that by reason of the added bad substance also the rest becomes noxious, but in such a way as when good liquor or bread itself is perverted so that now it is bad as such and poisonous or rather poison (ut illud per se iam malum ac venenatum aut potius venenum sit)." (Preger 2, 313.)

Also concerning the body and soul of fallen man Flacius does not hesitate to affirm that, since they are permeated and corrupted by original sin, "these parts themselves are sin, eas ipsas [partes, corpus et animam] esse illud nativum malum, quod cum Deo pugnat." "Some object," says Flacius, "that the creature of God must be distinguished from sin, which is not of God. I answer: now do separate, if you can, the devil from his inherent wickedness!... How can the same thing be separated from itself! We therefore can not distinguish them in any other way than by stating that with respect to his first creation and also his present preservation man, even as the devil himself, is of God, but that with respect to this horrible transformation (ratione istius horrendae metamorphoseos) he is of the devil, who, by the force of the efficacious sentence and punishment of angry God: 'Thou shalt die,' not only captured us to be his vilest slaves, but also recast, rebaked, and changed, or, so to speak, metamorphosed us into another man, as the Scripture says, even as he [the devil] himself is inverted." All parts, talents, and abilities of man, Flacius contends, are "evil and mere sins," because they all oppose God. "What else are they than armed unrighteousness!" he exclaims. Even the natural knowledge of God "is nothing but the abominable source of idolatry and of all superstitions." (Preger 316f.; Gieseler 3, 2, 255.)

That the fundamental view of Flacius, however, was much farther apart from Manicheism than some of his radical phrases imply, appears from his "Gnowthi seauton, De Essentia Originalis Institutiae," of 1568. After admitting that Augustine, Luther, and the Apology of the Augsburg Confession are correct when they define original sin as an inordinate disposition, a disorder (ataxia), perversion, and confusion of the parts of man, Flacius proceeds: "The substantial form of a certain thing for the most part, consists in the right position and disposition of the parts; as, for example, if a human body were born which had its eyes, ears, and mouth on the belly or feet, and, vice versa, the toes on the head, no one would say that it was properly a man, but rather a monster. ... It appears, therefore, that the inordinate disposition of the parts produces an altogether new body or thing. Thus, forsooth, the horrible perturbation of the soul has also produced, as it were a new kind of monster fighting against God." (Preger 2, 409.) Accordingly, it was not man's body and soul as such, but the alteration of the relation of his powers toward one another and the consequent corruption of these powers, that Flacius had in mind when he designated original sin as the new substantial form, or substance, of sinful man.

Flacius expressly denied that the fall of man or his conversion involved a physical change. "I do not teach a physical regeneration," he declared, "nor do I say that two hearts are created, but I say that this most excellent part of the soul or of man is once more established, or that the image of God is recast and transformed out of the image of Satan, even as before the image of God was transformed into the image of Satan. Physicam renascentiam non assero nec dico duo corda creari, sed dico istam praestantissimam animae aut hominis partem denuo condi aut ex imagine Satanae refundi aut transformari imaginem Dei, sicut antea imago Dei fuit transformata in imaginem Satanae." (Seeberg 4, 495.) Gieseler pertinently remarks: "It is apparent that Flacius did not deviate from the common concept of original sin, but from the concepts of substance and accident, but that here, too, he was uncertain, inasmuch as he employed the terms substantia, forma substantialis, and substantia formalis promiscuously." (3, 2, 255.)

If not necessarily involved in, it was at least in keeping with his extreme position and extravagant phraseology concerning original sin when Flacius, in his De Primo et Secundo Capite ad Romanos, quatenus Libero Arbitrio Patrocinari Videntur, rejected the doctrine of an inborn idea of God and of His Law inscribed in the heart of natural man. On Rom. 1, 19 he comments: It is only from the effects in the world that man infers the existence of a supreme cause. And with respect to Rom. 2, 15 he maintains that Paul's statements were to be understood, not of a law written in the heart of man, but of a knowledge which the heathen had derived by inference, from experience, or from tradition of the fathers. On this point Strigel, no doubt was correct when he objected: If the knowledge of God's existence were really extinguished from the heart, there could be no discipline among men; and if man had no inborn knowledge of the Law, then there could be no such thing as conscience which condemns him when he sins. The fact that man fears punishments even when there is no government to fear, as was the case with Alexander when he had murdered Clitus, proves that in the heart there is a certain knowledge both of God and of His Law. (Preger 2, 213.) However, Flacius did not, as Strigel seems to insinuate, deny that natural man has an obscure knowledge of God's existence and Law, but merely maintained that this knowledge was not inborn or inherited, but acquired from without.

171. Controversy Precipitated by Flacius.

Though Flacius, when he first made his statement concerning the substantiality of original sin may not have felt absolutely sure of the exact meaning, bearing, and correctness of his position, yet the facts do not warrant the assumption that afterwards he was in any way diffident or wavering in his attitude. Whatever his views on this subject may have been before 1560—after the fatal phrase had fallen from his lips, he never flinched nor flagged in zealously defending it. Nor was he ever disposed to compromise the matter as far as the substance of his doctrine was concerned. In 1570 Spangenberg of Mansfeld, who sided with Flacius, suggested that he retain his meaning, but change his language: "Teneat Illyricus mentem, mutet linguam." To this Flacius consented. On September 28 1570, he published his Brief Confession, in which he agreed to abstain from the use of the term "substance." However, what he suggested as a substitute, viz., that original sin be defined as the nature of man (the word "nature," as he particularly emphasized, to be taken not in a figurative, but in its proper meaning), was in reality but another way of repeating his error.

The same was the case in 1572, when Flacius, opposed and sorely pressed by the ministerium of Strassburg (whence he was banished the following year), offered to substitute for the word "substance" the phrase "essential powers." (Preger 2, 371.) Two years later, at the public disputation in Langenau, Silesia, where Flacius defended his doctrine with favorable results for himself against Jacob Coler [born 1537; studied in Frankfort-on-the-Oder, 1564 pastor in Lauban, Upper Lausatia (Oberlausitz); 1573 in Neukirch; 1574 he opposed Leonard Crentzheim and Flacius; 1575 professor in Frankfort; afterwards active first as Praepositus in Berlin and later on as Superintendent in Mecklenburg, published Disputatio De Libero Arbitrio; died March 7, 1612], he declared that he did not insist on his phrase as long as the doctrine itself was adopted and original sin was not declared to be a mere accident. But this, too, was no real retraction of his error. (Preger 2, 387.) In a similar way Flacius repeatedly declared himself willing to abstain from the use of the word "substance" in connection with his doctrine concerning original sin, but with conditions and limitations which made his concessions illusory, and neither did nor could satisfy his opponents.

At the disputation in Weimar, 1560, Wigand and Musaeus, as stated, warned Flacius immediately after the session in which he had made his statement. Schluesselburg relates: "Immediately during the disputation, as I frequently heard from their own lips, Dr. Wigand, Dr. Simon Musaeus, and other colleagues of his who attended the disputation ... admonished Illyricus in a brotherly and faithful manner to abstain from this new, perilous and blasphemous proposition of the ancient Manicheans, which would cause great turmoil in the Church of God, and to refute the error of Victorin [Strigel] concerning free will not by means of a false proposition, but with the Word of God. However, intoxicated with ambition, and relying, in the heat of the conflict, too much on the acumen and sagacity of his own mind, Illyricus haughtily spurned the brotherly and faithful admonitions of all his colleagues." (Catalogus 2, 4.) In his book De Manichaeismo Renovato Wigand himself reports: "Illyricus answered [to the admonition of his colleagues to abstain from the Manichean phrase] that he had been drawn into this discussion by his opponent against his own will. But what happened? Contrary to the expectations of his colleagues, Illyricus in the following session continued, as he had begun, to defend this insanity." (Preger 2, 324; Planck 4, 611.) However, it does not appear that after the disputation his friends pressed the matter any further, or that they made any efforts publicly to disavow the Flacian proposition.

In 1567 Flacius published his tract De Peccati Originalis aut Veteris Adami Appellationibus et Essentia, "On the Appellations and Essence of Original Sin or the Old Adam," appending it to his famous Clavis Scripturae of the same year. He had written this tract probably even before 1564. In 1566 he sent it to Simon Musaeus, requesting his opinion and the opinion of Hesshusius, who at that time was celebrating his marriage with the daughter of Musaeus. In his answer, Musaeus approved the tract, but desired that the term "substance" be explained as meaning not the matter, but the form of the substance to which Hesshusius also agreed. After the tract had appeared, Musaeus again wrote to Flacius, June 21, 1568, saying that he agreed with his presentation of original sin. At the same time, however, he expressed the fear that the bold statement which Flacius had retained, "Sin is substance," would be dangerously misinterpreted. (Preger 2, 327.) And before long a storm was brewing, in which animosity registered its highest point, and a veritable flood of controversial literature (one publication following the other in rapid succession) was poured out upon the Church, which was already distracted and divided by numerous and serious theological conflicts.

By the publication of this treatise Flacius, who before long also was harassed and ostracized everywhere, had himself made a public controversy unavoidable. In the conflict which it precipitated, he was opposed by all parties, not only by his old enemies, the Philippists, but also by his former friends. According to the maxim: Amicus Plato, amicus Socrates, sed magis amica veritas, they now felt constrained, in the interest of truth, to turn their weapons against their former comrade and leader. Flacius himself had made it impossible for his friends to spare him any longer. Nor did he deceive himself as to the real situation. In a letter written to Wigand he reveals his fear that the Lutherans and Philippists, then assembled at the Colloquium in Altenburg (held from October 21, 1568, to March, 1569, between the theologians of Thuringia and those of Electoral Saxony), would unite in a public declaration against his teaching. Wigand whose warning Flacius had disregarded at Weimar, wrote to Gallus: Flacius has forfeited the right to request that nothing be published against him, because he himself has already spread his views in print. And before long Wigand began to denounce publicly the Flacian doctrine as "new and prolific monsters, monstra nova et fecunda."

172. Publications Pro and Con.

According to Preger the first decided opposition to the Flacian teaching came from Moerlin and Chemnitz, in Brunswick, to whom Flacius had also submitted his tract for approval. Chemnitz closed his criticism by saying: It is enough if we are able to retain what Luther has won (parta tueri), let us abandon all desires to go beyond (ulterius quaerere) and to improve upon him. (Preger 2, 328.) Moerlin characterized Flacius as a vain man, and dangerous in many respects. Flacius answered in an objective manner, betraying no irritation whatever. (332.) In a letter of August 10, 1568, Hesshusius, who now had read the tract more carefully charged Flacius with teaching that Satan was a creator of substance, and before long refused to treat with him any further. In September of the same year Flacius published his Gnothi seauton against the attacks of the Synergists and Philippists, notably Christopher Lasius [who studied at Strassburg and Wittenberg, was active in Goerlitz, Greussen, Spandau, Kuestrin, Cottbus, and Senftenberg, wrote Praelibationes Dogmatis Flaciani de Prodigiosa Hominis Conversione; died 1572]. In the same year Hesshusius prepared his Analysis, which was approved by Gallus and the Jena theologians.

Realizing that all his former friends had broken with him entirely, Flacius, in January 1570, published his Demonstrations Concerning the Essence of the Image of God and the Devil, in which he attacked his opponents, but without mentioning their names. His request for a private discussion was bluntly rejected by the Jena theologians. Wigand, in his Propositions on Sin of May 5, 1570, was the first publicly to attack Flacius by name. About the same time Moerlin's Themata de Imagine Dei and Chemnitz's Resolutio appeared. The former was directed "against the impious and absurd proposition that sin is a substance", the latter, against the assertion "that original sin is the very substance of man, and that the soul of man itself is original sin." Hesshusius also published his Letter to M. Flacius Illyricus in the Controversy whether Original Sin is a Substance. Flacius answered in his Defense of the Sound Doctrine Concerning Original Righteousness and Unrighteousness, or Sin, of September 1, 1570. Hesshusius published his Analysis, in which he repeated the charge that Flacius made the devil a creator of substance.

In his Brief Confession, of September 28 1570, Flacius now offered to abstain from the use of the term "substance" in the manner indicated above. A colloquium, however, requested by Flacius and his friends on the basis of this Confession, was declined by the theologians of Jena. Moreover, in answer to the Brief Confession, Hesshusius published (April 21, 1571) his True Counter-Report, in which he again repeated his accusation that Flacius made the devil a creator of substance. He summarized his arguments as follows: "I have therefore proved from one book [Flacius's tract of 1567] more than six times that Illyricus says: Satan condidit, fabricavit, transformavit veterem hominem, Satan est figulus, that is: The devil created and made man, the devil is man's potter." The idea of a creation out of nothing, however, was not taught in the statements to which Hesshusius referred. (Preger 2, 348.)

Further publications by Andrew Schoppe [died after 1615], Wigand, Moerlin, Hesshusius, and Chemnitz, which destroyed all hopes of a peaceful settlement, caused Flacius to write his Orthodox Confession Concerning Original Sin. In this comprehensive answer, which appeared August 1, 1571, he declares "that either image, the image of God as well as of Satan, is an essence, and that the opposite opinion diminishes the merit of Christ." At the same time he complained that his statements were garbled and misinterpreted by his opponents, that his was the position of the man who asked concerning garlic and received an answer concerning onions, that his opponents were but disputing with imaginations of their own. (349f.)

In the same year, 1571, Wigand published a voluminous book, On Original Sin, in which he charged Flacius with teaching that original sin is the entire carnal substance of man according to both his body and soul. In his description of the Flacian doctrine we read: "Original sin is a substance, as they teach. Accordingly, original sin is an animal, and that, too, an intelligent animal. You must also add ears, eyes, mouth, nose, arms, belly, and feet. Original sin laughs, talks, sews, sows, works, reads, writes, preaches, baptizes, administers the Lord's Supper, etc. For it is the substance of man that does such things. Behold, where such men end!" Flacius replied in his Christian and Reliable Answer to All manner of Sophistries of the Pelagian Accident, 1572, protesting that the doctrine ascribed to him was a misrepresentation of his teaching. In the same year Wigand published Reasons Why This Proposition, in Controversy with the Manicheans: "Original Sin Is the Corrupt Nature," Cannot Stand. Here Wigand truly says: "Evil of the substance and evil substance are not identical. Malum substantiae et mala substantia non sunt idem." (Preger 2, 353. 410.)

In several publications of the same year Hesshusius asserted (quoting testimonies to this effect from Augustine), that the Flacian doctrine was identical with the tenets of the Manicheans, in substance as well as terms. Flacius answered in De Augustini et Manichaeorum Sententia, in Controversia Peccati, 1572, in which he declared: "I most solemnly condemn the Manichean insanity concerning two creators. I have always denied that original sin is something, or has ever been something outside of man; I have never ascribed to this sin any materiality of its own." (355.) This book was followed by another attack by Hesshusius and an answer, in turn, by Flacius.

In the same year Hesshusius, in order to prevent further accessions to Flacianism, published his Antidote (Antidoton) against the Impious and Blasphemous Dogma of Matthias Flacius Illyricus by which He Asserts that Original Sin Is Substance. In this book, which was republished in 1576 and again in 1579, Hesshusius correctly argued: "If original sin is the substance of the soul, then we are compelled to assert one of two things, viz., either that Satan is the creator of substances or that God is the creator and preserver of sin. Si substantia animae est peccatum originis, alterum a duobus necesse est poni, videlicet, aut Satanam esse conditorem substantiarum, aut Deum esse peccati creatorem et sustentatorem." (Gieseler 3, 2, 256.) At this late hour, 1572, Simon Musaeus, too, entered the arena with his Opinion Concerning Original Sin, Sententia de Peccato Originali. In it he taught "that original sin is not a substance, but the utmost corruption of it, in matter as well as form," and that therefore "Pelagianism no less than Manicheism is to be excluded and condemned."

When the ministerium of Strassburg turned against Flacius, he again published several books defending his position on the controverted questions, which resulted in his expulsion from the city. In 1573 Flacius published an answer to Hesshusius's Antidote entitled, Solid Refutation of the Groundless Sophistries, Calumnies, and Figments, as also of the Most Corrupt Errors of the "Antidote" and of Other Neopelagian Writers. Flacius charged Hesshusius with misrepresentation, and demanded that he swear whether he really believed to have found the alleged errors in his writings. (Preger 2, 364ff.)

Till his death, on March 11, 1575, at Frankfort-on-the-Main, Flacius consistently adhered to his false terminology as well as teaching, apparently never for a moment doubting that he was but defending Luther's doctrine. One of his last books was entitled, Some Clear and Splendid Testimonies of Martin Luther Concerning the Evil Essence, Image, Form, or Shape (Wesen, essentia, Bild, Form oder Gestalt) of the Earthly Dead Adam and Concerning the Essential Transformation of Man. (389.) As stated above, the mistake of Flacius was that he took literally terms denoting substance which the Bible and Luther employ in a figurative sense.

173. Adherents of Flacius.

The chief supporters of Flacius were the Mansfeldians, Count Vollrath and Cyriacus Spangenberg [born 1528; studied in Wittenberg; served in Eisleben, then in Mansfeld; died in Strassburg February 10, 1604]. In the serious dissensions which arose in Mansfeld in consequence of the controversy on original sin, the Count and Spangenberg were opposed by the Jena theologians and Superintendent Menzel [Jerome Menzel, born 1517; studied in Wittenberg; wrote against Spangenberg; died 1590]. As stated above, it was Spangenberg who endeavored to bring about an understanding between the contending parties on the principle: "Teneat Illyricus mentem, mutet linguam." A colloquy was held 1572 at Castle Mansfeld, in which Flacius and his adherents were pitted against Menzel, Rhode, Fabricius, and others. When Fabricius declared in the discussions: "Only in so far as our nature is not in conformity with the Law of God is it corrupt," Flacius exclaimed: "Non quantum, not in as far; but I say it is not in conformity because it is corrupt, quia corrupta est." (Preger 2, 375.) Count Vollrath and his adviser, Caspar Pflug gave Flacius a written testimony that at the colloquy he had not been convinced, but found to be correct in the controversy on original sin. The publication of this testimony by Flacius as also of the minutes of the Colloquy by Count Vollrath, in 1573, resulted in a number of further publications by Flacius and his friends as well as his opponents. At Mansfeld the animosity against the Flacians did not subside even after the death of Flacius in 1575. They were punished with excommunication, incarceration, and the refusal of a Christian burial. Count Vollrath left 1577, and died at Strassburg 1578. Spangenberg, who also had secretly fled from Mansfeld, defended the doctrine of Flacius in a tract, De Peccato Originali, Concerning Original Sin, which he published 1586 under a pseudonym. He died without retracting or changing his views.

Another adherent of Flacius was F. Coelestinus, professor at Jena. After his suspension he left the city and participated in the controversy. He published Colloquium inter Se et Tilem. Hesshusium. He died 1572. In August, 1571, Court-preacher Christopher Irenaeus and Pastors Guenther and Reinecker were dismissed in Weimar because of Flacianism. Irenaeus published Examen Libri Concordiae and many other books, in which he contends that original sin is a substance. Pastors Wolf in Kahla, Schneider in Altendorf, and Franke in Oberrosla were dismissed in 1572 for the same reason. They, too, entered the public arena in favor of Flacius. At Lindau four preachers, who had identified themselves with Flacius, were also deposed. One of them, Tobias Rupp, held a public disputation with Andreae. In Antwerp the elders forbade their ministers to indulge in any public polemics against Flacius. Among the supporters of Flacius were also his son, Matthias Flacius, and Caspar Heldelin. It may be noted here that Saliger (Beatus) and Fredeland, who were deposed at Luebeck in 1568 also taught "that original sin is the very substance of the body and soul of man," and that Christ had assumed "the flesh of another species" than ours. (Gieseler 3, 2, 257.)

In Regensburg four adherents of Flacius were dismissed in 1574, among them Joshua Opitz [born 1543; died 1585]. These and others emigrated to the Archduchy of Austria, where the Lutherans were numerous and influential, Opitz frequently preaching to an audience of 7,000. No less than 40 of the Lutheran ministers of Austria are said to have shared the views of Flacius. (Preger 2, 393.) Only a few of them revealed symptoms of fanaticism, which resulted in their dismissal. Among the latter was Joachim Magdeburgius, then an exile at Efferding. He taught "that the bodies of believing Christians after their death were still essential original sin, and that God's wrath remained over them till the Day of Judgment." (Joecher, Lexicon 3, 32.) At the same time he branded as errorists Spangenberg, Opitz, and Irenaeus, who declared their dissent. In 1581 the Flacians in Austria issued a declaration against the Formula of Concord, charging its teaching to be inconsistent with Luther's doctrine on original sin. As late as 1604 there were numerous Flacianists in German Austria.

174. Decision of Formula of Concord.

Seeberg remarks: "Flacius was not a heretic, but in the wrangle of his day he was branded as such, and this has been frequently repeated." (4, 2, 495.) A similar verdict is passed by Gieseler and other historians. But whatever may be said in extenuation of his error, it cannot be disputed that the unfortunate phrases of Flacius produced, and were bound to produce, most serious religious offense, as well as theological strife, and hopeless doctrinal confusion. Even when viewed in the light of his distinction between formal substance (man as endowed with the image of God) and material substance (man as possessed of body and soul, together with will and intellect), the odiousness of his terminology is not entirely removed. It was and remained a form of doctrine and trope or mode of teaching which the Lutherans were no more minded to tolerate than the error of Strigel.

Accordingly, the first article of the Formula of Concord rejects both the synergistic as well as the Manichean aberrations in the doctrine of original sin. In its Thorough Declaration we read: "Now this doctrine [of original sin] must be so maintained and guarded that it may not deflect either to the Pelagian or the Manichean side. For this reason the contrary doctrine ... should also be briefly stated." (865, 16.) Accordingly, in a series of arguments, the Flacian error is thoroughly refuted and decidedly rejected. At the same time the Formula of Concord points out the offensiveness of the Flacian phraseology. It refers to the controversy regarding this question as "scandalous and very mischievous," and declares: "Therefore it is unchristian and horrible to hear that original sin is baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity, sanctified, and saved, and other similar expressions found in the writings of the recent Manicheans, with which we will not offend simple-minded people." (873, 45. 59.)

On the other hand, the Formula of Concord is just as determined in opposing every effort at extenuating the corruption wrought by original sin. It is solicitous to explain that in designating original sin as an accident, its corruption is not minimized in the least, if the answer concerning the nature of this accident is not derived from philosophy or human reason, but from the Holy Scriptures. "For the Scriptures," says the Formula, "testify that original sin is an unspeakable evil and such an entire corruption of human nature that in it and all its internal and external powers nothing pure or good remains, but everything is entirely corrupt, so that on account of original sin man in God's sight is truly spiritually dead (plane sit emortuus), with all his powers dead to that which is good." (879, 60.)

Accordingly, the Formula of Concord rejects the errors of Strigel and the Semi-Pelagians, "that original sin is only external, a slight, insignificant spot sprinkled, or a stain dashed, upon the nature of man ... along with and beneath which the nature nevertheless possesses and retains its integrity and power even in spiritual things. Or that original sin is not a despoliation or deficiency, but only an external impediment to these spiritual good powers.... They are rebuked and rejected likewise who teach that the nature has indeed been greatly weakened and corrupted through the Fall, but that nevertheless it has not entirely lost all good with respect to divine, spiritual things, and that what is sung in our churches, 'Through Adam's fall is all corrupt, nature and essence human,' is not true, but from natural birth it still has something good, small, little, and inconsiderable though it be, namely, capacity, skill, aptness, or ability to begin, to effect, or to help effect something in spiritual things." (865, 21ff.)

While the Formula of Concord does not deny the capacity of fallen man for salvation, it is careful in defining that this is not an active, but a passive capacity. That is to say: Man is utterly incapable of qualifying himself for, or of contributing in the least toward, his own spiritual restoration; but what is impossible for man is not impossible with God who, indeed, is able to convert man, endow him with new spiritual powers, and lead him to eternal salvation,—a goal for the attainment of which, in contradistinction from inanimate and other creatures, man, being a rational creature, endowed with intellect and will, was created by God and redeemed by Christ. In the Formula of Concord we read: "And although God, according to His just, strict sentence, has utterly cast away the fallen evil spirits forever, He has nevertheless, out of special, pure mercy, willed that poor fallen human nature might again become and be capable and participant of conversion, the grace of God, and eternal life; not from its own natural, active [or effective] skill, aptness, or capacity (for the nature of man is obstinate enmity against God), but from pure grace, through the gracious efficacious working of the Holy Ghost. And this Dr. Luther calls capacitatem (non activam, sed passivam), which he explains thus: Quando patres liberum arbitrium defendunt, capacitatem libertatis eius praedicant, quod scilicet verti potest ad bonum per gratiam Dei et fieri revera liberum, ad quod creatum est. That is: When the Fathers defend the free will, they are speaking of this, that it is capable of freedom in this sense, that by God's grace it can be converted to good, and become truly free, for which it was created in the beginning." (889, 20.)

This accords with Luther's words in De Servo Arbitrio: "It would be correct if we should designate as the power of free will that [power] by which man, who is created for life or eternal death, is apt to be moved by the Spirit and imbued with the grace of God. For we, too, confess this power, i.e., aptitude or, as the Sophists [Scholastic theologians] say, disposition and passive aptitude. And who does not know that trees and animals are not endowed with it? For, as the saying goes, heaven is not created for geese. Hanc enim vim, hoc est, aptitudinem, seu, ut Sophistae loquuntur, dispositivam qualitatem et passivam aptitudinem, et nos confitemur; quam non arboribus neque bestiis inditam esse, quis est, qui nesciat? Neque enim pro anseribus, ut dicitur, coelum creavit." (E. v. a. 158: St. L. 18. 1720.)

XVI. The Osiandrian and Stancarian Controversies.

175. Osiander in Nuernberg and in Koenigsberg.

In the writings of Luther we often find passages foreboding a future corruption of the doctrine of justification, concerning which he declared in the Smalcald Articles: "Of this article nothing can be yielded or surrendered, even though heaven and earth, and whatever will not abide, should sink to ruin.... And upon this article all things depend which we teach and practise in opposition to the Pope, the devil, and the world. Therefore we must be sure concerning this doctrine, and not doubt, for otherwise all is lost, and the Pope and devil and all things gain the victory and suit over us." (461, 5.) Martin Chemnitz remarks: "I frequently shudder, because Luther—I do not know by what kind of presentiment—in his commentaries on the Letter to the Galatians and on the First Book of Moses so often repeats the statement: 'This doctrine [of justification] will be obscured again after my death.'" (Walther, Kern und Stern, 26.)

Andrew Osiander was the first to fulfil Luther's prophecy. In 1549 he began publicly to propound a doctrine in which he abandoned the forensic conception of justification by imputation of the merits of Christ, and returned to the Roman view of justification by infusion i.e., by infusion of the eternal essential righteousness of the divine nature of Christ. According to his own statement, he had harbored these views ever since about 1522. He is said also to have presented them in a sermon delivered at the convention in Smalcald, 1537. (Planck 4, 257.) Yet he made no special effort to develop and publicly to disseminate his ideas during the life of Luther. After the death of the Reformer, however, Osiander is reported to have said: "Now that the lion is dead, I shall easily dispose of the foxes and hares"—i.e., Melanchthon and the other Lutheran theologians. (257.) Osiander was the originator of the controversy "Concerning the Righteousness of Faith before God," which was finally settled in Article III of the Formula of Concord.

Osiander, lauded by modern historians as the only real "systematizer" among the Lutherans of the first generation, was a man as proud, overbearing, and passionate as he was gifted, keen, sagacious, learned, eloquent, and energetic. He was born December 19, 1498, at Gunzenhausen, Franconia, and died October 17, 1552, at Koenigsberg, where he was also buried with high honors in the Old City Church. In 1522 he was appointed priest at St. Lawrence's Church in the Free City of Nuernberg. Here he immediately acted the part of a determined champion of the Reformation. Subsequently he also participated in some of the most important transactions of his day. He was present at the Marburg Colloquy, 1529, where he made the personal acquaintance of Luther and the Wittenbergers. He also took part in the discussions at the Diet in Augsburg, 1530; at Smalcald, 1537; at Hagenau and Worms, 1540. Nor were his interests confined to theological questions. When, at Nuernberg, 1543, the work of Copernicus, De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium, "Concerning the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies," was published for the first time, Osiander read the proof-sheets and wrote the Preface, in which he designated the new theory as "hypotheses," thus facilitating its circulation also among the Catholics, until in the 17th century the book was placed on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum, where it remained till the 18th century.

When the Augsburg Interim was introduced in Nuernberg, Osiander resigned, and with words of deep emotion (in a letter of November 22, 1548, addressed to the city council) he left the place where he had labored more than a quarter of a century. January 27 1549, he arrived in Koenigsberg. Here he was joyously received by Count Albrecht of Prussia, whom he had gained for the Reformation in 1523. Moved by gratitude toward Osiander, whom he honored as his "spiritual father," Count Albrecht appointed him pastor of the Old City Church and, soon after, first professor of theology at the University of Koenigsberg, with a double salary, though Osiander had never received an academic degree. The dissatisfaction which this unusual preferment caused among his colleagues, Briessman, Hegemon, Isinder, and Moerlin, soon developed into decided antipathy against Osiander, especially because of his overbearing, domineering ways as well as his intriguing methods. No doubt, this personal element added largely to the animosity and violence of the controversy that was soon to follow, and during which the professors in Koenigsberg are said to have carried firearms into their academic sessions. (Schaff, Creeds 1, 273.) Yet it cannot be regarded as the real cause or even as the immediate occasion, of the conflict, which was really brought about by the unsound, speculative, and mystical views of Osiander on the image of God and, particularly, on justification and the righteousness of faith,—doctrinal points on which he deviated from the Lutheran teaching to such an extent that a controversy was unavoidable. Evidently, his was either a case of relapse into Romanism, or, what seems to be the more probable alternative, Osiander never attained to a clear apprehension of the Lutheran truth nor ever fully freed himself from the Roman doctrine, especially in its finer and more veiled form of mysticism.

176. Opposed by Moerlin and Lutherans Generally.

Osiander, as stated, had conceived the fundamental thoughts of his system long before he reached Koenigsberg. In 1524, when only twenty-six years of age, he laid down the outlines of his theory in a publication entitled: "A Good Instruction (Ein gut Unterricht) and Faithful Advice from the Holy Divine Scriptures What Attitude to Take in These Dissensions Concerning Our Holy Faith and Christian Doctrine, dealing especially with the questions what is God's Word and what human doctrine, what Christ and what Antichrist." Here he says: "Whoever hears, retains, and believes the Word, receives God Himself, for God is the Word. If, therefore, the Word of God, Christ, our Lord, dwells in us by faith and we are one with Him, we may say with Paul: 'I live, though not I, but Christ lives in me,' and then we are justified by faith." (Gieseler 3, 2, 270.) In the following year, 1525, he wrote in his Action of the Honorable Wise Council in Nuernberg with their Preachers (Handlung eines ehrsamen weisen Rats zu Nuernberg mit ihren Praedikanten): "The one and only righteousness availing before God is God Himself. But Christ is the Word which we apprehend by faith, and thus Christ in us, God Himself, is our Righteousness which avails before God." "The Gospel has two parts; the first, that Christ has satisfied the justice of God; the other, that He has cleansed us from sin, and justifies us by dwelling in us (und uns rechtfertigt, so er in uns wohnet)." (271.) The embryonic ideas of these early publications concerning the image of God and justification were fully developed by Osiander in his book of 1550, Whether the Son of God would have had to be Incarnated (An Filius Dei fuerit Incarnandus), if Sin had Not Entered the World; and especially in his confession of September, 1551, Concerning the Only Mediator Jesus Christ (Von dem einigen Mittler Jesu Christo) and Justification of Faith which appeared also in Latin under the title De Unico Mediatore, in October of the same year.

The public conflict began immediately after Osiander had entered upon his duties at the university. In his inaugural disputation of April 5, 1549, "Concerning the Law and Gospel (De Lege et Evangelio)," Osiander's vanity prompted him at least to hint at his peculiar views, which he well knew were not in agreement with the doctrine taught at Wittenberg and in the Lutheran Church at large. His colleague, Matthias Lauterwald, a Wittenberg master, who died 1555, immediately took issue with him. On the day following the disputation, he published theses in which he declared: "Osiander denied that faith is a part of repentance." October 24 of the following year Osiander held a second disputation ("On Justification, De Iustificatione") in which he came out clearly against the doctrine hitherto taught in the Lutheran Church. But now also a much more able and determined combatant appeared in the arena, Joachim Moerlin, who henceforth devoted his entire life to defeat Osiandrism and to vindicate Luther's forensic view of justification.

Moerlin (Moehrlein) was born at Wittenberg April 6, 1514, he studied under Luther and was made Master in 1537 and Doctor in 1540; till 1543 he was superintendent in Arnstadt, Thuringia, and superintendent in Goettingen till 1549, when he was compelled to leave because of his opposition to the Augsburg Interim. Recommended by Elizabeth Duchess of Braunschweig-Lueneburg, the mother-in-law of Duke Albrecht, he was appointed preacher at the Dome of Koenigsberg in 1550. Clearly understanding that solid comfort in life and death is possible only as long as our faith rests solely on the aliena iustitia, on the objective righteousness of Christ, which is without us, and is offered in the Gospel and received by faith; and fully realizing also that Christian assurance is incompatible with such a doctrine as Osiander taught, according to which our faith is to rely on a righteous condition within ourselves, Moerlin publicly attacked Osiander from his pulpit, and in every way emphasized the fact that his teaching could never be tolerated in the Lutheran Church. Osiander replied in his lectures. The situation thus created was most intolerable. At the command of the Duke discussions were held between Moerlin and Osiander, but without result.

In order to settle the dispute, Duke Albrecht, accordingly, on October 5, 1551, placed the entire matter before the evangelical princes and cities with the request that the points involved be discussed at the various synods and their verdicts forwarded to Koenigsberg. This aroused the general interest and the deepest concern of the entire Lutheran Church in Germany. Numerous opinions of the various synods and theologians arrived during the winter of 1551 to 1552. With the exception of the Wuerttemberg Response (Responsum), written by John Brenz, and the Opinion of Matthew Vogel, both of whom regarded Osiander's teaching as differing from the doctrine received by the Lutheran Church in terms and phrases rather than in substance, they were unfavorable to Osiander. At the same time all, including the opinions of Brenz and Vogel, revealed the fact that the Lutherans, the theologians of Wittenberg as well as those of Jena, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Hamburg, etc., were firmly united in maintaining Luther's doctrine, viz., that the righteousness of faith is not the essential righteousness of the Son of God, as Osiander held but the obedience of Christ the God-man imputed by grace to all true believers as their sole righteousness before God.

Feeling safe under the protection of Duke Albrecht, and apparently not in the least impressed by the general opposition which his innovations met with at the hands of the Lutherans, Osiander continued the controversy by publishing his Proof (Beweisung) that for Thirty Years I have Always Taught the Same Doctrine. And irritated by an opinion of Melanchthon (whom Osiander denounced as a pestilential heretic), published with offensive explanations added by the Wittenbergers, he in the same year (April, 1552) wrote his Refutation (Widerlegung) of the Unfounded, Unprofitable Answer of Philip Melanchthon. In this immoderate publication Osiander boasted that only the Philippian rabble, dancing according to the piping of Melanchthon, was opposed to him.

Before long, however, also such opponents of the Philippists as Flacius, Gallus, Amsdorf, and Wigand were prominently arraigned against Osiander. Meanwhile (May 23, 1552) Moerlin published a large volume entitled: Concerning the Justification of Faith. Osiander replied in his Schmeckbier of June 24 1552, a book as keen as it was coarse. In 1552 and 1553 Flacius issued no less than twelve publications against Osiander, one of them bearing the title: Zwo fuernehmliche Gruende Osiandri verlegt, zu einem Schmeckbier; another: Antidotum auf Osiandri giftiges Schmeckbier. (Preger 2, 551)

When the controversy had just about reached its climax, Osiander died, October 17, 1552. Soon after, the Duke enjoined silence on both parties, and Moerlin was banished. He accepted a position as superintendent in Brunswick, where he zealously continued his opposition to Osiandrism as well as to other corruptions of genuine Lutheranism. At Koenigsberg the Osiandrists continued to enjoy the protection and favor of Duke Albrecht and gradually developed into a quasi-political party. The leader of the small band was John Funck, the son-in-law of Osiander and the chaplain of the Duke. In 1566, however, the king of Poland intervened, and Funck was executed as a disturber of the public peace. Moerlin was recalled and served as bishop of Samland at Koenigsberg from 1567 till his death in 1571. The Corpus Doctrinae Pruthenicum, or Borussicum, framed by Moerlin and Chemnitz and adopted 1567 at Koenigsberg, rejected the doctrines of Osiander. Moerlin also wrote a history of Osiandrism entitled: Historia, welcher gestalt sich die Osiandrische Schwaermerei im Lande zu Preussen erhaben.

177. Corruptions Involved in Osiander's Teaching.

Osiander's theory of justification according to which the righteousness of faith is the eternal, essential holiness of the divine nature of Christ inhering and dwelling in man, consistently compelled him to maintain that justification is not an act by which God declares a man just, but an act by which He actually makes him inherently just and righteous; that it is not an imputation of a righteousness existing outside of man, but an actual infusion of a righteousness dwelling in man; that it is not a mere acquittal from sin and guilt, but regeneration, renewal, sanctification and internal, physical cleansing from sin that it is not a forensic or judicial act outside of man or a declaration concerning man's standing before God and his relation to Him but a sort of medicinal process within man, that the righteousness of faith is not the alien (strange, foreign) righteousness, aliena iustitia (a term employed also by Luther), consisting in the obedience of Christ, but a quality, condition, or change effected in believers by the essential righteousness of the divine nature dwelling in them through faith in Christ; that faith does not justify on account of the thing outside of man in which it trusts and upon which it relies, but by reason of the thing which it introduces and produces in man; that, accordingly, justification is never instantaneous and complete, but gradual and progressive.

Osiander plainly teaches that the righteousness of faith (our righteousness before God) is not the obedience rendered by Christ to the divine Law, but the indwelling righteousness of God (iustitia Dei inhabitans),—essentially the same original righteousness or image that inhered in Adam and Eve before the Fall. It consists, not indeed in good works or in "doing and suffering," but in a quality (Art) which renders him who receives it just, and moves him to do and to suffer what is right. It is the holiness (Frommigkeit) which consists in the renewal of man, in the gifts of grace, in the new spiritual life, in the regenerated nature of man. By His suffering and death, said Osiander, Christ made satisfaction and acquired forgiveness for us, but He did not thereby effect our justification. His obedience as such does not constitute our righteousness before God, but merely serves to restore it. It was necessary that God might be able to dwell in us, and so become our life and righteousness. Faith justifies, not inasmuch as it apprehends the merits of Christ, but inasmuch as it unites us with the divine nature, the infinite essential righteousness of God, in which our sins are diluted, as it were, and lost, as an impure drop disappears when poured into an ocean of liquid purity.

According to the teaching of Osiander therefore, also the assurance that we are justified and accepted by God does not rest exclusively on the merits of Christ and the pardon offered in the Gospel, but must be based on the righteous quality inhering in us. Our assurance is conditioned not alone upon what Christ has done outside of us and for us but rather upon what He is in us and produces in us. The satisfaction rendered by Christ many centuries ago is neither the only ground on which God regards us as just, nor a sufficient basis of our certainty that we are accepted by God. Not the Christ for us, but rather the Christ in us, is the basis both of our justification and assurance. Accordingly in order to satisfy an alarmed sinner, it is not sufficient to proclaim the Gospel-promise of divine absolution. In addition, an investigation is required whether the righteousness and holiness of God is also really found dwelling in him. While Luther had urged alarmed consciences to trust in the merits of Christ alone for their justification and salvation, Osiander led them to rely on the new life of divine wisdom, holiness, and righteousness dwelling in their own hearts. From the very beginning of the controversy, Moerlin, Melanchthon, and the Lutherans generally were solicitous to point out that Osiander's doctrine robs Christians of this glorious and only solid comfort that it is not a subjective quality in their own hearts, but solely and only the objective and absolutely perfect obedience rendered by Christ many hundred years ago, which God regards when He justifies the wicked, and upon which man must rely for the assurance of his acceptance and salvation.

Consistently developed, therefore, the innovation of Osiander was bound to vitiate in every particular the doctrine of justification restored once more by Luther. In fact, his theory was but a revamping of just such teaching as had driven the Lutherans out of the Church of Rome. True, Osiander denied that by our own works we merit justification; that our righteousness consists in our good works; that our good works are imputed to us as righteousness. But the fact that he held a subjective condition to be our righteousness before God gives to his doctrine an essentially Roman stamp, no matter how widely it may differ from it in other respects. Moehler, the renowned Catholic apologist, declared that properly interpreted and illucidated, Osiander's doctrine was "identical with the Roman Catholic doctrine." (Frank 2, 5. 91.) As stated before, his teaching was Romanism in its finer and more veiled form of mysticism.

178. Excerpts from Osiander's Writings.

In his publication of January 10, 1552 Wider den lichtfluechtigen Nachtraben, Osiander endeavors to prove that he is in complete doctrinal agreement with Luther. In it he gives the following summary, but guarded, presentation of his views. "I understand it this way," says he. "1. It flowed from His pure grace and mercy that God sacrificed His only Son for us. 2. The Son became man and was made under the Law, and He has redeemed us from the Law and from the curse of the Law. 3. He took upon Himself the sins of the whole world, for which He suffered, died, shed His blood, descended into hell, rose again, and thus overcame sin, death, and hell, and merited for us forgiveness of sin, reconciliation with God, the grace and gift of justification, and eternal life. 4. This is to be preached in all the world. 5. Whoever believes this and is baptized, is justified and blessed (selig) by virtue of such faith. 6. Faith apprehends Christ so that He dwells in our hearts through faith, Eph. 3, 17. 7. Christ, living in us through faith, is our Wisdom, Righteousness, Holiness, and Redemption, 1 Cor. 1, 30, Jer. 23, 6; 33, 16. 8. Christ, true God and man, dwelling in us through faith, is our Righteousness according to His divine nature, as Dr. Luther says: 'I rely on the righteousness which is God Himself; this He cannot reject. Such is, says Luther, the simple, correct understanding; do not suffer yourself to be led away from it.'" (Frank 2, 7f.) Seeberg cites the following passage: "But if the question be asked what is righteousness, one must answer: Christ dwelling in us by faith is our Righteousness according to His divinity; and the forgiveness of sins, which is not Christ Himself, but merited by Christ, is a preparation and cause that God offers us His righteousness, which He is Himself." (Dogg. 4, 498.) Incidentally Osiander's appeal to Luther is unwarranted. For according to him Christ is our Righteousness because His obedience is God's obedience, the work not only of His human nature, but, at the same time, also of His divine nature, while according to Osiander everything that Christ did for us merely serves to bring about the indwelling of the divine nature of Christ, whose essential holiness is our righteousness before God. That Osiander was not in agreement with Luther, as he claimed, appears also from his assertion that such statements of Luther as: Christ's death is our life, forgiveness of sins is our righteousness, etc., must be explained figuratively, as words flowing from a joyous heart. (2, 23.)

The manner in which Osiander maintained that Christ is our Righteousness only according to His divine nature appears from the following excerpts: "If the question be asked according to what nature Christ, His whole undivided person, is our Righteousness, then just as when one asks according to what nature He is the Creator of heaven and earth, the clear, correct, and plain answer is that He is our Righteousness according to His divine, and not according to His human nature, although we are unable to find, obtain or apprehend such divine righteousness apart from His humanity." (Frank 2, 12.) Again: "When we say: Christ is our Righteousness, we must understand His deity, which enters us through His humanity. When Christ says: I am the Bread of Life, we must understand His deity which comes into us through His humanity and is our life. When He says: My flesh is meat indeed, and My blood is drink indeed, we must take it to mean His deity which is in the flesh and blood and is meat and drink for us. Thus, too, when John says, 1 John 1, 7: The blood of Christ cleanseth us from all sin, we must understand the deity of Christ which is in the blood; for John does not speak of the blood of Christ as it was shed on the cross, but as it, united with the flesh of Christ, is our heavenly meat and drink by faith." (23.) Osiander, therefore, is but consistent when he reiterates that the Son of God, the Holy Spirit, and the Father are our Righteousness, because their divine essence which by faith dwells in Christians, is one and the same.

Osiander emphasizes that the essential righteousness of the divine nature of Christ alone is able to save us. He says: "For of what help would it be to you if you had all the righteousness which men and angels can imagine, but lacked this eternal righteousness which is itself the Son of God, according to His divine nature, with the Father and the Holy Ghost? For no other righteousness can lift you up to heaven and bring you to the Father. But when you apprehend this righteousness through faith, and Christ is in you, what can you then be lacking which you do not possess richly, superabundantly, and infinitely in His deity?" Again: "Since Christ is ours and is in us, God Himself and all His angels behold nothing in us but righteousness on account of the highest, eternal, and infinite righteousness of Christ, which is His deity itself dwelling in us. And although sin still remains in, and clings to, our flesh, it is like an impure little drop compared with a great pure ocean, and on account of the righteousness of Christ which is in us God does not want to see it." (Frank 2, 100. 102.)

To this peculiarity of Osiander, according to which he seems to have had in mind a justification by a sort of mystico-physical dilution rather than by imputation, the Formula of Concord refers as follows: "For one side has contended that the righteousness of faith, which the apostle calls the righteousness of God, is God's essential righteousness, which is Christ Himself as the true, natural, and essential Son of God, who dwells in the elect by faith and impels them to do right, and thus is their righteousness, compared with which righteousness the sins of all men are as a drop of water compared with the great ocean." (917, 2; 790, 2.)

In his confession Concerning the Only Mediator, of 1551, Osiander expatiates on justification, and defines it as an act by which righteousness is "infused" into believers. We read: "It is apparent that whatever part Christ, as the faithful Mediator, acted with regard to God, His heavenly Father, for our sakes, by fulfilling the Law and by His suffering and death, was accomplished more than 1,500 years ago, when we were not in existence. For this reason it cannot, properly speaking, have been, nor be called, our justification, but only our redemption and the atonement for us and our sins. For whoever would be justified must believe; but if he is to believe, he must already be born and live. Therefore Christ has not justified us who now live and die; but we are redeemed by it [His work 1,500 years ago] from God's wrath, death, and hell.... This, however, is true and undoubted that by the fulfilment of the Law and by His suffering and death He merited and earned from God, His heavenly Father, this great and superabounding grace, namely, that He not only has forgiven our sin and taken from us the unbearable burden of the Law, but that He also wishes to justify us by faith in Christ, to infuse justification or the righteousness (sondern auch uns durch den Glauben an Christum will rechtfertigen, die Gerechtmachung eingiessen), and, if only we obey, through the operation of His Holy Spirit and through the death of Christ, in which we are embodied by the baptism of Christ, to mortify, purge out, and entirely destroy sin which is already forgiven us, but nevertheless still dwells in our flesh and adheres to us. Therefore the other part of the office of our dear faithful Lord and Mediator Jesus Christ is now to turn toward us in order to deal also with us poor sinners as with the guilty party, that we acknowledge such great grace and gratefully receive it by faith, in order that He by faith may make us alive and just from the death of sin, and that sin, which is already forgiven, but nevertheless still dwells and inheres in our flesh, may be altogether mortified and destroyed in us. And this, first of all, is the act of our justification." (Tschackert, 492f.; Planck 4, 268.)

That Osiander practically identified justification with regeneration, renewal, and gradual sanctification appears from the following quotations. To justify, says he, means "to make a just man out of an unjust one, that is to recall a dead man to life—ex impio iustum facere, hoc est, mortuum ad vitam revocare." (Seeberg 4, 499.) Again: "Thus the Gospel further shows its power and also justifies us, i.e., it makes us just, even as, and in the same degree as, He also makes us alive (eben und in aller Masse, wie er uns auch lebendig macht)." (Frank 2, 18.) "And here you see again how terribly those err who endeavor to prove by this passage of David and Paul that our righteousness is nothing else than forgiveness of sin; for they have overlooked the covering of sin with the [essential] righteousness of Christ whom we put on in Baptism; they have also removed from justification the renewal of the inner man effected by regeneration." (102.)

Osiander was fanatical in denouncing those who identified justification with the forgiveness of sins. In his Disputation of October 24, 1550, he declared: "The entire fulness of the deity dwells in Christ bodily, hence in those also in whom Christ dwells.... Therefore we are just by His essential righteousness.... Whoever does not hold this manner of our justification is certainly a Zwinglian at heart, no matter what he may confess with his mouth.... They also teach things colder than ice [who hold] that we are regarded as righteous only on account of the forgiveness of sins, and not on account of the [essential] righteousness of Christ who dwells in us through faith. Glacie frigidiora docent nos tantum propter remissionem peccatorum reputari iustos, et non etiam propter iustitiam Christi per fidem in nobis inhabitantis. Non enim tam iniquus Deus est, ut eum pro iusto habeat, in quo verae iustitiae prorsus nil est." (Frank 2, 97; Tschackert, 494; Seeberg 4, 497.) They are errorists, Osiander declared, "who say, teach, and write that the righteousness is outside of us." (Frank 2, 100.) "The [essential] righteousness of Christ is indeed, imputed to us, but only when it is in us." "For God is not so unrighteous, nor such a lover of unrighteousness that He regards him as just in whom there is absolutely nothing of the true righteousness; as it is written, Ps. 5, 4: 'For Thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness; neither shall evil dwell with Thee,'" (Planck 4, 273.) Evidently, Osiander rejected or had never fully grasped Paul's clear statement and teaching concerning the God who justifies the ungodly, Rom. 4, 5: "But to him that worketh not, but believeth on Him that justifieth the ungodly, his faith is counted for righteousness."

179. Attitude of Brenz and Melanchthon.

With the exception of Brenz and Vogel, who, as stated before, regarded Osiander's doctrine as differing from the generally received view in phraseology and mode of presentation rather than in substance, the Lutherans everywhere were unanimous in rejecting Osiander's theory as a recrudescence of the Romish justification not by imputation, but by infusion. And as to Brenz, who put a milder construction on the statements of Osiander, Melanchthon wrote October 1, 1557: "Concerning the affair with Osiander, my writings are publicly known, which I hope will be of benefit to many. Brenz also is agreed with us doctrinally. He said he had advised peace, for he did not take Osiander's expressions to be as dangerous as the opponents did, and for this reason could not as yet condemn his person; but in doctrine he was agreed with us and would unite in condemning Osiander if the charges made against him were proved." Melanchthon himself fully realized the viciousness of Osiander's error, although at the colloquy in Worms, 1557, he, too, was opposed to condemning Osiandrism together with Zwinglianism, Majorism, and Adiaphorism, as the theologians of Ducal Saxony demanded. (C. R. 9, 311. 402.)

In May, 1551, Melanchthon wrote to Osiander that by the essential righteousness of Christ renewal is effected in us, but that we have forgiveness of sins and are reputed to be righteous on account of the merit of Christ whose blood and death appeased the wrath of God. In his confutation of the Osiandric doctrine, written in September, 1555, we read: "Osiander's definition of righteousness is: Righteousness is that which makes us do what is righteous.... Hence man is righteous by doing what is righteous.... Thereupon Osiander, in order to say something also concerning forgiveness of sins, tears remission of sins from righteousness. He expressly declares that the sins are forgiven to all men; Nero however, is damned because he does not possess the essential righteousness; and this, he says, is God Himself, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.... Osiander contends that man is just on account of the indwelling of God, or on account of the indwelling God, not on account of the obedience of the Mediator, not by the imputed righteousness of the Mediator through grace. And he corrupts the proposition, 'By faith we are justified,' into, By faith we are prepared that we may become just by something else, viz., the inhabiting God. Thus he in reality says what the Papists say: 'We are righteous by our renewal,' except that he mentions the cause where the Papists mention the effect. Ita re ipsa dicit, quod Papistae dicunt, sumus iusti novitate, nisi quod nominat causam, ubi nominant Papistae effectum. We are just when God renews us. He therefore detracts from the honor due to the Mediator, obscures the greatness of sin, destroys the chief consolation of the pious, and leads them into perpetual doubt. For faith cannot exist unless it looks upon the promise of mercy concerning the Mediator. Nor is there an inhabitation unless the consolation is received by this faith. And it is a preposterous way of teaching that one is to believe first the inhabitation, afterwards forgiveness of sins (prius credere inhabitationem, postea remissionem peccatorum). Since therefore this dogma of Osiander is both false and pernicious to consciences, it must be shunned and damned." (C. R. 7, 781; 8, 579ff.)