The pain-scream is of interest in this consideration of auditory reactions because it increases the range of sounds which we should expect frogs to hear if we grant the probability of them hearing their own voices.

It may be worth while to recall at this point the fact that a whistle from the human lips—the nearest approach to the pain-scream among the sounds which were used as stimuli in the experiments on respiration—caused marked inhibition of respiration. Perhaps this fact may be interpreted in the light of the pain-scream reaction. I may add that I have never seen a frog give a motor reaction to the pain-scream. Thinking it would certainly alarm the animals and cause them to make some movement which would serve for reaction-time measurements, I made repeated trials of its effects, but could never detect anything except respiratory changes.

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STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY.



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THE POSITION OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE SYSTEM OF KNOWLEDGE.

BY HUGO MUeNSTERBERG.

The modern efforts to bring all sciences into a system or at least to classify them, from Bacon to Spencer, Wundt and Pearson have never, if we abstract here from Hegel, given much attention to those questions of principle which are offered by the science of psychology. Of course the psychological separation of different mental functions has often given the whole scheme for the system, the classification thus being too often more psychological than logical. Psychology itself, moreover, has had for the most part a dignified position in the system; even when it has been fully subordinated to the biological sciences, it was on the other hand placed superior to the totality of mental and moral sciences, which then usually have found their unity under the positivistic heading 'sociology.' And where the independent position of psychology is acknowledged and the mental and moral sciences are fully accredited, as for instance with Wundt, psychology remains the fundamental science of all mental sciences; the objects with which philology, history, economics, politics, jurisprudence, theology deal are the products of the processes with which psychology deals, and philology, history, theology, etc., are thus related to psychology, as astronomy, geology, zooelogy are related to physics. There is thus nowhere a depreciation of psychology, and yet it is not in its right place. Such a position for psychology at the head of all 'Geisteswissenschaften' may furnish a very simple classification for it, but it is one which cannot express the difficult character of psychology and the complex relations of the system of mental sciences. The historical and philological and theological sciences cannot be subordinated to psychology if psychology as science is to be cooerdinated with physics, that is, if it is a science which describes and explains the psychical objects in the way in which physics describes and explains the physical objects. On the other hand, if it means in this central position of mental sciences a science which does not consider the inner life as an object, but as subjective activity needing to be interpreted and subjectively understood, not as to its elements, but as to its meaning, then we should have two kinds of psychology, one which explains and one which interprets. They would speak of different facts, the one of the inner life as objective content of consciousness, as phenomenon, the other of the inner life as subjective attitude, as purpose.

The fact is, that these two sciences exist to-day. There are psychologists who recognize both and keep them separated, others who hold to the one or the other as the only possible view; they are phenomenalists or voluntarists. Mostly both views are combined, either as psychological voluntarism with interposed concessions to phenomenalism or as phenomenalism with the well-known concessions to voluntarism at the deciding points. Further, those who claim that psychology must be phenomenalistic—and that is the opinion of the present writer—do not on that account hold that the propositions of voluntarism are wrong. On the contrary: voluntarism, we say, is right in every respect except in believing itself to be psychology. Voluntarism, we say, is the interpretative account of the real life, of immediate experience, whose reality is understood by understanding its meaning sympathetically, but we add that in this way an objective description can never be reached. Description presupposes objectivation; another aspect, not the natural aspect of life, must be chosen to fulfill the logical purposes of psychology: the voluntaristic inner life must be considered as content of consciousness while consciousness is then no longer an active subject but a passive spectator. Experience has then no longer any meaning in a voluntaristic sense; it is merely a complex of elements. We claim that every voluntaristic system as far as it offers descriptions and explanations has borrowed them from phenomenalistic psychology and is further filled up by fragments of logic, ethics and aesthetics, all of which refer to man in his voluntaristic aspect. We claim, therefore, that such a voluntaristic theory has no right to the name psychology, while we insist that it gives a more direct account of man's real life than psychology can hope to give, and, moreover, that it is the voluntaristic man whose purpose creates knowledge and thus creates the phenomenalistic aspect of man himself.

We say that the voluntaristic theory, the interpretation of our real attitudes, in short teleological knowledge, alone can account for the value and right of phenomenalistic psychology and it thus seems unfair to raise the objection of 'double bookkeeping.' These two aspects of inner life are not ultimately independent and exclusive; the subjective purposes of real life necessarily demand the labors of objectivistic psychology. The last word is thus not dualistic but monistic and the two truths supplement each other. But this supplementation must never be misinterpreted as meaning that the two sciences divide inner experience, as if, for instance, the phenomenalistic study dealt with perceptions and ideas, the voluntaristic with feelings and volitions. No, it is really a difference of logical purpose of treatment and thus a difference of points of view only; the whole experience without exception must be possible material for both. There is no feeling and no volition which is not for the phenomenalist a content of consciousness and nothing else. There is, on the other hand, no perception and no idea which is not, or better, ought not to be for the voluntarist a means, an aim, a tool, an end, an ideal. In that real life experience of which the voluntarist is speaking, every object is the object of will and those real objects have not been differentiated into physical things under the abstract categories of mechanics on the one hand, and psychical ideas of them in consciousness on the other; the voluntarist, if he is consistent, knows neither physical nor psychical phenomena. Phenomenalist and voluntarist thus do not see anything under the same aspect, neither the ideas nor the will.

This difference is wrongly set forth if the antithesis to voluntarism is called intellectualism. Intellectualism is based on the category of judgment, and judgment too is a ideological attitude. Phenomenalism does not presuppose a subject which knows its contents but a subject which simply has its contents; the consciousness which has the thought as content does not take through that the voluntaristic attitude of knowing it and the psychologist has therefore no reason to prefer the thought to the volition and thus to play the intellectualist. If the psychologist does emphasize the idea and its elements, the sensations, it is not because they are vehicles of thought but because their relations to physical objects make them vehicles of communication. The elements of ideas are negotiable and thus through their reference to the common physical world indirectly describable; as the elements of ideas are alone in this position, the psychologist is obliged to consider all contents of consciousness, ideas and volitions alike, as complexes of sensations.

The antithesis is also misinterpreted, or at least wrongly narrowed, if it is called voluntarism versus associationism. Recent discussions have sufficiently shown that the principle of association is not the only possible one for phenomenalistic theories. If associationism is identified with objective psychology, all the well-founded objections to the monopoly of the somewhat sterile principle of association appear as objections to phenomenalism in psychology, and voluntaristic theories, especially those which work with the teleological category of apperception, are put in its place. But without returning to apperceptionism we can overcome the one-sidedness of associationism if full use is made of the means which the world of phenomena offers to theory. The insufficiency of associationism disappears if the content of consciousness is considered as variable not only as to quality and intensity but also as to vividness. This variation of vividness, on the other hand, is no exception from the psychophysical parallelism as soon as the psychical process is considered as dependent not only upon the local and quantitative differences of the sensory process but also upon the motor function of the central physical process. The one-sidedness of the physiological sensory theories has been the hidden reason for the one-sidedness of associationism. The sensory-motor system must be understood as the physical basis of the psychophysical process and the variations in the motor discharge then become conditions of those psychical variations of vividness which explain objectively all those phenomena in whose interest associationism is usually supplemented by apperceptionism. The association theory must thus be given up in favor of an 'action-theory'[1] which combines the consistency of phenomenalistic explanation with a full acknowledgment of the so-called apperceptive processes; it avoids thus the deficiency of associationism and the logical inconsistency of apperceptionism.

[1] H. Muensterberg, 'Grundzuege der Psychologie.' Bd. I., Leipzig, 1900, S. 402-562.

Only if in this way the sciences of voluntaristic type, including all historical and normative sciences, are fully separated from phenomenalistic psychology, will there appear on the psychological side room for a scientific treatment of the phenomena of social life, that is, for sociology, social psychology, folk-psychology, psychical anthropology and many similar sciences. All of them have been in the usual system either crowded out by the fact that history and the other mental sciences have taken all the room or have been simply identified with the mental sciences themselves. And yet all those sciences exist, and a real system of sciences must do justice to all of them. A modern classification has perhaps no longer the right as in Bacon's time to improve the system by inventing new sciences which have as yet no existence, but it has certainly the duty not to ignore important departments of knowledge and not to throw together different sciences like the descriptive phenomenalistic account of inner life and its interpretative voluntaristic account merely because each sometimes calls itself psychology. A classification of sciences which is to be more than a catalogue fulfills its logical function only by a careful disentanglement of logically different functions which are externally connected. Psychology and the totality of psychological, philosophical and historical sciences offer in that respect far more difficulty than the physical sciences, which have absorbed up to this time the chief interest of the classifier. It is time to follow up the ramifications of knowledge with special interest for these neglected problems. It is clear that in such a system sciences which refer to the same objects may be widely separated, and sciences whose objects are unlike may be grouped together. This is not an objection; it indicates that a system is more than a mere pigeon-holing of scholarly work, that it determines the logical relations; in this way only can it indeed become helpful to the progress of science itself.

The most direct way to our end is clearly that of graphic representation wherein the relations are at once apparent. Of course such a map is a symbol and not an argument; it indicates the results of thought without any effort to justify them. I have given my arguments for the fundamental principles of the divisions in my 'Grundzuege der Psychologie' and have repeated a few points more popularly in 'Psychology and Life,' especially in the chapter on 'Psychology and History.' And yet this graphic appendix to the Grundzuege may not be superfluous, as the fulness of a bulky volume cannot bring out clearly enough the fundamental relations; the detail hides the principles. The parallelism of logical movements in the different fields especially becomes more obvious in the graphic form. Above all, the book discussed merely those groups which had direct relation to psychology; a systematic classification must leave no remainder. Of course here too I have not covered the whole field of human sciences, as the more detailed ramification offers for our purpose no logical interest; to subdivide physics or chemistry, the history of nations or of languages, practical jurisprudence or theology, engineering or surgery, would be a useless overburdening of the diagram without throwing new light on the internal relations of knowledge.

Without now entering more fully into any arguments, I may indicate in a few words the characteristic features of the graphically presented proposition. At the very outset we must make it clear that phenomena and voluntaristic attitudes are not cooerdinated, but that the reality of phenomena is logically dependent upon voluntaristic attitudes directed towards the ideal of knowledge. And yet it would be misleading to place the totality of phenomenalistic sciences as a subdivision under the teleological sciences. Possible it would be; we might have under the sciences of logical attitudes not only logic and mathematics but as a subdivision of these, again, the sciences which construct the logical system of a phenomenalistic world—physics being in this sense merely mathematics with the conception of substance added. And yet we must not forget that the teleological attitudes, to become a teleological science, must be also logically reconstructed, as they must be teleologically connected, and thus in this way the totality of purpose-sciences might be, too, logically subordinated to the science of logic. Logic itself would thus become a subdivision of logic. We should thus move in a circle, from which the only way out is to indicate the teleological character of all sciences by starting not with science but with the strictly teleological conception of life—life as a system of purposes, felt in immediate experience, and not as the object of phenomenalistic knowledge. Life as activity divides itself then into different purposes which we discriminate not by knowledge but by immediate feeling; one of them is knowledge, that is, the effort to make life, its attitudes, its means and ends a connected system of overindividual value. In the service of this logical task we connect the real attitudes and thus come to the knowledge of purposes: and we connect the means and ends—by abstracting from our subjective attitudes, considering the objects of will as independent phenomena—and thus come to phenomenalistic knowledge. At this stage the phenomenalistic sciences are no longer dependent upon the teleological ones, but cooerdinated with them; physics, for instance, is a logical purpose of life, but not a branch of logic: the only branch of logic in question is the philosophy of physics which examines the logical conditions under which physics is possible.

One point only may at once be mentioned in this connection. While we have cooerdinated the knowledge of phenomena with the knowledge of purposes we have subordinated mathematics to the latter. As a matter of course much can be said against such a decision, and the authority of most mathematicians would be opposed to it. They would say that the mathematical objects are independent realities whose properties we study like those of nature, whose relations we 'observe,' whose existence we 'discover' and in which we are interested because they belong to the real world. All that is true, and yet the objects of the mathematician are objects made by the will, by the logical will, only, and thus different from all phenomena into which sensation enters. The mathematician, of course, does not reflect on the purely logical origin of the objects which he studies, but the system of knowledge must give to the study of the mathematical objects its place in the group where the functions and products of logical thought are classified. The arithmetical or geometrical material is a free creation, and a creation not only as to the combination of elements—that would be the case with many laboratory substances of the chemist too—but a creation as to the elements themselves, and the value of the creation, its 'mathematical interest,' is to be judged by ideals of thought, that is, by logical purposes. No doubt this logical purpose is its application in the world of phenomena, and the mathematical concept must thus fit the world so absolutely that it can be conceived as a description of the world after abstracting not only from the will relations, as physics does, but also from the content. Mathematics would then be the phenomenalistic science of the form and order of the world. In this way mathematics has a claim to places in both fields: among the phenomenalistic sciences if we emphasize its applicability to the world, and among the teleological sciences if we emphasize the free creation of its objects by the logical will. It seems to me that a logical system as such has to prefer the latter emphasis; we thus group mathematics beside logic and the theory of knowledge as a science of objects freely created for purposes of thought.

All logical knowledge is divided into Theoretical and Practical. The modern classifications have mostly excluded the practical sciences from the system, rightly insisting that no facts are known in the practical sciences which are not in principle covered by the theoretical sciences; it is art which is superadded, but not a new kind of knowledge. This is quite true so far as a classification of objects of knowledge is in question, but as soon as logical tasks as such are to be classified and different aspects count as different sciences, then it becomes desirable to discriminate between the sciences which take the attitude of theoretical interest and those which consider the same facts as related to certain human ends. But we may at first consider the theoretical sciences only. They deal either with the objectified world, with objects of consciousness which are describable and explainable, or with the subjectivistic world of real life in which all reality is experienced as will and as object of will, in which everything is to be understood by interpretation of its meaning. In other words, we deal in one case with phenomena and in the other with purposes.

The further subdivision must be the same for both groups—that which is merely individual and that which is 'overindividual'; we prefer the latter term to the word 'general,' to indicate at once that not a numerical but a teleological difference is in question. A phenomenon is given to overindividual consciousness if it is experienced with the understanding that it can be an object for every one whom we acknowledge as subject; and a purpose is given to overindividual will in so far as it is conceived as ultimately belonging to every subject which we acknowledge. The overindividual phenomena are, of course, the physical objects, the individual phenomena the psychical objects, the overindividual purposes are the norms, the individual purposes are the acts which constitute the historical world. We have thus four fundamental groups: the physical, the psychological, the normative and the historical sciences.

Whoever denies overindividual reality finds himself in the world of phenomena a solipsist and in the world of purposes a sceptic: there is no objective physical world, everything is my idea, and there is no objective value, no truth, no morality, everything is my individual decision. But to deny truth and morality means to contradict the very denial, because the denial itself as judgment demands acknowledgment of this objective truth and as action demands acknowledgment of the moral duty to speak the truth. And if an overindividual purpose cannot be denied, it follows that there is a community of individual subjects whose phenomena cannot be absolutely different: there must be an objective world of overindividual objects.

In each of the four groups of sciences we must consider the facts either with regard to the general relations or with regard to the special material; the abstract general relations refer to every possible material, the concrete facts which fall under them demand sciences of their own. In the world of phenomena the general relations are causal laws—physical or psychical laws; in the world of purposes theories of teleological interrelations—normative or historical; the specific concrete facts are in the world of phenomena objects, physical or psychical objects, in the world of purposes acts of will—specific norms or historical acts. If we turn first to phenomena, the laws thereof are expressed in the physical sciences, by mechanics, physics, chemistry, and we make mechanics the superior as chemistry must become ultimately the mechanics of atoms. In the psychological sciences the science of laws is psychology, with the side-branch of animal psychology, while human psychology refers to individuals and to social groups. Social psychology, as over against individual psychology, is thus a science of general laws, the laws of those psychological phenomena which result from the mutual influence of several individuals.

On the other hand, we have as the special concrete products of the laws, the objects themselves, and the most natural grouping of them may be from whole to part. In the physical world it means that we start from the concrete universe, turning then to the earth, then to the objects on the earth, inorganic and organic. There is here no logical difficulty. Each one of these objects can be considered in three aspects, firstly as to its structure, secondly as to its special laws, that is, the special function of the object as related to the general sciences of physics and chemistry, and thirdly as to its natural development. If we apply these three methods of study to the whole universe we have astronomy, astrophysics and cosmology, to the whole earth, geography, geophysics, geology, to animals, zooelogy, physiology, comparative anatomy, and so on.

The special phenomena in the framework of the psychological sciences group themselves in the same logical order, from the whole to the part. The psychological totality is empirical mankind, and as we select the earth as the one part of the universe which is the habitat of man, so our scientific interest must move from the whole psychical humanity to those phenomena of human life which are the vehicle of our civilization, from mankind to its most important function, the association of man; and as we moved from earth to the special objects on earth, so we may turn from association to the special phenomena which result from association. If we separated further the inorganic from the organic, we must here separate the products of undifferentiated and of differentiated association. The science of mankind is race psychology, the science of the association of man is sociology, the science of the results of undifferentiated association is Voelkerpsychologie, folk psychology. The science of products of differentiated association has no special name; its subject matter is the whole of historical civilization considered as a psychological naturalistic phenomenon. As soon as we follow the ramification still further we have to do with the special kinds of these products, that is, with the volitions, thoughts, appreciations and beliefs. In the undifferentiated associations they give us morals and habits, languages and enjoyments and mythological ideas, while the individually differentiated association gives political, legal and economic life, knowledge, art and religion: all of course merely as causal, not as teleological processes, and thus merely as psychological and not as historical material. Here, as with the physical phenomena, the structure, the special laws and the development must be everywhere separated, giving us three sciences in every case. For instance, the study of mankind deals with the differences of mental structure in psychical anthropology, with the special psychical laws in race psychology and with the development in comparative psychology. The chief point for us is that social psychology, race psychology, sociology, folk psychology, etc., are under this system sharply differentiated sciences and that they do not at all overlap the real historical sciences. There is no historical product of civilization which does not come under their method but it must be conceived as a causal phenomenon, not as related to the purposes of the real man, and thus even the development means merely a growing complication of naturalistic processes and not history in the teleological sense.

We turn to the normative sciences. The general theory of the overindividual purposes is metaphysics; the special overindividual acts are those which constitute the normative volitions, connected in the philosophy of morals, the philosophy of state and the philosophy of law, those which constitute the normative thoughts and finally those which constitute the normative appreciations and beliefs, connected in aesthetics and the philosophy of religion. Especial interest belongs to the philosophy of thought. We have discussed the reasons why we group mathematics here and not among the phenomenalistic sciences. We have thus one science which deals critically with the presuppositions of thought, i.e. the theory of knowledge or epistemology, which can be divided into the philosophy of physical sciences, the philosophy of psychological sciences, the philosophy of normative sciences and the philosophy of historical sciences. We have secondly the science of the processes of thought dealing with concepts, judgments and reasoning, i.e., logic, and we have finally the science of those objects which the thought creates freely for its own purposes and which are independent from the content of the world, i.e., mathematics, which leads to the qualitative aspect of general mathematics and the quantitative aspect of concrete mathematics. For our purposes it may be sufficient to separate externally algebra, arithmetic, analysis and geometry. In this way all the philosophical sciences find their natural and necessary place in the system, while it has been their usual lot to form an appendix to the system, incommensurable with the parts of the system itself, even in the case that the other scheme were not preferred, to make ethics, logic, aesthetics, epistemology and metaphysics merely special branches of positivistic sociology and thus ultimately of biology.

In the historical sciences the general theory which stands over against the special acts has a special claim on our attention. We may call it the philosophy of history. That is not identical with the philosophy of historical sciences which we mentioned as a part of epistemology. The philosophy of historical sciences deals with the presuppositions by which historical teleological knowledge becomes logically possible. The philosophy of history seeks a theory which connects the special historical acts into a unity. It has two branches. It is either a theory of the personality, creating a theory of real individual life as it enters as ideological factor into history, or it seeks the unity of entire humanity. The theory of personality shows the teleological interrelation of our purposes; the theory of humanity shows the teleological interrelation of all nations. The name philosophy of history has been used mostly for the theory of humanity only, abstracting from the fact that it has been often misused for sociology or for the psychology of history or for the philosophy of historical sciences—but the name belongs also to the theory of personality. This theory of personality is exactly that second kind of 'psychology' which does not describe and does not explain but which interprets the inner teleological connections of the real man. It is 'voluntaristic psychology' or, as others call it who see correctly the relation of this science to history, 'historical psychology.' It is practically 'apperceptionistic psychology.' The special activities of the historical man divide themselves again into volitions, thoughts, appreciations and beliefs, with their realization in the state, law, economical systems, knowledge, art and religion. Each of these special realizations must allow the same manifoldness in treatment which we found with the special physical or psychical objects; we can ask as to structure, relation to the general view and development. But in accordance with the teleological material the study of the structure here means 'interpretation,' the study of the general relations here means study of the relation to civilization, and the study of the development here means the real history. We have, thus, for the state or law or economy or knowledge or art or religion always one science which interprets the historical systems of state, etc., in a systematic and philological way, one science which deals with its function in the historical world and one which studies biographically and nationally the history of state, law, economical life, science, art or religion.

In the sphere of the practical sciences the divisions of the theoretical sciences must repeat themselves. We have thus applied physical, applied psychological, applied normative and applied historical sciences, and it is again the antithesis of psychological and of historical sciences which is of utmost importance and yet too often neglected. The application of physical sciences, as in engineering, medicine, etc., or the application of normative knowledge in the sciences of criticism do not offer logical difficulty, but the application of psychological and historical knowledge does. Let us take the case of pedagogy or of penology, merely as illustrations. Is the application of phenomenalistic psychology or the application of teleological voluntarism in question? Considering the child, the criminal, any man, as psychophysical apparatus which must be objectively changed and treated, we have applied psychology; considering him as subject with purposes, as bearer of an historical civilization whose personalities must be interpreted and understood and appreciated, then we need applied historical knowledge. In the first case the science of pedagogy is a psycho-technical discipline which makes education mechanical and deprives the teacher of the teleological attitude of inner understanding; in the second case it is a science of real education far removed from psychology. All the sciences which deal with service in the system of civilization, service as teacher, as judge, as social helper, as artist, as minister, are sciences which apply the teleological historical knowledge, and their meaning is lost if they are considered as psycho-technical sciences only.

LIFE (in its immediate reality, felt as a system of telelogical experiences, involving the acknowledgement of other subjects of experiences) -VOLITION (will aiming towards new experiences). -Individual: _Practical Life._ -Overindividual: _Mortality._ -THOUGHT (will acknowledging the connection of experiences). -Individual: _Judgement_ -Overindividual: TRUTH -THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE (connection of experiences determined by pure experience). -KNOWLEDGE OF PHENOMENA (connection of experiences after abstracting their will relations). -Knowledge of Phenomena Given to Overindividual Consciousness. -I. PHYSICAL SCIENCES. -A. GENERAL LAWS. -Mechanics. -Physics. -Chemistry. -B. SPECIAL OBJECTS. -1. Universe. -Astronomy _a, b, c_. -2. Special Parts. -Geography _a, b, c_. -3. Special Objects on Earth. -Inorganic. -Mineralogy _a, b, c_. -Organic. -Plants. -Botany _a, b, c_. -Animals. -Zoology _a, b, c_. -Anthropology _a, b, c_. -Knowledge of Phenomena given to Indiviual Consciousness. -II. PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES. -A. GENERAL LAWS. -PHENOMENALISTIC PSYCHOLOGY -Animal Psychology. -Human psychology. -Individual Ps. -Normal. -Child. -Adult. -Abnormal. -B. SPECIAL OBJECTS. -1. Mankind. -Race Psychology _a, b, c_. -2. Special Functions. -Association of Men. -Sociology _a, b, c_. -3. Special Products of Association of Men (considered as natural phenomena). -Products of Undiffereniated Association of Men (Folk Psychology). -Volition. -Morals _a, b, c_. -Habits _a, b, c_. -Thoughts. -Languages _a, b, c_. -Appreciation. -Enjoyment _a, b, c_. -Belief. -Mythology _a, b, c_. -Products of Individual Differentiation (casual phenomenalistic sciences of civilization and its development). -Volition. -State _a, b, c_. -Law _a, b, c_. -Economy _a, b, c_. -Thoughts. -Sciences _a, b, c_. -Appreciation. -Art _a, b, c_. -Belief. -Religion _a, b, c_. -KNOWLEDGE OF PURPOSES (connection of experiences in their telelogical reality). -Knowledge of Purposes of the Overindividual Will. -III. NORMATIVE SCIENCES -A. GENERAL THEORY of absolute values. -Metaphysics. -B. SPECIAL ACTS. -Volition. -Philosophy of Morals (Ethics). -Philosophy of Law. -Philosophy of State. -Thoughts. -Presuppositions of Thought. -Theory of Knowledge. -Phil. of Physics. -Phil. of Psych. -Phil. of Normative Sciences. -Phil. of Historical Sciences. -Processes of Thought. -Logic. -Objects Created by Thought. -Mathematics. -Algebra. -Arithmetic. -Analysis. -Geometry. -Appreciation. -Philosophy of Art (AEsthetics). -Belief. -Philosophy of Religion. -Knowledge of Purposes of the Individual Will. -IV. HISTORICAL SCIENCES. -A. GENERAL THEORY of real life. -Philosophy of History. -Theory of Personality. -(Theory of selves.) -("Historical Psychology.") -("VOLUNTARISTIC Psychology.") -("Apperceptional Psychology.") -Theory of Humanity. -B. SPECIAL ACTS (telelogical interpretative sciences of civilization and history.) -Volition. -Politics, _a, b, c_. -Law, _a, b, c_. -Economy, _a, b, c_. -Thoughts. -Science, _a, b, c_. -Appreciation. -Art, _a, b, c_. -Belief. -Religion, _a, b, c_. -PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE. -APPLIED KNOWLEDGE OF PHENOMENA. -V. APPLIED PHYSICAL SCIENCES. -Technical Sciences. -Applied Physics. -Applied Chemistry. -Applied Biology. -Medicine. -VI. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES. -Psychotechnical Sciences. -Psychological Pedagogy. -Psychological Penology. -Psychiatry. -APPLIED KNOWLEDGE OF PURPOSES. -VII. APPLIED NORMATIVE SCIENCES. -Volition. -Politics. -Science of Public Service. -Law. -Science of Legal Service. (Practical Jurisprudence.) -Economy. -Science of Social Service. -Thoughts. -Science of Teaching. (Education.) -Appreciation. -Science of Artistic Production. -Belief. -Science of Religious Service. (Practical Theology.) -VIII. APPLIED HISTORICAL SCIENCES. -Volition. -Criticism of State. -Criticism of Law. -Thoughts. -Criticism of Science. -Appreciation. -Criticism of Art. -Belief. -Criticism of Religion. -APPRECIATION (will resting in isolated experiences). -Individual: _Enjoyment._ -Overindividual: _Beauty._ -BELIEF (will resting in the supplements of experience). -Individual: _Creed._ -Overindividual: _Religion.

NOTE: The letters a, b, c below the sciences of Special Objects and Special Acts indicate the three subdivisions that results from the threefold aspects;—of structure(a), of relation to the general laws or theories(b), and of development(c). With regards to physical phenomena, for instances, we have astronomy(a), astrophysics(b), and cosmology(c); or geography(a), geophysics(b), geology(c); or botany(a), plant physiology(b), phylogenetic development of plants(c). In the same way for psychical objects; for instance: structural sociology(a), functional sociology(b), comparative sociology(c); or structure (grammar and syntax) of languages(a), psychology of languages(b), comparative study of languages(c). With regard to the telelogical historical sciences the study of structure takes on here the character of intrepretation; the relation to the general view is here the dependence on civilization and the development is here the real history. We have thus, for instance, the intepretation of Roman law(a), dependence of Roman law upon civilization(b), history of Roman law(c).

THE END