"No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor from fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the multiplicity of things he has to think of he may be excused for making. I am very anxious that neither you nor Mr. Lindsay should mention those matters any more, as any discussion about them must tend to impair the good relations between the French and English Governments. Might I ask you to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow traveller[1099]."

The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to Roebuck to withdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because of the uncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated if pressed to a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged that if the debate be continued speakers should refrain from all further mention of the personal questions that had been raised, since these were not proper matters for discussion in the House and were embarrassing to the French Emperor. But Palmerston's skill in management was unavailing in this case and the "muss" (as Mason called it) was continued when Lindsay entered upon a long account of the interview with Napoleon, renewed the accusations of Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck not to withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday." The Scotia, he said was due and any moment news from America might change the governmental policy. Again the fat was in the fire. Palmerston sharply disavowed that news would change policy. Kinglake thought Roebuck's actions should be thoroughly investigated. Forster eagerly pressed for continuation of the debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's "diplomacy," and of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant and those of the South embarrassed and uncertain. Gregory believed that the motion should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South," but Lord Robert Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice to wait "until Monday" and this was finally done[1100].

All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America. Lee's advance was known to have passed by Washington, but no reports were yet at hand of the battle which must determine this first great offensive campaign by the South. July 9, the Times predicted, editorially, that Lee was about to capture Washington and that this event would be met by a great cry of joy and relief in the North, now weary of the war and eager to escape from the despotism of Lincoln's administration[1101]. Nevertheless the Times, while still confident of Lee's victorious advance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in the North, came out strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to withdraw his motion, arguing that even if he were successful Great Britain ought to make no hurried change of policy[1102]. On this day, the thirteenth, Roebuck moved the discharge of his motion in a speech so mild as to leave the impression that "Tear 'em" had his tail between his legs but, Lindsay, his feelings evidently injured by the aspersions cast upon his own "amateur diplomacy," spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleon and tried to show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact, "employed" by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic in reply. Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that this would be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it his duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may have passed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign country[1103]."

The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the cause of the South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete misunderstanding of the position of Tory leaders, begun with a vehemence that led its mover into tactical error, it rapidly dwindled to a mere question of personal veracity and concluded in sharp reproof from the Government. No doubt the very success (so it seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, upon which Roebuck counted to support his motion was, in actual effect, a deterrent, since many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain might now keep hands off since the South was "winning anyway." There is no evidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by any consideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral—even to the extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of the Government in relation to Southern ship-building.

Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent Southern victory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it would be overwhelmingly defeated. The debate was the last one of importance on the topics of mediation or recognition[1104]. News of Lee's check at Gettysburg reached London on July 16, but was described by the Times two days later as virtually a Southern victory since the Northern army had been compelled to act wholly on the defensive. In the same issue it was stated of Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hope there can be of reducing the city[1105]." But on July 20, full news of the events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat from Gettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged, though efforts were made to prove that these events simply showed that neither side could conquer the other[1106]. In contradiction of previous assertions that "another Vicksburg" might easily be set up to oppose Northern advance in the west there was now acknowledgment that the capture of this one remaining barrier on the Mississippi was a great disaster to the South. The Index, forgetful that it was supposedly a British publication, declared: "The saddest news which has reached us since the fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender of Vicksburg. The very day on which the capitulation took place renders the blow heavier[1107]."

"The fall of Vicksburg," wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the week, never yet being able to drive it off my mind[1108]." Adams reported that the news had caused a panic among the holders of the Cotton Loan bonds and that the press and upper classes were exceedingly glad they had refused support of Roebuck's motion[1109].

If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of Southern effort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed to failure from the outset, and receiving a further severe set-back by the ill-fortune of Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real crisis of governmental attitude had long since passed. Naturally this was not acknowledged by the staunch friends of the South any more than at Richmond it was acknowledged (or understood) that Gettysburg marked the crisis of the Confederacy. But that the end of Southern hope for British intervention had come at Richmond, was made clear by the action of Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writing that the recent debates in Parliament showed the Government determined not to receive him:

"Under these circumstances, your continued residence in London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent with the dignity of this Government, and the President therefore requests that you consider your mission at an end, and that you withdraw, with your secretary, from London[1110]."

A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason to remain if there were any "marked change" in governmental attitude, but since the decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird Rams had been made public at nearly the same moment when this instruction was received, September 15, Mason could hardly fail to retire promptly. Indeed, the very fact of that seizure gave opportunity for a dramatic exit though there was no connection between Benjamin's instruction and the stopping of Confederate ship-building in England. The real connection was with the failure of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse of Roebuck's motion. Even the Times was now expanding upon the "serious reverses" of the South and making it clearly understood that England "has not had and will not have the slightest inclination to intervention or mediation, or to take any position except that of strict neutrality[1111]."

Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall instruction and secured the latter's approval of the communication he proposed making to Russell[1112]. A general consultation of Southern agents took place and Mason would have been vexed had he known how small was the regard for his abilities as a diplomat[1113]. The Index hastened to join in a note already struck at Richmond of warm welcome to France in her conquest of Mexico, reprinting on September 17, an editorial from the Richmond Enquirer in which it was declared, "France is the only Power in the world that has manifested any friendly feeling towards the Confederacy in its terrible struggle for independence." Evidently all hope was now centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubt distasteful to Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final.

On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very nearly in the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once made public, calling out from the Times a hectoring editorial on the folly of the South in demanding recognition before it had won it[1114]. In general, however, the press took a tone apparently intended to "let Mason down easily," acknowledging that his act indicated a universal understanding that Great Britain would not alter her policy of strict neutrality, but expressing admiration for the courage and confidence of the South[1115]. September 25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesy but also with seeming finality:

"I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the accredited Minister of an established State.

"These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to repeat them.

"I regret that circumstances have prevented my cultivating your personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of affairs, I should have done with much pleasure and satisfaction[1116]."

Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in England were still to be his, but the chief role there was now assigned to others and the principal scenes transferred to France. That Mason did not fully concur in this as final, easily as it was accepted by Slidell, is evident from his later correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He regarded the question of British recognition of the South as mainly an English political question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of Palmerston's Ministry. This he believed to depend on the life of the Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of Palmerston were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a desired course of action and Mason after consulting Slidell and, naturally, securing his acquiescence, determined to remain in Europe waiting events.

If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was officially very friendly—at least so Lyons reported[1117]. In this same private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest against a notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of joint action by England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent rights to the North, unless the United States formally "concede to their enemy the status of a Belligerent for all international purposes." Why or how this idea came to be taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result of irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects—theory clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the American Secretary of State throughout the entire war and constantly causing difficulties in relations with neutral countries. At any rate Lyons was quick to see the danger. He wrote:

"Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of wrath from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be founded would be incontrovertible, and that in the end firmness answers better with the Americans than coaxing. But then England, France and Spain must be really firm, and not allow their Declaration to be a brutum fulmen. If on its being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal on the part of the United States, they did not proceed to break up the Blockade, or at all events to resist by force the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the United States Government and people would become more difficult to deal with than ever. I find, however, that I am going beyond my own province, and I will therefore add only an excuse for doing so[1118]."

Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of America's readiness for a foreign war, a situation very different from that of 1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing for such a contingency not with any desire for it but that she might not be caught napping[1119]. This was written as if merely an interesting general speculation and was accompanied by the assurance, "I don't think the Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel with us or with any European Power—but the better prepared it is, the less manageable it will be[1120]." Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion of withdrawing belligerent rights to the North was great, and his representations presumably had effect, for no more was heard of the matter. Russell relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21:

"I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I think this is better than any violent demonstrations of friendship which might turn sour like beer if there should be a thunder-storm.

"But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the Powers with whose Ministers I pass my time there is none with whom our relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United States[1121]."

If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and cordial," there was, indeed, little remaining hope possible to English friends of the South. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality is agreed upon by all, and I hope a more fair and friendly neutrality than we have seen during the past two years[1122]." George Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding Henry Ward Beecher for his speech there, commented on the many crowded open public meetings in favour of the North as compared with the two pro-Southern ones in London, slimly and privately attended[1123]. Jefferson Davis, in addressing the Confederate Congress, December 7, was bitter upon the "unfair and deceptive conduct" of England[1124]. Adams, by mid-December, 1863, was sure that previous British confidence in the ultimate success of the South was rapidly declining[1125].

Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended the cessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal of activity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden shift in the military situation in America and to the realization that the heretofore largely negative support given to the Southern cause must be replaced by organized and persistent effort. Grant's victorious progress in the West had been checked by the disaster to Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September 18, and Grant's army forced to retrace its steps to recover Chattanooga. It was not until November 24 that the South was compelled to release its grip upon that city. Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallen back to his old lines before Richmond, presented a still impregnable front to Northern advance. No sudden collapse, such as had been expected, followed the Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg. Again the contest presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Small wonder then that McHenry, confident in his statistics, should now declare that at last cotton was to become in truth King[1126], and count much upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently published book[1127]. Small wonder that Southern friends should hurry the organization of the "Southern Independence Association." Seeking a specific point of attack and again hoping for Tory support they first fixed their attention on the new trial of the Alexandra, on appeal from the decision by the Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer. On December 4, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had daily been "journeying to town" with the "old Chief Baron" and was confident the Government would again be defeated—in which case it would be very open to attack for the seizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his caution to Mason not to place too high a hope on any change in Government policy or on any expectation that the Tories would replace Palmerston[1128].

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1041: Trollope, North America, I, p. 124.]

[Footnote 1042: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3, 1863. Liverpool.]

[Footnote 1043: The Index, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217. The active agent in control of the Index was Henry Hotze, who, in addition to managing this journal, used secret service funds of the Confederacy to secure the support of writers in the London press. He was in close touch with all the Southern agents sent to Europe at various times, but appears never to have been fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I made notes from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then in the possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were (1) a letter and cash book marked "C.S.A. Commercial Agency, London"; (2) a copy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31, 1864; (3) a copy letter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May 28, 1864, to June 16, 1865. All these materials were secured by Mr. Adams from Professor J.F. Jameson, who had received them from Henry Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams' death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze materials has been found. My references, then, to "Hotze Papers," must rest on my notes, and transcripts of many letters, taken in 1912-13. Describing his activities to Benjamin, Hotze stated that in addition to maintaining the Index, he furnished news items and editorials to various London papers, had seven paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constant distributor of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana ... American whiskey and other articles." He added: "It is, of course, out of the question to give vouchers." (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze to Benjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863.) In Hotze's cash book one of his regular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of the Confederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid writer" on the Times.]

[Footnote 1044: See ante, Ch. XI.]

[Footnote 1045: Lyons Papers, Feb. 14, 1863.]

[Footnote 1046: Mason Papers, March 18, 1863.]

[Footnote 1047: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No. 34, May 3, 1863. This despatch is omitted by Richardson.]

[Footnote 1048: Schwab, The Confederate States of America gives the best analysis and history of Southern financing.]

[Footnote 1049: It is possible that a few were disposed of to contractors in payment for materials.]

[Footnote 1050: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 27, 1862.]

[Footnote 1051: Ibid., Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2, 1862.]

[Footnote 1052: Slidell's daughter was engaged to be married to Erlanger's son.]

[Footnote 1053: Slidell himself wrote: "I should not have gone so far in recommending these propositions ... had I not the best reason to believe that even in anticipation of its acceptance the very strongest influence will be enlisted in our favour." (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin, Oct. 28, 1862.)]

[Footnote 1054: Schwab, The Confederate States of America, pp. 30-31. Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger himself went to Richmond, since it appears from Slidell's letters that he was in constant contact with Erlanger in Paris during the time the "agents" were in Richmond.]

[Footnote 1055: Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15, 1863.]

[Footnote 1056: Ibid, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin, Feb. 5, 1863.]

[Footnote 1057: Mason Papers, Jan. 23, 1863.]

[Footnote 1058: Ibid., Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15, 1863.]

[Footnote 1059: Ibid., Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23, 1863, and Mason to Slidell, Feb. 24, 1863.]

[Footnote 1060: Schwab, p. 33.]

[Footnote 1061: Ibid., p. 33. In France permission to advertise the loan was at first refused, but this was changed by the intervention of the Emperor.]

[Footnote 1062: Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin, March 21, 1863.]

[Footnote 1063: Mason's Mason, p. 401. To Benjamin, March 30, 1863.]

[Footnote 1064: MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M.A. degree at Stanford University: James M. Mason—Confederate Diplomat (1915). I am much indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V: "Mason and Confederate Finance."]

[Footnote 1065: No evidence has been found to support this. Is not the real reason for the change to be found in British Governmental intentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of the Parliamentary debate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while March 31, on the other hand, the Alexandra case was referred to the Law Officers, and April 4 they recommend her seizure, which was done on April 5. It is to be presumed that rumours of this seeming face-about by the Government had not failed to reach the bond market.]

[Footnote 1066: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3, 1863.]

[Footnote 1067: Ibid., Spence to Mason, May 9, 1863. This letter was written a month after the event at Mason's request for an exact statement of what had occurred.]

[Footnote 1068: Ibid.]

[Footnote 1069: Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that Erlanger & Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion of having themselves been large holders of the bonds in question, especially in view of the presumably large amount of lapsed subscriptions, and of having quietly unloaded them on the unsuspecting Confederate agents when the market showed signs of collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access to Spence's report which gives further ground for this suspicion.]

[Footnote 1070: A newspaper item that Northern ships had run by Vicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania caused a recovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as thirty per cent. discount.]

[Footnote 1071: After the war was over Bigelow secured possession of and published an alleged list of important subscribers to the loan in which appeared the name of Gladstone. He repeated this accusation—a serious one if true, since Gladstone was a Cabinet member—in his Retrospections (I, p. 620), and the story has found place in many writings (e.g., G.P. Putnam, Memoirs, p. 213). Gladstone's emphatic denial, calling the story a "mischievous forgery," appears in Morley, Gladstone, II, p. 83.]

[Footnote 1072: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXX, pp. 776-838.]

[Footnote 1073: See ante, p. 155.]

[Footnote 1074: The Index, May 28, 1863, pp. 72-3.]

[Footnote 1075: The Times, June 1, 1863.]

[Footnote 1076: The Index, June 4, 1863.]

[Footnote 1077: Chesney, Military View of Recent Campaigns in Maryland and Virginia, London, 1863.]

[Footnote 1078: Army and Navy Gazette, June 6, 1863.]

[Footnote 1079: Lyons Papers, May 30, 1863.]

[Footnote 1080: Callahan, Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, p. 184. Callahan's Chapter VIII, "The Crisis in England" is misnamed, for Roebuck's motion and the whole plan of "bringing in the Tories" never had a chance of succeeding, as, indeed, Callahan himself notes. His detailed examination of the incident has unfortunately misled some historians who have derived from his work the idea that the critical period of British policy towards America was Midsummer, 1863, whereas it occurred, in fact, in October-November, 1862 (e.g., Schmidt, "Wheat and Cotton during the Civil War," pp. 413 seq. Schmidt's thesis is largely dependent on placing the critical period in 1863).]

[Footnote 1081: Mason Papers. To Slidell.]

[Footnote 1082: Callahan, pp. 184-5.]

[Footnote 1083: Ibid., p. 186. To Benjamin.]

[Footnote 1084: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, June 27, 1863. Mason wrote: "The question of veracity is raised."]

[Footnote 1085: Ibid., Slidell to Mason, June 29, 1863.]

[Footnote 1086: Ibid., To Slidell.]

[Footnote 1087: Ibid., To Mason. "Monday eve." (June 29, 1863.)]

[Footnote 1088: Callahan, 186; and Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXI, p. 1719.]

[Footnote 1089: Punch's favourite cartoon of Roebuck was of a terrier labelled "Tear 'em," worrying and snarling at his enemies.]

[Footnote 1090: Bright and Lindsay had, in fact, long been warm friends. They disagreed on the Civil War, but this did not destroy their friendship.]

[Footnote 1091: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXI, pp. 1771-1842, for debate of June 30. Roebuck's egotism was later related by Lamar, then in London on his way to Russia as representative of the South. A few days before the debate Lamar met Roebuck at Lindsay's house and asked Roebuck whether he expected Bright to take part in the debate. "No, sir," said Roebuck sententiously, "Bright and I have met before. It was the old story—the story of the swordfish and the whale! No, sir! Mr. Bright will not cross swords with me again." Lamar attended the debate and saw Roebuck given by Bright the "most deliberate and tremendous pounding I ever witnessed." (Education of Henry Adams, pp. 161-2.)]

[Footnote 1092: Mason Papers. To Slidell, July 1, 1863.]

[Footnote 1093: July 1, 1863.]

[Footnote 1094: July 4, 1863.]

[Footnote 1095: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, pp. 67-73.]

[Footnote 1096: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 4, 1863. In fact Disraeli, throughout the Civil War, favoured strict neutrality, not agreeing with many of his Tory colleagues. He at times expressed himself privately as believing the Union would not be restored but was wise enough to refrain from such comment publicly. (Monypenny, Disraeli, IV, p. 328.)]

[Footnote 1097: Hansard, 3rd. Ser., CLXXII, p. 252.]

[Footnote 1098: The Index felt it necessary to combat this, and on July 9 published a "letter from Paris" stating such criticisms to be negligible as emanating wholly from minority and opposition papers. "All the sympathies of the French Government have, from the outset, been with the South, and this, quite independently of other reasons, dictated the line which the opposition press has consistently followed; the Orleanist Debats, Republican Siecle, The Palais Royal Opinion, all join in the halloo against the South."]

[Footnote 1099: Palmerston MS. July 9, 1863.]

[Footnote 1100: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 554 seq., July 10, 1863.]

[Footnote 1101: In the same issue appeared a letter from the New York correspondent of the Times, containing a similar prediction but in much stronger terms. For the last half of the war the Times was badly served by this correspondent who invariably reported the situation from an extreme anti-Northern point of view. This was Charles Mackay who served the Times in New York from March, 1862, to December, 1865. (Mackay, Forty Years' Recollections, II, p. 412.) Possibly he had strict instructions. During this same week Lyons, writing privately to Russell, minimized the "scare" about Lee's advance. He reported that Mercier had ordered up a war-ship to take him away if Washington should fall. Lyons cannily decided such a step for himself inadvisable, since it would irritate Seward and in case the unexpected happened he could no doubt get passage on Mercier's ship. When news came of the Southern defeat at Gettysburg and of Grant's capture of Vicksburg, Lyons thought the complete collapse of the Confederacy an imminent possibility. Leslie Stephen is a witness to the close relations of Seward and Lyons at this time. He visited Washington about a month after Gettysburg and met Seward, being received with much cordiality as a verbal champion in England of the North. (He had as yet published no signed articles on the war.) In this conversation he was amused that Seward spoke of the friendly services of "Monkton Mill," as a publicist on political economy. (Maitland, Leslie Stephen, p. 120.)]

[Footnote 1102: In this issue a letter from the New York correspondent, dated July 1, declared that all of the North except New England, would welcome Lee's triumph: "... he and Mr. Jefferson Davis might ride in triumph up Broadway, amid the acclamations of a more enthusiastic multitude than ever assembled on the Continent of America." The New York city which soon after indulged in the "draft riots" might give some ground for such writing, but it was far fetched, nevertheless—and New York was not the North.]

[Footnote 1103: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXXII, 661 seq. Ever afterwards Roebuck was insistent in expressions of dislike and fear of America. At a banquet to him in Sheffield in 1869 he delivered his "political testament": "Beware of Trades Unions; beware of Ireland; beware of America." (Leader, Autobiography and Letters of Roebuck, p. 330.)]

[Footnote 1104: May 31, 1864, Lindsay proposed to introduce another recognition motion, but on July 25 complained he had had no chance to make it, and asked Palmerston if the Government was not going to act. The reply was a brief negative.]

[Footnote 1105: The Times, July 18, 1863.]

[Footnote 1106: The power of the Times in influencing public opinion through its news columns was very great. At the time it stood far in the lead in its foreign correspondence and the information printed necessarily was that absorbed by the great majority of the British public. Writing on January 23, 1863, of the mis-information spread about America by the Times, Goldwin Smith asserted: "I think I never felt so much as in this matter the enormous power which the Times has, not from the quality of its writing, which of late has been rather poor, but from its exclusive command of publicity and its exclusive access to a vast number of minds. The ignorance in which it has been able to keep a great part of the public is astounding." (To E.S. Beesly. Haultain, Correspondence of Goldwin Smith, p. 11.)]

[Footnote 1107: The Index, July 23, 1863, p. 200. The italics are mine. The implication is that a day customarily celebrated as one of rejoicing has now become one for gloom. No Englishman would be likely to regard July 4 as a day of rejoicing.]

[Footnote 1108: Mason Papers. To Mason, July 25, 1863.]

[Footnote 1109: U.S. Diplomatic Correspondence, 1863, Pt. I, p. 329. Adams to Seward, July 30, 1863.]

[Footnote 1110: Mason, Mason, p. 449.]

[Footnote 1111: Sept. 4, 1863. The Times was now printing American correspondence sharply in contrast to that which preceded Gettysburg when the exhaustion and financial difficulties of the North were dilated upon. Now, letters from Chicago, dated August 30, declared that, to the writer's astonishment, the West gave every evidence that the war had fostered rather than checked, prosperity. (Sept. 15, 1863.).]

[Footnote 1112: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 14 and 15, 1863. Slidell to Mason, Sept. 16, 1863.]

[Footnote 1113: McRea wrote to Hotze, September 17, 1863, that in his opinion Slidell and Hotze were the only Southern agents of value diplomatically in Europe (Hotze Correspondence). He thought all others would soon be recalled. Slidell, himself, even in his letter to Mason, had the questionable taste of drawing a rosy picture of his own and his family's intimate social intercourse with the Emperor and the Empress.]

[Footnote 1114: Sept. 23, 1863.]

[Footnote 1115: e.g., Manchester Guardian, Sept. 23, 1863, quoted in The Index, Sept. 24, p. 343.]

[Footnote 1116: Mason's Mason, p. 456.]

[Footnote 1117: Russell Papers. To Russell, Oct. 26, 1863.]

[Footnote 1118: Ibid., Lyons wrote after receiving a copy of a despatch sent by Russell to Grey, in France, dated October 10, 1863.]

[Footnote 1119: F.O., Am., 896. No. 788. Confidential. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863. "It seems, in fact, to be certain that at the commencement of a war with Great Britain, the relative positions of the United States and its adversary would be very nearly the reverse of what they would have been if a war had broken out three or even two years ago. Of the two Powers, the United States would now be the better prepared for the struggle—the coasts of the United States would present few points open to attack—while the means of assailing suddenly our own ports in the neighbourhood of this country, and especially Bermuda and the Bahamas, would be in immediate readiness. Three years ago Great Britain might at the commencement of a war have thrown a larger number of trained troops into the British Provinces on the continent than could have been immediately sent by the United States to invade those provinces. It seems no exaggeration to say that the United States could now without difficulty send an Army exceeding in number, by five to one, any force which Great Britain would be likely to place there."]

[Footnote 1120: Ibid., Private. Lyons to Russell, Nov. 3, 1863.]

[Footnote 1121: Lyons Papers. To Lyons.]

[Footnote 1122: Rhodes, IV, p. 393. Nov. 20, 1863.]

[Footnote 1123: The Liberator, Nov. 27, 1863. I have not dwelt upon Beecher's tour of England and Scotland in 1863, because its influence in "winning England" seems to me absurdly over-estimated. He was a gifted public orator and knew how to "handle" his audiences, but the majority in each audience was friendly to him, and there was no such "crisis of opinion" in 1863 as has frequently been stated in order to exalt Beecher's services.]

[Footnote 1124: Dodd, Jefferson Davis, p. 319. The words are Dodd's.]

[Footnote 1125: State Department, Eng., Vol. 84, No. 557. Adams to Seward, Dec. 17, 1863.]

[Footnote 1126: Hotze Correspondence. McHenry to Hotze, Dec. 1, 1863.]

[Footnote 1127: McHenry, The Cotton Trade, London, 1863. The preface in the form of a long letter to W.H. Gregory is dated August 31, 1863. For a comprehensive note on McHenry see C.F. Adams in Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, March, 1914, Vol. XLVII, 279 seq.]

[Footnote 1128: Mason Papers.]



CHAPTER XV

THE SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE ASSOCIATION

Northern friends in England were early active in organizing public meetings and after the second emancipation proclamation of January 1, 1863, these became both numerous and notable. Southern friends, confident in the ultimate success of the Confederacy and equally confident that they had with them the great bulk of upper-class opinion in England, at first thought it unnecessary to be active in public expressions aside from such as were made through the newspapers. Up to November, 1862, The Index records no Southern public meeting. But by the summer of 1863, the indefatigable Spence had come to the conclusion that something must be done to offset the efforts of Bright and others, especially in the manufacturing districts where a strong Northern sympathy had been created. On June 16, he wrote to Mason that on his initiative a Southern Club had been organized in Manchester and that others were now forming in Oldham, Blackburn and Stockport. In Manchester the Club members had "smashed up the last Abolitionist meeting in the Free Trade Hall":

"These parties are not the rich spinners but young men of energy with a taste for agitation but little money. It appears to my judgment that it would be wise not to stint money in aiding this effort to expose cant and diffuse the truth. Manchester is naturally the centre of such a move and you will see there are here the germs of important work—but they need to be tended and fostered. I have supplied a good deal of money individually but I see room for the use of L30 or L40 a month or more[1129]."

The appeal for funds (though Spence wrote that he would advance the required amounts on the chance of reimbursement from the Confederate secret service fund) is interesting in comparison with the contributions willingly made by Bright's friends. "Young men of energy with a taste for agitation but little money" reveals a source of support somewhat dubious in persistent zeal and requiring more than a heavy list of patrons' names to keep up a public interest. Nevertheless, Spence succeeded, for a short time, in arousing a show of energy. November 24, 1863, Mason wrote to Mann that measures were "in progress and in course of execution" to hold public meetings, memorialize Parliament, and form an association for the promotion of Southern independence "under the auspices of such men as the Marquis of Lothian, Lord Robert Cecil, M.P., Lord Wharncliffe, Lord Eustace Cecil, Messrs. Haliburton, Lindsay, Peacocke, Van Stittart, M.P., Beresford Hope, Robert Bourke, and others[1130]...." A fortnight later, Spence reported his efforts and postulated that in them, leading to European intervention, lay the principal, if not the only hope, of Southern independence—a view never publicly acknowledged by any devoted friend of the South:

"The news is gloomy—very, and I really do not see how the war is to be worked out to success without the action of Europe. That is stopped by our Government but there is a power that will move the latter, if it can only be stirred up, and that, of course, is public opinion. I had a most agreeable and successful visit to Glasgow upon a requisition signed by the citizens. The enemy placarded the walls and brought all their forces to the meeting, in which out of 4,000 I think they were fully 1,000 strong, but we beat them completely, carrying a resolution which embraced a memorial to Lord Palmerston. We have now carried six public meetings, Sheffield, Oldham, Stockport, Preston, Ashton, Glasgow. We have three to come off now ready, Burnley, Bury, Macclesfield, and others in preparation. My plan is to work up through the secondary towns to the chief ones and take the latter, Liverpool, Manchester, London, etc., as we come upon the assembling of Parliament.... By dint of perseverance I think we shall succeed. The problem is simply to convert latent into active sympathy. There is ample power on our side to move the Cabinet—divided as it is, if we can only arouse that power. At any rate the object is worth the effort[1131]."

In the month of November, The Index began to report these meetings. In nearly all, Northern partisans were present, attempted to heckle the speakers, and usually presented amendments to the address which were voted down. Spence was given great credit for his energy, being called "indefatigable":

"The commencement of the session will see Parliament flooded with petitions from every town and from every mill throughout the North. A loud protest will arise against the faineant policy which declines to interfere while men of English blood are uselessly murdering each other by thousands, and while England's most important manufacture is thereby ruined.... It remains to be seen whether the voice of the North will have any effect upon the policy of the Government[1132]."

By "the North" was meant the manufacturing districts and an explanation was made of the difficulty of similar efforts in London because it was really a "congeries of cities," with no such solidarity of interests as characterized "the North[1133]." Without London, however, the movement lacked driving force and it was determined to create there an association which should become the main-spring of further activities. Spence, Beresford Hope, and Lord Eustace Cecil were made a committee to draft a plan and preliminary address. Funds were now forthcoming from the big blockade-running firms

"Some time ago I saw friend Collie, who had made a terrific sum of money, and told him he must come out for the cause in proportion thereto. To this he responded like a brick, I was near saying, but I mean Briton—by offering at once to devote a percentage of cotton out of each steamer that runs the blockade, to the good of the cause. He has given me at once L500 on account of this—which I got to-day in a cheque and have sent on to Lord Eustace Cecil, our treasurer. Thus, you see, we are fairly afloat there[1134]."

Yet Spence was fighting against fear that all this agitation was too late:

"Nevertheless it is not to be disguised that the evil tidings make uphill work of it—very. Public opinion has quite veered round to the belief that the South will be exhausted. The Times correspondent's letters do great harm—more especially Gallenga's—who replaced Chas. Mackay at New York. I have, however, taken a berth for Mackay by Saturday's boat, so he will soon be out again and he is dead for our side[1135]."

Again Spence asserted the one great hope to be in European intervention:

"I am now clear in my own mind that unless we get Europe to move—or some improbable convulsion occur in the North—the end will be a sad one. It seems to me therefore, impossible that too strenuous an effort can be made to move our Government and I cannot understand the Southerners who say: 'Oh, what can you make of it?' I have known a man brought back to life two hours after he seemed stone-dead—the efforts at first seemed hopeless, but in case of life or death what effort should be spared[1136]?"

The Manchester Southern Club was the most active of those organized by Spence and was the centre for operations in the manufacturing districts. On December 15, a great gathering (as described by The Index) took place there with delegates from many of the near-by towns[1137]. Forster referred to this and other meetings as "spasmodic and convulsive efforts being made by Southern Clubs to cause England to interfere in American affairs[1138]," but the enthusiasm at Manchester was unquestioned and plans were on foot to bombard with petitions the Queen, Palmerston, Russell and others in authority, but more especially the members of Parliament as a body. These petitions were "in process of being signed in every town and almost in every cotton-mill throughout the district[1139]." It was high time for London, if it was desired that she should lead and control these activities, to perfect her own Club. "Next week," wrote Lindsay, on January 8, 1864, it would be formally launched under the name of "The Southern Independence Association[1140]," and would be in working order before the reassembling of Parliament.

The organization of meetings by Spence and the formation of the Southern Independence Association were attempts to do for the South what Bright and others had done earlier and so successfully for the North. Tardily the realization had come that public opinion, even though but slightly represented in Parliament, was yet a powerful weapon with which to influence the Government. Unenfranchised England now received from Southern friends a degree of attention hitherto withheld from it by those gentry who had been confident that the goodwill of the bulk of their own class was sufficient support to the Southern cause. Early in the war one little Southern society had indeed been organized, but on so diffident a basis as almost to escape notice. This was the London Confederate States Aid Association which came to the attention of Adams and his friends in December, 1862, through the attendance at an early meeting of one, W.A. Jackson ("Jefferson Davis' ex-coachman"), who reported the proceedings to George Thompson. The meeting was held at 3 Devonshire Street, Portland Place, was attended by some fifty persons and was addressed by Dr. Lempriere. A Mr. Beals, evidently an unwelcome guest, interrupted the speaker, was forcibly ejected by a policeman and got revenge by arranging a demonstration against Mason (who was present), confronting him, on leaving the house, with a placard showing a negro in chains[1141]. There was no "public effort" contemplated in such a meeting, although funds were to be solicited to aid the South. Adams reported the Association as a sort of Club planning to hold regular Wednesday evening meetings of its members, the dues being a shilling a week and the rules providing for loss of membership for non-attendance[1142].

Nothing more is heard of this Association after December, 1862. Possibly its puerilities killed it and in any case it was not intended to appeal to the public[1143]. But the launching of the Southern Independence Association betokened the new policy of constructive effort in London to match and guide that already started in the provinces. A long and carefully worded constitution and address depicted the heroic struggles of the Confederates and the "general sympathy" of England for their cause; dwelt upon the "governmental tyranny, corruption in high places, ruthlessness in war, untruthfulness of speech, and causeless animosity toward Great Britain" of the North; and declared that the interests of America and of the world would be best served by the independence of the South. The effect of a full year's penetration in England of Lincoln's emancipation proclamation is shown in the necessity felt by the framers of this constitution to meet that issue. This required delicate handling and was destined to cause some heart-burnings. The concluding section of the constitution read:

"The Association will also devote itself to the cultivation of kindly feelings between the people of Great Britain and of the Confederate States; and it will, in particular, steadily but kindly represent to the Southern States, that recognition by Europe must necessarily lead to a revision of the system of servile labour, unhappily bequeathed to them by England, in accordance with the spirit of the age, so as to combine the gradual extinction of slavery with the preservation of property, the maintenance of the civil polity, and the true civilization of the negro race[1144]."

The Association was unquestionably armed with distinguished guns of heavy calibre in its Committee and officers, and its membership fee (one guinea annually) was large enough to attract the elite, but it remained to be seen whether all this equipment would be sent into action. As yet the vigour of the movement was centred at Manchester and even there a curious situation soon arose. Spence in various speeches, was declaring that the "Petition to Parliament" movement was spreading rapidly. 30,000 at Ashton, he said, had agreed to memoralize the Government. But on January 30, 1864, Mason Jones, a pro-Northern speaker in the Free Trade Hall at Manchester, asked why Southern public meetings had come to a halt. "The Southerners," he declared, "had taken the Free Trade Hall in the outset with that intention and they were obliged to pay the rent of the room, though they did not use it. They knew that their resolutions would be outvoted and that amendments would pass against them[1145]." There must have been truth in the taunt for while The Index in nearly every issue throughout the middle of 1864 reports great activity there, it does not give any account of a public meeting. The reports were of many applications for membership "from all quarters, from persons of rank and gentlemen of standing in their respective counties[1146]."

Just here lay the weakness of the Southern Independence Association programme. It did appeal to "persons of rank and gentlemen of standing," but by the very fact of the flocking to it of these classes it precluded appeal to Radical and working-class England—already largely committed to the cause of the North. Goldwin Smith, in his "Letter to a Whig Member of the Southern Independence Association," made the point very clear[1147]. In this pamphlet, probably the strongest presentation of the Northern side and the most severe castigation of Southern sympathizers that appeared throughout the whole war, Smith appealed to old Whig ideas of political liberty, attacked the aristocracy and the Church of England, and attempted to make the Radicals of England feel that the Northern cause was their cause. Printing the constitution and address of the Association, with the list of signers, he characterized the movement as fostered by "men of title and family," with "a good sprinkling of clergymen," and as having for its object the plunging of Great Britain into war with the North[1148].

It is significant, in view of Mason Jones' taunt to the Southern Independence Association at Manchester, that The Index, from the end of March to August, 1864, was unable to report a single Southern public meeting. The London Association, having completed its top-heavy organization, was content with that act and showed no life. The first move by the Association was planned to be made in connection with the Alexandra case when, as was expected, the Exchequer Court should render a decision against the Government's right to detain her. On January 8, 1864, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had arranged for the public launching of the Association "next week," that he had again seen the Chief Baron who assured him the Court would decide "that the Government is entirely wrong":

"I told him that if the judgment was clear, and if the Government persisted in proceeding further, that our Association (which he was pleased to learn had been formed) would take up the matter in Parliament and out of it, for if we had no right to seize these ships, it was most unjust that we should detain them by raising legal quibbles for the purpose of keeping them here till the time arrived when the South might not require them. I think public opinion will go with us on this point, for John Bull—with all his failings—loves fair play[1149]."

It is apparent from the language used by Lindsay that he was thinking of the Laird Rams and other ships fully as much as of the Alexandra[1150], and hoped much from an attack on the Government's policy in detaining Southern vessels. Earl Russell was to be made to bear the brunt of this attack on the reassembling of Parliament. In an Index editorial, Adams was pictured as having driven Russell into a corner by "threats which would not have been endured for an hour by a Pitt or a Canning"; the Foreign Secretary as invariably yielding to the "acknowledged mastery of the Yankee Minister":

"Mr. Adams' pretensions are extravagant, his logic is blundering, his threats laughable; but he has hit his mark. We can trace his influence in the detention of the Alexandra and the protracted judicial proceedings which have arisen out of it; in the sudden raid upon the rams at Birkenhead; in the announced intention of the Government to alter the Foreign Enlistment Act of this country in accordance with the views of the United States Cabinet. When one knows the calibre of Mr. Adams one feels inclined to marvel at his success. The astonishment ceases when one reflects that the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs is Earl Russell[1151]."

But when, on February 23, the debate on the Laird Rams occurred[1152], the Tory leaders, upon whom Lindsay and others depended to drive home the meaning of the Alexandra decision, carefully avoided urging the Government to change its policy and contented themselves with an effort, very much in line with that initiated by The Index, to belittle Russell as yielding to a threat. Adams was even applauded by the Tories for his discretion and his anxiety to keep the two countries out of war. The Southern Independence Association remained quiescent. Very evidently someone, presumably Derby or Disraeli, had put a quietus on the plan to make an issue of the stoppage of Southern ship-building. Russell's reply to his accusers was but a curt denial without going into details, in itself testimony that he had no fear of a party attack on the policy of stopping the ships. He was disgusted with the result of the Alexandra trial and in conversation with Adams reflected upon "the uncertainty and caprice incident everywhere to the administration of justice[1153]."

As between Russell and Seward the waters formerly troubled by the stiff manner and tone of the one statesman and the flamboyance of the other were now unusually calm. Russell was less officious and less eager to protest on minor matters and Seward was less belligerent in language. Seward now radiated supreme confidence in the ultimate victory of the North. He had heard rumours of a movement to be made in Parliament for interposition to bring the war to an end by a reunion of North and South on a basis of Abolition and of a Northern assumption of the Confederate debts. Commenting on this to Lyons he merely remarked that the Northern answer could be put briefly as: (1) determination to crush rebellion by force of arms and resentment of any "interposition"; (2) the slaves were already free and would not be made the subject of any bargain; (3) "As to the Confederate debt the United States, Mr. Seward said, would never pay a dollar of it[1154]." That there was public animosity to Great Britain, Lyons did not deny and reported a movement in Congress for ending the reciprocity treaty with Canada but, on Seward's advice, paid no attention to this, acknowledging that Seward was very wise in political manipulation and depending on his opposition to the measure[1155]. Some alarm was indeed caused through a recurrence by Seward to an idea dating back to the very beginning of the war of establishing ships off the Southern ports which should collect duties on imports. He told Lyons that he had sent a special agent to Adams to explain the proposal with a view to requesting the approval of Great Britain. Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a bold Northern defiance to France if she objected[1156]. Adams did discuss the project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of it and in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157]. Apparently this was less a matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British attitude and to learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and France in their joint policy toward America was still strong. Certainly at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158].

For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence. Now he began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government. As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could be made to see this.

"... It is a pity," he wrote to Lyons, "the Federals think it worth their while to go on with the war. The obedience they are ever likely to obtain from the South will not be quiet or lasting, and they must spend much money and blood to get it. If they can obtain the right bank of the Mississippi, and New Orleans, they might as well leave to the Confederates Charleston and Savannah[1159]."

This was but private speculation with no intention of urging it upon the United States. Yet it indicated a change in the view held as to the warlike power of the North. Similarly the Quarterly Review, long confident of Southern success and still prophesying it, was acknowledging that "the unholy [Northern] dream of universal empire" must first have passed[1160]. Throughout these spring months of 1864, Lyons continued to dwell upon the now thoroughly developed readiness of the United States for a foreign war and urged the sending of a military expert to report on American preparations[1161]. He was disturbed by the arrogance manifested by various members of Lincoln's Cabinet, especially by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, with whom Seward, so Lyons wrote, often had difficulty in demonstrating the unfortunate diplomatic bearing of the acts of naval officers. Seward was as anxious as was Lyons to avoid irritating incidents, "but he is not as much listened to as he ought to be by his colleagues in the War and Navy Departments[1162]."

Such an act by a naval officer, defiant of British authority and disregardful of her law, occurred in connection with a matter already attracting the attention of the British public and causing some anxiety to Russell—the alleged securing in Ireland of enlistments for the Northern forces. The war in America had taken from the ranks of industry in the North great numbers of men and at the same time had created an increased demand for labour. But the war had also abruptly checked, in large part, that emigration from Europe which, since the middle 'forties, had been counted upon as a regular source of labour supply, easily absorbed in the steady growth of productive enterprise. A few Northern emissaries of the Government early sent abroad to revive immigration were soon reinforced by private labour agents and by the efforts of steamship companies[1163]. This resulted in a rapid resumption of emigration in 1863, and in several cases groups of Irishmen signed contracts of such a nature (with non-governmental agents) that on arrival in America they were virtually black-jacked into the army. The agents thereby secured large profits from the sums offered under the bounty system of some of the Eastern states for each recruit. Lyons soon found himself called upon to protest, on appeal from a few of these hoodwinked British citizens, and Seward did the best he could to secure redress, though the process was usually a long one owing to red-tape and also to the resistance of army officers.

As soon as the scheme of "bounty profiteers" was discovered prompt steps were taken to defeat it by the American Secretary of State. But the few cases occurring, combined with the acknowledged and encouraged agents of bona fide labour emigration from Ireland, gave ground for accusations in Parliament that Ireland was being used against the law as a place of enlistments. Russell had early taken up the matter with Adams, investigation had followed, and on it appearing that no authorized Northern agent was engaged in recruiting in Ireland the subject had been dropped[1164]. There could be and was no objection to encourage labour emigration, and this was generally recognized as the basis of the sudden increase of the numbers going to America[1165]. But diplomatic and public quiescence was disturbed when the United States war vessel Kearsarge, while in port at Queenstown, November, 1863, took on board fifteen Irishmen and sailed away with them. Russell at once received indirectly from Mason (who was now in France), charges that these men had been enlisted and in the presence of the American consul at Queenstown; he was prompt in investigation but before this was well under way the Kearsarge sailed into Queenstown again and landed the men. She had gone to a French port and no doubt Adams was quick to give orders for her return. Adams was soon able to disprove the accusation against the consul but it still remained a question whether the commander of the vessel was guilty of a bold defiance of British neutrality. On March 31, 1864, the Irishmen, on trial at Cork, pleaded guilty to violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, but the question of the commander's responsibility was permitted to drop on Adams' promise, April 11, of further investigation[1166].

The Kearsarge case occurred as Parliament was drawing to a close in 1863, and at a time when Southern efforts were at low ebb. It was not, therefore, until some months later when a gentleman with a shady past, named Patrick Phinney, succeeded in evading British laws and in carrying off to America a group of Irishmen who found themselves, unwillingly, forced into the Northern army, that the two cases were made the subject of a Southern and Tory attack on Russell. The accusations were sharply made that Russell was not sufficiently active in defending British law and British honour[1167], but these were rather individual accusations than concerted and do not indicate any idea of making an issue with the Government[1168]. Whenever opportunity arose some inquiry up to July, 1864, would be made intended to bring out the alleged timidity of Russell's policy towards the North—a method then also being employed on many other matters with the evident intention of weakening the Ministry for the great Tory attack now being organized on the question of Danish policy.

In truth from the beginning of 1864, America had been pushed to one side in public and parliamentary interest by the threatening Danish question which had long been brewing but which did not come into sharp prominence until March. A year earlier it had become known that Frederick VII of Denmark, in anticipation of a change which, under the operations of the Salic law, would come at his death in the constitutional relations of Denmark to Schleswig-Holstein, was preparing by a new "constitutional act" to secure for his successor the retention of these districts. The law was enacted on November 13, 1863, and Frederick VII died two days later. His successor, Christian IX, promptly declared his intention to hold the duchies in spite of their supposed desire to separate from Denmark and to have their own Prince in the German Confederation. The Federal Diet of the Confederation had early protested the purpose of Denmark and Russell had at first upheld the German arguments but had given no pledges of support to anyone[1169]. But Palmerston on various occasions had gone out of his way to express in Parliament his favour for the Danish cause and had used incautious language even to the point of virtually threatening British aid against German ambitions[1170]. A distinct crisis was thus gradually created, coming to a head when Prussia, under Bismarck's guiding hand, dragging Austria in with her, thrust the Federal Diet of the Confederation to one side, and assumed command of the movement to wrest Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark.

This occurred in February, 1864, and by this time Palmerston's utterances, made against the wish of the majority of his Cabinet colleagues (though this was not known), had so far aroused the British public as to have created a feeling, widely voiced, that Great Britain could not sit idly by while Prussia and Austria worked their will on Denmark. There was excellent ground for a party attack to unseat the Ministry on the score of a humiliating "Danish policy," at one time threatening vigorous British action, then resorting to weak and unsuccessful diplomatic manoeuvres. For three months the Government laboured to bring about through a European council some solution that should both save something for Denmark and save its own prestige. Repeatedly Palmerston, in the many parliamentary debates on Denmark, broke loose from his Cabinet colleagues and indulged in threats which could not fail to give an excellent handle to opponents when once it became clear that the Ministry had no intention of coming in arms to the defence of the Danish King.

From February to June, 1864, this issue was to the fore. In its earlier stages it did not appear to Southern sympathizers to have any essential bearing on the American question, though they were soon to believe that in it lay a great hope. Having set the Southern Independence Association on its feet in London and hoping much from its planned activities, Lindsay, in March, was momentarily excited over rumours of some new move by Napoleon. Being undeceived[1171] he gave a ready ear to other rumours, received privately through Delane of the Times, that an important Southern victory would soon be forthcoming[1172]. Donoughmore, the herald of this glad news also wrote:

"Our political prospects here are still very uncertain. The Conference on the Danish question will either make or mar the Government. If they can patch up a peace they will remain in office. If they fail, out they go[1173]."

Here was early expressed the real hope of one faction of extreme Southern friends in the Danish question. But Lindsay had not yet made clear where he stood on a possible use of a European situation to affect the cause of the South. Now, as always, he was the principal confidant and friend of Mason in England, but he was on ordinary political questions not in sympathy with Tory principles or measures. He was soon disgusted with the apathy of the London Independence Association and threatened to resign membership if this organization, started with much trumpeting of intended activity, did not come out boldly in a public demand for the recognition of the South[1174]. He had already let it be known that another motion would be made in Parliament for mediation and recognition and was indignant that the Association did not at once declare its adherence. Evidently there were internal difficulties. Lindsay wrote Mason that he retained membership only to prevent a break up of the Association and had at last succeeded in securing a meeting of the Executive Committee when his proposed parliamentary resolution would be considered. The Manchester Association was much more alert and ready to support him. "The question is quite ripe for fresh agitation and from experience I find that that agitation must be started by a debate in Parliament. No notice is taken of lectures or speeches in the provinces[1175]."

Before any move was made in Parliament letters to the newspapers began anew to urge that the Ministry should be pressed to offer mediation in America. They met with little favourable response. The Times, at the very end of Lindsay's effort, explained its indifference, and recited the situation of October-November, 1862, stating that the question had then been decided once for all. It declared that Great Britain had "no moral right to interfere" and added that to attempt to do so would result in filling "the North with the same spirit of patriotism and defiance as animated the invaded Confederates[1176]." Thus support to Lindsay was lacking in a hoped-for quarter, but his conferences with Association members had brought a plan of modified action the essential feature of which was that the parliamentary motion must not be made a party one and that the only hope of the South lay in the existing Government. This was decidedly Lindsay's own view though it was clearly understood that the opportuneness of the motion lay in ministerial desire for and need of support in its Danish policy. Lindsay expected to find Palmerston more complaisant than formerly as regards American policy and was not disappointed. He wrote to Mason on May 27:

"I received in due course your note of the 23rd. In a matter of so much importance I shall make no move in the House in regard to American affairs without grave consideration. I am therefore privately consulting the friends of the South. On this subject we had a meeting of our lifeless association on Monday last and on the same subject we are to have another meeting next Monday; but differences of opinion exist there as well as elsewhere, as to the advisability of moving at present. Some say 'move'—others, 'postpone'—but the news by the Scotia to-morrow will regulate to a considerable extent our course of action. One thing is now clear to me that the motion must not be a party one, and that the main point will be to get the Government to go with whoever brings forward the motion, for as you are aware I would rather see the motion in other hands than mine, as my views on the American question are so well known. As no competent member however seems disposed to move or rather to incur the responsibility, I sent to inquire if it would be agreeable to Lord Palmerston to see me on American affairs and on the subject of a motion to be brought forward in the House. He sent word that he would be very glad to see me, and I had, therefore, a long meeting with him alone last night, the result of which was that if I brought forward a motion somewhat as follows, on the third of June, he would likely be prepared to accept it, though he asked if I would see him again after the Scotia arrived. The motion we talked about was to this effect—'That the House of Commons deeply regretting the great loss of life and the sufferings of the people of the United States and the Confederate States of North America by the continuance of the war which has been so long waged between them, trust that Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating in conjunction with the other powers of Europe to bring about a cessation of hostilities.'"

Lindsay had suggested to Palmerston that it was desirable for Mason to return to England and have a conference with the Premier. To this Palmerston gave a ready consent but, of course, no invitation. Lindsay strongly urged Mason to come over:

I think much good will follow your meeting Lord Palmerston. It will lead to other meetings; and besides in other matters I think if you came here, you might at present prove of much service to the South[1177]."

Meanwhile the difference within the Southern Independence Association permitted the coming forward of a minor London organization called The Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America. A letter was addressed by it to Members of Parliament urging that the time had come for action:

"215 Regent Street, London, W. May 28th, 1864.

"SIR,

"The Society which has the honour to present to you the accompanying pamphlet, begs to state that there now exists in Great Britain and Ireland a strong desire to see steps taken by the Government of this country in concert with other Powers, to bring about peace on a durable basis between the belligerents in North America.

"I am directed by the Committee to express a hope that you will, before the Session closes, support a motion in Parliament to this effect; and should you desire to see evidence of the feeling of a large portion of the country in this matter, I shall be most happy to lay it before you[1178]."

Whether Lindsay, vexed with the delays of the Association, had stirred the Society to action, is not clear, but the date of this letter, following on the day after the interview with Palmerston, is suggestive. The pressure put on Mason to come to London was not at first successful. Mason had become fixed in the opinion, arrived at in the previous fall, that there was no favour to be expected from Palmerston or Russell and that the only hope rested in their overthrow. Against this idea Lindsay had now taken definite ground. Moreover, Mason had been instructed to shake the dust of England from off his shoes with no official authority to return. Carefully explaining this last point to Lindsay he declined to hold an interview with Palmerston, except on the latter's invitation, or at least suggestion:

"Had the suggestion you make of an interview and conversation with Lord Palmerston originated with his Lordship I might not have felt myself prohibited by my instructions from at once acceding to it, but as it has the form only of his assent to a proposition from you I must with all respect decline it.

"Although no longer accredited by my Government as Special Commissioner to Great Britain, I am yet in Europe with full powers, and therefore, had Lord Palmerston expressed a desire to see me as his own act (of course unofficially, and even without any reason assigned for the interview) I should have had great pleasure in complying with his request[1179]."

The explanation of disinclination to come was lengthy, but the last paragraph indicated an itching to be active in London again. Lindsay renewed his urgings and was not only hopeful but elated over the seeming success of his overtures to the Government. He had again seen Palmerston and had now pushed his proposal beyond the timid suggestion of overtures when the opportune moment should arrive to a definite suggestion of recognition of the Confederacy:

"I reasoned on the moral effect of recognition, considering that the restoration of the Union, which was utterly hopeless, was the object which the North had in view, etc., etc. This reasoning appeared to produce a considerable effect, for he appears now to be very open to conviction. He again said that in his opinion the subjugation of the South could not be effected by the North, and he added that he thought the people of the North were becoming more and more alive to the fact every day."

Lindsay's next step was to be the securing of an interview with Russell and if he was found to be equally acquiescent all would be plain sailing:

"Now, if by strong reasoning in a quiet way, and by stern facts we can get Lord R. to my views, I think I may say that all difficulty so far as our Cabinet is concerned, is at an end. I hope to be able to see Lord Russell alone to-morrow. He used to pay some little attention to any opinions I ventured to express to him, and I am not without hope. I may add that I was as frank with Lord Palmerston as he has been pleased to be with me, and I told him at parting to-day, that my present intention was not to proceed with the Motion at least for 10 days or a fortnight, unless he was prepared to support me. He highly commended this course, and seemed much gratified with what I said. The fact is, sub rosa, it is clear to me that no motion will be carried unless it is supported by the Government for it is clear that Lord Derby is resolved to leave the responsibility with the Executive, and therefore, in the present state of matters, it would seriously injure the cause of the South to bring forward any motion which would not be carried."

Lindsay then urges Mason to come at once to London.

"Now apart altogether from you seeing Lord Palmerston, I must earnestly entreat you to come here. Unless you are much wanted in Paris, your visit here, as a private gentleman, can do no harm, and may, at the present moment, be of great service to your country[1180]."

Palmerston's willingness to listen to suggestions of what would have amounted to a complete face-about of British policy on America, his "gratification" that Lindsay intended to postpone the parliamentary motion, his friendly courtesy to a man whom he had but recently rebuked for a meddlesome "amateur diplomacy," can be interpreted in no other light than an evidence of a desire to prevent Southern friends from joining in the attack, daily becoming more dangerous, on the Government's Danish policy. How much of this Lindsay understood is not clear; on the face of his letters to Mason he would seem to have been hoodwinked, but the more reasonable supposition is, perhaps, that much was hoped from the governmental necessity of not alienating supporters. The Danish situation was to be used, but without an open threat. In addition the tone of the public press, for some time gloomy over Southern prospects, was now restored to the point of confidence and in this the Times was again leading[1181]. The Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America quickly issued another circular letter inviting Members of Parliament to join in a deputation to call on Palmerston to urge action on the lines of Lindsay's first overture. Such a deputation would represent "more than 5,000 members and the feeling of probably more than twenty millions of people." It should not be a deputation "of parties" but representative of all groups in Parliament:

"The Society has reason to believe that the Premier is disposed to look favourably upon the attempt here contemplated and that the weight of an influential deputation would strengthen his hands[1182]."

This proposal from the Society was now lagging behind Lindsay's later objective—namely, direct recognition. That this was felt to be unfortunate is shown by a letter from Tremlett, Honorary Secretary of the Society, to Mason. He wrote that the Southern Independence Association, finally stirred by Lindsay's insistence, had agreed to join the Society in a representation to Palmerston but had favoured some specific statement on recognition. Palmerston had sent word that he favoured the Society's resolution but not that of the Association, and as a result the joint letter of the two organizations would be on the mild lines of Lindsay's original motion:

"Although this quite expresses the object of our Society, still I do not think the 'Independence Association' ought to have 'ratted' from its principles. It ought not to have consented to ignore the question which it was instituted to bring before Parliament—that of the Independence of the Confederacy—and more than that, the ambiguous ending of the resolution to be submitted is not such as I think ought to be allowed. You know the resolution and therefore I need only quote the obnoxious words 'That Her Majesty's Government will avail itself of the earliest opportunity of mediating, etc.'

"This is just leaving the Government where they have been all along. They have always professed to take 'the earliest opportunity' but of which they are to be the judges[1183]!"

Evidently there was confusion in the ranks and disagreement among the leaders of Southern friends. Adams, always cool in judgment of where lay the wind, wrote to Seward on this same day that Lindsay was delaying his motion until the receipt of favourable news upon which to spring it. Even such news, Adams believed, would not alter British policy unless it should depict the "complete defeat and dispersion" of Northern forces[1184]. The day following the Times reported Grant to be meeting fearful reverses in Virginia and professed to regard Sherman's easy advance toward Atlanta as but a trap set for the Northern army in the West[1185]. But in reality the gage of battle for Southern advantage in England was fixed upon a European, not an American, field. Mason understood this perfectly. He had yielded to Lindsay's insistence and had come to London. There he listened to Lindsay's account of the interview (now held) with Russell, and June 8 reported it to Slidell:

"Of his intercourse with Lord Russell he reports in substance that his Lordship was unusually gracious and seemed well disposed to go into conversation. Lord Russell agreed that the war on the part of the United States was hopeless and that neither could union be restored nor the South brought under the yoke.... In regard to Lindsay's motion Lord Russell said, that he could not accept it, but if brought up for discussion his side would speak favourably of it. That is to say they would commend it if they could not vote for it."

This referred to Lindsay's original motion of using the "earliest opportunity of mediation," and the pleasant reception given by Russell scarcely justified any great hope of decided benefit for the South. It must now have been fairly apparent to Lindsay, as it certainly was to Mason, that all this complaisance by Palmerston and Russell was but political manipulation to retain or to secure support in the coming contest with the Tories. The two old statesmen, wise in parliamentary management, were angling for every doubtful vote. Discussing with Lindsay the prospects for governmental action Mason now ventured to suggest that perhaps the best chances of success lay with the Tories, and found him unexpectedly in agreement:

"I told Lindsay (but for his ear only) that Mr. Hunter, editor of the Herald, had written to Hotze about his connection with Disraeli, and he said at once, that if the latter took it up in earnest, it could not be in better hands and would carry at the expense of the Ministry and that he would most cheerfully and eagerly yield him the pas. Disraeli's accession, as you remember, was contingent upon our success in Virginia—and agreeing entirely with Lindsay that the movement could not be in better hands and as there were but 10 days before his motion could again come, I thought the better policy would be for the present that he should be silent and to await events[1186]."

Slidell was less sceptical than was Mason but agreed that it might best advantage the South to be rid of Russell:

"If Russell can be trusted, which to me is very doubtful, Lindsay's motion must succeed. Query, how would its being brought forward by Disraeli affect Russell's action—if he can be beaten on a fair issue it would be better for us perhaps than if it appeared to be carried with his qualified assent[1187]."

But Mason understood that Southern expectation of a change in British policy toward America must rest (and even then but doubtfully) on a change of Government. By June 29 his personal belief was that the Tory attack on the Danish question would be defeated and that this would "of course postpone Lindsay's projected motion[1188]." On June 25, the Danish Conference had ended and the Prussian war with Denmark was renewed. There was a general feeling of shame over Palmerston's bluster followed by a meek British inaction. The debate came on a vote of censure, July 8, in the course of which Derby characterized governmental policy as one of "meddle and muddle." The censure was carried in the Lords by nine votes, but was defeated in the Commons by a ministerial majority of eighteen. It was the sharpest political crisis of Palmerston's Ministry during the Civil War. Every supporting vote was needed[1189].

Not only had Lindsay's motion been postponed but the interview with Palmerston for which Mason had come to London had also been deferred in view of the parliamentary crisis. When finally held on July 14, it resolved itself into a proud and emphatic assertion by Mason that the South could not be conquered, that the North was nearly ready to acknowledge it and that the certainty of Lincoln's defeat in the coming Presidential election was proof of this. Palmerston appears to have said little.

"At the conclusion I said to him in reply to his remark, that he was gratified in making my acquaintance, that I felt obliged by his invitation to the interview, but that the obligation would be increased if I could take with me any expectation that the Government of Her Majesty was prepared to unite with France, in some act expressive of their sense that the war should come to an end. He said, that perhaps, as I was of opinion that the crisis was at hand, it might be better to wait until it had arrived. I told him that my opinion was that the crisis had passed, at least so far as that the war of invasion would end with the campaign[1190]."

Reporting the interview to Slidell in much the same language, Mason wrote:

"My own impressions derived from the whole interview are, that [while] P. is as well satisfied as I am, that the separation of the States is final and the independence of the South an accomplished fact, the Ministry fears to move under the menaces of the North[1191]."

Slidell's comment was bitter:

"I am very much obliged for your account of your interview with Lord Palmerston. It resulted very much as I had anticipated excepting that his Lordship appears to have said even less than I had supposed he would. However, the time has now arrived when it is comparatively of very little importance what Queen or Emperor may say or think about us. A plague, I say, on both your Houses[1192]."

Slidell's opinion from this time on was, indeed, that the South had nothing to expect from Europe until the North itself should acknowledge the independence of the Confederacy. July 21, The Index expressed much the same view and was equally bitter. It quoted an item in the Morning Herald of July 16, to the effect that Mason had secured an interview with Palmerston and that "the meeting was satisfactory to all parties":

"The withdrawal of Mr. Lindsay's motion was, it is said, the result of that interview, the Premier having given a sort of implied promise to support it at a more opportune moment; that is to say, when Grant and Sherman have been defeated, and the Confederacy stand in no need of recognition."

In the same issue The Index described a deputation of clergymen, noblemen, Members of Parliament "and other distinguished and influential gentlemen" who had waited upon Palmerston to urge mediation toward a cessation of hostilities in America. Thus at last the joint project of the Southern Independence Association and of the Society for Promoting the Cessation of Hostilities in America had been put in execution after the political storm had passed and not before—when the deputation might have had some influence. But the fact was that no deputation, unless a purely party one, could have been collected before the conclusion of the Danish crisis. When finally assembled it "had no party complexion," and the smiling readiness with which it received Palmerston's jocular reply indicating that Britain's safest policy was to keep strictly to neutrality is evidence that even the deputation itself though harassed by Lindsay and others into making this demonstration, was quite content to let well enough alone. Not so The Index which sneered at the childishness of Palmerston: