Canada was also about to lose a large part of its trade. For ten years that trade had been built up largely on the basis of reciprocity with the United States, and the war had largely increased the American demand for Canadian products. It was generally expected, and that expectation was fulfilled, that the treaty would be abrogated by the United States. It was feared that the policy of commercial non-intercourse would be carried even farther, the bonding system abolished, and Canada cut off from access to the seaboard during the winter.[14]

If we add to these difficulties the domestic dissensions of Canada, we must recognize that the outlook was dark. Canada was then a fringe of settlement, extending from the Detroit River to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, having no independent access to the Atlantic except during the summer. She had been depending largely upon Great Britain for defence, and upon the United States for trade. She had received warning that both these supports were to be weakened, and that she must rely more on her own resources, find new channels of trade and new means of defence. The country lay in the midst of the continent, isolated from the west, isolated in part from the east, with a powerful and not too friendly neighbour to the south. Upper and Lower Canada, with their racial differences as sharply defined as in the days of Lord Durham, regarded each other with distrust; one political combination after another had failed to obtain a working majority of the legislature, and domestic government was paralyzed. Such a combination of danger and difficulty, within and without, might well arouse alarm, rebuke faction and stimulate patriotism.

The election of 1863 was virtually a drawn battle. The Reformers had a large majority in Upper Canada, their opponents a like majority in Lower Canada, and thus not only the two parties, but the two provinces, were arrayed against each other. The Reform government, headed by Sandfield Macdonald and Dorion, found its position of weakness and humiliation intolerable, and resigned in March, 1864. The troubled governor-general called upon A. T. Fergusson Blair, a colleague of Sandfield Macdonald, to form a new administration. He failed. He called upon Cartier with a like result. He finally had a little better success with Sir E. P. Tache, a veteran who had been a colleague of Baldwin, of Hincks, and of Macdonald. Tache virtually restored the Cartier-Macdonald government, taking in Foley and McGee from the other side. In less than three months, on June 14th, this government was defeated, and on the very day of its defeat relief came. Letters written by Brown to his family during the month preceding the crisis throw some light on the situation.

On May 13th he writes: "Things here are very unsatisfactory; no one sees his way out of the mess—and there is no way but my way—representation by population. There is great talk to-day of coalition—and what do you think? Why, that in order to make the coalition successful, the imperial government are to offer me the government of one of the British colonies. I have been gravely asked to-day by several if it is true, and whether I would accept. My reply was, I would rather be proprietor of the Globe newspaper for a few years than be governor-general of Canada, much less a trumpery little province. But I need hardly tell you, the thing has no foundation, beyond sounding what could be done to put me out of the way and let mischief go on. But we won't be bought at any price, shall we?" On May 18th he writes that he has brought on his motion for constitutional changes, and on May 20th that it has carried and taken Cartier and Macdonald by surprise. "Much that is directly practical may not flow from the committee, but it is an enormous gain to have the acknowledgment on our journals that a great evil exists, and that some remedy must be found."

On June 14th Mr. Brown, as chairman of a committee appointed to consider the difficulties connected with the government of Canada, brought in a report recommending "a federative system, applied either to Canada alone, or to the whole British North American provinces." This was the day on which the Tache government was defeated. On the subject of the negotiations which followed between Mr. Brown and the government, there is a difference between the account given by Sir John Macdonald in the House, and accepted by all parties as official, and a letter written by Mr. Brown to a member of his family. The official account represents the first movement as coming from Mr. Brown, the letter says that the suggestion came from the governor-general. It would seem likely that the idea moved gradually from informal conversations to formal propositions. The governor had proposed a coalition on the defeat of the Macdonald-Dorion government, and he repeated the suggestion on the defeat of the Tache-Macdonald government; but his official memorandum contains no reference to constitutional changes. It would seem that there was a great deal of talk of coalition in the air before Brown made his proposals, and perhaps some talk of offering him an appointment that would remove him from public life. But the Conservative ministers were apparently thinking merely of a coalition that would break the dead-lock, and enable the ordinary business of the country to proceed. Brown's idea was to find a permanent remedy in the form of a change in the constitution. When he made his proposal to co-operate with his opponents for the purpose of settling the difficulties between Upper and Lower Canada, his proposal fell upon minds familiarized with the idea of coalition, and hence its ready acceptance. On his part, Mr. Brown was ready to abate certain party advantages in order to bring about constitutional reform. Mr. Ferrier, in the debate on confederation, says that it was he who suggested that the proposal made by Mr. Brown to Mr. Pope and Mr. Morris should be communicated to the government. Ferrier gives a lively account of the current gossip as to the meeting between Brown and the ministers. "I think I can remember this being said, that when Mr. Galt met Mr. Brown he received him with that manly, open frankness which characterizes him; that when Mr. Cartier met Mr. Brown, he looked carefully to see that his two Rouge friends were not behind him, and that when he was satisfied they were not, he embraced him with open arms and swore eternal friendship; and that Mr. Macdonald, at a very quick glance, saw there was an opportunity of forming a great and powerful dependency of the British empire.... We all thought, in fact, that a political millennium had arrived."

In a family letter written at this time Mr. Brown said: "June 18th, past one in the morning. We have had great times since I wrote you. On Tuesday we defeated the government by a majority of two. They asked the governor-general to dissolve parliament, and he consented; but before acting on it, at the governor's suggestion, they applied to me to aid them in reconstructing the government, on the basis of settling the constitutional difficulties between Upper and Lower Canada. I refused to accept office, but agreed to help them earnestly and sincerely in the matter they proposed. Negotiations were thereupon commenced, and are still going on, with considerable hope of finding a satisfactory solution to our trouble. The facts were announced in the House to-day by John A. Macdonald, amid tremendous cheering from both sides of the House. You never saw such a scene; but you will have it all in the papers, so I need not repeat. Both sides are extremely urgent that I should accept a place in the government, if it were only for a week; but I will not do this unless it is absolutely needed to the success of the negotiations. A more agreeable proposal is that I should go to England to arrange the new constitution with the imperial government. But as the whole thing may fail, we will not count our chickens just yet."

Sir Richard Cartwright, then a young member of parliament, relates an incident illustrating the tension on men's minds at that time. He says: "On that memorable afternoon when Mr. Brown, not without emotion, made his statement to a hushed and expectant House, and declared that he was about to ally himself with Sir Georges Cartier and his friends for the purpose of carrying out confederation, I saw an excitable, elderly little French member rush across the floor, climb up on Mr. Brown, who, as you remember, was of a stature approaching the gigantic, fling his arms about his neck and hang several seconds there suspended, to the visible consternation of Mr. Brown and to the infinite joy of all beholders, pit, box and gallery included."[15]

The official account given by Mr. Macdonald in the House, is that immediately after the defeat of the government on Tuesday night (the 14th), and on the following morning, Mr. Brown spoke to several supporters of the administration, strongly urging that the present crisis should be utilized in settling forever the constitutional difficulties between Upper and Lower Canada, and assuring them that he was ready to co-operate with the existing or any other administration that would deal with the question promptly and firmly, with a view to its final settlement. Mr. Morris and Mr. Pope, to whom the suggestion was made, obtained leave to communicate it to Mr. John A. Macdonald and Mr. Galt. On June 17th Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Galt called upon Mr. Brown. In the conversation that ensued Mr. Brown expressed his extreme reluctance to entering the ministry, declaring that the public mind would be shocked by such an arrangement. The personal question being dropped for the time, Mr. Brown asked what remedy was proposed. Mr. Macdonald and Mr. Galt replied that their remedy was a federal union of all the British North American provinces. Mr. Brown said that this would not be acceptable to Upper Canada. The federation of all the provinces ought to come and would come in time, but it had not yet been thoroughly considered by the people; and even were this otherwise, there were so many parties to be consulted that its adoption was uncertain and remote. He expressed his preference for parliamentary reform, based on population. On further discussion it appeared that a compromise might be found in an alternative plan, a federal union of all the British North American provinces or a federal union of Upper and Lower Canada, with provision for the admission of the Maritime Provinces and the North-West Territory when they desired. There was apparently a difference of opinion as to which alternative should be presented first. One memorandum reduced to writing gave the preference to the larger federation; the second and final memorandum contained this agreement: "The government are prepared to pledge themselves to bring in a measure next session for the purpose of removing existing difficulties by introducing the federal principle into Canada, coupled with such provisions as will permit the Maritime Provinces and the North-West Territory to be incorporated into the same system of government. And the government will, by sending representatives to the Lower Provinces and to England, use its best endeavours to secure the assent of those interests which are beyond the control of our own legislation to such a measure as may enable all British North America to be united under a general legislature based upon the federal principle."

It was Mr. Brown who insisted on this mode of presentation. At the convention of 1859 he had expressed in the strongest language his hope for the creation of a great Canadian nationality; and he had for years advocated the inclusion of the North-West Territories in a greater Canada. But he regarded the settlement of the difficulties of Upper and Lower Canada as the most pressing question of the hour, and he did not desire that the solution of this question should be delayed or imperilled. Galt's plan of federation, comprehensive and admirable as it was, had failed because the assent of the Maritime Provinces could not be secured; and for five years afterwards no progress had been made. It was natural that Brown should be anxiously desirous that the plan for the reform of the union of the Canadas should not fail, whatever else might happen.

On June 21st, Mr. Brown called a meeting of the members of the Opposition for Upper Canada. It was resolved, on motion of Mr. Hope Mackenzie, "that we approve of the course which has been pursued by Mr. Brown in the negotiations with the government, and that we approve of the project of a federal union of the Canadas, with provision for the inclusion of the Maritime Provinces and the North-West Territory, as one basis on which the constitutional difficulties now existing could be settled." Thirty-four members voted for this motion, five declining to vote. A motion that three members of the Opposition should enter the government was not so generally supported, eleven members, including Alexander Mackenzie and Oliver Mowat, voting in the negative. The Lower Canadian Reformers held aloof, and in the subsequent debate in the legislature, strongly opposed confederation.

There were many evidences of the keen interest taken by the governor-general (Monk) in the negotiations. On June 21st he wrote to Mr. Brown: "I think the success or failure of the negotiations which have been going on for some days, with a view to the formation of a strong government on a broad basis, depends very much on your consenting to come into the cabinet.

"Under these circumstances I must again take the liberty of pressing upon you, by this note, my opinion of the grave responsibility which you will take upon yourself if you refuse to do so.

"Those who have hitherto opposed your views have consented to join with you in good faith for the purpose of extricating the province from what appears to me a very dangerous position.

"They have frankly offered to take up and endeavour to settle on principles satisfactory to all, the great constitutional question which you, by your energy and ability, have made your own.

"The details of that settlement must necessarily be the subject of grave debate in the cabinet, and I confess I cannot see how you are to take part in that discussion, or how your opinions can be brought to bear on the arrangement of the question, unless you occupy a place at the council table.

"I hope I may, without impropriety, ask you to take these opinions into consideration before you arrive at a final decision as to your own course."

Mr. Brown wrote home that he, in consenting to enter the cabinet, was influenced by the vote of the Reform members, by private letters from many quarters, and still more by the extreme urgency of the governor-general. "The thing that finally determined me was the fact, ascertained by Mowat and myself, that unless we went in the whole effort for constitutional changes would break down, and the enormous advantages gained by our negotiations probably be lost. Finally, at three o'clock yester-day, I consented to enter the cabinet as 'president of the council,' with other two seats in the cabinet at my disposal—one of which Mowat will take, and probably Macdougall the other. We consented with great reluctance, but there was no help for it; and it was such a temptation to have possibly the power of settling the sectional troubles of Canada forever. The announcement was made in the House yester-day, and the excitement all over the province is intense. I send you an official copy of the proceedings during the negotiations, from which you will see the whole story. By next mail I intend to send you some extracts from the newspapers. The unanimity of sentiment is without example in this country, and were it not that I know at their exact value the worth of newspaper laudations, I might be puffed up a little in my own conceit. After the explanations by ministers I had to make a speech, but was so excited and nervous at the events of the last few days that I nearly broke down. However, after a little I got over it, and made (as Mowat alleges) the most telling speech I ever made. There was great cheering when I sat down, and many members from both sides crowded round me to congratulate me. In short, the whole movement is a grand success, and I really believe will have an immense influence on the future destinies of Canada."

The formation of the coalition cabinet was announced on June 30th. Foley, Buchanan and Simpson, members of the Upper Canadian section of the Tache-Macdonald ministry, retired, and their places were taken by the Hon. George Brown, Oliver Mowat, and William Macdougall. Otherwise the ministry remained unchanged. Sir E. P. Tache, though a Conservative, was acceptable to both parties, and was well fitted to head a genuine coalition. But it must have been evident from the first that the character of a coalition would not be long maintained. The Reform party, which had just defeated the government in the legislature, was represented by only three ministers out of twelve; and this, with Macdonald's skill in managing combinations of men, made it morally certain that the ministry must eventually become Conservative, just as happened in the case of the coalition of 1854. Brown had asked that the Reformers be represented by four ministers from Upper Canada and two from Lower Canada, which would, as nearly as possible, have corresponded with the strength of his party in the legislature. Galt and Macdonald represented that a change in the personnel of the Lower Canadian section of the cabinet would disturb the people and shake their confidence. The Lower Canadian Liberal leaders, Dorion and Holton, were adverse to the coalition scheme, regarding it as a mere device for enabling Macdonald and his friends to hold office.

Mowat and Brown were re-elected without difficulty, but Macdougall met with strong opposition in North Ontario. Brown, who was working hard in his interests, found this opposition so strong among Conservatives that he telegraphed to Macdonald, who sent a strong letter on behalf of Macdougall. Brown said that the opposition came chiefly from Orangemen. The result was that Macdougall, in spite of the assistance of the two leaders, was defeated by one hundred. He was subsequently elected for North Lanark. In other bye-elections the advocates of confederation were generally successful. In the confederation debate, Brown said there had been twenty-five contests, fourteen for the Upper House and eleven for the Lower House, and that only one or two opponents of confederation had been elected.

There had been for some years an intermittent movement for the union of the Maritime Provinces, and in 1864 their legislatures had authorized the holding of a convention at Charlottetown. Accordingly eight members of the Canadian ministry visited Charlottetown, where they were cordially welcomed. They dwelt on the advantage of substituting the larger for the smaller plan of union, and the result of their representations was that arrangements were made for the holding of a general conference at Quebec later in the year. The Canadian ministers made a tour through the Maritime Provinces, speaking in public and familiarizing the people with the plan. At a banquet in Halifax, Mr. Brown gave a full exposition of the project and its advantages in regard to defence, commerce, national strength and dignity, adding that it would end the petty strifes of a small community, and elevate politics and politicians.

The scheme was destined to undergo a more severe ordeal in the Maritime Provinces than these festive gatherings. For the present, progress was rapid, and the maritime tour was followed by the conference at Quebec, which opened on October 10th, 1864.

FOOTNOTES:

[14] Sir Richard Cartwright says also that the credit of Canada was very low, largely because of the troubles of the Grand Trunk Railway Company. Memories of Confederation, p. 3.

[15] Memories of Confederation. An address delivered before the Canadian Club of Ottawa, January 20th, 1906.



CHAPTER XVI

THE QUEBEC CONFERENCE

The conference was held with closed doors, so as to encourage free discussion. Some fragmentary notes have been preserved. One impression derived from this and other records is that the public men of that day had been much impressed by the Civil War in the United States, by the apparent weakness of the central authority there, and by the dangers of State sovereignty. Emphasis was laid upon the monarchical element of the proposed constitution for Canada, and upon the fact that powers not expressly defined were to rest in the general, instead of the local, legislatures. In fact, Mr. Chandler, a representative of New Brunswick, complained that the proposed union was legislative, not federal, and reduced the local governments to the status of municipal corporations. In practice these residuary powers were not so formidable as they appeared; the defined powers of the local legislatures were highly important, and were fully maintained, if not enlarged, as a result of the resolute attitude of Ontario under the Mowat government. But the notion that Canada must avoid the dangers of State sovereignty is continually cropping up in the literature of confederation. Friends and opponents of the new constitution made much of these mysterious residuary powers, and the Lower Canadian Liberals feared that they were being drawn into a union that would destroy the liberties and imperil the cherished institutions of the French-Canadian people.

Another point is the extraordinary amount of time and labour given to the constitution of the senate. "The conference proceedings," wrote Mr. Brown, "get along very well, considering we were very near broken up on the question of the distribution of members in the Upper Chamber of the federal legislature, but fortunately, we have this morning got the matter amicably compromised, after a loss of three days in discussing it." During the latter years of the union, the elective system had prevailed in Canada, and Mowat, Macdougall and others favoured continuing this practice, but were overruled. Brown joined Macdonald in supporting the nominative system. His reasons were given in his speech in the legislature in 1865. He believed that two elective chambers were incompatible with the British parliamentary system. The Upper Chamber, if elected, might claim equal power with the Lower, including power over money bills. It might amend money bills, might reject all legislation, and stop the machinery of government. With a Conservative majority in one House, and a Reform majority in the other, a dead-lock might occur. To the objection that the change from the elective to the nominative system involved a diminution of the power of the people, Mr. Brown answered that the government of the day would be responsible for each appointment. It must be admitted that this responsibility is of little practical value, and that Mr. Brown fully shared in the delusions of his time as to the manner in which the senate would be constituted, and the part it would play in the government of the country.

A rupture was threatened also on the question of finance. A large number of local works which in Upper Canada were paid for by local municipal taxation, were in the Maritime Provinces provided out of the provincial revenues. The adjustment was a difficult matter, and finally it was found necessary for the financial representatives of the different provinces to withdraw, for the purpose of constructing a scheme.

On October 28th the conference was concluded, and its resolutions substantially form the constitution of Canada. On October 31st Brown wrote: "We got through our work at Quebec very well. The constitution is not exactly to my mind in all its details—but as a whole it is wonderful, really wonderful. When one thinks of all the fighting we have had for fifteen years, and finds the very men who fought us every inch, now going far beyond what we asked, I am amazed and sometimes alarmed lest it all go to pieces yet. We have yet to pass the ordeal of public opinion in the several provinces, and sad, indeed, will it be if the measure is not adopted by acclamation in them all. For Upper Canada we may well rejoice on the day it becomes law. Nearly all our past difficulties are ended by it, whatever new ones may arise."

A journey made by the delegates through Canada after the draft was completed enabled Canadians to make the acquaintance of some men of mark in the Maritime Provinces, including Tilley, of New Brunswick, and Tupper, of Nova Scotia, and it evoked in Upper Canada warm expressions of public feeling in favour of the new union. It is estimated that eight thousand people met the delegates at the railway station in Toronto. At a dinner given in the Music Hall in that city, Mr. Brown explained the new constitution fully. He frankly confessed that he was a convert to the scheme of the Intercolonial Railway, for the reason that it was essential to the union between Canada and the Maritime Provinces. The canal system was to be extended, and as soon as the finances would permit communication was to be opened with the North-West Territory. "This was the first time," wrote Mr. Brown, "that the confederation scheme was really laid open to the public. No doubt—was right in saying that the French-Canadians were restive about the scheme, but the feeling in favour of it is all but unanimous here, and I think there is a good chance of carrying it. At any rate, come what may, I can now get out of the affair and out of public life with honour, for I have had placed on record a scheme that would bring to an end all the grievances of which Upper Canada has so long complained."

The British government gave its hearty blessing to the confederation, and the outlook was hopeful. In December, 1864, Mr. Brown sailed for England, for the purpose of obtaining the views of the British government. He wrote from London to Mr. Macdonald that the scheme had given prodigious satisfaction. "The ministry, the Conservatives and the Manchester men are all delighted with it, and everything Canadian has gone up in public estimation immensely.... Indeed, from all classes of people you hear nothing but high praise of 'Canadian statesmanship,' and loud anticipations of the great future before us. I am much concerned to observe, however, and I write it to you as a thing that must seriously be considered by all men taking a lead hereafter in Canadian public matters—that there is a manifest desire in almost every quarter, that ere long the British American colonies should shift for themselves, and in some quarters evident regret that we did not declare at once for independence. I am very sorry to observe this, but it arises, I hope, from the fear of invasion of Canada by the United States, and will soon pass away with the cause that excites it."



CHAPTER XVII

THE CONFEDERATION DEBATE

The parliament of Canada assembled on January 19th, 1865, to consider the resolutions of the Quebec conference. The first presentation of the reasons for confederation was made in the Upper Chamber by the premier, Sir E. P. Tache. He described the measure as essential to British connection, to the preservation of "our institutions, our laws, and even our remembrances of the past." If the opportunity were allowed to pass by unimproved, Canada would be forced into the American union by violence; or would be placed upon an inclined plane which would carry it there insensibly. Canada, during the winter, had no independent means of access to the sea, but was dependent on the favour of a neighbour which, in several ways, had shown a hostile spirit. The people of the Northern States had an exaggerated idea of Canadian sympathy with the South, and the consequences of this misapprehension were—first, the threatened abolition of the transit system; second, the discontinuance of reciprocity; third, a passport system, which was almost equivalent to a prohibition of intercourse. Union with the Maritime Provinces would give Canada continuous and independent access to the Atlantic; and the Maritime Provinces would bring into the common stock their magnificent harbours, their coal mines, their great fishing and shipping industries. Then he recounted the difficulties that had occurred in the government of Canada, ending in dead-lock, and a condition "bordering on civil strife." He declared that Lower Canada had resisted representation by population under a legislative union, but that if a federal union were obtained, it would be tantamount to a separation of the provinces, and Lower Canada would thereby preserve its autonomy, together with all the institutions it held so dear. These were the main arguments for confederation, and in the speeches which followed on that side they were repeated, enforced, and illustrated in various ways.

In the assembly, Mr. John A. Macdonald, as attorney-general, gave a clear and concise description of the new constitution. He admitted that he had preferred a legislative union, but had recognized that such a union would not have been accepted either by Lower Canada or the Maritime Provinces. The union between Upper and Lower Canada, legislative in name, had been federal in fact, there being, by tacit consent and practice, a separate body of legislation for each part of the province. He described the new scheme of government as a happy combination of the strength of a legislative union with the freedom of a federal union, and with protection to local interests. The constitution of the United States was "one of the most skilful works which human intelligence ever created; one of the most perfect organizations that ever governed a free people." Experience had shown that its main defect was the doctrine of State sovereignty. This blemish was avoided in the Canadian constitution by vesting all residuary powers in the central government and legislature. The Canadian system would also be distinguished from the American by the recognition of monarchy and of the principle of responsible government. The connection of Canada with Great Britain he regarded as tending towards a permanent alliance. "The colonies are now in a transition state. Gradually a different colonial system is being developed; and it will become year by year less a case of dependence on our part, and of overruling protection on the part of the mother country, and more a case of a hearty and cordial alliance. Instead of looking upon us as a merely dependent colony, England will have in us a friendly nation—a subordinate, but still a powerful people—to stand by her in North America, in peace or in war."

Brown spoke on the night of February 8th, his speech, occupying four hours and a half in delivery, showing the marks of careful preparation. He drew an illustration from the mighty struggle that had well-nigh rent the republic asunder, and was then within a few weeks of its close. "We are striving," he said, "to settle forever issues hardly less momentous than those that have rent the neighbouring republic and are now exposing it to all the horrors of civil war. Have we not then great cause for thankfulness that we have found a better way for the solution of our troubles? And should not every one of us endeavour to rise to the magnitude of the occasion, and earnestly seek to deal with this question to the end, in the same candid and conciliatory spirit in which, so far, it has been discussed?"

He warned the assembly that whatever else happened, the constitution of Canada would not remain unchanged. "Something must be done. We cannot stand still. We cannot go back to chronic, sectional hostility and discord—to a state of perpetual ministerial crisis. The events of the last eight months cannot be obliterated—the solemn admissions of men of all parties can never be erased. The claims of Upper Canada for justice must be met, and met now. Every one who raises his voice in hostility to this measure is bound to keep before him, when he speaks, all the perilous consequences of its rejection. No man who has a true regard for the well-being of Canada can give a vote against this scheme unless he is prepared to offer, in amendment, some better remedy for the evils and injustice that have so long threatened the peace of our country."

In the first place, he said confederation would provide a complete remedy for the injustice of the system of parliamentary representation, by giving Upper Canada, in the House of Commons, the number of members to which it was entitled by population. In the senate, the principle of representation by population would not be maintained, an equal number of senators being allotted to Ontario, to Quebec, and to the group of Maritime Provinces, without regard to population. Secondly, the plan would remedy the injustice of which Upper Canada had complained in regard to public expenditures. "No longer shall we have to complain that one section pays the cash while the other spends it; hereafter they who pay will spend, and they who spend more than they ought, will bear the brunt. If we look back on our doings of the last fifteen years, I think it will be acknowledged that the greatest jobs perpetrated were of a sectional character, that our fiercest contests were about local matters that stirred up sectional jealousies and indignation to their deepest depth." Confederation would end sectional discord between Upper and Lower Canada. Questions that used to excite sectional hostility and jealousy were now removed from the common legislature to the legislatures of the provinces. No man need be debarred from a public career because his opinions, popular in his own province, were unpopular in another. Among the local questions that had disturbed the peace of the common legislature, he mentioned the construction of local works, the endowment of ecclesiastical institutions, the granting of money for sectarian purposes, and interference with school systems.

He advocated confederation because it would convert a group of inconsiderable colonies into a powerful union of four million people, with a revenue of thirteen million dollars, a trade of one hundred and thirty-seven million five hundred thousand dollars, rich natural resources and important industries. Among these he dwelt at length on the shipping of the Maritime Provinces. These were the days of the wooden ship, and Mr. Brown claimed that federated Canada would be the third maritime power in the world. Confederation would give a new impetus to immigration and settlement. Communication with the west would be opened up, as soon as the state of the finances permitted. Negotiations had been carried on with the imperial government for the addition of the North-West Territories to Canada; and when those fertile plains were opened for settlement, there would be an immense addition to the products of Canada. The establishment of free trade between Canada and the Maritime Provinces would be some compensation for the loss of trade with the United States, should the reciprocity treaty be abrogated. It would enable the country to assume a larger share of the burden of defence. The time had come when the people of the United Kingdom would insist on a reconsideration of the military relations of Canada to the empire, and that demand was just. Union would facilitate common defence. "The Civil War in the neighbouring republic—the possibility of war between Great Britain and the United States; the threatened repeal of the reciprocity treaty; the threatened abolition of the American bonding system for goods in transit to and from these provinces; the unsettled position of the Hudson's Bay Company; the changed feeling of England as to the relations of Canada to the parent state; all combine at this moment to arrest the earnest attention to the gravity of the situation and unite us all in one vigorous effort to meet the emergency like men."

A strong speech against confederation was made by Dorion, an old friend of Brown, a staunch Liberal, and a representative French-Canadian. He declared that he had seen no ground for changing his opinion on two points—the substitution of an Upper Chamber, nominated by the Crown, for an elective body; and the construction of the Intercolonial Railway, which he, with other Liberals, had always opposed. He had always admitted that representation by population was a just principle; and in 1856 he had suggested, in the legislature, the substitution of a federal for a legislative union of the Canadas; or failing this, representation by population, with such checks and guarantees as would secure local rights and interests, and preserve to Lower Canada its cherished institutions. When the Brown-Dorion government was formed, he had proposed a federation of the Canadas, but with the distinct understanding that he would not attempt to carry such a measure without the consent of a majority of the people of Lower Canada. From the document issued by the Lower Canadian Liberals in 1859, he quoted a passage in which it was laid down that the powers given to the central government should be only those that were essential, and that the local powers should be as ample as possible. "All that belongs to matters of a purely local character, such as education, the administration of justice, the militia, the laws relating to property, police, etc., ought to be referred to the local governments, whose powers ought generally to extend to all subjects which would not be given to the general government." The vesting of residuary powers in the provinces was an important difference between this and the scheme of confederation; but the point most dwelt upon by Dorion was the inclusion of the Maritime Provinces, which he strongly opposed.

Dorion denied that the difficulty about representation was the source of the movement for confederation. He contended that the agitation for representation by population had died out, and that the real authors of confederation were the owners of the Grand Trunk Railway Company, who stood to gain by the construction of the Intercolonial. "The Tache-Macdonald government were defeated because the House condemned them for taking without authority one hundred thousand dollars out of the public chest for the Grand Trunk Railway, at a time when there had not been a party vote on representation by population for one or two sessions." He declared that Macdonald had, in Brown's committee of 1864, voted against confederation, and that he and his colleagues adopted the scheme simply to enable them to remain in office. Dorion also criticized adversely the change in the constitution of the Upper Chamber, from the elective to the nominative system. The Conservative instincts of Macdonald and Cartier, he said, led them to strengthen the power of the Crown at the expense of the people, and this constitution was a specimen of their handiwork. "With a governor-general appointed by the Crown; with local governors also appointed by the Crown; with legislative councils in the general legislature, and in all the provinces, nominated by the Crown, we shall have the most illiberal constitution ever heard of in any government where constitutional government prevails."

He objected to the power vested in the governor-general-in-council to veto the acts of local legislatures. His expectation was that a minority in the local legislature might appeal to their party friends at Ottawa to veto laws which they disliked, and that thus there would be constant interference, agitation and strife between the central and the local authorities. He suspected that the intention was ultimately to change the federal union to a legislative union. The scheme of confederation was being carried without submission to the people. What would prevent the change from a federal to a legislative union from being accomplished in a similar way? To this the people of Lower Canada would not submit. "A million of inhabitants may seem a small affair to the mind of a philosopher who sits down to write out a constitution. He may think it would be better that there should be but one religion, one language and one system of laws; and he goes to work to frame institutions that will bring all to that desirable state; but I can tell the honourable gentleman that the history of every country goes to show that not even by the power of the sword can such changes be accomplished."

With some exaggeration Mr. Dorion struck at real faults in the scheme of confederation. The contention that the plan ought to have been submitted to the people is difficult to meet except upon the plea of necessity, or the plea that the end justifies the means. There was assuredly no warrant for depriving the people of the power of electing the second chamber; and the new method, appointment by the government of the day, has been as unsatisfactory in practice as it was unsound in principle. The federal veto on provincial laws has not been used to the extent that Dorion feared. But when we consider how partisan considerations have governed appointments to the senate, we can scarcely say that there was no ground for the fear that the power of disallowance would be similarly abused. Nor can we say that Mr. Dorion was needlessly anxious about provincial rights, when we remember how persistently these have been attacked, and what strength, skill and resolution have been required to defend them.



CHAPTER XVIII

THE MISSION TO ENGLAND

A new turn was given to the debate early in March by the defeat of the New Brunswick government in a general election, which meant a defeat for confederation, and by the arrival of news of an important debate in the House of Lords on the defences of Canada. The situation suddenly became critical. That part of the confederation scheme which related to the Maritime Provinces was in grave danger of failure. At the same time the long-standing controversy between the imperial and colonial authorities as to the defence of Canada had come to a head. The two subjects were intimately connected. The British government had been led to believe that if confederation were accomplished, the defensive power of Canada would be much increased, and the new union would be ready to assume larger obligations. From this time the tone of the debate is entirely changed. It ceases to be a philosophic deliberation of the merits of the new scheme. A note of urgency and anxiety is found in the ministerial speeches; the previous question is moved, and the proceedings hurried to a close, amid angry protests from the Opposition.

Mr. Brown wrote on March 5th: "We are going to have a great scene in the House to-day.... The government of New Brunswick appealed to the people on confederation by a general election, and have got beaten. This puts a serious obstacle in the way of our scheme, and we mean to act promptly and decidedly upon it. At three o'clock we are to announce the necessity of carrying the resolutions at once, sending home a deputation to England, and proroguing parliament without any unnecessary delay—say in a week."

The announcement was made to the House by Attorney-General Macdonald, who laid much stress on the disappointment that would be occasioned in England by the abandonment of a scheme by which Canadian colonies should cease to be a source of embarrassment, and become a source of strength. The question of confederation was intimately connected with the question of defence, and that was a question of the most imminent necessity. The provincial government had been in continued correspondence with the home government as to defence "against every hostile pressure, from whatever source it may come."

A lively debate ensued. John Sandfield Macdonald said that the defeat of the New Brunswick government meant the defeat of the larger scheme of confederation, unless it was intended that the people should be bribed into acquiescence or bullied into submission. "The Hon. Mr. Tilley and his followers are routed, horse and foot, by the honest people of the province, scouted by those whose interests he had betrayed, and whose behests he had neglected; and I think his fate ought to be a warning to those who adopted this scheme without authority, and who ask the House to ratify it en bloc, without seeking to obtain the sanction of the people." Later on he charged the ministers with the intention of manufacturing an entirely new bill, obtaining the sanction of the British government, and forcing it on the Canadian people, as was done in 1840.

This charge was hotly resented by Brown, and it drew from John A. Macdonald a more explicit statement of the intentions of the government. They would, if the legislature adopted the confederation resolutions, proceed to England, inform the imperial government of what had passed in Canada and New Brunswick, and take counsel with that government as to the affairs of Canada, especially in regard to defence and the reciprocity treaty. The legislature would then be called together again forthwith, the report of the conferences in England submitted, and the business relating to confederation completed.

On the following day Macdonald made another announcement, referring to a debate in the House of Lords on February 20th, which he regarded as of the utmost importance. A report made by a Colonel Jervois on the defences of Canada had been published, and the publication, exposing the extreme weakness of Canada, was regarded as an official indiscretion. It asserted that under the arrangements then existing British and Canadian forces together could not defend the colony. Lord Lyveden brought the question up in the House of Lords, and dwelt upon the gravity of the situation created by the defencelessness of Canada and by the hostility of the United States. He held that Great Britain must do one of two things: withdraw her troops and abandon the country altogether, or defend it with the full power of the empire. It was folly to send troops out in driblets, and spend money in the same way. The Earl de Grey and Ripon, replying for the government, said that Jervois' report contained nothing that was not previously known about the weakness of Canada. He explained the proposed arrangement by which the imperial government was to fortify Quebec at a cost of two hundred thousand pounds, and Canada would undertake the defence of Montreal and the West.[16]

Commenting on a report of this discussion, Mr. Macdonald said there had been negotiations between the two governments, and that he hoped these would result in full provision for the defence of Canada, both east and west. It was of the utmost importance that Canada should be represented in England at this juncture. In order to expedite the debate by shutting out amendments, he moved the previous question.

Macdonald's motion provoked charges of burking free discussion, and counter-charges of obstruction, want of patriotism and inclinations towards annexation. The debate lost its academic calm and became acrimonious. Holton's motion for an adjournment, for the purpose of obtaining further information as to the scheme, was ruled out of order. The same fate befell Dorion's motion for an adjournment of the debate and an appeal to the people, on the ground that it involved fundamental changes in the political institutions and political relations of the province; changes not contemplated at the last general election.

On March 12th the main motion adopting the resolutions of the Quebec conference was carried by ninety-one to thirty-three. On the following day an amendment similar to Dorion's, for an appeal to the people, was moved by the Hon. John Hillyard Cameron, of Peel, seconded by Matthew Crooks Cameron, of North Ontario. Undoubtedly the argument for submission to the people was strong, and was hardly met by Brown's vigorous speech in reply. But the overwhelming opinion of the House was against delay, and on March 13th the discussion came to an end.

The prospects for the inclusion of the Maritime Provinces were now poor. Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island withdrew. A strong feeling against confederation was arising in Nova Scotia, and it was proposed there to return to the original idea of a separate maritime union. It was decided to ask the aid of the British government in overcoming the hesitation of the Maritime Provinces. The British authorities were pressing Canada to assume increased obligations as to defence. Defence depended on confederation, and England, by exercising some friendly pressure on New Brunswick, might promote both objects.

The committee appointed to confer with the British government was composed of Macdonald, Brown, Cartier and Galt. They met in England a committee of the imperial cabinet, Gladstone, Cardwell, the Duke of Somerset and Earl de Grey and Ripon. An agreement was arrived at as to defence. Canada would undertake works of defence at and west of Montreal, and maintain a certain militia force; Great Britain would complete fortifications at Quebec, provide the whole armament and guarantee a loan for the sum necessary to construct the works undertaken by Canada, and in case of war would defend every portion of Canada with all the resources of the empire. An agreement was made as to the acquisition of the Hudson Bay Territory by Canada, and as to the influence to be brought to bear on the Maritime Provinces. "The idea of coercing the Maritime Provinces into the measure was never for a moment entertained." The end sought was to impress upon them the grave responsibility of thwarting a measure so pregnant with future prosperity to British America.

In spite of the mild language used in regard to New Brunswick, the fact that its consent was a vital part of the whole scheme must have been an incentive to heroic measures, and these were taken.

One of the causes of the defeat of the confederation government of New Brunswick had been the active hostility of the lieutenant-governor, Mr. Arthur Hamilton Gordon, son of the Earl of Aberdeen. He was strongly opposed to the change, and is believed to have gone to the limit of his authority in aiding and encouraging its opponents in the election of 1865. Soon afterwards he visited England, and it is believed that he was sent for by the home authorities and was taken to task for his conduct, and instructed to assist in carrying out confederation. A despatch from Cardwell, secretary of state for the colonies, to Governor Gordon, expressed the strong and deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's government in favour of a union of all the North American colonies.[17]

The governor carried out his instructions with the zeal of a convert, showed the despatch to the head of his government, set about converting him also, and believed he had been partly successful. The substance of the despatch was inserted in the speech from the throne, when the legislature met on March 8th, 1866. The legislative council adopted an address asking for imperial legislation to unite the British North American colonies. The governor, without waiting for the action of the assembly, made a reply to the council, expressing pleasure at their address, and declaring that he would transmit it to the secretary of state for the colonies. Thereupon the Smith ministry resigned, contending that they ought to have been consulted about the reply, that the council, not having been elected by the people, had no authority to ask the imperial parliament to pass a measure which the people of New Brunswick had expressly rejected at the polls. A protest in similar terms might have been made in the legislative assembly, but the opportunity was not given. A government favourable to confederation was formed under Peter Mitchell, with Tilley as his chief lieutenant, and the legislature was dissolved.

A threatened Fenian invasion helped to turn the tide of public opinion, and the confederate ministry was returned with a large majority. That result, however desirable, did not sanctify the means taken to bring about a verdict for confederation, which could hardly have been more arbitrary.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] Hansard, House of Lords, February 20th, 1865. See also a long and important debate in the British House of Commons, March 13th, 1865.

[17] Journals Canada, 1865, 2nd Session, pp. 8-15.



CHAPTER XIX

BROWN LEAVES THE COALITION

The series of events which gradually drew Mr. Brown out of the coalition began with the death of Sir Etienne P. Tache on July 30th, 1865. By his age, his long experience, and a certain mild benignity of disposition, Tache was admirably fitted to be the dean of the coalition and the arbiter between its elements. He had served in Reform and Conservative governments, but without incurring the reproach of overweening love of office. With his departure that of Brown became only a matter of time. To work with Macdonald as an equal was a sufficiently disagreeable duty; to work under him, considering the personal relations of the two men, would have been humiliating. Putting aside the question of where the blame for the long-standing feud lay, it was inevitable that the association should be temporary and brief. On August 3rd the governer-general asked Mr. Macdonald to form an administration. Mr. Macdonald consented, obtained the assent of Mr. Cartier and consulted Mr. Brown. I quote from an authorized memorandum of the conversation. "Mr. Brown replied that he was quite prepared to enter into arrangements for the continuance of the government in the same position as it occupied previous to the death of Sir Etienne P. Tache; but that the proposal now made involved a grave departure from that position. The government, heretofore, had been a coalition of three political parties, each represented by an active party leader, but all acting under one chief, who had ceased to be actuated by strong party feelings or personal ambitions, and who was well fitted to give confidence to all the three sections of the coalition that the conditions which united them would be carried out in good faith to the very letter. Mr. Macdonald, Mr. Cartier and himself [Mr. Brown] were, on the contrary, regarded as party leaders, with party feelings and aspirations, and to place any one of them in an attitude of superiority to the others, with the vast advantage of the premiership, would, in the public mind, lessen the security of good faith, and seriously endanger the existence of the coalition. It would be an entire change of the situation. Whichever of the three was so preferred, the act would amount to an abandonment of the coalition basis, and a reconstruction of the government on party lines under a party leader." When the coalition was formed, the Liberals were in a majority in the legislature; for reasons of State they had relinquished their party advantage, and a government was formed in which the Conservatives had nine members and the Liberals three. In what light would the Liberal party regard this new proposition? Mr. Brown suggested that an invitation be extended to some gentleman of good position in the legislative council, under whom all parties could act with confidence, as successor to Colonel Tache. So far as to the party. Speaking, however, for himself alone, Mr. Brown said he occupied the same position as in 1864. He stood prepared to give outside the ministry a frank and earnest support to any ministry that might be formed for the purpose of carrying out confederation.

Mr. Macdonald replied that he had no personal feeling as to the premiership, and would readily stand aside; and he suggested the name of Mr. Cartier, as leader of the French-Canadians. Mr. Brown said that it would be necessary for him to consult with his political friends. Sir Narcisse F. Belleau, a member of the executive council, was then proposed by Mr. Macdonald, and accepted by Mr. Brown, on condition that the policy of confederation should be stated in precise terms. Sir Narcisse Belleau became nominal prime minister of Canada, and the difficulty was tided over for a few months.

The arrangement, however, was a mere makeshift. The objections set forth by Brown to Macdonald's assuming the title of leader applied with equal force to his assuming the leadership in fact, as he necessarily did under Sir Narcisse Belleau; the discussion over this point, though couched in language of diplomatic courtesy, must have irritated both parties, and their relations grew steadily worse. The immediate and assigned cause of the rupture was a disagreement in regard to negotiations for the renewal of the reciprocity treaty. It is admitted that it was only in part the real cause, and would not have severed the relations between men who were personally and politically in sympathy.

Mr. Brown had taken a deep interest in the subject of reciprocity. In 1863 he was in communication with John Sandfield Macdonald, then premier of Canada, and Luther Holton, minister of finance. He dwelt on the importance of opening communication with the American government during the administration of Lincoln, whom he regarded as favourable to the renewal of the treaty. Seward, Lincoln's secretary of state, suggested that Canada should have an agent at Washington, with whom he and Lord Lyons, the British ambassador, could confer on Canadian matters. The premier asked Brown to go, saying that all his colleagues were agreed upon his eminent fitness for the mission. Brown declined the mission, contending that Mr. Holton, besides being fully qualified, was, by virtue of his official position as minister of finance, the proper person to represent Canada. He kept urging the importance of taking action early, before the American movement against the renewal of the treaty could gather headway. But neither the Macdonald-Sicotte government nor its successor lived long enough to take action, and the opportunity was lost. The coalition government was fully employed with other matters during 1864, and it was not until the spring of 1863 that the matter of reciprocity was taken up. In the summer of that year the imperial government authorized the formation of a confederate council on reciprocity, consisting of representation from Canada and the other North American colonies, and presided over by the governor-general. Brown and Galt were the representatives of Canada on the council.

Mr. Brown was in the Maritime Provinces in November, 1865, on government business. On his return to Toronto he was surprised to read in American papers a statement that Mr. Galt and Mr. Howland were negotiating with the Committee of Ways and Means at Washington. Explanations were given by Galt at a meeting of the cabinet at Ottawa on December 17th. Seward had told him that the treaty could not be renewed, but that something might be done by reciprocal legislation. After some demur, Mr. Galt went on to discuss the matter on that basis. He suggested the free exchange of natural products, and a designated list of manufactures. The customs duties on foreign goods were to be assimilated as far as possible. Inland waters and canals might be used in common, and maintained at the joint expense of the two countries. Mr. Galt followed up his narrative by proposing that a minute of council be adopted, ratifying what he had done, and authorizing him to proceed to Washington and continue the negotiations.

The discussion that followed lasted several days. Mr. Brown objected strongly to the proceeding. He declared that "Mr. Galt had flung at the heads of the Americans every concession that we had in our power to make, and some that we certainly could not make, so that our case was foreclosed before the commission was opened." He objected still more strongly to the plan of reciprocal legislation, which would keep the people of Canada "dangling from year to year on the legislation of the American congress, looking to Washington instead of to Ottawa as the controller of their commerce and prosperity." The scheme was admirably designed by the Americans to promote annexation. Before each congress the United States press would contain articles threatening ruin to Canadian trade. The Maritime Provinces would take offence at being ignored, and confederation as well as reciprocity might be lost. His own proposal was to treat Mr. Galt's proceedings at Washington as unofficial, call the confederate council, and begin anew to "make a dead set to have this reciprocal legislation idea upset before proceeding with the discussion."

Galt at length suggested a compromise. His proceedings at Washington were to be treated as unofficial, and no order-in-council passed. Galt and Howland were to be sent to Washington to obtain a treaty if possible, and if not to learn what terms could be arranged, and report to the government.

Brown regarded this motion as intended to remove him from the confederate council, and substitute Mr. Howland, and said so; but he declared that he would accept the compromise nevertheless. It appeared, however, that there had been a misunderstanding as to the recording of a minute of the proceedings. The first minute was withdrawn; but as Mr. Brown considered that the second minute still sanctioned the idea of reciprocal legislation, he refused to sign it, and decided to place his resignation in the hands of the premier, and to wait upon the governor-general. After hearing the explanation, His Excellency said: "Then, Mr. Brown, I am called upon to decide between your policy and that of the other members of the government?" Mr. Brown replied, "Yes, sir, and if I am allowed to give advice in the matter, I should say that the government ought to be sustained, though the decision is against myself. I consider the great question of confederation as of far greater consequence to the country than reciprocity negotiations. My resignation may aid in preventing their policy on the reciprocity question from being carried out, or at least call forth a full expression of opinion on the subject, and the government should be sustained, if wrong in this, for the sake of confederation."

The debate in council had occupied several days, and had evidently aroused strong feelings. Undoubtedly Mr. Brown's decision was affected by the affront that he considered had been put upon him by virtually removing him from the confederate council and sending Mr. Howland instead of himself to Washington as the colleague of Mr. Galt. He disapproved on public grounds of the policy of the government, and he resented the manner in which he had been ignored throughout the transaction. On the day after the rupture Mr. Cartier wrote Mr. Brown asking him whether he could reconsider his resignation. Mr. Brown replied, "I have received your kind note, and think it right to state frankly at once that the step I have taken cannot be revoked. The interests involved are too great. I think a very great blunder has been committed in a matter involving the most important interests of the country, and that the order-in-council you have passed endorses that blunder and authorizes persistence in it.... I confess I was much annoyed at the personal affront offered me, but that feeling has passed away in view of the serious character of the matter at issue, which casts all personal feeling aside."

If it were necessary to seek for justification of Mr. Brown's action in leaving the ministry at this time, it might be found either in his disagreement with the government on the question of policy, or in the treatment accorded to him by his colleagues. Sandfield Macdonald and his colleagues had on a former occasion recognized Mr. Brown's eminent fitness to represent Canada in the negotiations at Washington, not only because of his thorough acquaintance with the subject, but because of his steadily maintained attitude of friendship for the North. He was a member of the confederate council on reciprocity. His position in the ministry was not that of a subordinate, but of the representative of a powerful party. In resenting the manner in which his position was ignored, he does not seem to have exceeded the bounds of proper self-assertion. However, this controversy assumes less importance if it is recognized that the rupture was inevitable. The precise time or occasion is of less importance than the force which was always and under all circumstances operating to draw Mr. Brown away from an association injurious to himself and to Liberalism, in its broad sense as well as in its party sense, and to his influence as a public man. This had better be considered in another place.



CHAPTER XX

CONFEDERATION AND THE PARTIES

We are to consider now the long-vexed question of the connection of Mr. Brown with the coalition of 1864. Ought he to have entered the coalition government? Having entered it, was he justified in leaving it in 1865? Holton and Dorion told him that by his action in 1864, he had sacrificed his own party interests to those of John A. Macdonald; that Macdonald was in serious political difficulty, and had been defeated in the legislature; that he seized upon Brown's suggestion merely as a means of keeping himself in office; that for the sake of office he accepted the idea of confederation, after having voted against it in Brown's committee. A most wise and faithful friend, Alexander Mackenzie, thought that Reformers should accept no representation in the cabinet, but that they should give confederation an outside support. That Macdonald and his party were immensely benefitted by Brown's action, there can be no doubt. For several years they had either been in Opposition, or in office under a most precarious tenure, depending entirely upon a majority from Lower Canada. By Brown's action they were suddenly invested with an overwhelming majority, and they had an interrupted lease of power for the nine years between the coalition and the Pacific Scandal. Admitting that the interest of the country warranted this sacrifice of the interests of the Liberal party, we have still to consider whether it was wise for Mr. Brown to enter the ministry, and especially to enter it on the conditions that existed. The Lower Canadian Liberals were not represented, partly because Dorion and Holton held back, and partly because of the prejudice of Tache and Cartier against the Rouges; and this exclusion was a serious defect in a ministry supposed to be formed on a broad and patriotic basis. The result was, that while the Liberals were in a majority in the legislature, they had only three representatives in a ministry of twelve. Such a government, with its dominant Conservative section led by a master in the handling of political combinations, was bound to lose its character of a coalition, and become Conservative out and out.

A broader question is involved than that of the mere party advantage obtained by Macdonald and his party in the retention of power and patronage. There was grave danger to the essential principles of Liberalism, of which Brown was the appointed guardian. Holton put this in a remarkable way during the debate on confederation. It was at the time when Macdonald had moved the previous question, when the coalition government was hurrying the debate to a conclusion, in the face of indignant protests and demands that the scheme should be submitted to the people. Holton told Brown that he had destroyed the Liberal party. Henceforth its members would be known as those who once ranged themselves together, in Upper and Lower Canada, under the Liberal banner. Then followed this remarkable appeal to his old friend: "Most of us remember—those of us who have been for a few years in public life in this country must remember—a very striking speech delivered by the honourable member for South Oxford in Toronto in the session of 1856 or 1857, in which he described the path of the attorney-general [Macdonald] as studded all along by the gravestones of his slaughtered colleagues. Well, there are not wanting those who think they can descry, in the not very remote distance, a yawning grave waiting for the noblest victim of them all. And I very much fear that unless the honourable gentleman has the courage to assert his own original strength—and he has great strength—and to discard the blandishments and the sweets of office, and to plant himself where he stood formerly, in the affections and confidence of the people of this country, as the foremost defender of the rights of the people, as the foremost champion of the privileges of a free parliament—unless he hastens to do that, I very much fear that he too may fall a victim, the noblest victim of them all, to the arts, if not the arms of the fell destroyer."

There was a little humorous exaggeration in the personal references to Macdonald, for Holton and he were on friendly terms. But there was also matter for serious thought in his words. Though Macdonald had outgrown the fossil Toryism that opposed responsible government, he was essentially Conservative; and there was something not democratic in his habit of dealing with individuals rather than with people in the mass, and of accomplishing his ends by private letters and interviews, and by other forms of personal influence, rather than by the public advocacy of causes. Association with him was injurious to men of essentially Liberal and democratic tendencies, and subordination was fatal, if not to their usefulness, at least to their Liberal ideals. Macdougall and Howland remained in the ministry until confederation was achieved, and found reasons for remaining there afterwards. At the Reform convention of 1867, when the relation of the Liberal party to the so-called coalition was considered, they defended their position with skill and force, but the association of one with Macdonald was very brief, and of the other very unhappy. Mr. Howland was not a very keen politician, and a year after confederation was accomplished he accepted the position of lieutenant-governor of Ontario. Mr. Macdougall had an unsatisfactory career as a minister, with an unhappy termination. He was clearly out of his element. Mr. Tilley was described as a Liberal, but there was nothing to distinguish him from his Conservative colleagues in his methods or his utterances, and he became the champion of the essentially Conservative policy of protection.

But the most notable example of the truth of Holton's words and the soundness of his advice was Joseph Howe. Howe was in Nova Scotia "the foremost defender of the rights of people, the foremost champion of the privileges of free parliaments." He had opposed the inclusion of Nova Scotia on the solid ground that it was accomplished by arbitrary means. At length he bowed to the inevitable. In ceasing to encourage a useless and dangerous agitation he stood on patriotic ground. But in an evil hour he was persuaded to seal his submission by joining the Macdonald government, and thenceforth his influence was at an end. His biographer says that Howe's four years in Sir John Macdonald's cabinet are the least glorious of his whole career. "Howe had been accustomed all his life to lead and control events. He found himself a member of a government of which Sir John Macdonald was the supreme head, and of a cast of mind totally different from his own. Sir John Macdonald was a shrewd political manager, an opportunist whose unfailing judgment led him unerringly to pursue the course most likely to succeed each hour, each day, each year. Howe had the genius of a bold Reformer, a courageous and creative type of mind, who thought in continents, dreamed dreams and conceived great ideas. Sir John Macdonald busied himself with what concerned the immediate interests of the hour in which he was then living, and yet Sir John Macdonald was a leader who permitted no insubordination. Sir Georges Cartier, a man not to be named in the same breath with Howe as a statesman, was, nevertheless, a thousand times of more moment and concern with his band of Bleu followers in the House of Commons, than a dozen Howes, and the consequence is that we find for four years the great old man playing second fiddle to his inferiors, and cutting a far from heroic figure in the arena."[18] What Holton said by way of warning to Brown was realized in the case of Howe. He was "the noblest victim of them all."

From the point of view of Liberalism and of his influence as a public man, Brown did not leave the ministry a moment too soon; and there is much to be said in favour of Mackenzie's view that he ought to have refused to enter the coalition at all, and confined himself to giving his general support to confederation. By this means he would not have been responsible for the methods by which the new constitution was brought into effect, methods that were in many respects repugnant to those essential principles of Liberalism of which Brown had been one of the foremost champions. At almost every stage in the proceedings there was a violation of those rights of self-government which had been so hardly won by Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. The Quebec conference was a meeting of persons who had been chosen to administer the affairs of the various British provinces under their established constitutions, not to make a new constitution. Its deliberations were secret. It proceeded, without a mandate from the people, to create a new governing body, whose powers were obtained at the expense of those of the provinces. With the same lack of popular authority, it declared that the provinces should have only those powers which were expressly designated, and that the reserve of power should be in the central governing body. Had this body been created for the Canadas alone, this proceeding might have been justified, for they were already joined in a legislative union, though by practice and consent some features of federalism prevailed. But Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were separate, self-governing communities, and it was for them, not for the Quebec conference, to say what powers they would grant and what powers they would retain. Again the people of Canada had declared that the second chamber should be elected, not appointed by the Crown. The Quebec conference, without consulting the people of Canada, reverted to the discarded system of nomination, and added the senate to the vast body of patronage at the disposal of the federal government. The constitution adopted by this body was not, except in the case of New Brunswick, submitted to the people, and it can hardly be said that it was freely debated in the parliament of Canada, for it was declared that it was in the nature of a treaty, and must be accepted or rejected as a whole. In the midst of this debate the people of New Brunswick passed upon the scheme in a general election, and condemned it in the most decisive and explicit way. The British government was then induced to bring pressure to bear upon the province; and while it was contended that this pressure was only in the form of friendly advice it was otherwise interpreted by the governor, who strained his powers to compel the ministry to act in direct contravention of its mandate from the people, and when it resisted, forced it out of office. It is true that in a subsequent election this decision was reversed; but that is not a justification for the means adopted to bring about this result. It is no exaggeration to say that Nova Scotia was forced into the union against the express desire of a large majority of its people. There are arguments by which these proceedings may be defended, but they are not arguments that lie in the mouth of a Liberal. And if we say that the confederation, in spite of these taints in its origin, has worked well and has solved the difficulties of Canada, we use an argument which might justify the forcible annexation of a country by a powerful neighbour.

Again, there was much force in Dorion's contention that the new constitution was an illiberal constitution, increasing those powers of the executive which were already too large. To the inordinate strength of the executive, under the delusive name of the Crown, may be traced many of the worst evils of Canadian politics: the abuse of the prerogative of dissolution, the delay in holding bye-elections, the gerrymandering of the constituencies by a parliament registering the decree of a government. To these powers of the government the Confederation Act added that of filling one branch of the legislature with its own nominees. By the power of disallowance, by the equivocal language used in regard to education, and in regard to the creation of new provinces, pretexts were furnished for federal interference in local affairs. But for the resolute opposition of Mowat and his colleagues, the subordination of the provinces to the central authority would have gone very far towards realizing Macdonald's ideal of a legislative union; and recent events have shown that the danger of centralization is by no means at an end.

It was a true, liberal and patriotic impulse that induced Brown to offer his aid in breaking the dead-lock of 1864. He desired that Upper Canada should be fairly represented in parliament, and should have freedom to manage its local affairs. He desired that the Maritime Provinces and the North-West should, in the course of time, be brought in on similar terms of freedom. But by joining the coalition he became a participant in a different course of procedure; and if we give him a large, perhaps the largest share, of the credit for the ultimate benefits of confederation, we cannot divest him of responsibility for the methods by which it was brought about, so long, at least, as he remained a member of the government.

In the year and a half that elapsed between his withdrawal from the government and the first general election under the new constitution, he had a somewhat difficult part to play. He had to aid in the work of carrying confederation, and at the same time to aid in the work of re-organizing the Liberal party, which had been temporarily divided and weakened by the new issue introduced into politics. In the Reform convention of 1867 the attitude of the party towards confederation was considered. It was resolved that "while the new constitution contained obvious defects, it was, on the whole, based upon equitable principles and should be accepted with the determination to work it loyally and patiently, and to provide such amendments as experience from year to year may prove to be expedient." It was declared that coalitions of opposing political parties for ordinary administrative purposes resulted in corruption, extravagance and the abandonment of principle; that the coalition of 1864 could be justified only on the ground of imperious necessity, as the only available means of obtaining just representation for Upper Canada, and should come to an end when that object was attained; and that the temporary alliance of the Reform and Conservative parties should cease. Howland and Macdougall, who had decided to remain in the ministry, strove to maintain that it was a true coalition, and that the old issues that divided the parties were at an end; and their bearing before a hostile audience was tactful and courageous. But Brown and his friends carried all before them.

Brown argued strongly against the proposal to turn the coalition formed for confederation into a coalition for ordinary administrative purposes; and in a passage of unusual fervour he asked whether his Reform friends were to be subjected to the humiliation of following in the train of John A. Macdonald.

It is difficult to understand how so chimerical a notion as a non-party government led by Macdonald could have been entertained by practical politicians. A permanent position in a Macdonald ministry would have been out of the question for Brown, not only because of his standing as a public man, but because of his control of the Globe, which under such an arrangement would have been reduced to the position of an organ of the Conservative government. There were also all the elements of a powerful Liberal party, which soon after confederation rallied its forces and overthrew Sir John Macdonald's government at Ottawa, and the coalition government he had established at Toronto. Giving Macdougall every credit for good intentions, it must be admitted that he committed an error in casting in his political fortunes with Sir John Macdonald, and that both he and Joseph Howe would have found more freedom, more scope for their energies and a wider field of usefulness, in fighting by the side of Mackenzie and Blake.

FOOTNOTES:

[18] Longley's Joseph Howe, "Makers of Canada" series, pp. 228, 229.



CHAPTER XXI

CANADA AND THE GREAT WEST

Very soon after his arrival in Canada, Mr. Brown became deeply interested in the North-West Territories. He was thrown into contact with men who knew the value of the country and desired to see it opened for settlement. One of these was Robert Baldwin Sullivan, who, during the struggle for responsible government, wrote a series of brilliant letters over the signature of "Legion" advocating that principle, and who was for a time provincial secretary in the Baldwin-Lafontaine government. In 1847, Mr. Sullivan delivered, in the Mechanics' Institute, Toronto, an address on the North-West Territories, which was published in full in the Globe. The Oregon settlement had recently been made, and the great westward trek of the Americans was in progress. Sullivan uttered the warning that the Americans would occupy and become masters of the British western territory, and outflank Canada, unless steps were taken to settle and develop it by British subjects. There was at this time much misconception of the character of the country, and one is surprised by the very accurate knowledge shown by Mr. Sullivan in regard to the resources of the country, its coal measures as well as its wheat fields.

Mr. Brown also obtained much information and assistance from Mr. Isbester, a "native of the country, who by his energy, ability and intelligence had raised himself from the position of a successful scholar at one of the schools of the settlement to that of a graduate of one of the British universities, and to a teacher of considerable rank. This gentleman had succeeded in inducing prominent members of the House of Commons to interest themselves in the subject of appeals which, through him, were constantly being made against the injustice and persecution which the colonists of the Red River Settlement were suffering."[19]

Mr. Brown said that his attention was first drawn to the subject by a deputation sent to England by the people of the Red River Settlement to complain that the country was ill-governed by the Hudson's Bay Company, and to pray that the territory might be thrown open for settlement. "The movement," said Mr. Brown, "was well received by the most prominent statesmen of Britain. The absurdity of so vast a country remaining in the hands of a trading company was readily admitted; and I well remember that Mr. Gladstone then made an excellent speech in the Commons, as he has recently done, admitting that the charter of the company was not valid, and that the matter should be dealt with by legislation. But the difficulty that constantly presented itself was what should be done with the territory were the charter broken up; what government should replace that of the company. The idea struck Mr. Isbester, a most able and enlightened member of the Red River deputation to London, that this difficulty would be met at once were Canada to step in and claim the right to the territory. Through a mutual friend, I was communicated with on the subject, and agreed to have the question thoroughly agitated before the expiry of the company's charter in 1859. I have since given the subject some study, and have on various occasions brought it before the public." Mr. Brown referred to the matter in his maiden speech in parliament in 1851, and in 1854 and again in 1856 he gave notice of motion for a committee of inquiry, but was interrupted by other business. In 1852, the Globe contained an article so remarkable in its knowledge of the country that it may be reproduced here in part.

"It is a remarkable circumstance that so little attention has been paid in Canada to the immense tract of country lying to the north of our boundary line, and known as the Hudson's Bay Company's Territory. There can be no question that the injurious and demoralizing sway of that company over a region of four millions of square miles, will, ere long, be brought to an end, and that the destinies of this immense country will be united with our own. It is unpardonable that civilization should be excluded from half a continent, on at best but a doubtful right of ownership, for the benefit of two hundred and thirty-two shareholders.

"Our present purpose is not, however, with the validity of the Hudson's Bay Company's claim to the country north of the Canadian line—but to call attention to the value of that region, and the vast commercial importance to the country and especially to this section, which must, ere long, attach to it. The too general impression entertained is, that the territory in question is a frozen wilderness, incapable of cultivation and utterly unfit for colonization. This impression was undoubtedly set afloat, and has been maintained, for its own very evident purposes. So long as that opinion could be kept up, their charter was not likely to be disturbed. But light has been breaking in on the subject in spite of their efforts to keep it out. In a recent work by Mr. Edward Fitzgerald, it is stated that 'there is not a more favourable situation on the face of the earth for the employment of agricultural industry than the locality of the Red River.' Mr. Fitzgerald asserts that there are five hundred thousand square miles of soil, a great part of which is favourable for settlement and agriculture, and all so well supplied with game as to give great facility for colonization. Here is a field for Canadian enterprise.

"The distance between Fort William and the Red River Settlement is about five hundred miles, and there is said to be water communication by river and lake all the way. But westward, beyond the Red River Settlement, there is said to be a magnificent country, through which the Saskatchewan River extends, and is navigable for boats and canoes through a course of one thousand four hundred miles.

"Much has been said of the extreme cold of the country, as indicated by the thermometer. It is well known, however, that it is not the degree but the character of the cold which renders it obnoxious to men, and the climate of this country is quite as agreeable, if not more so, than the best part of Canada. The height of the latitude gives no clue whatever to the degree of cold or to the nature of the climate.

"Let any one look at the map, and if he can fancy the tenth part that is affirmed of the wide region of country stretching westward to the Rocky Mountains, he may form some idea of the profitable commerce which will soon pass through Lake Superior. Independent of the hope that the high road to the Pacific may yet take this direction, there is a field for enterprise presented, sufficient to satiate the warmest imagination."

It was not, however, until the year 1856 that public attention was aroused to the importance of the subject. In the autumn of that year there was a series of letters in the Globe signed "Huron," drawing attention to the importance of the western country, attacking the administration of the Hudson's Bay Company, and suggesting that the inhabitants, unless relieved, might seek to place the country under American government. In December 1856, there was a meeting of the Toronto Board of Trade at which addresses were delivered by Alan McDonnell and Captain Kennedy. Captain Kennedy said that he had lived for a quarter of a century in the territory in question, had eight or nine years before the meeting endeavoured to call attention to the country through the newspapers and had written a letter to Lord Elgin. He declared that the most important work before Canada was the settlement of two hundred and seventy-nine million acres of land lying west of the Lakes. The Board of Trade passed a resolution declaring that the claim of the Hudson's Bay Company to the exclusive right to trade in the country was injurious to the rights of the people of the territory and of British North America. The Board also petitioned the legislature to ascertain the rights of the Hudson's Bay Company, and to protect the interests of Canada. A few days afterwards the Globe said that the time had come to act, and thenceforward it carried on a vigorous campaign for the opening up of the territory to settlement and the establishment of communication with Canada.

During the year 1856, Mr. Brown addressed many meetings on the subject of the working of the union. He opposed the separation of the Canadas, proposed by some as a measure of relief for the grievances of Upper Canada. This would bring Canada back to the day of small things; he advocated expansion to the westward. William Macdougall, then a member of the Globe staff, was also an enthusiastic advocate of the union of the North-West Territories with Canada. In an article reviewing the events of the year 1856, the Globe said: "This year will be remembered as that in which the public mind was first aroused to the necessity of uniting to Canada the great tract of British American territory lying to the north-west, then in the occupation of a great trading monopoly. The year 1856 has only seen the birth of this movement. Let us hope that 1857 will see it crowned with success."

In January 1857, a convention of Reformers in Toronto adopted a platform including free trade, uniform legislation for both provinces, representation by population, national and non-sectarian education, and the incorporation of the Hudson Bay Territory. It was resolved "that the country known as the Hudson Bay Territory ought no longer to be cut off from civilization, that it is the duty of the legislature and executive of Canada to open negotiations with the imperial government for the incorporation of the said territory as Canadian soil."

The Globe's proposals at this early date provoked the merriment of some of its contemporaries. The Niagara Mail, January 1857, said: "The Toronto Globe comes out with a new and remarkable platform, one of the planks of which is the annexation of the frozen regions of the Hudson Bay Territory to Canada. Lord have mercy on us! Canada has already a stiff reputation for cold in the world, but it is unfeeling in the Globe to want to make it deserve the reproach." The Globe advised its contemporary not to commit itself hastily against the annexation of the North-West, "for it will assuredly be one of the strongest planks in our platform."

Another sceptic was the Montreal Transcript, which declared that the fertile spots in the territory were small and separated by immense distances, and described the Red River region as an oasis in the midst of a desert, "a vast treeless prairie on which scarcely a shrub is to be seen." The climate was unfavourable to the growth of grain. The summer, though warm enough, was too short in duration, so that even the few fertile spots could "with difficulty mature a small potato or cabbage." The subject seemed to be constantly in Brown's mind, and he referred to it frequently in public addresses. After the general election of 1857-8 a banquet was given at Belleville to celebrate the return of Mr. Wallbridge for Hastings. Mr. Brown there referred to a proposal to dissolve the union. He was for giving the union a fair trial. "Who can look at the map of this continent and mark the vast portion of it acknowledging British sovereignty, without feeling that union and not separation ought to be the foremost principle with British American statesmen? Who that examines the condition of the several provinces which constitute British America, can fail to feel that with the people of Canada must mainly rest the noble task, at no distant date, of consolidating these provinces, aye, and of redeeming to civilization and peopling with new life the vast territories to our north, now so unworthily held by the Hudson's Bay Company. Who cannot see that Providence has entrusted to us the building up of a great northern people, fit to cope with our neighbours of the United States, and to advance step by step with them in the march of civilization? Sir, it is my fervent aspiration and belief that some here to-night may live to see the day when the British American flag shall proudly wave from Labrador to Vancouver Island and from our own Niagara to the shores of Hudson Bay. Look abroad over the world and tell me what country possesses the advantages, if she but uses them aright, for achieving such a future, as Canada enjoys—a fertile soil, a healthful climate, a hardy and frugal people, with great mineral resources, noble rivers, boundless forests. We have within our grasp all the elements of prosperity. We are free from the thousand time-honoured evils and abuses that afflict and retard the nations of the Old World. Not even our neighbours of the United States occupy an equal position of advantage, for we have not the canker-worm of domestic slavery to blight our tree of liberty. And greater than these, we are but commencing our career as a people, our institutions have yet to be established. We are free to look abroad over the earth and study the lessons of wisdom taught by the history of older countries, and choose those systems and those laws and customs that experience has shown best for advancing the moral and material interests of the human family."[20]

As a member of the coalition of 1864, Brown had an opportunity to promote his long-cherished object of adding the North-West Territories to Canada. There had been some communication between the British and Canadian governments, and in November 1864, the latter government said that Canada was anxious to secure the settlement of the West and the establishment of local governments. As the Hudson's Bay Company worked under an English charter, it was for that government to extinguish its rights and give Canada a clear title. Canada would then annex, govern and open up communication with the territory. When Brown accompanied Macdonald, Cartier and Galt to England in 1865, this matter was taken up, and an agreement was arrived at which was reported to the Canadian legislature in the second session of 1865. The committee said that calling to mind the vital importance to Canada of having that great and fertile country open to Canadian enterprise and the tide of emigration into it directed through Canadian channels, remembering the danger of large grants of land passing into the hands of mere money corporations, and the risk that the recent discoveries of gold on the eastern slope of the Rocky Mountains might throw into the country large masses of settlers unaccustomed to British institutions, they arrived at the conclusion that the quickest solution of the question would be the best for Canada. They therefore proposed that the whole territory east of the Rockies and north of the American or Canadian line should be made over to Canada, subject to the rights of the Hudson's Bay Company; and that the compensation to be made by Canada to the company should be met by a loan guaranteed by the British government. To this, the imperial government consented.

The subsequent history of the acquisition of the West need not be told here. In this case, as in others, Brown was a pioneer in a work which others finished. But his services were generously acknowledged by Sir John Macdonald, who said in the House of Commons in 1875: "From the first time that he had entered parliament, the people of Canada looked forward to a western extension of territory, and from the time he was first a minister, in 1854, the question was brought up time and again, and pressed with great ability and force by the Hon. George Brown, who was then a prominent man in opposition to the government."