Writing on February 22nd, Gordon says:—

"I have all my old servants back, and it is like old times again. I have not minced matters with the Pashas; it was useless to do so. We have thousands of petitions daily. I have ordered an Arabic text, 'God rules the hearts of all men,' to be put up over my throne, to which I can refer when people come to me in fear.... There is, of course, a very mixed sort of feeling here about the evacuation of the Soudan; the civil employes do not desire it, for the half taxes will cause their pay to be diminished by half, and the personnel reduced."

From Mr. Power's interesting correspondence we get pleasant little peeps at the private life of the great hero:—

"Gordon is a most lovable character—quiet, mild, gentle and strong; he is so humble too. The way he pats you on the shoulder when he says, 'Look here, dear fellow, now what would you advise?' would make you love him. When he goes out of doors there are always crowds of Arab men and women at the gate to kiss his feet, and twice to-day the furious women, wishing to lift his feet to kiss them, threw him over. He likes my going so much amongst the natives, for not to do so is a mortal sin in his eyes.... It is wonderful that one man could have such an influence on 200,000 people. Numbers of women flock here every day to ask him to touch their children to cure them; they call him the 'Father and the Saviour of the Soudan.' He has found me badly up in Thomas a Kempis, which he reads every day, and has given me an 'Imitation of Christ.' He is indeed, I believe, the greatest and best man of this century....

"I like Gordon more and more every day; he has a most lovable manner and disposition, and is so kind to me. He is glad if you show the smallest desire to help him in his great trouble. How one man could have dared to attempt his task, I wonder. One day of his work and bother would kill another man, yet he is so cheerful at breakfast, lunch, and dinner; but I know he suffers fearfully from low spirits. I hear him walking up and down his room all night (it is next to mine). It is only his great piety carries him through. He and I agree in a great many religious views."

Mr. Power being an Irishman and a Roman Catholic, while General Gordon was a Scotchman and a member of the Church of England, such testimony speaks volumes for the General as well as for the writer. There can be little doubt that General Gordon had not known the brave young Irishman long, before he had cast over him that fascinating spell which invariably attracted and charmed young men. Cowper tells us that—

"Truth embodied in a tale, Shall entrance find at lowliest doors."

Might not the poet have added that truth embodied in a life shall be even more efficacious in obtaining an entrance? Power's life was cut short before he had an opportunity of doing much in the world, but the little that he was permitted to do shows us that he too was made of that stuff which produces heroes; and as long as our country has such men in reserve to fall back upon in times of emergency, there need be no fear of her not being able to maintain her supremacy among nations.

How unwavering was Gordon's faith in the providence of God, even in the midst of difficulties that would have appalled most men, is shown by the following letter:—

"February 27, 1884.—I have sent Stewart off to scour the river White Nile, and another expedition to push back the rebels on the Blue Nile. With Stewart has also gone Power, the British Consul and Times correspondent, so I am left alone in the vast palace of which you have a photograph, but not alone, for I feel great confidence in my Saviour's presence.

"The peculiar pain, which comes from the excessive anxiety one cannot help being in for these people, comes back to me at times. I think that our Lord, sitting over Jerusalem, is ruling all things to the glory of His kingdom, and cannot wish things were different than they are, for, if I did so, then I wish my will not His to be done. The Soudan is a ruin, and, humanly speaking, there is no hope. Either I must believe He does all things in mercy and love, or else I disbelieve His existence; there is no half-way in the matter. What holes do I not put myself into! And for what? So mixed are my ideas. I believe ambition put me here in this ruin; however, I trust and stay myself on the fact that not one sparrow falls to the ground without our Lord's permission; also that enough for the day is the evil. 'God provideth by the way, strength sufficient for the day.'

"March 1, 1884.—We are all right at present, and I have hope, but certainly things are not in a good way; humanly speaking, Baker's defeat at Suakim has been a great disaster, and now it has its effects up here. 'It is nothing to our God to help with many or with few,' and I now take my worries more quietly than before, for all things are ruled by Him for His glory, and it is rebellion to murmur against His will. Excuse a long letter."[14]

[14] This letter of 27th February and 1st March has been presented to the Trustees of the British Museum, and is now exhibited in the Manuscript Department.

It may be well at this point to consider the position of General Gordon in his official relationship to the Egyptian and English Governments, for it is impossible to understand subsequent events accurately, without a proper apprehension of the exact state of affairs. When Gordon was first sent out, his instructions were merely "to report to Her Majesty's Government on the military situation in the Soudan, and on the measures which it might be deemed advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding positions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartoum, &c., &c." Added, however, to these instructions was an insignificant clause to which no one at the time attached much importance, and which ran as follows, "You will consider yourself authorised and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring." The Egyptian Government decided to make Gordon Governor-General of the Soudan, and the Khedive gave into his hands all the absolute power that he himself possessed; this appointment was sanctioned by the British Government, and officially communicated to Gordon by Sir E. Baring. In view of this appointment, most readers will concur in the opinion of Mr. Egmont Hake, the editor of Gordon's Journals, that "it is as unfair as it is illogical to talk about General Gordon having exceeded the instructions conveyed to him by Her Majesty's Government." The real truth is that it was impossible for Gordon to exceed his instructions. He himself again and again contended that while it was open to the Khedive to cancel the appointment, until that was done he was absolutely master of the situation, to do as he thought best for the good of the country.

It must not, however, be supposed that General Gordon availed himself of a flaw in his instructions to carry out a policy of his own. On the contrary, he clearly understood from the British Government that evacuation was what was required, and that all the Egyptian employes must be given a chance of leaving the Soudan if possible. From beginning to end this was the one thing he held out as the object at which he aimed. All the suggestions he put forward were made with this end in view, and he never swerved from it. He was in reality more true to the instructions he received than were those who issued them. No sooner had he got into the country, and grasped the actual state of affairs, than he saw that things were looking very serious. The interval between Hicks's defeat and his own arrival had been too prolonged. People who might have been loyal had lost heart and gone over to the Mahdi. Added to this, Gordon had himself made public the fact that the country was to be evacuated, so all who intended to remain behind saw that their best policy was to throw in their lot with the Mahdi. Gordon blamed himself sometimes for having made known the intentions of the Government, but it is questionable if such an important fact could have been long kept secret. At all events, when he openly promulgated it as Governor-General, he thought, and many thought with him, that he was taking the line most likely to lead to a peaceful solution.

* * *

General Gordon did not take long to make up his mind, and soon after his arrival in Khartoum he astonished the English people by two steps he took. The first was the issue of a proclamation announcing that the institution of slavery was not to be interfered with in any way; the second was an application that his old enemy, Zebehr Rahama, the great slave-dealer, should be sent up to govern the Soudan. At first sight Gordon's action was amazing; but when it is more carefully examined in the light of facts, it cannot be blamed. To take the proclamation first, it must be apparent to any one that when it was decided that the Soudan was to be given up, and that thenceforth neither Egypt nor England should interfere in its internal affairs, it would have been ridiculous to go on talking about the abolition of slavery. Gordon had to face a fanatical body of Mohammedans who, rightly or wrongly, looked upon slavery as a religious institution. The feeling of the country was strongly in favour of slavery, and if the country was to be left to itself slavery would continue to exist. Gordon did but make a virtue of a necessity, and announce that henceforth outsiders would not interfere in the matter. Thus he took the wind out of the sails of the Mahdi and his party, who could not say that they were fighting on behalf of one of their religious institutions.

The proposal to the English Government that Zebehr should be made ruler of the Soudan, was, as Mr. Hake truly says, "one of those daring strokes of policy which made his tactics unlike those of other men." The telegram reached England on February 18, and must at first have caused some of the Cabinet Ministers to think that Gordon had lost his head. The last that they had heard on the subject of Gordon's relationship with Zebehr, was the suggestion of the former that the latter should be sent as a prisoner to Cyprus, to get him out of Egypt, where he thought he might give trouble. No wonder, then, if the ministers were astonished to hear that their representative had changed his mind so completely as to propose that instead of being imprisoned in Cyprus, his enemy should be sent to govern the Soudan!

Those who have followed Gordon's tactics closely will not wonder so much at the proposal. Indeed it seems to have been a part of his creed to utilise his enemies, and thus if possible to turn them into friends. In China he frequently enlisted hundreds of prisoners of war, converted them into staunchest allies, and led them to victory against their old comrades. He now wanted to apply in the case of Zebehr the principles he had found so effective elsewhere. So long as he did not see his way to utilising this king of slave-hunters, he desired to have him kept out of the way, but when his brilliant genius saw a way of turning his old foe into a friend, he asked for his services. Unfortunately, Gordon was not in the position of a Napoleon: he was hampered in the carrying out of his brilliant designs by those at home, who had neither his knowledge nor his capacity.

With regard to the proposed appointment of the great slave-hunter to be King of the Soudan, opinions even now differ greatly. Lord Wolseley, Sir Evelyn Baring, and most well-informed people are agreed that the recommendation ought to have been acted upon, and that its adoption would have been the means of saving many valuable lives, including Gordon's, and of placing the Soudan under an authoritative government, which it has not yet obtained. But the English Cabinet felt that public opinion would be strongly opposed to such a step, and therefore they would not sanction it.

When Gordon left Cairo for Khartoum he thought that the best plan for the Soudan, when the Egyptian Government withdrew, would be to replace it by the heirs of the petty Sultans, who had been deprived of their power when the Soudan was annexed by Mehemet Ali. But when he saw the real state of affairs, he felt that these disunited kinglets would not be strong enough to resist the power of the Mahdi. As for the Mahdi, he was too much of a religious fanatic to have the government of the Soudan put into his hands. He was ambitious as well as fanatical; his object was to overrun the whole world. Directly he ceased to be a conqueror, his people would cease to believe in his Divine mission, and he would lose his power. At that time he possessed great power, and Gordon felt that there must be a still more powerful man set up. There was only one such man alive, and he was a prisoner at Cairo. The argument against Zebehr was that he had been an inveterate slave-hunter, and that to put him into supreme power would be to give him unlimited means of gratifying his vices. Against this it must be urged that under the Mahdi's rule the kidnapping of slaves would be just as cruelly carried on as under that of Zebehr. Also that with Zebehr, being a prisoner, it would be possible to make certain stipulations on the subject of slave-hunting. Moreover, it was Gordon's intention eventually to annex, for the Congo State, the great slave-hunting district, and to rule that himself, so that Zebehr could not interfere. Apart from these arguments, Gordon did not believe that Zebehr loved slave-hunting for its own sake, but rather for the wealth and position it gave him. He believed that if Zebehr were made Sultan of the Soudan, his ambitious nature would be satisfied, and he would cease to hunt slaves, the raison d'etre for such an occupation being gone.

There can be no question that Zebehr was a most able man, a born ruler and leader of men. He was an inveterate enemy of Gordon's, and at the meeting which took place between Gordon and Zebehr at Cairo, when the former was en route to Khartoum, lookers-on considered that on no account ought these two men ever to be in the Soudan together.

It was, however, one of Gordon's characteristics, and a great charm in his nature, that he was not only forgiving, but that he never allowed personal feeling to affect his judgment. He thought only of what was good for the Soudan, and he was convinced that the only way to restore law and order there was to place Zebehr in power. One of the faults of our system of party government is that the Cabinet does not consider so much what is right in the abstract, as what will most affect the public mind. The national hatred of slavery is, in England, rightly very strong; but circumstances alter cases. The Cabinet could not face public opinion, although the public were at that time ill-informed, and ignorant of many important elements in the case, and they consequently refused to let Zebehr go.

Public opinion in England is generally in the right when the public have been properly informed, and have had time to form an opinion. But it is not to be expected that the first impressions, formed by a large mass of people who have not been supplied with full information, are very reliable. We ought therefore always to have a government in office strong enough to resist, if need be, the first impression of public opinion, but willing to yield when the public have thoroughly made up their minds. The government in office at that time were not united among themselves, and consequently were weak, and afraid to face the public. As a result, Gordon's policy was not carried out, and he fell a victim. The Soudan is still without a settled government, and the problem how it should be governed is as far as ever from being solved. As for slavery, that institution alone has gained by the weak policy of those who were afraid to send up the old slave-hunter to govern the unfortunate Soudan.



CHAPTER XV

THE SIEGE

One of the most remarkable characteristics of General Gordon was the marvellous fertility of his resources. Knowing that there would be a great deal of prejudice against employing Zebehr, he almost simultaneously suggested an alternative scheme, which was that, as the Egyptians could not govern the Soudan, and the English would not, rather than let it fall into a state of anarchy it should be offered to the Turks. There was much to be said for this suggestion. Turkey had once ruled Egypt, and still exercised a suzerainty over it and all its belongings, and if Egypt was not strong enough to rule itself and its annexations, it only seemed fair that the suzerain power should intervene to prevent its being grasped by an upstart like the Mahdi. Besides, the Sultan of Turkey is the head of the Mohammedan religion, and had therefore a special interest in suppressing the claims of a False Prophet.

That the scheme was no hastily-formed one, which he would see fit to change later on for something else, may be gathered from the fact that Gordon adhered to it to the very last. Nor was it a scheme suggested by the immediate difficulties of his position, for in the month of October, when Lord Wolseley was on the way to relieve him, he writes:—

"Give the country to the Turks, when once you have come to Khartoum, with one or two millions sterling (which you will have to spend in three months' occupation up here if you delay), make arrangements at once with the Porte for its Soudan cession, let 6000 Turks land at Suakim and march up to Berber, thence to Khartoum; you can then retire at once before the hot weather comes on....

"I do not advocate the keeping of the Soudan by us, it is a useless possession, and we could not govern it, neither can Egypt (after the late events). I am only discussing how to get out of it in honour and in the cheapest way (we must remember we caused its troubles), and that way is, either by some sort of provincial government under Zubair, or by giving it to the Turks; it is simply a question of getting out of it with decency. The Turks are the best solution, though most expensive. They would keep the Soudan: give them L2,000,000. The next best is Zubair, with L500,000 and L100,000 a year for two years: he will keep the Soudan for a time (in both cases slave trade will flourish), thus you will be quiet in Egypt, and will be able to retreat in January 1885. If you do not do this, then be prepared for a deal of worry and danger, and your campaign will be entirely unprofitable and devoid of prestige, for the day after you leave Khartoum the Mahdi will walk in and say that he drove you out."

But the Government that had refused the assistance of Zebehr for fear of public opinion at home, were equally decided not to allow the assistance that might be obtained from the Turks, and this time, it must be admitted, they had more reason on their side. There were already too many complications connected with the government of Egypt to make it prudent to admit another possible element of discord. Earl Granville, the Foreign Secretary, therefore telegraphed as follows:—

"Gordon should be at once informed by several messengers ... that we do not propose to supply him with Turkish or other force for the purpose of undertaking military expeditions, such being beyond the scope of the commission he holds, and at variance with the pacific policy which was the purpose of his mission to the Soudan; that, if with this knowledge, he continues at Khartoum, he should at once state to us the cause and intention with which he so continues."

This dispatch shows how little the powers in England actually understood the questions at issue, or the practical working of their own instructions. Gordon had been asked to undertake the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons, and civil employes. Having accepted this duty, he goes out, and finding the Mahdi's forces stronger than was supposed in this country, he sends home word that the task is a far more complicated one than the authorities in England knew of, and he suggests other methods. His suggestions are not accepted, and he is asked why he continues at Khartoum, as if he could have left his duty unperformed with honour to himself, or credit to his country.

Gordon was anxious to evacuate the country as quickly as possible; in this he was quite at one with his employers; but, on the spot, and knowing all the difficulties of the situation, he saw what they in the distance could not see, that the evacuation was a practical impossibility. The most distant garrison held by Egyptians was at Senaar, and if Gordon could have got to that place, a feat which it is more than doubtful if even he could have performed, it is perfectly certain that with the wretched troops he would have had to command he could not have safely escorted the host of the Egyptian employes thence to Khartoum, while the whole intermediate country was in the hands of the fanatical hordes owning allegiance to the Mahdi.

The commencement of his march from Senaar to Khartoum would have been the signal for a repetition of the horrors of the march of our retreating army from Cabul to Jellalabad in 1842, the sole survivor of which has been immortalised in Miss Elizabeth Thompson's (Lady Butler) celebrated picture, the only difference being that the heat and sand of the Soudan would have been substituted for the cold and snow of Afghanistan. The Mahdi's forces would have at once occupied Senaar, and spread reports to the effect that they had driven out the Egyptians, while Gordon's party with very limited provisions would have been exposed to incessant attacks during the whole of their journey. A retreating army has always plenty of enemies; and it is doubtful if a single survivor would have reached Khartoum.

On the other hand, if either of Gordon's suggestions had been accepted and the country handed over to the Turks or to Zebehr, the towns at both ends would have been held in force, and a suitable escort could have been provided for the Egyptian employes. Gordon states his position very fairly in the following brief telegram to Sir Evelyn Baring:—

"You ask me to state cause and intentions in staying at Khartoum, knowing Government means to abandon Soudan, and in answer I say, I stay at Khartoum because Arabs have shut us up, and will not let us out. I also add that if the road was opened the people would not let me go, unless I gave them some government or took them with me, which I could not do. No one would leave more willingly than I would if it was possible."

There were some in authority who advocated leaving such a distant garrison as Senaar to its fate, and wanted Gordon to retreat with the Khartoum force only, picking up the Berber force on the way home. Against this Gordon's generous heart revolted, and he was determined that so long as he was Governor-General it should never be said that he left his subordinates to perish. He thus telegraphs to Sir Evelyn Baring:—

"Put yourself in my position, if you say 'rapid retreat, and leave Senaar to its fate.' I will say, 'No, I would sooner die first,' and will resign my commission, for I could not do it. If you say, 'Then you are no longer Governor-General,' then I am all right, and all the responsibility is on you (for I could not be supposed, if you turn me out of being Governor-General, to be obliged to aid such a movement, which I think is disgraceful)."

Writing as late as October 24th, and assuming that Lord Wolseley had conquered the country, he says:—

"I declare I do not see how we will get out of it (the Soudan) even now; allow that you come to Khartoum, that you drive off the Arabs, open the road to Senaar. What are you going to do? You will say, 'Take out those who wish to leave.' Well, you begin with Senaar, and of course will have to fight all the way down. It will take three months. During these three months, how are you to feed Khartoum? for the moment you leave Senaar you leave your granary. You get to Khartoum, you are face to face with 30,000 people who will not leave, and who are hedging with the Mahdi; and with 3000 Shaggyeh all armed. You fight your way to Berber; another three months, you have no food at Berber; then it will need another two months to get to Dongola, which (seeing your policy) will be hostile.

"It is indeed a terrible problem, and I wish I could see my way out of it. Then you come into the hot months, and low Nile. This time next year will not see you out of the Soudan with decency. Of course you can go back now, but what was the use of your coming? I will not allow that you came for me. You came for the garrisons of the Soudan. Now, by the Turkish arrangement, if you act promptly, you can get away quietly in January 1885."

Not only, however, did the British Government refuse to adopt either of Gordon's alternative proposals, but they neglected until August 12th to take any other measures for relieving the garrisons. Yet all the time the gallant General felt that he had not a free hand, and could not take independent action, for he writes in his journal:—

"Truly the indecision of our Government has been, from a military point of view, a very great bore, for we never could act as if independent; there was always the chance of their taking action, which hampered us.... It is truly deplorable, the waste of men and money on account of our indecision."

The mistake our Government made was the old one of endeavouring to control details in distant countries from Downing Street, instead of sending out the best man to the spot, and giving him more or less of a free hand.

At last, on April 16th, Gordon telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring at Cairo:—

"As far as I can understand, the situation is this: You state your intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you refuse me Zebehr. I consider myself free to act according to circumstances. I shall hold on here as long as I can, and if I can suppress the rebellion I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to the Equator, and leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning the garrisons of Senaar, Kassala, and Dongola, with the certainty that you will eventually be forced to smash up the Mahdi under great difficulties, if you would retain peace in Egypt!"

But though Gordon saw that it was impossible to attempt an immediate evacuation with something like 50,000 men, women, and children, he did everything that lay within his power to get rid of as many refugees as possible during the few weeks that he was in Khartoum before the means of communication were cut off. The measures he took were described by Colonel Duncan, M.P., at that time in command of a station on the Nile, through which the refugees had to pass en route to Egypt, in a speech made some time afterwards, as follows:—

"Last year, after the arrival of General Gordon at Khartoum, I was sent to the northern end of the Korosko desert to facilitate the passage of the refugees from Khartoum to Egypt. It was then that I realised the true nature of Gordon, who was not a mere sentimental philanthropist, but a man of business as well as a man of courage. At that time the telegraph wire between Khartoum and where I was stationed was still uncut; and with marvellous monotony, I might say, batch after batch of the sick and the injured, of women and children, used to be sent by Gordon to me. They used to arrive in an almost perfect state of comfort, with all the necessary papers enabling me to disperse them among their different villages in Egypt. One of the first messages the General sent to me was this, 'Do try and find a motherly European woman to receive these poor women and children, for they have never been in Egypt yet before.' With the regularity of clockwork over 2000 refugees arrived, all the arrangements for their transport from Khartoum to Berber having been made by Gordon.... Two thousand five hundred men, women, and children were saved by the direct action and the direct humanity of Gordon himself, long before the expedition set out for Khartoum."

It is evident that the impression among the three Englishmen at Khartoum was, that the English Government had deserted Gordon, and intended to leave him there to die. Both Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power nobly decided that they would not forsake him in his hour of need, and that, happen what might, they would remain with him.

Though plenty of skirmishes took place, there was no real fight that might be dignified by the name of a battle till the middle of March. Some 4000 of the Mahdi's force had cut off about 800 of Gordon's men at a village called Halfaya, on the north of Khartoum, and, as the detachment could not retreat, Gordon decided to attempt to relieve them. By means of steamers he succeeded in extricating them from danger, but he could not drive away the rebels who held Halfaya in strong force.

On the 16th, therefore, he sent Colonel Stewart to attempt to dislodge the enemy, and the following is his own description of what actually occurred:—

"At 8 A.M. on the 16th, two steamers started for Halfaya. Bashi-Bazouks and some regulars advanced across plain towards rebels. At 10 A.M. the regulars were in square opposite centre of rebels' position, and Bashi-Bazouks were extended in their line to their right. The gun with regulars then opened fire. Very soon after this a body of about sixty rebel horsemen charged down a little to the right of centre of Bashi-Bazouks line. The latter fired a volley, then turned and fled. The horsemen galloped towards the square, which they immediately broke. The whole force then retreated slowly towards the fort with their rifles shouldered. The horsemen continued to ride along flanks, cutting off stragglers. The men made no effort to stand, and the gun was abandoned with sixty-three rounds and fifteen cases of reserve ammunition. The rebels advanced, and retreat of our men was so rapid that the Arabs on foot had no chance of attacking. Pursuit ceased about a mile from stockade and the men rallied. We brought in the wounded. Nothing could be more dismal than seeing these horsemen, and some men even on camels, pursuing close to troops who, with arms shouldered, plodded their way back."

The result of this, the first real battle, showed Gordon the hopelessness of his position. Colonel Stewart was wounded, though not very seriously, and Gordon saw that not only were his men cowards, but they were treacherous as well. At one time the rebels were actually retreating when two of Gordon's generals, Hassan and Seyid, by name, actually rode after them and summoned them back. Need it be added that an army, seeing itself thus betrayed by its own leaders, lost all heart and bolted, leaving two valuable guns in the hands of their opponents. It is satisfactory, however, to be able to record that both these traitors were tried by court-martial and shot.

General Gordon made every effort to avoid further bloodshed by opening negotiations with the Mahdi, and even going so far as to offer to make him Sultan of Kordofan. The False Prophet briefly replied, "I am the Mahdi," which was a polite way of saying that it would be beneath his dignity to accept such a subordinate post. He, however, sent Gordon a courteous letter, urging him to become a Mohammedan. As Gordon declined this offer all negotiations between the two were closed.

* * *

Towards the end of April Gordon wrote that the Nile was beginning to rise. It continues to rise during May, June, and July, and is so high during the last-mentioned month that boats can pass the numerous cataracts with comparative safety. This is the season of which an expedition should have taken advantage for the Nile campaign. Unfortunately the greatest empire of the world was at this time ruled by a disunited Cabinet, and party conflicts were going on at home. There may be much to be said in favour of party government, but there can be no question that to it is due the disgrace of England in the eyes of the whole civilised world, for having sent one of her bravest heroes into the heart of a hostile country in Africa, and then left him to perish. The blame in the matter is often cast solely upon the Liberals. Those who are not political partisans must see that this is not a fair way of stating the truth. The government in office was a Liberal one, but it cannot be said that it is a part of their programme to leave English heroes to perish. Lord Palmerston, the old Whig leader, would have been the first to denounce such a policy. The fact is, the fault was not due to either party as such, but to the party form of government that unfortunately prevails in this country. The opposite party might have fallen into the same mistake, had they been in the same position. The Government was afraid to split up its supporters by engaging in another war so soon after the Egyptian and Suakim campaigns. But, be the cause what it may, the fact remains that much valuable time was lost, in spite of Lord Wolseley's remonstrances, who said with truth—

"Remember, we can command many things, but all the gold of England will not affect the rise and fall of the Nile, or the duration of the hot and cold seasons in Egypt. Time is a most important element in this question, and it will be indeed an indelible disgrace if we allow the most generous, patriotic, and gallant of our public servants to die of want, or fall into the hands of a cruel enemy, because we would not hold out our hands to save him."

Public opinion at last grew too strong for the Government, and orders were given on August 12th to commence making the boats that were to convey the troops up the river Nile. The official report of the campaign states that there were only 104 vessels on the Nile that were able to pass the cataracts on the upper part of the river, so that boats of some sort had to be taken out. From August 12th till the final disaster took place no reasonable time was lost, but it takes time to transport a large army over such obstacles as had to be surmounted. It has been truly said that the campaign of the Nile was far more a conflict with Nature than with man. We might, however, have overcome Nature had we only taken the field earlier in the day.

* * *

When Gordon realised how thoroughly the enemy had invested Khartoum, and that all supplies from outside were cut off, he wisely decided to reduce the number of persons inside the beleaguered city. There were, it was estimated, something like 10,000 who were in sympathy with the enemy, and who not only ate food, which was most valuable, but were a source of weakness to the defenders. Consequently the General gave them permission to go over to the enemy, which they did with alacrity. He was after all only acting on the sensible advice he gave the leader of the Taipings in China, who was retaining a large force of white men against their wills in the city of Soo-chow, of whom Gordon's rival, Burgevine, was one (see page 60). The Khartoum general gained considerably more than the enemy by this bold yet humane stroke of policy, as he got rid of 10,000 traitors, who would have very soon demoralised his whole force.

The greater the difficulties became the nobler Gordon's character appears. No sooner was he absolutely cut off from the outer world than he fell back on his boundless fertility of resources, and showed himself to be at the same time a skilful general, a brave soldier, a far-seeing statesman, and a clever financier. The defences of the town were attended to, and the whole place so well covered with obstacles and mines, that it might have been defended for years, had the food supply only held out. Cartridges were manufactured on an enormous scale; the General calculated that over half a million were fired away during four months of the siege. Eight steamers, which were nothing more than ordinary vessels, similar to the "Penny Steamers" on the Thames, were armour-plated, and made to act as miniature men-of-war, new ones were built, old ones were fitted up and adapted, and landsmen were trained to take them into action. "Our steamers," Gordon said, "are blinded and bullet proof, and do splendid work, for you see they cannot run away, and must go into action." The food supply, such as it was, was regulated so that nothing should be wasted, and paper money was issued, redeemable in six months. So great was the faith of the inhabitants in Gordon's ultimate success that L2500 worth of this paper money was in circulation by the end of April, and L26,000 worth was issued before the end of July. In addition, the merchants advanced to him upwards of L50,000.

For six long weary months General Gordon held out at Khartoum. Till the 9th of September he had at all events the companionship of his two brave countrymen, Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power. But for the remaining months of the siege he was deprived of even this comfort, and had to stand at the post of duty single-handed, as far as his own countrymen were concerned. On the 26th August the authorities at Cairo received a telegram from Gordon to the effect that now that the Nile had risen, and the way from Khartoum to Dongola was opened for a steamer, he intended to attack Berber and capture it, and thence to despatch Colonel Stewart and Mr. Power to Dongola. His object was to publish to the outside world the real facts of the terrible position at Khartoum, and to enable Colonel Stewart to urge on the authorities the necessity of at once despatching troops to the rescue; for he had not received any notification that a few days before this time—namely, on August 12th—the Government had decided to send an expedition for his relief. Colonel Stewart brought Gordon's Diary of Events up to the date of his starting, and was accompanied by Mr. Power, M. Herbin, the French Consul, and about fifty soldiers. They went in the Abbas, a small paddle-boat drawing only two feet of water. The following remark is made in Gordon's Journals in reference to the departure of Colonel Stewart in this vessel:—

"Stewart said he would go if I would exonerate him from deserting me. I said, 'You do not desert me. I—I cannot go, but if you go you do me a great service.' I then wrote him an official. He wanted me to write him an order. I said, 'No, for though I fear not responsibility, I will not put you in any danger which I am not in myself.' I wrote then a letter couched thus: 'Abbas is going down. You say you are willing to go in her if I think you can do so with honour. You can go in honour, for you can do nothing here, and if you go you do me service in telegraphing my views.'"

The Abbas started together with two other steamers on the night of September 9th, and having shelled Berber proceeded on her way to Dongola, the two other vessels returning. On the 18th the Abbas struck on a rock. When Colonel Stewart saw that further progress was hopeless, he spiked the guns and threw them, with the ammunition, into the river. He then went on shore to arrange for the purchase of some camels to take his party on to Dongola. He was accompanied to the house of a blind man, named Fakri Etman, by Power and the French Consul. The Sheikh Suleiman Wad Gamr was present and invited them on shore, only insisting that the soldiers must not come armed for fear of frightening the people. To this Colonel Stewart agreed, and was the only one who was armed, he carrying a small revolver. Suleiman accepted from Colonel Stewart a sword and a dress as gifts. When Stewart and his party were in the house, Suleiman came outside and made some signs to his people, who were hanging about in large numbers. Immediately they divided into two parties, one proceeding to the house, the other to the steamer's crew landed on the bank, and the whole were massacred. News has recently reached Cairo to the effect that the perpetrator of this cold-blooded and treacherous murder has at last paid the penalty of his crime, being slain in a conflict with Saleh Bey. All the official documents that Gordon had sent for the British authorities fell into the hands of the Mahdi, giving him the most exact information as to the supply of ammunition and food within the walls of Khartoum. These documents were at once sent to the Mahdi, and it is generally supposed that at this present moment they are lying in the Fort at Omdurman, outside Khartoum.

The loss of the Abbas was a cause of great grief to General Gordon, and again and again he refers to it. Writing on November 5th he says:—

"I cannot get out of my head the Abbas catastrophe; that the Abbas (with her 970 bullet marks on her, her gun, and her parapets, which were bullet proof) could be captured by force seems impossible; that she ran upon a rock seems unlikely, for she had her sides defended by buffers, sunk one foot in water. I also warned them against ever anchoring by the bank, also to take wood from isolated spots; in fact as far as human foresight goes, I did all my possible.... You will notice the number of Greeks (on board). They were a bodyguard I ordered and paid highly, to prevent any treachery on the part of the crew. Thus the question of treachery was duly weighed by me, and guarded against, as far as I could—both on the part of the crew, and on the part of the inhabitants—and I told them to anchor mid-stream, and not to take wood except in isolated spots."

One can only echo the words of Mr. Egmont Hake: "It is impossible to read this without a feeling of admiration for the thorough way in which General Gordon examined into the minutest details of everything himself. Every precaution human foresight could conceive he took to ensure the safety of the Abbas and her crew; having done this, her fate was in higher hands than his."



CHAPTER XVI

THE FALL OF KHARTOUM

Fortunately for the public, as soon as Colonel Stewart left, Gordon commenced, in addition to all his other duties, writing journals of events at Khartoum, in which doubtless he recapitulated much of what had been given in the Diary of Events he had sent with Stewart. On September 21st, the General received authentic news that an expedition was actually on its way to Khartoum. On September 30th he sent five steamers to Metemmah to meet the advancing army, so that there should be no delay on his part in rendering help. By the steamers he sent his Journals made up to date, and it is from these that authentic information is obtained. The despatch of these steamers to Metemmah was a most unselfish act on his part; indeed, it is by no means certain that their presence at Khartoum might not have prevented the crowning disaster later on. He calculated that each steamer was worth to him at least 2000 men, so that he practically reduced his force by something like 10,000 men in order to assist the Relief Expedition. Since the Nile had risen these vessels had considerably increased in utility, and they had been most valuable in the defence of Khartoum. Each was well provisioned, so that they would not have required to draw on the slender resources of the garrison.

On November 5th Gordon says:—

"A curious thing has happened; my friend Kitchener sent up the post; he wrapped the letters in some old newspapers (he gave me no news in his letter), the old newspapers were thrown out into the garden: there a clerk who knew some English found them blowing about, and gave them to the apothecary of the hospital, who knows English. The doctor found him reading them, saw date 15th September, and secured them for me; they are like gold, as you may imagine, since we have had no news since 24th February 1884! These papers gave us far more information than any of your letters. Did K. send them by accident or on purpose?"

In the newspaper appeared the following statement in the form of a heading: "Lord Wolseley seen off at Victoria Station for the Gordon Relief Expedition." To this Gordon appended, "No! for the relief of the Soudan garrisons;" and he extracted another statement to the following effect, "An official telegram received here from Wady Halfa states that, owing to the unprecedented lowness of the Nile, no confidence is felt in the practicability of hauling boats over the cataracts till the end of September." General Gordon pasted this into the Journal, and wrote opposite to it, "It was not a low Nile, it was an average Nile, only you were too late"—a verdict which events only too completely justified. It will be of interest to give here a few brief extracts selected from Gordon's remarks regarding the Relief Expedition:—

"If it is right to send up an expedition now, why was it not right to send it up before?"

"We are a wonderful people; it was never our Government which made us a great nation; our Government has been ever the drag on our wheels."

"I am afraid to say what numbers have been killed through this present policy, certainly some 80,000; and it is not over yet."

"I altogether decline the imputation that the projected expedition has come to relieve me. It has come to save our national honour in extricating the garrisons, &c., from a position in which our action in Egypt had placed these garrisons. I was relief expedition No. I. They are relief expedition No. II. As for myself I could make good my retreat at any moment if I wished. Now realise what would happen if this first relief expedition was to bolt and the steamers fall into the hands of the Mahdi; this second relief expedition (for the honour of England engaged in extricating garrisons) would be somewhat hampered. We, the first and second, are equally engaged for the honour of England. This is fair logic. Earle[15] comes up to extricate garrisons and (I hope) succeeds. Earle does not come to extricate me.... I am not the rescued lamb, and I will not be."

[15] Gordon thought that General Earle was to be in command of the whole force. As a matter of fact he was in command of the brigade that was going by water the whole way to Khartoum. He was killed on the way.

In spite of his great anxiety, and the worries through which he was called to pass, Gordon never seemed to lose his sense of humour. There are many amusing entries in his Journals, of which the following may be taken as fair specimens:—

"A horse escaped from the Arabs, formerly belonging to Government. It gave no information; but from its action, may be supposed not to believe in the Mahdi."

"It is really amusing to find (when one can scarcely call one's life one's own) one's servant, already with one wife (which most men find is enough), coming and asking for three days' leave, in order to take another wife. Yet such was the case, a few days ago, with one of my servants."

His comments on the Mahdi are also amusing:—

"The Greek (refugee) who came in told the Greek Consul that the Mahdi puts pepper under his nails, and when he receives visitors then he touches his eyes and weeps copiously; that he eats a few grains of dhoora openly, but in the interior of the house he has fine feeding and drinks alcoholic drinks.... After this pepper business! I think I shall drop any more trouble in writing him letters, trying to convince or persuade him to reasonable measures. I must confess that the pepper business has sickened me; I had hitherto hoped I had to do with a regular fanatic, who believed in his mission, but when one comes to pepper in the finger nails, it is rather humiliating to have to succumb to him, and somehow I have the belief that I shall not have to do so....

"One cannot help being amused at this pepper business. Those who come in for pardon, come in on their knees, with a halter round their neck. The Mahdi rises, having scratched his eyes and obtained a copious flow of tears, and takes off the halter. As the production of tears is generally considered the proof of sincerity, I would recommend the Mahdi's receipt to Cabinet Ministers, justifying some job."

It is not necessary to enumerate the number of encounters that took place between Gordon's men and the Mahdists; he took little personal part in these engagements. The fiery spirit of the young soldier, who led his own troops in China, had not expended itself, but was kept in subjection by a higher spirit. He knew that much was staked on his life, and that the risk was too great. There was no one to succeed him; his death meant defeat to his cause, and ruin to the country for which he had done so much. Speaking generally, therefore, he did not expose himself more than he could help. But though he avoided rashness in any form, he was a good deal exposed to danger, and the palace in which he lived was an object on which the enemy expended much of their ammunition.

The Mahdi had kept himself as far from Gordon's reach as possible, by remaining at Obeid, while his troops conducted the investment of Khartoum. But when the new year of the Mohammedan Calendar commenced, on October 21st, and the Mahdi had heard, through the capture of Colonel Stewart's papers, of the difficulties that Gordon was in, he appears to have mustered his courage and to have brought up 30,000 men to intimidate Gordon. When called upon to surrender the following was the reply that Gordon returned: "If you are the real Mahdi, dry up the Nile and come over, and I will surrender." It is said that the Mahdi took him literally, and lost 3000 men in an attempt to walk across the Nile! Be that as it may, the Mahdi ordered an attack, which was conducted with some vigour. It was resisted successfully by Gordon, aided by his twelve steamers and 800 men, but the fighting must have been severe, for it lasted for eight hours. The bursting of mines and torpedoes carried more havoc into the ranks of the enemy than Gordon's men did. Material things of this kind at least responded to the will of him who organised them, and did not prove cowardly or treacherous.

The Mahdi then retreated to a more respectful distance, and, it is said, hid himself in a cave, prophesying that there should be sixty days of rest, and that then blood would flow like water. The real truth of the matter is that the Mahdi's military advisers saw that there was little use in attempting to capture Khartoum by direct assault. Having full information from Stewart's papers that the food supply could not last long, they prudently decided to starve out the garrison.

* * *

English officers have before now gone through trying sieges, as, for instance, Lawrence and Havelock at Lucknow, and Sale at Jellalabad, but it would be difficult in the whole of the military history of England to find a case in which an officer was left single-handed to contend with such frightful odds for so long a time. The siege lasted 317 days, very nearly as long as the siege of Sebastopol. English officers have usually had a few of their own countrymen, on whom they could rely and with whom they could take counsel, to share their hardships. But Gordon stood alone, and the troops he had were not only foreigners, but, with a few exceptions, they were cowards, and he knew that very few of them were really loyal to him. Nothing but his extraordinary personality kept the force together. His opinion of these miserable troops is frequently expressed in his Journals. The following passages are examples:—

"October 31st.—I have ever felt the greatest insecurity respecting the lines, for I believe 100 determined men would carry them with ease, if they made their attack on the Shaggyeh or Bashi-Bazouk part.... The Cairo Turkish Bashi-Bazouks, the Shaggyeh, and the Fellaheen soldiers, I will back against any troops in the world for cowardice."

"November 17th.—I certainly lay claim to having commanded, more often than any other man, cowardly troops, but this experience of 1884 beats all past experiences; the worst of the matter is that you cannot believe one word the officers say."

On November 2nd he writes: "Six weeks' consumption! and then the sponge must be thrown up." Fortunately, he discovered on November 11th that a robbery by some corrupt Egyptian officials had been going on, and that 2-1/2 million lbs. of biscuit—worth L9000 at any time, but at least L26,000 during the siege—had been stolen. The recovery of this helped him to hold out a little longer. On December 13th he writes:—

"We have in hand 1,796,000 rounds Remington ammunition; 540 rounds Krupp; 6000 rounds mountain gun ammunition; L140 in specie; L18,000 in paper in treasury! L60,000 in town in paper; 110,000 okes of biscuits; 700 ard ebs of dhoora....

"We are going to send down the Bordeen the day after to-morrow, and with her I shall send this Journal. If some effort is not made before ten days' time the town will fall."

The following day, December 14th, was the last as far as his ability to communicate with the outer world was concerned. Though he held on for nearly six weeks longer, nothing is known accurately after the Bordeen left Khartoum. Writing to the commander of the approaching Expeditionary Force, he says:—

"I send down the steamer Bordeen to-morrow, with vol. vi. of my private journal, containing account of the events in Khartoum from November 5 to December 14. The state of affairs is such that one cannot foresee further than five to seven days, after which the town may at any time fall. I have done all in my power to hold out, but I own I consider the position is extremely critical, almost desperate; and I say this without any feeling of bitterness with respect to Her Majesty's Government, but merely as a matter of fact. Should the town fall, it will be questionable whether it will be worth the while of Her Majesty's Government to continue its expedition; for it is certain that the fall of Khartoum will ensure that of Kassala and Senaar."

Another letter of the same date was received by Sir Gerald Graham in Cairo, saying: "Farewell. You will never hear from me again. I fear there will be treachery in the garrison, and all will be over by Christmas." The following message, addressed to a friend in Cairo, and also dated December 14, was received only on February 24: "All is up. I expect a catastrophe in ten days' time. It would not have been so if our people had kept me better informed as to their intentions. My adieux to all." He also wrote to his sister:—

"This may be the last letter you will receive from me, for we are on our last legs, owing to the delay of the expedition. However, God rules all, and, as He will rule to His glory and our welfare, His will be done. I fear, owing to circumstances, that my affairs pecuniarily are not over-bright....—Your affectionate brother,

"C. G. GORDON.

"P.S.—I am quite happy, thank God, and like Lawrence, I have 'tried to do my duty.'"

It has already been mentioned that August 12th was the day when the English Government yielded to the pressure of public opinion and gave orders to commence the building of the boats which were to convey the troops to relieve Khartoum. It is unnecessary to follow in detail the history of that force. Suffice it to say that the commander, Lord Wolseley, received at Korti a message from General Gordon, dated 14th December 1884, "Come quickly, come together; do not leave Berber behind you." But the verbal message which the messenger delivered was far worse, "Famine was in Khartoum; the Arabs knew it: there was not a moment to be lost."

At once, Sir Herbert Stewart, with a small force, was sent to dash through the desert from Korti to Metemmah. He, Colonel Burnaby, and several other brave men, fell on that famous march, for the enemy at two points warmly disputed their passage. The loss in these conflicts, at Abu Klea on the 17th, and at Metemmah on the 19th, was appalling for the Arabs, but such victories often repeated would soon have done for the conquerors. The entire force reached Gubat on the Nile on January 20th, and there they found the four steamers which Gordon had sent down. Originally there were five steamers, but one had been sunk. The six journals were handed over to Sir Charles Wilson, who, by right of seniority, had taken command on the death of Sir Herbert Stewart. A note was also given to Sir Charles, which had been brought by a messenger from Khartoum, to the following effect: "Khartoum all right, could hold out for years.—C. G. Gordon, 29th December 1884."

It was at first generally believed that this document was but one of many sent out in order to deceive the enemy, but it is now thought that his real object was not to deceive the enemy, who knew only too well the actual state of affairs, so much as to get them to let his messengers pass, if caught by them, and that then the messengers could deliver a viva voce message, and tell the appalling truth.

Sir Charles Wilson, with two officers and a small detachment of Englishmen belonging to the Sussex regiment (late 35th), started on the morning of the 24th for Khartoum in two of Gordon's steamers. The delay that occurred between the arrival of the English force at Gubat, and the start up the river for Khartoum, has been freely criticised by the press. The journey from Gubat to Khartoum being entirely by water, Lord Charles Beresford, a well-known naval officer, had been attached to Stewart's force, with orders "at once to take over and man any steamer or steamers that were either there or in the vicinity," and to "use every means in his power to get one or more of the steamers into an efficient state." Unfortunately, the British force that reached the Nile was in a very different condition from that which left Korti in such high spirits. Rapid marching and hard fighting had demanded a heavy penalty, and the death-roll and sick-list were very high; among others, Lord Charles Beresford himself was on the latter.

The whole force under Sir Charles Wilson did not equal a battalion of infantry on its war strength, and it included a large percentage of sick and wounded to be looked after. In addition to this, reports came into camp that large bodies of Arabs were advancing from the north as well as from the south, with the object of annihilating the force. The commander, therefore, had an anxious time of it, and was compelled to undertake a reconnaissance to ascertain the truth of the rumours, and to make all sorts of preparations for defending his little camp with its sick and wounded against any sudden onslaught. He was unconscious of the fact that time was so pressing, and that instead of his camp being attacked, it would be Khartoum, where Gordon had for so long held out against overwhelming odds. Thus the valuable hours of the 21st, 22nd, and 23rd glided away, all too rapidly.

Even when Wilson's force was ready to start, Lord Charles Beresford was not able to accompany it, and Sir Charles had to go without him. The distance to Khartoum was about 100 miles, but it was not until January 28th that the steamers got clear of the Sixth Cataract, which was about half-way between Gubat and Khartoum. For about a dozen miles large boulders and rocks caused delay and danger. No sooner had the steamers got clear of these obstacles than all eyes were strained to catch sight of the Egyptian flag floating over Khartoum. The steamers made rapid progress in the open water, and as the distance was reduced, the square roof of the palace where Gordon had resided came into view. But there was no Egyptian flag flying from it, and the reception accorded to the relieving force, although a warm one, was not such as Gordon would have given. His eyes had often been strained looking to the quarter whence he thought his grateful countrymen would surely send aid, but he had looked in vain. Now, when the tardy help was at hand, it received no welcome from him, for just two days before, on January 26th, he had yielded up his heroic spirit. From every side the Mahdists poured shot and shell upon Sir Charles Wilson and his little band; and it was matter for grateful surprise that they escaped the fate of him whom, too late, they had come to rescue. They approached within eight hundred yards of the city, and then, convinced that it had fallen, retreated to a safer position, from which they could institute inquiries as to the fate of the gallant hero, hoping, yet hardly daring to hope, that his life might have been spared.

It is not necessary to follow further in detail the history of Sir Charles Wilson's party, the narrow escape they had from being treacherously run on to a rock, and the way in which they were gallantly rescued by Lord Charles Beresford, who by February 1st was sufficiently recovered to enable him to take command of another of Gordon's steamers, and relieve the would-be relievers. There followed at least six days of suspense, as the accounts brought in by natives were very conflicting, but by the 11th of February it was known in England that a consensus of evidence pointed to the fact that the noble hero of Khartoum had been killed at his post.

* * *

Probably it will never be accurately known either how Khartoum fell into the hands of the Mahdi, or how the gallant defender actually met his fate. There have been many wild rumours regarding both events, but it is probable that the most authentic account is that obtained by Colonel Kitchener, who of all men was most likely to be well informed, for not only was his experience of the Arabs great, but he had personal opportunities of examining witnesses. He thinks that the ordinary food supply at Khartoum was quite exhausted by the 1st January 1885, and that on the 6th the General issued a proclamation, offering to any of the inhabitants who liked free permission to leave the town and go to the Mahdi. Great numbers availed themselves of this permission, and Gordon wrote letters to the Mahdi, requesting him to protect and feed these poor Moslem people, as he had for the last nine months. In this way the population of the city was reduced to about 14,000 out of the 34,000 inhabitants who were there in September. About the 18th of January, a sortie was made which resulted in desperate fighting, and a large number of the Mahdi's troops and about 200 of Gordon's men were killed. Colonel Kitchener says:—

"The state of the garrison was then desperate for want of food; all the donkeys, dogs, cats, rats, &c., had been eaten; a small ration of grain was issued daily to the troops, and a sort of bread was made from pounded palm-tree fibre.

"On the 23rd General Gordon had a stormy interview with Farag Pasha [the commander of his black troops]. An eye-witness states that it was owing to Gordon having passed a fort on the White Nile which was under Farag Pasha's charge, and found to be inadequately protected. Gordon is said to have struck Farag Pasha on this occasion. It seems probable to me that at this interview Farag Pasha proposed to Gordon to surrender the town, and stated the terms the Mahdi had offered, declaring in his opinion that they should be accepted. Farag Pasha left the palace in a great rage, refusing the repeated attempts of other officers to effect a reconciliation between him and Gordon. On the following day (24th) General Gordon held a council of the notables at the palace. The question of the surrender of the town was then discussed, and General Gordon declared, whatever the council decided, he would never surrender the town. I think it very probable that on this occasion General Gordon brought Farag Pasha's action and proposals before the council, and it appears that some in the council were of Farag Pasha's opinion, that the town could resist no longer, and should be surrendered on the terms offered by the Mahdi. General Gordon would not, however, listen to this proposal.

"On the 25th Gordon was slightly ill, and as it was Sunday, he did not appear in public. He had, however, several interviews with leading men of the town, and evidently knew that the end was near.... On the night of the 25th many of the famished troops left their posts on the fortifications in search of food in the town. Some of the troops were also too weak, from want of nourishment, to go to their posts."

Meanwhile news had reached the Mahdists of their terrible defeat at Abu Klea, and also rumours that the English had taken Metemmah. Reports which have quite recently arrived from Egypt say that the Mahdi, alarmed at the approach of English troops, had already packed up his goods and chattels and was about to beat a retreat. There was a meeting of all the Emirs in the camp of the Mahdi, and, with one exception, all were in favour of abandoning the siege. A single Emir, however, said, "Let us make one more attempt. Let us fire 101 guns and proclaim a great victory over the advancing English army, and then make one more attempt on Khartoum. If we fail we shall be no worse off than we are now, for we can only retreat, but if we succeed we shall be able to defy the approaching British." Unfortunately for us the advice of the Emir was taken, and the British expedition, which was so near succeeding, failed by forty-eight hours to gain its object. The Mahdist attack took place at 3.30 A.M. on Monday, January 26th, and was only too successful. With regard to the report that the fall of Khartoum was due to foul play on the part of Farag Pasha, Colonel Kitchener says: "The accusations of treachery have all been vague, and are, to my mind, the outcome of mere supposition. In my opinion Khartoum fell from sudden assault, when the garrison was too exhausted by privation to make proper resistance!" Whether Farag Pasha was guilty or not is not definitely known, but it is certain that he was taken prisoner, and three days after the fall of the town was brought up to show where the wealth was hidden. As there was none he could not reveal it, so he was killed in the market-place at Omdurman. The Mahdi's troops massacred 4000 persons, and after they had been engaged for six hours in thus wreaking their vengeance, the Mahdi sent over to stop them, and a systematic method was adopted of searching for loot. As the Mahdi had bribed his men by promises of untold wealth, and they were disappointed, a large number deserted his cause, and afterwards actually fought against him.

The most contradictory reports have been circulated as to the manner in which General Gordon met his fate, and although it would be impossible to allude to all, it may not be out of place to refer to one which has been very widely accepted. It is to the effect that the General, hearing that the city had been betrayed, put on his uniform and rushed out, sword in hand, to die as a soldier. Narratives which have a dramatic element are always easily accepted. Dramatic effect was, however, the last thing our gallant hero thought of at any time, and still less on such an occasion as this. As a matter of fact he had not a stitch of uniform in Khartoum, and, considering his Chinese experience, it is very unlikely that he would have drawn his sword, even if he had possessed one, which he certainly did not. One person who recognised Gordon after his death says that he was dressed in light clothes. Colonel Kitchener quotes the only person who claimed to be an eye-witness of his death, who says:—

"On hearing the noise, I got my master's donkey, and went with him to the palace. Muhamed Bey Mustapha, with my master, Ibrahim Bey Rushdi, and about twenty cavasses, then went with Gordon towards the house of the Austrian Consul Hansall, near the church, when we met some rebels in an open place near the outer gate of the palace. Gordon Pasha was walking in front leading the party. The rebels fired a volley, and Gordon was killed at once; nine of the cavasses, Ibrahim Bey Rushdi, and Muhamed Bey Mustapha were killed; the rest ran away."

Whether Gordon's death was intended by the Mahdi or was entirely an accident is not known. Colonel Kitchener says that the Mahdi professed to be very angry when he heard that Gordon was killed, but the Colonel thinks that had he expressed himself strongly on the subject beforehand, this calamity would never have taken place. This, however, is very doubtful; a rushing host of victorious soldiers, firing wildly in every direction, are never very discriminating; of course many of them did not know Gordon personally, and the brave General was not the man to make himself conspicuous by any distinguishing garb. Though Colonel Kitchener is perhaps rather hard on the Mahdi in this respect, he is probably correct in thinking that "the want of discipline in the Mahdi's camp made it dangerous for him to keep as a prisoner a man whom all the black troops liked better than himself, and in favour of whom, on a revulsion of feeling, a successful revolt might take place in his own camp. Moreover, if Gordon was dead, he calculated (and rightly) the English would retire and leave him in peace." How Gordon was actually killed, and whether it was the intention of the Mahdi that he should be "accidentally" disposed of, is open to dispute. There can, however, be no question that he was slain, for his dead body was recognised. Well might Colonel Kitchener say, "Never was a garrison so nearly rescued, never was a commander so sincerely lamented." As far back as October 13th General Gordon had written:—

"It is, of course, on the cards that Khartoum is taken under the nose of the Expeditionary Force, which will be just too late.

"The Expeditionary Force will perhaps think it necessary to retake it; but that will be of no use, and will cause loss of life uselessly on both sides. It had far better return, with its tail between its legs.... England was made by adventurers, not by its Government, and I believe it will only hold its place by adventurers."

The Government decided to take Gordon's advice, and, to save further bloodshed, withdrew the Relief Expedition. Wady Halfa, Korosko, and Assouan, were held with some force, in case the Mahdi's adherents should seek to follow up their victory. The death of the Mahdi, however, and the defeat of his followers at the end of 1885, have together helped to crush the Mahdist movement, and Egypt has been left unmolested.



CHAPTER XVII

CONCLUSION

The news of Gordon's death startled not England only, but the whole of the civilised world. Every eye had been watching the relief column slowly wending its way up the Nile, and over the desert route. One war correspondent had actually used the words in his telegram, "To-morrow the lonely and weary hero will joyfully grasp the hand of an Englishman." People would not at first believe the sad reality, and for a time every one hoped against hope. The news reached the War Office on February 4th, and was communicated to the public during the following day. No better proof exists of the tenacity with which many clung to the hope that Gordon might possibly have survived, than the fact that the Queen, whose womanly heart always prompted her to be one of the first to send expressions of sympathy to the relatives of those who fall at the post of duty, did not date her letter to Miss Gordon till February 17th, and even then used the sentence, "I fear there cannot be much doubt of it," in alluding to the hero's death. The Queen's letter, which did but give expression to the feelings of the country on the subject, was as follows:—

"OSBORNE, 17th February 1885.

"DEAR MISS GORDON,—How shall I write to you, or how shall I attempt to express what I feel! To think of your dear, noble, heroic Brother, who served his Country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so edifying to the World, not having been rescued. That the promises of support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed on those who asked him to go—is to me grief inexpressible! indeed, it has made me ill! My heart bleeds for you, his Sister, who have gone through so many anxieties on his account, and who loved the dear Brother as he deserved to be. You are all so good and trustful, and have such strong faith, that you will be sustained even now, when real absolute evidence of your dear Brother's death does not exist—but I fear there cannot be much doubt of it. Some day I hope to see you again, to tell you all I cannot express. My daughter Beatrice, who has felt quite as I do, wishes me to express her deepest sympathy with you. I hear so many expressions of sorrow and sympathy from abroad: from my eldest daughter, the Crown Princess, and from my Cousin, the King of the Belgians,—the very warmest. Would you express to your other Sisters and your elder Brother my true sympathy, and what I do so keenly feel, the stain left upon England for your dear Brother's cruel, though heroic fate?—Ever, dear Miss Gordon, yours sincerely and sympathisingly,

"V. R. I."

Parliament at once voted L20,000, the sum usually given to a successful general on the completion of a campaign, to be set apart for the sisters, nephew, and nieces of General Gordon, and an In Memoriam service was conducted in every cathedral, and in nearly all the large churches of England. A statue was in course of time erected in Trafalgar Square,[16] and another has recently been unveiled at Chatham. A monument was erected in St. Paul's Cathedral, and it was decided to place another in Westminster Abbey, the national mausoleum of England. But better still, we know that his memory is enshrined in the hearts of many left behind, and that the record of his noble saintly life is still teaching many of our countrymen valuable lessons.

[16] It is from this monument that the picture on the cover is taken. It represents Gordon in the undress uniform of the Royal Engineers, with a Bible under one arm, and the "magic wand of victory" under the other.

Few men have done more than General Gordon to elevate the tone of the soldier. The old-fashioned notion still survives that soldiers love war for its own sake, and for the honours it brings to those who take part in it; but Gordon showed us a higher ideal, that the true soldier should study his profession with the idea of mastering it, so as the better to enable him to maintain peace. If good men were all to abstain from studying the science of war, evildoers would very soon have a monopoly of it, and would become aggressors. There are plenty of bullies, who, like Napoleon, would soon upset the peace of Europe were it not that they fear to do so. Such men can only be kept in order by brute force, and brute force is absolutely of no avail, unless it is organised and directed by a brain that has studied the art and science of directing and controlling physical force. It need hardly be said that a knowledge of this kind is not acquired in a day, and although there have been some splendid soldiers of the type of Cromwell, Warren Hastings, and Washington, who have never had a military training, it is unquestionable that a knowledge of the science of war gives a general a very great advantage over one who has not had such training. Exceptions there are to every rule, and the names mentioned must be placed amongst them. It is doubtful if some of the generals named would have ever attained celebrity had their opponents been well trained. Gordon loved his profession, but he took a high view of it. Soldiering with him was not a mere profession for slaughtering his fellow-creatures, but for the prevention of that bullying and bloodshed which would be ever going on in this world, were it not for those who train themselves in order to be able to stop it. The Taiping rebellion, which caused the death of millions of innocent creatures, is but a specimen of what might go on throughout the world did not skilful, well-trained soldiers throw in their lot with the side of law and order. Had the Chinese Government only possessed an able general, and a proper army, that rebellion would never have made such headway as it did. And had they not received the services of such an able soldier as Gordon proved to be, the rebellion might have been indefinitely prolonged, and might have broken up the Empire of China.

In less civilised days the percentage of persons who loved fighting for its own sake was undoubtedly larger than it is now. The more civilised we become, the more we learn to value peace and to dislike war. But even in a civilised nation like the English, there is a certain percentage who really love fighting for its own sake; and besides these, there are many who do not actually love it, but think they ought to do so, as they are in the army, and so they cultivate a style of talking as if they really liked it, and thus they mislead others. In the case of Gordon there was an entire absence of either the one or the other spirit. He did not love fighting for its own sake, and he would probably have looked upon a person who did as a survival of a former age. As for the latter class he had an utter abhorrence of all shams, and he took every opportunity of speaking out of the honesty of his heart. "People have little idea how far from 'glorious' war is. It is organised murder, pillage, and cruelty, and it is seldom that the weight falls on the fighting men—it is on the women, children, and old people. Consider it how we may, war is a brutal, cruel affair." Speaking of some of his men killed and wounded in a skirmish, he says, "I wish people could see what the suffering of human creatures is—I mean those who wish for war. I am a fool, I daresay, but I cannot see the sufferings of any of these people without tears in my eyes."

It is worthy of note that some of the ablest generals who have lived and died in the latter half of this century have held similar views. The great Duke of Wellington remarked, as he crossed the field of Waterloo, the evening after the battle, that "nothing exceeds the horror of victory except a defeat;" and such men as Sir Henry Havelock, Sir Hope Grant, Sir Henry Lawrence, and the heroic General Lee of America, used expressions of similar purport. Gordon was a living illustration of the saying that "the gentlest men are ever the bravest when enlightened consciousness tells them that they have a just cause to support."

Gordon's courage was unquestioned, but, though he possessed more natural courage than most men, he never made a wanton display of it merely with a view of impressing others. In China he exposed himself almost recklessly, in order to encourage his officers and men; but in the Soudan, where he felt so much depended on his life, he carefully refrained from exposing himself, though it must at times have been a great trial to him to see his men so badly handled by their leaders.

It is not unnatural that, in the case of the death of a man like General Gordon, people should like to know his views on that event which must in due course happen to all of us, unless our Lord Himself shall come to terminate this dispensation. Apparently he sometimes wished for this, though he did not appear to think the Second Advent near at hand. In one of his letters he says:—

"I wish, I wish the King would come again and put things right on earth; but His coming is far off, for the whole world must long for Him ere He comes, and I really believe that there are but very, very few who would wish Him to appear, for to do so is to desire death, and how few do this! Not that we really ever die: we only change our sheaths."

But though he longed for the return of the Heavenly Bridegroom during his life, he also looked upon death as a welcome release from the trials and troubles of life. He frequently alluded to this subject, and dozens of extracts might be made from his letters, all more or less similar to the two following, which were written at different dates:—

"I would that all could look on death as a cheerful friend, who takes us from a world of trial to our true home. All our sorrows come from a forgetfulness of this great truth. I desire to look on the departure of my friends as a promotion to another and a higher sphere, as I do believe that to be the case with all.

"Any one, to whom God gives to be much with Him, cannot even suffer a pang at death. For what is death to a believer? It is a closer approach to Him, whom, even through the veil, he is ever with."

There is one point on which we ought specially to dwell in considering the lessons to be learnt from the life of General Gordon, and that is the moral courage he always exhibited. His physical courage has already been touched on, but great as it was, his moral courage was far greater. There are plenty of men possessing physical courage who fail to exhibit moral courage when put to the test. Man being a gregarious animal, and accustomed to go in flocks, is led by his fellows to evil as well as to good. No man can be a true leader of men who is not prepared to stand alone, if need be, against overwhelming majorities. Gordon had the courage of his convictions, and no amount of pressure, no weight of public opinion, could deter him when once the path of duty was clear. The time-server does not ask, What is right? What is my duty? but, What will pay? What will public opinion think? For such an one Gordon had a supreme contempt. It has been well said by Dr. Ryle, the Bishop of Liverpool, "It is not overwhelming majorities that shake and influence the world. Small minorities have ever had more influence than large majorities. All great men have had their seasons of loneliness. See Napoleon, Mahomet, Luther, John Wesley, and Christ Himself." To this list we may add the name of General Gordon; few men so often found themselves so much in opposition in fashionable circles and in the official world.

* * *

Among the false reports that have been circulated about General Gordon is one that he was very unsociable and morose, shunning society in general, and ladies' society in particular. It is true that he shunned a certain class of society; there was also a certain set of women that he fought shy of; but it is quite untrue to say that he was unsociable. He greatly enjoyed the society of ordinary cultivated women, who were in sympathy with his efforts to do good, and with them he was neither shy nor reserved. He could talk pleasantly for hours together, and as his own mind was a very cultivated one, he was a great element of attraction to society of a certain kind. What he did dislike intensely was the society of that class of ladies who think of little beyond the fashions of the day, the latest style of dress, and the newest forms of amusement. Such persons he used to find had no minds to think, and no hearts to feel for suffering humanity. Many of them attempted to lionise him, while others paid him the most fulsome compliments, both being things that he particularly disliked. The ordinary conventional dinner-party, where a man is condemned to take in a lady with whom he has nothing in common, and next to whom he must sit for a couple of hours or so eating and drinking things which do not agree with him, was to Gordon a special object of antipathy. Writing from Cairo on March 15, 1878, he says:—

"I am much bothered, but I get to bed at 8 P.M., which is a comfort, for I do not dine out, and consequently do not drink wine. Every one laughs at me; but I do not care."

Again, when in South Africa, he writes:—

"How I hate society; how society hates me! I never tell you the sort of life I lead, it is not worth it; for it is simply the life I led at home, being asked out, and refusing when it is possible;—when I go, getting humiliated, or being foolish. This latter is better than not being exposed—keeping one's self in cotton wool, for that brings out no knowledge of self, such as is brought out by being with others. At the same time, I think it is not right to be much in society, indeed I fight against it truly, and have only dined out about seven times since I have been here."

On October 24th, 1884, when he had made up his mind not to return to England, even if he should get away from Khartoum, he says:—

"I dwell on the joy of never seeing Great Britain again, with its horrid, wearisome dinner-parties and miseries. How we can put up with those things passes my imagination! It is a perfect bondage. At those dinner-parties we are all in masks, saying what we do not believe, eating and drinking things we do not want, and then abusing one another. I would sooner live like a Dervish with the Mahdi, than go out to dinner every night in London. I hope, if any English general comes to Khartoum, he will not ask me to dinner. Why men cannot be friends without bringing the wretched stomachs in, is astounding."

But though Gordon did not like the artificial conventional society one meets at ordinary dinner-parties, it must not be supposed that he was in any way gloomy. His friend, Prebendary Barnes, says about him: "The seriousness of Gordon's temper did not prevent him from being a bright and agreeable companion, especially when those with whom he talked could join him in smoking a cigarette. He had a keen sense of humour, and on every matter about which he cared to form an opinion he spoke clearly and decisively." And his old brother officer, Sir Gerald Graham, thus speaks of him:—

"Pictures have been drawn of Gordon as a gloomy ascetic, wrapped up in mystic thoughts, retiring from all communion with the world, and inspiring fear rather than affection. I can only describe him as he appeared to me. Far from being a gloomy ascetic, he always seemed to me to retain a boyish frankness, and to long to share his ideas with others. Our intimacy began when we were thrown together in mining the docks of Sebastopol during the winter of 1855-56—a period Gordon always delighted in referring to whenever we met, by calling up old scenes, and even our old jokes of that time. Like all men of action, more especially soldiers, Gordon disliked argument with subordinates when once he had resolved on his course of action; otherwise he invited discussion, and I always found him most tolerant in listening to arguments against his own views, even on subjects in which he, of course, possessed a knowledge far exceeding any I could pretend to. To show the impression he made upon me at the time of my last seeing him, in 1884, I will quote from a letter which I wrote shortly after: 'Charlie Gordon's character is a very fascinating one; he has so much of the natural man about him. To his friends—and he treats all as friends whom he knows and trusts—his charm of manner is irresistible. It is utterly unlike the charm of a polished man of the world; it is the charm of a perfectly open mind, giving and demanding confidence, sometimes playfully, sometimes earnestly, and sometimes with touching humility."

There were various reasons which made him avoid worldly society; one was the incessant grumbling in which many indulge, who have little cause to complain. Writing from the Soudan, he says:—

"I have not patience with the groans of half the world, and declare there is more happiness among these miserable blacks, who have not a meal from day to day, than among our own middle classes. The blacks are glad of a little handful of maize, and live in the greatest discomfort. They have not a strip to cover them; but you do not see them grunting and groaning all day long, as you see scores and scores in England, with their wretched dinner-parties, and attempts at gaiety, where all is hollow and miserable."

Then there was a higher reason. He found that such society interfered with his spiritual life. He says, in three distinct letters:—

"Getting quiet does one good; it is impossible to hear God's voice in a whirl of visits. You must be more or less in the desert, to use the scales of the Sanctuary, to see and weigh the true value of things and sayings."

"We have no conception or idea of what God will show us, if we persevere in seeking Him; and it is He who puts this wish into our hearts. All I can say to you is: Persevere; avoid the world and its poor wretched little talk about others; never mind being thought stupid; look on everything with regard to the great day, and trust Him implicitly."

"Christ must actually die, not come very near death; and so must we, if we would rise. I once thought it possible to bargain with Christ; to say, I will give up half of my desire of the world, and gain, in the gap, a corresponding measure of Christ. It was no good: I lost the half, but did not get the measure filled. Then I tried to give up a little more, but with the same result; now I think God has shown me that it is not the least use trying these subtle bargains; that the giving up little by little is more wearisome and trying than one surrender, and that I trust He will give me power to make."

Another reason, doubtless, why he shunned fashionable society was his extreme sensitiveness to praise. His honest, straightforward nature could not tolerate the praise that so often is showered upon great men. He used to say:—

"If a man speaks well of me, divide it by millions and then it will be millions of times too favourable. If a man speaks evil of me, multiply it by millions and it will be millions of times too favourable. Man is disguised, as far as his neighbour is concerned; this disguise is his outward goodness. Some have it in a slight measure torn off in this life, and are judged accordingly by those whose disguise of goodness is more intact; the revelation of the evil by this partial tearing off is but the manifestation of what exists. Whether the disguise is torn or intact, the interior and true state (known to God quite clearly) is the same corrupt thing; the eye of the Spirit discerns through the disguise.

"Who could bear to have this disguise quite rent off, and the evil exposed to the eyes of the world? How would the world receive me, if they knew what I really was, and what God knows that I am at this minute? Yet, how hardly I judge another whose disguise, slightly rent, shows a little of the corruption I know exists in me. Nothing evil was ever said of any man which was not true, his worst enemies could not say a thousandth part of the evil that is in him.

"Praise now humbles me, it does not elate me; did the world praise Jesus? and what right have we to take this praise of men, when it is due to Him?

"When one knows the little one does of oneself, and any one praises you, I, at any rate, have a rising, which is a suppressed 'You lie.' There are several nice bits in our Lord's life, when He replied with some unpalatable truth to those men who would follow Him, and would make much of Him, but afterwards they entirely changed their demeanour."

At one time he used, for the same reason, to avoid reading all newspapers, as they contained so much praise of him. Writing in 1882, when he was Governor-General of the Soudan, he says:—

"I have come to a conclusion; may God give me strength to keep it! Stop all the newspapers. It is no use mincing the matter; as the disease is dire, so also must be the remedy.... Newspapers feed a passion I have for giving my opinion; therefore, as we have no right to judge and have nothing to do with this world (of which we are not), this feeding must be cut short.

"The giving up the papers may cause the starvation of my passion for politics, and that scab may drop off. God has shown me what the scabs are:—Evil-speaking, lying, slandering, back-biting, scoffing, self-conceit, boasting, silly talking, and some few more.