It was my good fortune to have had, by close personal association, exact knowledge of the difficulties which my predecessors had encountered, as well as, perhaps, a more modest ambition, and hence to avoid some of those difficulties. Yet in view of the past experience of all commanders of the army, from that of George Washington with the Continental Congress down to the present time, I advise all my young brother soldiers to limit their ambition to the command of the Division of the Atlantic or Department of the East. But since some of them must in all probability be required to discharge the duties of the higher position, I trust the varied experiences of their predecessors may serve as some help to them in the discharge of those duties, which are vastly more difficult and far less agreeable than any other duties of an American soldier. They are the duties which most closely concern the subordinate relation of the military to the civil power in a republic. In that relation I had the great good fortune to enjoy most cordial and considerate personal treatment on the part of my distinguished associates representing the civil power. Hence my advice to my young military friends may be fairly regarded as based upon the most favorable view of what any of them may reasonably expect. It is the one position of all in the army which most severely tries the spirit of subordination which is so indispensable in a soldier of a republic. I have not thought it surprising that none of my great predecessors were quite able to endure the trial.

THE SECRETARY'S CALL-BELL

It is there where the polished surfaces of military etiquette and modern methods come in contact with the rough cast-iron of those which often prevail in civil administration, and the former get badly scratched. Military rules are invariable, with rare exceptions understood and observed by all, while civil practice varies according to the character and habits of the chief in authority, from those of the illustrious Stanton, now well known in history,( 1) to the opposite extreme of refined courtesy. Long observation and experience have led to the belief that such rasping of feelings, too sensitive perhaps, even more than substantial difference, has often been the cause of discord. A single example may suffice to illustrate what is meant. In the arrangements of the room especially designed for the office of the Secretary of War in the splendid new State, War, and Navy Departments building, was a great table-desk on which was a complete system of electric buttons connected with wires leading to bells in all the principal offices in the department, the buttons bearing the titles of the officers at the head of the several bureaus, etc., so that the Secretary could "ring up" any colonel, brigadier-general, or major-general whom he wished to see, just as a gentleman in private life does his coachman, butler, or valet. To an army officer who had for many years, in lower grades, been accustomed to the invariable formula, delivered by a well-dressed soldier standing at "attention" and respectfully saluting, "The commanding officer sends his compliments to Captain B—-, and wishes to see the captain at headquarters," the tinkling of that soft little bell must have sounded harsh indeed after he had attained the rank of brigadier-general. Twice only, I believe, my own old soldier messenger who attended in the room where the telephone and bells were located, came to my room, with an indescribable expression on his face, and said, "The bell from the Secretary's office is ringing!" I replied, "Indeed? Go up and inquire what it means." Presently the Secretary's own messenger appeared, and delivered a message in courteous terms—whether the same the Secretary had given to him I did not know, but had reason to doubt, for I had seen and heard the Secretary violently ring a certain bell several times, and then say with great emphasis to his messenger, "Go and tell —— to come here," not even using the high military title by which "——" was habitually addressed in the War Department. But those uncivil methods of an imperfect civilization are gradually passing away, and the more refined courtesies, taught, I believe, in all our great schools as well as in the military and naval service, are taking their place. It is now a long time since that reform was practically complete in the War Department.

THE RELATIONS OF SECRETARY AND GENERAL

Thus it appeared, when I went into the office in 1888, that of my predecessors in command of the army, Scott and Sherman had given up the contest, Sheridan had been put quickly hors de combat, while Grant alone had won the fight, and that after a long contest, involving several issues, in which a Secretary of War was finally removed from office with the consent of his own personal and political friends, a President was impeached and escaped removal from office by only one vote, and the country was brought to the verge of another civil war. As I had helped Evarts, Seward, and some others whose names I never knew, to "pour oil on the troubled waters" in the time of Grant and Stanton, and to get everybody into the humor to respond heartily to that great aspiration, "Let us have peace," I thought perhaps I might do something in the same direction in later years. Be that as it might, I had no desire to try again what so many others had failed to accomplish, but thought it better to make an experiment with a less ambitious plan of my own, which I had worked out while trying to champion the ideas entertained by all my predecessors. At the request of General Grant and General Sherman, when the one was President and the other general of the army, I studied the subject as thoroughly as I was capable of doing, and formulated a regulation intended to define the relations between the Secretary of War, the general of the army, and the staff departments. I still think that plan of my great superiors, only formulated by me, would have worked quite satisfactorily if it could have had general and cordial support. Yet I do not think it was based upon the soundest view of the constitutional obligations of the President as commander-in-chief of the army, nor at all consistent with the practice in this country of giving the command of the army to the officer happening to be senior in rank, without regard to the "special trust and confidence" reposed in him by the President for the time being. It was based too much upon the special conditions then existing, wherein the general of the army, no less than the Secretary of War, enjoyed the confidence of the President in the highest degree. The plan proposed to give far too great authority to the general, if he did not, for whatever reason, enjoy the full confidence of the President. It also trusted too much to the ability and disinterested fidelity of the several chiefs of the staff departments. In short, it was based upon a supposed higher degree of administrative virtue than always exists even in this country.

However all this may be, the proposed regulation did not meet with cordial support, so far as I know, from any but General Grant, General Sherman, and General M. C. Meigs, then quartermaster-general. The other bureau chiefs earnestly opposed it. It was near the end of General Grant's second term, and no effort was made, so far as I know, to adopt any regulation on the subject in the next or any succeeding administration. The personal controversy between General Scott and the Secretary of War many years before had resulted in the repeal, through revision, of the old and quite satisfactory regulation on the subject, and no other worthy of the name has ever been adopted in its place.

Soon after I was assigned to the command of the army I submitted, in writing, to President Cleveland my own mature views on the subject. They received some favorable consideration, but no formal action, in view of the near approach of the end of his first term. From that time till near the present the paper was in the personal custody of the Secretary of War. What consideration, if any, it ever received, I was never informed. But it was the guide of my own action, at least, while I was in command of the army. It is now on file in the War Department. It is to be hoped that some future military and administrative geniuses, superior to any of the last hundred years, may be able to solve that difficult problem. I can only say that my own plan worked well enough so long as I helped to work it. How it may be with anybody else, either under my plan or some other, only the future can determine. I so far succeeded that the most intelligent staff officers used to say, "For the first time the general actually does command the army." They saw only the results, without exactly perceiving the nature of the motive-power.

The way to success in rendering efficient public service does not lie through any assumption of the authority which the nation may have given to another, even if not most wisely, but rather in zealous, faithful, and subordinate efforts to assist that other in doing what the country has imposed upon him.

THE LAW FIXING RETIREMENT FOR AGE

A soldier may honorably crave, as the dearest object of his life, recognition of his past services by promotion to a higher grade. That is his one reward for all he may have done. But the desire for higher command, greater power, and more unrestrained authority exhibits ambition inconsistent with due military subordination and good citizenship. It is a dangerous ambition in a republic. The highest examples of patriotism ever shown in this country have been in the voluntary surrender of power into the hands of the people or of their chosen representatives, not in efforts to increase or prolong that power. Following those highest examples, in the year 1882 all the senior officers of the army, including Sherman, Sheridan, and Hancock, united in advocating the measure then pending in Congress, to fix a limit of age when every officer should relinquish command and return to the ranks of private citizenship. In doing so, nearly all of those seniors, especially Hancock, relinquished forever all hope of rising to the command of the army. My case was not so strong as that of Hancock, because I was younger. But Sheridan was only six months older than I, and his "expectation of life" was far beyond the time when I should become sixty-four years old. Hence I cheerfully relinquished in 1882 any reasonable ambition I may ever have had to command the army. My ultimate succession to that command in 1888 was, like all other important events in my personal career, unsought and unexpected. Hence whatever I did from 1888 to 1895 was only a little "extra duty," and I have had no reason to find fault on account of the "extra- duty pay" which I received, though none of it was in money. I am inclined to think it a pretty good rule for a soldier to wait until he is "detailed," and not to try to put himself "on guard." I do not know any case in American history where the opposite course has not resulted in irretrievable injury to him who adopted it. Temporary success in gaining high position, before education and experience have given the necessary qualifications, necessarily results finally in failure; while slower advancement, giving full opportunities for education and experience in the duties of each grade, insures full qualification for the next higher. American history is full of such examples, as it is—alas! too truly—of those cases where the highest qualifications and most becoming modesty have not met with any appropriate advancement or other recognition.

AN ANECDOTE OF GENERAL GRANT

In the official intercourse of a soldier with the great departments of government, he often finds useful those maxims which have served him as commander of an army in the field. The most important of these is, not to enter a combat where he is sure to be beaten, as, for instance, where his opponent is the judge who is to decide the issue. As in war, so in administration, battle once joined, questions of right become obscured. The most powerful guns and battalions are sure to win. It is much wiser to seek an ally who carries a heavier armament. Some subordinates of mine—clerks and messengers, I believe—were once required to refund some money which had been paid them on my interpretation of the law and regulations. My careful explanation of the ground of my action was promptly disapproved. I then requested that the money be charged to me and the whole matter referred to Congress, in reply to which request I was informed that the accounts had been settled. In another case I requested that my appeal from adverse action be submitted to President Grant, who had had occasion to know something about me. I was requested by telegraph, in cipher, to withdraw that appeal, as it was liable to cause trouble. Being a lover of peace rather than war, I complied. In that perhaps I made a mistake. If I had adhered to my appeal, it might have saved a public impeachment. Again, I was called upon by one of the Treasury bureaus to refund some money which had been paid me for mileage by the Secretary of War, on the alleged ground that the Secretary could not lawfully give me such an order. I referred the matter to the Secretary, as one that did not concern me personally, but which involved the dignity of the head of the War Department as compared with that of a subordinate bureau of another department. The Treasury official soon notified me that the account had been allowed. To illustrate the application of the same principle under opposite conditions, I must relate the story told of President Grant. When informed by a Treasury officer that he could not find any law to justify what the President had desired to be done, he replied, "Then I will see if I can find a Treasury officer who can find that law." Of course no change in the incumbent of that office proved to be necessary. I have thought in several cases in later years that Grant's military method might have been tried to advantage.

"Be ye wise as a serpent and harmless as a dove" is the only rule of action I have ever heard of that can steer a soldier clear of trouble with the civil powers of this great republic. Yet he must sometimes, when his honor or the rights of his subordinates are involved, make the fight, though he knows he must be beaten. A soldier must then stand by his guns as long as he can, and it has happened that such a fight, apparently hopeless at the time, has given victory to a future generation.

[( 1) Sherman's "Memoirs," second edition, Vol. II, p. 422.]

CHAPTER XXVII President of the New Board of Ordnance and Fortifications—Usefulness of the Board—Troubles with the Sioux Indians in 1890-1891—Success of the Plan to Employ Indians as Soldiers—Marriage to Miss Kilbourne—The Difficulty with Chili in 1892.

Even as late as the year 1882, very high military authority in this country advocated with great earnestness the proposition that our old brick and stone forts, with their smooth-bore guns, could make a successful defense against a modern iron-clad fleet! At the same time, and even much later, high naval authority maintained that the United States navy should be relied upon for the defense of our many thousands of miles of sea-coast! In view of such counsel, it does not seem strange that Congress, after all the old ships had nearly all rotted away, began to give some attention to a new navy, but thought little or nothing of land defenses. The old brick and stone parapets and the cast-iron guns were still there; none of them had become rotten, though the wooden carriages had gone to decay, and the guns were lying on the ground! Yet, after a long dream of security, the Great National Council announced the decision that something ought probably to be done for sea- coast defense. Provision was made by law for a very high board, with the Secretary of War presiding, to report to Congress what was required—a thing which, if Congress had only known it, the Engineer Bureau of the War Department could have reported just as well in far less time. But a length a very able report was submitted, which inspired the confidence of Congress.

BOARD OF ORDNANCE AND FORTIFICATION

In the meantime there had arisen a condition which can best be expressed as "want of confidence" in the chief of the Ordnance Department of the army on the part of committees of Congress. From this it resulted that no appropriations were made for several years for any new armament, and hence none for fortifications. Thus by a trifle were the wheels of a great government blocked for a long time! Yet that government still survives! Finally, in the year 1888 an act was passed creating a Board of Ordnance and Fortifications, of which the commanding general of the army should be president, and appropriating quite a large sum of money to be expended, under the direct supervision of that board, to commence the work of fortification and armament of the sea-coast. After a very careful examination and full consideration and discussion, the board adopted the plans prepared by the Bureaus of Engineering and Ordnance, and the work was began and carried forward substantially the same as if the expenditure of the appropriation had been intrusted to the two bureaus concerned and the Secretary of War.

The board did perform, and still continues to perform, a very important and essential duty, and one which cannot be satisfactorily intrusted to any one man, namely, that of deciding the delicate and difficult questions constantly arising in respect to the practical utility and economy of new inventions having reference to works of defense or of attack. But these questions had no immediate bearing whatever upon the all-important problem of the day—to place the sea-coasts of the United States in a satisfactory state of defense according to the best scientific methods then known to the world. And that problem had already been solved, in all respects save one, namely, how to get out of Congress the necessary money to do the work? Genius will never cease to invent something better. If we are to wait for the best, the next war will be over long before we shall begin to prepare for it. All great military nations had been engaged for many years in elaborate and costly experiments, to develop the best possible means of attack and defense, and our Engineer and Ordnance departments had not failed to profit thereby to the fullest extent. They were ready, without any such costly experiments, to make our defenses as good as any in the world. Yet that work of so vital importance must be delayed until American genius could also be assured of a chance, at government expense, of developing something better than anybody else in the world had done! An end was finally, in 1888, put to that dangerous delay by the device, so happily invented by somebody in Congress, of a Board of Ordnance and Fortification.

USEFULNESS OF THE BOARD

The board has also served, and will doubtless continue to serve, another very important purpose. It brings together, in close consideration and discussion of all details of the system of national defense, representative officers of the engineers, the ordnance, and the artillery, together with a representative civilian who has become, by service in Congress, far better able than any other member to insure that perfect understanding between the board and the committees of Congress which is essential to harmonious action. Above all, it has given to the commanding general an opportunity to become perfectly familiar with all the details of the coast defenses, and to exert a legitimate influence in making preparations for war, which must be of vital importance to him and to the country when he has to bear the great responsibility of command. I used to say that it would not be just to me to deprive me of such opportunities for education, and I doubt not all my successors will share that feeling. Thus, what may prove to be of the greatest benefit to the military service has finally come out of that evil of "want of confidence" in an ordnance chief.

When in command of the Division of the Atlantic in 1886-7, I made a careful estimate of the aggregate strength of the war garrisons required for the fortifications and armament recommended by the Endicott board, and of the peace garrisons which would be absolutely required for the care of the new works and for the instruction of the militia artillery reserves. It was found that the addition of two regiments to the present artillery strength of the army would provide the requisite force. Hence a measure was formulated and submitted to Congress to convert the present five regiments into seven, with some proportionate reduction in the number of officers, intended to promote efficiency and economy. That measure has appeared to meet with the approval of nearly all concerned, but is still pending in Congress. It is probably the most important military measure now awaiting favorable action. The measure which accompanies it for the reorganization of the infantry, though not of so pressing necessity, is based upon sound military principles, and is worthy of prompt and favorable action.

The first introduction of the policy of confining the warlike tribes of Indians upon very restricted reservations necessarily caused great discontent, especially among the younger men, who where thus cut off from the sports of the chase and the still greater sport of occasional forays into frontier settlements, which were the only means known in Indian custom by which a young warrior could gain a name and a position of honor in his tribe. Either through too limited appropriations or bad management, the provisions furnished for the support of the Indians, in lieu of those to which they had been accustomed, proved inadequate. This caused the spirit of discontent to increase and to become general among all ages. The natural result was such a threat of war from the great Sioux nation in the winter of 1890-91 as to necessitate the concentration of quite a large army to meet the danger of a general outbreak. In the course of military operations, accidents rather than design on either side occasioned some serious collisions between the troops and the Indians, especially at Wounded Knee, resulting in desperate conflict and much loss of life. But by very careful management on the part of the commanding general in the field, Major-General Miles, a general conflict was averted, and the Sioux made their submission. They had had no general intention to go to war, if they could avoid it without starvation. After a large sum of money had been expended by the War Department in this way, the deficiencies in food were supplied at about the same cost as would, if made in advance, have removed the cause of war. The Indians gained their point of getting as much food as they needed, and the War Department paid the extra bills, but out of the same public treasury which has so often been bled in that way.

TROUBLES WITH THE SIOUX INDIANS IN 1890-91

It was quite beyond the power of the War Department to guard against a recurrence of that greatest danger of Indian wars—starvation of the Indians. But long experience and accurate knowledge of Indian character had suggested a method by which the other cause of discontent among the young Indian warriors might be, at least in a great measure, removed. That was by providing a legitimate method by which their irrepressible love of military life and exploits might be largely gratified, and, at the same time, those ambitious young men transferred from the ranks of more or less probable savage enemies to the ranks of friends and practically civilized allies. Fortunately, the strongest trait of the Indian character, namely, fidelity to the war chief, lent itself to this project. Long experience had shown the existence of this Indian trait. In only one solitary instance had the Indian scouts so long employed by the army ever proved unfaithful, though often employed in hostilities against their own tribes. Hence, if the ardent young warriors could be induced to enlist for three years in the army, they would, at least for that time, be converted from enemies into allies, even against such of their own tribes as might refuse to enlist. Of course the army must suffer somewhat, in its effective strength for all purposes, during this experiment; for it is evident that a company or troop of Indians would not be quite as valuable for general service as the same number of white men. Yet the transfer of a few hundred of the best Sioux warriors from the Sioux side to our side would much more than compensate for the loss of the same number of white troops. The result of that experiment seemed to be entirely satisfactory. At all events, there has been no great Indian war, nor any threat of one, since that experiment was begun. It has served to tide over the time during which the young men, who had from earliest childhood listened to stories of the Custer massacre and other great Indian achievements, were undergoing transformation from the life and character of savage warriors to those of civilized husbandmen, under the system of allotments in severalty. When the short warlike part of the life of one generation is past, the danger will no longer exist.

In June, 1891, at Keokuk, Iowa, I married Miss Georgia Kilbourne, daughter of Mrs. George E. Kilbourne of that city. Then a host of old soldiers of the Union army reassembled to greet their comrade.

In 1892 this country seemed to be on the verge of war with the little republic of Chile. So confident were some officials of the administration that war was inevitable, that I was asked to make an estimate of the military force which would be necessary to occupy and hold a vital point in Chilean territory until the demands of the United States were complied with. It was assumed, of course, that the navy could easily do all the rest. Pending the consideration of this subject, so disagreeable to me, I had a dream which I repeated at the time to a few intimate friends. I saw in the public street a man holding a mangy-looking dog by the neck, and beating him with a great club, while a crowd of people assembled to witness the "sport." Some one asked the man why he was beating the poor dog. He replied: "Oh, just to make him yelp." But the dog did not "yelp." He bore his cruel punishment without a whine. Then he was transformed into a splendid animal, one of the noblest of his species, and the entire crowd of bystanders, with one accord, rushing in and compelled the man to desist from beating him.

CHAPTER XXVIII Services of the Army During the Labor Strikes of 1894—Military Control of the Pacific Railways—United States Troops in the City of Chicago—Orders Sent to General Miles, and his Reports—The Proclamation of the President—Instructions to Govern the Troops in Dealing with a Mob—The Duties of the Military Misunderstood— Orders of the President in Regard to the Pacific Railways.

In 1894 the vast development of railroad communication between the Mississippi valley and the Pacific Ocean, and the similar building of new cities and founding of industrial enterprises in the region between the Rocky Mountains and the Pacific, both in anticipation of the future development of the country rather then in response to any demand then existing, having been substantially completed, or suspended for an indefinite time, a large amount of capital so invested was found for the time unproductive, and a great number of laborers were left in the Pacific States without any possible employment. The great majority of these laborers were, as usual, without any accumulated means to pay their transportation to any other part of the country, and hence were left to drift as they might toward the East, subsisting by whatever means they could find during their long tramp of many hundreds of miles. Similar and other causes had produced at the same time industrial depression throughout the country, so that the unfortunate laborers drifting eastward were only an additional burden upon communities already overloaded with unemployed labor. Thus the borrowing of foreign capital to put into unprofitable investments, and the employment of great numbers of laborers in making premature developments, met with the consequences which are sure to follow disregard of natural laws. The management of the Pacific railroads did not appear to appreciate the wisdom of mitigating, so far as was in their power, the evil which had resulted from their own policy, by giving free transportation to the laborers who had been stranded on the Pacific coast. Hence all the transcontinental roads were soon blocked by lawless seizures of trains, and suffered losses far greater than they saved in transportation. Indeed, the requisite transportation of destitute laborers eastward would have cost the roads practically nothing, while their losses resulting from not providing it were very great. Every possible effort was made for a long time to deal effectively with this evil by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings; but such methods proved entirely inadequate. The government was finally compelled, in consequence of the almost total interruption of interstate commerce and of the transportation of the United States mails and troops, to assume military control along the lines of all the Pacific roads, and direct the department commanders to restore and maintain, by military force, traffic and transportation over those roads.

MILITARY CONTROL OF THE PACIFIC RAILWAYS

For some time those lawless acts did not seem to result from any general organization. But they gradually developed into the formidable character of a wide-spread conspiracy and combination, with recognized general leaders, to obstruct and prevent the due execution of the laws of the United States respecting transportation and interstate commerce. The principal center of this conspiracy, and by far the most formidable combination, was in Chicago, where the greatest material interests, both public and private, were at stake, though many other important railroad centers and many thousand miles of road were involved. There the insurrection was so great in numbers and so violent in its acts as to require the most prompt and energetic action of a very large force to suppress disorder, protect public property, and execute the laws. The city police were utterly powerless in such an emergency, and deputy United States marshals, though employed without limit as to numbers, were no more effective. The State militia were not called out in time to meet the emergency. Hence nothing remained but for the National Government to exercise the military power conferred upon it by the Constitution and laws, so far as the same were applicable.( 1) Fortunately, the acts of Congress passed in pursuance of the Constitution, although never before made effective in a similar case, were found to give ample authority for the action then required. Fortunately, also, the wise foresight of the government in establishing a large military post at Fort Sheridan, near Chicago, made a regiment of infantry, a squadron of cavalry, and a battery of artillery immediately available for service in that city. But, unfortunately, the commanding general of that department was absent from his command, where superior military capacity was so much needed at that time. Although the troops west of the Mississippi had been engaged for a long time, under the President's orders, in overcoming the unlawful obstruction of railroad traffic above referred to, the general appears not to have anticipated any emergency which would in his judgment require or justify such use of troops in his own department, and hence remained in the Eastern States, where he had gone some time before. From this it resulted that when the troops at Fort Sheridan were ordered into Chicago, the execution of the order devolved upon subordinate officers, and the troops were so dispersed as to be unable to act with the necessary effect.

It having become apparent that the services of troops would probably be required in the city of Chicago, and in anticipation of orders from the President, instructions were telegraphed on July 2 to the commanding general of the Department of the Missouri to make preparations to move the garrison of Fort Sheridan to the Lake Front Park in the city. The reply of his staff-officer, Colonel Martin, showed that the department commander, Major-General Miles, was not in Chicago, and the adjutant-general of the army did not know where he was, but, after several inquiries by telegraph, learned that the general had started that afternoon from Long Island for Washington instead of Chicago. The next day (July 3), in the President's room at the Executive Mansion, in reply to my suggestion that his presence was needed with his command, General Miles said he was subject to orders, but that in his opinion the United States troops ought not to be employed in the city of Chicago at that time. No reply was made by the President or the Secretary of War, who was also present, to that expression of opinion, but the President approved my further suggestion that General Miles should return at once to his command. The general started by the first train, but could not reach Chicago in time to meet the emergency. It became necessary in the judgment of the President to order the Fort Sheridan garrison into the city in the afternoon of the same day (July 3).

UNITED STATES TROOPS IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

The instructions given the day before about moving the troops to Lake Front Park were not complied with. From that point they could most readily have protected the sub-treasury, custom-house, post- office, and other United States property, and also have acted in a formidable body at any other point where their service might properly have been required. But instead of that, the troops were so dispersed that they could not act with much effect anywhere, and could give no protection whatever to the vast amount of United States property exposed to destruction. This error appears to have resulted in some measure from the too great deference paid by commanding officers to the advice or wisdom of civil officers to whom they were referred to for information, and much more from lack of knowledge of the lawful relations existing between the national troops and the civil authorities in this country, although those relations had been plainly defined in an order dated May 25, quoted below. Like ignorance in respect to the proper tactical methods of dealing with insurrection against the authority of the United States caused halting and ineffective action of the troops. To correct this error and make known to all the rules which must govern United States troops in like emergencies, the subjoined order, dated July 9, was issued. The extracts from correspondence quoted below, indicate the nature of the errors above referred to, and their correction some time after the arrival of General Miles in Chicago.

The garrison of Fort Sheridan proved sufficient, notwithstanding the first faulty disposition and action of troops, to hold the mob in check until reinforcements arrived from distant stations and the State troops were brought into effective action. Finally, the proclamation of the President of the United States, quoted below, which was issued at the moment when ample military forces had been placed in position to enforce his constitutional mandates, very quickly terminated all forcible resistance to the execution of the laws of the United States. The same result, though perhaps with greater destruction of life and far less destruction of property, would probably have been accomplished in a single day by the Fort Sheridan garrison alone, acting in one compact body, according to the tactics prescribed for such service. If a like occasion ever again occurs, the action of the troops will doubtless be governed by such tactics. Delay is too dangerous in such cases.

"(Telegram.) "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., July 2, 1894. "To the Commanding General, Department of the Missouri, Chicago, Illinois.

"You will please make all necessary arrangements, confidentially, for the transportation of the entire garrison of Fort Sheridan— infantry, cavalry, and artillery—to the Lake Front Park in the city of Chicago. To avoid possible interruption of the movement by rail and by marching through a part of the city, it may be advisable to bring them by steamboat. Please consider this matter, and have the arrangements perfected without delay. You may expect orders at any time for the movement. Acknowledge receipt, and report in what manner the movement is to be made.

"J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding."

"(Telegram.) "Chicago, Illinois, July 2, 1894. "Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

"Confidential despatch this date received at three-thirty P. M. Arrangements can be made to bring troops from Sheridan to Lake Front Park by steamer, but there would be difficulty in disembarking them there, as the Van Buren street viaduct has been torn down; and, besides, transportation from barracks to pier at Sheridan would necessarily be slow. They can be brought from Sheridan to Lake Front direct by rail, and disembark on grounds, thus avoiding marching through city. Suggest the latter plan as best, especially as rail transportation is now at the post sufficient to bring the whole command—infantry, artillery, and cavalry—as soon as they can be loaded on cars at that point.

"Martin, Asst. Adjt.-Genl. "(in absence of Major-Genl. Comdg.)."

UNITED STATES TROOPS IN THE CITY OF CHICAGO

"(Telegram.) "Washington, D. C., July 3, 1894, four o'clock P. M. "To Martin, Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. Dept. of the Missouri, Chicago, Ills.

"It having become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States, you will direct Colonel Crofton to move his entire command at once to the city of Chicago, leaving the necessary guard at Fort Sheridan, there to execute the orders and processes of the United States court, to prevent the obstruction of the United States mails, and generally to enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the United States. He will confer with the United States marshal, the United States district attorney, and Edwin Walker, special counsel. Acknowledge receipt, and report action promptly.

"By order of the President: "J. M. Schofield, Major-General."

"(Telegram.) "Chicago, Ills, July 4, 1894. "Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

"At ten-fifteen this morning Colonel Crofton reports his command in the city; located, infantry at Blue Island and Grand Crossing, cavalry and artillery at stock-yards; cannot learn that anything definite has been accomplished, but there has been no active trouble. People appear to feel easier since arrival of troops. General Miles is expected to arrive in city within an hour or at twelve.

"Martin, Asst. Adjt.-Genl."

"(Telegram.) "Chicago, Ills., July 4, 1894. "Adjt. Genl. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

"Returned at eleven-thirty this morning.

"Miles, Maj.-Genl. Commanding."

"(Telegram.) "Chicago, Ills., July 4, 1894. "Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

"Cavalry and artillery moving to the stock-yards were delayed by obstructions placed upon the track, also cars being overturned on track and the threatening mob in the vicinity. A report is received that a mob of about two thousand men has gathered near Blue Island and threatened to take that place at four o'clock this afternoon. It is occupied by four companies of infantry. At the request of U. S. Marshal Arnold, troops had been located at Blue Island, the stock-yards, and the crossing at Forty-seventh street of the Lake Shore and Rock Island railroads before my arrival, and others are desired at South Chicago. I have directed all commanding officers not to allow crowds or mobs to congregate about the commands in a menacing or threatening manner, and to keep out pickets and guards; and, after due warning, if the mobs approach the commands in a threatening manner, they must be dispersed, even if firearms have to be used. A large number of men in the city are wearing white ribbon, the color ordered by Debs to indicate their allegiance to his orders. Owing to the feeling of feverish excitement in the city, and the large number of unoccupied, the condition of to-day is more critical than at any other time. Most of the roads are moving mail and passenger trains. All of the roads will attempt to move their trains to-morrow morning. Sufficient number of men are available and anxious to work to take the place of all the strikers, provided proper protection can be given them. Seven roads have moved a few cars of perishable freight. All the troops from Sheridan are occupied, and I renew my recommendation that the garrison be very largely increased at once to meet any emergency that may arise. The effect of moving troops through the country, especially from Kansas to Chicago, at this time would be desirable.

"Nelson A. Miles, Major-General Commanding."

Additional troops were concentrated in Chicago as rapidly as they could be transported, until the force there aggregated about two thousand men. More were in readiness to move if necessary.

ORDERS SENT TO GENERAL MILES, AND HIS REPORTS

"(Telegram.) "Chicago, Ills., July 5, 1894. "Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

"Owing to the excellent discipline and great forbearance of officers and men, serious hostilities were avoided yesterday; several small fights and affrays occurred. Matters look more favorable to-day, although interference exists on five roads. All railroads are endeavoring to move freight and mail trains.

"Miles, Major-General Commanding."

"(Telegram.) "Chicago, Ills, July 5, 1894. "Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

"The mob of several thousand are moving east along Rock Island nearer center of city, overturning cars, burning station-houses, and destroying property. There is a report that the mob intend sacking some of the principal building near Rookery Building to- night. The riot will soon embrace all the criminals of the city and vicinity. Unless very positive measures are taken, the riot will be beyond the control of any small force. Has the government any additional instructions?

"Nelson A. Miles, Major-General Commanding."

"(Telegram—Confidential.) "Chicago, Ills, July 5, 1894. "Adjutant-General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:

"While most of the roads are moving passenger and mail trains, nearly all the freight trains are interfered with, and but very few are moving. This morning a mob of over two thousand men gathered at the stock-yards, crowded among the troops, obstructed the movement of trains, knocked down a railroad official, and overturned some twenty freight-cars on the track, which obstructs all freight and passenger traffic in the vicinity of the stock-yards, and thereby the transit of meat-trains to different parts of the country, as well as the passenger traffic of the Rock Island Railroad. The mob also derailed a passenger-train coming into the city on the Pittsburg, Fort Wayne, and Chicago Railroad, and burned switches, which destroys track. The injunction of the United States Court is openly defied, and unless the mobs are dispersed by the action of the police, or they are fired upon by United States troops, more serious trouble may be expected, as the mob is increasing and becoming more defiant. Shall I give the order for troops to fire on mob obstructing trains?

"Miles, Major-General Commanding."

The following extracts from correspondence and orders, and the proclamation of the President, with the foregoing explanation, sufficiently indicate the methods by which the unlawful combination in Chicago was suppressed:

"(Telegram.) "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, D. C., July 5, 1894, 10:15 P. M. "To Major-General Miles, Headquarters Department of the Missouri, United States Army, Chicago, Illinois.

"In view of the situation in Chicago, as reported in your despatches to the adjutant-general this evening, it is your duty to concentrate your troops so as to enable them to act effectively either in execution of the orders heretofore given, or in protecting the property of the United States, as in your judgment may be necessary. In any event, the troops should not be scattered or divided into small detachments, nor should they attempt to do service in several places at the same time, which their numbers will not enable them to do effectively.

"The mere preservation of peace and good order in the city is, of course, the province of the city and State authorities.

"J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding."

ORDERS SENT TO GENERAL MILES, AND HIS REPORTS

"(Telegram.) "Chicago, Ills., July 6, 1894. "Adjutant-General, U. S. A., Washington, D. C.:

"In accordance with the orders of the War Department, the troops were sent to Blue Island, stock-yards, Grand Crossing, and Forty- ninth street, at the request of the U. S. marshal. This disposition was made before my arrival yesterday. The roads were obstructed in several places by mobs; the largest and most violent gathered near the stock-yards at noon, and gradually moved east along the line of the Rock Island road, overturning cars, burning station- house, roundhouse, and other property. The mob was estimated at ten thousand men, three miles long and half a mile wide; it moved steadily north until after dark, destroying property and setting fires, and the cry of the mob was "To hell with the government!" It reached Eighteenth street after dark, and then dispersed. While this threatening movement was in action I withdrew some of the troops on the outskirts of the city, and in the evening the battery and one troop of cavalry, to the Lake Front Park, for the purpose of attacking the mob should it reach the vicinity of the government building between Adams and Jackson sts. During the afternoon, night, and this morning I have concentrated nine (9) companies infantry, troop cavalry, and the battery of artillery on the Lake Front Park. This includes troops from Leavenworth and Brady. During last night a proclamation was issued by the mayor directing the police to disperse mobs and prevent the lawless from interfering with railroads. If this order is executed there will be no further trouble. One engineer has been stoned to death. During the night a dozen fires were started in different places, but destroying very little property, except the principal buildings of the World's Fair and more than a hundred cars; this morning a mob has gathered near the stock-yards in as large numbers as yesterday at this time; they threatened to hang U. S. marshals and policemen. The law-breakers constitute a very small percentage of the people. The mass of the people desire the maintenance of law and order. The action of the Chief Executive has given universal satisfaction.

"Miles, Major-General Commanding."

THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT

"By the President of the United States of America. "A Proclamation.

"Whereas, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages of persons, it has become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States within the State of Illinois, and especially in the city of Chicago, within said State:

"And whereas, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution of the laws of the United States and protecting its property and removing obstructions to the United States mails, in the State and city aforesaid, the President has employed a part of the military forces of the United States:

"Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, do hereby admonish all good citizens and all persons who may be, or may come, within the city and State aforesaid, against aiding, countenancing, encouraging, or taking any part in such unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages; and I hereby warn all persons engaged in, or in any way connected with, such unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages, to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes on or before twelve o'clock noon on the ninth day of July instant.

"Those who disregard this warning and persist in taking part with a riotous mob in forcibly resisting and obstructing the execution of the laws of the United States, or interfering with the functions of the government, or destroying or attempting to destroy the property belonging to the United States or under its protection, cannot be regarded otherwise than as public enemies.

"Troops employed against such a riotous mob will act with all the moderation and forbearance consistent with the accomplishment of the desired end; but the stern necessities that confront them will not with certainly permit discrimination between guilty participants and those who are mingled with them from curiosity and without criminal intent. They only safe course, therefore, for those not actually unlawfully participating is to abide at their homes, or at least not to be found in the neighborhood of riotous assemblages.

"While there will be no hesitation or vacillation in the decisive treatment of the guilty, this warning is especially intended to protect and save the innocent.

"In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be hereto affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington, this eighth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and of the independence of the United States the one hundred and nineteenth.

"Grover Cleveland. "By the President: "W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State."

"(General Orders, No. 6). "Headquarters Department of the Missouri, Chicago, Illinois, July 9, 1894. "To all United States troops serving in the Department of the Missouri.

"The acts of violence committed during the past few days in obstructing the mail-trains and post-roads; the blocking of the interstate commerce; the open defiance and violation of the injunction of the United States Court; the assaults upon the Federal forces in the lawful discharge of their duties; the destruction, pillage, and looting of the inland commerce property belonging to citizens of the different States, and other acts of rebellion and lawlessness, have been of such a serious character that the duties of the military authorities are now clearly defined.

"The proclamation of the President, the commander-in-chief of the land and navy forces and the State militia when called into service, is understood by the military to be in the interests of humanity and to avoid the useless waste of life, if possible. It is an executive order for all law-abiding citizens to separate themselves from the law-breakers and those in actual hostility to the action of the United States Court and the laws of the National Government. He has defined the attitude of these law-breakers to be that of enemies of the government, and hence it is the duty of the military forces to aid the United States marshals to disperse, capture, or destroy all bodies of men obstructing the mail-routes and in actual hostility to the injunction of the United States Court and the laws of the United States.

"This does not change the relations of the Federal officials with those of the local authority, as it is expected that the State and municipal governments will maintain peace and good order within the territory of their jurisdiction. Should they fail or be overpowered, the military forces will assist them, but not to the extent of leaving unprotected property belonging to or under the protection of the United States.

"The officer in the immediate command of troops must be the judge as to what use to make of the forces of his command in executing his orders, and in case serious action be required and there be time, he will communicate with his next superior for his instructions.

"The earnest efforts of the law-abiding citizens have done much to improve the condition of affairs during the last few days, and I earnestly request all law-abiding citizens to do whatever is possible to assist in maintaining the civil government and the authority of the municipal, State, and Federal governments in preserving peace and good order.

"By command of Major-General Miles: "J. P. Martin, Assistant Adjutant-General."

"(General Orders, No. 23) "Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, July 9, 1864. "The following instructions are published for the government of the army:

"A mob forcibly resisting or obstructing the execution of the laws of the United States, or attempting to destroy property belonging to or under the protection of the United States, is a public enemy.

"Troops called into action against such a mob are governed by the general regulations of the army and military tactics in respect to the manner in which they shall act to accomplish the desired end. It is purely a tactical question in what manner they shall use the weapons with which they are armed—whether by the fire of musketry and artillery, or by the use of the bayonet and saber, or by both, and at what stage of the operations each or either mode of attack shall be employed.

"This tactical question must necessarily be decided by the immediate commander of the troops, according to his best judgment of the situation and the authorized drill regulations.

"In the first stage of an insurrection lawless mobs are frequently commingled with great crowds of comparatively innocent people drawn there by curiosity and excitement, and ignorant of the great danger to which they are exposed. Under such circumstances the commanding officer should withhold the fire of his troops, if possible, until timely warning has been given to the innocent to separate themselves from the guilty.

"Under no circumstances are the troops to fire into a crowd without the order of the commanding officer, except that single sharp- shooters, selected by the commanding officer, may shoot down individual rioters who have fired upon or thrown missiles at the troops.

"As a general rule, the bayonet alone should be used against mixed crowds in the first stages of a revolt. But as soon as sufficient warning has been given to enable the innocent to separate themselves from the guilty, the action of the troops should be governed solely by the tactical considerations involved in the duty they are ordered to perform. They are not called upon to consider how great may be the losses inflicted upon the public enemy, except to make their blows so effective as to promptly suppress all resistance to lawful authority, and to stop the destruction of life the moment lawless resistance has ceased. Punishment belongs not to the troops, but to the courts of justice.

"By command of Major-General Schofield: "Geo. D. Ruggles, Adjutant-General."

INSTRUCTIONS IN DEALING WITH A MOB

"(General Orders, No. 15) "Headquarters of the Army, Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, May 25, 1894. "The following instructions are issued for the government of department commanders:

"Whenever the troops may be lawfully employed, under the order of the President, to suppress 'insurrection in any State against the government thereof,' as provided in section 5297 of the Revised Statutes; or to 'enforce the execution of the laws of the United States' when 'by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages of persons' it has 'become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States,' as provided in section 5298 of the Revised Statutes, the troops are employed as a part of the military power of the United States, and act under the orders of the President, as commander-in-chief, and his military subordinates. They cannot be directed to act under the orders of any civil officer. The commanding officers of the troops so employed are directly responsible to their military superiors. Any unlawful or unauthorized act on their part would not be excusable on the ground of any order or request received by them from a marshal or any other civil officer.

"By command of Major-General Schofield: "Geo. D. Ruggles, Adjutant-General."

It appears to have been thought in Chicago that "the request of the United States marshal," with whom the commanding officer of the troops had been directed to "confer," was equivalent to "orders of the War Department," notwithstanding the order of May 25, above quoted, strictly prohibiting any such use of the troops. Hence the faulty disposition of the troops which was corrected when the mob was approaching the heart of the city. Then "some of the troops on the outskirts of the city" were withdrawn, and "in the evening the battery and one troop of cavalry" were moved "to the Lake Front Park, for the purpose of attacking the mob should it reach the vicinity of the government building between Adams and Jackson sts." And during the afternoon and night of the 5th and morning of the 6th an effective force was concentrated on the Lake Front Park, forty-eight hours after the time when the orders from Washington indicated that the Fort Sheridan garrison should be at that place.

THE DUTIES OF THE MILITARY MISUNDERSTOOD

On July 9, the day after the President had issued his proclamation, it appeared in Chicago that "the duties of the military authorities are now clearly defined." The President's proclamation was "understood by the military to be in the interests of humanity," and to concern, in some way, "the State militia," as if they had been "called into the service" of the United States. It was "the duty of the military forces to aid the United States marshals." Again, "it is expected the State and municipal governments will maintain peace and good order . . . . Should they fail or be overpowered, the military force will assist them . . "—and this notwithstanding the well-known law on that subject to which allusion was made in the despatch of July 5 from the headquarters of the army.

The President's proclamation was strictly limited to "the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution of the laws of the United States, and protecting its property, and removing obstructions to the United States mails," for which purpose the proclamation stated "the President has employed a part of the military forces of the United States"—not is about to employ, but has employed, under specific orders, which were telegraphed to Colonel Martin on July 3, to do certain things which were precisely the things specified in the proclamation of July 8, and not "to aid the United States marshals" in doing those things or any others. Yet it was not until July 9, six days after the order to Colonel Martin, that those duties became "clearly defined," and then they were misunderstood in the very essential particulars above specified.

The lawless interruption of traffic on the Pacific roads had continued from the latter part of April till early in July,—two months and a half,—in spite of all the efforts to enforce the laws, in each special case, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. Yet as soon as full discretionary authority was given to the several department commanders to act promptly as each emergency might require, all obstruction to the operations of the Pacific railroads rapidly disappeared.

The ordinary course of judicial proceedings is generally far too slow to produce satisfactory results when military force is required. Fortunately the Constitution and laws of the United States do not require such ineffective mixture of civil and military methods. When the civil power ceases to be effective and the President is required to exercise his authority as commander-in-chief of the army, his acts become purely military, untrammeled by any civil authority whatever. This is perhaps one of the strongest and most valuable provisions of the Constitution and laws—one which, if generally known, is most likely to deter the lawless from any attempt to act in defiance of the judicial authority of the United States. The General Order No. 15, issued at the time herein referred to (May 25, 1894), was based upon the foregoing interpretation of the Constitution and laws.

Under the Constitution and existing statutes of the United States it is not proper to use the troops, either in large or small numbers, to "aid the United States marshals." When the civil officers, with their civil posse, are no longer able to enforce the laws, they stand aside, and the military power, under the orders of the commander-in-chief, steps in and overcomes the lawless resistance to authority. Then the civil officers resume their functions, to make arrests of individuals, hold them in custody, and deliver them to the courts for trial. It is not the duty of the troops in such cases to guard prisoners who are in the custody of civil officers; but it is the duty of the troops, if necessary, to repel by force of arms any unlawful attempt to rescue such prisoners. This distinction should be clearly understood by all army officers, and it is of universal application. The duty of the army is, when so ordered by the President, to overcome and suppress lawless resistance to civil authority. There military duty ends, and civil officers resume their functions.

THE DUTIES OF THE MILITARY MISUNDERSTOOD

The distinction between the authority of the United States and that of the several States is so clearly defined that there can be no possible excuse for ignorance on that subject on the part of any officer of the army. But the relation between the civil and the military authorities of the United States had not been clearly defined, after the passage of the "Posse Comitatus Act," until the order of May 25, 1894, was issued. But that can hardly excuse continued ignorance of the law a month or more after that order was issued; and it is worthy of note that at least one department commander showed himself familiar with the law before the order was issued, by correcting the mistake of a subordinate, which called attention to the necessity of issuing some such order.

Of course that order had the sanction of the President, after consideration and approval by the Attorney-General, before it was issued.

The acts of Congress creating the Pacific railroads and making them military roads justify and require that the government give them military protection whenever, in the judgment of the President, such protection is needed. It is not incumbent on the commander- in-chief of the army of the United States to call on civil courts and marshals to protect the military roads over which he proposes to move his troops, whether on foot or on horseback or in cars. It appears to have been almost forgotten that the transcontinental railroads were built, at great expense to the national treasury, mainly as a military bond between the Atlantic States and the Pacific States, and that this is by far their most important service, and this explains the meaning of the language employed by the acts of Congress creating them.

At the time of the massacre of Chinese laborers at Rock Springs, Wyoming, during President Cleveland's first administration, I was ordered by the President to go to that place from Chicago and suppress that violation of the treaty obligations between this country and China. On my arrival at Omaha, I was informed by the press reporters that a grand conclave at Denver that night was to consider a proposition to order out all the train-men on the Union Pacific Railroad the next morning, for the purpose, as I understood, of preventing the passage of my train. I told the reporters they might telegraph those people in Denver, but not for publication, that I was traveling over a military road, on military duty, under orders from the commander-in-chief of the army; that interference with that journey would be regarded by me as an act of war, and would be so treated. I heard no more on that subject. That interpretation of the Pacific Railroad acts was suggested several times, but never officially accepted until 1894.

ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT

The following are in substance the orders sent on July 6 and 7, by the President's direction, to all the department commanders in the country traversed by the Pacific railroads, and the President's proclamation which followed two days later, under the operation of which traffic was resumed throughout all that vast region of country as rapidly as trains carrying troops could be moved. No serious opposition or resistance was offered anywhere.

"(Telegram.) "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, July 7, 1894. "Brigadier-General Otis, Commanding Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Washington:

"In view of the fact, as substantiated by communications received from the Department of Justice, from military official reports, and from other reliable sources, that by reason of unlawful obstructions, and combinations or assemblages of persons, it has become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States, and to prevent obstructions of the United States mails, and interruptions to commerce between the States, on the line of the Northern Pacific Railroad, and to secure to the United States the right guaranteed by section II of the act approved July 2, 1864, constituting the Northern Pacific Railroad 'a post route and military road subject to the use of the United States for postal, military, naval, and all other government service,' you are directed by the President to employ the military force under your command to remove obstructions to the mails, and to execute any orders of the United States courts for the protection of property in the hands of receivers appointed by such courts, and for preventing interruption of interstate commerce, and to give such protection to said railroad as will prevent any unlawful and forcible obstruction to the regular and orderly operation of said road 'for postal, military, naval, and all other government service.'

"J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding."

"(Telegram) "Headquarters of the Army, Washington, July 7, 1894. "Brigadier-General Otis, Commanding Department of the Columbia, Vancouver Barracks, Washington:

"The order of the President sent you this morning by telegraph is the same in substance as one sent last night to General Merritt, the purpose being to extend military protection over the entire line of the Northern Pacific Railroad from St. Paul to Puget Sound. In the movement of the troop-trains along the line of the road in the execution of this order, the Department of Justice will furnish a sufficient force of marshals to make arrests and hold prisoners subject to the orders of the United States courts. You will please concert with General Merritt by direct correspondence the necessary exchanges of guards upon moving trains at the military posts in your department and in his, nearest to each other, so that the troops may return to their proper stations without unnecessary delay.

"J. M. Schofield, Major-General Commanding."

"By the President of the United States of America. "A Proclamation.

"Whereas, by reason of unlawful obstruction, combinations, and assemblages of persons, is has become impracticable, in the judgment of the President, to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the United States at certain points and places within the States of North Dakota, Montana, Idaho, Washington, Wyoming, Colorado, and California, and the Territories of Utah and New Mexico, and especially along the lines of such railways traversing said States and Territories as are military roads and post routes, and are engaged in interstate commerce and in carrying United States mails:

"And whereas, for the purpose of enforcing the faithful execution of the laws of the United States, and protecting property belonging to the United States or under its protection, and of preventing obstructions of the United States mails and of commerce between the States and Territories, and of securing to the United States the right guaranteed by law to the use of such roads for the postal, military, naval, and other government service, the President has employed a part of the military forces of the United States:

"Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States, do hereby command all persons engaged in, or in any way connected with, such unlawful obstructions, combinations, and assemblages, to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes on or before three o'clock in the afternoon on the tenth day of July instant.

"In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United states to he hereto affixed.

"Done at the city of Washington, this ninth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and ninety-four, and in the independence of the United States the one hundred and nineteenth.

"Grover Cleveland. "By the President: "W. Q. Gresham, Secretary of State."

[( 1) See the report of Attorney-General Olney, December 1, 1894, p. 31.]

CHAPTER XXIX Lessons of the Civil War—Weakness of the Military Policy at the Outbreak of the Rebellion—A Poor Use of the Educated Soldiers of the Army—Military Wisdom Shown by the Confederate Authorities— Territorial Strategy—General Military Education Indispensable to Good Citizenship—Organization of the National Guard—General Grant Without Military Books—Measures Necessary to the National Defense.

In my opinion, the most important of all the lessons taught by the Civil War is the necessity of using in the most effective manner the means at the disposal of the government when war breaks out. The necessity for adequate preparation is a different question, which has been much discussed, and in regard to which some progress has been made toward a satisfactory solution. Whatever the outcome may be in respect to preparation for war, certainly the government and the people ought to adopt such a policy as will lead to the best practicable use of the preparations which have actually been made.

In this respect the policy adopted by the National Government in 1861 was about as weak as possible, while that of the Confederates was comparatively strong. It is said that this weak policy was due largely to General Scott, and grew out of his distrust of volunteer troops; he having thought it necessary to have a considerable body of regular troops to give steadiness and confidence to the volunteers or militia. This is a very good theory, no doubt, providing the regulars could be provided in advance in such numbers as to produce the desired effect. But if that theory had been relied upon in 1861, the "Confederate States" would have established their independence long before the regular army could be organized and made effective. What was demanded by the necessities of the country in 1861 was the best large army that could be made in the shortest possible time, not a better small army to be made in a much longer time.

The United States government actually had in hand the means of creating in a very short time a far larger efficient army than the South could possibly have raised in the same time. This means had been provided, with great care and at great expense, through a long term of years, by the education of young men at the Military Academy, and their practical training in the small regular army in all kinds of actual service, including one foreign war and almost constant campaigns against the Indians. Nowhere in the world could have been found a better corps of officers to organize, instruct, and discipline new troops. Yet those officers were hardly employed at all in that service at first, when it was of supreme importance. Some time later, when the necessity was not so great, a few officers of the army were permitted to accept commands in the volunteers. Even then it often required great "influence" to secure such "indulgences." Scores of young officers, qualified in every way to do such service in the first six months of the war, sought in vain for opportunities to render the valuable services for which the government had educated them, and were compelled to drag along four years in the discharge of duties several grades below their qualifications.

WEAKNESS OF THE MILITARY POLICY

In the regular army in 1861 there were, exclusive of those who went South, at least 600 officers who, after graduating at West Point, had served several years with their regiments, and were well qualified to drill a regiment and command it in battle. A large proportion of them were fitted to command brigades, and some of them divisions, and even army corps. The three years' volunteers first called out could have been fully supplied with brigade, division, and corps commanders from graduates of West Point who were thoroughly qualified by theoretical education and established character, and many of them by practical experience in the Mexican war and Indian campaigns, for the instruction, discipline, and command of troops, still leaving a sufficient number with the regulars for efficient service. The old sergeants of the army in 1861 were relatively competent company commanders. One commissioned officer to four companies of these veteran Indian-fighters made as reliable a battalion as any general could wish for in the conditions then existing.

Experience demonstrated that a volunteer regiment could in a very few weeks be converted into an efficient and thoroughly reliable force in battle by a single young officer of the regular army. In other words, by a judicious use of the small body of officers whom the country had educated at so great an expense, a fine army of 500,000 men, or more, could have been called into service, organizied, disciplined, and put into the field by August 1, 1861; and that without interfering in any way with the three months' militia called out to meet the first emergency, which militia ought, of course, to have acted strictly on the defensive until the more permanent force could take the field. In a few months more, certainly by the spring of 1862, the instruction, discipline, and field experience of the first levy would have given good officers enough to organize and command a million more men. It required, in short, only a wise use of the national resources to overwhelm the South before the spring of 1863.

The supply of arms, it is true, was deplorably deficient in 1861. But the South was only a little better off than the North in that regard. Besides, the National Government had command of all the markets of the world, and of the means of ocean transportation. It could have bought at once all the available arms everywhere, and thus fully equipped its own troops, while preventing the South from doing the same. Hence the excuse given at the time—namely, want of muskets—was no excuse whatever for delay in the organization of armies.

The rebellion made some progress at first, and offered effective resistance for a long time, simply because the Southern authorities manifested greater military wisdom than the Northern. The difference in preparations and in military training in advance was quite insignificant. The North had many more educated and competent military men than the South. The difference was that the South used the few they had to the best advantage, while the North so used only a very few of their many.

The lesson next in importance taught by our experience is the necessity of general military education in a country having popular government. No man can be fully qualified for the duties of a statesman until he has made a thorough study of the science of war in its broadest sense. He need not go to a military school, much less serve in the army or in the militia. But unless he makes himself thoroughly acquainted with the methods and conditions requisite to success in war, he is liable to do almost infinite damage to his country. For instance, the very first success of the Union armies—the capture of Fort Donelson—was quickly followed by a proclamation of thanksgiving and an order to stop recruiting. That one act of "statesmanship" cost the country untold millions of dollars and many thousands of lives. It was necessary only to take the ordinary military advantage of the popular enthusiasm throughout the country after Grant's first victory to have made the Union armies absolutely irresistible by any force the South could raise and arm at that time.

A POOR USE OF THE EDUCATED SOLDIERS OF THE ARMY

There has been much irrelevant discussion about the ability or inability of commanders in the North and South. The fact is that political instead of military ideas controlled in a very large degree the selection of commanders in the Union armies; while for three whole years the authorities in Washington could not see the necessity of unity of action in all the armies under one military leader. It required three years of costly experience to teach the government that simple lesson, taught in the military text-books! As experience finally proved, there was no lack of men capable of leading even large armies to victory; but, with few exceptions, they were not put in command until many others had been tried. Information as to military fitness was not sought from military sources. If a lawyer is wanted for the supreme bench, or an engineer to construct a great bridge, information is sought from the best men of the profession concerned; but the opinions of politicians were thought sufficient in determining the selection of major- generals!

Again, the policy of the government required the capture and occupation of all the important seaports and other places in the South, and the permanent occupation and protection of all the territory gained in military operations. Until near the close of the war, neither the public nor the government seemed to have the remotest conception of the fundamental fact that Confederate armies, wherever they might go, instead of places and States, were the only real objectives. Even some of the best Union generals were constrained to act upon this popular heresy, contrary to their own sound military judgment and education. Yet while this erroneous "territorial" strategy was insisted on, no adequate conception was formed of the vastly greater force required to hold all the territory gained, and to push aggressive operations still further into the heart of the South. Very rarely indeed were the Union armies large enough, until near the end of the war, to assure success. The end finally came through a long succession of desperate battles between forces so nearly equal that decisive victory was impossible until the weaker side finally became exhausted. Thus the aggregate loss in men as well as in money was vastly greater than it would have been if the Union had put forth its full strength and ended the rebellion in two years instead of four.

It is true that some of the worst of these "blind guides" were men supposed to have a very high military education. But if sound military education had been at all general in the country, statesmen would have known by what standard to judge of any one man's fitness for high command.

It is true that no amount of military education can supply the place of military genius or create a great commander. It may possibly happen at any time that there may not be among all the living graduates of West Point one Grant or Sherman or Sheridan, or one Lee or Johnston or Jackson. So much greater the need of a well-educated staff and a well-disciplined army. Nobody is wise enough to predict who will prove best able to command a great army. But it is the easiest thing in the world to tell who can best create such an army and command its subdivisions, and this is the work to be done instantly upon the outbreak of war. The selection of commanders for the several armies, and, above all, of a general-in- chief, must of course be the most difficult; for it is not probable that any man young enough will have had any experience in such commands in this country. But even this difficulty will disappear in a very great measure if statesmen will make the study of the art and science of war, instead of far less important subjects, a part of their pastime. They will thus acquire the ability to judge, from personal acquaintance with military men and conversation with other best informed, of the relative fitness of officers for the highest commands.

GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION INDISPENSABLE

There is no possible remedy for such evils as this country has suffered except general military education. In my opinion, no man is fit for a seat in Congress unless he has had such an education. The first thing he ought to learn is the old and trite military maxim that the only was to carry on war economically is to make it "short, sharp, and decisive." To dole out military appropriations in driblets is to invite disaster and ultimate bankruptcy. So it is in respect to the necessary preparations for war in time of peace. No man is wise enough to tell when war will come. Preparations are made upon the theory that it may come at any time. If a hundred millions are necessary for adequate preparation for defense, and you have spent only fifty when war comes, you might as well have thrown your fifty millions into the sea. There is no such thing as partial defense in modern war. If there are weak points in your defense, your enemy is sure to find them. Indeed, he knows about them all the time, and will strike them at once. Then your whole costly system will be worthless.

What would be thought of the business capacity of a man who would not insure his house or his store or his stock of goods against fire because he did not happen to have money enough in bank to pay the premium, but would have to borrow it at three per cent.? Or of a man who would wait until he had realized the expected profit on a commercial venture before insuring the goods? If preparation for defense is the policy of a country, it would be little short of blindness to delay it on account of a temporary deficiency in the current revenue.

All now admit that universal education is an indispensable requisite to fitness for universal suffrage. The most serious questions upon which a free people can be called to vote are: A question of war, a question of preparation for war, and a question of approval and support, or disapproval and condemnation, of an administration on account of the mode in which war has been conducted. Can this highest duty of the citizen be intelligently performed without military education? A sovereign individual regards this as demanding the highest education and the ablest counsel he can possibly obtain. Can sovereign millions do it wisely without any education whatever? I believe no proposition could possibly be plainer than that general military education is indispensable to good citizenship in this country, and especially to all who may be intrusted with high responsibilities in the legislative and executive departments of the National Government. What would be thought of a general of the army who tried to shield himself from censure or punishment behind his ignorance of the law? Can a legislator be excused because he knows nothing of the art and science of war? If there is any one offense in this country which ought never, under any circumstances, to be pardoned, it is ignorance in those who are trusted by the people to manage the affairs of their government. As in the military, so in the civil departments of government, there a few greater crimes than that of seeking and assuming the responsibilities of an office for which the man himself knows he is not fit. It is nearly as great as that committed by the appointing power under similar circumstances.

GENERAL MILITARY EDUCATION INDISPENSABLE

A system of general military education should of course include elementary training in all the schools, public and private, so that every boy, before he is sixteen years old, would know how to use the rifled musket in ranks, and be familiar with the simple evolutions of a company and battalion. Young men never forget such training received when they are boys. The country would have in a few years several millions of fairly well-trained young soldiers, requiring only competent officers and a few days drill in regimental tactics to make a reliable army for any service this country will probably ever require of her volunteer soldiery. If it were a question of the invasion of a foreign country against a modern veteran army, the case would be different. But for defense against any possible landing of a hostile army on our shores, our available force ought to be so overwhelming in numbers as to far more than compensate for lack of experience. Yet it must not be forgotten that some training is indispensable. No possible advantage in numbers can overcome the disadvantage resulting from total ignorance of tactics and of the use of the modern long-range rifle. Good parents who apprehend evil effects from giving their boys military training ought to reflect that the boys will go, all the same, whether trained or not, when the country is threatened with invasion. Then, if ignorant, the will simply be doomed to fall the victims of skilled marksmen to whose shots they know not how to reply. Possibly the most cruel fate which American parents could prepare for their sons would be to keep them in ignorance of the highest duty their country may call upon them to perform, so that, unable to offer and effective resistance to invasion, they could only die in a hopeless effort to do their duty as citizen soldiers and patriots—or, worse, live only to be driven in disgrace from a field which a little education would have enabled them gloriously to win.

There should be, under State authority, a general enrolment and organization of all the young men who have received military training, and places of rendezvous fixed at convenient centers at or near railway-stations. Officers of all grades up to that of colonel should be appointed in advance, and occasional musters held under State laws, even if military exercises were not attempted.

Our colleges and high schools, besides the military academies of the country, are even now educating a fair percentage of young men to be officers of such an organization of enrolled regiments as that here suggested. This percentage could easily be increased in accordance with the demand. Besides, the retired men of the regiments of the National Guard in the several States might furnish some officers for the enrolled militia. But those well-trained and fully equipped regiments would be required to move with full ranks at once to the place of danger. Hence their active members would not be available in the great expansion of the army in the first period of war. The organization of the first reserve must, for this reason, be entirely independent of the National Guard.

A great and very important advance has already been made in bringing the regular army into close relations with the National Guard of the several States, and in the employment of regular officers in disseminating military education, both theoretical and practical, throughout the country. These are among the most valuable services the regular army can render in time of peace, and they should be extended, if practicable, still further. Especially in the State artillery, which must soon be organized for war service in the new fortifications, instruction by regular officers will be indispensable, and this can best be given in conjunction with the regular garrisons, the same as in war service. It would also be well to perfect an arrangement by which the new infantry regiments, when first taking the field upon the breaking out of war, might be accompanied by small bodies of regulars, to lead the way and indicate by example what is to be done. Experience has shown that under such example the rawest volunteers will be almost as stanch in battle as the regulars themselves. The beneficial effect upon new troops of the example of men who have before been in battle is very great. Hence it is that old regiments should always be kept full by the addition of recruits, rather than that the casualties of service be replaced by new regiments.

ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL GUARD

What constitutes valuable education, military no less than civil, is often greatly misunderstood. Elementary education and practical training are indispensable to everybody, while higher education may be rather injurious than beneficial, unless it is so regulated as to elevate the reasoning faculties and independence of thought, rather than mere acquisition of knowledge. Some notable examples of this have appeared in the military annals of this country, and no doubt in the civil also. Men who had become famous military scholars were total failures in war, not only as commanders in the field, for which no amount of theoretical education alone can qualify a man, but also as military advisers. This was apparently because their elaborate studies had made them mere imitators or copyists. Whatever originality of thought or power of invention they ever possessed had ceased to exist from disuse. They could plan and direct a campaign with absolute accuracy, according to the teachings of the great masters, for the well-defined purpose upon which those teachings had been based. But when a wholly new problem was presented to them, they had no conception of the right mode of solving it. The plan of one great campaign was based absolutely upon the best-approved method of capturing a certain place, without any reference to what damage might or might not be done to the opposing army in that operation. The plan of another great campaign had for its sole object the conquest and permanent occupation of a great territory, and was so conducted as to avoid the possibility of seriously hurting the enemy in that operation. Yet the theory upon which this last plan was based, as well as the first, governed the policy of the government more than two years.

GENERAL GRANT WITHOUT MILITARY BOOKS

It was not until Grant took command of "all the armies" that the true strategic principle governed the general military policy. In this connection, the story told by Grant himself about his military studies is very instructive. When asked by the representative of some friends who wished to present him a library for his new house in Washington, what military books he then had, so that they might not duplicate them, he replied that he did not have any military books, and never had any, except the West-Point text-books. No doubt Grant might have profited from some additional study, but none at all was far better than so much as to have dwarfed his mind into that of an imitator of former commanders.

The development of great military ability in Grant, as the result of his own experience and independent thought,—that is, the independent development of his own native military genius,—is by far the most interesting part of his history.

In short, the great lesson taught by our own experience is that elementary military training should be universal, because every young man may be called upon the perform the duties of a soldier; that general military reading, and habits of independent thought upon all great military subjects, should be cultivated by all who aspire to any high place in life, because they may be called upon to discharge the highest possible duties of good citizens in peace or in war, namely, those connected with the national defense; that due preparation for defense ought to be made without delay, and the requisite means kept always ready; and, above all, that the best method of making the quickest possible effective use of those means ought to be fully matured and understood by all who may be called upon to execute the orders of the government.

It now seems to me amazing that the affairs of an enlightened nation could have been so badly managed as to leave the secession issue in doubt almost to the last moment of a four years' contest, as it is now well known it was. Probably the one saving fact in all those years was that the young soldiers of the republic—and they were nearly all young then—knew little and cared less about the wrangling of self-seeking politicians and visionary doctrinaires in the rear, but fought steadily on to the end, never doubting for a moment the final triumph. I have never been able to recall a single instance of doubt manifested by any soldier in the field, though I did know a very few cases of officers of considerable rank, who thought they ought to have had more rank, who went to the rear and said something about failure in the field.

I believe now that it required only some real emergency, such, for instance, as the capture of Washington in July, 1863, to call forth the power of the North and crush the rebellion in six months. If any man thinks a great disaster would have disheartened the North, he knows nothing of the people of our country. It was the slow waste of enormous resources and of latent military strength that at length made many even of the stoutest hearts begin to feel despondent. I do not believe there was any time when the people would not have responded with unanimity and enthusiasm to an appeal to put forth all their strength and end the rebellion at a single blow.

The one lesson of reason and experience that I would impress upon my countrymen in every possible way is, when war or insurrection comes or is threatened, do not trifle with it. Do not invoke judicial proceedings, or call for 75,000 men; but call for men, and let them come as many as will! If some of them do not get there in time, before it is all over, it will not cost much to send them home again! The services of the Pennsylvania reserve, though ready for the field, were actually, positively refused until after the disaster of Bull Run! The greatest wonder in the history of this wonderful republic is that the government actually survived such a military policy as that!

In this connection, it ought to be distinctly understood that the great object of education at West Point and other military schools in not to make high commanders, but to make thorough soldiers, men capable of creating effective armies in the shortest possible time, and of commanding comparatively small bodies of men. If great commanders are ever again required in this country, they will come to the front in due time. They cannot be selected in advance of the actual trial in war. Even West Point, though one of the best schools in the world, can at the most only lay the foundation of a military education. Each individual must build for himself upon that foundation the superstructure which is to mark his place in the world. If he does not build, his monument will hardly appear above the surface of the ground, and will soon be covered out of sight.

It is of vital importance that the necessity of providing for calling into active service a very large army in the shortest possible time be fully understood. It is assumed that every important seaport will in time be so fortified as to be safe against any unsupported naval attack. Modern science has rendered this easy and certain. Hence a naval attack must necessarily be supported by the landing of a military force upon the open coast, to attack the land defenses in reverse; and such defenses are now far more vulnerable to attack in rear than those of former times.

MEASURES NECESSARY TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE

The sea-coasts of the United States are many thousand miles in extent, and an attack may be made at any one or several of the many important seaports in these long lines of coast. No one can anticipate where the blow or blows may fall. Hence it is necessary to be prepared to resist an attempt to land at any one of those many points which are of such importance as to tempt an enemy to attack them. The railroad facilities of the country are such that the necessary armies can be moved to all exposed points in time to meet any emergency. But the armies must be ready to move almost at a moment's notice. There will be no time to organize, much less to drill, new troops. Before that could be done, any one or two or three of our largest seaport cities could be captured and destroyed, and the invading forces get back again on their transports, and under the protection of the guns of their own fleet. And even if we had a navy more powerful than that of our enemy, it alone could give us no adequate protection; for the enemy would be sure to select a point of attack where our navy was not at the time, and which it could not reach until too late. Indispensable as a navy is to this country, it cannot act any very important part in the defense of so extended a sea-coast unless it is many times more powerful than any fleet which an enemy may send to attack us. The enemy being free to choose his point of attack, we would required at or near every one of the exposed points a fleet at least as large as his, or in the aggregate at least five times as large. No one, it is presumed, contemplates the creation of any such navy as that in this country.

Indeed, it would be the height of folly to require the navy to take part in the defense. In a country having the situation of the United States, the navy is the aggressive arm of the national military power. Its function is to punish an enemy until he is willing to submit to the national demands. For this purpose entire freedom of action is essential; also secure depots where supplies may be drawn and where necessary repairs may be made, and harbors where cruisers or other vessels may seek safety if temporarily overpowered. Hence arises one of the most important functions of the land defense: To give the aggressive arm secure bases of operation at all the great seaports where navy-yards or depots are located. It may be that in special cases military forces may be needed to act in support of naval operations, or to hold for a time important points in a foreign country; but such service must be only auxiliary, not a primary object. Foreign conquest and permanent occupation are not a part of the policy of this country. There is no division of opinion among standard naval and military authorities on this great subject; such standard authors as Rear-Admiral Walker and Captain Mahan have clearly set forth the relative functions of the army and navy in enforcing the military policy of the United States. The military problem which this country must solve is to provide such means of aggressive and defensive action as to be able to enforce a due observance of American public law on this continent, and, while doing this, to defend itself against insult and spoilation. The land defenses, including torpedoes and in a few cases floating batteries, should be entirely independent of the active navy, so that the latter may be free to act in one compact mass against any enemy which may anywhere oppose it.