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It has been often remarked that Nelson founded no school of tactics, and the instructions which were issued with the new Signal Book immediately after the war entirely endorse the remark. They can be called nothing else but reactionary. Nelson's drastic attempt to break up the old rigid formation into active divisions independently commanded seems to have come to nothing, and the new instructions are based with almost all the old pedantry on the single line of battle. Of anything like mutually supporting movements there is only a single trace. It is in Article XIV., and that is only a resurrection of the time-honoured corps de reserve, formed of superfluous ships after your line has been equalised with that of a numerically inferior enemy. The whole document, in fact, is a consecration of the fetters which had been forged in the worst days of the seventeenth century, and which Nelson had so resolutely set himself to break.
The new Signal Book in which the instructions appear was founded on the code elaborated by Sir Home Riggs Popham, but there is nothing to show whether or not he was the author of the instructions. He was an officer of high scientific attainments, but although he had won considerable distinction during the war, his service had been entirely of an amphibious character in connection with military operations ashore, and he had never seen a fleet action at sea. He reached flag rank in 1814, and was one of the men who received a K.C.B. on the reconstitution of the order in 1815. Of the naval lords serving with Lord Melville at the time none can show a career or a reputation which would lead us to expect from them anything but the colourless instructions they produced. The controlling influence was undoubtedly Lord Keith. The doyen of the active list, and in command of the Channel Fleet till he retired after the peace of 1815, he was all-powerful as a naval authority, and his flag captain, Sir Graham Moore, had just been given a seat on the board. A devout pupil of St. Vincent and Howe, correct rather than brilliant, Keith represented the old tradition, and notwithstanding the patience with which he had borne Nelson's vagaries and insubordination, the antipathy between the two men was never disguised. However generously Keith appreciated Nelson's genius, he can only have regarded his methods as an evil influence in the service for ordinary men, nor can there be much doubt that his apprehensions had a good deal to justify them.
The general failure to grasp the whole of Nelson's tactical principles was not the only trouble. There are signs that during the later years of the war a very dangerous misunderstanding of his teaching had been growing up in the service. In days when there was practically no higher instruction in the theory of tactics, it was easy for officers to forget how much prolonged and patient study had enabled Nelson to handle his fleets with the freedom he did; and the tendency was to believe that his successes could be indefinitely repeated by mere daring and vehemence of attack. The seed was sown immediately after the battle and by Collingwood himself. 'It was a severe action,' he wrote to Admiral Parker on November 1, 'no dodging or manoeuvring.' And again on December 16, to Admiral Pasley, 'Lord Nelson determined to substitute for exact order an impetuous attack in two distinct bodies.' Collingwood of course with all his limitations knew well enough it was not a mere absence of manoeuvring that had won the victory. In the same letter he had said that although Nelson succeeded, as it were, by enchantment, it was all the effect of system and nice combination.' Yet such phrases as he and others employed to describe the headlong attack, taken from their context and repeated from mouth to mouth, would soon have raised a false impression that many men were only too ready to receive. So the seed must have grown, till we find the fruit in Lord Dundonald's oft-quoted phrase, 'Never mind manoeuvres: always go at them.' So it was that Nelson's teaching had crystallised in his mind and in the mind perhaps of half the service. The phrase is obviously a degradation of the opening enunciations in Nelson's memoranda, a degradation due to time, to superficial study, and the contemptuous confidence of years of undisputed mastery at sea.
The conditions which brought about this attitude to tactics are clearly seen in the way others saw us. Shortly after Trafalgar a veteran French officer of the war of American Independence wrote some Reflections on the battle, which contain much to the point. 'It is a noteworthy thing,' he says in dealing with the defects of the single-line formation, 'that the English, who formerly used to employ all the resources of tactics against our fleets, now hardly use them at all, since our scientific tacticians have disappeared. It may almost be said that they no longer have any regular order of sailing or battle: they attack our ships of the line just as they used to attack a convoy.'[6] But here the old tactician was not holding up English methods as an example. He was citing them to show to what easy victories a navy exposed itself in which, by neglect of scientific study and alert observation, tactics had sunk into a mere senile formula. 'They know,' he continues, 'that we are in no state to oppose them with well-combined movements so as to profit by the kind of disorder which is the natural result of this kind of attack. They know if they throw their attack on one part of a much extended line, that part is soon destroyed.' Thus he arrives at two fundamental laws: '1. That our system of a long line of battle is worthless in face of an enemy who attacks with his ships formed in groups (reunis en pelotons), and told off to engage a small number of ships at different points in our line. 2. That the only tactical system to oppose to theirs is to have at least a double line, with reserve squadrons on the wings stationed in such a manner as to bear down most easily upon the points too vigorously attacked.' The whole of his far-sighted paper is in fact an admirable study of the conditions under which impetuous attacks and elaborate combinations are respectively called for. But from both points of view the single line for a large fleet is emphatically condemned, while in our instructions of 1816 not a hint of its weakness appears. They resume practically the same standpoint which the Duke of York had reached a century and a half before.
Spanish tacticians seem also to have shared the opinion that Trafalgar had really done nothing to dethrone the line. One of the highest reputation, on December 17, 1805, had sent to his government a thoughtful criticism of the action, and his view of Nelson's attack was this: 'Nothing,' he says, 'is more seamanlike or better tactics than for a fleet which is well to windward of another to bear down upon it in separate columns, and deploy at gun-shot from the enemy into a line which, as it comes into action, will inflict at least as much damage upon them as it is likely to suffer. But Admiral Nelson did not deploy his columns at gun-shot from our line, but ran up within pistol-shot and broke through it, so as to reduce the battle to a series of single-ship actions. It was a manoeuvre in which I do not think he will find many imitators. Where two fleets are equally well trained, that which attacks in this manner must be defeated.'[7]
So it was our enemies rightly read the lesson of Trafalgar. The false deductions therefore which grew up in our own service are all the more extraordinary, even as we find them in the new instructions and the current talk of the quarter-deck. But this is not the worst. It is not till we turn to the Signal Book itself that we get a full impression of the extent to which tactical thought had degenerated and Nelson's seed had been choked. The movements and formations for which signals are provided are stubbornly on the old lines of 1799. The influence of Nelson, however, is seen in two places. The first is a group of signals for 'attacking the enemy at anchor by passing either outside them or between them and the land,' and for 'anchoring and engaging either within or outside the enemy.' Here we have a rational embodiment of the experience of the Nile. The second is a similar attempt to embody the teaching of Trafalgar, and the way it is done finally confirms the failure to understand what Nelson meant. So extraordinary is the signification of the signal and its explanatory note that it must be given in full.
'Signal.—Cut the enemy's line in the order of sailing in two columns.
'Explanatory Note.—The admiral will make known what number of ships from the van ship of the enemy the weather division is to break through the enemy's line, and the same from the rear at which the lee division is to break through their line.
'To execute this signal the fleet is to form in the order of sailing in two columns, should it not be so formed already; the leader of each column steering down for the position pointed out where he is to cut through the enemy's line.
'If the admiral wishes any particular conduct to be pursued by the leader of the division, in which he happens not to be, after the line is broken, he will of course point it out. If he does not it is to be considered that the lee division after breaking through the line is left to its commander.
'In performing this evolution the second astern of the leader in each column is to pass through the line astern of the ship next ahead [sic] of where her leader broke through, and so on in succession, breaking through all parts of the enemy's line ahead [sic] of their leaders as described in the plate.'
The plate represents the two columns bearing down to attack in a strictly formed line ahead, and the ships, after the leaders have cut through, altering course each for its proper interval in the enemy's line, and the whole then engaging from to-leeward. The note proceeds:
'By this arrangement no ship will have to pass the whole of the enemy's line. If however, in consequence of any circumstance, the rear ships should not be able to cut through in their assigned places, the captains of those ships, as well as of the ships that are deprived of opponents in the enemy's line by this mode of attack, are to act to the best of their judgment for the destruction of the enemy, unless a disposition to the contrary has been previously made.
'It will be seen that by breaking the line in this order the enemy's van ships will not be able to assist either their centre or rear without tacking or wearing for that purpose.'
This from cover to cover of the Signal Book is the sole trace to be found of the great principles for which Nelson had lived and died. That Lord Keith or anyone else could have believed that it adequately represented the teaching of Trafalgar is almost incredible.
To begin with, the wording of the note contains an inexplicable blunder. The last paragraph shows clearly that the idea of the signal is an attack on the rear and centre, as at Trafalgar; yet the ships of each column as they come successively into action are told to engage the enemy's ship ahead of the point where their leaders broke through, a movement which would resolve itself into an attack on their centre and van, and leave the rear free to come into immediate action with an overwhelming concentration on the lee division.
That so grave an error should have been permitted to pass into the Signal Book is bad enough, but that such a signal even if it had been correctly worded should stand for Nelson's last word to the service is almost beyond belief. The final outcome of Nelson's genius for tactics lay of course in his memorandum, and not in the form of attack he actually adopted. Yet this remarkable signal ignores the whole principle of the memorandum. The fundamental ideas of concentration and containing by independent squadrons are wholly missed; and not only this. It distorts Nelson's lee attack into a weather attack, and holds up for imitation every vice of the reckless movement in spite of which Nelson had triumphed. Not a word is said of its dangers, not a word of the exceptional circumstances that alone could justify it, not a word of how easily the tables could be turned upon a man who a second time dared to fling to the winds every principle of his art. It is the last word of British sailing tactics, and surely nothing in their whole history, not even in the worst days of the old Fighting Instructions, so staggers us with its lack of tactical sense.[8]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I.e. the Instructions of 1799, supra, p. 278. For Signal 27 see p. 255.
[2] 'To attack on bearing indicated.'
[3] In Ekin's text the punctuation of this sentence is obviously wrong and destroys the sense. It should accord, as I have ventured to amend it, with that of the previous paragraph.
[4] Signal 109, 'To close nearer the ship or ships indicated.'
[5] Sir Charles Elkin adds, 'In the same work he has also a signal (No. 785) under the head "Enemy" to "Lay on board," with the following observation:—
'"N.B.—This signal is not meant that your people should board the enemy unless you should find advantage by so doing; but it is that you should run your ship on board the enemy, so as to disable her from getting away."'
[6] Mathieu-Dumas, Precis des Evenements Militaires: Pieces Justificatives, vol. xiv. p. 408.
[7] Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola, viii. 353.
[8] The anonymous veteran of the old French navy, cited by Mathieu-Dumas, explains exactly how Villeneuve might have turned the tables on Nelson by forming two lines himself. 'There is,' he concludes, 'no known precedent of a defensive formation in two lines; but I will venture to assert that if Admiral Villeneuve had doubled his line at the moment he saw Nelson meant to attack him in two lines, that admiral would never have had the imprudence of making such an attack.'—Evenements Militaires, xiv. 411.
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF 1816.
[Signal Book, United Service Institution.]
Instructions relating to the Line of Battle and the Conduct of the Fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an enemy.
I. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle are, that the ships may be able, to assist and support each other in action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships greater in number than themselves, and that every ship may be able to fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own fleet.
II. On whichever tack the fleet may be sailing, when the line of battle is formed, the van squadron is to form the van, the centre squadron the centre, and the rear squadron the rear of the line, unless some other arrangement be pointed out by signal. But if a change of wind, or tacking, or wearing, or any other circumstance, should alter the order in which the line of battle was formed, the squadrons are to remain in the stations in which they may so happen to be placed, till the admiral shall direct them to take others.
III. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle, each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as expeditiously as possible; and to keep in close order, if not otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the line, when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it.
IV. In forming the line of battle, each ship should haul up a little to windward rather than to leeward of her second ahead, as a ship a little to leeward will find great difficulty in getting into her station, if it should be necessary to keep the line quite close to the wind; and it may also be better to form at a distance a little greater, rather than smaller, than the prescribed distance, as it is easier to close the line than to extend it.
V. If the admiral should haul out of the line, the ships astern of him are to close up to fill the vacancy he has made, and the line is to continue on its course, and to act in the same manner as if the admiral had not left it All signals made to the centre will be addressed to the senior officer remaining in it, who, during the absence of the admiral, is to be considered as the commander of the centre squadron.
VI. The repeating frigates are to be abreast of the commanders of the squadrons to which they belong, and the fireships and frigates to windward of their squadrons, if no particular station be assigned to them.
VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to place themselves in such a manner that, if they were to haul to the wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed, they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this, every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on which the line of battle would sail, viz. on that point of the compass which is six points from the direction of the wind.
As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or squadron flags, shown with the signals for such a line, will refer to the forming the line of battle; that division or squadron whose flag is uppermost (without considering whether it do or do not form the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind, and form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is undermost is to place itself in that station in which it would become the rear if by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be formed.
VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed the ships are to preserve their relative bearing from each other, whenever they are directed to alter their course together; but if they are directed to alter their course in succession, as the line of bearing would by that circumstance be destroyed, it is to be no longer attended to.
IX. If after having made the signal to prepare to form the line of battle, or either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative flag flying, should make several signals in succession to point out the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when the signal for the line is hoisted again. They are to be executed in the order in which they are made, excepting such as the admiral may annul previously to his again hoisting the signal for the line.
X. If the wind should come forward when the fleet is formed in line of battle, or is sailing by the wind on a line of bearing, the leading ship is to steer seven points from the wind, and every ship is to haul as close to the wind as possible till she has got into the wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought it on the proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come aft, the ships are to bear up until they get into the wake, or on the proper point of bearing from the leading ship.
XI. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet on any separate service are not to obey the signal for forming the line of battle unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by signal.
XII. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as directed in Article XIX. in the General Instructions, though in the presence of an enemy. The captains of such ships will not thereby be prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have the opportunities of rendering essential service by placing their ships advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with the other part of the fleet.
XIII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper, but he is to hoist it in one of his own squadron or division, if there be one near and fit for the purpose.
XIV. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the ships, which at either extremity of the line are thereby left without opponents, may, after the action is begun, quit the line, without waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or assist the ships of the fleet in the best manner that circumstances will allow.
XV. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy either over or very near to any ships of the fleet, nor, though the signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy.
XVI. No ship is to separate from the body of the fleet in time of action to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have been beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some other flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled their opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their attack till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled, unless by signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act otherwise.
XVII. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of being destroyed or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate that may be near is to use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off, or by joining in the attack on the enemy, or by covering the fireship, or, if necessity requires it, by taking out the crew of the disabled ship, or by any other means which circumstances at the time will admit.
XVIII. Though a ship be disabled and hard pressed by the enemy in battle, she is not to quit her station in the line if it can possibly be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do from the commander of the division or squadron to which he belongs, or from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of the line, or should be obliged to quit it before assistance can be sent to him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space become vacant to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it.
XIX. If there should be a captain so lost to all sense of honour and the great duty he owes his country as not to exert himself to the utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy them when engaged, the commander of the squadron or division to which he belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from the command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship till the admiral's pleasure shall be known.
APPENDIX
FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT
[Sir Charles Ekin's Naval Battles, pp. 271 et seq. Extract.]
The intelligent officer to whom the writer is indebted for this important manuscript was an eye-witness of what he has so ably related, and upon which he has reasoned with so much judgment.[1]
'The combined fleet, after veering from the starboard to the larboard tack, gradually fell into the form of an irregular crescent; in which they remained to the moment of attack. Many have considered that the French admiral intended this formation of the line of battle; but from the information I obtained after the action, connected with some documents found on board the Bucentaur, I believe it was the intention to have formed a line ahead, consisting of twenty-one sail—the supposed force of the British fleet—and a squadron of observation composed of twelve sail of the line, under Admiral Gravina, intended to act according to circumstances after the British fleet were engaged. By wearing together, the enemy's line became inverted, and the light squadron which had been advanced in the van on the starboard tack, was left in the rear after wearing; and the ships were subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body. The wind being light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main topsails to the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve their exact station in the line; consequently scarce any ship was immediately ahead or astern of her second. The fleet had then the appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, thus: so that the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the space left between two in the weather-line.
'In the rear, the line was in some places trebled; and this particularly happened where the Colossus was, who, after passing the stern of the French Swiftsure, and luffing up under the lee of the Bahama, supposing herself to leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly ran alongside of the French Achille under cover of the smoke. The Colossus was then placed between the Achille and the Bahama, being on board of the latter; and was also exposed to the fire of the Swiftsure's after-guns. All these positions I believe to have been merely accidental; and to accident alone I attribute the concave circle of the fleet, or crescent line of battle. The wind shifted to the westward as the morning advanced; and of course the enemy's ships came up with the wind, forming a bow and quarter line. The ships were therefore obliged to edge away, to keep in the wake of their leaders; and this manoeuvre, from the lightness of the wind, the unmanageable state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, the inexperience of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity, undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the best that could have been planned, had it been supported by the skilful manoeuvring of individual ships, and with efficient practice in gunnery.
'Of the advantages and disadvantages of the mode of attack adopted by the British fleet, it may be considered presumptuous to speak, as the event was so completely successful; but as the necessity of any particular experiment frequently depends upon contingent circumstances, not originally calculated upon, there can be no impropriety in questioning whether the same plan be likely to succeed under all circumstances, and on all occasions.
'The original plan of attack, directed by the comprehensive mind of our great commander, was suggested on a supposition that the enemy's fleet consisted of forty-six sail of the line and the British forty; and the attack, as designed from to-windward, was to be made under the following circumstances:
'Under a supposition that the hostile fleet would be in a line ahead of forty-six sail, the British fleet was to be brought within gun-shot of the enemy's centre, in two divisions of sixteen sail each, and a division of observation consisting of the remaining eight.
'The lee division was by signal to make a rapid attack under all possible sail on the twelve rear ships of the enemy. The ships were to break through the enemy's line; and such ships as were thrown out of their stations were to assist their friends that were hard pressed. The remainder of the enemy's fleet, of thirty-four sail, were to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief.'
This able officer then proceeds to describe, by a figure, the plan of attack as originally intended; bearing a very close resemblance to that already given in Plate XXVIII. fig. 1; but making the enemy's fleet, as arranged in a regular line ahead, to extend the distance of five miles; and the van, consisting of sixteen ships, left unoccupied; the whole comprising a fleet of forty-six sail of the line. He then observes:
'If the regulated plan of attack had been adhered to, the English fleet should have borne up together, and have sailed in a line abreast in their respective divisions until they arrived up with the enemy. Thus the plan which consideration had matured would have been executed, than which perhaps nothing could be better; the victory would have been more speedily decided, and the brunt of the action would have been more equally felt, &c.
'With the exception of the Britannia, Dreadnought, and Prince, the body of the fleet sailed very equally; and I have no doubt could have been brought into action simultaneously with their leaders. This being granted, there was no time gained by attacking in a line ahead, the only reason, I could suppose, that occasioned the change.
'The advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a squadron of observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution under all circumstances.
'The power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular point of an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the ships attacked, and the power of condensing such a force afterwards [so] as not only to protect the attacking ships from any offensive attempt that may be made by the unoccupied vessels of the hostile fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most probably lead to a victory; and if followed up according to circumstances, may ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part of the mutilated fleet.
'Each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without being so far removed from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support.
'The swifter ships, passing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less liable to be disabled; and, after closing with their opponents, divert their attention from the inferior sailers, who are advancing to complete what their leaders had begun. The weather division, from being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some little time, according to the rate of the sailing; and may direct their attack as they observe the failure or success of the first onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend the success they may appear to have gained, &c.
'If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in pursuit.
'The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired throughout the British fleet from their being commanded by their beloved Nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the English fleet.
'It was successful also from the consternation spread through the combined fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile fleets, inspiring the one and dispiriting the other and from the loss of the admiral's ship early in the action.
'The disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and alternately, that an enemy of equal spirit and equal ability in seamanship and gunnery would have annihilated the ships one after another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and light airs.
'At the distance of one mile five ships, at half a cable's length apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have been four miles an hour; and within the distance of half a mile three ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking ship could fire a gun in her defence.
'It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship does certainly in a great measure cover the hulls of those astern, yet great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole by the fire directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of them, they are placed, for the most part, hors de combat for the rest of the action.
'Or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear could possibly come to their assistance.
'In proceeding to the attack of October 21, the weather was exactly such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the British were six or seven miles distant. By the mode of attacking in detail, and the manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to receive it, instead of doubling on the enemy, the British were, on that day, themselves doubled and trebled on; and the advantage of applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was totally lost.
'The Victory, Temeraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus and Bellerophon were placed in such situations in the onset, that nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their guns could have extricated them. If the enemy's vessels had closed up as they ought to have done, from van to rear, and had possessed a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even British skill and British gallantry could not have availed. The position of the combined fleet at one time was precisely that in which the British were desirous of being placed; namely, to have part of an opposing fleet doubled on, and separated from the main body.
'The French admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest passive gallantry; and certainly the French Intrepide, with some others, evinced active courage equal to the British; but there was no nautical management, no skilful manoeuvring.
'It may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of the Trafalgar attack; but it is only just, to point out the advantages and disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment of great results, that the probabilities and existing circumstances may be well weighed before such means are applied. A plan, to be entirely correct, must be suited to all cases. If its infallibility is not thus established, there can be no impropriety in pointing out the errors and dangers to which it is exposed, for the benefit of others.
'Our heroic and lamented chief knew his means, and the power he had to deal with; he also knew the means he adopted were sufficient for the occasion; and that sufficed.
'The Trafalgar attack might be followed under different circumstances, and have a different result: it is right, therefore, to discuss its merits and demerits. It cannot take one atom from the fame of the departed hero, whose life was one continued scene of original ability, and of superior action.'
FOOTNOTE:
[1] The concluding part of the MS. is devoted to a detailed account of the part played in the action by the Conqueror and her two seconds, Neptune and Leviathan, with the special purpose of showing that Villeneuve really struck to the Conqueror. In a note the author says, 'I have been thus particular, as the capture of the French admiral has been unblushingly attributed to others without any mention being made of the ship that actually was the principal in engaging her, wishing to do justice to a gallant officer who on that day considered his task not complete until every ship was either captured or beyond distance of pursuit.' The inference is that the author was an officer of the Conqueror, defending his captain, Israel Pellew, younger brother of the more famous Edward, Lord Exmouth. It is possible therefore, and even probable, that this criticism of Trafalgar represents the ideas of the Pellews.
INDEX
Additional Instructions, 113, 115, 126-8, 203-229
Admiral, station of, inline, 12, 15, 16, 22, 24, 61, 77, 88, 91, 100, 123, 127, 166, 243-5, 276, 317. See also Flag, and Flagship
Advanced squadron, Nelson's, 294, 300-6, 316-7, 319 n., 325
Ammunition, supply of, 69
Anchor, engaging at, 264, 277,
d'Annibault, Admiral, 18
Anson, Lord, 116, 204, 209-10, 216, 218 n., 285 n.
Argall, Sir Samuel, 49
Armada, 27-9, 32-5, 75, 283, 288
Attack, from to-windward, 31, 33-5, 42, 59, 95, 113, 126, 153, 155-6, 170-1, 227, 246, 330-3. See also Line, breaking the Oblique, 143-5 Parallel, 143, 148, 155-6, 170-1, 186, 191-2, 197, 218 n., 245, 266, 273, 324-5 Perpendicular, 265, 307, 324 On contrary tacks, 245; on opposite number, 211-2, 217-8, 227-3, 265, 377; in coming up, 277 By defiling, 42-3, 51, 59, 65 On superior fleet, 180-2, 236, 262-3, 276, 308, 346
Audley, Sir Thomas, 14-17
Augers, for scuttling, 13
Badiley, Captain Richard, 84
Ball, Admiral Sir Alexander, 303
Banckers, Admiral Adriaen, 156 n.
Barham, Admiral Lord, 293
Barrington, Admiral the Hon. Samuel, 258
Baskerville, Sir Thomas, his battle order, 29
Battle orders, see Order of Battle
Battles. Gravelines (1588), 75, 283, 288 Isla de Pinos (1596), 29 Oquendo and Tromp (1639), 85 Monte Christo (1652), 84 Dungeness (1652), 93 Portland (Feb. 1653), 94 The Gabbard (June 1653), 97 Lowestoft or Texel, No. 2 (1665), 113-4 Four Days' Battle (1066), 116-9, 134, 136-7 St. James's Fight (1666), 122 n., 138, 140-1 Holmes's action (1672), 169 Solebay (1672), 138-9, 155 n., 169 Schoonveldt (1673) 133, 156 Texel, No. 3 (1673), 154 n., 157 n., 162 n., 182 Beachy Head or Bevesier (1690), 177, 181 La Hogue (1692), 180 Malaga (1704), 184, 186, 195-6, 198 n. Toulon (1744), 188 n., 196, 205, 210 Finisterre (Anson and De la Jonquiere, 1747), 209 Finisterre (Hawke and L'Etenduere, 1747), 226 n. Havana (1748), 224 n. Minorca (1756), 218 n. Quiberon (1759), 186, 312 Granada (1779), 258 Martinique (1780), 211, 227 n. Chesapeake (1781), 212 Les Saintes (1782), 211-2, 237 First of June (1794), 256, 265, 283 St. Vincent (1797), 254, 265, 267 Camperdown (1797), 254, 266, 287 The Nile (1798), 262, 312 Copenhagen (1801), 264 Trafalgar (1805), 257, 264, 266, 282 et seq., 321-7, 335-42, 351-8
Berkley, Admiral Sir William, 116
Berry, Sir John, 169
Berry, Captain Edward, 262, 288
Bilboes, 33
Blake, Admiral Robert, 83-5, 92-9; orders of, 99-104
Boarding, 7, 13, 15, 42, 51, 59, 62, 68, 97, 119, 326
Boats in action, 10-13, 15, 89-90, 248, 275-6
Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 197, 203-4, 208, 210; his Additional Instructions, 219-25
Boswall, Captain, his translation of Hoste, 236 n., 287 n.
Boteler, Captain Nathaniel, on tactics, 27, 73-6
Breaking the line, see Line
Browne, Lieutenant G.L., 299
Buckingham, George Villiers, Duke of, 33, 76
Byng, Admiral Sir George, 204, 218 n.
Cabins, 61
Calder, Admiral Sir Robert Bart., 294
Calthrops, 11
Captains, lists of, 65-6, 71
Captains, removal of, in action, 247, 274-5, 347
Carteret, Admiral Sir George, 121
Cartouches, 69
Cavalry tactics at sea, 7, 119
Cecil, Sir Edward, Viscount Wimbledon, 31, 49, 51-72, 73, 75, 83, 85
Changing station, see Station
Charles V, Emperor, 1, 18
Chasing, 43, 56, 60, 127-9, 155, 162, 204. See also General chase
Chaves, Alonso de, 1 et seq. 18-9, 52, 73, 75, 291, 296
Chaves, Hieronymus de, 2
Clearing for action, 41, 58, 62, 69
Clerk of Eldin, 235, 262, 265, 285, 326
Close action, 41, 68, 112, 159, 215, 220
Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander, 185, 326-7, 330-4
Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward, 295, 301-7
Collingwood, Admiral Lord, 283, 292, 295, et seq.; his memorandum, 323-30, 336-7
'Commander-in-chief,' 100 n.
Concentration, 142-5, 154 n., 177, 213, 228, and n., 259, 284, 330-4 By doubling, see Doubling; On rear, see Rear-concentration On van, 143-4, 213, 314-5
Confusing, 36, 144, 213, 284, 291, 315
Containing, 135-8, 214, 284, 297, 318-20, 325 By feinting, see Feints
Convoy, method of attacking, 219, 227, 288; of protecting, 94
Corporal of the field, 40
Corps de reserve, see Reserve
Coventry, Sir William, 111, 114, 128, 133
Cowardice, see Captains, removal of
Cross-bows, 11
Crossing the T, 210, 221
Cruisers, 29, 71-3, 88-90, 99, 103-4, 109, 122, 125,152; duties of, in action, 151, 219, 251
Cruising formations, 209, 220, 228
Dartmouth, Admiral George Legge, first lord, 141; his instructions, 168-172, 177
Dartmouth MSS. 110, 133, 139
Deane, Admiral Richard, 93, 95
Decres, 310
Defeat, 247
Debug, William Fielding, First Earl of, 49
Detached ships, 240, 244, 249, 269, 272-3, 276, 345
Disabled ships, 101, 103, 112-3, 123-4, 127, 146, 161-2, 192-3, 246-7, 274, 346-7; question of following up, 224, 246, 273, 346
Disrobe, Colonel John, general at sea, 98; orders of, 99-104
Discipline, 40, 43-5, 52-4, 58, 93
Dispersing, instructions for, 247, 275
Divisions, independent control of, 287-9, 294-6, 316-9, 323, 327. See also Sub squadrons; Order of battle
Doubling, 117, 179-85, 210, 236, 262, 326, 331-3.
Drake, Sir Francis, 17 n., 283; his sailing order, 29, 50
Duff, Captain George, 303
Demeanor, Vice-Admiral, 310
Duncan, Admiral Viscount, 254, 266, 287
Duodenal, Admiral the Earl of, 337
Tuques, Admiral Abraham, 164
Engaging, see Attack
Equalizing speed, 228, 241, 243, 269, 271, 273
Essex, Robert Devereux, Earl of, 49
Essington, Rear-Admiral, 322
d'Estrees, Marechal, 154 n., 179, 182
Etenduere, Admiral des Herbiers de l', 226 n.
Exmouth, Admiral Edward Pellew, Lord, 351 n.
Expeditional orders, 204-6
Feints, 302, 307-12
Fire discipline, 41-3, 51, 54, 60, 62, 68, 70, 103, 125, 159, 172, 245, 273, 346
Fire, precautions against, 37, 41, 54, 58-9, 70
Fireships, 89, 90, 103-4; instructions for, 139, 149, 159-60, 172, 223-4, 227, 248 and n., 250-1, 274-5
Flag, shifting the, 130, 141, 162 n., 248-9, 276, 345-6
Flags, squadronal, 16, 22-3, 55; abolished, 251
Flagship as objective, 12, 15, 273. 317, 346. See also Admiral, station of
Forcing, 227, 334
Foreign views of British tactics, 97-8, 118-9, 337-9
Frederick, Rear-Admiral, 254 n., 255
Frigates, see Cruisers
Galen, Admiral Johann van, 84
Galleys, tactics of, 6; used with sailing ships, 18-24
Gambier, Admiral Lord, 322-3, 325; his instructions, 327-8
Gambling, 43-4, 52
General chase, 130, 193, 221, 226
'General' for naval conmander-in-chief, 82, 93, 99
General Instructions, 268, 342
George of Denmark, Prince, 195
Gibraltar, 196, 225, 235-6
Glanville, Sir John, 63 n.
Gorges, Sir William, 32-5, 50
Grain, 101 and n.
Grappling, 7, 12, 248, 250
Grasse, Vice-Admiral Comte de, 238, 285-6
Graves, Admiral Lord, 212
Gravina, Admiral, 264
Greenwood, Jonathan, his signal book, 233 n.
Grenades, 11
Grenier, Vicomte de, his tactical treatise, 285
Group tactics, 50-1, 74, 85-7, 338
Guiche, Comte de, on English and Dutch tactics, 118-9
Guides, 239, 240-1, 278-9
Gunfire as basis of tactics, 120
Gunners and gun crews, 35, 62, 69. See also Seamen gunners
Gunnery, 69, 97, 263. See also Close action, and Fire discipline
Hand-guns, 11
Harpoons, 11
Harvey, Captain Eliab, 297, 310
Hawke, Lord, 116,209,210-1; his Additional Instructions, 217-8, 312
Hawkins, Sir Richard, 34
Henry VIII, 14, 18
Herbert, Admiral, See Torrington
Hill, General Lord, 292
Holmes, Admiral Sir Robert, 132 n.
Hood, Vice-Admiral Sir Samuel, 322
Hood, Viscount, 211-4; his additional signals, 228-9, 236-8, 255
Hope, Captain George, 295, 303, 320 n.
Hoste, Pere Paul, his Evolutions Navales, 97-8, 113-4, 179-83, 225 n., 235-6, 257, 262-3, 308
Howard of Effingham, Lord, 27, 29
Howard, Sir Edward, 14
Howe, Earl, 184-5, 225 n.; as first lord, 233-8, 252 et seq., 262-5, 267; his great manoeuvre, 255-62, 265, 267, 287, 308, 311, 336
Hygiene, 44, 60
Initiative, 267-8, 279, 314. See also Divisions, independent control of
Intervals, 67, 113, 127, 158, 191, 220, 222-3, 244, 327-8, 330 n.
Jack-flag, 108 and n.
James II, 168. See also York, Duke of
Jervis, Admiral Sir John, Earl of St. Vincent, 254, 265-6
Jonquiere, Admiral de la, 209
Jordan, Admiral Sir Joseph, 141, 155 n.
Keats, Admiral Sir Richard Goodwin, 290-2, 295-6, 304, 311, 322
Keith, Admiral Lord, 336, 341
Keppel, Admiral Augustus, Viscount, 235, 258
Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles, 1st bart. (ob. 1777), 224 n., 235, 258
Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles Henry, 2nd bart. (1754-1831), 185, 210, 235 n., 235-7, 257-8, 260-1
Landing, 16
Lasking, 171
Lawson, Admiral Sir John, 112
Lestock, Admiral, 188 n., 205-8
Lindsey, Robert Bertie, Earl of, 76-7, 85
Line. See also Orders of battle. Abreast, 75, 107-9, 165-6, 220 Ahead, origin of, 28-36, 42, 59, 62, 82-7; first instructions for, 92, 95-9, 100-2, 108-9, 124-6; insistence on, 134-5, 149, 155, 159, 335-9; close hauled, first use of, 113; invented by English, 118-21 of bearing, see Quarter line Breaking the, 114, 136-7, 142, 149, 153, 158 n., 169-70, 176-8, 182, 212, 229, 237, 289, 314-5, 324-5; early objections to, 145, 153 n., 183-4, 256; the two methods of, 255-62, 264-6, 279, 326-7, 330-3; synonyms for, 261 Closing up, 192, 198, 241, 243 Equalising, 205, 219, 221, 227, 346. See also Reserve, corps de Forming, as convenient, 170-1, 221, 226, 277 Inverting, 226-7, 238, 331-2 Position of squadrons in, 239-40 Principles of, stated, 269, 342 Quitting the, 161, 193, 198, 247, 273-4. See also Equalising Early Spanish use of, 8-10; early English, 28-36, 42, 59, 62 Reactions against, 115-6, 159 n., 186, 283-9, 335-9 Reduplication of, 118-9, 312-3, 338, 342 n., 352
Linstocks, 11
Lisle, John Dudley, Lord, 18-24, 291, 296
Louisbourg, 203
Love, Sir Thomas, 49-51, 61 n.
Macpherson, Alexander, 225
Malta, 164
Mathews, Admiral, 188 n., 190 n., 196, 205-8, 210
Medows, Captain Charles, 225
Melee, 259, 267, 291
Monck, George, Duke of Albemarle, 93-9; orders of, 99-104, 107, 111-5, 134-6
Monson, Sir William, on tactics, 76
Moore, Admiral Sir Graham, 336
Moorsom, Vice-Admiral Constantine, 298-9
Moorsom, Captain Robert, 298-9, 311 n.
Morogues, Bigot de, his Tactique navale, 171 n., 185, 285 n., 327
Mortemart, Duc de, 179
Moulton, Captain Robert, his seabook, 112, 126 n., 129 n., 151 n.
Musket-arrows, 34
Mutual support, 61, 67, 74, 85-6, 89, 91, 100-1, 123, 129, 172, 266-7, 283
Myngs, Admiral Sir Christopher, 136-7
Narbrough, Admiral Sir John, 164-7
Nelson, Admiral Lord, 116, 185, 214, 257, 259, 261, 266, 321-7, 335-42 His general orders (1798-1801), 264, 287-9 His memorandum (1803) 261, 280-1, 289-90, 313-6 His memorandum (1805), 272 n., 282-313, 316-20, 353-4
'Nelson touch,' the, 283, 293, 296, 299-313, 326
Norris, Admiral Sir John, 196, 206-7
Oar propulsion, 18-24
O'Bryen, Lieutenant Christopher, his translation of Hoste, 236 n.
Order of battle, forming, as convenient, 70-1
Orders of battle. Early Spanish, 8-10; English, 19-24, 50-1, 65 et seq,, 74-5; wedge-shaped, 9, 19; Baskerville's, 30; Boteler on, 73-6; crescent, 75, 94, 351; in two lines, 209, 214, 220, 226, 229, 285, 294-300, 305, 323; in three lines, 286, 289-296, 354
Order of sailing, 29, 50, 225 n., 235; as order of battle, 316, 322, 327, 340
Parisot, his account of Trafalgar, 310 n.
Pellew, Captain Israel, 299, 351 n.
Penn, Admiral Sir William, 81, 92, 96, 98, 135; orders of, 99-104, 114; his talk with Pepys, 120-1
Pepys, Samuel, 117 n., 120-1, 168-9
Perez de Grandallana, Don Domingo, 267
Pigot, Admiral Hugh, 212, 228-9 n., 237, 255, 260
Popham, Admiral Sir Home, 254, 335-6
Prayers, 33, 36, 52
Preparative signals, 269
Prizes, treatment of, 103, 112
Quarter line, 209, 216-7, 225, 242, 269-71, 344; at Trafalgar, 311-2
Quarters, 41-2, 58-9, 62, 69-70
Raking, 170, 221
Ralegh, Sir Walter, 27 et seq., 50
Rear-concentration, 143-4, 145 n., 180, 221, 226, 238, 249, 263, 289, 293, 310, 313-9, 330-3, 339-41
Repeating ships, 142, 199, 243, 271, 305 n., 308, 344
Reserve, Corps de, 205, 214, 219, 221, 227, 241, 243, 269, 272, 276, 331, 335. 345. See also Equalising and Quitting the line
Reserve squadrons, 7, 12, 50-1, 67, 71
Retreat, order of, 94 and n., 165. See also Dispersing
Rockets as signals, 163 n.
Rodney, Lord, 184-5, 2O9, 211-3; Additional Instructions used by, 225, 227 n., 228 n., 236-7, 255-62, 284-5, 287
Rooke, Admiral Sir George, 187, 195-9, 207
Rupert, Prince, 111-2, 115-7; Instructions of, 129-30, 133-6, 159 n., 169
Russell, Admiral Edward, Earl of Orford, 175 et seq., 187-96, 233 n.
Ruyter, Admiral Michiel de, 87, 119, 156 n.
Sailing order, see Order of sailing
Sailors serving ashore, 37, 56
Sandwich, Edward Mountagu, Earl of, 82, 107-9, 111-2, 165
Saumarez, Admiral Lord de, 262
Scouts, see Cruisers
Sealed orders, 38
Seamen gunners, 35, 41
Ship-money fleets, 76-7
Ships, lists of, 20-2, 65-6, 71, 166 Achille, 352 Agamemnon, 301, 303-4, 311 n. Anne Royal, 63, 65 Assurance, 81 Bahama, 352 Belleisle, 294, 300, 304, 357 Bellerophon, 300, 304, 305 n., 357 Britannia, 195, 354 Bucentaure, 309, 351 Colossus, 300-1, 303-6, 352, 357 Conqueror, 299,305 n., 351 n. Defence, 295, 301, 303-4 Defiance, 305 n. Dreadnought (1578), 65; (1805), 354 Euryalus, 305 n., 308-9 Leviathan, 304, 351 n. Marlborough, 253 Mars, 300-1, 303-6, 357 Neptune, 351 n. Orion, 301-2, 304-5 Pembroke, 169 Polyphemus, 304 Prince, 354 Prince of Wales, 322 Queen Charlotte, 252 Redoutable, 309 Revenge, 298, 311 n. Royal Catherine, 169 Royal Charles, 111, 128-9 Royal James, 112 n. Royal Sovereign, 300, 357 St. George, 264 Santa Ana, 309 Santisima Trinidad, 309-10 Shannon, 225 Superb, 290 Swiftsure, 352 Temeraire, 300, 308, 310, 357 Vanguard, 287 Victory, 293, 299, 300, 305, 3O7-8, 357
Shot-holes, 62, 69
Shovell, Admiral Sir Clowdisley, 195, 198 n.
Sidmouth, Lord, 292, 295
Sign (for signal), 82
Signal books, introduction of, 233 and n., 234 and n.
Signal officers, 216, 299
Signals, early forms of, 10, 38, 54-8, 73; improvements in, 242, 152 n., 155 n., 163 n., 233, et seq., 254 n.; numerical, 235
Slinging yards, 70
Smoke, tactical value of, 8, 10, 15, 16
Soldiers at sea, 35, 37, 41, 53, 56, 59,69; as admirals, 29-30, 49, 73-6, 96
Spain, orders adopted from, 18, 33 n., 41 n.
Spanish Armament, the (1790), 253
Squadronal organisation, 50-1, 55, 65-7, 73-4, 85-7, 186-9, 193-4, 322
Stanhope, Vice-Admiral, 322
Station, changing, 218, 226, 243, 276; keeping, 222, 224, 228, See also Line, quitting the
Stinkballs, 11
Strickland, Admiral Sir Roger, 169
Sub-squadrons, 50-1, 65-7, 85, 87, 322-3. See also Divisions
Tacking in succession, first signal for, 113, 127-8
Tactical exercises, 209, 253, 285 n.
Tactics, principles of, 283-4, 286. See also Concentration, Confusing, Containing, Mutual support Oscillations in, 178, 213 Dutch, 50, 66-7, 73, 85-7, 97-8, 114, 118-20, 313 French, 185, 258-9, 267-8, 285-6 Spanish, 267-8. See also Chaves, Alonso de Treatises on, see Hoste, Morogues, Clerk, Grenier, Knowles
Tangier, 168
Telegraphing, 254 n.
Tobacco smoking, 37
Torrington, Admiral Arthur Herbert, Earl of, 141, 177, 181, 187, 236
Toulouse, Comte de, 196
Tourville, Marechal de, 179-181
Transports, 71
Tromp, Admiral Marten Harpertszoon, 83-7, 93-4; orders of, 91
Tromp, Admiral Cornelis Martenszoon, 118, 156 n.
Van, concentration on, 142-5, 154 n.
Vane, Sir Harry, 93
Vernon, Admiral, 205-7, 210; his Additional Instructions, 214-216
Villeneuve, Admiral, 264, 286, 308-9, 312-3, 342 n.
Walsh, Lieutenant John, his signal book, 253
Warren, Vice-Admiral Sir Peter, 285 n.
Weapons for close quarters, 11, 15
Weather-gage, 8, 15, 16, 23-4, 62, 68, 102, 114, 154, 238
Weft, waft or wheft, 89, 99
Wimbledon, see Cecil
Wing squadrons, 18-24, 73
With, Admiral Witte de, 86
Wren, Dr. Mathew, F.R.S., 133, 138-9
York, James, Duke of, 82; his instructions, 110-28, 133-63, 177; his school, 134-5, 178, 338; end of his career, 140
Zamorano, Roderigo, 4
Zante, 164, 167
THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
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THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY, which has been established for the purpose of printing rare or unpublished works of naval interest, aims at rendering accessible the sources of our naval history, and at elucidating questions of naval archaeology, construction, administration, organisation and social life.
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In 1900: Vol. XVIII. Logs of the Great Sea Fights (Vol. II.). Edited by Sir T.S. Jackson. (Two vols. 25s.)
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In 1901: Vol. XX. The Naval Miscellany (Vol. I.). Edited by the Secretary. (15s.)
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Other works in preparation, in addition to further volumes of Mr. Tanner's Descriptive Catalogue, of Sir William Monson's Tracts, of The First Dutch War, which will be edited by Mr. C.T. Atkinson, and of The Naval Miscellany, are The Journal of Captain (afterwards Sir John) Narbrough, 1672-73, to be edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; Official Documents illustrating the Social Life and Internal Discipline of the Navy in the XVIIIth Century, to be edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; Select Correspondence of the great Earl of Chatham and his Sons, to be edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; Select Correspondence of Sir Charles Middleton, afterwards Lord Barham, 1778-1806, to be edited by
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REPORT OF THE COUNCIL
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Read at the Thirteenth Annual General Meeting, Thursday, June 28, 1906.
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THE COUNCIL have to report that the number of members and subscribers on the Society's list is 536; a net increase of 28 over last year. This is largely due to the additional support received from the Admiralty, which has increased the number of its subscriptions to fourteen, as well as to the accession of other departments of the public service and of public institutions, including
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and, in his private capacity, the Secretary of State for War. The Society of Swedish Naval Officers, Stockholm, has also been admitted as a subscriber.
On the other hand, death has removed nine of our members, and among them two who have, from the beginning, been most active in furthering the ends and promoting the interests of the Society. These are:—
Captain MONTAGU BURROWS, R.N., Chichele Professor of History in the University of Oxford, and known to all of us as the author of the Life of Hawke; and
Rear-Admiral Sir WILLIAM WHARTON, K.C.B., Hydrographer to the Admiralty.
The names of the others are:—
Sir W. LAIRD CLOWES; Earl COWPER; Lord CURRIE, G.C.B.; Commander W.M. LATHAM, R.N.; Mr. C.A. NANKIVELL; Mr. G.R. STEVENS; Commander W.H. WATSON, R.N.R.
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Since the date of the last General Meeting the Society has issued:
For 1905. Vol. XXX. The First Dutch War (Vol. III.). Edited by the late Dr. S.R. GARDINER and Mr. C.T. ATKINSON.
For this year it is proposed to issue The Reminiscences of Commander James Anthony Gardner, 1775-1806, edited by Sir R. VESEY HAMILTON; and Select Correspondence of Sir Charles Middleton, afterwards Lord Barham, edited by Professor J.K. LAUGHTON.
These are now well advanced, and will, it is hoped, be issued in the course of the autumn.
Of the several works in preparation—a list of which will be found in the Advertisement at the end of Vol. XXX—it is unnecessary to speak here.
The Society will, however, be interested to learn that copies have been found of the Fighting Instructions of Hawke and Rodney. These were described at some length by Mr. Julian S. Corbett in the Times of December 19, and, by the kind permission of the owner, Mr. Pritchard, will be edited for the Society by Mr. Corbett, and issued—probably next year—either as a separate volume or included in a volume of the Miscellany.
The Balance Sheet is appended.
ABSTRACT OF ACCOUNTS. JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1905. RECEIPTS. L s. d. L s. d. Balance brought forward: At Messrs. Coutts & Co. 202 5 10 With Treasurer 0 18 0 With Secretary 8 17 1 - 212 0 11 612 Subscriptions 642 12 0 Over-payment on same 0 1 4 - 642 13 4 Volumes sold 60 1 0 - L914 15 3 ========== Audited and found correct: W.A. JAMES, } Auditors. P.H. PRIDHAM WIPPELL,} May 1906.
PAYMENTS. L s. d. Printing, &c. 370 3 3 Indexing and Transcribing 7 8 0 Salaries and Wages 110 18 9 Miscellaneous 9 18 5 Balance carried forward:— At Messrs. Coutts & Co. L412 10 5 With Treasurer 1 1 0 With Secretary 2 15 5 ————- 416 6 10 ————- L914 15 3 ========= W. GRAHAM GREENE, Hon. Treasurer.
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