'1. De rendre nulle une partie des forces de l'ennemi afin de reunir toutes les siennes contre celles qui l'on attaque, ou qui attaquent; et de vaincre ensuite le reste avec plus de facilite et de certitude.

'2. De ne presenter a l'ennemi aucune partie de son armee qui ne soit flanquee et ou il ne put combattre et vaincre s'il vouloit se porter sur les parties de cette armee reconnues faibles jusqu'a present.'

Never had the fundamental intention of naval tactics been stated with so much penetration, simplicity, and completeness. The order, however, which Grenier worked out—that of three lines of bearing disposed on three sides of a lozenge—was somewhat fantastic and cumbrous, and it seems to have been enough to secure for his clever treatise complete neglect. It had even less effect on French tactics than had Nelson's memorandum on our own. This is all the more curious, for so thoroughly was the change that was coming over English tactics understood in France that Villeneuve knew quite well the kind of attack Nelson would be likely to make. In his General Instructions, issued in anticipation of the battle, he says: 'The enemy will not confine themselves to forming a line parallel to ours.... They will try to envelope our rear, to break our line, and to throw upon those of our ships that they cut off, groups of their own to surround and crush them.' Yet he could not get away from the dictum of De Grasse, and was able to think of no better way of meeting such an attack than awaiting it 'in a single line of battle well closed up.'

In England things were little better. In spite of the fact that at Camperdown Duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency which Grenier had noticed. The possibilities even of Rodney's manoeuvre had not been followed up, and Howe had contented himself with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of the single line. It was reserved for Nelson's genius to bring a sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad and combine all that was good in previous systems.[7]

The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the genesis and history of his memorandum. As early as 1798, when he was hoping to intercept Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet commander. It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the lesson of St. Vincent: 'As it is very probable the enemy will not be formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by separate divisions. In which case the commanders of divisions are strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order, and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their ships.'[8] The divisional organisation follows, being his own division of six sail and two others of four each. 'Had he fallen in with the French fleet at sea,' wrote Captain Berry, who was sent home with despatches after the Nile, 'that he might make the best impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each]. Two of these sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it could.'[9] The exact manner in which he intended to use this organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his captains, but no further record of his design has been found. Still there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same time that gives us the needed light. We cannot fail to notice the striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the Elizabethan admirals at Gravelines upon the Armada after its formation had been broken up by the fireships. That attack was made intuitively by divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and Nelson's new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which he too intended. The alteration he ordered was to change the signification of Signal 16, so that it meant that each of his flag officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own division and make any signals he thought proper.

But this was not all. By the same general order he made two other alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the French in order of battle. They too are of the highest interest and run as follows: 'To be inserted in pencil in the signal book. At No. 182. Being to windward of the enemy, to denote I mean to attack the enemy's line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen ships, or whatsoever number of the British ships of the line may be present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy's line.' No. 183. 'I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy's rear.'[10]

Thus we see that at the very first opportunity Nelson had of enforcing his own tactical ideas he enunciated three of the principles upon which his great memorandum was based, viz. breaking up his line of battle into three divisional lines, independent control by divisional leaders, and concentration on the enemy's rear. All that is wanting are the elements of surprise and containing.

These, however, we see germinating in the memorandum he issued five years later off Toulon. In that case he expected to meet the French fleet on an opposite course, and being mainly concerned in stopping it and having a slightly superior force he is content to concentrate on the van. But, in view of the strategical necessity of making the attack in this way, he takes extra precautions which are not found in the general order of 1798. He provides for preventing the enemy's knowing on which side his attack is to fall; instead of engaging an equal number of their ships he provides for breaking their line, and engaging the bulk of their fleet with a superior number of his own; and finally he looks to being ready to contain the enemy's rear before it can do him any damage.

Thus, taking together the general order of 1798 and the Toulon memorandum of 1803, we can see all the tactical ideas that were involved at Trafalgar already in his mind, and we are in a position to appreciate the process of thought by which he gradually evolved the sublimely simple attack that welded them together, and brought them all into play without complication or risk of mistake. This process, which crowns Nelson's reputation as the greatest naval tactician of all time, we must now follow in detail.

Shortly before he left England for the last time, he communicated to Keats, of the Superb, a full explanation of his views as they then existed in his mind, and Keats has preserved it in the following paper which Nicolas printed.

'Memorandum of a conversation between Lord Nelson and Admiral Sir Richard Keats, the last time he was in England before the battle of Trafalgar.[11]

'One morning, walking with Lord Nelson in the grounds of Merton, talking on naval matters, he said to me, "No day can be long enough to arrange a couple of fleets and fight a decisive battle according to the old system. When we meet them" (I was to have been with him), "for meet them we shall, I'll tell you how I shall fight them. I shall form the fleet into three divisions in three lines; one division shall be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked ships, which I shall keep always to windward or in a situation of advantage, and I shall put them under an officer who, I am sure, will employ them in the manner I wish, if possible. I consider it will always be in my power to throw them into battle in any part I choose; but if circumstances prevent their being carried against the enemy where I desire, I shall feel certain he will employ them effectually and perhaps in a more advantageous manner than if he could have followed my orders" (he never mentioned or gave any hint by which I could understand who it was he intended for this distinguished service).[12] He continued, "With the remaining part of the fleet, formed in two lines, I shall go at them at once if I can, about one third of their line from their leading ship." He then said, "What do you think of it?" Such a question I felt required consideration. I paused. Seeing it he said, "But I will tell you what I think of it. I think it will surprise and confound the enemy. They won't know what I am about. It will bring forward a pell-mell battle, and that is what I want."[13]

Here we have something roughly on all-fours with the methods of the First Dutch War. There are the three squadrons, the headlong 'charge' and the melee. The reserve squadron to windward goes even further back, to the treatise of De Chaves and the Instructions of Lord Lisle in 1545. It was no wonder it took away Keats's breath. The return to primitive methods was probably unconscious, but what was obviously uppermost in Nelson's mind was the breaking up of the established order in single line, leading by surprise and concealment to a decisive melee. He seems to insist not so much upon defeating the enemy by concentration as by throwing him into confusion, upsetting his mental equilibrium in accordance with the primitive idea. The notion of concentration is at any rate secondary, while the subtle scheme for 'containing' as perfected in the memorandum is not yet developed. As he explained his plan to Keats, he meant to attack at once with both his main divisions, using the reserve squadron as a general support. There is no clear statement that he meant it as a 'containing' force, though possibly it was in his mind.[14]

There is one more piece of evidence relating to this time when he was still in England. According to this story Lord Hill, about 1840, when still Commander-in-Chief, was paying a visit to Lord Sidmouth. His host, who, better known as Addington, had been prime minister till 1804, and was in Pitt's new cabinet till July 1805, showed him a table bearing a Nelson inscription. He told him that shortly before leaving England to join the fleet Nelson had drawn upon it after dinner a plan of his intended attack, and had explained it as follows: 'I shall attack in two lines, led by myself and Collingwood, and I am confident I shall capture their van and centre or their centre and rear.' 'Those,' concluded Sidmouth, 'were his very words,' and remarked how wonderfully they had been fulfilled.[15] Hill and Sidmouth at the time were both old men and the authority is not high, but so far as it goes it would tend to show that an attack in two lines instead of one was still Nelson's dominant idea. It cannot however safely be taken as evidence that he ever intended a concentration on the van, though in view of the memorandum of 1803 this is quite possible.

Finally, there is the statement of Clarke and McArthur that Nelson before leaving England deposited a copy of his plan with Lord Barham, the new first lord of the admiralty. This however is very doubtful. The Barham papers have recently been placed at the disposal of the Society, in the hands of Professor Laughton, and the only copy of the memorandum he has been able to find is an incomplete one containing several errors of transcription, and dated the Victory, October 11, 1805. In the absence of further evidence therefore no weight can be attached to the oft-repeated assertion that Nelson had actually drawn up his memorandum before he left England.

Coming now to the time when he had joined the fleet off Cadiz, the first light we have is the well-known letter of October 1 to Lady Hamilton. In this letter, after telling her that he had joined on September 28, but had not been able to communicate with the fleet till the 29th, he says, 'When I came to explain to them the Nelson touch it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears and all approved. It was new—it was singular—it was simple.' What he meant exactly by the 'Nelson touch' has never been clearly explained, but he could not possibly have meant either concentration or the attack on the enemy's rear, for neither of these ideas was either new or singular.

On October 3 he writes to her again: 'The reception I met with on joining the fleet caused the sweetest sensation of my life.... As soon as these emotions were past I laid before them the plan I had previously arranged for attacking the enemy, and it was not only my pleasure to find it generally approved, but clearly perceived and understood.'[16]

The next point to notice is the 'Order of Battle and Sailing' given by Nicolas. It is without date, but almost certainly must have been drawn up before Nelson joined. It does not contain the Belleisle, which Nelson knew on October 4 was to join him.[17] It also does include the name of Sir Robert Calder and his flagship, and on September 30 Nelson had decided to send both him and his ship home.[18]

The order is for a fleet of forty sail, but the names of only thirty-three are given, which were all Nelson really expected to get in time. The remarkable feature of this order is that it contains no trace of the triple organisation of the memorandum. The 'advanced squadron' is absent, and the order is based on two equal divisions only.

Then on October 9, after Calder had gone, there is this entry in Nelson's private diary: 'Sent Admiral Collingwood the Nelson touch.' It was enclosed in a letter in which Nelson says: 'I send you my Plan of Attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in. But, my dear friend, it is to place you perfectly at your ease respecting my intentions and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect.' The same day Collingwood replies, 'I have a just sense of your lordship's kindness to me, and the full confidence you have reposed in me inspires me with the most lively gratitude. I hope it will not be long before there is an opportunity of showing your lordship that it has not been misplaced.' On these two letters there can be little doubt that the 'Plan of Attack' which Nelson enclosed was that of the memorandum. The draft from which Nicolas printed appears to have been dated October 9, and originally had in one passage 'you' and 'your' for the 'second in command,' showing that Nelson in his mind was addressing his remarks to Collingwood, though subsequently he altered the sentence into the third person. Only one other copy was known to Nicolas, and that was issued in the altered form to Captain Hope, of the Defence, a ship which in the order of battle was in Collingwood s squadron, but Codrington tells us it was certainly issued to all the captains.[19]

So far, then, we have the case thus—that whatever Nelson may have really told Lord Sidmouth, and whatever may have been in his mind when he drew up the dual order of battle and sailing, he had by October 9 reverted to the triple idea which he had explained to Keats. Meanwhile, however, his conception had ripened. There are marked changes in organisation, method and intention. In organisation the reserve squadron is reduced from the original twelve or fourteen to eight, or one fifth of his hypothetical fleet instead of about one third—reduced, that is, to a strength at which it was much less capable of important independent action. In method we have, instead of an attack with the two main divisions, an attack with one only, with the other covering it. In intention we have as the primary function of the reserve squadron, its attachment to one or other of the other two main divisions as circumstances may dictate.

The natural inference from these important changes is that Nelson's conception was now an attack in two divisions of different strength, the stronger of which, as the memorandum subsequently explains, was to be used as a containing force to cover the attack of the other, and except that the balance of the two divisions was reversed, this is practically just what Clerk of Eldin had recommended and what actually happened in the battle. It is a clear advance upon the original idea as explained to Keats, in which the third squadron was to be used on the primitive and indefinite plan of De Chaves and Lord Lisle as a general reserve. It also explains Nelson's covering letter to Collingwood, in which he seems to convey to his colleague that the pith of his plan was an attack in two divisions, and, within the general lines of the design, complete freedom of action for the second in command. How largely this idea of independent control entered into the 'Nelson touch' we may judge from the fact that it is emphasised in no less than three distinct paragraphs of the memorandum.

Such, then, is the fundamental principle of the memorandum as enunciated in its opening paragraphs. He then proceeds to elaborate it in two detailed plans of attack—one from to-leeward and the other from to-windward. It was the latter he meant to make if possible. He calls it 'the intended attack,' and it accords with the opening enunciation. The organisation is triple, but no special function is assigned to the reserve squadron. The actual attack on the enemy's rear is to be made by Collingwood, while Nelson with his own division and the reserve is to cover him. In the event of an attack having to be made from to-leeward, the idea is different. Here the containing movement practically disappears. The fleet is still to attack the rear and part of the centre of the enemy, but now in three independent divisions simultaneously, in such a way as to cut his line at three points, and to concentrate a superior force on each section of the severed line. To none of the divisions is assigned the duty of containing the rest of the enemy's fleet from the outset. It is to be dealt with at a second stage of the action by all ships that are still capable of renewing the engagement after the first stage. 'The whole impression,' as Nelson put it, in case he was forced to attack from to-leeward, was to overpower the enemy's line from a little ahead of the centre to the rearmost ship. He does not say, however, that this was to be 'the whole impression' of the intended attack from to-windward. 'The whole impression' there appears to be for Collingwood to overpower the rear while Nelson with the other two divisions made play with the enemy's van and centre; but the particular manner in which he would carry out this part of the design is left undetermined.

The important point, then, in considering the relation between the actual battle and the memorandum, is to remember that it provided for two different methods of attacking the rear according to whether the enemy were encountered to windward or to leeward. The somewhat illogical arrangement of the memorandum tends to conceal this highly important distinction. For Nelson interpolates between his explanation of the windward attack and his opening enunciation of principle his explanation of the leeward attack, to which the enunciation did not apply. That some confusion was caused in the minds of some even of his best officers is certain, but let them speak for themselves.

After the battle Captain Harvey, of the Temeraire, whom Nelson had intended to lead his line, wrote to his wife, 'It was noon before the action commenced, which was done according to the instructions given us by Lord Nelson.... Lord Nelson had given me leave to lead and break through the line about the fourteenth ship,' i.e. two or three ships ahead of the centre, as explained in the memorandum for the leeward attack but not for the windward.

On the other hand we have Captain Moorsom, of the Revenge, who was in Collingwood's division, saying exactly the opposite. Writing to his father on December 4, he says, 'I have seen several plans of the action, but none to answer my ideas of it. A regular plan was laid down by Lord Nelson some time before the action but not acted on. His great anxiety seemed to be to get to leeward of them lest they should make off to Cadiz before he could get near them.' And on November 1, to the same correspondent he had written, 'I am not certain that our mode of attack was the best: however, it succeeded.' Here then we have two of Nelson's most able captains entirely disagreeing as to whether or not the attack was carried out in accordance with any plan which Nelson laid down.

Captain Moorsom's view may be further followed in a tactical study written by his son, Vice-Admiral Constantine Moorsom.[20] His remarks on Trafalgar were presumably largely inspired by his father, who lived till 1835. In his view there was 'an entire alteration both of the scientific principle and of the tactical movements,' both of which he thinks were due to what he calls the morale of the enemy's attitude—that is, that Nelson was afraid they were going to slip through his fingers into Cadiz. The change of plan—meaning presumably the change from the triple to the dual organisation—he thinks was not due to the reduced numbers which Nelson actually had under his flag, for the ratio between the two fleets remained much about the same as that of his hypothesis.

The interesting testimony of Lieutenant G.L. Browne, who, as Admiral Jackson informs us, was assistant flag-lieutenant in the Victory and had every means of knowing, endorses the view of the Moorsoms.[21] After explaining to his parents the delay caused by the established method of forming the fleets in two parallel lines so that each had an opposite number, as set forth in the opening words of the memorandum, he says, 'but by his lordship's mode of attack you will clearly perceive not an instant of time could be lost. The frequent communications he had with his admirals and captains put them in possession of all his plans, so that his mode of attack was well known to every officer of the fleet. Some will not fail to attribute rashness to the conduct of Lord Nelson. But he well considered the importance of a decisive naval victory at this time, and has frequently said since we left England that, should he be so fortunate as to fall in with the enemy, a total defeat should be the result on the one side or the other.'

Next we have what is probably the most acute and illuminating criticism of the battle that exists, from the pen of 'an officer who was present.' Sir Charles Ekin quotes it anonymously; but from internal evidence there is little difficulty in assigning it to an officer of the Conqueror, though clearly not her captain, Israel Pellew, in whose justification the concluding part was written. Whoever he was the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the tactical basis of Nelson's plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering his attack in line abreast as he intended. It might well have been done, so far as he could see, without any more loss of time than actually occurred in getting the bulk of the fleet into action. Loss of time was the only excuse for attacking in line ahead, and the only reason he could suppose for the change of plan. If they had all gone down together in line abreast, he is sure the victory would have been more quickly decided and the brunt of the fight more equally borne. Nothing, he thinks, could have been better than the plan of the memorandum if it had only been properly executed. An attack in two great divisions with a squadron of observation—so he summarises the 'Nelson touch'—seemed to him to combine every precaution under all circumstances. It allows of concentration and containing. Each ship can use her full speed without fear of being isolated. The fastest ships will break through the line first, and they are just those which from their speed in passing are liable to the least damage, while having passed through, they cause a diversion for the attack of their slower comrades. Finally, if the enemy tries to make off and avoid action, the fleet is well collected for a general chase. But as Nelson actually made the attack in his hurry to close, he threw away most of these advantages, and against an enemy of equal spirit each ship must have been crushed as she came into action. Instead of doubling ourselves, he says, we were doubled and even trebled on. Nelson in fact presented the enemy's fleet with precisely the position which the memorandum aimed at securing for ourselves—that is to say, he suffered a portion of his fleet, comprising the Victory, Temeraire, Royal Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus, and Bellerophon, to be cut off and doubled on.[22]

The last important witness is Captain Codrington, of the Orion. No one seems to have kept his head so well in the action, and this fact, coupled with the high reputation he subsequently acquired, gives peculiar weight to his testimony. It is on the question of the advanced or reserve squadron that he is specially interesting. On October 19 at 8 P.M., just after they had been surprised and rejoiced by Nelson's signal for a general chase, and were steering for the enemy, as he says, 'under every stitch of sail we can set,' he sat down to write to his wife. In the course of the letter he tells her, 'Defence and Agamemnon are upon the look out nearest to Cadiz; ... Colossus and Mars are stationed next. The above four and as many more of us are now to form an advanced squadron; and I trust by the morning we shall all be united and in sight of the enemy.' Clearly then Nelson must have issued some modification of the dual 'order of battle and sailing.' Many years later in a note upon the battle which Codrington dictated to his daughter, Lady Bourchier, he says that on the 20th, in spite of Collingwood's advice to attack at once, Nelson 'continued waiting upon them in two columns according to the order of sailing and the memorable written instruction which was given out to all the captains.'[23] Later still, when a veteran of seventy-six years, he gave to Sir Harris Nicolas another note which shows how in his own mind he reconciled the apparent discrepancy between the dual and the triple organisation. It runs as follows: 'In Lord Nelson's memorandum of October 9, 1805, he refers to "an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships" to be added to either of the two lines of the order of sailing as may be required; and says that this advanced squadron would probably have to cut through "two, three or four ships of the enemy's centre so as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture";[24] and he afterwards twice speaks of the enemy's van coming to succour their rear. Now I am under the impression that I was expressly instructed by Lord Nelson (referring to the probability of the enemy's van coming down upon us), being in the Orion, one of the eight ships named, that he himself would probably make a feint of attacking their van in order to prevent or retard it.' Here then would seem to be still further confusion, due to a failure to distinguish between the leeward and windward form of attack. According to this statement Codrington believed the advanced squadron was in either case to attack the centre, while Nelson with his division contained the van. But curiously enough in a similar note, printed by Lady Bourchier on Nicolas's authority, there is a difference in the wording which, though difficult to account for, seems to give the truer version of what Codrington really said. It is there stated that Codrington told Nicolas he was strongly impressed with the belief 'that Lord Nelson directed eight of the smaller and handier ships, of which the Orion was one, to be ready to haul out of the line in case the enemy's van should appear to go down to the assistance of the ships engaged to meet and resist them: that to prevent this manoeuvre on the part of the enemy Lord Nelson intimated his intention of making a feint of hauling out towards their van,' &c. There is little doubt that we have here the true distribution of duties which Nelson intended for the windward attack—that is, the advanced squadron was to be the real containing force, but he intended to assist it by himself making a feint on the enemy's van before delivering his true attack on the centre.[25]

From Codrington's evidence it is at any rate clear that some time before the 19th Nelson had told off an 'advanced squadron' as provided for in his memorandum, and that the ships that were forming the connection between the fleet and the frigates before Cadiz formed part of it. Now Nelson had begun to tell off these ships as early as the 4th. On that day he wrote to Captain Duff, of the Mars, 'I have to desire you will keep with the Mars, Defence and Colossus from three to four leagues between the fleet and Cadiz in order that I may get information from the frigates stationed off that port as expeditiously as possible.' On the 11th, writing to Sir Alexander Ball at Malta, he speaks of having 'an advanced squadron of fast sailing ships between me and the frigates.' The Agamemnon (64) was added on the 14th, the day after she joined. On that day Nelson entered in his private diary, 'Placed Defence and Agamemnon from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz, and Mars and Colossus four leagues east of the fleet,' &c,[26] On the 15th he wrote to Captain Hope, of the Defence: 'You will with the Agamemnon take station west from Cadiz from seven to ten leagues, by which means if the enemy should move I hope to have constant information, as two or three ships will be kept as at present between the fleet and your two ships.'[27]

On the 12th he writes to Collingwood, of the Belleisle, the fastest two-decker in the fleet, as though she too were an advanced ship, and on the morning of the 19th he tells him the Leviathan was to relieve the Defence, whose water had got low. Later in the day, when Mars and Colossus had passed on the signal that the enemy was out, he ordered 'Mars, Orion, Belleisle, Leviathan, Bellerophon and Polyphemus to go ahead during the night.'[28] On the eve of the battle therefore these six ships, with Colossus and Agamemnon, made up the squadron of eight specified on the memorandum.

The conclusion then is that, though some of the ships destined to form the advanced squadron had not arrived by the 9th when the memorandum was issued, Nelson had already taken steps to organise it, and that on the evening of the 19th, the first moment he had active contact with the enemy, it was detached from the fleet as a separate unit. Up to this moment it would look as though he had intended to use it as his memorandum directed. Since with the exception of the Agamemnon and the Leviathan, which had only temporarily replaced the Defence while she watered, the whole of the ships named belonged to Collingwood's division, the resulting organisation would have been, lee-line nine ships, weather-line eight ships, and eight for the advanced squadron—an organisation which in relative proportion was almost exactly that which he had explained to Keats. It would therefore still have rendered Nelson's original plan of attack possible, although it did not preserve the balance of the divisions prescribed in the memorandum.

There can be little doubt, however, that Nelson on the morning of the battle did abandon the idea of the advanced squadron altogether. Early on the 20th it was broken up again. At 8 o'clock in the morning of that day the captains of the Mars, Colossus and Defence (which apparently was by this time ready again for service) were called on board the Victory and ordered out to form a chain as before between the admiral and his frigates.[29] The rest presumably resumed their stations in the fleet. Even if he had not actually abandoned this part of his plan, it is clear that in his hurry to attack Nelson would not spend time in reforming the squadron as a separate unit, but chose rather to carry out his design, so far as was possible, with two divisions only. So soon as he sighted the enemy's fleet at daylight on the 21st, he made the signal to form the line of battle in two columns, and with one exception the whole of the advanced ships took station in their respective divisions according to the original order of battle and sailing.'[30] The exception was Codrington's ship, the Orion. No importance however need be attached to this, for although he was originally in Collingwood's division he may well have been transferred to Nelson's some time before. It is only worthy of remark because Codrington, of all the advanced squadron captains, was the only one, so far as we know, who still considered the squadron a potential factor in the fleet and acted accordingly. While Belleisle, Mars, Bellerophon and Colossus rushed into the fight in the van of Collingwood's line, Orion in the rear of Nelson's held her fire even when she got into action, and cruised about the melee, carefully seeking points where she could do most damage to an enemy, or best help an overmatched friend—well-judged piece of service, on which he dwells in his correspondence over and over again with pardonable complacency. He was thus able undoubtedly to do admirable service in the crisis of the action.

That the bulk of his colleagues thought all idea of a reserve squadron had been abandoned by Nelson is clear, and the resulting change was certainly great enough to explain why some of the captains thought the plan of the memorandum had been abandoned altogether. For not only was the attack made in two divisions instead of one, and in line ahead instead of line abreast, but its prescribed balance was entirely upset. Instead of Nelson having the larger portion of the fleet for containing the van and centre, Collingwood had the larger portion for the attack on the rear. In other words, instead of the advanced squadron being under Nelson's direction, the bulk of it was attached to Collingwood. If some heads—even as clear as Codrington's—were puzzled, it is little wonder.

As to the way in which this impulsive change of plan was brought about, Codrington says, 'They [the enemy] suddenly wore round so as to have Cadiz under their lee, with every appearance of a determination to go into that port. Lord Nelson therefore took advantage of their confusion in wearing, and bore down to attack them with the fleet in two columns.' This was in the note dictated to Lady Bourchier, and in a letter of October 28, 1805, to Lord Garlies he says, 'We all scrambled into battle as soon as we could.'[31]

Codrington's allusion to Nelson's alleged feint on the enemy's van brings us to the last point; the question, that is, as to whether, apart from the substitution of the perpendicular for the parallel attack, and in spite of the change of balance, the two lines were actually handled in the action according to the principles of the memorandum for the intended attack from to-windward.

Lady Bourchier's note continues, after referring to Nelson's intention to make a feint on the van, 'The Victory did accordingly haul to port: and though she took in her larboard and weather studding sails, she kept her starboard studding sails set (notwithstanding they had become the lee ones and were shaking), thus proving that he proposed to resume his course, as those sails would be immediately wanted to get the Victory into her former station.' The note in Nicolas is to the same effect, but adds that Codrington had no doubt that having taken in his weather studding sails he kept the lee ones 'set and shaking in order to make it clear to the fleet that his movement was merely a feint, and that the Victory would speedily resume her course and fulfil his intention of cutting through the centre.' And in admiration of the movement Codrington called his first lieutenant and said, 'How beautifully the admiral is carrying his design into effect!' Though all this was written long after, when his memory perhaps was fading, it is confirmed by a contemporary entry in his log: 'The Victory, after making a feint as of attacking the enemy's van, hauled to starboard so as to reach their centre.'[32] This is all clear enough so far, but now we have to face a signal mentioned in the log of the Euryalus which, as she was Nelson's repeating frigate, cannot be ignored. According to this high authority Nelson, about a quarter of an hour before making his immortal signal, telegraphed 'I intend to push or go through the end of the enemy's line to prevent them from getting into Cadiz.' It is doubtful how far this signal was taken in, but those who saw it must have thought that Nelson meant to execute Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's leading ships. At this time, according to the master of the Victory, he was standing for the enemy's van. Nelson also signalled to certain ships to keep away a point to port. The Victory's log has this entry: 'At 4 minutes past 12 opened our fire on the enemy's van, in passing down their line.' At 30 minutes past 12 the Victory got up with Villeneuve's flagship and then broke through the line. Now at first sight it might appear that Nelson really intended to attack the van and not the centre, on the principle of Hoste's old manoeuvre which Howe had reintroduced into the Signal Book for attacking a numerically superior fleet—that is, van to van and rear to rear, leaving the enemy's centre unoccupied.[33] For the old signal provided that when this was done 'the flag officers are, if circumstances permit, to engage the flag officers of the enemy,' which was exactly what Nelson was doing. On this supposition his idea would be that his ships should attack the enemy ahead of Villeneuve as they came up. And this his second, the Temeraire, actually did. But, as we have seen by Instruction XXIV. of 1799, the old rule of 1790 had been altered, and if Nelson intended to execute Hoste's plan of attack he, as 'leading ship,' would or should have engaged the enemy's 'leading ship,' leaving the rest as they could to engage the enemy of 'greatest force.' The only explanation is that, if he really intended to attack the van, he again changed his mind when he fetched up with Villeneuve, and could not resist engaging him. More probably, however, the signal was wrongly repeated by the Euryalus, and as made by Nelson it was really an intimation to Collingwood that he meant to cover the attack on the rear and centre by a feint on the van.[34]

However this may be, the French appear to have regarded Nelson's movement to port as a real attack. Their best account (which is also perhaps the best account that exists) says that just before coming into gun-shot the two British columns began to separate. The leading vessels of Nelson's column, it says, passed through the same interval astern of the Bucentaure, and then it tells how 'les vaisseaux de queue de cette colonne, au contraire, serrerent un peu le vent, comme pour s'approcher des vaisseaux de l'avant-garde de la flotte combinee: mais apres avoir recu quelques bordees de ces vaisseaux ils abandonnerent ce dessein et se porterent vers les vaisseaux places entre le Redoutable et la Santa Anna ou vinrent unir leurs efforts a ceux des vaisseaux anglais qui combattaient deja le Bucentaure et la Santisima Trinidad.'[35] This is to some extent confirmed by Dumanoir himself, who commanded the allied van, in his official memorandum addressed to Decres, December 30, 1809. In defending his failure to tack sooner to Villeneuve's relief, he says, 'Au commencement du combat, la colonne du Nord [i.e. Nelson's] se dirigea sur l'avant-garde qui engagea avec elle pendant quarante minutes.'[36] In partial corroboration of this there is the statement in the log of the Temeraire, the ship that was immediately behind Nelson, that she opened her fire on the Santisima Trinidad and the two ships ahead of her; that is, she engaged the ships ahead of where Nelson broke the line, so that Captain Harvey as well as Dumanoir may have believed that Nelson intended his real attack to be on 'the end of the line.'

In the face of these facts it is impossible to say categorically that Nelson intended nothing but a feint on the van. It is equally impossible to say he intended a real attack. The point perhaps can never be decided with absolute certainty, but it is this very uncertainty that brings out the true merit and the real lesson of Nelson's attack. As we now may gather from his captains' opinions, its true merit was not that he threw his whole fleet on part of a superior enemy—that was a commonplace in tactics. It was not concentration on the rear, for that also was old; and what is more, as the attack was delivered, so far from Nelson concentrating, he boldly, almost recklessly, exposed himself for a strategical object to what should have been an overwhelming concentration on the leading ships of his two columns. The true merit of it above all previous methods of concentration and containing was that, whether, as planned or as delivered, it prevented the enemy from knowing on which part of their line Nelson intended to throw his squadron, just as we are prevented from knowing to this day. 'They won't know what I am about' were his words to Keats.

The point is clearer still when we compare the different ways in which Nelson and Collingwood brought their respective columns into action. Collingwood in his Journal says that shortly before 11 o'clock, that is, an hour before getting into action, he signalled 'for the lee division to form the larboard line of bearing.' The effect and intention of this would be that each ship in his division would head on the shortest course to break the enemy's line in all parts. It was the necessary signal for enabling him to carry out regularly Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's rear, and his object was declared for all to see.[37] Nelson, on the other hand, made no such signal, but held on in line ahead, giving no indication of whether he intended to perform the manoeuvre on the van or the centre, or whether he meant to cut the line in line ahead. Until they knew which it was to be, it was impossible for the enemy to take any step to concentrate with either division, and thus Nelson held them both immobile while Collingwood flung himself on his declared objective.

Nothing could be finer as a piece of subtle tactics. Nothing could be more daring as a well-judged risk. The risk was indeed enormous, perhaps the greatest ever taken at sea. Hawke risked much at Quiberon, and much was risked at the Nile. But both were sea-risks of the class to which our seamen were enured. At Trafalgar it was a pure battle-risk—a mad, perpendicular attack in which every recognised tactical card was in the enemy's hand. But Nelson's judgment was right. He knew his opponent's lack of decision, he knew the individual shortcomings of the allied ships, and he knew he had only to throw dust, as he did, in their eyes for the wild scheme to succeed. As Jurien de la Graviere has most wisely said 'Le genie de Nelson c'est d'avoir compris notre faiblesse.'

Yet when all is said, when even full weight is given to the strategical pressure of the hour and the uncertainty of the weather, there still remains the unanswerable criticism of the officer of the Conqueror: that by an error of judgment Nelson spoilt his attack by unnecessary haste. The moral advantage of pushing home a bold attack before an enemy is formed is of course very great; but in this case the enemy had no intention of avoiding him, as they showed, and he acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action. The confusion of their line was tactically no weakness: it only resulted in a duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting Howe's manoeuvre that there was a widespread belief in the British fleet, which Collingwood himself shared, that Villeneuve had adopted it deliberately.[38] Seeing what the enemy's accidental formation was, every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or trebled on. It was, we know, the old Dutch manner of meeting the English method of attack in the earliest days of the line.[39] Had he given Villeneuve time for forming his line properly the enemy's battle order would have been only the weaker. Had he taken time to form his own order the mass of the attack would have been delivered little later than it was, its impact would have been intensified, and the victory might well have been even more decisive than it was, while the sacrifice it cost would certainly have been less, incalculably less, if we think that the sacrifice included Nelson himself.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Nelson's Letters and Despatches, p. 382.

[2] Nicolas, Nelson's Despatches, v. 287, note. It is also given in vol. vii. p. ccxvi, apparently from a captain's copy which is undated.

[3] Ibid. v. 283.

[4] Professor Laughton pointed out (op. cit.) that the conditions will fit June to August 1804, but that it might have been 'earlier, certainly not later.'

[5] It is very doubtful whether this formation was ever intended for anything but tactical exercises. Morogues has a similar signal and instruction (Tactique Navale, p. 294, ed. 1779), 'Partager l'armee en deux corps, ou mettre l'armee sur deux colonnes; et representation d'un combat.' Anson certainly used it for manoeuvring one half of his fleet against the other during his tactical exercises in 1747. Warren to Anson, Add. MSS. 15957, p. 172.

[6] Mathieu-Dumas, Precis des Evenements Militaires, xiii. 193.

[7] Captain Boswall, in the preface to his translation of Hoste, says Grenier's work was translated in 1790. If this was so Nelson may well have read it, but I have not been able to find a copy of the translation either in the British Museum or elsewhere.

[8] Ross, Memoir of Saumarez, i. 212.

[9] Laughton, Nelson's Letters and Despatches, 150.

[10] No. 182 as it stood in the signal book meant, Ships before in tow to proceed to port. No. 183. When at anchor to veer to twice the length of cable. No. 16. Secret instructions to be opened.

[11] It was in the handwriting, Nicolas says, of Edward Hawke Locker, Esq., the naval biographer and originator of the naval picture gallery at Greenwich. He endorsed it, 'Copy of a paper communicated to me by Sir Richard Keats, and allowed by him to be transcribed by me, 1st October, 1829.'

[12] It was certainly not Keats himself, though afterwards Nelson meant to offer him command of the squadron he intended to detach into the Mediterranean. In the expected battle Keats, had he arrived in time, was to have been Nelson's 'second' in the line. Nelson to Sir Alexander Ball, October 15, 1805.

[13] Nelson's Despatches, vii. 241, note.

[14] Nelson's 'advance squadron' must not be confused with the idea of a reserve squadron which Gravina pressed on Villeneuve at the famous Cadiz council of war before Trafalgar. Gravina's idea was nothing but the old one of a reserve of superfluous ships after equalising the line, as provided by the old English Fighting Instructions and recommended by Morogues.

[15] Sidney, Life of Lord Hill, p. 368.

[16] Clarke and McArthur say the letter was to Lady Hamilton. Nicolas, reprinting from the Naval Chronicle, has the addressee's name blank.

[17] Nelson to Captain Duff, October 4. The order to take her under his command was despatched on September 20. Same to Marsden, October 10.

[18] Same to Lord Barham, September 30.

[19] See the note on Trafalgar dictated by him in Memoirs of Sir Edward Codrington, edited by Lady Bourchier, 1873.

[20] On the Principles of Naval Tactics, 1846.

[21] Great Sea Fights, ii. 196, note.

[22] See post, p. 357 Appendix, where this interesting paper is set out in full.

[23] Life of Codrington, ii. 57-8.

[24] It should be noted that the memorandum only enjoins this for an attack from to-leeward, and not for the 'intended attack' from to-windward.

[25] See Nelson's Despatches, vii. 154; Life of Codrington, ii. 77.

[26] Nicolas, vii. 122. Before this Mars and Colossus had had the inside station. See Nelson to Collingwood, October 12.

[27] Ibid., vii. 122.

[28] Nicolas, vii. 115, 129, 133.

[29] Memorandum and Private Diary, Nicolas, pp. 136-7.

[30] Some doubt has been expressed as to the signals with which Nelson opened at daybreak on the 21st. But their actual numbers are recorded in the logs of the Mars, Defiance, Conqueror and Bellerophon, and all but the first in the log of the Euryalus repeating frigate. They were No. 72: 'To form order of sailing in two columns or divisions of the fleet,' which, by the memorandum was also to be the order of battle; No. 76, with compass signal ENE, 'when lying by or sailing by the wind to bear up and sail large on the course pointed out'; No. 13, Prepare for battle. Collingwood has in his journal: 'At 6.30 the commander-in-chief made the signal to form order of sailing in two columns, and at 7.0 to prepare for battle. At 7.40 to bear up east.'

[31] Life of Codrington, ii. 59, 60.

[32] Great Sea Fights, ii. 278.

[33] A veteran French officer of the old wars took this view of Nelson's threat in a study of the battle which he wrote. 'Nelson,' he says, 'a d'abord feint de vouloir attaquer la tete et la queue de l'armee. Ensuite il a rassemble ses forces sur son centre, et a abandonne le sort de la bataille a l'intelligence de ses capitaines.' Mathieu-Dumas, Precis des Evenements Militaires, xiv. 408.

[34] The only trace of notice having been taken by anyone of a signal from Nelson at the time stated was Collingwood's impatient remark when Nelson began to telegraph 'England expects,' &c. 'I wish Nelson would stop signalling,' he is reported to have said. 'We all know well enough what we have to do,' as though Nelson had been signalling something just before.

[35] Monuments des Victoires et Conguetes des Francais from Nicolas, vii. 271. It was also adopted by Mathieu-Dumas (op. cit. xiii. p. 178) as the best and most impartial account. He says it was written by a French naval officer called Parisot.

[36] Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres Maritimes, ii. 220, note.

[37] This highly important signal appears to have been generally overlooked in accounts of the action. Yet Collingwood's journal is so precise about signals that there can be no doubt he made it. Agamemnon in Nelson's column answered it under the impression it was general. Her log says, 'Answered signal No. 50'—that is, 'To keep on the larboard line of bearing though then on the starboard tack. Ditto starboard bearing if on larboard tack.' Captain Moorsom also says, 'My station was sixth ship in the rear of the lee column; but as the Revenge sailed well Admiral Collingwood made my signal to keep a line of bearing from him which made me one of the leading ships through the enemy's line.' No other ship records the signal. Probably few saw it, for in the memorandum which Collingwood issued two years later he lays stress on the importance of captains being particularly watchful for the signals of their divisional commander. See post, pp. 324 and 329.

[38] Collingwood to Marsden, October 22. same to Parker, November 1. Same to Pasley, December 16, 1805.

[39] See supra, p. 119. Villeneuve saw this. In his official despatch from the Euryalus, November 5, he says 'Notre formation s'effectuait avec beaucoup de peine; mais dans le genre d'attaque que je prevoyais que l'ennemi allait nous faire, cette irregularite meme dans notre ligne ne me paraissait pas un inconvenient.'—Jurien de la Graviere, Guerres Maritimes, ii. 384.



LORD NELSON, 1803.

[Clarke and McArthur, Life of Nelson, ii. 427.[1]]

Plan of Attack.

The business of a commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy's fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean that of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating until the business is decided), I am sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that I should say a word, being fully assured that the admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will, knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply any deficiency in my not making signals, which may, if extended beyond those objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for very probably from various causes be impossible for the commander-in-chief to make. Therefore it will only be requisite for me to state in as few words as possible the various modes in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object; on which depends not only the honour and glory of our country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all Europe, from French tyranny and oppression.

If the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is necessary, the less the better. A day is soon lost in that business. Therefore I will only suppose that the enemy's fleet being to leeward standing close upon a wind, and that I am nearly ahead of them standing on the larboard tack. Of course I should, weather them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of wind the manoeuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive action would take place with the whole fleet.[2]

Two modes present themselves: one to stand on just out of gun-shot, until the van ship of my line would be about the centre ship of the enemy; then make the signal to wear together; then bear up [and] engage with all our force the six or five van ships of the enemy, passing, certainly if opportunity offered, through their line. This would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be decisive. The second or third rear ships of the enemy would act as they please, and our ships would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our ships.

The other mode would be to stand under an easy but commanding sail directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from knowing whether I should pass to leeward or to windward of him. In that situation I would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward, and cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, passing very close. They being on a wind and you going large could cut their line when you please. The van ships of the enemy would, by the time our rear came abreast of the van ship, be severely cut up, and our van could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our rear ship and every ship in succession wear [and] continue the action with either the van ship or the second as it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and this mode pursued I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy's van. The two or three ships of the enemy's rear must either bear up or wear; and in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably than our two van ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit. And by that time I believe the battle would, from the judgment of the admiral and captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from these moments are useless when every man is disposed to do his duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep close to the enemy and to leeward of him.

If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be to engage the enemy on arriving up with them; and the other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c., giving if possible a close fire into the enemy on passing, taking care to give our ships engaged notice of your intention.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] From the original in the St. Vincent Papers. Also in Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vi. 443. Obvious mistakes in punctuation have been corrected in the text.

[2] Cf. the similar remark of De Chaves, supra, p. 5.



LORD NELSON, 1805.

[Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vii.[1]]

Memorandum.

Secret. Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805.

Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command), that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships, which will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the commander-in-chief may direct.

The second in command will,[2] after my intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.

If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[3] they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear.

I should therefore probably make the second in command's[4] signal, to lead through about the twelfth ship from the rear (or wherever he[5] could fetch, if not able to get as far advanced). My line would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to cut two, three, or four ships ahead of their centre, so far as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief on whom every effort must be made to capture.

The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from two to three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the centre, to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose twenty sail of the enemy's line to be untouched; it must be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships engaged.[6]

Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others. Shots will carry away the masts[7] and yards of friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear;[8] and then the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off.

If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward of the British fleet; if the enemy wears, the British must place themselves between the enemy and the captured and disabled British ships; and should the enemy close, I have no fears as to the result.

The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy.

Of the intended attack from to-windward, the enemy in the line of battle ready to attack.

[9]

The divisions of the British fleet[10] will be brought nearly within gunshot of the enemy's centre. The signal will most probably be made for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails[11] in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from the enemy's rear.[12] Some ships may not get through their exact place; but they will always be at hand to assist their friends; and if any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy.[13]

Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the twelve ships, composing in the first position the enemy's rear, are to be the object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the commander-in-chief; which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the lee line, after the intention of the commander-in-chief is signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the admiral commanding that line.

The remainder of the enemy's fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief, who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as possible.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] Sir Harris Nicolas states that he took his text from an 'Autograph [he means holograph] draught in the possession of Vice-Admiral Sir George Mundy, K.C.B., except the words in italics which were added by Mr. Scott, Lord Nelson's secretary: and from the original issued to Captain Hope of the Defence, now in possession of his son, Captain Hope, R.N.'

[2] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'in fact command his line and.'—Nicolas.

[3] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'I shall suppose them forty-six sail in the line of battle.'—Nicolas.

[4] Originally 'your' but deleted.—Ibid.

[5] Originally 'you' but deleted.—Ibid.

[6] In the upper margin of the paper Lord Nelson wrote and Mr. Scott added to it a reference, as marked in the text—'the enemy's fleet is supposed to consist of 46 sail of the line, British fleet 40. If either be less, only a proportionate number of enemy's ships are to be cut off: B. to be 1/4 superior to the E. cut off.—Ibid.

[7] The Barham copy reads 'a mast.'

[8] Originally 'friends.'—Nicolas.

[9] This is the only diagram found in either of Nelson's memoranda. It is not in the Barham copy.

[10] Nelson presumably means the two main divisions as distinguished from the 'advanced squadron.' This distinction is general in the correspondence of his officers and accords with the arrangement as shown in the diagram. The Barham copy has 'division' in the singular, as though Nelson intended to specify one division only. It is probably a copyist's error.

[11] In the upper margin of the paper, and referred to by Lord Nelson as in the text 'Vide instructions for signal yellow with blue fly. Page 17, Eighth Flag, Signal Book, with reference to Appendix.'—Nicolas. Steering-sail, according to Admiral Smyth (Sailors' Word-Book, p. 654), was 'an incorrect name for a studding sail,' but it seems to have been in common use in Nelson's time.

[12] The Barham copy reads 'their rear.'

[13] The Barham copy ends here. The second sheet has not been found.



NELSON AND BRONTE.[1]

INSTRUCTIONS AFTER TRAFALGAR

INTRODUCTORY

The various tactical memoranda issued after Trafalgar by flag officers in command of fleets are amongst the most interesting of the whole series. The unsettled state of opinion which they display as the result of Nelson's memorandum is very remarkable; for with one exception they seem to show that the great tactical principles it contained had been generally misunderstood to a surprising extent. The failure to fathom its meaning is to be accounted for largely by the lack of theoretical training, which made the science of tactics, as distinguished from its practice, a sealed book to the majority of British officers. But the trouble was certainly intensified by the fact—as contemporary naval literature shows—that by Nelson's success and death the memorandum became consecrated into a kind of sacred document, which it was almost sacrilege to discuss. The violent polemics of such men as James, the naval chronicler, made it appear profanity so much as to consider whether Nelson's attack differed in the least from his intended plan, and anyone who ventured to examine the question in the light of general principles was likely to be shouted down as a presumptuous heretic. Venial as was this attitude of adulation under all the circumstances, it had a most evil influence on the service. The last word seemed to have been said on tactics; and oblivious of the fact that it is a subject on which the last word can never be spoken, and that the enemy was certain to learn from Nelson's practice as well as ourselves, admirals were content to produce a colourable imitation of his memorandum, and everyone was satisfied not to look ahead any further. To no one did it occur to consider how the new method of attack was to be applied if the enemy adopted Nelson's formation. They simply assumed an endless succession of Trafalgars.

The first outcome of this attitude of mind is an 'Order of Battle and Sailing,' accompanied by certain instructions, issued by Admiral Gambier from the Prince of Wales in Yarmouth Roads, on July 23, 1807, when he was about to sail to seize the Danish fleet.[2] His force consisted of thirty of the line, and its organisation and stations of flag officers were as follows:

VAN SQUADRON

Division 1. Commodore Hood (No. 1 in line). Division 2. Vice-Admiral Stanhope (No. 6).

CENTRE DIVISION

Division 1.} Admiral Gambier (No. 15). Division 2.}

REAR SQUADRON

Division 1. Rear-Admiral Essington (No. 25). Division 2. Commodore Keats (No. 30).

Gambier's fleet was thus organised in three equal squadrons (the centre one called 'the centre division') and six equal subdivisions. The commander-in-chief was in the centre and had no other flag in his division, Similarly each junior flag officer was in the centre of his squadron and led his subdivision, but he had a commodore to lead his other subdivision. These two commodores also led the fleet on either tack. So far all is plain, but when we endeavour to understand by the appended instruction what battle formation Gambier intended by his elaborate organisation it is very baffling. Possibly we have not got the instruction exactly as Gambier wrote it; but as it stands it is confused past all understanding, and no conceivable battle formation can be constructed from it. All we can say for certain is that he evidently believed he was adopting the principles of Trafalgar, and perhaps going beyond them. The sailing order is to be also the battle order, but whether in two columns or three is not clear. Independent control of divisions and squadrons is also there, and even the commodores are to control their own subdivisions 'subject to the general direction' of their squadronal commanders, but whether the formation was intended to follow that of Nelson the instruction entirely fails to disclose.

The next is a tactical memorandum or general order, issued by Lord Collingwood for the Mediterranean fleet in 1808, printed in Mr. Newnham Collingwood's Correspondence of Lord Collingwood. No order of battle is given; but two years later, in issuing an additional instruction, he refers to his general order as still in force. In this case we have the battle order, and it consists of twenty of the line in two equal columns, with the commander-in-chief and his second in command, second in their respective divisions. There were no other flag officers in the fleet.[3] The memorandum which is printed below will be seen to be an obvious imitation of Nelson's, and nothing can impress us more deeply with the merit of Nelson's work than to compare it with Collingwood's. Like Nelson, Collingwood begins with introductory remarks emphasising the importance of 'a prompt and immediate attack' and independent divisional control; and in order to remedy certain errors of Trafalgar, he insists in addition on close order being kept throughout the night and the strictest attention being paid to divisional signals, thinking no doubt how slowly the rear ships at Trafalgar had struggled into action, and how his signal for line of bearing had been practically ignored. Then, after stating broadly that he means with the van or weather division to attack the van of the enemy, while the lee or larboard division simultaneously attacks the rear, he differentiates like Nelson between a weather and a lee attack. For the attack from to-windward he directs the two divisions to run down in line abreast in such a way that they will come into action together in a line parallel to the enemy; but, whatever he intended, nothing is said about concentrating on any part of the enemy, or about breaking the line in all parts or otherwise.

The attack from to-leeward is to be made perpendicularly in line ahead. In this formation his own (the weather column) is to break the line, so as to cut off the van quarter of the enemy's line from the other three quarters, and the lee column is to sever this part of the enemy's line a few ships in rear of their centre. So soon as the leading ships have passed through and so weathered the enemy, they are to keep away and lead down his line so as to engage the rear three fourths to windward. This is of course practically identical with the lee attack of Nelson's memorandum. The only addition is the course that is to be taken after breaking the line. One cannot help wondering how far the leading ships after passing the line would have been able to lead down it before they were disabled, but the addition is interesting as the first known direction as to what was to be done after breaking the line in line ahead after Rodney's method. Seeing the grave and obvious dangers of the movement it is natural that, like Nelson, Collingwood hoped not to be forced to make it; what he desired was a simple engagement on similar tacks. His 'intended attack' as in Nelson's case is clearly that from to-windward.

Turning then again to the windward attack, we see at once its superficial resemblance to Nelson's, but so entirely superficial is it that it is impossible to believe Collingwood ever penetrated the subtleties of his great chiefs design. The dual organisation is there and the independent divisional control, but nothing else. The advance squadron has gone, and with it all trace of a containing movement. There is not even the feint—the mystification of the van. Concentration too has gone, and instead of the sound main attack on the rear, he is most concerned with attacking the van. True, he may have meant what Nelson meant, but if he had really grasped his fine intention he surely must have let some hint of it escape him in his memorandum. But for the windward attack at least there is no trace of these things, and Nelson's masterly conception sinks in Collingwood's hands into a mere device for expediting the old parallel attack in single line—that is to say, the line is to be formed in bearing down instead of waiting to bear down till the line was complete. We can only conclude, then, that both Collingwood and Gambier could see nothing in the 'Nelson touch' but the swift attack, the dual organisation, and independent divisional control.

There is a third document, however, which confirms us in the impression already formed that there were officers who saw more deeply. It is a tactical memorandum issued by Admiral the Hon. Sir Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, Bart., G.C.B., uncle of the more famous Earl of Dundonald. It is printed by Sir Charles Ekin, in his Naval Battles, from a paper which he found at the end of a book in his possession containing 'Additional Signals, Instructions, &c.,' issued by Sir A.I. Cochrane to the squadron under his command upon the Leeward Islands station.' He commanded in chief on this station from 1805 to 1814, but appears never to have been directly under Nelson's influence except for a few weeks, when Nelson came out in pursuit of Villeneuve and attached him to his squadron. He was rather one of Rodney's men, under whom he had served in his last campaigns, and this may explain the special note of his tactical system. His partiality for Rodney's manoeuvre is obvious, and the interesting feature of his plan of attack is the manner in which he grafts it on Nelson's system of mutually supporting squadrons. He does not even shrink from a very free use of doubling which his old chiefs system entailed, and he provides a special signal of his own for directing the execution of the discarded manoeuvre. The 'explanation' of another of his new signals for running aboard an enemy 'so as to disable her from getting away' is also worthy of remark, as a recognition of Nelson's favourite practice disapproved by Collingwood.

Yet, although we see throughout the marks of the true 'Nelson touch,' Cochrane's memorandum bears signs of having been largely founded on an independent study of tactical theory. His obligations to Clerk of Eldin are obvious. There are passages in the document which seem as though they must have been written with the Essay on Naval Tactics at his elbow, while his expression 'an attack by forcing the fleet from to-leeward' is directly borrowed from Morogues' 'Forcer l'ennemi au combat elant sous le vent.' On the other hand certain movements are entirely his own, such as his excellent device of inverting the line after passing through the enemy's fleet, a great improvement on Collingwood's method of leading down it in normal order.

The point is of some interest, for although Cochrane's memorandum is over-elaborate and smells of the lamp, yet it seems clear that his theoretical knowledge made him understand Nelson's principles far better than most of the men who had actually fought at Trafalgar and had had the advantage of Nelson's own explanations. All indeed that Cochrane's memorandum seems to lack is that rare simplicity and abstraction which only the highest genius can achieve.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The signature does not occur to the draught but was affixed to the originals issued to the admirals and captains of the fleet. To the copy signed by Lord Nelson, and delivered to Captain George Hope, of the Defence, was added: 'N.B.—When the Defence quits the fleet for England you are to return this secret memorandum to the Victory' Captain Hope wrote on that paper: 'It was agreeable to these instructions that Lord Nelson attacked the combined fleets of France and Spain off Cape Trafalgar on the 21st of October, 1805, they having thirty-three of the line and we twenty-seven,'—Nicolas.

The injunction to return the memorandum may well have been added to all copies issued, and this may account for their general disappearance.

[2] For this document the Society is indebted to Commander G.P.W. Hope, R.N., who has kindly placed it at my disposal.

[3] For this document the Society is again indebted to Commander Hope, R.N.



ADMIRAL GAMBIER, 1807.

[MS. of Commander Hope, R.N. Copy.]

Order of Battle and Sailing.[1]

The respective flag officers will have the immediate direction of the division in which their ships are placed, subject to the general direction of the admiral commanding the squadron to which they belong.

The ships in order of battle and sailing are to keep at the distance of two cables' length from and in the wake of each other, increasing that distance according to the state of the weather.[2]

The leading ship of the starboard division is to keep the admiral two points on her weather bow. The leading ship of the lee division is when sailing on a wind to keep the leader of the weather column two points before her beam; when sailing large, abreast of her.

(Signed) J. GAMBIER. Prince of Wales, Yarmouth Roads: 23 July, 1807.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] For the actual order to which the instructions are appended see Introductory Note, supra, p. 322.

[2] The normal distance was then a cable and a half. See post, p. 330 note.



LORD COLLINGWOOD, 1808-10.

[Correspondence of Collingwood, p. 359.]

From every account received of the enemy it is expected they may very soon be met with on their way from Corfu and Tarentum, and success depends on a prompt and immediate attack upon them. In order to which it will be necessary that the greatest care be taken to keep the closest order in the respective columns during the night which the state of the weather will allow, and that the columns be kept at such a sufficient distance apart as will leave room for tacking or other movements, so that in the event of calm or shift of wind no embarrassment may be caused.

Should the enemy be found formed in order of battle with his whole force, I shall notwithstanding probably not make the signal to form the line of battle; but, keeping in the closest order, with the van squadron attack the van of the enemy, while the commander of the lee division takes the proper measures, and makes to the ships of his division the necessary signals for commencing the action with the enemy's rear, as nearly as possible at the same time that the van begins. Of his signals therefore the captains of that division will be particularly watchful.

If the squadron has to run to leeward to close with the enemy, the signal will be made to alter the course together, the van division keeping a point or two more away than the lee, the latter carrying less sail; and when the fleet draws near the enemy both columns are to preserve a line as nearly parallel to the hostile fleet as they can.

In standing up to the enemy from the leeward upon a contrary tack the lee line is to press sail, so that the leading ship of that line may be two or three points before the beam of the leading ship of the weather line, which will bring them to action nearly at the same period.

The leading ship of the weather column will endeavour to pass through the enemy's line, should the weather be such as to make that practicable, at one fourth from the van, whatever number of ships their line may be composed of. The lee division will pass through at a ship or two astern of their centre, and whenever a ship has weathered the enemy it will be found necessary to shorten sail as much as possible for her second astern to close with her, and to keep away, steering in a line parallel to the enemy's and engaging them on their weather side.

A movement of this kind may be necessary, but, considering the difficulty of altering the position of the fleet during the time of combat, every endeavour will be made to commence battle with the enemy on the same tack they are; and I have only to recommend and direct that they be fought with at the nearest distance possible, in which getting on board of them may be avoided, which is alway disadvantageous to us, except when they are flying.[1]

Additional Instruction.[2]

When the signal No. 43 or 44[3] is made to form the order, the fleet is to form in one line, the rear shortening sail to allow the van to take their station ahead. If such signal should not be made the captains are referred to the general order of 23 March, 1808.

COLLINGWOOD. Ville de Paris, 4th January, 1810.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] The remaining clauses of the memorandum do not relate to tactics.

[2] From the original in the possession of Commander Hope, R.N. It is attached to an order of battle in two columns. See supra, p. 323.

[3] Sig. 43: 'Form line of battle in open order.' Sig. 44: 'Form line of battle in close order at about a cable and a half distant'; with a white pennant, 'form on weather column'; with a blue pennant, 'form on lee column.'



SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE, 1805-1814.

[Printed in Skin's Naval Battles, pp. 394 seq. (First edit.)]

Modes of Attack from the Windward, &c.

When an attack is intended to be made upon the enemy's rear, so as to endeavour to cut off a certain number of ships from that part of their fleet, the same will be made known by signal No. 27, and the numeral signal which accompanies it will point out the headmost of the enemy's ships that is to be attacked, counting always from the van, as stated in page 160, Article 31 (Instructions).[1] The signal will afterwards be made for the division intended to make the attack, or the same will be signified by the ship's pennants, and the pennants of the ship in that division which is to begin the attack, with the number of the ship to be first attacked in the enemy's line. Should it be intended that the leading ship in the division is to attack the rear ship of the enemy, she must bear up, so as to get upon the weather quarter of that ship; the ships following her in the line will pass in succession on her weather quarter, giving their fire to the ship she is engaged with; and so on in succession until they have closed with the headmost ship intended to be attacked.

The ships in reserve, who have no opponents, will break through the enemy's line ahead of this ship, so as to cut off the ships engaged from the rest of the enemy's fleet.

When it is intended that the rear ship of the division shall attack the rear ship of the enemy's line, that ship's pennants will be shown; the rest of the ships in the division will invert their order, shortening sail until they can in succession follow the rear ship, giving their fire to the enemy's ships in like manner as above stated; and the reserve ships will cut through the enemy's line as already mentioned.

When this mode of attack is intended to be put in force, the other divisions of the fleet, whether in order of sailing or battle, will keep to windward just out of gun-shot, so as to be ready to support the rear, and prevent the van and centre of the enemy from doubling upon them. This manoeuvre, if properly executed, may force the enemy to abandon the ships on his rear, or submit to be brought to action on equal terms, which is difficult to be obtained when the attack is made from to-windward.

When the fleet is to leeward, and the commanding officer intends to cut through the enemy's line, the number of the ship in their line where the attempt is to be made will be shown as already stated.

If the ships after passing the enemy's line are to tack, and double upon the enemy's ships ahead, the same will be made known by a blue pennant over the Signal 27; if not they are to bear up and run to the enemy's line to windward, engaging the ship they first meet with; each succeeding ship giving her fire, and passing on to the next in the rear. The ships destined to attack the enemy's rear will be pointed out by the number of the last ship in the line that is to make this movement, or the pennants of that ship will be shown; but, should no signal be made, it is to be understood that the number of ships to bear up is equal in number to the enemy's ships that have been cut off; the succeeding ships will attack and pursue the van of the enemy, or form, should it be necessary to prevent the enemy's van from passing round the rear of the fleet to relieve or join their cut-off ships.

If it is intended that the ships following those destined to engage the enemy's rear to windward shall bear up, and prevent the part of their rear which has been cut off from escaping to leeward, the same will be made known by a red pennant being hoisted over the Signal 21,[2] and the number of ships so ordered will be shown by numeral signals or pennants. If from the centre division, a white pennant will be hoisted over the signal.

If the rear ships are to perform this service by bearing up, the same will be made known by a red pennant under. The numeral signal or pennants, counting always from the van, will show the headmost ship to proceed on this service.[3] The ships not directed by those signals are to form in close order, to cover the ships engaged from the rest of the enemy's fleet.

When the enemy's ships are to be engaged by both van and centre, the rear will keep their wind, to cover the ships engaged from the enemy to windward, as circumstances may require.

When the signal shall be made to cut through the enemy's van from to-leeward, the same will be made known by Signal 27, &c. In this case, if the headmost ships are to tack and double upon the enemy's van, engaging their ships in succession as they get up, the blue pennant will be shown as already stated, and the numeral signal pointing out the last ship from the van which is to tack, which in general will be equal in number to the enemy's ships cut through. The rest of the ships will be prepared to act as the occasion may require, either by bearing up and attacking the enemy's centre and rear, or tacking or wearing to cut off the van of the enemy from passing round the rear of the fleet to rejoin their centre. And on this service, it is probable, should the enemy's ships bear up, that some of the rear ships will be employed—the signal No. 21 will be made accompanied with the number or pennants of the headmost ship—upon which she, with the ships in her rear, will proceed to the attack of the enemy.

When an attack is likely to be made by an enemy's squadron, by forcing the fleet from to-leeward, Signal 109 will be made with a blue pennant where best seen;[4] upon which each ship will luff up upon the weather quarter of her second ahead, so as to leave no opening for the leading ship of the enemy to pass through: this movement will expose them to the collected fire of all that part of the fleet they intended to force.[5]