 |
17. Signal to call attention of larboard or starboard line of the division only.[4]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] See pp. 211-2. These additional signals are all added in paler ink, with those made by Admiral Pigot. In the original they occur on various pages without numbers. In the text above they have merely been numbered consecutively for convenience of reference. Hood was made a viscount September 12, 1782, and began to issue these orders on March 11, 1783, when he had a squadron placed under his command.
[2] Ascribed also to Pigot.
[3] Also ascribed to Pigot.
[4] The MS. has also an additional signal ascribed to Pigot for a particular ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle, and for the other ships to follow her in close order to support each other.
PART IX
THE LAST PHASE
I. LORD HOWE'S FIRST SIGNAL BOOK
II. SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR
III. NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA
IV. ADMIRAL GAMBIER, 1807
V. LORD COLLINGWOOD, 1808-1810
VI. SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE'S INSTRUCTIONS
VII. THE SIGNAL BOOK OF 1816
THE NEW SIGNAL BOOK INSTRUCTIONS
INTRODUCTORY
The time-worn Fighting Instructions of Russell and Rooke with their accretion of Additional Instructions did not survive the American War. Some time in that fruitful decade of naval reform which elapsed between the peace of 1783 and the outbreak of the Great War they were superseded. It was the indefatigable hand of Lord Howe that dealt them the long-needed blow, and when the change came it was sweeping. It was no mere substitution of a new set of Instructions, but a complete revolution of method. The basis of the new tactical code was no longer the Fighting Instructions, but the Signal Book. Signals were no longer included in the Instructions, and the Instructions sank to the secondary place of being 'explanatory' to the Signal Book.[1]
The earliest form in which these new 'Explanatory Instructions' are known is a printed volume in the Admiralty Library containing a complete set of Fleet Instructions, and entitled 'Instructions for the conduct of ships of war explanatory of and relative to the Signals contained in the Signal Book herewith delivered.' The Signal Book is with it.[2] Neither volume bears any date, but both are in the old folio form which had been traditional since the seventeenth century. They are therefore presumably earlier than 1790 when the well-known quarto form first came into use, and as we shall see from internal evidence they cannot have been earlier than 1782. Nor is there any direct evidence that they are the work of Lord Howe, but the 'significations' of the signals bear unmistakable marks of his involved and cumbrous style, and the code itself closely resembles that he used during the Great War. With these indications to guide us there is little difficulty in fixing with practical certainty both date and authorship from external sources.[3]
In a pamphlet published by Admiral Sir Charles Henry Knowles in 1830, when he was a very old man, he claims to have invented the new code of numerical signals which Howe adopted. The pamphlet is entitled 'Observations on Naval Tactics and on the Claims of Clerk of Eldin,' and in the course of it he says that about 1777 he devised this new system of signals, and gave it to Howe on his arrival in the summer of that year at Newport, in Rhode Island, 'and his lordship,' he says, 'afterwards introduced them into the Channel Fleet.' Further, he says, he soon after invented the tabular system of flags suggested by the chess-board, and published them in the summer of 1778. To this work he prefixed as a preface the observations of his father, Sir Charles Knowles, condemning the existing form of sailing order, and recommending Pere Hoste's old form in three columns, and this order, he says, Howe adopted for the relief of Gibraltar in September 1782. He also infers that the alleged adoption of his signals in the Channel Fleet was when Lord Howe commanded it before he became first lord of the admiralty for the second time—that is, before he succeeded Keppel in December 1783. For during the peace Knowles tells us he made a second communication to Howe on tactics, of which more must be said later on. The inference therefore is that when Knowles says that Howe adopted his code in the Channel Fleet it must have been the first time he took command of it—that is, on April 2, 1782.[4]
Now if, as Knowles relates—and there is no reason to doubt this part of his story—Howe did issue a new code of signals some time before sailing for Gibraltar in 1782, and if at the time, as Knowles also says, he had been studying Hoste, internal evidence shows almost conclusively that these folios must be the Signal Book in question. From end to end the influence of Hoste's Treatise and of Rodney's tactics in 1782 is unmistakable.[5]
From Hoste it takes not only the sailing formation in three columns, but re-introduces into the British service the long-discarded manoeuvre of 'doubling.' For this there are three signals, Nos. 222-4, for doubling the van, doubling the rear, and for the rear to double the rear. From Hoste also it borrows the method of giving battle to a superior force, which the French writer apparently borrowed from Torrington. The signification of the signal is as follows: 'No. 232. When inferior in number to the enemy, and to prevent being doubled upon in the van or rear, for the van squadron to engage the headmost ships of the enemy's line, the rear their sternmost, and the centre that of the enemy, whose surplus ships will then be left out of action in the vacant spaces between our squadrons.'
The author's obligations to the recent campaigns of Rodney and Hood are equally clear. Signal 236 is, 'For ships to steer for independent of each other and engage respectively the ships opposed to them in the enemy's line,' and this was a new form of the signal, which, according to the MS. Signal Book of 1782, was introduced by Hood.[6] Still more significant is Signal 235, 'when fetching up with the enemy to leeward, and on the contrary tack, to break through their line and endeavour to cut off part of their van or rear.' This is clearly the outcome of Rodney's famous manoeuvre, and is adopted word for word from the signification of the signal that Hood added. Pigot, it will be remembered, on succeeding Rodney, added two more on the same subject, viz. (1) 'For the leading ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle,' and (2) 'For a particular ship specified to cut through the enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to follow her in close order to support each other.' Neither of these later signals is in the code we are considering, and the presumption is that it was drawn up very soon after Rodney's victory and before Pigot's signals were known at home.
Finally there is a MS. note added by Sir Charles H. Knowles to his 'Fighting and Sailing Instructions,' to the effect that in the instructions issued by Howe in 1782 he modified Article XXI. of the old Fighting Instructions (i.e. Article XX. of Russell's). 'His lordship in 1782,' it says, 'directed by his instructions that the line [i.e. his own line] should not be broken until all the enemy's ships gave way and were beaten.' And this is practically the effect of Article XIV. of the set we are considering. In the absence of contrary evidence, therefore, there seems good ground for calling these folio volumes 'Howe's First Signal Book, 1782,' and with this tentative attribution the Explanatory Instructions are printed below.
As has been already said, these instructions, divorced as they now were from the signals, give but a very inadequate idea of the tactics in vogue. For this we must go to the tactical signals themselves. In the present case the more important ones (besides those given above) are as follows:
'No. 218. To attack the enemy's rear in succession by ranging up with and opening upon the sternmost of their ships; then to tack or veer, as being to windward or to leeward of the enemy, and form again in the rear.' This signal, which at first sight looks like a curious reversion to the primitive Elizabethan method of attack, immediately follows the signals for engaging at anchor, and may have been the outcome of Hood's experience with De Grasse in 1782.
'No. 232. In working to gain the wind of the enemy, for the headmost and sternmost ships to signify when they can weather them by Signal 17, p. 66; or if to windward of the enemy and on the contrary tack, for the sternmost ship to signify when she is far enough astern of their rear to be able to lead down out of their line of fire.'
'No. 234. When coming up astern and to windward of the enemy to engage by inverting the line'—that is, for the ship leading the van to engage the sternmost of the enemy, the next ship to pass on under cover of her fire and engage the second from the enemy's rear, and so on.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The first attempt to provide a convenient Signal Book separate from the Instructions was made privately by one Jonathan Greenwood about 1715. He produced a small 12mo. volume dedicated to Admiral Edward Russell, Earl of Orford, and the other lords of the admiralty who were then serving with him. It consists of a whole series of well-engraved plates of ships flying the various signals contained in the Sailing and Fighting Instructions, each properly coloured with its signification added beneath. The author says he designed the work as a pocket companion to the Printed Instructions and for the use of inferior officers who had not access to them. Copies are in the British Museum and the R.U.S.I. Library.
[2] Catalogue, Nos. 252/27 and 252/26.
[3] A still earlier Signal Book attributed to Lord Howe is in the United Service Institution, but it is no more than a condensed and amended form of the established one. Its nature and intention are explained by No. 10 of the 'explanatory observations' which he attached to it. It is as follows; 'All the signals contained in the general printed Signal Book which are likely to be needful on the present occasion being provided for in this Signal Book, the signals as appointed in the general Signal Book will only be made either in conformity to the practice of some senior officer present, or when in company for the time being with other ships not of the fleet under the admiral's command, and unprovided with these particular signals.' It was therefore probably issued experimentally, but what the 'present occasion' was is not indicated. It contains none of the additional signals of 1782-3.
[4] Knowles was of course too old in 1830 for his memory to be trusted as to details. A note in his handwriting upon a copy of his code in possession of the present baronet gives its story simply as follows: 'These signals were written in 1778, as an idea—altered and published—then altered again in 1780—afterwards arranged differently in 1787, and finally in 1794; but not printed at Sir C.H. Knowles's expense until 1798, when they were sent to the admiralty, but they were not published, although copies have been given to sea officers.'
[5] A partial translation of Hoste had been published by Lieutenant Christopher O'Bryen, R.N., in 1762. Captain Boswall's complete translation was not issued till 1834.
[6] Note that the signal differs from that which Rodney made under Article 17 of the Additional Fighting Instructions in his action of April 17, 1780, and which being misunderstood spoilt his whole attack.
LORD HOWE, 1782.
[Admiralty Library 252/27.]
Instructions respecting the Order of Battle and conduct of the fleet, preparative to and in action with the enemy.
Article I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form in order of battle, each captain or commander is to get most speedily into his station, and keep the prescribed distance from his seconds ahead and astern upon the course steered, and under a proportion of sail suited to that carried by the admiral.
But when the signal is made for tacking, or on any similar occasion, care is to be taken to open, in succession, to a sufficient distance for performing the intended evolution. And the ships are to close back to their former distance respectively as soon as it has been executed.
II. In line of battle, the flag of the admiral commanding in chief is always to be considered as the point of direction to the whole fleet, for forming and preserving the line.
III. The squadron of the second in command is to lead when forming the line ahead, and to take the starboard side of the centre when forming the line abreast, unless signal is made to the contrary; these positions however are only restrained to the first forming of the lines from the order of sailing.
For when the fleet is formed upon a line, then in all subsequent evolutions the squadrons are not to change their places, but preserve the same situation in the line whatever position it may bring them into with the centre, with respect to being in the van or the rear, on the starboard or larboard side, unless directed so to do by signal.
Suppose the fleet sailing in line ahead on the larboard tack, the second in command leading, and signal is made to form a line abreast to sail large or before the wind, the second squadron in that case is to form on the larboard side of the centre.
Again, suppose in this last situation signal is made to haul to the wind, and form a line ahead on the starboard tack, in this case the squadron of the third in command is to lead, that of the second in command forming the rear.
And when from a line ahead, the squadron of the second in command leading, the admiral would immediately form the line on the contrary tack by tacking or veering together, the squadron of the third in command will then become the van.
These evolutions could not otherwise be performed with regularity and expedition.
When forming the line from the order of sailing, the ships of each squadron are to be ranged with respect to each other in the line in the same manner as when in order of sailing each squadron in one line; and, as when the second in command is in the van, the headmost ship of his squadron (in sailing order) becomes the leading ship of the line, so likewise the headmost ship of the third squadron (in sailing order) becomes the leading ship of the line, when the third in command takes the van, except when the signal is made to form the line reversed.
Ships happening to have been previously detached on any service, separate from the body of the fleet, when the signal for forming in order of battle is made, are not meant to be comprehended in the intention of it, until they shall first have been called back to the fleet by the proper signal.
IV. When the fleet is sailing in line of battle ahead, the course is to be taken from the ship leading the van upon that occasion; the others in succession being to steer with their seconds ahead respectively, whilst they continue to be regulated by the example of the leading ship.[1]
V. The ships, which from the inequality of their rates of sailing cannot readily keep their stations in the line, are not to obstruct the compliance with the intent of the signal in others; nor to hazard throwing the fleet into disorder by persisting too long in their endeavours to preserve their stations under such circumstances; but they are to fall astern and form in succession in the rear of the line.
The captains of such ships will not be thereby left in a situation less at liberty to distinguish themselves; as they will have an opportunity to render essential service, by placing their ships to advantage when arrived up with the enemy already engaged with the other part of the fleet.
The ships next in succession in order of battle are to occupy in turn, on this and every other similar occasion, the vacant spaces that would be otherwise left in the line; so that it may be always kept perfect at the appointed intervals of distance.
And when the fleet is sailing large, or before the wind, in order of battle, and the admiral makes the signal for coming to the wind on either tack, the ship stationed to lead the line on that tack, first, and the others in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship and of their seconds ahead respectively, are to haul to the wind without loss of time accordingly.
And all the signals for regulating the course and motions of the fleet by day or night, after the signal for forming in order of battle has been made, are to be understood with reference to the continuance of the fleet in such order, until the general signal to chase, or to form again in order of sailing, is put abroad.
VI. When the fleet is formed on any line pointed out by the compass signal, the relative bearing of the ships from each other is to be preserved through every change of course made, as often as any alteration thereof together shall be by signal directed.[2]
When, on the contrary, the signal to alter the course in succession has been put abroad, the relative bearing of the ships from each other will be then consequently changed; and any alteration of the course subsequently directed to be made by the ships together will thereafter have reference to the relative bearing last established. The same distinction will take place so often as the alteration of course in succession, as aforesaid, shall in future recur.
VII. If the admiral should observe that the enemy has altered his course, and the disposition of his order of battle, one, two, three, or any greater number of points (in which case it will be necessary to make a suitable change in the bearing of the ships from each other in the British fleet, supposed to be formed in such respects correspondently to the first position of the enemy), he will make the signal for altering course in succession, according to the nature of the occasion. The leading ship of the line is thereupon immediately to alter to the course pointed out; and (the others taking their places astern of her in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship and of their seconds ahead respectively) she is to lead the fleet in line of battle ahead on the course so denoted, until farther order.
VIII. When it is necessary to shorten or make more sail whilst the fleet is in order of battle, and the proper signal in either case has been made, the fleet is to be regulated by the example of the frigate appointed to repeat signals; which frigate is to set or take in the sail the admiral is observed to do.
The ship referred to is thereupon to suit her sail to the known comparative rate of sailing between her and the admiral's ship.
Hence it will be necessary that the captains of the fleet be very attentive to acquire a perfect knowledge of the comparative rate of sailing between their own and the admiral's ship, so as under whatever sail the admiral may be, they may know what proportion to carry, to go at an equal rate with him.
IX. When, the ships of the fleet being more in number than the enemy, the admiral sees proper to order any particular ships to withdraw from the line, they are to be placed in a proper situation, in readiness to be employed occasionally as circumstances may thereafter require—to windward of the fleet, if then having the weather-gage of the enemy, or towards the van and ahead, if the contrary—to relieve, or go to the assistance of any disabled ship, or otherwise act, as by signal directed.
The captains of ships, stationed next astern of those so withdrawn, are directly to close to the van, and fill up the vacant spaces thereby made in the line.
When, in presence of an enemy, the admiral or commander of any division of the fleet finds it necessary to change his station in the line, in order to oppose himself against the admiral or commander in a similar part of the enemy's line, he will make the signal for that purpose; and the ships referred to on this occasion are to place themselves forthwith against the ships of the enemy, that would otherwise by such alteration remain unopposed.
X. When the fleet is sailing in a line of battle ahead, or upon any other bearing, and the signal is made for the ships to keep in more open order, it will be generally meant that they should keep from one to two cables' length asunder, according as the milder or rougher state of the weather may require; also that they should close to the distance of half a cable, or at least a cable's length, in similar circumstances, when the signal for that purpose is put abroad.
But in both cases, the distance pointed out to the admiral's second ahead and astern, by the continuance of the flag abroad, as intimated in the Signal Book, is to be signified from them respectively to the ships succeeding them on either part, by signals.
These signals are to be continued either way, onward, throughout the line if necessary.
Notice is to be taken, in the same manner, of any continued deviation from the limited distance; and to commence between the several commanders of private ships respectively, independent of the admiral's previous example, when they observe their seconds ahead or astern to be at any time separated from them, further than the regulated distance kept by the ships next to the admiral, or that which was last appointed.
When the admiral, being before withdrawn from the line, means to resume his station therein, he will make the signal for the particular ships, between which he means to place himself, to open to a greater distance, whether it be in his former station, or in any other part of the line, better suited for his future purpose.
XI. When any number of ships is occasionally detached from the fleet for the same purpose, they are, during their separation from the body of the fleet, to comply with all such signals as shall be made at any time, whilst the signal flag appropriated for that occasion remains abroad.
But the signals made to all ships so appointed, having the commander of a squadron or division with them, will be under the flag descriptive of such commander's squadron or division, whose signals and instructions they are to obey.
XII. Great care is to be taken at all times when coming to action not to fire upon the enemy either over or near any ships of the fleet, liable to be injured thereby; nor, when in order of battle, until the proper signal is made, and that the ships are properly placed in respect to situation and distance, although the signal may have been before put abroad.
And if, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are then steering down for the enemy in an oblique direction from each other, they are to haul to the wind, or to any order parallel with the enemy, to engage them as they arrive in a proper situation and distance, without waiting for any more particular signal or order for that purpose: regard being only had by the several commanders in these circumstances to the motions of the ships preceding them on the tack whereunto the course more inclines, and upon and towards which the enemy is formed for action, that they may have convenient space for hauling up clear of each other.
When our fleet is upon the contrary tack to that of the enemy, and standing towards them, and the admiral makes the signal to engage, the van ship is then to lead close along their line, with a moderate sail, and engage; the rest of the fleet doing the same, passing to windward or to leeward of the enemy, as the admiral may direct.
XIII. When weathering the enemy upon the contrary tack, and signal is made to engage their van, the leading ship is then to bear down to the van ship of the enemy, and engage, passing along their line to windward to the sternmost ship of their van squadron, then to haul off close to the wind, the rest of the fleet doing the same in succession.[3]
XIV. No ship is to separate in time of action from the body of the fleet, in pursuit of any small number of the enemy's ships beaten out of the line; nor until their main body be also disabled or broken: but the captains, who have disabled or forced their opponents out of the line, are to use their best endeavours to assist any ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, or the ships nearest to them, to hasten the defeat of the enemy, unless otherwise by signal, or particular instruction, directed.[4]
XV. When any ship in the fleet is so much disabled as to be in the utmost danger and hazard of being taken by the enemy, or destroyed, and makes the signal expressive of such extremity; the Captains of the nearest ships, most at liberty with respect to the state of their opponents in the enemy's line, are strictly enjoined to give all possible aid and protection to such disabled ship, as they are best able. And the captain of any frigate (or fireship) happening to be at that time in a situation convenient for the purpose, is equally required to use his utmost endeavours for the relief of such disabled ship, by joining in the attack of the ship of the enemy opposed to the disabled ship, if he sees opportunity to place his ship to advantage, by favouring the attempt of the fireship to lay the enemy on board, or by taking out any of the crew of the disabled ship, if practicable and necessary, as may be most expedient.
XVI. No captain, though much pressed by the enemy, is to quit his station in time of battle, if possible to be avoided, without permission first obtained from the commanding officer of his division, or other nearest flag officer, for that purpose; but, when compelled thereto by extreme necessity before any adequate assistance is furnished, or that he is ordered out of the line on that account, the nearest ships and those on each part of the disabled ship's station are timely to occupy the vacant space occasioned by her absence, before the enemy can take advantage thereof.
And if any captain shall be wanting in the due performance of his duty in time of battle, the commander of the division, or other flag officer nearest to him, is immediately to remove such deficient captain from his post, and appoint another commander to take the charge and conduct of the ship on that occasion.
XVII. When, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet, or from bad weather, or otherwise, the admiral hath by signal signified his intention to leave the captains and other commanders at liberty to proceed at their discretion; they are then permitted to act as they see best under such circumstances, for the good of the king's service and the preservation of their ships, without regard to his example. But they are, nevertheless, to endeavour at all times to gain the appointed rendezvous in preference, if it can be done with safety.
XVIII. The ships are to be kept at all times prepared in readiness for action. And in case of coming to an engagement with the enemy, their boats are to be kept manned and armed, and prepared with hand and fire-chain grapnels, and other requisites, on the off-side from the enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ship of the fleet attempted by the fireships of the enemy; or for supporting the fireships of the fleet when they are to proceed on service.
The ships appointed to protect and cover these last, or which may be otherwise in a situation to countenance their operations, are to take on board their crews occasionally, and proceed before them down, as near as possible, to the ships of the enemy they are destined to attempt.
The captains of such ships are likewise to be particularly attentive to employ the boats they are provided with, as well to cover the retreat of the fireships boat, as to prevent the endeavours to be expected from the boats of the enemy to intercept the fireship, or in any other manner to frustrate the execution of the proposed undertaking.[5]
XIX. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag officer may embark on board any private ship that he sees fit, for carrying on the service: but it is to be of his own squadron or division in preference when equally suitable for his purpose.
XX. The flag officers, or commanders of divisions, are on all occasions to repeat generally, as well as with reference to their respective divisions, the signals from the admiral, that they may be thereby more speedily communicated correspondent to his intentions.
And the purpose of all signals for the conduct of particular divisions is then only meant to be carried into execution when the signal has been repeated, or made by the commanders of such particular divisions respectively. In which circumstances they are to be always regarded and complied with by the ships or divisions referred to, in the same manner as if such signals had been made by the admiral commanding in chief.
XXI. When ships have been detached to attack the enemy's rear, the headmost ship of such detachment, and the rest in succession, after having ranged up their line as far is judged proper, is then to fall astern; and (the ship that next follows passing between her and the enemy) is to tack or wear as engaged to windward or leeward, and form in the rear of the detachment.
XXII. When the fleet is to tack in succession, the ship immediately following the one going in stays should observe to bear up a little, to give her room; and the moment for putting in stays is that when a ship discovers the weather quarter of her second ahead, and which has just tacked before her.
On this and every other occasion, when the fleet is in order of battle, it should be the attention of each ship strictly to regulate her motions by those of the one preceding her; a due regard to such a conduct being the only means of maintaining the prescribed distance between the ships, and of preserving a regular order throughout the line.
XXIII. As soon as the signal is made to prepare for battle, the fireships are to get their boarding grapnels fixed; and when in presence of an enemy, and that they perceive the fleet is likely to come to action, they are to prime although the signal for that purpose should not have been made; being likewise to signify when they are ready to proceed on service, by putting abroad the appointed signal.
They are to place themselves abreast of the ships of the line, and not in the openings between them, the better to be sheltered from the enemy's fire, keeping a watchful eye upon the admiral, so as to be prepared to put themselves in motion the moment their signal is made, which they are to answer as soon as observed.
A fireship ordered to proceed on service is to keep a little ahead and to windward of the ship that is to escort her, to be the more ready to bear down on the vessel she is to board, and to board if possible in the fore shrouds. By proceeding in this manner she will not be in the way of preventing the ship appointed to escort her from firing upon the enemy, and will run less risk of being disabled herself; and the ship so appointed and the two other nearest ships are to assist her with their boats manned and armed.
She is to keep her yards braced up, that when she goes down to board, and has approached the ship she is to attempt, she may have nothing to do but to spring her luff.
Captains of fireships are not to quit them till they have grappled the enemy, and have set fire to the train.
XXIV. Frigates have it in particular charge to frustrate the attempts of the enemy's fireships, and to favour those of our own. When a fireship of the enemy therefore attempts to board a ship of the line, they are to endeavour to cut off the boats that attend her, and even to board her, if necessary.
XXV. The boats of a ship attempted by an enemy's fireship, with those of her seconds ahead and astern, are to use their utmost efforts to tow her off, the ships at the same time firing to sink her.
XXVI. In action, all the ships in the fleet are to wear red ensigns.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] This and Article II. appear to be the first mention of working the fleet by 'guides.'
[2] The original has here the following erasure: 'The same is to be understood of the bearing indicated, though the admiral should shape his course from the wind originally when the signal for forming upon a line of bearing is made.'
[3] It was Nelson's improvement on this unscientific method of attack that is the conspicuous feature of his Memorandum, 1803, but it must be remembered that Howe had not yet devised the manoeuvre of breaking the line in all parts on which Nelson's improvement was founded.
[4] Cf. note 1, p. 224.
[5] Howe's insistence on these points both here and in Articles XXII.-XXV. is curious in view of the fact that the use of fireships in action had gone out of fashion. From 1714 to 1763 only one English fireship is known to have been 'expended,' and that was by Commander Callis when he destroyed the Spanish galleys at St. Tropez in 1742. At the peace of 1783 the Navy List contained only 17 fireships out of a total of 468 sail. Howe had two fireships on the First of June, 1794, but did not use them.
THE SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR
INTRODUCTORY
The second form in which the new Fighting Instructions, originated by Lord Howe, have come down to us, is that which became fixed in the service after 1790; that is, instead of two folio volumes with the Signals in one and the Explanatory Instructions in the other, we have, at least after 1799, one small quarto containing both, and entitled 'Signal Book for Ships of War.' The earliest known example, however, of the new quarto form is a Signal Book only, which refers to a set of Instructions apparently similar to those of 1799. These have not been found, but presumably they were in a separate volume. The Signal Book is in the Admiralty Library labelled in manuscript '1792-3(?),' but, as before, no date or signature appears in the body of it. From internal evidence, however, as well as from collateral testimony, there is little difficulty in identifying it as Lord Howe's second code issued in 1790.
The feature of the book that first strikes us is that, though the bulk of it is printed, all the most important battle signals, as well as many others, have been added in MS., while at the end are the words, 'Given on board the Queen Charlotte, to Capt. ——, commander of his majesty's ship the ——, by command of the admiral.' It is thus obvious that the original printed form, which contains many further unfilled blanks for additional signals, was used as a draft for a later edition. No such edition is known to exist in print, but both the original signals and the additions correspond exactly with the MS. code which was used by Lord Howe in his campaign of 1794. In editing this code for the Society in his Logs of the Great Sea Fights, Admiral Sturges Jackson hazarded the conjecture that it had not then been printed, but was supplied to each ship in the fleet in MS. The admiralty volume goes far to support his conjecture, and it is quite possible that we have here the final draft from which the MS. copies were made.
As to the actual date at which the code was completed there is not much difficulty. The Queen Charlotte was Howe's flagship in the Channel fleet from 1792-4, but it was also his flagship in 1790 at the time of the 'Spanish Armament,' when he put to sea in immediate expectation of war with Spain. While the tension lasted he is known to have used the critical period in exercising his fleet in tactical evolutions, in order to perfect it in a new code of signals which he had been elaborating for several years.[1] It is probable therefore that this Signal Book belongs to that year, and that it is one of several copies which Howe had printed with the battle signals blank for his own use while he was elaborating his system by practical experiment. This conjecture is brought to practical certainty by a rough and much-worn copy of it in the United Service Institution. It was made by Lieut. John Walsh, of H.M.S. Marlborough, one of Howe's fleet, and inside the cover he has written 'Earl Howe's signals by which the Grand Fleet was governed 1790, 1791, and 1794.'
It was upon the tactical system contained in this book that all the great actions of the Nelson period were fought. The alterations which took place during the war were slight. The codes used by Howe himself in 1794, and by Duncan at Camperdown in 1797, follow it exactly. A slightly modified form was issued by Jervis to the Mediterranean fleet, and was used by him at St. Vincent in 1797. No copy of this is known to exist, but from the logs of the ships there engaged it would appear that, though the numbering of the code had been changed, the principal battle signals remained the same. In 1799 a new edition was printed in the small quarto form. In this the Signal Book and the Instructions were bound together, and were issued to the whole navy, but here again, though the numbers were changed, the alterations were of no great importance.[2] Reprints appeared in 1806 and 1808, but the code itself continued in use till 1816. In that year an entirely new Signal Book based on Sir Home Popham's code was issued with a fresh set of Explanatory Instructions, or, as they had come to be called, 'Instructions relating to the line of battle and the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an enemy.'[3] Both these sets of 'Explanatory Instructions' are printed below, but, as we have seen, they throw but little light by themselves on the progress of tactical thought during the great period they covered. They were no longer 'Fighting Instructions' in the old sense, unless read with the principal battle signals, and to these we have to go to get at the ideas that underlay the tactics of Nelson and his contemporaries.
Now the most remarkable feature of Howe's Second Signal Book, 1790, is the apparent disappearance from it of the signal for breaking the line which in his first code, 1782, he had borrowed from Hood in consequence of Rodney's manoeuvre. The other two signals introduced by Hood and Pigot for breaking the line on Rodney's plan are equally absent. In their stead appears a signal for an entirely new manoeuvre, never before practised or even suggested, so far as is known, by anyone. The 'signification' runs as follows: 'If, when having the weather-gage of the enemy, the admiral means to pass between the ships of their line for engaging them to leeward or, being to leeward, to pass between them for obtaining the weather-gage. N.B.—The different captains and commanders not being able to effect the specified intention in either case are at liberty to act as circumstances require.' In the Signal Book of 1799 the wording is changed. It there runs 'To break through the enemy's line in all parts where practicable, and engage on the other side,' and in the admiralty copy delivered to Rear-Admiral Frederick there is added this MS. note, 'If a blue pennant is hoisted at the fore topmast-head, to break through the van; if at the main topmast-head, to break through the centre; if at the mizen topmast-head, to break through the rear.'[4]
This form of the signification shows that the intention of the signal was something different from what is usually understood in naval literature by 'breaking the line.' By that we generally understand the manoeuvre practised by Lord Rodney in 1782, a manoeuvre which was founded on the conception of 'leading through' the enemy's line in line ahead, and all the ships indicated passing through in succession at the same point. Whereas in Lord Howe's signal the tactical idea is wholly different. In his manoeuvre the conception is of an attack by bearing down all together in line abreast or line of bearing, and each ship passing through the enemy's line at any interval it found practicable; and this was actually the method of attack which he adopted on June 1, 1794. In intention the two signals are as wide as the poles asunder. In Rodney's case the idea was to sever the enemy's line and cut off part of it from the rest. In Howe's case the idea of severing the line is subordinate to the intention of securing an advantage by engaging on the opposite side from which the attack is made. The whole of the attacking fleet might in principle pass through the intervals in the enemy's line without cutting off any part of it. In principle, moreover, the new attack was a parallel attack in line abreast or in line of bearing, whereas the old attack was a perpendicular or oblique attack in line ahead.
Nothing perhaps in naval literature is more remarkable than the fact that this fundamental difference is never insisted on, or even, it may be said, so much as recognised. Whenever we read of a movement for breaking the line in this period it is almost always accompanied with remarks which assume that Rodney's manoeuvre is intended and not Howe's. Probably it is Nelson who is to blame. At Trafalgar, after carefully elaborating an attack based on Howe's method of line abreast, he delivered it in line ahead, as though he had intended to use Rodney's method. His reasons were sound enough, as will be seen later. But as a piece of scientific tactics it was as though an engineer besieging a fortress, instead of drawing his lines of approach diagonally, were to make them at right angles to the ditch. When the greatest of the admirals apparently (but only apparently) confused the two antagonistic conceptions of breaking the line, there is much excuse for civilian writers being confused in fact.
The real interest of the matter, however, is to inquire, firstly, by what process of thought Howe in his second code discarded Rodney's manoeuvre as the primary meaning of his signal after having adopted it in his first, and, secondly, how and to what end did he arrive at his own method.
On the first point there can be little doubt. Sir Charles H. Knowles gives us to understand that Howe still had Hoste's Treatise at his elbow, and with Hoste for his mentor we may be sure that, in common with other tactical students of his time, he soon convinced himself that Rodney's manoeuvre was usually dangerous and always imperfect. Knowles himself in his old age, though a devout admirer of Rodney, denounced it in language of characteristic violence, and maintained to the last that Rodney never intended it, as every one now agrees was the truth. Nelson presumably also approved Howe's cardinal improvement, or even in his most impulsive mood he would hardly have called him 'the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever produced.'[5]
As to the second point—the fundamental intention of the new manoeuvre—we get again a valuable hint from Knowles. Upon his second visit to the admiralty, after Howe had succeeded Keppel at the end of 1783, Knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and discussed with Howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the French employed for avoiding decisive actions. He showed that when engaged to leeward they fell off by alternate ships as soon as they were hard pressed, and kept reforming their line to leeward, so that the British had continually to bear up, and expose themselves to be raked aloft in order to close again. In this way, as he pointed out, the French were always able to clip the British wings without receiving any decisive injury themselves. In a MS. note to his 'Fighting and Sailing Instructions,' he puts the matter quite clearly. 'In the battle off Granada,' he says, 'in the year 1779 the French ships partially executed this manoeuvre, and Sir Charles Ḥ Knowles (then 5th lieutenant of the Prince of Wales of 74 guns, the flagship of the Hon. Admiral Barrington) drew this manoeuvre, and which he showed Admiral Lord Howe, when first lord of the admiralty, during the peace. His lordship established a signal to break through the enemy's line and engage on the other side to leeward, and which he executed himself in the battle of the 1st of June, 1794.' The note adds that before Knowles drew Howe's attention to the supposed French manoeuvre he had been content with his original Article XIV., modifying Article XXI. of the old Fighting Instructions as already explained. Whether therefore Knowles's account is precisely accurate or not, we may take it as certain that it was to baffle the French practice of avoiding close action by falling away to leeward that Howe hit on his brilliant conception of breaking through their line in all parts.
No finer manoeuvre was ever designed. In the first place it developed the utmost fire-face by bringing both broadsides into play. Secondly, by breaking up the enemy's line into fragments it deprived their admiral of any shadow of control over the part attacked. Thirdly, by seizing the leeward position (the essential postulate of the French method of fighting) it prevented individual captains making good their escape independently to leeward and ensured a decisive melee, such as Nelson aimed at. And, fourthly, it permitted a concentration on any part of the enemy's line, since it actually severed it at any desired point quite as effectually as did Rodney's method. Whether Howe ever appreciated the importance of concentration to the extent it was felt by Nelson, Hood and Rodney is doubtful. Yet his invention did provide the best possible form of concentrated attack. It had over Rodney's imperfect manoeuvre this inestimable advantage, that by the very act of breaking the line you threw upon the severed portion an overwhelming attack of the most violent kind, and with the utmost development of fire-surface. Finally it could not be parried as Rodney's usually could in Hoste's orthodox way by the enemy's standing away together upon the same tack. By superior gunnery Howe's attack might be stopped, but by no possibility could it be avoided except by flight. It was no wonder then that Howe's invention was received with enthusiasm by such men as Nelson.
Still it is clear that in certain cases, and especially in making an attack from the leeward, as Clerk of Eldin had pointed out, and where it was desirable to preserve your own line intact, Rodney's manoeuvre might still be the best. Howe's manoeuvre moreover supplied its chief imperfection, for it provided a method of dealing drastically with the portion of the enemy's line that had been cut off. Thus, although it is not traceable in the Signal Book, it was really reintroduced in Howe's third code. This is clear from the last article of the Explanatory Instructions of 1799 which distinguishes between the two manoeuvres; but whether or not this article was in the Instructions of 1790 we cannot tell. The probability is that it was not, for in the Signal Book of 1790 there is no reference to a modifying instruction. Further, we know that in the code proposed by Sir Charles H. Knowles the only signal for breaking the line was word for word the same as Howe's. This code he drew up in its final form in 1794, but it was not printed till 1798. The presumption is therefore that until the code of 1799 was issued Howe's method of breaking the line was the only one recognised. In that code the primary intention of Signal 27 'for breaking through the enemy's line in all parts' is still for Howe's manoeuvre, but the instruction provides that it could be modified by a red pennant over, and in that case it meant 'that the fleet is to preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy's line, and to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's ships as are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to rejoin their fleet.' This was precisely Rodney's manoeuvre with the proviso for close order introduced by Pigot. The instruction also provided for the combining of a numeral to indicate at which number in the enemy's line the attempt was to be made. No doubt the distinction between manoeuvres so essentially different might have been more logically made by entirely different signals.[6] But in practice it was all that was wanted. It is only posterity that suffers, for in studying the actions of that time it is generally impossible to tell from the signal logs or the tactical memoranda which movement the admiral had in mind. Not only do we never find it specified whether the signal was made simply or with the pennant over, but admirals seem to have used the expressions 'breaking' and 'cutting' the line, and 'breaking through,' 'cutting through,' 'passing through,' and 'leading through,' as well as others, quite indiscriminately of both forms of the manoeuvre. Thus in Nelson's first, or Toulon, memorandum he speaks of 'passing through the line' from to-windward, meaning presumably Howe's manoeuvre, and of 'cutting through' their fleet from to-leeward when presumably he means Rodney's. In the Trafalgar memorandum he speaks of 'leading through' and 'cutting' the line from to-leeward, and of 'cutting through' from to-windward, when he certainly meant to perform Howe's manoeuvre. Whereas Howe, in his Instruction XXXI. of 1799, uses 'breaking the line' and 'passing through it' indifferently of both forms.
All we can do is generally to assume that when the attack was to be made from to-windward Howe's manoeuvre was intended, and Rodney's when it was made from to-leeward. Yet this is far from being safe ground. For the signification of the plain signal without the red pennant over—i.e. 'to break through ... and engage on the other side'—seems to contemplate Howe's manoeuvre being made both from to-leeward and from to-windward.
The only notable disappearances in Howe's second code (1790) are the signals for 'doubling,' probably as a corollary of the new manoeuvre. For, until this device was hit upon, Rodney's method of breaking the line apparently could only be made effective as a means of concentration by doubling on the part cut off in accordance with Hoste's method. This at least is what Clerk of Eldin seems to imply in some of his diagrams, in so far as he suggests any method of dealing with the part cut off. Yet in spite of this disappearance Nelson certainly doubled at the Nile, and according to Captain Edward Berry, who was captain of his flagship, he did it deliberately. 'It is almost unnecessary,' he wrote in his narrative, 'to explain his projected mode of attack at anchor, as that was minutely and precisely executed in the action.... These plans however were formed two months before, ... and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the understanding of every captain in the fleet.' Nelson probably felt that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose steadiness he could trust. Still Saumarez, his second in command, regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of our ships having suffered from each other's fire.[7]
Amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that for Hoste's method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear. The wording however is changed. It is no longer enjoined as a means of avoiding being doubled. As Howe inserted it in MS. the signification now ran 'for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of the enemy's van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy's rear, and the centre the centre of the enemy. But with exception of the flag officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy respectively in preference.'[8] This signification again is considerably modified by the Explanatory Instructions. Article XXIV., it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving regular gaps. The leading ship is to engage the enemy's leading ship, and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the largest ships they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till the stronger are disabled. It was in effect the adoption of Hoste's fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the English gunnery usually made them.
The curious signal No. 218 of 1782 for attacking the enemy's rear in succession by 'defiling' on the Elizabethan plan was also retained. In the Signal Book of 1799 it ran, 'to fire in succession upon the sternmost ships of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in rear of the squadron or division specified (if a part of the fleet is so appointed) until otherwise directed.'
It has been already said that the alterations in the edition of 1799 were not of great importance, but one or two additions must be noticed. The most noteworthy is a new signal for carrying out the important rule of Article IX. of the Instructions of 1782 (Article X. of 1799), providing for the formation of a corps de reserve when you are numerically superior to the enemy, as was done by Villeneuve on Gravina's advice in 1805, although fortunately for Nelson it was not put in practice at Trafalgar.
The other addition appears in MS. at the end of the printed signals. It runs as follows: 'When at anchor in line of battle to let go a bower anchor under foot, and pass a stout hawser from one ship to another, beginning at the weathermost ship,' an addition which would seem to have been suggested by what had recently occurred at the Nile. Nelson's own order was as follows: 'General Memorandum.—As the wind will probably blow along shore, when it is deemed necessary to anchor and engage the enemy at their anchorage it is recommended to each line-of-battle ship of the squadron to prepare to anchor with the sheet cable in abaft and springs, &c.'[9] Another copy of the signal book has a similar MS. addition to the signal 'Prepare for battle and for anchoring with springs, &c.'[10] It runs thus: 'A bower is to be unbent, and passed through the stern port and bent to the anchor, leaving that anchor hanging by the stopper only.—Lord Nelson, St. George, 26 March, 1801. If with a red pennant over with a spring only.—Commander-in-chiefs Order Book, 27 March, 1801.' These therefore were additions made immediately before the attack on the Danish fleet at Copenhagen.
No other change was made, and it may be said that Howe's new method of breaking the line was the last word on the form of attack for a sailing fleet. How far its full intention and possibilities were understood at first is doubtful. The accounts of the naval actions that followed show no lively appreciation on the part of the bulk of British captains. On the First of June the new signal for breaking through the line at all points was the first Howe made, and it was followed as soon as the moment for action arrived by that 'for each ship to steer for, independently of each other, and engage respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's line.' The result was an action along the whole line, during which Howe himself at the earliest opportunity passed through the enemy's line and engaged on the other side, though as a whole the fleet neglected to follow either his signal or his example.
In the next great action, that of St. Vincent, the circumstances were not suitable for the new manoeuvre, seeing that the Spaniards had not formed line. Jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the 'not very probable case' which Clerk of Eldin had instanced as justifying a perpendicular attack. Whether or not Jervis had Clerk's instance in his mind, he certainly did deliver a perpendicular attack. The signal with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the flagship's log, was 'The admiral intends to pass through the enemy's line.'[11] There is nothing to show whether this meant Howe's manoeuvre or Rodney's, for we do not know whether at this time the instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be distinguished by a pennant over.
What followed however was that the fleet passed between the two separated Spanish squadrons in line ahead as Clerk advised. The next thing to do, according to Clerk, was for the British fleet to wear or tack together, but instead of doing so Jervis signalled to tack in succession, and then repeated the signal to pass through the enemy's line although it was still unformed. It was at this moment that Nelson made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and what he did was in effect as though Jervis had made the signal to tack together as Clerk enjoined. Thereupon Jervis, with the intention apparently of annulling his last order to pass through the line, made the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains of those days believed in—viz. to take suitable stations for mutual support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in succession. In practice it was little more than a frank relapse to the methods of the early Commonwealth, and it was this signal and not that for breaking the line which made the action general.
Again, at the battle of Camperdown, Duncan, while trying to form single line from two columns of sailing, began with the signal for each ship to steer independently for her opponent. This was followed—the fleet having failed to form line parallel to the enemy, and being still in two disordered columns—by signals for the lee or van division to engage the enemy's rear, and as some thought the weather division his centre; and ten minutes later came the new signal for passing through the line. The result was an action almost exactly like that of Nelson at Trafalgar—that is, though the leading ships duly acted on the combination of the two signals for engaging their opposites and for breaking the line, each at its opposite interval, the rest was a melee; for, since what was fundamentally a parallel attack was attempted as a perpendicular one, it could be nothing but a scramble for the rear ships.
In none of these actions therefore is there any evidence that Howe's attempt to impress the service with a serious scientific view of tactics had been successful, and the impression which they made upon our enemies suggests that the real spirit that inspired British officers at this time was something very different from that which Howe had tried to instil. Writing of the battle of St. Vincent, Don Domingo Perez de Grandallana, whose masterly studies of the French and English naval systems and tactics raised him to the highest offices of state, has the following passage: 'An Englishman enters a naval action with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by the sacred and priceless law of mutual support. Accordingly, both he and all his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not be deserted. Experience shows, on the contrary, that a Frenchman or a Spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support, and goes into action with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief's signals for such and such manoeuvres.... Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any favourable opportunity that may present itself. They are fettered by the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. Worst, of all, they are denied the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn from them.'[12]
This was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in the golden signal which was the panacea of British admirals when in doubt: 'Ships to take station for mutual support and engage as they come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard. The truth is that in the British service formal tactics had come to be regarded as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a substitute for initiative in fighting him.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Dictionary of National Biography, sub voce 'Howe,' p. 97.
[2] A copy of this is in the Admiralty Library issued to 'Thomas Lenox Frederick esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue,' and attested by the autographs of Vice-Admiral James Gambier, Vice-Admiral James Young, and another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by William Marsden, the famous numismatist and Oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from 1795 to 1804. Another copy, also in the Admiralty Library, is attested by Gambier, Sir John Colpoys and Admiral Philip Patton, and countersigned by the new second secretary, John Barrow, all of whom came to the admiralty under Lord Melville on Pitt's return to office in 1804. Two other copies are in the United Service Institution.
[3] Sir Home Popham's code had been in use for many years for 'telegraphing.' It was by this code Nelson's famous signal was made at Trafalgar.
[4] In one of the United Service Institution copies the signal has been added in MS. and the note is on a slip pasted in. In the other both signal and note are printed with blanks in which the distinguishing pennants have been written in.
[5] Nelson to Howe, January 8, 1799. Nicolas, iii. 230.
[6] Sir Charles H. Knowles did modify his code in this way some time after 1798. For his original signal he substituted two in MS. with the following neatly worded significations: 'No. 32. To break through the enemy's line together and engage on the opposite side. No. 33. To break through the enemy's line in succession and engage on the other side.' Had these two lucid significations been adopted by Howe there would have been no possible ambiguity as to what was meant.
[7] Laughton, Nelson's Letters and Despatches, p. 151. Ross, Memoir of Lord de Saumarez, vol. i.
[8] This last mediaeval proviso was omitted in the later editions. It is not found in Hoste.
[9] Ross, Memoir of Saumarez, i. 212. Nelson refers to 'Signal 54, Art. XXXVII. of the Instructions,' which must have been a special and amplified set issued by Jervis. There is no Art. XXXVII. in Howe's set.
[10] In the United Service Institution.
[11] Logs of the Great Sea Fights, i. 210. The log probably only gives an abbreviation of the signification. Unless Jervis had changed it, its exact wording was 'The admiral means to pass between the ships of their line for engaging them to leeward,' &c. See supra, p. 255.
[12] Fernandez Duro, Armada Espanola, viii. 111.
LORD HOWE'S EXPLANATORY INSTRUCTIONS.
[Signal Book, 1799.[1]]
Instructions for the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their engaging, and when engaged, with an enemy.
I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle, each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as expeditiously as possible, and to keep in close order, if not otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the line when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it.
II. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle are: that the ships may be able to assist and support each other in action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships greater in number than themselves; and that every ship may be able to fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own fleet.
III. If, after having made a signal to prepare to form the line of battle on either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative flag flying, should make several signals in succession, to point out the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when the signal for the line is hoisted again; they are to be executed in the order in which they were made, excepting such as the admiral may annul previously to his hoisting again the signal for the line.
IV. If any part of the fleet should be so far to leeward, when the signal is made for the line of battle, that the admiral should think it necessary to bear up and stand towards them, he will do it with the signal No. 105 hoisted.[2] The ships to leeward are thereupon to exert themselves to get as expeditiously as possible into their stations in the line.
V. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet, on any separate service, are not to obey the signal for forming the line of battle, unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by signal.
VI. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as directed in Article 9 of the General Instructions, though in the presence of an enemy.[3] The captains of such ships will not thereby be prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have opportunities of rendering essential service, by placing their ships advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with the other part of the fleet.
VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to place themselves in such a manner that if they were to haul to the wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed, they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this, every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on which the line of battle would sail, viz., on that point of the compass which is seven points from the direction of the wind, or six points if the signal is made to keep close to the wind.
As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or squadron flags, shown with the signal for such a line, will refer to the forming of the line of battle; that division or squadron whose flag is uppermost (without considering whether it do or do not form the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind and form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is undermost is to place itself in that station in which it would become the rear if by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be formed.[4]
VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed, the ships are to preserve that relative bearing from each other, whenever they are directed to alter the course together; but if they are directed to alter the course in succession, as the line of bearing will by that be destroyed, it is no longer to be attended to.
IX. If the signal to make more or less sail is made when the fleet is in line of battle, the frigate appointed to repeat signals will set the same sails as are carried by the admiral's ship; the ships are then in succession (from the rear if to shorten, or the van, if to make more, sail) to put themselves under a proportion of sail correspondent to their comparative rate of sailing with the admiral's ship.
To enable captains to do this it will be necessary that they acquire a perfect knowledge of the proportion of sail required for suiting their rate of sailing to that of the admiral, under the various changes in the quantity of sail, and state of the weather; which will enable them, not only to keep their stations in the line of battle, but also to keep company with the fleet on all other occasions.
When the signal to make more sail is made, if the admiral is under his topsails he will probably set the Foresail.
If the signal is repeated, or if the foresail is set he will probably set Jib and staysails.
If the foresail, jib, and staysails are set, he will set the Topgallant-sails.
Or in equally weather Mainsail.
When the signal to shorten sail is made, he will probably take in sail in a gradation the reverse of the preceding.
X. Ships which are ordered by signal to withdraw from the line are to place themselves to windward of the fleet if it has the weather-gage of the enemy, or to leeward and ahead if the contrary; and are to be ready to assist any ship which may want their assistance, or to act in any other manner as directed by signal.
If the ships so withdrawn, or any others which may have been detached, should be unable to resume their stations in the line when ordered by signal to do so, they are to attack the enemy's ships in any part of the line on which they may hope to make the greatest impression.[5]
XI. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the ships which, at either extremity of the line, are thereby left without opponents may, after the action is begun, quit the line without waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or assist the ships of the fleet, in the best manner that circumstances will allow.
XII. When any number of ships, not having a flag officer with them, are detached from the fleet to act together, they are to obey all signals which are accompanied by the flag appropriated to detachments, and are not to attend to any made without that flag. But if a flag officer, commanding a squadron, or division, be with such detachment, all the ships of it are to consider themselves, for the time, as forming part of the division, or squadron, of such flag officer; and they are to obey those signals, and only those, which are accompanied by his distinguishing flag.
XIII. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy, either over, or very near to, any ships of the fleet; nor, though the signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy.
XIV. If, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are steering down for the enemy, they are to haul to the wind, or to any course parallel to the enemy, and are to engage them when properly placed, without waiting for any particular signal; but every ship must be attentive to the motions of that ship which will be her second ahead, when formed parallel to the enemy, that she may have room to haul up without running on board of her. The distance of the ships from each other during the action must be governed by that of their respective opponents on the enemy's line.
XV. No ship is to Separate from the body of the fleet, in time of action, to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have been beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some other flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled their opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their attack till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled; unless by signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act otherwise.
XVI. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of being destroyed, or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal, expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate, that may be near, is to use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off, or by joining in the attack of the enemy, or by covering the fireship; or, if necessity require it, by taking out the crew of the disabled ship; or by any other means which circumstances at the time will admit.[6]
XVII. Though a ship be disabled, and hard pressed by the enemy in battle, she is not to quit her station in the line, if it can possibly be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do from the commander of the squadron, or division, to which he belongs, or from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of the line, or should be obliged to quit it, before assistance can be sent to him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space become vacant, to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it.
XVIII. If there should be found a captain so lost to all sense of honour and the great duty he owes his country, as not to exert himself to the utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy them when engaged; the commander of the squadron, or division, to which he belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from his command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship, till the admiral's pleasure shall be known.
XIX. When, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet, or from bad weather, or from any other cause, the admiral makes the signal for the fleet to disperse, every captain will be left to act as he shall judge most proper for the preservation of the ship he commands, and the good of the king's service; but he is to endeavour to go to the appointed rendezvous, if it may be done with safety.
XX. The ships are to be kept at all times as much prepared for battle as circumstances will admit; and if the fleet come to action with an enemy which has the weather-gage, boats, well armed, are to be held in readiness, with hand and fire-chain grapnels in them; and if the weather will admit, they are to be hoisted out, and kept on the offside from the enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ships against which fireships shall be sent; or for supporting the fireships of the fleet, if they should be sent against the enemy.[7]
XXI. The ships appointed to protect and cover fireships, when ordered on service, or which, without being appointed, are in a situation to cover and protect them, are to receive on board their crews, and, keeping between them and the enemy, to go with them as near as possible to the ships they are directed to destroy. All the boats of those ships are to be well armed, and to be employed in covering the retreat of the fireship's boats, and in defending the ship from any attempts that may be made on her by the boats of the enemy.
XXII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper; but he is to hoist it in one of his own squadron or division if there be one near, and fit for the purpose.
XXIII. If a squadron or any detachment be directed by signal to gain or keep the wind of the enemy, the officer commanding it is to act in such manner as shall in his judgment be the most effectual for the total defeat of the enemy; either by reinforcing those parts of the fleet which are opposed to superior force, or by attacking such parts of the enemy's line as, by their weakness, may afford reasonable hopes of their being easily broken,
XXIV. When the signal (30) is made to extend the line from one extremity of the enemy's line to the other, though the enemy have a greater number of ships, the leading ship is to engage the leading ship, and the sternmost ship the sternmost of the enemy; and the other ships are, as far as their situation will admit, to engage the ships of greatest force, leaving the weaker ships unattacked till the stronger shall have been disabled.[8]
XXV. If the admiral, or any commander of a squadron or division, shall think fit to change his station in the line, in order to place himself opposite to the admiral or the commander of a similar squadron or division in the enemy's line, he will make the Signal 47 for quitting the line in his own ship, without showing to what other part of the line he means to go; the ships ahead or astern (as circumstances may require) of the station opposed to the commander in the enemy's line are then to close and make room for him to get into it. But if the admiral, being withdrawn from the line, should think fit to return to any particular place in it, he will make the signal No. 269 with the distinguishing signal of his own ship, and soon after he will hoist the distinguishing signal of the ship astern of which he means to take, his station. And if he should direct by signal any other ship to take a station in the line, he will also hoist the distinguishing signal of the ship astern of which he would have her placed, if she is not to take the station assigned her in the line of battle given out.
XXVI. When the Signal 29 is made for each ship to steer for her opponent in the enemy's line, the ships are to endeavour, by making or shortening sail, to close with their opponents and bring them to action at the same time; but they must be extremely careful not to pass too near each other, nor to do anything which may risk their running on board each other: they may engage as soon as they are well closed with their opponents, and properly placed for that purpose.
XXVII. When the Signal 28 is made, for ships to form as most convenient, and attack the enemy as they get up with them; the ships are to engage to windward or to leeward, as from the situation of the enemy they shall find most advantageous; but the leading ships must be very cautious not to suffer themselves to be drawn away so far from the body of the fleet as to risk the being surrounded and cut off.
XXVIII. When Signal 14 is made to prepare for battle and for anchoring, the ships are to have springs on their bower anchors, and the end of the sheet cable taken in at the stern port, with springs on the anchor to be prepared for anchoring without winding if they should go to the attack with the wind aft. The boats should be hoisted out and hawsers coiled in the launches, with the stream anchor ready to warp them into their stations, or to assist other ships which may be in want of assistance. Their spare yards and topmasts, if they cannot be left in charge of some vessel, should in moderate weather be lashed alongside, near the water, on the off-side from the battery or ship to be attacked. The men should be directed to lie down on the off side of the deck from the enemy, whenever they are not wanted, if the ship should be fired at as they advance to the attack.
XXIX. When the line of battle has been formed as most convenient, without regard to the prescribed form, the ships which happen to be ahead of the centre are to be considered, for the time, as the starboard division, and those astern of the centre as the larboard division of the fleet; and if the triangular flag, white with a red fly, be hoisted, the line is to be considered as being divided into the same number of squadrons and divisions as in the established line of battle. The ship which happens at the time to lead the fleet is to be considered as the leader of the van squadron, and every other ship which happens to be in the station of the leader of the squadron or division is to be considered as being the leader of that squadron or division, and the intermediate ships are to form the squadrons or divisions of such leaders, and to follow them as long as the triangular flag is flying, and every flag officer is to be considered as the commander of the squadron or division in which he may be accidentally placed.
XXX. If the wind should come forward when the fleet is formed in line of battle, or is sailing by the wind in a line of bearing, the leading ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind, and every other ship is to haul as close to the wind as possible, till she has got into the wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought it on the proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come aft, the sternmost ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind, and the other ships are to haul close to the wind till they have brought the sternmost ship into their wake, or on the proper point of bearing.
XXXI. If Signal 27, to break through the enemy's line, be made without a 'red pennant' being hoisted, it is evident that to obey it the line of battle must be entirely broken; but if a 'red pennant' be hoisted at either mast-head, that fleet is to preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy's line, and to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's ships as are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to rejoin their fleet.
If a signal of number be made immediately after this signal, it will show the number of ships of the enemy's van or rear which the fleet is to endeavour to cut off. If the closing of the enemy's line should prevent the ships passing through the part pointed out, they are to pass through as near to it as they can.
If any of the ships should find it impracticable, in either of the above cases, to pass through the enemy's line, they are to act in the best manner that circumstances will admit of for the destruction of the enemy.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Similar but not identical instructions are referred to in the Signal Book of 1790. The above were reproduced in all subsequent editions till the end of the war.
[2] 'Ships to leeward to get in the admiral's wake.'
[3] The instructions referred to are the 'General Instructions for the conduct of the fleet.' They are the first of the various sets which the Signal Book contained, and relate to books to be kept, boats, keeping station, evolutions and the like. Article IX. is 'If from any cause whatever a ship should find it impossible to keep her station in any line or order of sailing, she is not to break the line or order by persisting too long in endeavouring to preserve it; but she is to quit the line and form in the rear, doing everything she can to keep up with the fleet.'
[4] See at p. 235, as to the new sailing formation in three columns.
[5] It should be noted that this is an important advance on the corresponding Article IX. of the previous instructions, and that it contains a germ of the organisation of Nelson's Trafalgar memorandum.
[6] The continued insistence on fireship tactics in this and Articles XX. and XXI. should again be noted, although from 1793 to 1802 the number of fireships on the Navy List averaged under four out of a total that increased from 304 to 517.
[7] It should be remembered that at this time there were no davits and no boats hoisted up. They were all carried in-board.
[8] This is a considerable modification of the signification of the signal; see supra, p. 263.
NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA
INTRODUCTORY
The first of these often quoted memoranda is the 'Plan of Attack,' usually assigned to May 1805, when Nelson was in pursuit of Villeneuve, and it is generally accompanied by two erroneous diagrams based on the number of ships which he then had under his command. But, as Professor Laughton has ingeniously conjectured, it must really belong to a time two years earlier, when Nelson was off Toulon in constant hope of the French coming out to engage him.[1] The strength and organisation of Nelson's fleet at that time, as well as the numbers of the French fleet, exactly correspond to the data of the memorandum. To Professor Laughton's argument may be added another, which goes far actually to fix the date. The principal signal which Nelson's second method of attack required was 'to engage to leeward.' Now this signal as it stood in the Signal Book of 1799 was to some extent ambiguous. It was No. 37, and the signification was 'to engage the enemy on their larboard side, or to leeward if by the wind,' while No. 36 was 'to engage the enemy on their starboard side if going before the wind, or to windward if by the wind.' Accordingly we find Nelson issuing a general order, with the object apparently of removing the ambiguity, and of rendering any confusion between starboard and larboard and leeward and windward impossible. It is in Nelson's order book, under date November 22, 1803, and runs as follows:
'If a pennant is shown over signal No. 36, it signifies that ships are to engage on the enemy's starboard side, whether going large or upon a wind.
'If a pennant is shown in like manner over No. 37, it signifies that ships are to engage on the enemy's larboard side, whether going large or upon a wind.
'These additions to be noted in the Signal Book in pencil only.'[2]
The effect of this memorandum was, of course, that Nelson had it in his power to let every captain know, without a shadow of doubt, under all conditions of wind, on which side he meant to engage the enemy.
To the evidence of the Signal Book may be added a passage in Nelson's letter to Admiral Sir A. Ball from the Magdalena Islands, November 7, 1803. He there writes: 'Our last two reconnoiterings: Toulon has eight sail of the line apparently ready for sea ... a seventy-four repairing. Whether they intend waiting for her I can't tell, but I expect them every hour to put to sea.'[3] He was thus expecting to have to deal with eight or nine of the line, which is the precise contingency for which the memorandum provides. There can be little doubt therefore that it was issued while Nelson lay at Magdalena, the first week in November 1803.[4]
The second memorandum, which Nelson communicated to his fleet, soon after he joined it off Cadiz, is regarded by universal agreement as the high-water mark of sailing tactics. Its interpretation however, and the dominant ideas that inspired it, no less than the degree to which it influenced the battle and was in the mind of Nelson and his officers at the time, are questions of considerable uncertainty. Some of the most capable of his captains, as we shall see presently, even disagreed as to whether Trafalgar was fought under the memorandum at all. From the method in which the attack was actually made, so different apparently from the method of the memorandum, some thought Nelson had cast it aside, while others saw that it still applied. A careful consideration of all that was said and done at the time gives a fairly clear explanation of the divergence of opinion, and it will probably be agreed that those officers who had a real feeling for tactics saw that Nelson was making his attack on what were the essential principles of the memorandum, while some on the other hand who were possessed of less tactical insight did not distinguish between what was essential and what was accidental in Nelson's great conception, and, mistaking the shadow for the substance, believed that he had abandoned his carefully prepared project.
For those who did not entirely grasp Nelson's meaning there is much excuse. We who are able to follow step by step the progress of tactical thought from the dawn of the sailing period can appreciate without much difficulty the radical revolution which he was setting on foot. It was a revolution, as we can plainly see, that was tending to bring the long-drawn curve of tactical development round to the point at which the Elizabethans had started. Surprise is sometimes expressed that, having once established the art of warfare under sail in broadside ships, our seamen were so long in finding the tactical system it demanded. Should not the wonder be the converse: that the Elizabethan seamen so quickly came so near the perfected method of the greatest master of the art? The attack at Gravelines in 1588 with four mutually supporting squadrons in echelon bears strong elementary resemblance to that at Trafalgar in 1805. It was in dexterity and precision of detail far more than in principle that the difference lay. The first and the last great victory of the British navy had certainly more in common with each other than either had with Malaga or the First of June. In the zenith of their careers Nelson and Drake came very near to joining hands. Little wonder then if many of Nelson's captains failed to fathom the full depth of his profound idea. Naval officers in those days were left entirely without theoretical instruction on the higher lines of their profession, and Nelson, if we may judge by the style of his memoranda, can hardly have been a very lucid expositor. He thought they all understood what with pardonable pride he called the 'Nelson touch.' The most sagacious and best educated of them probably did, but there were clearly some—and Collingwood, as we shall see, was amongst them—who only grasped some of the complex principles which were combined in his brilliant conception.
An analysis of the memorandum will show how complex it was. In the first and foremost place there is a clear note of denunciation against the long established fallacy of the old order of battle in single line. Secondly, there is in its stead the reestablishment of the primitive system of mutually supporting squadrons in line ahead. Thirdly, there is the principle of throwing one squadron in superior force upon one end of the enemy's formation, and using the other squadrons to cover the attack or support it if need arose. Fourthly, there is the principle of concealment—that is, disposing the squadrons in such a manner that even after the real attack has been delivered the enemy cannot tell what the containing squadrons mean to do, and in consequence are forced to hold their parrying move in suspense. The memorandum also included the idea of concentration, and this is often spoken of as its conspicuous merit. But in the idea of concentration there was nothing new, even if we go back no further than Rodney. It was only the method of concentration, woven out of his four fundamental innovations, that was new. Moreover, as Nelson delivered the attack, he threw away the simple idea of concentration. For a suddenly conceived strategical object he deliberately exposed the heads of his columns to what with almost any other enemy would have been an overwhelming superiority. On the other hand, by making, as he did, a perpendicular instead of a parallel attack, as he had intended, he accentuated—it is true at enormous risk—the cardinal points of his design; that is, he departed still further from the old order of battle, and he still further concealed from the enemy what the real attack was to be, and after it was developed what the containing squadron was going to do. Concentration in fact was only the crude and ordinary raw material of a design of unmatched subtlety and invention.
The keynote of his conception, then, was his revolutionary substitution of the primitive Elizabethan and early seventeenth century method for the fetish of the single line. For some time it is true the established battle order had been blown upon from various quarters, but no one as yet had been able to devise any system convincing enough to dethrone it. It will be remembered that at least as early as 1759 an Additional Instruction had provided for a battle order in two lines, but it does not appear ever to have been used.[5] Rodney's manoeuvre again had foreshadowed the use of parts of the line independently for the purpose of concentration and containing. In 1782 Clerk of Eldin had privately printed his Essay, which contained suggestions for an attack from to-windward, with the line broken up into echeloned divisions in close resemblance to the disposition laid down in Nelson's memorandum. In 1790 this part of his work was published. Meanwhile an even more elaborate and well-reasoned assault on the whole principle of the single line had appeared in France. In 1787 the Vicomte de Grenier, a French flag officer, had produced his L'Art de la Guerre sur Mer, in which he boldly attacked the law laid down by De Grasse, that so long as men-of-war carried their main armament in broadside batteries there could never be any battle order but the single line ahead. In Grenier's view the English had already begun to discard it, and he insists that, in all the actions he had seen in the last two wars, the English, knowing the weakness of the single line, had almost always concentrated on part of it without regular order. The radical defects of the line he points out are: that it is easily thrown into disorder and easily broken, that it is inflexible, and too extended a formation to be readily controlled by signals. He then proceeds to lay down the principle on which a sound battle order should be framed, and the fundamental objects at which it should aim[6]. His postulates are thus stated: |
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