[Sidenote: B.C. 282 (a.u. 472)] 3. Dio in Book 9: "Lucius Valerius, [Footnote: Appian (Samnite Wars, VII, 1) gives the second name as Cornelius.] who was admiral of the Romans and had been despatched on some errand by them." (Bekker, Anecd. p.158, 25. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

4. Lucius was despatched by the Romans to Tarentum. Now the Tarentini were celebrating the Dionysia, and sitting gorged with wine in the theatre of an afternoon suspected that he was sailing against them as an enemy. Immediately in a passion and partly under the influence of their intoxication they set sail in turn: so without any show of force on his part or the slightest expectation of any hostile act they attacked and sent to the bottom both him and many others. When the Romans heard of this they naturally were angry, but did not choose to take the field against Tarentum at once. However, they despatched envoys in order not to seem to have passed over the affair in silence and by that means render them more impudent. But the Tarentini, so far from receiving them decently or even sending them back with an answer in any way suitable, at once, before so much as granting them an audience, made sport of their dress and general appearance. It was the city garb, which we use in the Forum; and this the envoys had put on, either for the sake of stateliness or else through fear, thinking that this at least would cause the foreigners to respect their position. Bands of revelers accordingly jeered at them,—they were still celebrating the festival, which, although they were at no time noted for temperate behavior, rendered them still more wanton,—and finally a man planted himself in the road of Postumius and, with a forward inclination, threw him down and soiled his clothing. At this an uproar arose from all the rest, who praised the fellow as if he had performed some remarkable deed, and they sang many scurrilous anapaests upon the Romans, accompanied by applause and capering steps. But Postumius cried: "Laugh, laugh while you may! For long will be the period of your weeping, when you shall wash this garment clean with your blood." (Ursinus, p.375. Mai, 168. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

5. Hearing this they ceased their jests but could accomplish nothing towards obtaining pardon for their insult: however, they took to themselves credit for a kindness in the fact that they let the ambassadors withdraw unharmed. (Mai, ib.)

6. Meton, failing to persuade the Tarentini not to engage in hostilities with the Romans, retired unobserved from the assembly, put garlands on his head, and returned along with some fellow-revelers and a flute girl. At the sight of him singing and dancing the kordax, they gave up the business in hand to accompany his movements with shouts and hand-clapping, as is often done under such circumstances. But he, after reducing them to silence, spoke: "Now it is yours both to be drunken and to revel, but if you accomplish what you plan to do, we shall be slaves." (Mai, p.169.)

[Frag. XL]

[Sidenote: B.C. 281 (a.u. 473)] King Pyrrhus was not only king of the district called Epirus, but had made the larger part of the Greek world his own, partly by kindness and partly by fear. The AEtolians, who at that period possessed great power, and Philip [Footnote: The son of Cassander, who ruled only four months in B. C. 296.] the Macedonian, and the chief men in Illyricum did his bidding. By natural brilliancy and force of education and experience in affairs he far surpassed all, so as to be esteemed far beyond what was warranted by his own powers and those of his allies, although these powers were great. (Valesius, p.589. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

2. Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus, had a particularly high opinion of his powers in that he was deemed by foreign nations a match for the Romans: and he believed that it would be opportune to assist the fugitives who had taken refuge with him, especially as they were Greeks, and at the same time to anticipate the Romans with some plausible excuse before he received any damage at their hands. So careful was he about a fair pretext that though he had long had his eye on Sicily and had been considering how he could overthrow the Roman dominion, he shrank from taking the initiative in hostilities, when no wrong had been done him. (Mai, p.169. Zonaras, 8, 2.)

3. King Pyrrhus was said to have captured more cities by Cineas than by his own spear. For the latter, says Plutarch, [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 14.] was skilled in speaking,—the only one in fact to be compared in skill with Demosthenes. Notwithstanding, as a sensible man, he spoke in opposition to Pyrrhus, pointing out to him the folly of the expedition. For the king intended by his prowess to rule the whole earth, whereas Cineas urged him to be satisfied with his own possessions, which were sufficient for enjoyment. But the man's fondness for war and fondness for leadership prevailed against the advice of Cineas and caused him to depart in disgrace from both Sicily and Italy, after losing in all of the battles many myriads of his own forces. (Valesius, p.586.)

4. Pyrrhus sent to Dodona and enquired of the oracle about the expedition. And a response having come to him: "You, if you cross into Italy, Romans shall conquer," he construed it according to his wish (for desire has mighty power to deceive any one) and would not even await the coming of spring. (Mai, p.169.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 280 (a.u. 474)] 5. The Rhegians had asked of the Romans a garrison, and Decius [Footnote: Decius Vibellius.] was the leader of it. The majority of these guards, accordingly, as a result of the excess of supplies and general easy habits,—for they enjoyed a far less strenuous existence than they had known at home,—through the persuasion of Decius formed the desire to kill the foremost Rhegians and occupy the city. It seemed as though they might be quite free to perform whatever they pleased, unconcerned about the Romans, who were busied with the Tarentini and with Pyrrhus. Decius was further enabled to persuade them by the fact that they saw Messana in the power of the Mamertines. The latter, who were Campanians and had been appointed to garrison it by Agathocles, the lord of Sicily, had slaughtered the natives and occupied the town.

The conspirators did not, however, make their attempt openly, since they were decidedly inferior in numbers. Letters were forged by Decius, purporting to have been written to Pyrrhus by some citizens with a view to the betrayal of the city. He next assembled the soldiers and read these to them, stating that they had been intercepted, and by his talk (the character of which may easily be conceived) excited them greatly. The effect was enhanced by the sudden announcement of a man (who had been assigned to the role) that a portion of Pyrrhus's fleet had anchored somewhere off the coast, having come for a conference with the traitors. Others, who had been instructed, magnified the matter, and shouted out that they must anticipate the Rhegians before some harm happened, and that the traitors, ignorant of what was being done, would find it difficult to resist them. So some rushed down to the landing places, and others broke into the houses and slaughtered great numbers,—save that a few had been invited to dinner by Decius and were slain there. (Valesius, p.589.)

6. Decius, commander of the garrison, after slaying the Rhegians, ratified friendship with the Mamertines, thinking that the similar nature of their outrages would render them most trustworthy allies. He was well aware that a great many men find the ties resulting from some common transgression stronger to unite them than the obligations of lawful association or the bonds of kinship. (Mai, p.170.)

7. The Romans suffered some reproach from them for a while, until such time as they took the field against them. For since they were busied with concerns that were greater and more urgent, what these men did seemed to some of comparatively little importance. (Mai, p.170.)

8. The Romans, on learning that Pyrrhus was to come, stood in terror of him, since they had heard that he was a good warrior and had a large force by no means despicable as an adversary,—the sort of information, of course, that is always given to enquirers in regard to persons unknown to them who live at a very great distance. (Mai, p.170. Zonaras, 8,3.)

9. For it is impossible that persons not brought up under the same institutions, nor filled with the same ambitions, nor regarding the same things as base or noble, should ever become friends with one another. [Footnote: Nos. 9, 10, and 11 are thought to be possibly from the speech made by Laevinus to the soldiers (Zonaras, VIII, 3, 6).] (Mai, p. 537.)

10. Ambition and distrust are always qualities of tyrants, and so it is inevitable that they should possess no real friend. A man who is distrusted and envied could not love any one sincerely. Moreover, a similarity of habits and a like station in life and the fact that the same objects are disastrous and beneficial to persons are the only forces that can create true, firm friends. Wherever any one of these conditions is lacking, you see a delusive appearance of comradeship, but find it to be without secure support. (Mai, p.170 and 537.)

11. Generalship, if it is assisted by respectable forces of men, contributes greatly both to their preservation and their chances of victory, but by itself is worth nothing. Nor is there any other profession that is of weight without persons to cooeperate and to aid in its administration. (Mai, p.171.)

12. When Megacles was dead and Pyrrhus had cast off his cap the battle took an opposite turn. One side was filled with much greater boldness by his preservation and the fact that he had survived contrary to their fears than if the idea had never gained ground that he was dead: the other side, deceived, had no second fund of zeal to expend, but, since they had been cut short in their premature encouragement and because of the sudden change in their feelings to an expectation of less favorable results, had no hope that he might subsequently perish once more. (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

13. When certain men congratulated Pyrrhus on his victory, he accepted the glory of the exploit, but said that if he should ever conquer again in like fashion, it would be his ruin. Besides this story, it is told of him that he admired the Romans even in their defeat and judged them superior to his own soldiers, declaring: "I should already have mastered the whole inhabited world, were I king of the Romans." (Mai, p.171. Zonaras, 8, 3.)

14. Pyrrhus became famous for his victory and acquired a great reputation from it, to such an extent that many who were standing neutral came over to his side and that all the allies who had been watching the turn of events espoused his cause. He did not openly display anger towards them nor conceal entirely his suspicions; he rebuked them somewhat for their tardiness, but otherwise received them kindly. The result of showing excessive irritation would be, he feared, their open estrangement, while if he failed to reveal his real feelings at all, he thought that he would either be condemned by them for his simplicity in not comprehending what they had done, or would be suspected of harboring secret wrath. Such a surmise would breed in them either contempt or hatred, or would lead to a plot against him, due to the desire to anticipate injuries that they might suffer at his hands. For these reasons, then, he conversed affably with them and presented to them some of the spoils. (Mai, p.172. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

15. Pyrrhus at first undertook to persuade the Roman captives (who were many) to join with him in a campaign against Rome; when, however, they refused, he treated them with the utmost consideration and did not put them in prison or harm them in any other way, his intention being to restore them voluntarily and through their agency to win over the city without a battle. (Valesius, p.590.)

16. The Romans, who by reason of the elephants,—a kind of beast that they had never before seen,—had fallen into dismay, still, by reflecting on the mortal nature of the animals and the fact that no beast is superior to man, but that all of them in every way show inferiority if not as regards strength, at least in respect to understanding, they gradually became encouraged. (Mai, p.172.)

17. The soldiers of Pyrrhus, also, both his native followers and the allies, showed tremendous eagerness for plunder, which seemed to lie ready before them and to be free from danger. (Mai, ib.)

18. The Epirots dishonored the ties of friendship, through vexation that after making the campaign supported by high hopes they were getting nothing except trouble. And this happened very opportunely for the Romans: for the dwellers in Italy that had leagued themselves with him, on seeing that he ravaged the possessions of allies and enemies alike, withdrew. In other words, his acts made a greater impression upon them than his promises. (Mai, ib.)

19. Pyrrhus dreaded being cut off on all sides by the Romans, while he was in unfamiliar regions. When his allies showed displeasure at this he told them that he could see clearly from the country itself what a difference existed between them and the Romans. The subject territory of the latter had all kinds of trees, vineyards and farms, and expensive agricultural machinery; whereas the property of his own friends had been so pillaged, that it was impossible to tell even whether it had ever been settled. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

20. The same man, when as he was retreating it occurred to him to wonder [Footnote: Gap supplied by van Herwerden.] how he beheld the army of Laevinus much larger than it was before, declared that the Roman troops when cut to pieces grew whole again, hydra-fashion. This did not, however, cause him to lose courage: he made preparations in his turn, but did not come to the issue of battle. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8,4.)

21. Pyrrhus, who learned that Fabricius and other envoys were approaching, to treat in behalf of the captives, sent a guard to them as far as the border, to the end that they should suffer no violence at the hands of the Tarentini, met them in due time, escorted them to the city, entertained them brilliantly and honored them in other ways, expecting that they would ask for a truce and make such terms as was proper for a defeated party. (Ursinus, p.376. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

22. When Fabricius made this statement merely: "The Romans sent us to bring back the men captured in battle, and to pay ransoms of such size for them as shall be agreed upon by both of us," he was quite dumbfounded because the man did not say that he was commissioned to treat about peace; and after removing them he took counsel with the friends who were usually his advisers partly, to be sure, about the return of the captives, but chiefly about the war and its management, whether with vehemence or in some other way it [lacuna] (Four pages are lacking.) (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

23 [lacuna]. "to manage, or to run the risk of battles and combats, the outcome of which is doubtful. [Footnote: Cineas is the speaker.] Hence, if you heed me, Milo, and the old proverb, you will not employ violence for any purpose rather than skill, where the latter is feasible, since Pyrrhus knows precisely what he has to do and does not need to be enlightened by us regarding a single detail of his program." By this speech they were all brought to one decision, particularly because this course entailed neither loss nor danger, whereas the others were likely to bring both. And Pyrrhus, being of this mind, said to the ambassadors: "Not willingly, Romans, did I previously make war upon you, and I would not war against you now: I feel that it is of the highest importance to become your friend, and for this reason I release all the captives without ransom and make a treaty of peace." Privately, also, he did them favors, in order that, if possible, they might take his part, or at any rate obtain friendship for him. (Mai, p.173. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

24. Pyrrhus made friends of nearly all, and with Fabricius he conversed as follows: "Fabricius, I do not want to be at war with you any longer, and indeed I repent that I heeded the Tarentini in the first place and came hither, although I have beaten you badly in battle. I would gladly, then, become a friend to all the Romans, but most of all to you. For I see that you are a thoroughly excellent and reputable [Footnote: The two words "and reputable" are a conjecture of Bossevain's. Some ten letters in the MS. have faded out.] man. I accordingly ask you to help me in getting peace and furthermore to accompany me home. I want to make a campaign against Greece and need you as adviser and general." Fabricius replied: "I commend you for repenting of your expedition and desiring peace, and will cordially assist you in that purpose if it is to our advantage (for of course you will not ask me, a man who pretends to uprightness, as you say, to do anything against my country); but an adviser and general you must never choose from a democracy: as for me, I have no leisure whatever. Nor could I ever accept any of these things, because it is not seemly for an ambassador to receive gifts at all. I would fain know, therefore, whether you in very truth regard me as a reputable man or not. If I am a scoundrel, how is it that you deem me worthy of gifts? If, on the other hand, I am a man of honor, how can you bid me accept them? Let me assure you, then, of the fact that I have many possessions and am in no need of more: what I own supplies me and I feel no desire for what belongs to others. You, however, even if you believe yourself ever so rich, are in unspeakable poverty. For you would not have crossed over to this land, leaving behind Epirus and the rest of your dominions, if you had been content with them and had not been reaching out for more. Whenever a man is in this condition and sets no limit to his greed, he is the poorest of beggars. And why? Because he longs for everything not his own as if it were absolutely necessary, and with the idea that he could not live without it.

"Consequently I would gladly, since you call yourself my friend, afford you a little of my own wealth. It is far more secure and imperishable than yours, and no one envies it or plots against it, neither populace nor tyrant: best of all, the larger the number of persons who share it, the greater it will grow. In what, accordingly, does it consist? In using the little one has with as much satisfaction as if it were inexhaustible, in refraining from the goods of others as if they contained some mighty danger, in wronging no man, in doing well to many, and in numberless other details, which only a person of leisure could rehearse. I, for my part, should choose, if it were absolutely necessary to suffer either one or the other, to perish by violence rather than by deceit. The former falls to the lot of some by the decree of Fortune, but the latter only as a result of folly and great greed of gain: it is, therefore, preferable to fall by the crushing hand of Fate [Footnote: Omitting [Greek: ti], and reading [Greek: thehioy], which the MSS. give.] rather than by one's own baseness. In the former instance a man's body is laid low, but in the latter his soul is ruined as well,[lacuna] but in that case a man becomes to a certain extent the slayer of himself, because he who has once taught his soul not to be content with the fortune already possessed, acquires a boundless desire for increased advantages." (Mai, pp.174 and 538. Zonaras, 8, 4.)

25. And they presented themselves for the enlistment with the greatest zeal, believing, each man of them, that his own defection would mean the overthrow of the fatherland. [Footnote: Cp. Plutarch, Life of Pyrrhus, chapter 18 (early).] (Mai, p.176.)

26. Such is the nature of oratory and so great is its power that it led even them to change, causing courage and hatred to take the place respectively of the fear inspired by Pyrrhus and the estrangements his gifts had wrought. (Mai, ib.)

27. Every force which, contrary to expectation, is humbled in spirit, suffers a loss also in strength. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 279 (a.u. 475)] 28. Pyrrhus sent to Decius, telling him that he would not succeed in accomplishing this even if he wished it [i. e., to die without being seized] and threatened besides that if he were taken alive he should perish miserably. To this the consuls answered that they were in no need of having recourse to such a proceeding as the one to which he alluded, since they were sure to conquer him in other ways. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 278 (a.u. 476)] 29. He did not know how he would repulse the one of them [Footnote: "They" are C. Fabricius Luscinus and Q. Aemilius Papus, Roman consuls.] first, nor how he should repel them both, and was in perplexity. To divide the army, which was smaller than that of his opponents, was something he feared to do, yet to allow one of them to ravage the country with impunity seemed to him almost out of the question. (Mai, p.177.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 277 (a.u. 477)] 30. However, he behaved in general toward them with great circumspection, and awarded greater credit for his safety to the fact that no one, even if he wished, could harm him, than to the probability that no one would have desired to inflict an injury. It was for this reason, too, that he expelled and slew many who held office and many who called him in to help in their disputes. This was partly because he was somewhat displeased with them, on account of their statements that he had secured the reins of power in the State through their influence, and partly because he was suspicious of them and thought that as they had come over to his side so they might go over to some one else's [lacuna] (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 5.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 276 (a.u. 479)] 31. As the allies were unwilling to contribute anything for the support of Pyrrhus, he betook himself to the treasuries of Persephone, that were widely reputed for their wealth, despoiled them and sent the spoils on ships to Tarentum. And the men almost all perished through a storm, while the money and offerings were cast out on land. (Valesius, p.590.)

32. All admired the following act of Pyrrhus. Some youths at a banquet had ridiculed him, and at first he wished to have them before a court and exact vengeance, but, afterward, when they declared: "We should have said a lot more things a good deal worse, if the wine hadn't failed us," he laughed and let them go. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 273 (a.u. 481)] Ptolemy, nicknamed Philadelphus, king of Egypt, when he learned that Pyrrhus had fared poorly and that the Romans were growing, sent gifts to them and made a compact. The Romans, accordingly, pleased that a monarch living so very far away should have come to respect them, despatched ambassadors to him in turn. From him the envoys, too, received magnificent gifts; but when they had offered these to the treasury, they would not accept them. (Ursinus, p.374. Zonaras, 8, 6.)

[Frag. XLII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 266 (a.u. 488)]Though the Romans were faring in this manner and were constantly rising to greater heights they showed no haughtiness as yet: on the contrary, they surrendered to the Appolloniatians (Corinthian colonists on the Ionian Gulf) Quintus Fabius, a senator, because he had insulted some of their ambassadors. The people of this town, however, did him no harm, and even sent him home. (Valesius, p.590. Zonaras, 8, 7.)

[Frag. XLIII]

1. The causes responsible for the dispute between the two were—on the side of the Romans that the Carthaginians had assisted the Tarentini, on the side of the Carthaginians, that the Romans had made a treaty of friendship with Hiero. But these they merely put forward as excuses, as those are inclined to do who in reality are desirous of advancing their own interests but pause before a reputation for such action. The truth is different. As a matter of fact, the Carthaginians, who had long been powerful, and the Romans, who were now growing rapidly, kept viewing each other with jealousy; and they were incited to war partly by the desire of continually getting more, according to the instinct of the majority of mankind, most active when they are most successful, and partly also by fear. Each alike thought that the one sure salvation for her own possessions lay in obtaining what the other held. If there had been no other reason, it was most difficult, nay, impossible, for two nations that were free, powerful, and proud, and separated from each other, so to speak, only a very short distance (considering the speed of voyages) to rule any outside tribes and yet keep their hands off each other. But a mere accident of the kind that befell broke the truce they had been keeping and dashed them together in war. (Mai, p.178. Zonaras, 8, 8.)

2. The conflict, according to report, concerned Messana and Sicily, but in reality both parties perceived that from this region danger threatened their native land, and they thought that the island, lying, as it did, between them, would furnish to the side that conquered it a safe base for operations against the other party. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras, 8, 8.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 264 (a.u. 490)] 3. Gaius Claudius came to the meeting, and among other remarks which he made to tempt them declared that the object of his presence was to free the city, since the Romans had no need of Messana; and that he would immediately sail away, as soon as he should set their affairs in order. Next he bade the Carthaginians also either to withdraw, or, if they had any just plea to offer, to submit to arbitration. Now when not one of the Mamertines (by reason of fear) opened his lips, and the Carthaginians since they were occupying the city by force of arms paid little heed to him, he stated that the silence on both sides afforded sufficient evidence: on the part of the invaders it showed that they were in the wrong, for they would have justified themselves if their purposes were at all honest, and on the part of the Mamertines that they desired freedom; they might have been quite free to speak, had they espoused the cause of the Carthaginians, especially as there was a force of the latter present. Furthermore he promised that he would aid them, both on account of their Italian origin and on account of the request for assistance they had made. (Mai, p.179. Zonaras, 8,8.)

4. Gaius Claudius lost some of the triremes and with difficulty reached safety. Neither he nor the Romans in the City, however, were prevented from renewing attempts by sea through the fact that they had been worsted when first making a trial of it, although this is the ordinary course that people pursue who fail in the first undertaking and think that they can never again succeed, viewing the past in the light of an omen. On the contrary, they applied themselves to the watery element with an even greater zeal, and chiefly because they were ambitious and did not wish to appear to have been diverted from their purpose by the disaster. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras 8, 8, sq.) 5. Hanno, who was in no wise disposed to make light of the war in case it were bound to occur, was particularly anxious to throw the responsibility for breaking the truce upon the other man, for fear it might be thought that he himself was taking the initiative. Accordingly, he sent back to him the ships and the captives, while he urged him to accept peace and exhorted him besides not to meddle with the sea. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

6. When he would accept nothing, he launched at him an arrogant and reprehensible threat. For he declared that he would never allow the Romans even to wash their hands in the sea: yet he lost not only the sea but also Messana not much later. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

7. Claudius, finding the Mamertines gathered at the harbor, called an assembly of their number and made the statement: "I have no need of arms but will leave it with you to decide everything." By this means he persuaded them to send for Hanno. As the latter refused to come down, he chid him soundly, inveighing against him and declaring that if he had even the slightest justification, he would certainly hold a conference with him and not persist in occupying the city by force. (Mai, p.180. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

8. The consul Claudius exhorted the soldiers beforehand to be of good cheer and not to be cast down over the defeat of the tribune. He instructed them that in the first place victories fall to the lot of the better equipped, and that secondly their valor far surpassed the skill of their opponents. They would acquire, he said, the knowledge of seafaring in a short time, whereas the Carthaginians would never have bravery equal to theirs. Knowledge was something that could be obtained in a brief space by men who gave their minds to it and could be mastered by practice; but bravery, in case it were absent from a man's nature, could never be furnished by instruction. (Mai, p. 181.)

9. The Libyans, rejoicing in the idea that they had conquered not through the nature of their position, but by their own valor, sallied out. But Claudius made them so fearful that they would not even peep out of the camp. (Mai, p. 181. Zonaras, 8, 9.)

10. For it happens in the majority of instances that those who as a result of calculation fear something are successful by reason of their precaution against it, whereas those whose boldness rests on lack of forethought, are ruined on account of their unguarded condition. [Footnote: The Carthaginians are, in a general way, the subject of this section.] (Mai, p. 539.)

11. The quality of moderation both obtains victories and preserves them after they are won, whereas that of wantonness can prevail against nothing, and if it be at any time fortunate in some matter, very easily destroys it. And again, if it perchance preserves some conquest, it grows worse by the very fact of extraordinary good fortune and so far from being benefited by its success is actually ruined by it irretrievably.

Moreover, whenever there is boldness not in accord with reason, you may expect to find unreasoning fear. Calculation, bringing with it resolution strengthened by forethought, and a hope made confident by its own trustworthiness do not allow one to be either dejected or presumptuous. Unreasoning impulse, however, often elates men in the midst of good fortune and humbles them to dust in disasters, possessing, as it were, no support, but always copying the feature of the chance event. (Mai, p. 539 and p. 181.)

12. The Romans and Carthaginians when they entered upon war were equally matched in the number of ships and readiness to serve. [Sidenote: B.C. 260 (a.u. 494)] It was a naval battle soon after in which, with equal equipment, they first became engaged. They hoped that it would decide the whole war: Sicily lay before their eyes as the prize: they were contending in a matter of servitude or empire, resolved not to be beaten, lest they taste the former, but to conquer and obtain the latter. One side surpassed in the experience possessed by the crews of its triremes, since they had long been masters of the sea, and the other in the strength of its marines and its daring; for the rashness and audacity of their fighting was commensurate with their inexperience in naval affairs. In matters of experience practically all men make exact calculations and are imbued with wholesome fear, even if their judgment approves a particular course, but the untried renders them unreasonably bold, and draws them into conflict through lack of due consideration. (Mai, p.181.)

13. The Carthaginians because of their defeat by the Romans in the sea-fight came near putting Hannibal to death. It is a trait of practically all people who send out armies on any mission to lay claims to advantage gained but to put the responsibility of defeat upon their leaders, and the Carthaginians were very ready to chastise those who failed in an enterprise.

He, however, was afraid and immediately after the defeat enquired of them whether if the business were still untouched they would bid him risk a sea-fight or not. When they declared in the affirmative, as he had doubtless expected, because they prided themselves on having such a superior navy, he added, by the mouths of the same messengers: "I, then, have done no wrong, for I went into the engagement with the same hopes as you. The decision was within my power but not the fortune of the battle." (Mai, p.182. Zonaras, 8, 11.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 258 (a.u. 496)] 14. Dio in Book 11: "When the storm continued and a mist arose besides, he brought about Hannibal's defeat through the agency of some deserters." (Bekker, Anecd. p.171, 26. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

15. But regarding the non-surrender of their native land and the acquirement of foreign territory as matters of equal importance, they [Footnote: I.e., The Carthaginians.] contended with courage and force. For whereas most men defend their own possessions to the very limit of their power but are unwilling to lay claim to the goods of others if it involves danger, these antagonists set a like value upon what they held fast and what they expected, and so were equally determined upon both points. Now the Romans thought it better to conduct the war no longer at a distance, nor to risk a first encounter in the islands, but to have the contest in the Carthaginians' own land. If they failed, they would lose nothing; and if they conquered they would obtain something besides hopes. Therefore, making their preparation follow their resolve, they took the field against Carthage. (Mai, p. 183. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (a.u. 498)] 16. Their leaders were Regulus and Lucius, preferred before others for their excellence. Regulus was, indeed, in so great poverty that he did not readily consent, on that account, to take up the command; and it was voted that his wife and children should be furnished their support from the public treasury. (Valesius, p. 593. Zonaras, 8, 12.)

17. Hanno had been sent to the Romans by Hamilcar, as was pretended, in behalf of peace, but in reality for the sake of delay. And he, when some clamored for his arrest, because the Carthaginians by fraud [lacuna] Cornelius [lacuna] [Mai, p. 183.] Four pages of the MS. are lacking. (Zonaras, 8, 12.)

18. Dio the Roman, who wrote a history about the Empire and the Republic of Rome and describes the far-famed Carthaginian war, says that when Regulus,

[Sidenote: B.C. 256 (a.u. 498)] consul for Rome, was warring against Carthage, a serpent suddenly crept out of the palisade of the Roman army and lay there. By his command the Romans slew the reptile and having flayed it sent its skin, a great prodigy, to the Roman senate. And when measured by the same senate (as the same Dio says) it was found to have a length of one hundred and twenty feet. In addition to its length its thickness was also notable. (Ioannes Damascenus, On Serpents, vol. I, p. 472, A.B. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 13.)

19. The Carthaginians in fear of capture sent heralds to the consul to the end that by some satisfactory arrangement they might turn aside the danger of the moment, and so escape. But since they refused to withdraw from both Sicily and Sardinia, to release the Roman captives free of cost and to ransom their own, to make good all the expenses incurred by the Romans for the war and besides to pay more as tribute each year, they accomplished nothing. And in addition to the above mentioned, there were the following commands which displeased them: that they should make neither war nor treaties without the consent of the Romans, that they should employ not more than one warship but the Romans would come to their aid with fifty triremes as often as notice should be sent them, and that they would not be on an equal footing in conducting some other kinds of business. Considering these points they decided that the truce would mean their utter subjugation, and preferred rather to fight with the Romans. (Ursinus, p. 376. Zonaras, 8, 13.)

20. Dio in Book 11: "The Carthaginians kept watch for their ships homeward bound and captured several heavily laden with money." (Bekker, Anecd. p. 131, 12. Zonaras, 8, 14.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (a.u. 503)] 21. They say the Carthaginians sent heralds to the Romans on account of the great number of the captives (among other causes), and most of all to see if they would be inclined to make peace on some moderate terms; if this could not be effected, their purpose still held to get back the captives. They say that Regulus, too, had been sent among the envoys because of his reputation and valor. The people assumed that the Romans would do anything whatever in the hope of getting him back, so that he might even be delivered up alone in return for peace, or at any rate in exchange for the captives. Accordingly, they bound him by mighty oaths and pledges to return without fail in case neither of their objects should be accomplished, and they despatched him as an envoy with others.

And he acted in all respects like a Carthaginian, not a Roman; for he did not even grant his wife leave to confer with him nor did he enter the city, although he was invited: instead, when the senate assembled outside of the walls, as their custom was in treating with the envoys of the enemy, he asked for permission to approach with the others—at least, so the story goes, [lacuna] (Ursinus, p. 377. Zonaras, 8, 15.)

22. Dio in Book 11: "Regulus paid no heed to them until the Carthaginians permitted him to do so." (Bekker, Anecd. p. 140, 20. Zonaras, 8, 15.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 251 (a.u. 503)] 23. Dio in Book 11: "For it is neither my duty nor that of any other upright man to give up aught that pertains to the public welfare." (Ib. p. 165, 23.)

24. In Book 11: "Any one else, wishing to console himself for the disaster which had happened in his own case, would have exalted the prowess of the enemy." (Ib. p. 165, 30.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 249 (a.u. 505)] 25. The second part of the augury is transmitted to us by Dio Cassius Cocceianus, who says that they keep tame birds which eat barley, and put barley grains in front of them when they seek an omen. If, then, in the course of eating the birds do not strike the barley with their beaks and toss it aside, the sign is good; but if they do so strike the grain, it is not good. (Io. Tzetzes, Exegesis of Homer's Iliad, p. 108, 2.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 244 (a.u. 510)] 26. He [sc. Mamilcar] thought it was requisite for a man who wished to accomplish anything by secret means not to make the matter known to anyone at all. There was no one, he believed, so self-possessed as to be willing, when he had heard, merely to observe operations and be silent. Just the reverse was true: the more strongly a man might be forbidden to mention anything, the greater would be his desire to speak of it, and thus one man learning the secret from another with the understanding that he was the only person to know it would reveal the story. [Footnote: Section 26 may refer to Hamilcar Barca's plans for seizing Mount Eryx.] (Mai, p. 540. Cp. Diodorus, 24, 7.)

27. In Book 11 of Dio: "He feasted the populace." [Footnote: Boissevain thinks that No. 27 may concern the banqueting of the populace during Metellus's triumph. Others have other opinions.] (Bekker, Anecd. p. 133, 24.)

28. In Book 11 of Dio: "You attack even such friends as have been guilty of any error, whereas I pardon even my enemies." (Ib. p.171, 29.)

29. In Book 12 of Dio: "By the one process [Footnote: Perhaps from the speech of Regulus to the senators.] he might have become to a certain extent estranged from you." (Ib. p.124, 4.) 30. In Book 12 of Dio: "Some are dead, and others who were deserving of some notice, have been captured." [Footnote: This may be likewise from the speech of Regulus and be said of the Carthaginian leaders.] (Ib. p. 133,25.)

[Frag. XLIV]

1. For the Ligurians occupy the whole shore from Etruria up to the Alps and as far as Gaul, according to Dio's statement. (Isaac Tzetzes, on Lycophron, 1312.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 236 (a.u. 518)] 2. The Romans at first sent Claudius to the Corsicans and gave him up. This was after he had made terms with them, but his countrymen, who claimed that the fault in breaking the compact rested on him and not on themselves, had waged war upon them and subdued them. When the Corsicans refused to receive him, the Romans drove him out. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8, 18.)

[Frag. XLV]

[Sidenote: B.C. 235 (a.u. 519)] 1. The Romans after exacting also money from the Carthaginians, renewed the truce. And at first when an embassy from the latter arrived, they returned no proper answer, because they were aware of the state of their own equipment and because they were themselves still busied at that time with the war against the neighboring tribes. After this, however, Hanno, a man of youthful years who employed striking frankness of speech, was sent. He touched unreservedly on a number of other subjects and finally his appeal—"If you don't want to be at peace, restore to us both Sardinia and Sicily; for with these we purchased not a temporary respite but eternal friendship"—caused them to become milder and ashamed [lacuna] (Ursinus, p.378. Zonaras, 8, 18.)

2[lacuna] lest [Footnote: Preceding this fragment four pages of the MS. are missing.] they might suffer the same injuries in return, so that they were very glad to delay,—the one side choosing to preserve the prosperity that was an inheritance of the past, and the other to cling to the possessions which were still theirs. To judge by their threats they were no longer maintaining peace, but in fact they still deliberated about the matter, so that all could see that whichever of the two found it to his advantage to create the first disturbance would also be the one to begin war. Most men abide by their agreements just so long as suits their own convenience. If they have in view a greater resultant benefit to themselves, they deem it safe even to break some compact. (Mai, p.184.)

[Frag. XLVI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 231 (a.u. 523)] Once in the consulship of Marcus Pomponius and Gaius Papirius they despatched envoys to investigate affairs in Spain, although none of the Spanish States had ever yet belonged to them. He, [Footnote: A reference to some previous proper name, outside this fragment.] besides showing them other honors, addressed them in suitable words, declaring that he was obliged to fight against the Spaniards in order that the money which was still owing to the Romans on the part of the Carthaginians might be paid; for it was impossible to obtain it from any other source. The envoys were consequently embarrassed to know how to censure him. (Mai, p.184)

[Frag. XLVII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (a.u. 524)] 1. The island of Issa surrendered itself voluntarily to the Romans. This was the first time the islanders were about to make the acquaintance of the latter, but they judged them more friendly and faithful than the powers which they then dreaded. Calculation caused them to place more dependence on the unknown than on the evident; for while the latter had aroused irritation through the dealings already had with it, the former afforded good hope, because its actions were as yet only matters of expectation. (Mai, ib. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 230 (a.u. 524)] 2. When the Issaeans had attached themselves to the Romans, the latter, being ready and anxious to do them some favor in return forthwith, so as to get the reputation of aiding such as espoused their cause and also for the purpose of restraining the Ardiasans, who were annoying those that sailed from Brundusium,—for these reasons they sent messengers to Agro, who were to ask clemency for the Issaeans and censure the king in that he was wronging them without previous cause. Now these men found Agro no longer in existence: he had died, leaving behind a child named Pineus. Teuta, Agro's wife and stepmother of Pineus, held the power over the Ardiaeans,[lacuna] Being [lacuna] by boldness, she made no moderate response to their requests, but woman-like she showed a vanity (due to innate recklessness as well as to the power that she was holding) by casting some of the ambassadors into prison and killing others for speaking frankly. Such was her action at that time, and she actually took pride in it as if she had displayed some strength by her facile cruelty. In a very short space, however, she proved the weakness of the female sex, for as she had quickly flown into a passion through short-sightedness of judgment, so through cowardice she was quickly terrified. As soon as she learned that the Romans had voted for war against her she was panic-stricken, and promised to restore their men whom she held, while she tried to defend herself for the death of the others, declaring that they had been slain by some robbers. When the Romans were thus led to cease temporarily their campaign and demand the surrender of the murderers, she showed contempt again, because the danger was not yet at her doors, and declaring that she would not give anybody up despatched an army against Issa. When she learned that the consuls were at hand she grew terrified again, gave over her high spirit, and became ready to heed them in every minutest detail. She had not yet, however, been fully brought to her senses, for when the consuls had crossed over to Corcyra she felt imbued with new courage, revolted, and despatched an army against Epidamnus and Apollonia. After the Romans had rescued the cities and at the news of their capture of ships and treasures of hers she was on the point of again yielding obedience. Meanwhile in the course of scaling certain heights overlooking the sea they were worsted near the Atyrian hill and she now waited, hoping, in view of the fact that it was really winter already, for their withdrawal. But on perceiving that Albinus remained where he was and Demetrius as a result of her caprice as well as from fear of the Romans had transferred his allegiance, besides persuading some others to desert, she became utterly terrified and gave up her sovereignty. (Ursinus, p. 378. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Frag. XLVIII]

[Sidenote: B.C. 228 (a.u. 526)] In the time of Fabius Maximus Berucosus ("full of warts") the Romans did this, after burying in the middle Of the Forum a Greek and a Gallic couple, man and woman: they were frightened by a certain oracle which said that Greek and Gaul should occupy the city. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603, 1056. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 19.)

[Frag. XLIX]

1. The Romans were being frightened by an oracle of the Sibyl which urged the necessity of guarding against the Gauls when a thunderbolt should fall upon the Capitol near the temple of Apollo. (Mai, p. 185.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 225 (a.u. 529)] 2. The Gauls became dejected on seeing that the Romans had taken beforehand the most favorable locations. All men if they obtain the object of their first aim proceed more readily toward their subsequent goals, but if they miss it, lose interest in everything else. They, however, after the Gallic fashion and more than is usual with the rest of mankind, lay hold very eagerly of what they desire and cling most tenaciously to any success, but if they meet with the slightest obstacle have no hope left for the future. Folly makes them inclined to expect whatsoever they wish, and their spirited temperament ready to carry out whatsoever they undertake. They are given to violent anger and dash headlong into enterprises, and for that reason they have within themselves no quality of endurance (since it is impossible for reckless audacity to prevail for any time), and if they once suffer any setback they are unable (especially by reason of the fear to which they then fall a prey) to recover themselves: they are plunged into a state of panic corresponding to their previous fearless daring. In a brief period they rush vehemently to the most opposite extremes, since they can furnish no motive based on calculation for either action. (Mai, p. 185.)

3. AEmilius on conquering the Insubres celebrated a triumph and in it conveyed the foremost captives clad in armor up to the Capitol, making jests upon them because he had heard that they had sworn not to remove their breastplates before they had ascended the Capitol. (Mai, p. 186. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. L]

If any of the details, even the smallest, that were customary in festivals had been missed, they renewed the ceremonial proceedings at any rate a second and a third time, and even more times still, so far as was possible in one day, till everything seemed to them to have been done faultlessly. (Mai, p. 186. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. LI]

[Sidenote: B.C. 219 (a.u. 535)] Demetrius, elated by his position as guardian of Pineus and by the fact that he had married the latter's mother Triteuta (Teuta was dead), was hateful to the natives and injured the property of neighboring tribes. So they summoned him before them (since it appeared that it was by misusing the friendship of the Romans that he was able to wrong those peoples) as soon as they heard of it. When he refused compliance and actually assailed their allies, they made a campaign against Issa, where he was. (Valesius, p.593. Zonaras, 8, 20.)

[Frag. LII]

1. The Romans were at their prime in equipment for war and enjoyed absolute harmony among themselves. Whereas the majority of persons are led by unmixed good fortune to audacity but by a tremendous fear to proper behavior, they had quite a different experience at that time in those matters. The more successes they had the more sober it made them; against their enemies they displayed the kind of boldness that partakes of bravery, while toward one another they employed that right dealing which is closely connected with good order. [Footnote: The word for "good order" is conjectured by van Herwerden.] They held their power with a view to the practice of moderation and kept their orderliness for the acquirement of a true bravery: they did not allow their good fortune to develop into wantonness, nor their right dealing into cowardice. They believed that in case of such laxity temperance might be ruined by bravery and boldness by boldness; but that when people exercised care, as they did, moderation was made more secure by bravery and good fortune rendered surer by discipline. This was the reason for their vast superiority over the enemies that encountered them and for their excellent administration of both their own affairs and those of the allies. (Mai, p. 186.)

2. All who dwelt on the near side of the Alps revolted to join the Carthaginians, not because they preferred the Carthaginians to the Romans as leaders, but because they hated the force that ruled them and were for welcoming the untried. The Carthaginians had allies against the Romans from every one of the tribes that then existed; but Hannibal was worth nearly all of them. He could comprehend matters very quickly and plan the details of every project that he laid to heart, notwithstanding the fact that generally sureness is the product of slowness and only rash decisions result from hastiness of disposition. He was most [lacuna] when given the smallest margin of time, and most enduring with a very great degree of reliability. He managed in a safe way the affair of the moment and showed skill in considering the future beforehand: he proved himself a most capable counselor in ordinary events and a very accurate judge of the unusual. By these powers he handled the issue immediately confronting him very readily and in the shortest time, while by calculation he anticipated the future afar off and considered it as though it were actually present. Consequently he, more than any man, met each occasion with suitable words and acts, because he made no distinction between what he possessed and what he hoped for. He was able to conduct matters so for the reason that in addition to his natural capacity he was well versed in much Phoenician learning, common to his country, and likewise much Greek, and furthermore he understood divination by inspection of entrails. (Mai, p. 187 and Valesius, p. 593.)

3. With such intellectual qualities he had brought his body to a state of equal perfection, partly by nature, partly by practice, so that he could carry out easily everything that he took in hand. It was nimble and at the same time heavy to the utmost degree, and he could, therefore, run, fight, and ride safely at full speed. He never burdened himself with overmuch food, nor suffered annoyance by lack of it, but took more or less with equal grace, feeling that either was satisfactory. Hardship made him rugged, and on loss of sleep he grew strong.

Having these advantages of mind and body he universally administered affairs in a fashion now to be described. Since he saw that most men were trustworthy only in what concerned their own interest, he himself dealt with them in this manner and expected the same treatment of them, so that he very often succeeded by deceiving persons and very seldom failed by being the object of a plot. He regarded as hostile every force that could gain an advantage both among foreigners and among kinsmen alike, and did not wait to learn their intentions from their acts, but handled them quite unsparingly, assuming that they were anxious to commit a wrong when they could: he thought it better to be the first to act than the first to suffer, and resolved that the rest of the world should be dependent on him, and not he upon other persons. In fine, he paid attention to the nature of things, rather than to their reputed good points, as often as the two did not happen to coincide. He also, however, prized extravagantly whatever he needed. Slaves, most of them, he esteemed in that way, and beheld them willing to encounter danger for him even contrary to their own advantage. For these reasons he often himself refrained from opportunities for gain and other most delightful pleasures, but gave a share ungrudgingly to them. Hence he could get them to be not unwilling partners in hard work. He subjected himself not only to the same conditions of living as these men, but also to the same dangers and was the first to accomplish every task that he demanded of them. Likewise he was confident that they, too, without pretexts and with zeal,—since he showed his care for them not in words only,—would help him effect his projects.

Toward the rest he always behaved quite proudly; and the whole multitude, in consequence, felt either good-will or fear toward him because of their similar conditions of life, on the one hand, and because of his haughtiness on the other. Accordingly, he was fully able to bring low the towering head, to exalt humility, and to inspire all whom he pleased, in the shortest period, one with hesitation, another with boldness, with hope also and despair regarding most important matters.

And that this information about him is not false, but is truthful tradition, his works are proof. Much of Spain he won over in a short time, and from there carried the war into Italy through the country of the Gauls, most of whom were not only not in league with him, but actually unknown to him. He was the first of non-Europeans, so far as we know, to cross the Alps with an army, and after that he made a campaign against Rome itself, sundering from it almost all its allies, some by force and others by persuasion. This, however, he achieved by himself without the aid of the Carthaginian government. He was not sent forth in the beginning by the magistrates at home, nor did he later obtain any considerable assistance from them. While they were on the eve of enjoying the greatest glory and benefit through his efforts, they wished rather not to appear to be leaving him in the lurch than to cooeperate effectively in any enterprise. (Valesius, p. 593.)

[Frag. LIII]

Dio Cocceianus calls the Narbonenses Bebruces, writing this: "To those who of old were Bebruces, but now Narbonenses, belongs the Pyrenees range. This range is the boundary between Spain and Gaul." (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 516. Zonaras, 8, 21.)

[Frag. LIV]

1. Peace both creates wealth and preserves it, but war both expends it and destroys it. [Footnote: The first eight sections of this fragment seem to be taken from speeches of Romans in the senate-house. Nos. 1 and 2 are apparently the words of an unknown individual discouraging the eagerness for war; Nos. 3 and 4 may be spoken by Lentulus, urging war; and Nos. 5 to 8 may contain the opposing arguments of Fabius.](Mai, p. 188.)

2. Every human being is so constituted as to desire to lord it over such as yield, and to employ the turn of Fortune's scale against voluntary slaves. (Mai, ib.)

3. But do you who know the facts and have experienced them, think that propriety and humaneness are sufficient for your safety? And do you regard listlessly all the wrongs they have committed against us by stealth or deceit or violence? Are you not stimulated, are you not for paying them back or for defending yourselves? Then again, you have never reflected that such behavior is in place for you toward one another, but toward the Carthaginians is cowardly and base. Our citizens we must treat in a gentle and politic fashion; if one be preserved unexpectedly, he is of our possessions: but harsh treatment is for the enemy. We shall save ourselves not by our defeats as a result of sparing them, but by our victories that will come from abasing them. (Mai, p.188.)

4. War both preserves men's own possessions and wins the property of others, whereas peace destroys not only what has been bestowed by war but itself in addition. (Mai, pp.188 and 541.)

[Frag. LIV]

5. It is base to proceed to action ere arguments about the matter have been heard: for in such a case, if successful, you will be thought to have enjoyed good fortune rather than to have employed good counsel, and if worsted, to have taken your resolution without forethought, at a time when there was no profit in it. And yet who does not know this,—that to heap up reproaches and to accuse people that have once warred against us is very easy—any man can do it—whereas, to say what is advantageous for the State, not in anger over other men's deeds, but with a view to the State's benefit, is really the duty of the advising class? Do not irritate us, Lentulus, nor persuade us to begin war until you show us that it shall be really for our advantage. Reflect particularly (though there are other considerations) that speaking here about deeds of war is not the same sort of thing as their actual performance. (Mai, p.189.)

6. Men are often set on their feet by disasters, and many who use them wisely fare better than those who are completely fortunate and for that very reason wanton. Somehow ill luck seems to hold no inconsiderable portion of benefit, because it does not permit men to lose their senses or indulge in extreme wantonness. For naturally it is most advisable to set one's face steadfastly toward all the best things, and to make not possibility, but calculation, the measure of desire. And if a man be not able to prefer what is more excellent, it will still pay him to behave, even unwillingly, with moderation so as to regard in the light of happiness even the failure to be fortunate in all cases. (Mai, p.542.)

7. It is imperative to be on one's guard against any similar experience again,—that being the only benefit that can come from disasters. Repeated good fortune occasionally ruins those who unthinkingly base their hopes upon it, believing they are sure of another victory, whereas failures compel every one as a result of his past trouble to provide for the future carefully beforehand. (Mai, pp.189 and 542.)

8. For securing the favor of the gods or a good reputation among men it is no small thing to escape the appearance of creating war, and seem to be compelled to defend the existing population. (Mai, p.189.)

9. After speeches of this character on both sides they determined to prepare for fighting: they would not vote that way however, but determined to send envoys to Carthage and denounce Hannibal; then, if the Carthaginians refrained from approving his exploits, they would arbitrate the matter, or if all responsibility were laid on his shoulders, they would demand his extradition; if he were given up, well; otherwise they would declare war. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

10. When the Carthaginians made no definite answer to the envoys and instead behaved contemptuously toward them, Marcus [Footnote: According to Livy (XXI, 18, 1) his name was Quintus. Willems suggests emending to Maximus here.] Fabius thrust his hands beneath his toga and holding them with palms upward said: "Here I bring to you, Carthaginians, both war and peace: do you choose unequivocally whichever of them you wish." Upon their replying to this challenge even then that they chose neither but would readily accept either that the Romans left with them, he declared war upon them. (Mai, p.190. Zonaras, 8, 22.)

[Frag. LV]

The Romans invited the Narbonenses to an alliance. But the latter declared that they had never suffered any harm from the Carthaginians or received any favor from the Romans that they should war against the one or defend the other, and were quite angry with them, charging that the Romans had often treated their kinsmen outrageously. (Mai, p.190.)

[Frag. LVI]

1. From such an expectation, Dio says, already acquired from that source, the Romans and Carthaginians had reached a state in which they had formed the most different judgments regarding the administration of the war. For hopefulness, in that it leads all men to cheerfulness, renders them also more active and confident, possessed of a faith that they will be victorious; lack of hope casts them into dejection and despair, and deprives of strength even the naturally stout-hearted. (Mai, p.191.)

2. Just as matters at a great distance and quite unknown are accustomed to disturb many men, so now they struck no little fear to the hearts of the Spaniards. [Footnote: This refers to the Spaniards' refusing, at the start, to undertake a campaign. Cp. Livy, XXI, 23.] For the majority of the multitude that makes a campaign not for any reason of its own but ranking as an allied force is a strong force just so long as it has the hopes of obtaining some benefit without danger. But when the men reach the vicinity of the conflict, they are frightened out of their hopes of gain and lose their faith in promises. And the most of them have gotten it into their heads that they are by all means going to be successful in any case; consequently, even if they should meet with some reverse, they esteem it lightly in comparison with the hopes which have been offsetting it. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 218 (a.u. 536)] 3. When the preparations failed to be sufficient in any respect for the size of Hannibal's army, and some one on this account suggested to him that the soldiers be fed on the flesh of their opponents, he did not take the idea amiss, but said he feared that some day through lack of bodies of that kind they might turn to eating one another. (Mai, p.191. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

4. Hannibal before beginning operations called together the soldiers and brought in the captives whom he had taken by the way: he enquired of the latter whether they wished to undergo imprisonment in fetters and to endure a grievous slavery or to fight in single combat one with another on condition that the victors should be released. When they chose the second alternative, he set them to fighting. And at the end of the conflict he said: "Now is it not shameful, fellow-soldiers, that these men who have been captured by us are so disposed toward bravery as to be eager to die in place of becoming slaves, whereas we shrink from incurring a little toil and danger for the purpose of not being subservient to others,—yes, and ruling them besides?" (Mai, p.192. Zonaras, 8, 23.)

5. All the sufferings that we have endured when occasionally defeated by the enemy we will inflict upon them, if we are victorious. Be well assured that by conquering we shall obtain all the benefits that I mention, but if conquered we shall not even have a safe means of escape. The victor straightway finds everything friendly, even if possibly it hates him, and to the vanquished no one even of his own household pays any longer heed. (Mai, pp. 543 and 192.)

6. To have once failed in an enterprise against some foes puts them forever out of countenance, and is a preventative of any future courage. (Mai, p. 192.)

7. For the whole Gallic race is naturally more or less eccentric and cowardly and faithless. Just as they are readily emboldened in the face of hopes, so (only more readily) when frightened do they fall into a panic. The fact that they were no more faithful to the Carthaginians will teach the rest of mankind a lesson never to dare to invade Italy. (Mai, p. 192. Cp. Zonaras, 8, 24.)

8. Many portents, [Footnote: Cp. Livy XXI, 62, and XXII, I, 8-20.] some of which had actually occurred and others which were the product of idle talk, became the subject of conversation. For when persons get seriously frightened and those [lacuna] are in reality proven to have occurred to them, oftentimes others are imagined. And if once any of the former phenomena is believed, heedlessly at once the rest [lacuna]

Accordingly, the sacrifices were offered and all the other ceremonies were accomplished which men are in the habit of performing for the cure of their temporary terror and for escape from expected ruin. Yet the race of men is wont to trust such agencies, hoping in the line of improvement, and so now, even if because of the greatness of the danger awaited they thought that the harshest fate would fall upon them, still they kept hoping that they would not be defeated. (Mai, p. 192.)

9. The Romans proclaimed Fabius dictator, satisfied if they could themselves survive, and neither despatched any aid to the allies nor [lacuna] but learning that Hannibal had turned aside from Campania, they made sure of the former's safety through fear that they might change sides either willingly or under compulsion. (Mai, p. 193. Zonaras, 8, 25.)

10. Fabius continued to besiege him from a safe distance instead of in dangerous proximity; he would not venture to make a trial of men skilled in the art of war, and made the safety of the soldiers a matter of great circumspection because of the scarcity of the citizens, deeming it no disaster to fail of destroying the forces of the enemy but a great one to lose any of his troops. The Carthaginians, he believed, by means of their enormous multitude would encounter danger again even if once defeated, but if the smallest part of his own army met with failure he calculated that he should find himself in every extremity of evil; this would not be due to the number of the dead on any such occasion but to the previous setbacks endured. He was in the habit of saying that men with powers undiminished could often suffer without hurt the most dreadful losses, but those who were already exhausted might be harmed by the slightest reverses. Once, when his son advised him to run the risk and be done with it and said something about his not losing more than a hundred men, the above consideration led him to refuse assent, and he further inquired of the young man whether he would like to be one of the hundred men. (Mai, pp. 193 and 544. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

11. The Carthaginians, far from sending voluntarily any support to Hannibal, were rather disposed to make sport of him, because whereas he was continually writing of his splendid progress and his many successes he still asked money and soldiers of them. They said his requests did not agree with his successes: victors ought to find their existing army sufficient and to send money home instead of demanding additional funds from them. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

12. I am under accusation, not because I dash headlong into battles nor because I risk dangers in my office as general, purposing by losing many soldiers and killing many enemies to be named dictator and celebrate a triumph, but because I am slow and because I delay and because I always exercise extreme foresight for your preservation. (Mai, p.542.)

13. Is it not really absurd for us to be zealous for success in enterprises outside and far off before the city itself is really set upon a firm foundation? Is it not absolutely outrageous to be eager to conquer the enemy before we set our own affairs well in order? (Mai, p. 543.)

14 Hannibal either as a favor to Fabius, on the ground that he was an advantage to them or perhaps to create a prejudice against him, did not ravage any of his possessions. Accordingly, when an exchange of captives was made between the Romans and Carthaginians with the proviso that any number in excess on either side should be ransomed, and as the Romans were unwilling to ransom their men with money from the public treasury, Fabius sold the farms and paid their ransom. Therefore they did not depose him but they gave equal power to his master of the horse, so that both held their commands on a like footing. Fabius harbored no wrath against either the citizens or Rufus: he excused them for an act prompted by human nature and was for contenting himself if in any way they might survive. He desired the preservation and victory of the commonwealth rather than an individual reputation, and continued to believe that excellence depends not on decrees but on each man's spirit, and that a man is better or worse not as a result of any ordinance but as a result of his own wisdom or ignorance.

Rufus, however, who had not shown the right spirit in the first place was now more than ever puffed up and could not contain himself because he had obtained through his insubordination the further prize of equal authority with the dictator. And so he kept asking for the right to hold sole sway a day at a time, or for several days alternately. But Fabius, in the fear that he might work some harm if he should get possession of the undivided power, would not consent to either plan of his, but divided the army in such a way that they each, like the consuls, had a separate force. And immediately Rufus encamped apart, in order that he might give a practical illustration of the fact that he held sway in his own right and not subject to the dictator. (Valesius, p. 597. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

15. It is customary for men who are ruled to concur in opinion easily. Especially often do they join forces when the object is to slander men of good reputation, for the reason that it is their nature to help in augmenting any power just come to light but to bring low what has already obtained preeminence. And though one can not immediately measure one's self with men who surpass one through ampler resources, growth in an unexpected quarter brings hope of a like good fortune to others that dwell in obscurity. [Footnote: This may come from a speech of M. Terentius Varro in favor of equalizing the powers of dictator and of master-of-horse.](Mai, p. 194.) 16. Rufus, who obtained equal authority with the dictator, after a defeat by the Carthaginians altered his attitude (for disasters chasten somehow those who are not completely fools) and voluntarily gave up his leadership. And for this all praised him loudly. He was not held worthy of censure because he had failed to recognize at first what was fitting, but was commended for not hesitating to change his mind. They deemed it an act of good fortune for a man to choose right at the start a proper course of conduct, but they thoroughly approved the course of one, who, having learned from practical experience the better way, was not ashamed to face squarely about. From this episode, too, it was clearly shown how much one man differs from another and true excellence from the reputation therefor. What had been taken from Fabius by jealousy and prejudice of the citizens, he received back with good-will and even at the request of his colleague. (Mai, p. 194. Zonaras, 8, 26.) 17. The same man when about to retire from office sent for the consuls, surrendered his army to them, and advised them in addition very fully regarding all the details of what must be done. The safety of the city stood higher in his estimation than a reputation for being the only successful commander, and expecting that if they followed their own bent they would probably meet with failure, but if they heeded his counsel they would meet with a favorable outcome, he preferred to look to the second contingency for praise. And the consuls were not unduly bold but acted on the suggestion of Fabius, deeming it better not to accomplish any important result than to be ruined; hence they remained where they were throughout the entire period of their command. (Mai, p. 195. Zonaras, 8, 26.)

18. For the Iapygians and Apulians dwell around the Ionic Gulf. Of the Apulians the tribes according to Dio are the Peuketii Pediculi, Daunii, Tarentini. There is also Cannae, the "plain of Diomed," near Daunian Apulia. Messapia was called also Iapygia, later Salentia, and then Calabria. Argyrippa, a Diomedian city, was renamed Arpi by the Apulians. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 603 and 852. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 216 (a.u. 538)] 19. Later he was arrayed against the Romans at Cannae, when the Roman generals were Paulus and Terentius. Now Cannae is a level district of Argyrippa, where Diomed founded the city Argyrippa, that is to say "Argos the Horse-City" in the tongue of the Greeks. And this plain comes to belong later to the Daunii (of the Iapygians), then to the Salantii, and now to those that all call by the name Calauri. It is also the boundary between the Calauri and Longibardi, where the great war burst upon them. (Tzetzes, Hist., 1, 757-767. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

20. With regard to divination and astronomy Dio says: "I, however, can not form any opinion either about these events or about others that are foretold by divination. For what does foreshowing avail, if a thing shall certainly come to pass, and if there could be no averting of it either by human devices or by divine providence? Accordingly, let each man look at these matters in what way he pleases." (Mai, p. 195. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

21. The commanders were Paulus and Terentius, men not of similar temperament, but differing alike in family and in character. The former was a patrician, possessed of the graces of education, and esteemed safety before haste, being restrained partly, it might be said, as a result of the censure he had received for his former conduct in office. Hence he was not inclined to audacity, but was considering how he might keep from getting into trouble again rather than how he might achieve success by some desperate venture. Terentius, however, had been brought up among the rabble, was practiced in vulgar bravado, and so displayed lack of prudence in nearly all respects; for instance, he promised himself general direction of the war, kept constantly annoying the patricians, and thought that he alone should have the leadership in view of the quiet behavior of his colleague. Now they both reached the camp at a most opportune time: Hannibal had no longer any provender; Spain was in turmoil; the affection of the allies was being alienated from him: and if they had waited for even the briefest possible period, they would have conquered without trouble. As matters went, however, the heedlessness of Terentius and the submissiveness of Paulus, who always desired the proper course but assented to his colleague in most points—so sure is gentleness to be overcome by audacity,—compassed their defeat. (Mai, p. 196. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

22. In the melee of the war not even the boldest possessed a hope so buoyant as to rise above the fear that arose from its uncertainty. The surer they felt of conquering the more did they tremble for fear they might in some way come to grief. Those who are ignorant of a matter by reason of their very lack of perception are not awaiting anything terrible, but the boldness derived from calculation [lacuna] (Six pages are lacking.) (Mai, p. 196.)

23. At the time when burst this frightful war, a terrific earthquake occurred, so that mountains were cleft asunder and showers of great stones poured down from heaven. But they, fighting vigorously, perceived none of these things. At last so great a multitude of Roman warriors fell that Hannibal, the general, in sending to Sicily the finger-rings of the generals and the other men of repute filled many bushel and peck measures—so great a multitude that the noble, foremost Roman women ran lamenting to the temples in Rome and with the hairs of their heads cleansed the statues there;—and later had intercourse with both slaves and barbarians (because the Roman land had been utterly impoverished of men), to the end that their race might not be every whit extirpated. Rome at that time, after the utter loss of all her citizens, stood inglorious through many day-coursing cycles. Her old men sitting at her outer gates bewailed the disaster most grievous to be borne and asked ever and anon the passers-by whether any one perchance were left alive. (Tzetzes, Hist. 1, 767-785. (Cp. Fragm. LVI, 19, which precedes this.) Cp. Zonaras, 9, 1.)

24. Scipio, on learning that some of the Romans were prepared to abandon Rome, and indeed all Italy, because they felt it was destined to fall into the hands of the Carthaginians, yet found a way to restrain them. Sword in hand he sprang suddenly into the room where they were conferring, and after himself swearing to take all proper measures both of word and act he made them also devote themselves by oath to utter destruction, should they fail to keep their pledges to him. Later these men reached a harmonious decision and wrote to the consul that they were safe enough. He, however, did not at once write or despatch a messenger to Rome; on reaching Canusium he set in order affairs at that place, sent to the regions in proximity garrisons sufficient for immediate needs, and repulsed a cavalry attack upon the city. Altogether, he displayed neither dejection nor terror, but with an unbending spirit, as if no serious evil had befallen them, he both planned and executed all measures of immediate benefit. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

25. Hannibal took possession of the Nucerini under an agreement that each man should leave the city carrying one change of clothing. As soon, however, as he was master of the situation he shut the senators into bath-houses and suffocated them, and in the case of the others, although he had granted them permission to go away where they pleased, he cut down many of them even on the road. Still, this course was of no profit to him, for the rest became afraid that they might suffer a similar fate, and so would not come to terms with him and resisted as long as they could hold out. (Valesius, p. 598. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

26. Marcellus showed great bravery, moderation, and justice. His demands on his subjects were not all rigorous or harsh, nor was he careful to see that they also should do what was needful. Those of them who committed any errors he pardoned humanely and, furthermore, was not angry if they failed to be like him. (Valesius, p. 601.)

27. When many citizens of Nola were dreading the men captured at Cannae and later released by Hannibal, because they thought that such persons favored the invader's cause, and when they were even desirous of putting them to death, he opposed it. Furthermore, he concealed from this time on the suspicion that he felt toward them, and treated them in such a way that they chose his side by preference, and became extremely useful both to their native land and to the Romans. (Valesius, p. 601. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

28. The same Marcellus when he perceived that one of the Lucanian cavalrymen was in love with a woman permitted him to keep her in the camp, because he was a most excellent fighter: this in spite of the fact that he had forbidden any women to enter the ramparts. (Valesius, p. 601.)

29. He pursued the same course with the people of Acerrae as he had with those of Nucreia, except that he cast the senators into wells and not into bath-houses. (Valesius, p. 601. Zonaras, 9, 2.)

30. Fabius got back some of the men captured in former battles by exchanging man for man, while others he made a compact to ransom with money. When, however, the senate failed to confirm the expenditure, because it did not approve of their ransoming, he offered for sale, as I have said, [Footnote: Cp. section 14 (first paragraph) of this fragment.] his own farms and from the proceeds of them furnished the ransom for the men. (Valesius, p. 601.)

31. Archimedes, the well-known inventor, was by birth a Syracusan. Now this old geometrician, who had passed through seventy-five seasons, had built many powerful engines, and by the triple pulley, with the aid of the left hand alone, could launch a merchant ship of fifty thousand medimni burden. And when Marcellus once, the Roman general, assaulted Syracuse by land and sea, this man first by his engines drew up some merchantmen, and lifting them up against the wall of Syracuse dropped them again and sent them every one to the bottom, crews and all. Again, as Marcellus removed his ships a little distance, the old man gave all the Syracusans the power to lift stones of a wagon's size, and letting them go one by one to sink the ships. When Marcellus withdrew a bow shot thence, the old man manufactured a kind of hexagonal mirror, and at an interval proportionate to the size of the mirror he set similar small mirrors with four edges, moving by links and by a kind of hinge, and made the glass the center of the rays of the sun,—its noontide ray, whether in summer or in the dead of winter. So after that when the beams were reflected into this, a terrible kindling of flame arose upon the ships, and he reduced them to ashes a bowshot off. Thus by his contrivances did the old man vanquish Marcellus.

He used to say, moreover, in Dorian, the Syracusan dialect: "Give me where to stand, and with a lever I will move the whole earth."

This man, when (according to Diodorus) this Syracuse surrendered herself entire to Marcellus, or (according to Dio) was pillaged by the Romans during an all-night festival to Artemis that the citizens were celebrating, was killed by a certain Roman in the following fashion.—He was bent over, drawing some geometrical figure, and some Roman, coming upon him, made him his prisoner and began to drag him away: but he, with all his attention fixed just then upon his figure, not knowing who it was that pulled him said to the man: "Stand aside, fellow, from my figure." But as the other kept on dragging, he turned, and recognizing him as a Roman cried out: "Let some one give me one of my machines." The Roman in terror immediately killed him, an unsound weak old man, but marvelous through his works. Marcellus straightaway mourned on learning this, buried him brilliantly in his ancestral tomb, assisted by the noblest citizens and all the Romans, and the man's murderer, I trow, he slew with an axe. Dio and Diodorus have written the story. (Tzetzes, Hist. 2, 103-149. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 4.)

32. Proculus sings of having forged fire-producing mirrors and of having hung them from the wall opposite the enemy's ships. Then when the rays of the sun fell upon these, fire was struck out of them that consumed the naval force of the opponents and the ships themselves,—a device which Dio relates Archimedes hit upon long ago, at the time when the Romans were besieging Syracuse. (Zonaras, 14, 3.)

33. Though such a disaster at that time had overwhelmed Rome, Hannibal neglected to reduce the town, and occupied in triumphs, drinking bouts and luxurious living appeared sluggish in the enterprise, until at length a Roman army was collected for the Romans.

[Sidenote: B.C. 211 (a.u. 543)] Then was he hindered in three-fold manner when he set out for Rome. For of a sudden from the clear sky a most violent hail poured down, and a spreading darkness kept him from his journey. (Tzetzes, Hist. 1, 786-792. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 6.)

34. Dio in his Roman History 15: "For as a result of their position from very early times and their pristine friendship for the Romans, they would not endure to be punished, but the Campanians undertook to accuse Flaccus and the Syracusans Marcellus. And they were condemned in the assembly." (Suidas, s. v. [Greek: 'edkaiothaesan'].)

35. Dio in 15th Book: "For fear the Syracusans, in despair of assistance, commit some act of rebellion." (Bekker, Anecdota, p. 119, 121. Zonaras, 9, 6.)

36. The Romans had made propositions to Hannibal looking to a return of the prisoners on both sides, but did not accomplish the exchange although they sent, Carthalo to them for this very purpose. For when they would not receive him, as an enemy, within the walls, he refused to hold any conversation with them, but immediately turned back in anger. (Ursinus, p. 379. Zonaras, 9, 6.)

37. Scipio the praetor, who saved his wounded father, surpassed in natural excellence, was renowned for his education, and possessed great force both of mind and also of language, whenever the latter was necessary. These qualities he displayed conspicuously in his acts, so that he seemed to be high-minded and disposed to do great deeds not for the sake of an empty boast but as the result of a steadfast tendency. For these reasons and because he scrupulously paid honors to the heavenly powers, he was elected. He had never had charge of any public or private enterprise before he ascended the Capitol and spent some time there. On this account also he acquired the reputation of having sprung from Jupiter, who had taken the form of a serpent on the occasion of intercourse with his mother. [Footnote: Compare the story about Augustus (Volume III, page 3 of this translation).] And by this tradition he inspired many with a kind of hope in him. (Valesius, p.601. Zonaras, 9, 7.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 210 (a.u. 544)] 38. Scipio, although he did not receive the title of legal commander from those by whom he was elected, nevertheless made the army his friend, roused the men from their undisciplined state and drilled them, and brought them out of the terror with which their misfortunes had filled them. As for Marcius, [Footnote: This is L. Marcius, a knight, who at the death of Publius and Gnaeus Scipio in Spain was chosen commander by the soldiers.] Scipio did not, as most men would have done, regard him as unfit because he had acquired popularity, but both in word and deed always showed him respect. He was the sort of man to wish to make his way not by slandering and overthrowing his neighbor, but by his native excellence. And it was this most of all that helped him to conciliate the soldiers. (Valesius, p.602.)

[Sidenote: B.C. 209 (a.u. 545)] 39. When a mutiny of the soldiers took place, Scipio distributed many gifts to the soldiers and designated many also for the public treasury. Some of the captives he appointed to service in the general fleet and all the hostages he gave back freely to their relatives. For this reason many towns and many princes, among them Indibilis and Mandonius of the Ilergetes, came over to his side. The Celtiberian race, the largest and strongest of those in that region, he gained in the following way. He had taken among the captives a maiden distinguished for her beauty and it was supposed, on general principles, that he would fall in love with her: and when he learned that she was betrothed to Allucius, one of the Celtiberian magistrates, he voluntarily sent for him and delivered the girl to him along with the ransom her kinsfolk had brought. By this deed he attached to his cause both them and the rest of the nation. (Valesius, p.602. Zonaras, 9, 8.)

40. Scipio was clever in strategy, agreeable in society, terrifying to his opponents, and humane to such as yielded. Furthermore, through his father's and his uncle's reputation he was thoroughly able to inspire confidence in his projects, because he was thought to have acquired his fame by hereditary excellence and not fortuitously. At this time the swiftness of his victory, the fact that Hasdrubal had retreated into the interior, and especially the recollection that he had predicted, whether through divine inspiration or by some chance information, that he would encamp in the enemy's country,—a prediction now fulfilled,—caused all to honor him as superior to themselves, while the Spaniards actually named him Great King. (Valesius, p. 605. Zonaras, 9, 8.)

41. The king of the Spaniards, taken captive by Scipio, chose to follow the Roman cause, surrendered his own sovereignty, and stood ready to furnish hostages. Scipio, though he accepted the man's alliance, said there was no need of hostages, for he possessed the necessary pledge in his own arms. [Footnote: Probably spurious (Melber).] (Mai, p. 545.)

42. Dio in 16: "You all deserve to die: however, I shall not put you all to death, but I shall execute only a few whom I have already arrested; the rest I shall release." (Suidas, s. v. [Greek: edikaiothaesan]. Zonaras, 9, 10.)

43. Later Hannibal incurred the jealousy of the Sicilians, and when he fell in need of grain, as the islanders did not send it, the former noble conqueror, now by famine conquered, was put to flight by Scipio the Roman, and to the Sicilians became part cause of their utter, dire destruction. (Tzetzes, Hist. 1, 793-797.)

44. Thus these authorities in regard to the Gymnesian islands. Dio Cocceianus, however, says they are near the Iberus river and near the European Pillars of Hercules,—which islands the Greeks and Romans alike call the Gymnesian, but the Spaniards Valerian or Healthful Islands. (Isaac Tzetzes on Lycophron, 633. Cp. Zonaras, 9, 10.)

45. Masinissa was in general among the most prominent men and was wont to accomplish warlike deeds, whether by planning or by force, in the best manner, and gained the foremost place in the confidence not only of the men of his own race (and these are most distrustful as a rule) but of those who greatly prided themselves upon their sagacity. (Valesius, p. 605. Zonaras, 9, 11.)

46. Masinissa became mightily enamoured of Sophonis, [Footnote: The name appears as Sophoniba in Livy (XXX, 12).] who possessed conspicuous beauty,—that symmetry of body and bloom of youth which is characteristic of the prime of life,—and had also been trained in a liberal literary and musical education. She was of attractive manners, coy and altogether so lovable that the mere sight of her or even the sound of her voice vanquished every one, however devoid of affection he might be. (Valesius, p. 605. Zonaras, 9, 11.)

47[lacuna]. However he also wished to take revenge on him. For having incurred suspicion beforehand he took to flight, and on arriving at Libya inflicted many injuries by himself and many with Roman aid upon Syphax and the Carthaginians. Scipio, when he had won over the whole territory south of the Pyrenees, partly by force, partly by treaty, equipped himself for the journey to Libya, as he had received orders to do. This business, too, had now been entrusted to him in spite of much opposition, and he was instructed to join Syphax. Certainly he would have accomplished something worthy of his aspirations: he would have either surrounded Carthage with his troops and have captured the place or he would have drawn Hannibal from as he later did, had not the Romans at home through jealousy of him and through fear stood in his way. They reflected that youth without exception always reaches out after greater results and good fortune is often insatiate of success, and thought that it would be very difficult for a youthful spirit [lacuna] through self-confidence [lacuna] [lacuna] it would be of advantage not to treat him according to his power and fame but to look to their own liberty and safety, they dismissed him; in other words, the man that they themselves had put in charge of affairs when they stood in need of him they now of their own motion removed because he had become too great for the public safety. They were no longer anxious to conduct a destructive warfare through his agency against the Carthaginians, but simply to escape training up for themselves a self-chosen tyrant. So they sent two of the praetors to relieve him and called him home. Also they did not vote him a triumph, because he was campaigning as an individual and had been appointed to no legal command, but they allowed him to sacrifice a hundred white oxen upon the Capitol, to celebrate a festival, and to canvass for the consulship of the second year following. For the elections for the next year had recently been held.

[Sidenote: B.C. 207 (a.u. 547)] At this same period Sulpicius, too, with Attalus captured Oreus by treachery and Opus by main force. Philip although in Demetrias was unable to check their encroachments speedily because the AEtolians had seized the passes in advance. At last, however, he did arrive on the scene and finding Attalus disposing of the spoil from Opus (for this had fallen to his lot and that from Oreus to the Romans) he hurled him back to his ships. Attalus, accordingly, for this reason and also because Prusias, king of Bithynia, had invaded his country and was devastating it, hastily sailed away homewards.