Every one of us knows that, if France has not been able to help materialize the Greek's rightful aspirations, this is not due to lack of good intentions on her part, but rather to the French compliance with the interests of the Slav; and we know that France had to cultivate those interests by her own wealth, and contrary to her democratic principles, only in order to have an alliance against her neighboring enemy, against whom she meditated revenge for a defeat and the vindication of her subjugated children.

For the German people, this people of progress and civilization, which has never aspired to a world hegemony by the subjugation of other peoples, outside of the needs of their frontiers, Greece feels the same admiration and sympathy. And when such French patriots as Jules Huret and Georges Bourdon, in voluminous works, have cited the German progress and German social civilization as an example to their own country, it would be almost a reversal of logic if we outsiders were to deny these things, at the sight of two friends who have come to blows.

If there is anything that grieves the Greek soul, which has always been used to appreciate virtue disinterestedly, it is the fratricidal woe of two nations who ought to be, hand in hand, forerunners and co-workers in the great enterprises of science and civilization!

PRIME MINISTRY'S ATTITUDE.

Premier Venizelos set forth the Government's neutral policy in his speech to Parliament on Sept. 15, (28,) 1914. A translation appears below.

After speaking of the Greco-Turkish relations and the efforts being made at the time for the settlement of the outstanding questions of the refugees and the Aegean Islands, Mr. Venizelos said:

Unfortunately the labors of the new session are beginning amid the clangor of the great European war. The Government has declared that during this war Greece is to remain neutral, but at the same time it did not conceal the fact that it has obligations toward one of the belligerents, Servia, and that said obligation it was resolved to fulfill faithfully should the casus foederis arise.

Greece, however, wishes nothing more than that such an occasion should not arise, as it desires that the conflagration which is gradually enveloping Europe should not spread over the Balkans, whose peoples, after two wars, so much need rest.

So far as it depends upon the initiative of Greece, every one may be assured that the European conflagration will not spread in the Balkan Peninsula. And if its other peoples are inspired by the same thoughts, then we can feel sure that peace will be preserved in the Levant up to the end of the war.

But even for the neutrals there are obligations. The position of the neutrals is not so easy as one might think, and the Government has endeavored and is still endeavoring to fulfill as perfectly as possible the various obligations imposed by neutrality. I must acknowledge at this time that my task has been rendered easier by public opinion, which notwithstanding its sympathies, has done nothing to hurt any one of the belligerents. I regret that I cannot say the same as regards the press, because the press, not confining itself to the expression of so many natural sentiments, has often indulged in violent attacks against the belligerents, and especially at the time when, owing to the peculiar psychological condition in which the latter find themselves, every such attack touches them most deeply. And I again entreat you, from this official tribune, to avoid any such attack. I hope my advice will be more willingly complied with at this time.

WHERE GREECE STANDS.

The following statement by Premier Venizelos was published in the Corriere della Sera of Milan on Oct. 29, 1914.

The Greek Government has declared its neutrality and will abide by this policy. Notwithstanding this, she did not deny her treaty obligations to Servia, and is resolved to fulfill all the terms of this treaty should the casus foederis arise.

It is understood that Greece does not desire this casus foederis to arise.

Our relations with Turkey have been strained for some months. But after the negotiations of Bucharest some agreement was reached regarding the refugees. Those in Europe will learn that the Greeks expelled two hundred thousand persons from Thrace and Asia Minor. One portion of them we have settled in the islands. Besides those there are about fifty thousand Turkish refugees—though not persecuted—in Macedonia. A mixed committee was to arrange the exchange of these refugees at the beginning of the war. As to the question of the ownership of the Aegean islands, the Hellenic Government considers the question settled from an international standpoint, not only by the treaties of London and Athens, but also by the unanimous decision of all the European powers.

The Government declared that it was ready to satisfy Turkey regarding this question, under the sine qua condition that the islands would continue to be occupied and administered by Greece in the same way as all the other provinces of the Hellenic Kingdom. After an exchange of views on the subject, it was decided that I should meet the Grand Vizier in Brussels, but the war prevented this.

Afterward, this desire was again expressed, that the negotiations which originally were to take place in Brussels should open elsewhere. To this end both parties sent delegates to Bucharest in order to find some solution of the island question, but again this meeting failed to accomplish anything.

Turkey proposed an adjournment of the negotiations to a more propitious time, alleging that the general conditions in Europe, and her internal troubles, made it impossible for her delegates to continue the discussions on the island question. Unfortunately the plight of the Greek populations in Turkey is becoming worse every day, and large numbers of refugees are coming daily to Greece.

Regarding Bulgaria, I can say nothing, except that she keeps repeating her intention of remaining neutral. At the same time Bulgaria did not mobilize, therefore we have not taken this measure ourselves.

But naturally—and this must be taken in its widest meaning—when the flames of a conflagration are licking one's door one must take all the precautionary measures. Is it not right?

Regarding Epirus, we declared clearly that we have no designs upon Avlona.

OCCUPATION OF EPIRUS.

The subjoined statement by Premier Venizelos appeared in The London Morning Post.

ATHENS, Oct. 27.

In the Chamber of Deputies this evening, in reply to an interpellation, M. Venizelos, the Premier, stated that Greece had reoccupied Northern Epirus solely to restore order and security to those districts already cruelly tried by prolonged bloodshed and anarchy. The Premier emphasized the provisional character of this reoccupation, inasmuch as Greece continued to respect the international agreements regarding Albania.

M. Venizelos was followed by M. Zographos, the late President of the Epirote Provisional Government, and now Deputy for Attica, who, amid profound attention and great enthusiasm, recounted the enormous sacrifices of blood and treasure by the Epirotes for their freedom, and declared that the liberation of Epirus must this time be final. M. Rallis, one of the leaders of the Opposition, declared that Epirus was resolved to remain united with Greece.

I am informed from a diplomatic source that the great powers have received the announcement of the reoccupation in a friendly spirit, and no protests have thus far been received from quarters whence they might have been expected.

RELATIONS WITH BULGARIA.

Following is an editorial article from the semi-official newspaper Patris of Athens of Dec. 12, (25,) 1914.

With Bulgaria not one of the Balkan States can come to any understanding. The neighboring Balkan peoples, at least the Christians, cannot agree with them—not because they are lacking good intentions, but because the Bulgarians in their demands are unreasonable, unjust, insatiable, monstrous, and treacherous; because the Bulgarians always demand the impossible; because they are pursuing profits at the expense of third parties, whom they invite to cede rights obtained by sacrifices and based on the right of war; because, while they can demand compensations at the expense of a non-Christian neighbor—to which no one would object—they turn on their co-religionists, struggling to take away from them what they lawfully and with sacrifices have acquired.

On account of this policy of the Bulgarians, not one of the Christian peoples of the Balkan Peninsula believes in the possibility of an understanding with them. That, also, is Rumania's position. Accordingly it should be unnecessary to deny the news from Sofia announcing the attainment of an alleged Rumano-Bulgarian rapprochement. In order to reach this understanding, the Bulgarians would not confine themselves to the rules of present Rumano-Bulgarian practice, which in itself is a question of secondary importance.

The Bulgarians turn eager eyes to the whole of Dobrondja, which might perhaps be the dowry of the royal Rumano-Bulgarian match so impudently heralded in Sofia, although the whole thing was a monstrous lie, without any appearance of respect for the family affairs of the royal throne of Rumania.

But, as in our own case, neither the Servians can cede even an acre of land to Bulgaria nor Rumania give back Dobrudja, because all of these territories belong to their present owners by right of war. For the same reason the Serbo-Bulgarian relations failed a month ago; likewise no ground was found for an understanding between Bulgaria and Greece; and for the same reason the negotiations between Rumania and Bulgaria are failing today.

The Bulgarians have turned from one to another of the peoples of the Balkans in order to cheat them. But this attempt, made once too often, at length has failed. But will this final failure bring to reason the hotheads of Sofia? After the cruel disappointment they received at the hands of Rumania, the Bulgarian politicians must understand that whatever is won by war by war only is given back. No one is so stupid as to give them willingly his dominions.

Do they wish to take them? Let them come. Let them declare war. Because so long as they are not doing this, and so long as they persist in their present methods, they are offering the spectacle of a childish if not a demented people.

GRECO-RUMANIAN FRIENDSHIP.

The Rumanian Minister, Mr. Filidor, presented his new credentials to King Constantine on Dec. 14. His speech appears below.

Your Majesty! I have the honor to deliver to your Majesty the letters with which his Majesty, my august sovereign, has deigned to confirm my quality as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to your Majesty, a mission which I had already the honor of filling under the glorious reign of the great King Carol I., the founder of the Rumanian dynasty.

I happened to be a witness of the most brilliant period of the history of new Greece, during which your Majesty at the head of his Government has succeeded, by his military talents, in bringing into realization the great achievements of ancient Greece, whose majestic relics are serving still as an inimitable example to the whole of mankind.

The military effort of your Majesty has been crowned by the Treaty of Bucharest, which was a common pacifying work of Greece and Rumania, and which was so instrumental in strengthening the bonds of friendship and interests which so happily unite the two peoples.

Deeply impressed by the conviction that my mission consists in working for this latter end, I dare pray your Majesty to grant me his august favor, as in the past, and I assure you that I will employ all my energy for the fulfillment of this effort, so necessary for the future fortunes of both countries.



Where Rumania Stands in the Crisis

Declaration of Neutrality

BUCHAREST, Aug. 5, 1914.

The Council of the Crown has decided on the neutrality of Rumania—Agence Roumaine.

THE SITUATION IN RUMANIA.

[From the Paris Temps of Aug. 23, 1914.]

From an occasional correspondent we receive the following letter:

The departure of the mobilized French soldiers who were in Bucharest has been the occasion for sympathetic manifestations toward France.

Among the population and in the streets there was not a single voice which was not heartily and enthusiastically for the Triple Entente in general and France in particular.

Certain personages, such as the General Pilot who in 1870 fought on the side of France, and certain newspaper editors who, yielding to national aspirations, have carried on since the first day of the war a violent campaign against Austria, are enthusiastically cheered by the public in the cafes and by the majority of the army officers who assisted in uniform at these scenes.

More than that, there were imposing manifestations in the streets; other meetings, still more effective, were held in secret, at which Generals and superior officers assisted. But notwithstanding this public sentiment the police are on the lookout; the orders they have received are particularly severe, as entire regiments are kept in readiness in the public parks and Government buildings. All those functionaries who are suspected of being openly hostile to Austria are closely followed and watched.

What is the reason of this? One may put the question to himself, as really this sentiment of the nations corresponds too well with a secular and inevitable policy. Despite all contrary reasoning, one fact remains, and this is summed up in Transylvania and Bukowina and the five million Rumanians who are under Austro-Hungarian rule. There is for the Rumanians of the kingdom the unforgettable series of persecutions of every kind to which their brethren on the other side of the mountains are subjected—persecutions dating from yesterday and which are continued today. Only the day before the Austrian mobilization fifty students from the Rumanian Kingdom who happened to be in Brassow (Hungary) on an excursion were arrested and brought before the police authorities, and actually thrown into prison, because they dared display badges with Rumanian colors in their buttonholes.

"If I were to march into Moldavia," a Rumanian was telling me, "against the enemies of Austria, I would have to begin by sabring all the Moldavian peasants, who are crying, 'Down with Austria!' Of course, I never could do this!"

Under such conditions, if the waverings of the Government were to be explained, the task would be a hard one. In our opinion, they may be ascribed to different causes, the more important factor being the opinion of the King himself; but this alone would not suffice.

The King (Carol) is first of all bound to Emperor Francis Joseph by an old friendship. King Carol has never admitted that the diminution of his kingdom after Plevna was a right thing, and the toasts in Constanza (during the Czar's visit to Rumania early in the Summer of 1914) have demonstrated, for those who could read between the lines, in both the politeness of the Czar and the reserved tone of King Carol, that this sentiment had not yet disappeared.

In the face of this disposition, so firmly expressed, the Ministers and the party leaders of Rumania felt rather uncomfortable. It must be borne in mind that a parliamentary regime, properly speaking, does not exist; the Ministries do not fall by vote of the chambers of Parliament. When the King estimates that a Ministry has been too long in power, when he hears distinctly the murmur of the Opposition, then he calls a new President of the Council, who has Parliament prorogued and a new one formed—this is the exact procedure—according to his liking. By reason of this process, and also by reason of a special attraction which the Court exercises over a small, refined, and elegant society, the counsels of the King are inspired by the advices of his counselors.

But there are also other reasons that plead for this uncertain attitude, and by which it is attempted to justify a policy of indifference.

The successes of last year—of which the Rumanians have not understood the causes, because they never tried to understand them—have troubled them in a certain way.

Their statesmen persist perhaps a little too much in playing Machiavelli, and in exalting abstention to a system. Their fondest desire at the present moment is not, we are persuaded, to march on Austria, but, on the contrary, not to march at all, and not to intervene in the war up to the day of the final liquidation.

What is this policy worth? The chances are that it may not always be good, particularly in the present state of things. Rumania is still a small country by reason of its area. In addition to this, her neighbors, on which she was wont to exercise a moderating influence, are bound to change in density of population. And it is very likely that Rumania, on the next day after the war, might find herself suddenly surrounded by homogeneous peoples, who in the meantime would become distinctly more important than she is, and that these people might have against her certain slight grievances which they would make her feel. Moreover, even if Austria by chance is victorious, and even if the Government at Bucharest helped her, is it not clear that her (Rumania's) Hungarian neighbor, becoming stronger, would make her (Rumania) suffer the same as she made the Servians suffer when they were feeble?

Rumania may well protest her friendship, but this will not prevent her, if only by her presence, from being a danger to the tranquillity of the Hungarian subjects in Transylvania. And then who is going to defend her?

Here is what the good sense of the people says, and it is this common sense which will triumph in the end over all vacillation, and will, in spite of everything, assert its way of seeing things.

THE ATTITUDE OF RUMANIA.

[From the Paris Temps of Sept. 25, 1914.]

Mr. Diamandy, Rumanian Minister at Petrograd and an ardent advocate of Rumanian intervention, has returned to the Russian capital after a voyage to Bucharest, where he went in order to explain his views to his Government.

The return of Mr. Diamandy to Petrograd is regarded as a favorable omen, as this diplomat had expressed previous to his departure that he would not come back to his post if he were not successful in placing Rumania on the side of the Triple Entente.

On the other hand, l'Agence de Balkans is in receipt of the following dispatch from Bucharest, Sept. 19, 1914:

"The semi-official papers of the Rumanian Government have published the following statement with regard to the Treaty of Bucharest: The viewpoint of Rumania on the subject of the Treaty of Bucharest, and of its connection with the European war, has been discussed and established in a council of the Crown, held on the 21st of July, (Aug. 3, N.S.) In the Treaty of Bucharest the Rumanian interest was not bound to fixed frontier lines, except so long as these assured an equilibrium necessary to Rumania. Rumania was not obliged to protect this equilibrium in its actual form any longer than in her mind this could be possibly maintained.

"If the European war, in its future consequences, should bring about certain modifications in the actual frontiers of one or the other of the Balkan States, the interest of Rumania requires that the Balkan equilibrium be established in accordance with the changes made to correspond with the purpose of maintaining the real equilibrium in its new form, no matter what the frontier lines will be in their final re-establishment. In connection with the attitude of Rumania in the presence of the European war no new decision has been taken. All the political parties are subjecting their attitude to the action of the Government. Mr. von Busch, the new Minister of Germany, has arrived and was received yesterday in confidence by King Charles."

DEATH OF KING CHARLES.

[From The London Times, Oct. 12, 1914.]

King Charles of Rumania died of heart failure early on Saturday morning at the Castle of Pelesh, Sinaeia.

Yesterday Parliament was convoked, and the new King took the oath of allegiance. Subsequently the Government issued a proclamation stating that the new King would follow in the footsteps of his predecessor and realize the ideals of the Rumanian race.

Both in itself and as an episode of the present European conflagration, the death of the King of Rumania is an event of singular importance. The late King was in many respects the maker of his adopted country. When, in March, 1866, he accepted the crown the condition of the Danubian principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, was little better than that of a misgoverned Turkish province. They still owned Ottoman suzerainty, their army was non-existent, their financial resources were precarious, the condition of their people was wretched, their means of communication were primitive, and their public affairs were in a condition bordering on anarchy. With the support of the French Emperor, to whom he was distantly related, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen faced one of the most difficult tasks ever allotted to an inexperienced ruler, and carried it to triumphal completion.

He created an army, introduced railways, won independence for his realm and for himself. He evolved order out of chaos, secured military renown at Plevna as commander of the joint Russo-Rumanian forces in the Russo-Turkish war, established national finance on a sound basis, built up a considerable export trade, extended the frontiers of the principality and raised it to the rank of a kingdom, and watched with untiring vigilance over every aspect of national development. Not only as the first recognized and independent sovereign of modern Rumania, but as her creator, King Charles will ever hold a foremost place in Rumanian history.

In this great work the late ruler derived advantage, not only from his eminent personal qualities, but from his foreign origin. As a German Prince, powerfully connected, he stood outside and above Rumanian party factions, and succeeded gradually in imposing his will on them all. Born on April 20, 1839, at Sigmaringen, near the source of the Danube, he was barely 27 when he accepted the call to rule an unknown country with which his only connection was that, like the estates of his family, it, too, was watered by the Danube. Of middle height, well built, pronounced features, and clear, gray eyes, his personality expressed quiet energy. His statecraft he learned by experience and from the excellent counsel of his father, Prince Charles Anthony of Hohenzollern, head of the senior and Roman Catholic branch of the Hohenzollerns. Only once did he falter. In March, 1871, when the French sympathizers of his subjects exposed him as a German Prince and a Hohenzollern to great unpopularity, while the bankruptcy of the Jewish speculator to whom his railway schemes had been intrusted threw discredit upon his ideas of economic development, he summoned the members of the Provisional Government from whom he had accepted the crown and announced to them his decision to abdicate. Fortunately for Rumania, they succeeded in dissuading him from his purpose. The famous Conservative statesman, Lascar Catargi, formed a Ministry which held office for five years and enabled the ruler to turn the most dangerous corner of his reign. Thenceforward the path was comparatively clear, though by no means easy. It led to Rumanian participation in the Russo-Turkish war, to the conquest of national independence, and eventually, on May 22, 1881, to his coronation as King of Rumania, with a crown made of steel from a Turkish gun captured by Rumanian troops at Plevna.

Yet the Rumanian triumph was not unalloyed. Russia injudiciously and ungratefully insisted on depriving Rumania of the portion of Rumanian Bessarabia of which Russia had been deprived after the Crimean war, and allotted the Dobrudja, a swampy region south of the Danube, to the principality as compensation. The indignation in Rumania was indescribable and has never entirely subsided. The Senate in the Chamber declared the resolve of the country to defend its integrity by force. The Czar threatened to disarm the Rumanian Army—a threat which drew from Prince Charles the proud reply: "The Rumanian Army, which fought so gallantly before Plevna under the eyes of the Czar, may be annihilated, but will never be disarmed." But he nevertheless recognized the futility of resistance to the Russian demand, and exerted himself to calm the national excitement. In later years the breach was partially if not wholly healed.

Of the more material achievements of his reign there is little space to speak. The best record of his life is to be found in the present condition of the country—si monumentum requiris circumspice. His furtherance of the petroleum industry, of the export of grain, timber and other agricultural produce, the building of the great bridge over the Danube at Tchernavoda, and the extensive harbor at Constanza, the network of railways, the immense system of fortifications defending the capital, and the line Fokshani-Galatz—all these and much more are mainly his work.

Little is yet known of the action of King Charles in the last crisis of his life. It is a strange coincidence that just as the Franco-German war of 1870-71 brought him into conflict with the Francophil tendencies of his subjects and led to his offer of abdication, so the present war should again have engendered rumors of his abdication on account of his alleged antagonism to the national desire for the acquisition of Transylvania and the Southern Bukovina, which are peopled by more than 3,000,000 Hungarian and Austrian Rumanes. The Rumanian people felt that the hour for the liberation of their kindred had struck. Russia is understood to have invited Rumania to occupy the desired territory. But King Charles, who brought and kept Rumania within the orbit of the Triple Alliance, was, as a Hohenzollern and a German Prince, averse to hostile action against the German Emperor and the Emperor Francis Joseph. It is, moreover, stated that he was bound by his word of honor never to take the field against a Hohenzollern cause.

The late King Charles married, in November, 1869, Princess Elizabeth of Wied, the gifted "Carmen Sylva," whose brilliant literary and artistic talents have gained her a worldwide reputation. The only child of the marriage, the infant Princess Marie, died in 1874—a bereavement that ever left a note of sadness in the lives of her parents.

THE NEW KING.

King Ferdinand, who now succeeds his uncle on the throne of Rumania, was born in August, 1865, and, like his predecessor, is a Hohenzollern and a Roman Catholic.

Among his near relatives are the King of the Belgians and his namesake, Tsar Ferdinand of the Bulgarians, who are both first cousins, and his niece, Queen Augustina Victoria, the consort of Dom Manoel. Through his mother, the Princess Antonia, who was born an Infanta of Portugal, King Ferdinand is kin with all the house of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, to which his consort, the new Queen Mary, belongs as daughter of the late Duke of Edinburgh.

Her Majesty is thus first cousin to King George and to the Czar, as also to Princess Nicholas of Greece. Her three sisters are married respectively to the Grand Duke Cyril of Russia, Prince Ernest, the eldest son of the mediatized Prince of Hohenlohe-Langenburg, and to the Infante Alfonso d'Orleans of Spain.

Their Majesties have six children, of whom the Crown Prince Carol, who celebrates his 21st birthday this week, and the Princess Elizabeth, born in 1894, are of marriageable age. The youngest, Prince Mircea, who bears a historic Rumanian name closely connected with Silistria, was born during the Balkan war at the beginning of 1913. King Ferdinand's family is a remarkable example of religious differences—his Majesty is a Roman Catholic, the Queen is a Lutheran, and their children are members of the Orthodox Church of Rumania.

The Rumanian Minister has received a copy of a proclamation published in The Official Gazette stating that the new King will follow in the footsteps of the late monarch and will accomplish the ideals of the Rumanian race.

IN RUMANIA'S PARLIAMENT.

[From The Messaggero of Rome.]

BUCHAREST, Dec. 17.

The intention of the Government to avoid in Parliament any discussion of the political action of the Ministry was reaffirmed yesterday by Premier Braliano, who, in a brief declaration in the Chamber, prayed the parties to waive any discussion whatever upon the answer of Parliament to the speech from the throne, and to have confidence in those governing the country.

The independent Deputies, however, have shown themselves determined to provoke a discussion. Among the others, Mr. Couza, a Nationalist, demanded permission to express his personal admiration for the valor of the Servians, and insisted on ample measures being taken for preventing the exportation of articles of which in due time there will be an absolute deficiency in the country.

Constantin Mille, an independent, and proprietor of the newspaper Adeverul, delivered a long speech in which he declared himself dissatisfied with the policy of the Government, which ought to have taken a decisive stand at the beginning of the conflict. Instead of doing this, the Government has put us in the position of not knowing to which side we must turn, as long as our only intention is to turn first to this side and then to that, without having the necessary guarantees.

After paying high tribute to the valor of the Servian Army and the heroism of Belgium, the speaker demonstrated that Rumania, since the beginning of the conflict, ought to enter the war on the side of the Triple Entente.

He afterward protested against certain facts that the expressed neutrality of the country cannot tolerate; such as the passage through Rumanian territory of guns and ammunition from Germany for Turkey; the taking over by Germany of certain medical supplies originally intended for the Rumanian Army, and exchanging the same for grain.

He then assailed the propaganda carried out by German emissaries through certain news agencies, and the corruption of certain papers of the Rumanian press.

And during all this time, concluded Mr. Mille, our brethren in Transylvania are being exterminated by war while expecting our intervention. The Government must break its silence, which is becoming more and more suspicious, and frankly affirm its intention.

RUMANIA'S POLICY.

[From The London Daily Telegraph of Dec. 29, 1914.]

BUCHAREST, Dec. 28.

Today, in the debate on the address in reply to the message from the throne, the Prime Minister repeated the declaration made in the Chamber asking the majority to waive discussion and the Opposition to leave the Government full liberty of action to fulfill its great duty.

The Conservative Party, by the mouth of its chief, expressed its willingness to do this. M. Disesco, on behalf of the Conservative Democrats, repeated the declaration made by M. Take Jonesco, in the Chamber, according to which Rumania ought to abandon her neutral position and make an immediate alliance with the Triple Entente.

M. Disesco added that the Rumano-Austro-German alliance ceased to exist from the day when the Crown Council was held at Sinaeia; that council settled the matter of Rumania's neutrality. The speaker laid stress on the ingratitude of Austria toward Rumania in 1913, and alluded to the statements made recently by M. Take Jonesco concerning the threat of Austria against Rumania in 1913 should that country attack Bulgaria.

He concluded by observing that the two sections of the Opposition, Conservative and Conservative-Democrat, had declared for abandonment of neutrality and an alliance with the Triple Entente, and expressed the hope that presently this policy will be adopted officially. The address was afterward agreed to unanimously.

A large number of Senators telegraphed to the President of the Italo-Rumanian League at Rome expressing their happiness at witnessing the realization of the league's initiative, and requesting the President to consider them members of the Rumanian section of the league, which, being convinced of the profound significance and great usefulness of closer relations between the two countries, they joined with enthusiasm.

"LEAGUE OF UNITY."

BUCHAREST, Dec. 27.

At a special session today the League for the National Unity of All Rumanians acclaimed with grand enthusiasm the new committee, which has as President the Rev. Father Lucaci, the great propagandist of and martyr for the Rumanian cause in Transylvania and a member of the Rumanian National Committee of Hungary. There were also elected MM. Take Jonesco, Nicolas Filipescu, and Delavrance Gradischteano, all former Ministers. The committee is charged with the hastening of action by Rumania for the conquest of the Rumanian provinces of Austria-Hungary.

RUMANIAN STATISTICS.

[From Le Messager d'Athenes, Nov. 28, 1914.]

According to statistics published in a Rumanian paper, when the foreign press speaks of Rumanian aspirations it sums up the whole question in the word Transylvania.

It is not unnecessary perhaps to remark that this word has in this case a significance rather political and ethnological than purely geographical. This word comprises all the Austro-Hungarian territories occupied by Rumanians, with the understanding that Transylvania is the most important as regards area and Rumanian popularity.

Actually the Rumanian claims on the Austro-Hungarian territories are the following:

Transylvania—57,250 square kilometers, 2,850,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,750,000 are Rumanians.

Banat—28,510 square kilometers area, and 1,730,000 inhabitants, of whom 700,000 are Rumanians.

Chrishana—Area, 41,338 square kilometers, and 2,920,000 inhabitants, of whom 1,100,000 are Rumanians.

Mamoaresh—Area, 9,720 square kilometers, and 360,000 inhabitants, of whom 120,000 are Rumanians.

Bukowina—Area, 10,471 square kilometers, and 900,000 inhabitants, of whom 300,000 are Rumanians.

Total area, 147,280 square kilometers, and 8,760,000 inhabitants, of whom 3,970,000 are Rumanians.

In consequence, of 8,760,000 inhabitants of trans-Carpathian Rumania, nearly 4,000,000 are Rumanians, 2,200,000 Hungarians, 1,000,000 Serbo-Croatians, 730,000 Germans, and so on.

RUMANIA'S CLAIMS.

[From The London Times, Nov. 25, 1914.]

SOFIA, Nov. 23.

The efforts made by Germany and Austria-Hungary to win over Rumania, or at least to induce her to refrain from prosecuting her claims to Transylvania, are being pursued with indefatigable energy and perseverance. The same methods are being employed in Bucharest as here, but on an even larger scale. The issues involved seem to be more fully realized by the Central European powers than by their opponents, and no pains are being spared to draw Rumania and Bulgaria within the orbit of their influence.

The campaign in Bucharest was at first attended by a certain measure of success, owing to the attitude of M. Bratiano, the Premier; of M. Carp, a former Prime Minister, and of M. Marghiloman, the present leader of the Conservative Opposition. But many influential Liberals have already associated themselves with the programme of the action advocated by M. Take Jonesco, the chief of the Conservative-Democratic Party, and of M. Filipescu, a former Conservative Minister, whose advocacy of a forward policy threatens to cause a split in the Conservative camp. The great bulk of the political world desires to profit by the European crisis to secure Transylvania, the only difference of opinion being with regard to the advisability of immediate action. The consultative committee of the Conservative Party has passed a resolution demanding the abandonment of neutrality.

The concessions offered by Count Tisza, the Hungarian Premier, in the hope of averting the coming storm, make no impression on the Rumanians either within or without the monarchy. He promises to allow the teaching of Rumanian in the schools, the use of the language in the public services, and increased Rumanian representation in the Hungarian Parliament. But the time for concessions has gone by. The Austrian advance into Servia threatens to cut off Rumania from Southern and Western Europe and to prevent the arrival from the United States of the large supplies of stores and medicaments ordered there.

It is evident that neither Rumania nor Bulgaria can long maintain their present attitudes. It remains for the powers of the Entente to devise a means for securing the co-operation of both States.

Servia recently inquired in Bucharest whether Rumania would oppose territorial concessions to a neighboring State, evidently indicating Bulgaria. Rumania replied that she would be happy to see all the quarrels of her neighbors arranged. The Government at Nish, appreciating the necessities of the situation, is now disposed toward a policy of concession. Servia's only hope of maintaining an independent existence lies in the success of the Entente powers. She is, therefore, bound to consent to any course they may deem necessary at the present juncture.

UTTERANCES OF STATESMEN.

The New York Daily Greek Atlantis, in its issue of Nov. 21, 1914, reports as follows the statement of three Rumanian leaders to a Greek paper in Constantinople. The Rumanian Foreign Minister, Mr. Purumbaru, said:

Rumania is inspired by a sincere desire not to displease either of the two European Georges. Having adopted a policy of neutrality, she will maintain it to the end. Russia has expressed her satisfaction with the present attitude of Rumania, while Austria, since the beginning of the war, has avoided taking any oppressive measures against the Rumanians of Transylvania. As regards Italy, the Rumanian people harbor the friendliest intentions toward her. The Italo-Rumanian relations are most cordial. In Rumania the policy of Italy is followed with much attention. The relations of Rumania toward the other Balkan States, and especially toward Servia and Greece, are good. It is true that the Bulgarian intentions are not very clear. It appears, however, that the desire for peace is strong in Sofia, where it is felt that the interest of Bulgaria lies in adapting rather the country to the present situation than in throwing it into a struggle whose results would be unknown beforehand.

As for Servia, Rumania has not intervened on her behalf in this war, as it had not its origin in the Treaty of Bucharest.

In accordance with the common understanding of all the Balkan States, Rumania is always in favor of a union of them all, but opposes any combination between two or more Balkan States to the detriment of another.

M. Jonesco, leader of the Opposition, spoke on the Balkan situation as follows:

I always believed and still believe that the Balkan States cannot secure their future otherwise than by a close understanding among themselves, whether this understanding shall or shall not take the form of a federation. No one of the Balkan States is strong enough to resist the pressure from one or another of the European powers.

For this reason I am deeply grieved to see in the Balkan coalition of 1912 Rumania not invited. If Rumania had taken part in the first one, we should not have had the second. I did all that was in my power and succeeded in preventing the war between Rumania and the Balkan League in the Winter of 1912-1913.

I risked my popularity, and I do not feel sorry for it. I employed all my efforts to prevent the second Balkan war, which, as is well known, was profitable to us. I repeatedly told the Bulgarians that they ought not to enter it because in that case we would enter it too. But I was not successful in my efforts.

During the second Balkan war I did all in my power to end it as quickly as possible. At the conference of Bucharest I made efforts, as Mr. Pashich and Mr. Venizelos know very well, to secure for beaten Bulgaria the best terms. My object was to obtain a new coalition of all the Balkan States, including Rumania. Had I succeeded in this the situation would be much better. No reasonable man will deny that the Balkan States are neutralizing each other at the present time, which in itself makes the whole situation all the more miserable.

In October, 1913, when I succeeded in facilitating the conclusion of peace between Greece and Turkey, I was pursuing the same object of the Balkan coalition. On my return from Athens I endeavored, though without success, to put the Greco-Turkish relations on a basis of friendship, being convinced that the well understood interest of both countries lies not only in friendly relations, but even in an alliance between them.

The dissensions that exist between the Balkan States can be settled in a friendly way without war. The best moment for this would be after the general war, when the map of Europe will be remade. The Balkan country which would start war against another Balkan country would commit, not only a crime against her own future, but an act of folly as well.

The destiny and the future of the Balkan States, and of all the small European peoples as well, will not be regulated by fratricidal wars, but, with this great European struggle, the real object of which is to settle the question whether Europe shall enter an era of justice, and therefore happiness for the small peoples, or whether we will face a period of oppression more or less gilt edged. And as I always believed that wisdom and truth will triumph in the end, I want to believe, too, that, in spite of the pessimistic news reaching me from the different sides of the Balkan countries, there will be no war among them in order to justify those who do not believe in the vitality of the small peoples.

RUMANIANS IN HUNGARY.

N. Filipescu, ex-Minister of War, said:

The position of the Rumanians in Hungary is not so bad after all. Since the beginning of the general war the Rumanians of Hungary gave proofs of their faith and devotion to Hungary.

We hoped to see this country appreciating the fact. Our belief is strengthened every day. I am convinced that if from this war Hungary should emerge victorious she would show less good-will toward the Rumanians of Transylvania. It is the first time that I have expressed in this way my opinion as a seeming threat. I hoped that the Hungarians would in the end take to the right path. But I see that we have nothing to hope from that side, and I only regret our former amicable relations with Germany.

Two Balkan States—Servia and Greece—are nearer to us on account of the recent past. But in saying this I do not mean that our relations in the future will be less friendly. With the other States, and especially Bulgaria, our relations might become better. This is our sincerest desire. As for Turkey, we never ceased to be on good terms with her, and I hope the same will hold good in the future.



Exit Albania?

Departure of Prince William of Wied—After the Revolution of July, 1914.

[From Il Corriere della Sera of Milan, Italy, of Sept. 3, 1914.]

DURAZZO, Sept. 3.

An hour ago the Italian yacht Misurata, flying the Albanian ensign on the foremast and the Italian colors aft, weighed anchor and proceeded to Venice. Aboard the Misurata were Prince William of Wied, Princess Sophie, Tourkhan Pasha, (the Albanian Premier,) Akis Pasha, and other members of the Court.

Princess Sophie, coming aboard the launch which took them to the Misurata, was weeping. Prince William looked calm. The Italian marines and the Rumanian volunteers cheered, and the cruiser Libia saluted the Prince with the regular number of salvos. The square near the seashore was by that time full of refugees.

Prince William bade Durazzo good-bye, but every one is convinced that he will never come back.

Last Monday (Aug. 31) the Ministers of the powers met in the Italian Legation to consider the taking of certain measures, in case of trouble, which was already brewing on account of the non-payment of the apportionments to the men of the garrison.

On the morning of the next day the Minister of Rumania brought to the palace a letter from the insurgents addressed to the representatives of the powers and announcing that the patience of the insurgents was exhausted, and that they were resolved to enter Durazzo by any means. An identical letter was addressed to the inhabitants of the city.

It was then that the Prince decided to abandon Durazzo.

The Ministers, having received the message of the insurgents and having been notified of the intention of the Prince to leave the place, met again in the palace in order to find a way of settlement of the vexing financial problem. At the same time the International Commission of Control decided to call on the insurgent camp at Shiak, (outside of Durazzo,) give them the news of the imminent departure of the Prince, and invite them to the city.

The insurgents replied assuring the commission of their good intentions toward the city and the foreigners. They added that they had not taken any decision regarding the new form of government, because some of their chiefs were at that time in Avlona, and they promised to make their decision known after the departure of the Prince from Durazzo. On the other hand, they left it to be understood that there was already established in Albania a mutual national confidence between all the Musselman Albanians.

On its return to Durazzo the International Commission of Control found itself face to face with another surprise. The gendarmerie had mutinied. The men belonging to this corps were opposing the departure of the Prince before he had paid their wages, and threatened to make use of their weapons.

The commission sent the French delegate to the gendarmerie barracks, and it was with great trouble that the men were dissuaded from their original designs. Yesterday the Prince distributed decorations freely. Today at 7 A.M. he left the palace, and, saluted by the Diplomatic Corps, he repaired to the waterfront.

After the Prince and Princess embarked, the adjoining square was filled with great crowds of people. Malissor and Kotsovessi tribesmen and all those who were yet in Durazzo as protectors of the Prince went to the waterfront in order to embark on an Italian mail steamer bound for San Giovanni di Medua.

These people looked desperate and gave the impression of being in the last degree of poverty. Each one had from two to three pistols, and no one was unarmed. There might have been nearly 2,000 men there, all eager to leave, but this proved impossible, as their chiefs, Issa Boletinotz and Bairam Zouri, had not provided them with the necessary tickets.

At last, with the help of the Almighty, order was re-established, and, after two hours of trouble impossible to describe, these 2,000 refugees embarked on the steamer Citta di Bori.

The Italian marines re-embarked on the cruiser Libia, and the International Commission took charge of the Government.

LAST PROCLAMATION OF PRINCE OF WIED.

Before leaving Durazzo, the Prince of Wied addressed the following proclamation to the Albanian people:

Albanians, when your delegates came to offer me the crown of Albania, I answered with confidence to the appeal of this noble and chivalrous people who were asking me to aid them in the work of their national regeneration. I came to you animated by the most ardent desire to help you in this patriotic task.

You have seen me, from the beginning, devoting all my efforts for the reorganization of the country, and desirous of giving you a good administration and justice for all. But ill-omened events occurred to destroy our common labors. In fact, certain souls, blinded by passion, have misunderstood the scope of our reforms and have not given credit to a Government just born. On the other hand, the war which broke out in Europe has all the more complicated our position.

I therefore thought that, in order not to leave unfinished the work to which I wish to consecrate my forces and my life, I must just for a little while go to the Occident.

But know that, from afar as from near, I will have but one thought—to work for the prosperity of our noble and chivalrous Albanian fatherland. During my absence the International Commission of Control, deriving its powers from Europe, which created our country, will assume the Government.

ESSAD PASHA PRESIDENT.

[From Le Temps, Paris.]

DURAZZO, Oct. 4.

Essad Pasha was today named President of the temporary Government. The time limit for taking possession of the Government expired at 2 P.M. A short time before this hour Essad Pasha occupied the strategic points of the city with his forces of 10,000 Ottomans.

The members of the Albanian Senate elected him President, and expressed to him their congratulations for the confidence the nation has in him.

ALBANIA UNDER MANY RULERS.

[From The Times of London, Oct. 30.]

BUCHAREST, Oct. 27.

There are now six Italian warships at Avlona, where a sanitary station will be established for the relief of Albanian refugees driven from Epirus by the Greek "sacred bands." The duty of maintaining the decisions of the conference in London will apparently be intrusted to Italy as the only neutral power among the signatories to the Albanian settlement. The consent of Austria to this arrangement would seem to have been secured.

At present Albania is under six different regimes. Scutari and its neighborhood is governed by a local commission composed of Moslems and Christians. Avlona is also administered by a commission. The Mirdites form a separate State under Prenk Bib Doda. The Malissors remain isolated under their patriarchal institutions. The southern districts have been appropriated by the Greek invaders. Durazzo and the central regions obey Essad Pasha, who enjoys the title of Prime Minister and is recognized by the International Commission. That shadowy body, now reduced to four members, personates the ghost of the European concert. Except in the south the country is remarkably tranquil under its indigenous institutions.

After he had left Albania Prince William of Wied received a telegram from the King of Italy assuring him of support in the future. His subsequent inclusion, however, in the German General Staff is regarded as seriously compromising to his prospects as sovereign of Albania.

ITALY'S SANITARY MISSION.

[From The London Morning Post, Oct. 28, 1914.]

ROME, Oct. 27.

The dispatch of the battleship Dandolo, the Climene and other Italian warships to Valona is due to the Government's knowledge of a scheme for starting an agitation tending to infringe the decision of the London Conference, which declared Albania neutral. Ismail Kemal Bey, whom I have just seen, expressed his satisfaction at Italy's action at Valona on both political and humanitarian grounds. He did not think that the step would lead to complications, and described the condition of the people at Valona as very miserable.

The Tribuna, commenting on the Government announcement, declares that Italy's aim is for the present solely humanitarian, since the miserable conditions of Valona necessitate sanitary aid. A few companies of marines will land from the Dandolo to protect the Sanitary Mission. With regard to coast surveillance, the British and French Governments have warned Italy of a suspicious Moslem movement in the harbor of Smyrna, whence a thousand rabid young Turks have started or are starting on two steamers hired by the committee for Albania, with the intention of hoisting the Turkish flag and reannexing Albania to Turkey. Italy, in perfect accord with all the signatories of the London Conference, proposes to thwart the attempt.

The Giornale d'Italia considers that what has been done at Valona is sufficient affirmation of Italian interests. Italy never meditated expeditions into the interior or a protectorate over Albania. The Government's intention is to show that whoever touches Valona touches Italian interests, which are that no power shall establish a naval base there.

SASENO OCCUPIED.

[From The London Times, Oct. 30, 1914.]

ROME, Oct. 30.

The Italian occupation of the rocky and desolate islet of Saseno which, from a strategic point of view, completely dominates the sea approaches to Avlona, is a logical consequence of the occupation of that town for the purpose of establishing a hospital and maintaining order. The islet itself was for some months in 1913 and 1914 a bone of contention between the Italians, who insisted on obtaining it for the Principality of Albania, and the Greeks, who were equally anxious to retain it in their own possession. With Saseno under the control of a foreign power, the possessor of Avlona could never make the town into a place of arms.

Saseno, as one of the Ionian Islands, became a British protectorate in virtue of the Treaty of Paris of Nov. 5, 1815, but was given to Greece by the Treaty of London of March 29, 1864. The Ambassadors' Conference decided in the Autumn of last year that it was illogical to allow the chief harbor of Albania to be dominated by the territory of a foreign power, and by the Protocol of Florence, Dec. 19, 1913, it was definitely included in Albania. This decision was ratified by legislative enactment in Greece, to which effect was given by King Constantine's proclamation of June 13, 1914, shortly after which the Hellenic garrison was withdrawn. During the Greek regime, the island, being neutralized by the Treaty of 1864, was quite unimportant, and at one time the Turks by arrangement with the Hellenic Government, maintained a lighthouse there.

GREEK TROOPS IN EPIRUS.

[From The Morning Post, London, Oct. 28, 1914.]

ATHENS, Oct. 26.

In view of the continuous Albanian attacks and the growing insecurity in Northern Epirus the Greek Government today ordered Greek troops to occupy the districts of Argyrocastro and Premeti. The official communique just issued declares this to be an entirely provisional measure to restore order and security in a country already exhausted by prolonged sanguinary conflicts, and Greece proposes to continue to adhere to the international arrangements regarding Epirus. It goes without saying that this reoccupation coincides entirely with public opinion, which has long been exercised over the sufferings of the Epirotes.

ASSENT OF THE POWERS.

[From The London Morning Post, Oct. 30, 1914.]

Following are the replies of the great powers (states Reuter's Agency) to the Greek note announcing the intention of Greece to reoccupy Epirus:

France declared that she saw no objection to the course proposed by M. Venizelos's note.

Russia intimated that she would gladly accept whatever decision in the matter was reached by Great Britain and France.

The British Government accepted M. Venizelos's note.

Germany and Austria-Hungary replied that they accepted the declaration of the Greek Government that the occupation would not be contrary to the decisions of the London Conference.

Italy declared that she, for the same purpose as set forth in the Greek note, namely, the maintenance of order and security, was taking similar steps at Valona, and that she had adopted this course while fully respecting the decisions of the powers. She raised no objection to M. Venizelos's proposal.

ITALIAN OCCUPATION OF AVLONA.

[From the Messaggero of Rome, Dec. 28, 1914.]

AVLONA, Dec. 26.

The following proclamation addressed to the population was posted here:

The grave disorders that become apparent from time to time in this country have paralyzed commerce, work, and initiative, and are endangering the life and property of the inhabitants.

The Italian Government, a watchful guardian of Albanian fortunes, desires that your tranquillity, so cruelly tried, shall be assured. Invoked by your wishes the marines of Italy are disembarking from the ships to establish order and defend you.

(Signed) ADMIRAL PATRIS.

THE LAST WORD.

[From the Messaggero of Rome, Jan. 6, 1915.]

DURAZZO, Jan. 4.

Yesterday the rebels by a letter signed "The Mussulman Committee" demanded that the Ministers of Servia and France be consigned to them.

At 6:30 o'clock the attack against the city began.

Essad Pasha visited the trenches, notified the Italian Legation that there was great danger, and demanded all possible assistance.

At 2:30 a few cannon shots from the Misurata and the Sardegna made themselves heard, defending the city, silencing in this way the rebel musket fire.

The Italian colony and the legations of Italy, France, and Servia are embarked on the ships Sardegna and Misurata.



TO BELGIUM

By EDEN PHILLPOTTS.

[From King Albert's Book.]

Champion of human honor, let us lave Your feet and bind your wounds on bended knee, Though coward hands have nailed you to the tree And shed your innocent blood and dug your grave, Rejoice and live! Your oriflamme shall wave While man has power to perish and be free— A golden flame of holiest liberty, Proud as the dawn and as the sunset brave.

Belgium, where dwelleth reverence for right Enthroned above all ideals; where your fate And your supernal patience and your might Most sacred grow in human estimate, You shine a star above this stormy night, Little no more, but infinitely great.



The War in the Balkans

General Aspect of the Near East on Aug. 1, 1914.

By Adamantios Th. Polyzoides, Editor The Atlantis.

The opening of the great European war found the Balkan Peninsula in the political shape given to it by the Treaty of Bucharest, Aug. 10, (old style, July 28,) 1913.

This treaty was signed in the Rumanian capital immediately after the second Balkan war by Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, and, considered in its essential points, was the handiwork of European diplomacy, at whose instance Rumania had entered the war, with the avowed purpose to re-establish the destroyed Balkan equilibrium. Europe had two reasons for interfering in what was then considered as the final settlement of the Balkan question. In the first place, she wanted to reaffirm her authority and predominance over the Balkan States, and, in the second, she considered it as an indispensable part of her Near Eastern policy never to allow much freedom of movement on the part of these same States, which in two successive wars had proved their ability to safeguard and promote their vital interests in spite of all European opposition. To explain this course of European diplomacy one must bear in mind that the Balkan States, since their constitution as such, have always been considered as proteges of Europe, or, to put it more plainly, as not being of age, and therefore deprived of the right and privilege to deal directly with their ancient master, Turkey, in all serious matters in which their most vital interests were involved.

In the Treaty of Berlin after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 a congress, in which all of the Great European powers participated, most emphatically affirmed that Turkey was responsible to Europe for any complaints that the Balkan States might have against the Ottoman Government regarding the treatment of their connationals, still left under the Sultan. At the same time the Balkan States received due warning regarding their dealings with Turkey, and were made to take a pledge that whenever they had troubles with the Porte the powers and not themselves were to be the arbiters. All the world knows how Turkey, by constant wire-pulling, secured immunity from Europe for not fulfilling the obligations incumbent on her by the Treaty of Berlin, and how one of the Balkan States, namely, Greece, was left alone and unprotected, to be chastised by Turkey in 1897 for not leaving to the powers the settlement of the Cretan question which had brought about the war.

The European powers, having done practically nothing during thirty-five years for the betterment of the conditions under which the non-Moslem populations had to live in Turkey, were overwhelmed to hear in the Autumn of 1912 the news of a series of alliances concluded at Sofia on June 12 between Bulgaria and Servia, and between Bulgaria and Greece, for the purpose of settling once for all the perennial Balkan question. European diplomacy was slow, as usual, in grasping the meaning of the new alliance, and when, on Oct. 5, 1912, Montenegro suddenly declared war on Turkey, with Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece following suit on the 18th, there was consternation in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and, to a certain degree, in Petrograd.

An idea of the unpreparedness of European diplomacy in the face of the sudden Balkan war can be had by simply glancing at the records of the British House of Commons of the first weeks after the war was declared.

Sir Edward Grey, then and now Foreign Secretary of State for Great Britain, making the first announcement of the rupture between Turkey and the Balkan States, said—exposing the views not only of his Government but of the European concert as well—that Europe, being taken unawares, would not permit any alteration of the Balkan frontiers as the result of the war. After the first victories of the Balkan allies we see Great Britain changing her policy. "The Balkan victors shall not be deprived of the fruits of their victories," Premier Asquith was declaring in Parliament less than a fortnight after Sir Edward spoke. In both these instances the British statesmen were voicing the policy of the European concert taken as a whole. In the first place, the Foreign Secretary was led into believing that Turkey might prove victorious against the Balkan coalition, and the warning about the immutability of the Balkan frontiers was only for Turkey, in case her victorious armies were to cross the boundaries into Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece.

When events marked the utter collapse of the Turkish campaign, Premier Asquith came out with the declaration that Europe had agreed on a policy safeguarding the interests of the victorious Balkan allies. This policy was maintained as long as the Balkan victories were confined in their first progress toward Ottoman territory, at the same time leaving the great European interests unharmed. But when Servian troops arrived at Durazzo, and Montenegro entered Scutari while Greece kept pushing on to Avlona and Bulgaria stood before Tchataldja, the European concert was no longer unanimous in safeguarding the interests of the victors.

Austria, seeing her secular dream of a descent on Saloniki definitely destroyed, and feeling at the same time the imperative need of making impossible a Servian occupation of the Adriatic littoral, raised her voice in favor of the creation of an autonomous Albania at the expense of Servia, Montenegro, and Greece.

Italy, and then Germany, joined their ally in support of Albania. Russia, at the same time not wishing to give any greater impetus to the Bulgarian campaign, dexterously manipulated Rumania, which raised at that time her first claims on Dobrudja. France, who for the last twenty-five years has subjected her Near Eastern policy to the exigencies of the Petrograd statesmen, agreed to the Albanian proposals of the four powers, and finally Great Britain, fearing complications, declared abruptly through Sir Edward Grey that the Balkan war was one of conquest, and for that reason subject to European intervention. In this way European diplomacy stepped into the Balkan conflict and took charge of the final settlement of the first war.

The resolution to interfere in the war once taken, the European powers lost no time in finding a way to end the conflict, and with this object in mind they forced on the belligerents two successive armistices, culminating in the two peace conferences of London. These armistices served two purposes from the diplomatic point of view; first, they exhausted financially the little Balkan countries; and, secondly, they prepared public opinion for the acceptance of any peace terms. The second conference in London succeeded in forcing a peace treaty on the Balkan States. With the exception of Bulgaria, who hoped to retain most of the Turkish territory won by the Balkan coalition, every one was dissatisfied with the way the London conference ended.

Turkey, on one hand, was losing more territory than at first imagined, as the result of her defeat, and the loss of Adrianople was especially hard for every Turk.

Greece was obliged to sign a peace treaty giving her vague and indefinite boundaries and leaving out the question of the Aegean Islands and Epirus, to be settled at a later date by another conference of the Ambassadors of the six great powers in London.

Servia also had to wait for the realization of her fondest hope, which was to obtain a free commercial access to the Adriatic by way of Durazzo or San Giovanni di Medua. That question also was to be decided by the Ambassadorial conference. Montenegro was to lose Scutari, for which she had shed her heart's blood, without getting at the same time any adequate compensation. Such was the Peace of London, from the strictly Balkan point of view, and its conclusion in May, 1913, was the signal for the disruption of the Balkan League and the forerunner of the second war. One month later Bulgaria, having fallen under Austrian influences, quarreled with Servia and Greece over the division of certain Macedonian territories, and on June 16 (29, new style) all of a sudden attacked her erstwhile allies, thereby bringing about the second Balkan conflict, with Greece, Servia, and Montenegro united against her. The outcome of this war, the entry of Rumania and Turkey into the field against Bulgaria, the tearing up of the London Treaty, and the settlement of Bucharest are too well known to need an extensive mention here.

The Treaty of London once torn to pieces by the second Balkan war, it remained for the great powers to find a new way of forcing their terms on the recalcitrant Balkan States, and this they succeeded in doing by adroitly using Rumania as the representative of European diplomacy. Thus the Rumanian Army, without any provocation from Bulgaria, took the field against her neighbor, and acted as a mediator and arbiter of the second Balkan conflict.

The Greek, Servian, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian delegates who went to Bucharest at the close of the war knew beforehand that behind the actions of the Rumanian Government stood united the whole of European diplomacy, again striving to put down once for all these insolent little States who thought themselves emancipated from European guardianship. These delegates knew quite well that there was no escape, but they went, trying and hoping for the best. The Rumanian "Green Papers," published a short time after the Treaty of Bucharest and covering a period between Sept. 20, 1912, and Aug. 1, 1913, give a vivid and true story of the whole proceedings, showing once more what a powerful instrument diplomacy is in the hands of the strong for cheating the weak.

On Aug. 1, 1914, we see the Balkan Peninsula presenting the following aspect:

From the erstwhile European Turkey, of six vilayets, or departments, namely, those of Adrianople, Saloniki, Monastir, Uskub, Jannina, and Scutari, only one, and that mutilated, remains, the Vilayet of Adrianople. Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Albania appropriated the rest. Gone is Crete, and gone are the twenty-six Aegean Islands, twelve of them permanently united to their Hellenic motherland, while Italy temporarily occupies fourteen as a result of the Tripolitan war of 1911. Thus Turkey, from an area of 168,500 square kilometers, and 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 inhabitants, forming her European dominions, was reduced to about 30,000 square kilometers and nearly 3,000,000 inhabitants, including the population of Constantinople, amounting, according to the only available foreign statistics, to 1,203,000 inhabitants. Of course Turkey has in Asia an area of more than 2,000,000 square kilometers, with a population approximating 20,000,000, but that, properly speaking, does not enter into Balkan considerations.

Greece, after her two victorious wars, approximates 120,000 square kilometers in territory, with more than 5,000,000 population.

Rumania has 139,690 square kilometers of area and 7,601,660 of population.

Servia has an area of 87,300 square kilometers and a population of 4,256,000.

Bulgaria's area is 114,000 square kilometers, with 4,766,900 of population.

Montenegro has an area of 14,180 square kilometers and half a million in population, and, lastly, Albania, the newborn State, with its scant hope of future political life, has an area of about 17,600 square kilometers, with an approximate population of 800,000 inhabitants.

Were the Balkan States satisfied with the above arrangement when the great European war broke? To this question we have the following answer from those concerned:

Turkey never forgave the European powers the treatment accorded to her in the London peace conference, and proved her dissatisfaction by entering Thrace and occupying Adrianople immediately she saw Bulgaria engaged in the second war. But Turkey desired also the Aegean islands occupied by Greece, and these, all but two at the entrance to the Dardanelles, the powers allotted to Greece, not securing thereby an increase of Turkish sympathies.

Greece was disappointed in two instances by the European powers; first, because they did not make their decision regarding the islands binding upon Turkey, thus creating a series of unending controversies between the Porte and the Government of Athens, one result of which was the wholesale expulsions and persecutions of the Greek element in Turkey, and especially in the Vilayets of Adrianople and Smyrna. The question of settling in a friendly way the Greco-Turkish differences was to be discussed between the Grand Vizier, Prince Said Halim, and the Premier of Greece, E.K. Venizelos, in a meeting of the two statesmen in Brussels, when the great European war broke.

Bulgaria, who for a moment saw her most cherished dream of Balkan hegemony realized and had all her fondest hopes shattered by the second war and the Treaty of Bucharest, cannot help regarding her neighbors as the robbers of what she considers her national patrimony, and at the same time she does not forget that in all their proceedings against her, Greek, Servian, Rumanian, and Montenegrin acted with the tacit approval of the great powers.

Servia for years had struggled to get an outlet on the Adriatic, and when, after a glorious war, she attained her goal, she found Austria opposing her, and behind Austria the whole of the European concert.

Montenegro in the same way cannot forget the disappointment of being cast out of Scutari after one of the most strenuous and glorious campaigns of her history, and lastly Albania, poor and helpless, without any support from her creators, feels all that a weak and wretched foundling has to feel toward those responsible for its misfortunes and miseries. In contrast with these feelings, Rumania was the only Balkan State perfectly satisfied with the new arrangement. In fact, Rumania, having played in the war the part of a great power, came out of it not only with increased prestige but also with the richest of all the Bulgarian provinces, Dobrudja, as a sort of deserved payment for serving the ends of European diplomacy.

From this general dissatisfaction of the Balkan States with European diplomacy and European intrigue sprang Gavrilo Prinzip and the murder at Serajevo that plunged Europe and the world into the greatest and most disastrous war of all time.

In fairness, however, to the Balkan States it must be said at this juncture that war, in whatever form and character, was far from the Balkan mind on June 28, 1914, when the Austrian Archduke and heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, and his consort were assassinated by the Servian youth Prinzip in the capital of Bosnia.

The years 1912 and 1913 had been too costly for the whole of the Balkan Peninsula, and the necessity of a continued peace for a good number of years was universally recognized, with the exception of Constantinople, in Athens, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Cettinge, and even Durazzo. To prove this we have the opinions of all the Balkan leaders and the views expressed in the Balkan press up to Aug. 1, 1914.

A single point yet calls for a few remarks, and this covers the mutual relations of the Balkan States just before the European war.

We have seen in what a degree the question of the ownership of the Aegean Islands had divided the Governments of Athens and Constantinople. In fact, if any war in the Near East were to be feared, this was one between the two secular enemies, Greek and Turk, and when in May, 1913, the anti-Greek agitation in the Ottoman Empire reached its climax it was only through the tremendous influence of the Greek Premier on Hellenic public opinion and his extreme moderation that a new diplomatic rupture between the two countries was averted.

In anticipation of this eventuality Turkey secured two battleships of the dreadnought type, the Brazilian Rio de Janeiro (then Sultan Osman I. and afterward H.M.S. Erin, England having taken over the ship on Aug. 5, 1914) and the Reshadieh, (likewise taken over by England and renamed H.M.S. Agincourt,) and was preparing for war in such haste that Greece did not hesitate to buy at the original cost price the two old American battleships Idaho and Mississippi, (now Limnos and Kilkis.)

This was in July, 1914, just a few weeks before the European war. Since that time Greco-Turkish relations have been neither better nor worse. It must be said here that these relations had their origin, not in the obsolete London Treaty of May, 1913, but in the Treaty of Athens, signed in December, 1913, between the two countries, and covering in a general way the more essential points of the outstanding questions between the two parties, excluding, however, the Aegean Islands controversy.

After signing the Treaty of Bucharest Bulgaria turned her attention exclusively to Turkey, and, letting bygones be bygones, concluded the Peace Treaty of Constantinople in October, 1913, and inaugurated the most friendly relations with her erstwhile opponent. Since that time the report has spread that an alliance, both offensive and defensive, had been signed by the two countries, but this has been repeatedly denied both from Constantinople and Sofia.

The diplomatic relations between Servia and Turkey and Montenegro and Turkey were re-established a short time before the European war, but these countries, being now in no direct contact with Turkish territory, their relations with the Porte are of little importance.

Between Bulgaria on one hand and Rumania, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro on the other, the diplomatic relations have been re-established, but gone is the old friendship, for reasons already explained. Greece, Servia, and Montenegro are the best of friends, and, according to unofficial and confidential reports, a defensive and offensive alliance for the maintenance of the Balkan status quo, exists between the three countries. Between Rumania and Greece friendly relations exist, and for some time it was said that a marriage was to be arranged between the Greek Crown Prince, George, and the Princess Elizabeth, daughter of the Rumanian King, Ferdinand I., who succeeded to the throne after the death of his uncle, King Charles. This match, however, seems to have been abandoned, perhaps for political reasons, and more so because Greco-Rumanian relations have not as yet reached that firmness which only might justify such a rapprochement of the two royal families.

Between Servia and Rumania there is some courtesy but scarcely any friendship, and this is not surprising, especially now, when each side is aiming to an aggrandizement (at the expense of Austria) in a way injurious to the other. Montenegro naturally follows Servia's course, and as for Albania, what we said previously of her applies now, with this particular observation, that the only neighborly interest shown her is from Italy, trying to play the game of Tripoli at the expense of the Skipetars, while all the other European powers are busily engaged in the great war.

In conclusion we may note that of all the Balkan States only Rumania and, to a certain degree, Greece have any money to run their affairs. This, however, has nothing to do with the matter of their entrance in the war, as in that case there will be one or the other European combination to pay the freight.

Such was the aspect of the Balkan Peninsula at the beginning of the great European war.



THE EUROPEAN WAR AS SEEN BY CARTOONISTS

A SELECTION OF NOTABLE CARTOONS FROM LEADING ENGLISH, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND GERMAN PUBLICATIONS, SHOWING HOW THE KNIGHTS OF THE PEN AND BRUSH ARE WAGING THE WAR OF CARICATURE AGAINST THE FOES OF THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIANCES

ENGLISH CARTOONS, PAGE 1073

FRENCH CARTOONS, PAGE 1084

ITALIAN CARTOONS, PAGE 1088

GERMAN CARTOONS, PAGE 1091



Still Not Letting Go—and Still Breathing!



Going! Going! ——?



The God in the Cart

(AN UNREHEARSED EFFECT.)



The Great Illusion



What Punch Thinks Is Awaiting the Kaiser



The Man Behind the Kaiser



Nothing Doing



As Between Friends



Kultur



Homers



The New Year's Present That We Are Wishing For



"His" Christmas Sabots



"Sire, Your Soup's Getting Cold"



Chaffing the French Censor

(From La Vie Parisienne, Paris.)



The Under-Study



A Substitute for Belgian Blocks



What Italy Thinks of "Guglielmo"

(A SERIES OF ITALIAN POSTCARDS.)



You Can't Bluff the Turk

(From Simplicissimus, Munich.)



The Mistress of the Sea

(From Lustige Blaetter, Berlin.)



The "Prize-Taker"

]



The Face at the Window



Novel Coastwise Scenery



The Dancers



The English Spider



The Jap-Infested British Lion



The Englishman and His Globe

]



The German Watch in Kiao-Chau

]



GERMANY vs. BELGIUM

Case of the Secret Military Documents Presented by Both Sides

[The Belgo-British plot alleged by Germany is thoroughly aired in the following communications. The text of the secret documents, which, according to the German contention, prove that the Allies did not intend to respect Belgian neutrality—that Belgium herself conspired with England to break it—was discovered in the archives of the Belgian Government after the German occupation of Brussels, and is embodied on Pages 1105 to 1109 in the subjoined article, published in behalf of Germany by Dr. Bernhard Dernburg.

The article, called by Dr. Dernburg "The Case of Belgium," as reproduced below, and published between gray covers like the Belgian "Gray Book," prompted publications in rejoinder by the Belgian Legation at Washington. The first of these, entitled "The Innocence of Belgium," appears on Page 1110; it states that the secret documents show in their own statements the "clearest proof of the innocence of Belgium." The second Belgian article, headed "Why Belgium Was Devastated," and appearing on Page 1115, embodies the German proclamations establishing military rule in the violated territory.—EDITOR.]

"THE CASE OF BELGIUM"

"In the Light of Official Reports Found in the Secret Archives of the Belgian Government after the Occupation of Brussels"

Remarks Introductory to the Secret Documents

By Dr. Bernhard Dernburg

Herewith are published facsimiles of papers found among the documents of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels, referring to arrangements between the English Military Attache and the Belgian Minister of War regarding British intervention in Belgium.

It will be remembered from the British "White Book" that in November, 1912, a correspondence passed between Sir Edward Grey and the French Minister in London, in which it was stated that British and French military and naval experts had consulted together from time to time as to plans to be followed in case of war, and it was stated in this correspondence that in accordance with such prearranged plans the French fleet would stay in the Mediterranean to safeguard the joint interests there, whereas the British fleet would safeguard their interests in the north. Of this correspondence the members of the British Cabinet remained ignorant until the Cabinet meeting immediately preceding the written statement by Great Britain on Aug. 2 that in case a German fleet attacked the French coast or passed into the Channel, England would give all the assistance in her power, (British "White Papers," No. 148,) and it was also, of course, concealed from the British public until the speech of Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 3. It will be remembered that in consequence of this revelation the British Minister of Commerce, Mr. John Burns, and two other members, Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, left the British Cabinet under protest; that the leader of the British Labor Party, Mr. Ramsey Macdonald, resigned from the leadership and that Mr. Arthur Ponsonby in his famous letter denounced Sir Edward Grey's practices.

Mr. Ponsonby said that time and again they had been assured that there were no obligations whatsoever on the part of Great Britain to come to France's assistance and yet they found themselves now so hopelessly entangled that as a matter of fact the British Government could not back out.

The fact of these consultations, by which, of course, all the plans of mobilization of both the British and French armies were disclosed to the two allies and which include the landing of English troops in France, is now fully established by the annexed documents. They show that these conversations were also held with Belgium, that plans had been concerted to invade Belgium with an army of 100,000 men by way of three French ports—viz., Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne—and that the British plans even considered a landing by way of the Scheldt, thus violating also Dutch neutrality.

The documents, giving all the details as translated and showing that Belgian railway cars were to be sent to the named French ports in order to transport the British troops into Belgium, are dated from 1906.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, a well-known Belgian patriot, protested to his Government. The heading of his protest is also given in facsimile. In it he said that it was not quite safe to trust to the British and French to keep the Belgian neutrality, that it was not wise to take all measures only against a German infraction of Belgian neutrality and that the British spirit was clearly shown by the words of Col. Barnardiston that the Scheldt might be used for transporting troops into Belgium.

Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French Governments violently protested when the plans were made public that the Dutch Government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in 1906. But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British went one step further. When Col. Bridges, in a conversation with Gen. Jungbluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, said that England was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed and that they would land them as soon as any European conflict should break out, Gen. Jungbluth protested that for such a step the permission of Belgium was necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it, but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect herself, England would land troops anyway. Gen. Jungbluth answered that Belgium felt strong enough to protect herself, which is in keeping with her declaration to France, when she offered to protect Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the British "White Book." The position of England was therefore that, while in 1906 they had already concerted plans for a joint action, in 1912 England intended action in any case, should a European conflagration break out.

Now, it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, as mentioned in his communication to Sir E. Goschen: "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside." (British "White Papers," No. 89.)

This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all. It only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus the British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British "White Book," prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which she had taken in 1870, when she made a treaty with France as against the German invasion of Belgium and with Germany as against the French invasion of Belgium. A similar agreement was suggested by Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 1, 1914, as reported in the English "White Book," No. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality England would engage to remain neutral, upon which Grey replied that he could not say that.

It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of a German war, that was sure to be brought about by Russia's mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany, and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war, (see report of Belgian Charge d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Brussels, July 30.)

In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's neutrality, in Belgium, irrespective of whether German troops were marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been made in 1912 or any time thereafter until Aug. 4 in the German Reichstag. It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized, Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England, and that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at Liege that put this important railway centre commanding the railway connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium.

The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and French Governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be presumed that the conference between British and French experts was unknown to the British Military Attache in Brussels. It is furthermore impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of British troops from Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne into Belgium in Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron Greindl and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This disposes of the contention that the Belgian conversation had a purely defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one-sidedness of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the placing of all Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.

The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that Germany demanded that the Belgian forces should fight with the Germans against the French and the English, and the truth had become known only three full months later, when the Belgian "Gray Book" was published. Then Belgium was practically occupied territory. While Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward Germany, it was secretly planning for her defeat in a war which was considered unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, however, must suffer because of the large ambitions of King Leopold of Congo fame and of a broken-down diplomacy.

The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he had no regret that it violated international law. This law of necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, Vol. 130, Page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning Chinese immigration into the United States: "It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence."

We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves.

Summary of the Secret Documents

I. The first document is a report of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, to the Minister of War, reporting a series of conversations which he had had with the Military Attache of the British Legation, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston, in Brussels. It discloses that, as early as January, 1906, the Belgian Government was in consultation with the British Government over steps to be taken by Belgium, Great Britain, and France against Germany. A plan had been fully elaborated for the landing of two British army corps in French ports to be transferred to the point in Belgium necessary for operations against the Germans. Throughout the conversation the British and Belgian forces were spoken of as "allied armies"; the British Military Attache insisted on discussing the question of the chief command; and he urged the establishment, in the meantime, of a Belgian spy system in Germany.

II. When in the year 1912 Lieut. Col. Barnardiston had been succeeded by Lieut. Col. Bridges as British Military Attache in Brussels, and the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major Gen. Ducarme, had been succeeded by Gen. Jungbluth as Chief of the Belgian General Staff, the conversations proceeded between the two latter officials. That is to say, these were not casual conversations between individuals, but a series of official conversations between representatives of their respective Governments, in pursuance of a well-considered policy on the part of both Governments.

III. The above documents are given additional significance by a report made in 1911 by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, from which it appears that this representative of the Belgian Government in Berlin was familiar with the plans above set forth and protested against them, asking why like preparations had not been made with Germany to repel invasion by the French and English.

Taken together, these documents show that the British Government had the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, of sending troops into Belgium immediately—that is, of doing the very thing which, done by Germany, was used by England as a pretext for declaring war on Germany.

They show also that the Belgian Government took, in agreement with the English General Staff, military precautions against a hypothetical German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German Government, military precautions against an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium, though fully informed that it was the purpose of the British Government to land and dispatch, across French territory into Belgium, 160,000 troops, without asking Belgium's permission, on the first outbreak of the European war. This clearly demonstrates that the Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join Germany's enemies.



DOCUMENT NO. 1

Report of Gen. Ducarme, Chief of the Belgian General Staff, to the Belgian Minister of War

"Confidential Letter to the Minister Concerning the Confidential Conversations.

"BRUSSELS, April 10, 1906.

"Mr. Minister:

"I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations which I had with Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and which have already been the subject of my oral communications.

"The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to the general political situation, and because of the possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

"The Lieutenant Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.

"Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs.