The battle which now raged among these trees, rocks, and ravines was so complicated that it is hard to follow and difficult to describe the movements of the contestants. Some idea of it can probably be gained by an examination of the following diagram:

It will be seen that a long line of rebel batteries bears upon A, and that one of them was brought up to enfilade the side AB. The angle at A, attacked by Barksdale on the north and Kershaw on the west, was broken in. In consequence of this, several batteries on the line EF were sacrificed, and Wofford's brigade soon came forward and took the position DE.

The Confederate line being very long, and overlapping Ward's brigade on the left, the latter was forced back, and the exulting rebels advanced to seize Little Round Top. They attacked the force there with great fury, assailing it in front and rear, but they were ultimately repulsed, and finally took up the line GL. Two divisions of the Fifth Corps and one of the Second Corps were sent in, one after the other, to drive back the strong rebel force posted from D to G, but each one had a bitter contest in front, and was flanked by the rebel line at DE, so that ultimately all were obliged to retreat, although each performed prodigies of valor. Indeed, Brooks' brigade charged almost up to the enemy's line of batteries, HI. The rebels gained the position LG, confronting our main line and close to it; but a fine charge made by Crawford's division of the Pennsylvania Reserves drove them farther back, and as part of the Sixth Corps came up and formed to support Crawford, the rebels gave up the contest for the night as regards this part of the field.

The attack against Humphreys' division which followed the breaking in of the angle at A will be described further on. The general result was that Sickles' entire line, together with the reinforcements sent in at different times to sustain it, were all forced back to the ridge which was our main line of battle, with the exception of Crawford's division which maintained a somewhat advanced position.

The details of this contest are full of incident, and too important to be wholly omitted.

About 3.30 P.M. the rebels commenced the movement against our left, by sending a flanking force from Hood's division, formed in two lines, around to attack Sickles' left, held by General J. Hobart Ward's brigade, which occupied the open ground covering the approaches to Little Round Top; Ward's line passing in front of the mountain, and his flank resting on a rocky depression in the ground called the Devil's Den. The right extended to the minor spur or wooded ridge beyond the wheat-field. The engagement was furious; commencing on the rebel right, it extended to the left, until it reached the Peach Orchard, where it became especially violent. This central point of Sickles' line was held by eleven regiments of Birney's and Humphreys' divisions. Birney's two brigades, commanded by Graham and De Trobriand, held on bravely, for the men who fought with Kearney in the Peninsula were not easily driven; but the line was too attenuated to resist the shock very long, and reinforcements became absolutely necessary to sustain that unlucky angle at the Peach Orchard. Sickles had authority to call on Sykes, whose corps was resting from a long and fatiguing march, but the latter wished his men to get their coffee and be refreshed before sending them in; and as those who are fighting almost always exaggerate the necessity for immediate reinforcements, Sykes thought Sickles could hold on a while longer, and did not respond to the call for three- quarters of an hour.

It would seem that Lee supposed that Meade's main line of battle was on the Emmetsburg pike, and that the flank rested on the Peach Orchard, for he ordered Longstreet to form Hood's division perpendicular to that road, whereas Sickles occupied an advanced line, and Sykes the main line in rear. McLaws says that Lee thought turning the Peach Orchard was turning the Union left. With this idea, he directed Longstreet to form across the Emmetsburg road, and push our troops toward Cemetery Hill. Kershaw, after the minor ridge was taken, reported to Longstreet that he could not carry out these orders without exposing his right flank to an attack from Sykes' corps.

Ward fought bravely against Benning's and Anderson's brigades on the left, driving back two attacks of the latter, but his line was long and weak, and the enemy overlapped it by the front of nearly two brigades. Being concealed from view, from the nature of the ground they could concentrate against any point with impunity. He attempted to strengthen his forces at the Devil's Den by detaching the 99th Pennsylvania from his right, and, although De Trobriand had no troops to spare, he was directed by General Birney to send the 40th New York, under Colonel Egan, to reinforce that flank. Egan arrived too late to perform the duty assigned to him, as Ward had been already driven back, but not too late to make a gallant charge upon the rebel advance.

The fighting soon extended to the Peach Orchard, but as it commenced on the left, we will describe that part of the engagement first.

General Warren, who was on Meade's staff as Chief Engineer, had ridden about this time to the signal station on Little Round Top, to get a better view of the field. He saw the long line of the enemy approaching, and about to overlap Ward's left, and perceived that unless prompt succor arrived Little Round Top would fall into their hands. Once in their possession they would flank our whole line and post guns there to drive our troops from the ridge; so that this eminence was in reality the key of the battle-field, and must be held at all hazards. He saw Barnes' division, which Sykes had ordered forward, formed for a charge, and about to go to the relief of De Trobriand, who held the centre of Birney's line, and who was sorely beset. Without losing a moment he rode down the slope, over to Barnes, took the responsibility of detaching Vincent's brigade, and hurried it back to take post on Little Round Top. He then sent a staff officer to inform General Meade of what he had done and to represent the immense importance of holding this commanding point.

The victorious column of the enemy was subjected to the fire of a battery on Little Round Top, and to another farther to the right; but it kept on, went around Ward's brigade and rushed eagerly up the ravine between the two Round Tops to seize Little Round Top which seemed to be defenceless. Vincent's brigade rapidly formed on the crest of a small spur which juts out from the hill, and not having time to load, advanced with the bayonet, in time to save the height. The contest soon became furious and the rocks were alive with musketry. General Vincent sent word to Barnes that the enemy were on him in overwhelming numbers, and Hazlett's regular battery, supported by the 140th New York under Colonel O'Rorke of Weed's brigade, was sent as a reinforcement. The battery was dragged with great labor to the crest of Little Round Top, and the 140th were posted on the slope on Vincent's right. They came upon the field just as the rebels, after failing to penetrate the centre, had driven back the right. In advancing to this exposed position, Colonel O'Rorke, a brilliant young officer who had just graduated at the head of his class at West Point, was killed and his men thrown into some confusion, but Vincent rallied the line and repulsed the assault. In doing so he exposed himself very much and was soon killed by a rebel sharpshooter. General Weed, who was on the crest with the battery, was mortally wounded in the same way; and as Hazlett leaned over to hear his last message, a fatal bullet struck him also and he dropped dead on the body of his chief. Colonel Rice of the 44th New York now took command in place of Vincent. The enemy having been foiled at the centre and right, stole around through the woods and turned the left of the line; but Chamberlain's regiment—the 20th Maine—was folded back by him, around the rear of the mountain, to resist the attack. The rebels came on like wolves, with deafening yells, and forced Chamberlain's men over the crest; but they rallied and drove their assailants back in their turn. This was twice repeated and then a brigade of the Pennsylvania Reserves and one of the Fifth Corps dashed over the hill. The 20th Maine made a grand final charge and drove the rebels from the valley between the Round Tops, capturing a large number of prisoners. Not a moment too soon, for Chamberlain had lost a third of his command and was entirely out of ammunition. Vincent's men in this affair took two colonels, fifteen officers, and five hundred men prisoners, and a thousand stand of arms. Hill in his official report says "Hood's right was held as in a vise."

We will now return to the Peach Orchard. In answer to a shot from Clark's battery a long line of guns opened from the eleven batteries opposite. Graham's infantry were partially sheltered from this iron hail, but the three batteries with him in the beginning, which were soon reinforced by four more from the reserve artillery, under Major McGilvery, were very much cut up; and at last it became necessary to sacrifice one of them—that of Bigelow—to enable the others to retire to a new line in the rear. Graham still held the Peach Orchard, although he was assailed on two fronts, by Barksdale's brigade on the north and Kershaw's brigade on the west. A battery was brought forward to enfilade Sickles' line on the Emmetsburg road, and under cover of its fire Barksdale carried the position, but was mortally wounded in doing so.* Sickles lost a leg about this time (5.30 P.M.), and Graham, who was also badly wounded, fell into the enemy's hands. The command of the Third Corps now devolved upon General Birney.

[* Barksdale soon after was brought into my lines and died like a brave man, with dignity and resignation. I had known him as an officer of volunteers in the Mexican war. As a member of Congress he was very influential in bringing on the Rebellion.]

The batteries under Major McGilvery, which lined the cross road below the Peach Orchard, were very effective, but were very much shattered. Kershaw captured them at one time but was driven off temporarily by a gallant charge of the 141st Pennsylvania of Graham's brigade, who retook the guns, which were then brought off by hand. Bigelow was ordered by Major McGilvery to sacrifice his battery to give the others time to form a new line. He fought with fixed prolonge until the enemy were within six feet of him, and then retired with the loss of three officers and twenty-eight men. Phillips' battery, which adjoined his, had a similar experience. McLaws bears testimony to the admirable manner with which this artillery was served. He says one shell killed and wounded thirty men, out of a company of thirty-seven.

The capture of the Peach Orchard necessarily brought the enemy directly on Humphreys' left flank and De Trobriand's right. The disaster then became irremediable, because every force thrown in after this period, had to contend with a direct fire in front, and an enfilading fire from the right.

While the Peach Orchard was assailed, several combats took place in the vicinity, which had a general relation to the defence of Sickles' line. A little stream runs through a ravine parallel to the cross road, and about five hundred yards south of it, and then turns abruptly to the south at the corner of a wheat-field, passing through a rocky wooded country, to empty in Plum Run. De Trobriand held the north bank of this stream with a very insufficient force —a front of two regiments—and his contest with Semmes' brigade in front and Kershaw's brigade, which was trying to penetrate into the Peach Orchard, on his right, was at very close range and very destructive. At the same time as Ward's left was turned and driven back the enemy came in on the left and rear of De Trobriand, and occupied the wheat-field. Barnes' division of the Fifth Corps, composed of Sweitzer's and Tilton's brigades, soon came to his assistance. The former, by wheeling to the left and retaining several lines, kept up the fight successfully against the enemy who came up the ravine, but the latter was flanked and obliged to give way. De Trobriand's two regiments in front had a most determined fight, and would not yield the ground. When relieved by Zook's force they fell back across the wheat-field. There Birney used them as a basis of a new line, brought up two fresh regiments, charged through the field, and drove the enemy back to the stone fence which bounded it.

Caldwell's division of Hancock's corps now came on to renew the contest. Caldwell formed his men with the brigades of Cross and Kelly in front, and those of Zook and Brooke in rear. In the advance Colonel Cross was killed, and the front line being enfiladed in both directions, was soon so cut up that the rear line came forward in its place. Zook was killed, but Brooke made a splendid charge, turning Kershaw's right and driving Semmes back through the supporting batteries. Sweitzer's brigade then came up a second time to aid Brooke, but it was useless, for there was still another line of batteries beyond, and as the Peach Orchard by this time was in possession of the enemy, Brooke's advanced position was really a disadvantage, for both his flanks were turned. Semmes' brigade, together with parts of Benning's and Anderson's brigades, rallied behind a stone wall, again came forward, and succeeded in retaking the knoll and the batteries they had lost. Caldwell, under cover of our artillery, extricated his division with heavy loss, for both Zook's and Kelly's brigades were completely surrounded.

Then Ayres,* who had been at the turning-point of so many battles, went in with his fine division of regulars, commanded by Day and Burbank, officers of courage and long experience in warfare. He struck the enemy in flank who were pursuing Caldwell, and who would have renewed the attack on Little Round Top, doubled them up, and drove them back to the position Caldwell had left; but his line, from the nature of things, was untenable, for a whole brigade with ample supports had formed on his right rear, so that nothing remained but to face about and fight his way home again. This was accomplished with the tremendous loss of fifty per cent. of his command in killed and wounded. His return was aided by the artillery on Little Round Top, and by the advance of part of the Sixth Corps. When the troops were all gone, Winslow's battery still held the field for a time, and withdrew by piece.

[* General Ayres, whose service in the war commenced with the first Bull Run and ended at Appomattox, may almost be called an impersonation of the Army of the Potomac, as he took part in nearly all its battles and minor engagements.]

The enemy, Wofford's, Kershaw's, and Anderson's brigades, now swarmed in the front of our main line between the wheat-field and Little Round Top. General S. Wiley Crawford, who commanded a division composed of two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, was ordered to drive them farther back. This organization, which at one time I had the honor to command, were veterans of the Peninsula, and were among the most dauntless men in the army. Crawford called upon them to defend the soil of their native State, and headed a charge made by McCandless' brigade, with the colors of one of the regiments in his hand. The men went forward with an impetus nothing could withstand. The enemy took shelter behind a stone fence on the hither side of the wheat-field, but McCandless stormed the position, drove them beyond the field, and then, as it was getting dark, both sides rested on their arms. The other brigade of Crawford's division—that of Fisher—had previously been sent to reinforce Vincent in his desperate struggle on the slope of Little Round Top. The enemy retired before it, so that it was not engaged, and it then took possession of the main Round Top on the left of Little Round Top and fortified it.

As Crawford charged, two brigades of Sedgwick's corps, those of Nevin and Eustis, formed under Wheaton on the right and below Little Round Top. The sight of the firm front presented by these fresh troops thoroughly discouraged Longstreet, who went forward to reconnoitre, and he gave up all attempts at making any farther advance.

The enemy at night took post at the western base of the ridge, and held a fortified line as far south as the Devil's Den, in which rocky cavern they took shelter.

It remains now to describe the effect of the loss of the Peach Orchard and the wounding of Sickles and Graham—which took place soon after—upon the fate of Humphreys' division, posted on the right along the Emmetsburg road. When Sickles lost his leg, Birney assumed command of the corps, and ordered Humphreys to move his left wing back to form a new oblique line to the ridge, in connection with Birney's division. Humphreys, up to the loss of the Peach Orchard, had not been actively engaged, as the enemy had merely demonstrated along his front; but now he was obliged, while executing the difficult manoeuvre of a change of front to rear, to contend with Barksdale's brigade of McLaws' division on his left at the Peach Orchard, and enfilading batteries there also, while his entire front was called upon to repel a most determined assault from Anderson's division, which hitherto had not been engaged, and which now pressed with great force on his right, which still clung to the road. Four regiments were thrown in by Hancock to support that part of the line, but the attack was so sudden and violent that they only had time to fire a few volleys before Humphreys received orders to give up his advanced position and fall back to the ridge itself. There he turned at bay. Hancock, who had been placed in command of the First, Second, and Third Corps, was indefatigable in his vigilance and personal supervision, "patching the line" wherever the enemy was likely to break through. His activity and foresight probably preserved the ridge from capture. Toward the last Meade brought forward Lockwood's Maryland brigade from the right and sent them in to cover Sickles' retreat. Humphreys was followed up by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, and Wright—about the best fighting material in the rebel army. Perry was driven back by the fire of our main line, and as his brigade was between the other two, his retreat left each of them in a measure unsupported on the flanks. Posey's and Mahone's brigades were to advance as soon as the others became actively engaged, but failed to do so, and therefore Pender, who was to follow after them, did not move forward. Hence the great effort of Wilcox and Wright, which would have been ruinous to us if followed up, was fruitless of results. Both were repulsed for lack of support, but Wright actually reached the crest with his Georgians and turned a gun, whose cannoneers had been shot, upon Webb's brigade of the Second Corps. Webb gave him two staggering volleys from behind a fence, and went forward with two regiments. He charged, regained the lost piece, and turned it upon them. Wright, finding himself entirely isolated in this advanced position, went back again to the main line, and Wilcox did the same. On this occasion Wright did what Lee failed to accomplish the next day at such a heavy expense of life, for he pierced our centre, and held it for a short time, and had the movement been properly supported and energetically followed up, it might have been fatal to our army, and would most certainly have resulted in a disastrous retreat. It was but another illustration of the difficulty of successfully converging columns against a central force. Lee's divisions seemed never to strike at the hour appointed. Each came forward separately, and was beaten for lack of support.

Wright attained the crest and Wilcox was almost on a line with him. The latter was closely followed up and nearly surrounded, for troops rushed in on him from all sides. He lost very heavily in extricating himself from his advanced position. Wilcox claims to have captured temporarily twenty guns and Wright eight.

As they approached the ridge a Union battery limbered up and galloped off. The last gun was delayed and the cannoneer, with a long line of muskets pointing at him within a few feet, deliberately drove off the field. The Georgians manifested their admiration for his bravery by crying out "Don't shoot," and not a musket was fired at him.* I regret that I have not been able to ascertain the man's name.

[* As it is well to verify these incidents, I desire to state that this is a reminiscence of Dr. J. Robie Wood, of New York, a Georgian, a relative of Wendell Phillips, who was in the charge with Wright. Wood fell struck by six bullets, but recovered.]

In the morning General Tidball, who was attached to the cavalry as Chief of Artillery, rode along the entire crest from Little Round Top to Culp's Hill to make himself familiar with the line. As he passed by headquarters he noticed some new troops, the Second Vermont brigade under General Stannard, which formed part of my command. They were a fine-looking body of men, and were drawn up in close column by division, ready to go to any part of the field at a moment's notice. After inquiring to what corps they belonged he passed over to the right. On his return late in the day he saw Sickles' whole line driven in and found Wright's rebel brigade established on the crest barring his way back. He rode rapidly over to Meade's headquarters and found the general walking up and down the room, apparently quite unconscious of the movements which might have been discerned by riding to the top of the hill, and which should have been reported to him by some one of his staff. Tidball said, "General, I am very sorry to see that the enemy have pierced our centre." Meade expressed surprise at the information and said, "Why, where is Sedgwick?" Tidball replied, "I do not know, but if you need troops, I saw a fine body of Vermonters a short distance from here, belonging to the First Corps, who are available." Meade then directed him to take an order to Newton and put the men in at once; the order was communicated to me and I went with my division at double quick to the point indicated. There we pursued Wright's force as it retired, and retook, at Hancock's instigation, four guns taken by Wright earlier in the action. When these were brought in I sent out two regiments, who followed the enemy up nearly to their lines and retook two more guns. I have been thus particular in narrating this incident as Stannard's Vermont brigade contributed greatly to the victory of the next day and it is worthy of record to state how they came to be located in that part of the field.

It is claimed that unless Sickles had taken up this advanced position Hood's division would have turned our left, have forced us from the shelter of the ridge, and probably have intervened between us and Washington. The movement, disastrous in some respects, was propitious as regards its general results, for the enemy had wasted all their strength and valor in gaining the Emmetsburg road, which after all was of no particular benefit to them. They were still outside our main line. They pierced the latter it is true, but the gallant men who at such heavy expense of life and limb stood triumphantly on that crest were obliged to retire because the divisions which should have supported them remained inactive. I must be excused for thinking that the damaging resistance these supports encountered on the first day from the men of my command exerted a benumbing influence on the second day.

It is said, that Hood being wounded, Longstreet led the last advance against Little Round Top in person, but when he saw Sedgwick's corps coming into line he gave up the idea of capturing the heights as impracticable. This eminence should have been the first point held and fortified by us early in the day, as it was the key of the field, but no special orders were given concerning it and nothing but Warren's activity and foresight saved it from falling into the hands of the enemy.

Meade was considerably startled by the fact that the enemy had pierced our centre. He at once sent for Pleasonton and gave him orders to collect his cavalry with a view to cover the retreat of the army. Indeed, in an article on the "Secret History of Gettysburg," published in the "Southern Historical Papers," by Colonel Palfrey, of the Confederate army, he states that the movement to the rear actually commenced, and that Ewell's pickets heard and reported that artillery was passing in that direction. After a short time the noise of the wheels ceased. He also says that in a conversation he had with Colonel Ulric Dahlgren of our cavalry, who had lost a leg, and was a prisoner in Richmond, he was told that while the battle of Gettysburg was going on he (Dahlgren) captured a Confederate scout with a despatch from Jefferson Davis to General Lee, in which the former wrote of the exposed condition of Richmond owing to the presence of a large Union force at City Point. Dahlgren said a retreat had been ordered, but when Meade read this despatch, he looked upon it as a sign indicating the weakness of the enemy, and perhaps thinking it would not do to supplement the probable capture of Richmond by a retreat of the Army of the Potomac, countermanded the order. Sedgwick, who was high in the confidence of General Meade, told one of his division commanders that the army would probably fall back on Westminster. General Pleasonton testifies that he was engaged, by order of General Meade, until 11 P.M. in occupying prominent points with his cavalry, to cover the retreat of the army. Nevertheless it has been indignantly denied that such a movement was contemplated.

Although it was General Lee's intention that both flanks of the Union army should be assailed at the same time, while the intermediate forces made demonstrations against the centre, Ewell did not move to attack the right of our line at Culp's Hill until Longstreet's assault on the left had failed. Longstreet attributes it to the fact that Ewell had broken his line of battle by detaching two brigades up the York road. There is always some reason why columns never converge in time. Johnson's division, which was on the extreme left of the rebel army, and had not been engaged, made their way, sheltered by the ravine of Rock Creek, to assail the right at Culp's Hill, held by Wadsworth's division of the First Corps, and that part of the line still farther to the right where Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps was posted.

In his desire to reinforce the Fifth Corps at the close of the conflict with Longstreet, General Meade made the sad mistake of ordering the Twelfth Corps to abandon its position on the right and report to General Sykes for duty on the left. General Slocum, sensible that this would be a suicidal movement, reported that the enemy were advancing on his front, and begged permission to keep Geary's division there to defend the position. General Meade finally allowed him to retain Greene's brigade, and no more, and thus it happened that Ewell's troops, finding the works on the extreme right of our line defenceless, had nothing to do but walk in and occupy them. If Meade was determined to detach this large force, there seems no good reason why two of Sedgwick's brigades should not have been sent to take its place, but nothing was done.

Johnson's division, as it came on, deployed and crossed Rock Creek about half and hour before sunset. It suffered so severely from our artillery, that one brigade, that of Jones, fell back in disorder, its commander being wounded. The other, however, advanced against Wadsworth, and Greene on his right; but as these generals had their fronts well fortified, the attack was easily repulsed. Nevertheless, the left of Johnson's line, not being opposed, took possession of Geary's works about 9 P.M. and thus endangered our communications.

Gregg's division of cavalry which was posted east of Slocum's position saw this movement of Johnson. Gregg opened fire on the column with his artillery and sent out his men dismounted to skirmish on the flank of the enemy. Johnson detached Walker's brigade to meet him, and the contest continued until after dark. Greene, in the meantime, swung his right around on the edge of a ravine, perpendicular to the main line and fortified it, to avoid being flanked. He was an accomplished soldier and engineer, having graduated second in his class at West Point, and knew exactly what ought to be done and how to do it. He held on strongly, and as it was dark, and the enemy did not exactly know where they were, or where our troops were posted, they waited until daylight before taking any further action. Yet they were now but a short distance from General Meade's headquarters, and within easy reach of our reserve artillery. A night attack on the rear of our army, in conjunction with an advance from the opposite side on Hancock's front, would have thrown us into great confusion and must have succeeded.

During the night Ewell sent Smith's brigade to reinforce Johnson. Geary, after all, did not reach Little Round Top or report to Sykes, and if he had done so, his troops would have been of no use, as the battle was over in that part of the field. There was a mystery about his movements which needs to be cleared up.

To supplement this attack on the extreme right, and prevent reinforcements from being sent there, Early's division was directed to carry Cemetery Hill by storm. Before it advanced, a vigorous artillery fire was opened from four rebel batteries on Benner's Hill, to prepare the way for the assault, but our batteries on Cemetery Hill, which were partially sheltered by earthworks, replied and soon silenced those of the enemy. Then Early's infantry moved forth, Hays' brigade on the right, Hoke's brigade on the left, under Colonel Avery, and Gordon's brigade in reserve. It was supposed Johnson's division would protect Early's left flank, while Rodes' and Pender's divisions would come forward in time to prevent any attack against his right. The enemy first struck Von Gilsa's brigade, which was posted behind a stone fence at the foot of the hill. Still farther to its left, at the base of the hill, was Ames' brigade, both enclosing Rickett's and Weidrick's and Stevens' batteries, which had been a good deal cut up on the first day, were now brought to bear on the approaching enemy. Colonel Wainwright, Chief of Artillery of the First Corps, gave them orders not to attempt to retreat if attacked, but to fight the guns to the last. The enemy advanced up the ravine which was specially commanded by Stevens' battery. Weidrick, Ricketts, and Stevens played upon the approaching line energetically. The rebel left and centre fell back, but the right managed to obtain shelter from houses and undulating ground, and came on impetuously, charging over Von Gilsa's brigade, and driving it up the hill, through the batteries. In doing so Hays says the darkness and smoke saved his men from a terrible slaughter. Weidrick's battery was captured, and two of Ricketts' guns were spiked. The enemy, in making this movement, exposed their left flank to Stevens' battery, which poured a terrible fire of double canister into their ranks. The 33d Massachusetts also opened a most effective oblique fire. The batteries were penetrated but would not surrender. Dearer than life itself to the cannoneer is the gun he serves, and these brave men fought hand to hand with handspikes, rammers, staves, and even stones. They shouted, "Death on the soil of our native State rather than lose our guns." Hancock, all this time should have been kept busy on his own front repelling an attack from Rodes and Pender, but as they did not come forward, and as he felt that there was great danger that Howard would lose Cemetery Hill and his own right be turned, he sent Carroll's brigade to the rescue. Carroll was joined by the 106th Pennsylvania and some reinforcements from Schurz's division. For a few minutes, Hays says, there was an ominous silence and then the tramp of our infantry was heard. They came over the hill and went in with a cheer. The enemy, finding they were about to be overwhelmed, retreated, as no one came to their assistance. When they fell back our guns opened a very destructive fire. It is said that out of 1,750 men of the organization known as "The Louisiana Tigers," only 150 returned. Hays attributes his defeat to the fact that Gordon was not up in time to support him.

The failure to carry the hill isolated Johnson's division on our extreme right. As it could only be reached by a long circuit it was not easy for Lee to maintain it there, without unduly weakening other parts of his line. That Rodes' division did not reach Cemetery Hill in time to co-operate with Early's attack was not owing to any lack of zeal or activity on the part of that energetic officer. He was obliged to move out of Gettysburg by the flank, then change front and advance double the distance Early had to traverse, and by the time he had done so Early had made the attack and had been repulsed.

The day closed with the rebels defeated on our left, but victorious on our right. Fortunately for us, this incited Lee to continue his efforts. He could not bear to retreat after his heavy losses, and acknowledge that he was beaten. He resolved to reinforce Johnson's division, now in rear of our right, and fling Pickett's troops, the elite of his army, who had not been engaged, against our centre. He hoped a simultaneous attack made by Pickett in front and Johnson in rear, would yet win those heights and scatter the Union army to the winds. Kilpatrick, who had been resting the tired men and horses of his cavalry division at Abbotsford after the conflict at Hanover, went on the afternoon of the 2d to circle around and attack the left and rear of the enemy by way of Hunterstown. This plan was foiled, however, by the sudden arrival of Stuart's cavalry from its long march. They reached that part of the field about 4 P.M. After a fierce combat, in which Farnsworth's and Custer's brigades and Estes' squadron were principally engaged against Hampton's brigade supported by the main body, darkness put an end to the fight. Kilpatrick then turned back and bivouacked at Two Taverns for the night.

Gregg's division of cavalry left Hanover at noon and took post opposite and about three miles east of Slocum's Corps on the right. There, as stated, he saw Johnson's division moving to the attack and after throwing some shells into their ranks deployed his own skirmish line and advanced against the one they threw out to meet him. At 10 P.M. he withdrew and took post on the Baltimore pike where it crosses Cress Run, near Rock Creek. By so doing he guarded the right and rear of the army from any demonstration by Stuart's cavalry.

At night a council of war was held, in which it was unanimously voted to stay and fight it out. Meade was displeased with the result, and although he acquiesced in the decision, he said angrily, "Have it your own way, gentlemen, but Gettysburg is no place to fight a battle in." The fact that a portion of the enemy actually prolonged our line on the right and that our centre had been pierced during the day, made him feel far from confident. He thought it better to retreat with what he had, than run the risk of losing all.*

[* Since the above was written, the discussion has been renewed in the public prints as to whether General Meade did or did not intend to leave the field. So far as the drawing up of an order of retreat is concerned, it ws undoubtedly right and proper to do so, for it is the duty of a general to be prepared for every emergency. It is easy to criticise, and say what should have been done, after a battle has been fought, after the position of troops is all laid down on the maps, and the plans of every commander explained in official reports; but amid the doubt and confusion of actual combat, where there has been great loss of men and material, it is not always so easy to decide. On the night of the 2d the state of affairs was disheartening. In the combats of the preceding days, the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps had been almost annihilated; the Fifth Corps and a great part of the Second were shattered, and only the Sixth Corps and Twelfth Corps were comparatively fresh. It was possible therefore that the enemy might gain some great success the next day, which would stimulate them to extra exertions, and diminish the spirit of our men in the same proportion. In such a case it was not improbable that the army might be destroyed as an organization, and there is a vast difference between a destroyed army and a defeated army. By retiring while it was yet in his power to do so, General Meade felt that he would assure the safety of our principal cities, for the enemy were too exhausted to pursue; and being out of ammunition, and far from their base of supplies, were not in a condition to do much further damage, or act very energetically. Whereas our troops could soon be largely reinforced from the draft which had just been established, and, being in the centre of their resources, could be supplied with all that was necessary for renewed effort.

There is no question in my mind that, at the council referred to, General Meade did desire to retreat, and expressed fears that his communications with Taneytown might be endangered by remaining at Gettysburg.

It has also been stated that both General Gibbon and General Newton objected to our position at Gettysburg, but this is an error. They merely recommended some additional precautions to prevent the enemy from turning our left at Round Top, and thus intervening between us and Washington. Hancock, in giving his vote, said the Army of the Potomac had retreated too often, and he was in favor of remaining now to fight it out.]



CHAPTER VI. THE BATTLE OF THE THIRD DAY—JOHNSON'S DIVISION DRIVEN OUT.

At dawn on the 3d the enemy opened on us with artillery, but the firing had no definite purpose, and after some hours it gradually slackened.

The principal interest early in the day necessarily centred on the right, where Johnson's position not only endangered the safety of the army, but compromised our retreat. It was therefore essential to drive him out as soon as possible. To this end batteries were established during the night on all the prominent points in that vicinity. Geary had returned with his division about midnight, and was not a little astonished to find the rebels established in the works he had left. He determined to contest possession with them at daylight. In the meantime he joined Greene and formed part of his line perpendicular to our main line of battle, and part fronting the enemy.

On the other hand, Ewell, having obtained a foothold, swore he would not be driven out, and hastened to reinforce Johnson with Daniel's and O'Neill's brigades from Rodes' division.

As soon as objects could be discerned in the early gray of the morning our artillery opened fire. As Johnson, on account of the steep declivities and other obstacles, had not been able to bring any artillery with him, he could not reply. It would not do to remain quiet under this fire, and he determined to charge, in hopes of winning a better position on higher ground. His men—the old Stonewall brigade leading—rushed bravely forward, but were as gallantly met by Kane's brigade of Geary's division and a close and severe struggle ensued for four hours among the trees and rocks. Ruger's division of the Twelfth Corps came up and formed on the rebel left, taking them in flank and threatening them in reverse. Indeed, as the rest of our line were not engaged, there was plenty of support for Geary. Troops were sent him, including Shaler's brigade, which took the front, and was soon warmly engaged in re- establishing the line.

At about 11 A.M., finding the contest hopeless, and his retreat threatened by a force sent down to Rock Creek, Johnson yielded slowly and reluctantly to a charge made by Geary's division, gave up the position and withdrew to Rock Creek, where he remained until night.

Our line was once more intact. All that the enemy had gained by dogged determination and desperate bravery was lost from a lack of co-ordination, caused perhaps by the great difficulty of communicating orders over this long concave line where every route was swept by our fire.

Lee had now attacked both flanks of the Army of the Potomac without having been able to establish himself permanently on either. Notwithstanding the repulse of the previous day he was very desirous of turning the left, for once well posted there he could secure his own retreat while interposing between Meade and Washington. He rode over with Longstreet to that end of the line to see what could be done. General Wofford, who commanded a brigade of McLaws' division, writes in a recent letter to General Crawford, United States Army, as follows: "Lee and Longstreet came to my brigade Friday morning before the artillery opened fire. I told him that the afternoon before, I nearly reached the crest. He asked if I could not go there now. I replied, 'No, General, I think not.' He said quickly, 'Why not?' 'Because,' I said, 'General, the enemy have had all night to intrench and reinforce. I had been pursuing a broken enemy and the situation was now very different.'"

Having failed at each extremity, it only remained to Lee to retreat, or attack the centre. Such high expectations had been formed in the Southern States in regard to his conquest of the North that he determined to make another effort. He still had Pickett's division, the flower of Virginia, which had not been engaged, and which was full of enthusiasm. He resolved to launch them against our centre, supported on either flank by the advance of the main portion of the army. He had hoped that Johnson's division would have been able to maintain its position on the right, so that the Union centre could be assailed in front and rear at the same time, but Johnson having been driven out, it was necessary to trust to Pickett alone, or abandon the whole enterprise and return to Virginia.

Everything was quiet up to 1 P.M., as the enemy were massing their batteries and concentrating their forces preparatory to the grand charge—the supreme effort—which was to determine the fate of the campaign, and to settle the point whether freedom or slavery was to rule the Northern States.

It seems to me there was some lack of judgment in the preparations. Heth's division, now under Pettigrew, which had been so severely handled on the first day, and which was composed in a great measure of new troops, was designated to support Pickett's left and join in the attack at close quarters. Wilcox, too, who one would think had been pretty well fought out the day before, in his desperate enterprise of attempting to crown the crest, was directed to support the right flank of the attack. Wright's brigade was formed in rear, and Pender's division on the left of Pettigrew, but there was a long distance between Wilcox and Longstreet's forces on the right.

At 1 P.M., a signal gun was fired and one hundred and fifteen guns opened against Hancock's command, consisting of the First Corps under Newton, the Second Corps under Gibbon, the Third Corps under Birney, and against the Eleventh Corps under Howard. The object of this heavy artillery fire was to break up our lines and prepare the way for Pickett's charge. The exigencies of the battle had caused the First Corps to be divided, Wadsworth's division being on the right at Culp's Hill, Robinson on Gibbon's right, and my own division intervening between Caldwell on the left and Gibbon on the right. The convex shape of our line did not give us as much space as that of the enemy, but General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, promptly posted eighty guns along the crest—as many as it would hold—to answer the fire, and the batteries on both sides suffered severely in the two hours' cannonade. Not less than eleven caissons were blown up and destroyed; one quite near me. When the smoke went up from these explosions rebel yells of exultation could be heard along a line of several miles. At 3 P.M. General Hunt ordered our artillery fire to cease, in order to cool the guns, and to preserve some rounds for the contest at close quarters, which he foresaw would soon take place.

My own men did not suffer a great deal from this cannonade, as I sheltered them as much as possible under the crest of the hill, and behind rocks, trees, and stone fences.

The cessation of our fire gave the enemy the idea they had silenced our batteries, and Pickett at once moved forward, to break the left centre of the Union line and occupy the crest of the ridge.* The other forces on his right and left were expected to move up and enlarge the opening thus made, so that finally, the two wings of the Union Army would be permanently separated, and flung off by this entering wedge in eccentric directions.

[* The attack was so important, so momentous, and so contrary to Longstreet's judgment, that when Pickett asked for orders to advance he gave no reply, and Pickett said proudly, "I shall go forward, sir!"]

This great column of attack, it was supposed, numbered about seventeen thousand men, but southern writers have a peculiar arithmetic by which they always cipher down their forces to nothing. Even on the left, on the preceding day, when our troops in front of Little Round Top were assailed by a line a mile and a half long, they figure it almost out of existence. The force that now advanced would have been larger still had it not been for a spirited attack by Kilpatrick against the left of Longstreet's corps, detaining some troops there which otherwise might have co-operated in the grand assault against our centre.

It necessarily took the rebels some time to form and cross the intervening space, and Hunt took advantage of the opportunity to withdraw the batteries that had been most injured, sending others in their place from the reserve artillery, which had not been engaged. He also replenished the ammunition boxes, and stood ready to receive the foe as he came forward—first with solid shot, next with shell, and lastly, when he came to close quarters, with canister.

General Meade's headquarters was in the centre of this cannonade, and as the balls were flying very thickly there, and killing the horses of his staff, he found it necessary temporarily to abandon the place. Where nothing is to be gained by exposure it is sound sense to shelter men and officers as much as possible. He rode over to Power's Hill, made his headquarters with General Slocum, and when the firing ceased rode back again. During his absence the charge took place. He has stated that it was his intention to throw the Fifth and Sixth Corps on the flanks of the attacking force, but no orders to this effect were issued, and it is questionable whether such an arrangement would have been a good one. It would have disgarnished the left, where Longstreet was still strong in numbers, and in forming perpendicular to our line of battle the two corps would necessarily have exposed their own outer flanks to attack. Indeed, the rebels had provided for just such a contingency, by posting Wilcox's brigade and Perry's brigade under Colonel Lang on the left, both in rear of the charging column under Pickett and Pettigrew. Owing to a mistake or misunderstanding, this disposition, however, did not turn out well for the enemy. It was not intended by Providence that the Northern States should pass under the iron rule of the slave power, and on this occasion every plan made by Lee was thwarted in the most unexpected manner.

The distance to be traversed by Pickett's column was about a mile and a half from the woods where they started, to the crest of the ridge they desired to attain. They suffered severely from our artillery, which opened on them with solid shot as soon as they came in sight; when half way across the plain they were vigorously shelled; double canisters were reserved for their nearer approach.

At first the direction of their march appeared to be directly toward my division. When within five hundred yards of us, however, Pickett halted and changed direction obliquely about forty-five degrees, so that the attack passed me and struck Gibbon's division on my right. Just here one of those providential circumstances occurred which favored us so much, for Wilcox and Lang, who guarded Pickett's right flank, did not follow his oblique movement, but kept on straight to the front, so that soon there was a wide interval between their troops and the main body, leaving Pickett's right fully uncovered.

The rebels came on magnificently. As fast as the shot and shell tore through their lines they closed up the gaps and pressed forward. When they reached the Emmetsburg road the canister began to make fearful chasms in their ranks. They also suffered severely from a battery on Little Round Top, which enfiladed their line. One shell killed and wounded ten men. Gibbon had directed his command to reserve their fire until the enemy were near enough to make it very effective. Pickett's advance dashed up to the fence occupied by the skirmishers of the Second Corps, near the Emmetsburg road, and drove them back; then the musketry blazed forth with deadly effect, and Pettigrew's men began to waver on the left and fall behind; for the nature of the ground was such that they were more exposed than other portions of the line. They were much shaken by the artillery fire, and that of Hays' division sent them back in masses.*

[* The front line of Hays' division, which received this charge, was composed of the 12th New Jersey, 14th Connecticut, and 1st Delaware. The second line was composed of the 111th, 125th, 126th, and 39th New York.]

Before the first line of rebels reached a second fence and stone wall, behind which our main body was posted, it was obliged to pass a demi-brigade under Colonel Theodore B. Gates, of the 20th New York State Militia, and a Vermont brigade under General Stannard, both belonging to my command. When Pickett's right became exposed in consequence of the divergence of Wilcox's command, Stannard seized the opportunity to make a flank attack, and while his left regiment, the 14th, poured in a heavy oblique fire, he changed front with his two right regiments, the 13th and 16th, which brought them perpendicular to the rebel line of march. In cases of this kind, when struck directly on the flank, troops are more or less unable to defend themselves, and Kemper's brigade crowded in toward the centre in order to avoid Stannard's energetic and deadly attack. They were closely followed up by Gates' command, who continued to fire into them at close range. This caused many to surrender, others to retreat outright, and others simply to crowd together. Simultaneously with Stannard's attack, the 8th Ohio, which was on picket, overlapping the rebel left, closed in on that flank with great effect. Nevertheless, the next brigade—that of Armistead— united to Garnett's brigade, pressed on, and in spite of death- dealing bolts on all sides, Pickett determined to break Gibbon's line and capture his guns.

Although Webb's front was the focus of the concentrated artillery fire, and he had already lost fifty men and some valuable officers, his line remained firm and unshaken. It devolved upon him now to meet the great charge which was to decide the fate of the day. It would have been difficult to find a man better fitted for such an emergency. He was nerved to great deeds by the memory of his ancestors, who in former days had rendered distinguished services to the Republic, and felt that the results of the whole war might depend upon his holding of the position. His men were equally resolute. Cushing's battery, A, 4th United States Artillery, which had been posted on the crest, and Brown's Rhode Island Battery on his left, were both practically destroyed by the cannonade. The horses were prostrated, every officer but one was struck, and Cushing had but one serviceable gun left.

As Pickett's advance came very close to the first line, young Cushing, mortally wounded in both thighs, ran his last serviceable gun down to the fence, and said: "Webb, I will give them one more shot!" At the moment of the last discharge he called out, "Good- by!" and fell dead at the post of duty.

Webb sent for fresh batteries to replace the two that were disabled, and Wheeler's 1st New York Independent Battery came up just before the attack, and took the place of Cushing's battery on the left.

Armistead pressed forward, leaped the stone wall, waving his sword with his hat on it, followed by about a hundred of his men, several of whom carried battle-flags. He shouted, "Give them the cold steel, boys!" and laid his hands upon a gun. The battery for a few minutes was in his possession, and the rebel flag flew triumphantly over our line. But Webb was at the front, very near Armistead, animating and encouraging his men. He led the 72d Pennsylvania regiment against the enemy, and posted a line of wounded men in rear to drive back or shoot every man that deserted his duty. A portion of the 71st Pennsylvania, behind a stone wall on the right, threw in a deadly flanking fire, while a great part of the 69th Pennsylvania and the remainder of the 71st made stern resistance from a copse of trees on the left, near where the enemy had broken the line, and where our men were shot with the rebel muskets touching their breasts.

Then came a splendid charge of two regiments, led by Colonel Hall, which passed completely through Webb's line, and engaged the enemy in a hand-to-hand conflict.* Armistead was shot down by the side of the gun he had taken. It is said he had fought on our side in the first battle at Bull Run, but had been seduced by Southern affiliations to join in the rebellion; and now, dying in the effort to extend the area of slavery over the free States, he saw with a clearer vision that he had been engaged in an unholy cause, and said to one of our officers who leaned over him: "Tell Hancock I have wronged him and have wronged my country."

[* Colonel Norman J. Hall, commanding a brigade in Hancock's corps, who rendered this great service, was one of the garrison who defended Fort Sumter at the beginning of the war. At that time he was the Second Lieutenant of my company.]

Both Gibbon and Webb were wounded, and the loss in officers and men was very heavy; two rebel brigadier-generals were killed, and more prisoners were taken than twice Webb's brigade; 6 battle-flags, and 1,463 muskets were also gathered in.

My command being a little to the left, I witnessed this scene, and, after it was over, sent out stretcher-bearers attached to the ambulance train, and had numbers of wounded Confederates brought in and cared for. I was told that there was one man among these whose conversation seemed to indicate that he was a general officer. I sent to ascertain his rank, but he replied: "Tell General Doubleday in a few minutes I shall be where there is no rank." He expired soon after, and I never learned his name.

The rebels did not seem to appreciate my humanity in sending out to bring in their wounded, for they opened a savage fire against the stretcher-bearers. One shell burst among us, a piece of it knocked me over on my horse's neck, and wounded Lieutenant Cowdry of my staff.

When Pickett—the great leader—looked around the top of the ridge he had temporarily gained, he saw it was impossible to hold the position. Troops were rushing in on him from all sides. The Second Corps were engaged in a furious assault on his front. His men were fighting with clubbed muskets, and even banner staves were intertwined in a fierce and hopeless struggle. My division of the First Corps were on his right flank, giving deadly blows there, and the Third Corps were closing up to attack. Pettigrew's forces on his left had given way, and a heavy skirmish line began to accumulate on that flank. He saw his men surrendering in masses, and, with a heart full of anguish, ordered a retreat. Death had been busy on all sides, and few indeed now remained of that magnificent column which had advanced so proudly, led by the Ney of the rebel army, and those few fell back in disorder, and without organization, behind Wright's brigade, which had been sent forward to cover the retreat. At first, however, when struck by Stannard on the flank, and when Pickett's charge was spent, they rallied in a little slashing, where a grove had been cut down by our troops to leave an opening for our artillery. There two regiments of Rowley's brigade of my division, the 151st Pennsylvania and the 20th New York State Militia, under Colonel Theodore R. Gates, of the latter regiment, made a gallant charge, and drove them out. Pettigrew's division, it is said, lost 2,000 prisoners and 15 battle-flags on the left.

While this severe contest was going on in front of Webb, Wilcox deployed his command and opened a feeble fire against Caldwell's division on my left. Stannard repeated the manoeuvre which had been so successful against Kemper's brigade by detaching the 14th and 16th Vermont to take Wilcox in flank. Wilcox thus attacked on his right, while a long row of batteries tore the front of his line to pieces with canister, could gain no foothold. He found himself exposed to a tremendous cross fire, and was obliged to retreat, but a great portion of his command were brought in as prisoners by Stannard* and battle-flags were gathered in sheaves.

[* As Stannard's brigade were new troops, and had been stationed near Washington, the men had dubbed them The Paper Collar Brigade, because some of them were seen wearing paper collars, but after this fight the term was never again applied to them.]

A portion of Longstreet's corps, Benning's, Robertson's, and Law's brigades, advanced against the two Round Tops to prevent reinforcements from being sent from that vicinity to meet Pickett's charge. Kilpatrick interfered with this programme, however, for about 2 P.M. he made his appearance on our left with Farnsworth's brigade and Merritt's brigade of regulars, accompanied by Graham's and Elder's batteries of the regular army, to attack the rebel right, with a view to reach their ammunition trains, which were in the vicinity. The rebels say his men came on yelling like demons. Having driven back the skirmishers who guarded that flank, Merritt deployed on the left and soon became engaged there with Anderson's Georgia brigade, which was supported by two batteries. On the right Farnsworth, with the 1st Vermont regiment of his brigade, leaped a fence, and advanced until he came to a second stone fence, where he was checked by an attack on his right flank from the 4th Alabama regiment of Law's brigade, which came back for that purpose from a demonstration it was making against Round Top. Farnsworth then turned and leaping another fence in a storm of shot and shell, made a gallant attempt to capture Backman's battery, but was unable to do so, as it was promptly supported by the 9th Georgia regiment of Anderson's brigade. Farnsworth was killed in this charge, and the 1st Vermont found itself enclosed in a field, with high fences on all sides, behind which masses of infantry were constantly rising up and firing. The regiment was all broken up and forced to retire in detachments. Kilpatrick after fighting some time longer without making much progress, fell back on account of the constant reinforcements that were augmenting the force opposed to him. Although he had not succeeded in capturing the ammunition train, he had made a valuable diversion on the left, which doubtless prevented the enemy from assailing Round Top with vigor, or detaching a force to aid Pickett.

The Confederate General Benning states that the prompt action of General Law in posting the artillery in the road and the 7th and 9th Georgia regiments on each side, was all that saved the train from capture. "There was nothing else to save it." He also says that two-thirds of Pickett's command were killed, wounded, or captured. Every brigade commander and every field officer except one fell. Lee and Longstreet had seen from the edge of the woods, with great exultation, the blue flag of Virginia waving over the crest occupied by the Union troops. It seemed the harbinger of great success to Lee. He thought the Union army was conquered at last. The long struggle was over, and peace would soon come, accompanied by the acknowledgment of the independence of the Southern Confederacy. It was but a passing dream; the flag receded, and soon the plain was covered with fugitives making their way to the rear. Then, anticipating an immediate pursuit, he used every effort to rally men and officers, and made strenuous efforts to get his artillery in position to be effective.

The Confederate General A. R. Wright criticises this attack and very justly says, "The difficulty was not so much in reaching Cemetery Ridge or taking it. My brigade did so on the afternoon of the 2d, but the trouble was to hold it, for the whole Federal army was massed in a sort of horse shoe, and could rapidly reinforce the point to any extent; while the long enveloping Confederate line could not support promptly enough." This agrees with what I have said in relation to the convex and concave orders of battle.

General Gibbon had sent Lieutenant Haskell of his staff to Power's Hill to notify General Meade that the charge was coming. As Meade approached his old headquarters he heard firing on the crest above, and went up to ascertain the cause. He found the charge had been repulsed and ejaculated "Thank God!"

When Lee learned that Johnson had yielded his position on the right, and therefore could not co-operate with Pickett's advance, he sent Stuart's cavalry around to accomplish the same object by attacking the right and rear of our army. Howard saw the rebel cavalry moving off in that direction, and David McM. Gregg, whose division was near White's Creek where it crosses the Baltimore pike, received orders about noon to guard Slocum's right and rear.

Custer had already been contending with his brigade against portions of the enemy's force in that direction, when Gregg sent forward McIntosh's brigade to relieve him, and followed soon after with J. Irvin Gregg's brigade. Custer was under orders to join Kilpatrick's command, to which he belonged, but the exigencies of the battle soon forced Gregg to detain him. McIntosh, having taken the place of Custer, pushed forward to develop the enemy's line, which he found very strongly posted, the artillery being on a commanding ridge which overlooked the whole country, and covered by dismounted cavalry in woods, buildings, and behind fences below. McIntosh became warmly engaged and send back for Randol's battery to act against the rebel guns on the crest, and drive the enemy out of the buildings. The guns above were silenced by Pennington's and Randol's batteries, and the force below driven out of the houses by Lieutenant Chester's section of the latter. The buildings and fences were then occupied by our troops. The enemy attempted to regain them by a charge against McIntosh's right flank, but were repulsed. In the meantime Gregg came up with the other brigade, and assumed command of the field. The battle now became warm, for W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Chambliss, advanced to support the skirmish line, and the 1st New Jersey, being out of ammunition, was charged and routed by the 1st Virginia. The 7th Michigan, a new regiment which came up to support it, was also driven in; for the enemy's dismounted line reinforced the 1st Virginia. The latter regiment, which had held on with desperate tenacity, although attacked on both flanks, was at last compelled to fall back by an attack made by part of the 5th Michigan. The contending forces were now pretty well exhausted when, to the dismay of our men, a fresh brigade under Wade Hampton, which Stuart had kept in reserve, made its appearance, and new and desperate exertions were required to stem its progress. There was little time to act, but every sabre that could be brought forward was used. As Hampton came on, our artillery under Pennington and Randol made terrible gaps in his ranks. Chester's section kept firing canister until the rebels were within fifty yards of him. The enemy were temporarily stopped by a desperate charge on their flank, made by only sixteen men of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, under Captains Triechel and Rogers, accompanied by Captain Newhall of McIntosh's staff. This little band of heroes were nearly all disabled or killed, but they succeeded in delaying the enemy, already shattered by the canister from Chester's guns, until Custer was able to bring up the 1st Michigan and lead them to the charge, shouting "Come on, you wolverines!" Every available sabre was thrown in. General McIntosh and his staff and orderlies charged into the melee as individuals. Hampton and Fitz Lee headed the enemy, and Custer our troops. Lieutenant Colonel W. Brooke-Rawle, the historian of the conflict, who was present, says, "For minutes, which seemed like hours, amid the clashing of the sabres, the rattle of the small arms, the frenzied imprecations, the demands to surrender, the undaunted replies, and the appeals for mercy, the Confederate column stood its ground." A fresh squadron was brought up under Captain Hart of the 1st New Jersey, and the enemy at last gave way and retired. Both sides still confronted each other, but the battle was over, for Pickett's charge had failed, and there was no longer any object in continuing the contest.

Stuart was undoubtedly baffled and the object of his expedition frustrated; yet he stated in his official report that he was in a position to intercept the Union retreat in case Pickett had been successful. At night he retreated to regain his communications with Ewell's left.

This battle being off of the official maps has hardly been alluded to in the various histories which have been written; but its results were important and deserve to be commemorated.

When Pickett's charge was repulsed, and the whole plain covered with fugitives, we all expected that Wellington's command at Waterloo, of "Up, guards, and at them!" would be repeated, and that a grand counter-charge would be made. But General Meade had made no arrangements to give a return thrust. It seems to me he should have posted the Sixth and part of the Twelfth Corps in rear of Gibbon's division the moment Pickett's infantry were seen emerging from the woods, a mile and a half off. If they broke through our centre these corps would have been there to receive them, and if they failed to pierce our line and retreated, the two corps could have followed them up promptly before they had time to rally and reorganize. An advance by Sykes would have kept Longstreet in position. In all probability we would have cut the enemy's army in two, and captured the long line of batteries opposite us, which were but slightly guarded. Hancock, lying wounded in an ambulance, wrote to Meade, recommending that this be done. Meade, it is true, recognized in some sort the good effects of a counter-blow; but to be effective the movement should have been prepared beforehand. It was too late to commence making preparations for an advance when some time had elapsed and when Lee had rallied his troops and had made all his arrangements to resist an assault. It was ascertained afterward that he had twenty rounds of ammunition left per gun, but it was not evenly distributed and some batteries in front had fired away all their cartridges. A counter-charge under such circumstances is considered almost imperative in war; for the beaten army, running and dismayed, cannot, in the nature of things, resist with much spirit; whereas the pursuers, highly elated by their success, and with the prospect of ending the contest, fight with more energy and bravery. Rodes says the Union forces were so long in occupying the town and in coming forward after the repulse of the enemy that it was generally thought they had retreated. Meade rode leisurely over to the Fifth Corps on the left, and told Sykes to send out and see if the enemy in his front was firm and holding on to their position. A brigade preceded by skirmishers was accordingly sent forward, but as Longstreet's troops were well fortified, they resisted the advance, and Meade—finding some hours had elapsed and that Lee had closed up his lines and was fortifying against him—gave up all idea of a counter-attack.



CHAPTER VII. GENERAL RETREAT OF THE ENEMY—CRITICISMS OF DISTINGUISHED CONFEDERATE OFFICERS.

Lee was greatly dispirited at Pickett's failure, but worked with untiring energy to repair the disaster.

There was an interval of full a mile between Hill and Longstreet, and the plain was swarming with fugitives making their way back in disorder. He hastened to get ready to resist the counter-charge, which he thought was inevitable, and to plant batteries behind which the fugitives could rally. He also made great personal exertions to reassure and reassemble the detachments that came in. He did not for a moment imagine that Meade would fail to take advantage of this golden opportunity to crush the Army of Virginia and end the war.

The most distinguished rebel officers admit the great danger they were in at this time, and express their surprise that they were not followed up.

The fact is, Meade had no idea of leaving the ridge. I conversed the next morning with a corps commander who had just left him. He said: "Meade says he thinks he can hold out for part of another day here, if they attack him."

This language satisfied me that Meade would not go forward if he could avoid it, and would not impede in any way the rebel retreat across the Potomac. Lee began to make preparations at once and started his trains on the morning of the 4th. By night Rodes' division, which followed them, was in bivouac two miles west of Fairfield. It was a difficult task to retreat burdened with 4,000 prisoners, and a train fifteen miles long, in the presence of a victorious enemy, but it was successfully accomplished as regards his main body. The roads, too, were bad and much cut up by the rain.

While standing on Little Round Top Meade was annoyed at the fire of a rebel battery posted on an eminence beyond the wheat-field, about a thousand yards distant. He inquired what troops those were stationed along the stone fence which bounded the hither side of the wheat-field. Upon ascertaining that it was Crawford's division of the Fifth Corps, he directed that they be sent forward to clear the woods in front of the rebel skirmishers, who were very annoying, and to drive away the battery, but not to get into a fight that could bring on a general engagement. As Crawford unmasked from the stone fence the battery opened fire on his right. He sent Colonel Ent's regiment, deployed as skirmishers, against the guns, which retired as Ent approached. McCandless, who went forward with his brigade, moved too far to the right, and Crawford ordered him to change front and advance toward Round Top. He did so and struck a rebel brigade in flank which was behind a temporary breastwork of rails, sods, etc. When this brigade saw a Union force apparently approaching from their own lines to attack them in flank, they retreated in confusion, after a short resistance, and this disorder extended during the retreat to a reserve brigade posted on the low ground in their rear. Their flight did not cease until they reached Horner's woods, half a mile distant, where they immediately intrenched themselves. These brigades belonged to Hood's division, then under Law.

Longstreet says, "When this (Pickett's) charge failed, I expected that, of course, the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries as the only support that I could given them." . . . "I knew if the army was to be saved these batteries must check the enemy." . . . "For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue his advantage."

Longstreet always spoke of his own men as invincible, and stated that on the 2d they did the best three hours' fighting that ever was done, but Crawford's* attack seemed to show that they too were shaken by the defeat of Picket's grand charge.

[* Crawford was also one of those who took a prominent part in the defence of Fort Sumter, at the beginning of the war. We each commanded detachments of artillery on that occasion.]

In regard to the great benefit we would have derived from a pursuit, it may not be out of place to give the opinion of a few more prominent Confederate officers.

Colonel Alexander, Chief of Longstreet's artillery, says in a communication to the "Southern Historical Papers":

"I have always believed that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity they ever had of routing Lee's army by a prompt offensive. They occupied a line shaped somewhat like a horseshoe. I suppose the greatest diameter of this horseshoe was not more than one mile, and the ground within was entirely sheltered from our observation and fire, with communications by signals all over it, and they could concentrate their whole force at any point and in a very short time without our knowledge. Our line was an enveloping semi- circle, over four miles in development, and communication from flank to flank, even by courier, was difficult, the country being well cleared and exposed to the enemy's view and fire, the roads all running at right angles to our lines, and, some of them at least, broad turnpikes where the enemy's guns could rake for two miles. Is it necessary now to add any statement as to the superiority of the Federal force, or the exhausted and shattered condition of the Confederates for a space of at least a mile in their very centre, to show that a great opportunity was thrown away? I think General Lee himself was quite apprehensive the enemy would riposte, and that it was that apprehension which brought him alone out to my guns, where he could observe all the indications."

General Trimble, who commanded a division of Hill's corps, which supported Pickett in his advance, says, "By all the rules of warfare the Federal troops should (as I expected they would) have marched against our shattered columns and sought to cover our army with an overwhelming defeat."

Colonel Simms, who commanded Semmes' Georgia brigade in the fight with Crawford just referred to, writes to the latter, "There was much confusion in our army so far as my observation extended, and I think we would have made but feeble resistance, if you had pressed on, on the evening of the 3d."

General Meade, however, overcome by the great responsibilities of his position, still clung to the ridge, and fearful of a possible disaster would not take the risk of making an advance. And yet if he could have succeeded in crushing Lee's army then and there, he would have saved two years of war with its immense loss of life and countless evils. He might at least have thrown in Sedgwick's corps, which had not been actively engaged in the battle, for even if it was repulsed the blows it gave would leave the enemy little inclination to again assail the heights.

At 6.30 P.M. the firing ceased on the part of the enemy, and although they retained their position the next day, the battle of Gettysburg was virtually at an end.

The town was still full of our wounded, and many of our surgeons, with rare courage, remained there to take charge of them, for it required some nerve to run the risk of being sent to Libby prison when the fight was over, a catastrophe which has often happened to our medical officers. Among the rest, the chief surgeons of the First Corps, Doctor Theodore Heard and Doctor Thomas H. Bache, refused to leave their patients, and in consequence of the hasty retreat of the enemy were fortunately not carried off.

After the battle Meade had not the slightest desire to recommence the struggle. It is a military maxim that to a flying enemy must be given a wall of steel or a bridge of gold. In the present instance it was unmistakably the bridge of gold that was presented. It was hard to convince him that Lee was actually gone, and at first he thought it might be a device to draw the Union army from its strong position on the heights.

Our cavalry were sent out on the 4th to ascertain where the enemy were, and what they were doing. General Birney threw forward a reconnoitering party and opened fire with a battery on a column making their way toward Fairfield, but he was checked at once and directed on no account to bring on a battle. On the 5th, as it was certain the enemy were retreating, Sedgwick received orders to follow up the rear of the rebel column. He marched eight miles to Fairfield Pass. There Early, who was in command of the rear guard, was endeavoring to save the trains, which were heaped up in great confusion. Sedgwick, after a distant cannonade, reported the position too strong to be forced. It was a plain, two miles wide, surrounded by hills, and it would not have been difficult to take it, but Sedgwick knew Meade favored the "bridge of gold" policy, and was not disposed to thwart the wishes of his chief. In my opinion Sedgwick should have made an energetic attack, and Meade should have supported it with his whole army, for our cavalry were making great havoc in the enemy's train in rear; and if Lee, instead of turning on Kilpatrick, had been forced to form line against Meade, the cavalry, which was between him and his convoys of ammunition, in all probability might have captured the latter and ended the war. Stuart, it is true, was following up Kilpatrick, but he took an indirect route and was nearly a day behind. I do not see why the force which was now promptly detached from the garrisons of Washington and Baltimore and sent to Harper's Ferry could not have formed on the Virginia side of the Potomac opposite Williamsport, and with the co-operation of General Meade have cut off the ammunition of which Lee stood so much in need. As the river had risen and an expedition sent out by General French from Frederick had destroyed the bridge at Falling Waters, everything seemed to favor such a plan. The moment it was ascertained that Lee was cut off from Richmond and short of ammunition the whole North would have turned out and made a second Saratoga of it. As it was, he had but few roads for his cannon, and our artillery could have opened a destructive fire on him from a distance without exposing our infantry. It was worth the effort and there was little or no danger in attempting it. Meade had Sedgwick's fresh corps and was reinforced by a division of 11,000 men under General W. F. Smith (Baldy Smith). French's division of 4,000 at Frederick, and troops from Washington and Baltimore were also available to assist in striking the final blow. The Twelfth Corps was also available, as Slocum volunteered to join in the pursuit. Meade, however, delayed moving at all until Lee had reached Hagerstown and then took a route that was almost twice as long as that adopted by the enemy. Lee marched day and night to avoid pursuit, and when the river rose and his bridge was gone, so that he was unable to cross, he gained six days in which to choose a position, fortify it, and renew his supply of ammunition before Meade made his appearance.

In consequence of repeated orders from President Lincoln to attack the enemy, Meade went forward and confronted Lee on the 12th. He spent that day and the next in making reconnoissances and resolved to attack on the 14th; but Lee left during the night, and by 8 A.M. the entire army of the enemy were once more on Virginia soil.

The Union loss in this campaign is estimated by the Count of Paris, who is an impartial observer, at 2,834 killed, 13,700 wounded, and 6,643 missing; total, 23,186.

The rebel loss he puts at 2,665 killed, 12,599 wounded, 7,464 missing; total 22,728.

Among the killed in the battle on the rebel side were Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett, Pender, and Semmes; and Pettigrew during the retreat.

Among the wounded were Generals G. T. Anderson, Hampton, Jenkins, J. M. Jones, Kemper, and Scales.

Archer was captured on the first day.

Among the killed on the Union side were Major-General Reynolds and Brigadier-Generals Vincent, Weed, and Zook.

Among the wounded were Major-Generals Sickles (losing a leg), Hancock, Doubleday, Gibbon, Barlow, Warren, and Butterfield, and Brigadier-Generals Graham, Stannard, Paul (losing both eyes), Barnes, Brooke, and Webb.

APPENDIX A. Roster of the Federal Army engaged in the Battle of Gettysburg, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, July 1st, 2d, and 3d, 1863.

MAJOR-GENERAL GEO. GORDON MEADE STAFF. MAJOR-GENERAL DANIEL BUTTERFIELD, Chief of Staff. BRIG.-GENERAL M. R. PATRICK, Provost Marshal-General. " " SETH WILLIAMS, Adjutant-General. " " EDMUND SCHRIVER, Inspector-General. " " RUFUS INGALLS, Quartermaster-General. COLONEL HENRY F. CLARKE, Chief Commis'y of Subsistence. MAJOR JONATHAN LETTERMAN, Surgeon, Chief of Medical Department. BRIG.-GENERAL G. K. WARREN, Chief Engineer. MAJOR D. W. FLAGLER, Chief Ordnance Officer. MAJOR-GENERAL ALFRED PLEASONTON, Chief of Cavalry. BRIG.-GENERAL HENRY J. HUNT, Chief of Artillery. CAPTAIN L. B. NORTON, Chief Signal Officer.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS,* Commanding the First, Third, and Eleventh Corps on July 1st. [* He was killed and succeeded by Major-General O. O. Howard.] MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W. SLOCUM, Commanding the Right Wing on July 2d and July 3d. MAJOR-GENERAL W. S. HANCOCK, Commanding the Left Centre on July 2d and July 3d.

FIRST CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN F. REYNOLDS, PERMANENT COMMANDER. MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY, Commanding on July 1st. MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN NEWTON, Commanding July 2d and 3d. FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JAMES S. WADSWORTH First Brigade.—(1) Brigadier-General SOLOMON MEREDITH (wounded); (2) Colonel HENRY A. MORROW (wounded);* (3) Colonel W. W. ROBINSON. [* See page 130.] 2d Wisconsin, Colonel Lucius Fairchild (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel George H. Stevens (wounded), Major John Mansfield (wounded), Captain Geo. H. Otis 6th Wisconsin, Lieut.-Colonel R. R. Dawes 7th Wisconsin, Colonel W. W. Robinson 24th Michigan, Colonel Henry A. Morrow (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel Mark Flanigan (wounded), Major Edwin B. Wright (wounded), Captain Albert M. Edwards 19th Indiana, Colonel Samuel Williams Second Brigade.—Brigadier-General LYSANDER CUTLER 7th Indiana, Major Ira G. Grover 56th Pennsylvania, Colonel J. W. Hoffman 76th New York, Major Andrew J. Grover (killed), Captain John E. Cook 95th New York, Colonel George H. Biddle (wounded), Major Edward Pye 147th New York, Lieut.-Colonel F. C. Miller (wounded), Major George Harney 14th Brooklyn, Colonel E. B. Fowler SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. ROBINSON First Brigade.—Brigadier-General GABRIEL R. PAUL (wounded); Colonel S. H. LEGNARD; Colonel RICHARD COULTER. 16th Maine, Colonel Charles W. Tilden (captured), Lieut.- Colonel N. E. Welch, Major Arch. D. Leavitt 13th Massachusetts, Colonel S. H. Leonard (wounded) 94th New York, Colonel A. R. Root (wounded), Major S. H. Moffat 104th New York, Colonel Gilbert G. Prey 107th Pennsylvania, Colonel T. F. McCoy (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel James McThompson (wounded), Captain E. D. Roath 11th Pennsylvania, Colonel Richard S. Coulter, Captain J. J. Blerer.* [* The 11th Pennsylvania was transferred from the Second Brigade.] Second Brigade.—Brigadier-General HENRY BAXTER 12th Massachusetts, Colonel James L. Bates 83d New York, Lieut.-Colonel Joseph R. Moesch 97th New York, Colonel Charles Wheelock 88th Pennsylvania, Major Benezet F. Faust, Captain E. Y. Patterson 90th Pennsylvania, Colonel Peter Lyle THIRD DIVISION. MAJOR-GENERAL ABNER DOUBLEDAY PERMANENT COMMANDER on July 2d and 3d. BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS A. ROWLEY, July 1st. First Brigade.—Brigadier-General THOMAS A. ROWLEY, July 2d and 3d; Colonel CHAPMAN BIDDLE, July 1st. 121st Pennsylvania, Colonel Chapman Biddle, Major Alexander Biddle 142d Pennsylvania, Colonel Robert P. Cummings (killed), Lieut.- Colonel A. B. McCalmont 151st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel George F. McFarland (lost a leg), Captain Walter L. Owens 20th New York S. M., Colonel Theodore B. Gates Second Brigade.—(1) Colonel ROY STONE Commanding (wounded); (2) Colonel LANGHORNE WISTER (wounded); (3) Colonel EDMUND L. DANA 143d Pennsylvania, Colonel Edmund L. Dana, Major John D. Musser 149th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Walton Dwight (wounded), Captain A. J. Sofield (killed), Captain John Irvin 150th Pennsylvania, Colonel Langhorne Wister (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel H. S. Huidekoper (wounded), Major Thomas Chamberlain (wounded), Capt. C. C. Widdis (wounded), Captain G. W. Jones Third Brigade.—Brigadier-General GEO. J. STANNARD (wounded) 12th Vermont, Colonel Asa P. Blunt (not engaged) 13th Vermont, Colonel Francis V. Randall 14th Vermont, Colonel William T. Nichols 15th Vermont, Colonel Redfield Proctor (not engaged) 16th Vermont, Colonel Wheelock G. Veazey Artillery Brigade.—Colonel CHARLES S. WAINWRIGHT 2d Maine, Captain James A. Hall 5th Maine, G. T. Stevens Battery B, 1st Pennsylvania, Captain J. H. Cooper Battery B, 4th United States, Lieutenant James Stewart Battery L, 1st New York, Captain J. A. Reynolds [NOTE.—Tidball's Battery of the 2d United States Artillery, under Lieutenant John H. Calef, also fought in line with the First Corps. Lieutenant Benj. W. Wilber, and Lieutenant George Breck, of Captain Reynolds' Battery, and Lieutenant James Davison, of Stewart's Battery, commanded sections which were detached at times.]

SECOND CORPS. MAJOR-GENERAL WINFIELD S. HANCOCK, PERMANENT COMMANDER (wounded). MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN GIBBON (wounded). BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. CALDWELL. FIRST DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN C. CALDWELL COLONEL JOHN H. BROOKE (wounded) First Brigade.—Colonel EDWARD E. CROSS (killed); Colonel H. B. McKEEN 5th New Hampshire, Colonel E. E. Cross, Lieut.-Colonel C. E. Hapgood 61st New York, Lieut.-Colonel Oscar K. Broady 81st Pennsylvania, Colonel H. Boyd McKeen, Lieut.-Colonel Amos Stroho 148th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Robert McFarland Second Brigade.—Colonel PATRICK KELLY 28th Massachusetts, Colonel Richard Byrnes 63d New York, Lieut.-Colonel R. C. Bentley (wounded), Captain Thos. Touhy 69th New York, Captain Richard Maroney (wounded), Lieutenant James J. Smith 88th New York, Colonel Patrick Kelly, Captain Dennis F. Burke 116th Pennsylvania, Major St. Clair A. Mulholland Third Brigade.—Brigadier-General S. K. ZOOK Commanding (killed), Lieut.-Colonel JOHN FRAZER 52d New York, Lieut.-Colonel Charles G. Freudenberg (wounded), Captain Wm. Scherrer 57th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Alfred B. Chapman 66th New York, Colonel Orlando W. Morris (wounded), Lieut. Colonel John S. Hammell (wounded), Major Peter Nelson 146th Pennsylvania, Colonel Richard P. Roberts (killed), Lieut.- Colonel John Frazer Fourth Brigade.—Colonel JOHN R. BROOKE Commanding (wounded) 27th Connecticut, Lieut.-Colonel Henry C. Merwin (killed), Major James H. Coburn 64th New York, Colonel Daniel G. Bingham 53d Pennsylvania, Colonel J. R. Brooke, Lieut.-Colonel Richard McMichael 145th Pennsylvania, Colonel Hiram L. Brown (wounded), Captain John W. Reynolds (wounded), Captain Moses W. Oliver 2d Delaware, Colonel William P. Bailey SECOND DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL JOHN GIBBON, PERMANENT COMMANDER (wounded). BRIGADIER-GENERAL WILLIAM HARROW. First Brigade.—Brigadier-General WILLIAM HARROW, Colonel FRANCIS E. HEATH 19th Maine, Colonel F. E. Heath, Lieut.-Colonel Henry W. Cunningham 15th Massachusetts, Colonel George H. Ward (killed), Lieut.- Colonel George C. Joslin 82d New York, Colonel Henry W. Hudson (killed), Captain John Darrow 1st Minnesota, Colonel William Colvill (wounded), Captain N. S. Messick (killed), Captain Wilson B. Farrell, Captain Louis Muller, Captain Joseph Perham, Captain Henry C. Coates Second Brigade.—Brigadier-General ALEX. S. WEBB (wounded) 69th Pennsylvania, Colonel Dennis O. Kane (killed), Lieut.- Colonel M. Tschudy (killed), Major James Duffy (wounded), Captain Wm. Davis 71st Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Richard Penn Smith 72d Pennsylvania, Colonel De Witt C. Baxter 106th Pennsylvania, Lieut.-Colonel Theo. Hesser Third Brigade.—Colonel NORMAN J. HALL Commanding 19th Massachusetts, Colonel Arthur F. Devereaux 20th Massachusetts, Colonel Paul J. Revere (killed), Captain H. L. Abbott (wounded) 42d New York, Colonel James E. Mallon 59th New York, Lieut.-Colonel Max A. Thoman (killed) 7th Michigan, Colonel N. J. Hall, Lieut.-Colonel Ames E. Steele (killed), Major S. W. Curtis Unattached.—Andrew Sharpshooters. THIRD DIVISION. BRIGADIER-GENERAL ALEXANDER HAYS First Brigade.—Colonel SAMUEL S. CARROLL 4th Ohio, Lieut.-Colonel James H. Godman, Lieut.-Colonel L. W. Carpenter 8th Ohio, Colonel S. S. Carroll, Lieut.-Colonel Franklin Sawyer 14th Indiana, Colonel John Coons 7th West Virginia, Colonel Joseph Snyder Second Brigade.—Colonel THOMAS A. SMITH (wounded); Lieut.- Colonel F. E. PIERCE 14th Connecticut, Major John T. Ellis 10th New York (battalion), Major Geo. F. Hopper 108th New York, Colonel Charles J. Powers 12th New Jersey, Major John T. Hill 1st Delaware, Colonel Thomas A. Smyth; Lieut.-Colonel Edward P. Harris, Captain M. B. Ellgood (killed), Lieutenant Wm. Smith (killed) Third Brigade.—Colonel GEORGE L. WILLARD (killed); Colonel ELIAKIM SHERRILL (killed); Lieut.-Colonel JAMES M. BULL 39th New York, Lieut.-Colonel James G. Hughes 111th New York, Colonel Clinton D. McDougall (wounded), Lieut.- Colonel Isaac M. Lusk, Captain A. P. Seeley 125th New York, Colonel G. L. Willard (killed), Lieut.-Colonel Levi Crandall 126th New York, Colonel E. Sherrill (killed), Lieut.-Colonel J. M. Bull Artillery Brigade.—Captain J. G. HAZARD Battery B, 1st New York, Captain James McK. Rorty (killed) Battery A, 1st Rhode Island, Lieutenant William A. Arnold Battery B, 1st Rhode Island, Lieutenant T. Fred. Brown (wounded) Battery I, 1st United States, Lieutenant G. A. Woodruff (killed) Battery A, 4th United States, Lieutenant A. H. Cushing (killed) [NOTE.—Battery C, 4th United States, Lieutenant R. Thomas, was in the line of the Second Corps on July 3d. Some of the batteries were so nearly demolished that there was no officer to assume command at the close of the battle.]