 |
That this object can only partially be obtained on the larger exercising grounds, and not at all on the drill grounds, is sufficiently obvious, and it is only necessary to call to mind the attacks on villages, railway-stations, and the like, which are not usually found on such places to make the difficulty apparent. The keystone, therefore, for our purposes can only be found in the country itself, or in manoeuvres, in which the application of every tactical form develops naturally, and finds its justification in the general scheme of operations, and in which the varying conditions are always creating new situations, more or less practical in their nature.
CHAPTER V
FIELD-SERVICE TRAINING AND MANOEUVRES
If in the above sections we have dealt almost exclusively with the training of the Cavalry for actual combat, the cause lies in the nature of things. Victory whether in the shock of 'Masses' or even in the minor encounters of patrols, forms so much the foundation of every possible success, whether strategical or otherwise, that training with this end in view naturally comes first under our consideration.
But as the chief importance of Cavalry no longer lies in its application on the battle-field, but rather in the solution of the strategical problems encountered in the progress of operations, so its training for battle is no longer the one aim and object, but only one element of its whole preparation for the field. Field service, its true duties in reconnaissance and strategic movements, must all be taken into account as factors of equal importance.
I wish to bring this necessity most especially into the foreground, since hitherto, and particularly in view of the changed conditions of modern Warfare, it has not attracted anything approaching the attention it deserves.
What do we practise in the field-service exercises and in the manoeuvres beyond the normal Cavalry versus Cavalry encounters? Principally, only formal outpost duties in combination with Infantry, the smallest incidents of War on the smallest scaled tactical scouting, and the participation of small Cavalry bodies in the encounter between the combined Arms—all matters which nowadays come within the sphere of the Divisional Cavalry; and, indeed, only then when the divisions to which they belong, or even smaller bodies, are operating independently, for the daily routine of the Divisional Cavalry in the enormous Armies of the present day will be on a most modest scale. At most in the Army Corps manoeuvres we may get as far as the employment of Brigades, and perhaps to the shadowing of an enemy's line of advance.
For the most important field of our enterprise, which is to be sought in the activity of the Independent Cavalry, all this is of small account. The real duties of Cavalry in War are only practised in peace on the most confined scale, and often not at all.
Long marches of endurance, independent outposts, attack and defence of localities, the forcing of defiles, passage of rivers, etc., which are held by an enemy's dismounted men, reconnaissances in the widest sense, undertakings against the enemy's communications, pursuit, protracted engagements covering retreats, marches with columns and convoys, finally, the arrangement and execution of wide strategic movements under practical conditions, with accurate computation of time and space, the suitable employment of fighting power for the attainment of the strategical object, and the best strategic introduction of the consciously sought-out combat, all within the limits imposed by the magnitude of the masses handled, are matters which in future will form the principal sum of all Cavalry activity, but find no place in our scheme of education.
Even the Imperial Manoeuvres do not meet the situation, because, in the first place, only comparatively few regiments are annually affected by them; and in the second, the forces are generally from the outset in such close proximity with one another that it is only, perhaps, on the first day that a suitable situation for their strategic employment may be said to arise at all.
Whilst in this manner our whole training is adopted for conditions which in future campaigns can only arise exceptionally, whilst it practically ignores the true sphere of action of the Cavalry, we are working in a vicious circle of forms and misrepresentations which belong to an extinct era of Warfare, and which have long since ceased to have any but the smallest connection with the facts of stern reality.
That things were no better in the period before the last Wars the negative results obtained by our Cavalry in 1866 and 1870 sufficiently prove. In no sphere of their action during these campaigns did they obtain the results the Arm is really capable of—not because the material in the ranks was inferior, but simply and solely because in equipment and training they had lagged behind the requirements of the time. These experiences should have been to us a serious warning not to fall into similar errors a second time; and yet at the present there is most serious danger that a future War may again find us regarding by far the most important branch of our duties from a standpoint which has long since passed away.
The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me of a twofold character. In the first place, the tasks accruing to the Arm in War do not receive either amongst its own officers, still less amongst those of the rest of the Army, their proper appreciation, because in this direction guidance and instruction are alike lacking; in the second, because most serious difficulties lie in the way of a practical adaptation of our training to modern conditions.
In contradistinction to former times, the tasks which await the Cavalry lie principally in the sphere of strategical operations, and here is the root of our special difficulty.
Great Armies, with their communications, reconnaissances and raids under really warlike conditions—that is to say, with their full allowance of trains and baggage—extended retreats with beaten troops, and the consequent pursuit, can only with difficulty be represented in peace, owing to their expense and the consideration necessary to be shown to local circumstances; but it is precisely in exercises of this description, which might give a really working representation of the conditions we shall be called upon to deal with, that circumstances leave us entirely deficient.
Considering all these conditions, it must be recognised that an ideal method of instruction is practically beyond the bounds of the attainable; but for that very reason, in my opinion, we must pursue with all energy the practically possible, and for the unattainable find the best substitute we can.
The first point which strikes one, and which lies at the bottom of all Cavalry undertakings, but in which no real education ever takes place, is the conduct of patrols, and particularly of those employed for reconnoitring purposes.
Instruction in the matter is certainly universal, and in the writing of reports the non-commissioned officers have considerable practice, but no uniform or systematic method or fixed principle is observed, and the practical performances of the men are subject to no superior check. It is left to the Leaders to apply practically their, for the most part, very nebulous, theoretical knowledge. The young officer in particular is altogether left to his own devices; no one takes the trouble to teach him what is essential, and yet he is expected to instruct his inferiors. The consequences are what might be anticipated. The performances of the patrols in covering distances are generally most commendable, but their reports most deficient. Seldom is a clear distinction drawn between the essential and the non-essential; the most trivial news is forwarded with the same expenditure of horses' power as matter of greatest moment; for most patrol Leaders find it very difficult, for want of an imagination trained by the study of military history, to think themselves into and see the situation as it actually would be in War, and thus to act and ride as the circumstances viewed in this light really require. Most information, poor as it is, is thus obtained in an unpractical manner; and seldom is the degree of instruction realized which the situation affords, namely, to observe keenly and clearly from a distant point, and to carry out the ride in the spirit of the general situation, with a proper calculation of time and space. In this branch of duty change is imperative; the training for scouting must be made the foundation of the whole course, and carried through in a uniform manner. Everywhere it must be based on the conditions of a great War.
How the scientific knowledge necessary for the officers, which forms the basis of this instruction, is to be encouraged and imparted forms the subject of this next section. Here we can only consider what can and must be done within the regiments and brigades, and the following suggestions seem to me to meet the difficulty.
In the winter, as soon as the inspection 'on the curb' is over, the Regimental Commander with his Staff Officer and Squadron Commanders must take the training in hand. He must begin with a definite strategical situation, and from this as a basis, devise corresponding schemes for patrols, which can be worked out in the neighbourhood of the garrison, and then ride out with his officers exactly as in practice the patrols would have to do. Arrived in the vicinity in which contact with the enemy would take place, he assumes what the patrols would see, and lets the class form their own decisions, write their reports, and determine the manner of their further procedure.
In these opportunities he can instil the true principles to be followed, and demonstrate their practicability by all sorts of exercises, until he is convinced that his hearers have completely assimilated his standpoint and method of thought. Particular importance must be attached to the point that the patrol leaders never lose sight of the whole problem, and refer their observations always to this standard, for it is only then that things appear in their true importance; further, it must always be borne in mind up to what time the report must be in the hands of the Leader if it is to be of use for the special operation.
The best information may be valueless if, as in 1870 so often happened, it arrives too late. This the patrol leader must keep in mind throughout his ride, and thence deduce the time at which his report must be despatched. He must also not only state clearly and precisely what he has seen, but call attention to its probable bearing on the operations, and inform his superior as to any peculiarities of the ground that may influence his future conduct. The object of the ride must be constantly in view, and the report not be overburdened with trivialities about the enemy's patrols and the like, which are often in War of quite negligible importance.
If the Commanding Officer chooses to take the whole of his officers out to these expeditions, he is, of course, free to do so.
The Squadron Commanders now take their subordinates in hand and pass on the instruction in the same spirit and manner, or hand over the matter to the senior lieutenant, if he has been thoroughly instructed for the purpose. In this manner a good uniform system of patrol leading based on sound principles can be attained if the Commanding Officer and his subordinates take all types of patrol duty into the sphere of their practical instruction. The Brigade Commander can use his discretion in its supervision, and give any assistance he may consider necessary.
For the practical training of the men, the foundation must, of course, be found in the squadron. But the teaching must start from constantly changing standpoints, and must be systematically carried on in the higher Commands, which is at present not the case. For though at times such exercises are carried out by the regiments, there is no systematic progress, and no consequent development or representation of the most important elements, whilst higher up no attempt is even made to continue the instruction further. The influence of the Brigadier is confined in general to the detail education and drill, and though the Division is now and again drilled, it never 'operates' in the strategical sense.
As concerns the education of the squadron, this must from the very beginning be rooted in modern conditions, which in the first place demand the development in the man of the greatest possible individuality. War requires this, as well as the gift of grasp and resolution even in difficult situations, from every Cavalry soldier, from the highest to the lowest. The exercise, however, of such qualities can only be demanded from men who bring with them at least a certain degree of comprehension for the nature of War, and it is therefore of the utmost importance that this comprehension should be developed by suitable instruction. This is often sinned against, because sufficient attention is not paid to such instruction, and also because we still work on out-of-date lines, and without any well-defined principles. In my opinion the recruit must not be overwhelmed with a whole mass of thoroughly unpractical knowledge.
In this period of education one must limit the scope to only the most important and necessary matters, but teach these so that the men understand them clearly and thoroughly.
In the latter years one can build out systematically on this foundation. Thus I consider it quite unnecessary to harass the recruit with long-winded explanations of the military virtues—loyalty, obedience, and courage—or with long lists of different salutes to be given, the recipients of which never come within his ken. It is quite superfluous to teach them the different parts of the lock of the carbine and their mutual interaction, all about stable duty and guard mounting. Even the theoretical instruction about the organization of the Army, treatment of sore backs, horse sickness, etc., can be reduced to much smaller dimensions than at present. Stable work and guard duties, and so forth, a man learns much quicker and better from daily practice. On the other hand, the time gained by curtailing these matters must be used most zealously to teach him what he absolutely must know for War. That is to say, the simplest principles of Field Service, the composition of mixed detachments, practical shooting, and the exterior treatment of the carbine. The instruction in Field Service, which interests us here the most, can, for the recruits, be kept down to very narrow limits. The principles to be observed in placing pickets, vedettes, etc., he can very well do without. On the other hand, he must know thoroughly those things which he will have to do himself—his duty on patrols, or as bearer of a message, or orderly, also the general connection of the military conditions amongst which he will have to move or to notice amongst the enemy, such as organization of the troops, arrangement of the outposts, relation of the commands, plan and appearance of entrenchments, shelter trenches, gun epaulments, cover, etc.[29]
[Footnote 29: Instruction with models helps the man quickest; it is very difficult for the recruit to form a mental picture of military things.]
He must know, too, that if taken prisoner, he must give no correct answers as to anything concerning his own Army.
It is quite possible to awaken the intellectual faculties of the man and to develop them even within these narrow limits, for the more tersely the facts are stated, and the more thorough the instructions, the more is his thinking power stimulated, whereas a mass of material to be absorbed merely confuses him. This intellectual pressure of the instructor must not, of course, be limited solely to the lesson hour, but he must seize every possible opportunity to assert his influence. Especial attention is to be directed to habituate the men to carry in their minds verbal messages for a considerable period, and then to repeat them clearly and concisely. It is of great assistance to the intellectual development of the men if they are compelled always to express themselves in grammatically complete sentences, instead of in broken phrases; but I should consider it as a serious error to attempt to teach the recruit the neighbourhood of the garrison, both on the map and on the ground. For in this way one deprives the man of one of his few opportunities which occur to him during his whole service of learning to find his way in unknown country, and thus to develop the instinct of finding his way, which requires considerable practice.
That this faculty is one of the most important in War-time for every Cavalry soldier can hardly be open to doubt. From the same point of view I must enter a protest against the absurd misuse of maps in Peace-time. Of course, the men, and particularly the patrol leaders, must understand how to read a map and find their way by it, and all non-commissioned officers and men out of their first year's service must be trained in so doing, but it is altogether impractical, and therefore a bad preparation for war, if in the interests of better manoeuvre results maps are issued in uncounted numbers even on the larger scales, so that not only every patrol leader, but every orderly, can obtain one for a couple of pence. In War, and particularly in an enemy's country, such extravagance in their issue is obviously out of the question.
The education of the non-commissioned officers must also be systematically set in hand. They should be divided, according to their intelligence and performances, in different groups—two will generally suffice—and the abler men should not only receive instruction for the higher branches of their duties, but must also be rationally taught how to teach others. The non-commissioned officers' school must also receive thorough attention; if it is not conducted seriously, it involves a scandalous waste of time, but if the men receive a really earnest and stimulating instruction, it helps most materially in their intellectual development, and thus reacts most favourably on their military capacity.
As concerns the practical exercises of the squadron, these must, as far as possible, cut themselves free from the spirit of minor tactics, and work as directly as they can towards the requirements of War on a great scale. The destruction of railways and bridges, service on requisitioning duties, etc., must naturally continue to be practised; for though in spirit they belong to minor tactics, they are also required in great Wars. But, above all, one must break with the old one-sided schemes of outpost squadron—officers and non-commissioned officers, posts and vedettes—and the whole subject must be treated on wider lines more in accordance with the changing requirements of active service. The different purposes for which localities are held and utilized in different manners, the use of woods, and waves of the ground, must all be drawn most thoroughly into the scope of the exercises; and whilst still at squadron work the men must be made clearly to understand the difference between mixed outposts and those of Independent Cavalry, and the chief importance of their whole training in this branch of their duty must be laid on the latter, which is even nowadays not yet sufficiently the case. Further, there must be thorough training in duties of security and reconnoitring at night, and in particular of the defence of cantonments against nocturnal attacks.
In general, it must be clearly understood that all squadron training can only be elementary, and hence must be regarded as a stepping-stone towards the whole field-service training. Where this is left altogether to the squadrons, the men never have the opportunity of becoming acquainted with the conditions of time and space which limit their action when in large bodies. Continuous exercises also, always in the same units, lead only too easily to empty repetition and many misunderstandings. The Squadron Field Service training must, therefore, be limited in time, and as soon as it is completed it must be continued in the regiment, and where the conditions at all allow—i.e., where the garrisons are not too far apart—it must culminate in brigade work.
The 'training'—i.e., the condition of the horses-must by this time have made such progress that marches of twenty to thirty miles for the main body are well within their power. Here a wide and profitable field opens for the Brigade Commander, but it is important in every case—security, screening, reconnaissance, raid, or surprise—to bring out systematically and clearly the essential difference of procedure required, so that all grades of Leaders learn to realize the fundamental distinction which exists between these various forms of their several duties.
It is also equally important that in each Command operations in several detachments, the regulation of their marching speed, their combined action in the fight, the proper working of the arrangements for collecting information or transmitting orders, should be practised again and again till certainty in their interaction is secured.
It is further necessary to call attention to the necessity, in the interests of a prudent economy of one's forces, to arrange the patrol service systematically, not only as regards the sphere of action allotted to each, but also as to the time of their departure.
Thus, in the march of a single body, the duty of attending to its security may be assigned to the troops themselves, whilst the reconnoitring task is allotted by the officer directing the operations; or, in the case of separate bodies, that each receives its own particular scouting mission, with which, then, the Director refrains from interfering. Otherwise it may easily happen that patrols are despatched for the same purpose by different Commanders, with a corresponding waste of power and the risks of leaving gaps in the whole line.
The Commanders of mixed detachments should also make this need of systematic procedure clear to themselves, and either leave the whole duty of reconnaissance in the hands of the Cavalry, or if they elect to retain certain portions of the work in their own hands they should inform the Cavalry Commander of the fact, and not interfere afterwards with his arrangements, or fail to keep him acquainted with the measures they have themselves taken.
The first course is correct in principle, and will always give the best results when a competent Cavalry officer is kept sufficiently acquainted with the views of his superior, and made personally responsible for results.
Finally, as concerns practice in conjunction with the other Arms, these, too, must lead into different paths from those at present pursued. Detachments of Infantry and Artillery need Cavalry for reconnaissance, security, and orderly duties; but for the Cavalry itself these exercises (of small bodies) have little importance, except in so far as they familiarize the men with the organization and development of the other Armies, and thus learn to form an opinion when viewing these from a distance. The combined action of Cavalry with companies, battalions, and regiments has no importance at all, and is often the merest waste of time. It is much more important to secure practice for the troops in judging the appearance of considerable bodies of Infantry, either on the march or in position, and thence deducing their probable numerical strength.
The former class of exercises will, therefore, be on as restricted a scale as possible, whilst more time is given to the former, and by arrangement with neighbouring garrisons opportunities can often be made. In this way much can be done in the garrison and the Brigade to further the training of Cavalry for the work of a great War, although such exercises can in no way replace the actual manoeuvring of large bodies.
It must rather be insisted on that the whole Field-Service training of the Arm can only be brought to its legitimate conclusion in the strategical exercises of large and changing combinations of units. Even the manoeuvres, important as they undoubtedly are, can never replace them. They must, therefore, be placed on a footing of equal importance with the great drill practices of the higher units, since the strategical value of the Arm to the supreme Commander of the Army depends on its intelligent handling in this particular field, and it is here that the difficulties to be overcome are especially great.
Again, system must be inculcated if clearness of apprehension of the several problems is to be produced.
It will be of the utmost importance that baggage and, if possible, trains corresponding to the conditions on mobilization should be employed, and that men and horses should be fed from their contents; otherwise we would only too easily drop into habits of under-estimating the difficulties with which in real War we shall have to contend. But to guard against this self-deception should be the end and object of all our efforts.
It will, therefore, be necessary to calculate distance and the width of areas to be swept over, with reference to modern conditions, and not to work on the scale that sufficed us in France in 1870. The telegraph must also be taken into account, and it must be strictly insisted on that it is only to be used for such reports and in such cases in which it would be available on service. It should, therefore, be laid down beforehand which side is to be considered as in an enemy's country. For the representation of following portions of the Army, flag columns and peace garrisons may be employed, as this is of the utmost importance for the systematic practice of the patrol service.
The formation of territorial Cavalry Inspections and Sub-Inspections, already advocated above, would give the necessary foundation for our purposes. After finding the Divisional Cavalry necessary on a War strength, the remaining regiments in their several districts could be formed in Divisions and Corps of always varying composition in order to carry out Independent Cavalry manoeuvres.
To practise the participation of the other Arms, corresponding arrangements with the adjacent Corps Commanders could be made, so that their annual manoeuvres could work in with the Cavalry scheme, but the strategic side should have the preference. Operations would not always culminate in a great Cavalry engagement, but a skilful conduct of the manoeuvres in practical country would generally insure such encounters without too great a charge for agricultural compensation.
I do not believe that such a scheme, though it would certainly mean a complete break with established Routine, would materially increase the cost of the manoeuvres. The damage, now disseminated by the many regiments without any corresponding gain to their efficiency, would now be concentrated on the same district, but the gain to the Arm itself, as well as for the whole Army, would be both decisive and epoch-making.
Great though the importance and necessity of such an arrangement seems to me, yet, as circumstances at present exist, one could hardly count on seeing it applied at once to the whole service, and meanwhile we must search for expedients.
From this point of view, also, we must strive to extend the period allotted for the training of the larger Cavalry bodies to such a degree that Field-Service days can be interposed between the drill days, in which at least the combined action of masses within the limits of Field-Service exercises can be practised.
The question then arises whether it would not be as well to sacrifice a part of the tactical training of the Divisional Cavalry in the interest of the proposed strategic manoeuvres, and whether the advantages we anticipate from these latter might not, at any rate partially, be attained in another manner. It seems to me that to a certain extent this may well be possible, if we can only make up our minds to break with our existing arrangements regulating the present exercises, and order a certain number of garrisons, detailed in groups, to operate one against the other. If this grouping is carried out without reference to Corps boundaries, and the exercises are so managed that the troops need only spend one night out of quarters, during which they can bivouac, very great advantages at very small cost would be derived, because, since in these operations it is not at all necessary to carry them through to their culmination in an engagement, but only to concentrate them for the purpose, when necessary, in a practical manner, and to set all the machinery for reconnoitring, for transmission of orders, and reports, in operation, the damages to cultivation might be kept within very reasonable limits.
An example will help to make the idea clearer. If from the regiments in Metz, Thionville, and St. Avoid on the one side, and of those in Saarburg, Saargemund, Saarbrucken on the other, two opposing forces are constituted, it would be easy to draw up a general idea by which each element of the group considered as an independent Cavalry screen covering the advance of an Army had reached on a given night the points at which they are actually quartered. The distances of the places named one from another are such that they fairly represent a possible situation in War, and a single day's march might well bring them into collision. Inexpensive bivouac places could easily be found in the wooded districts of Lorraine or elsewhere, and the Infantry in the respective garrisons might represent the heads of the following Armies' columns without undue interference with their programme of training. If the Cavalry march out with four squadrons only per regiment, the fifth can find horses for a part of the train, the point being not so much the number of such waggons provided as the service loading of those that are taken. In the afternoon and night preceding the march, outposts could be established, and the service of exploration commenced. Thus in two or three days a strategic exercise for the Cavalry on a large scale could be arranged at a very low cost and with very little difficulty. Such operations would naturally be conducted by the Inspectors-General of Cavalry, and, as the example shows, they could be generally, if not everywhere, easily organized.[30]
[Footnote 30: Taking into account these and similar demands on the Inspectors-General, the question arises whether the time has not come to attach to them permanently officers of the General Staff. Every increase in the number of these officers employed in peace is a great advantage for War, because the War formations require far more Staff Officers to fill the new positions created on mobilization than are employed in peace—a very serious disadvantage. I consider it absolutely essential that each Inspector-General of Cavalry should be provided with a permanent Staff.]
Since it is essential in all Cavalry exercises to take into account the numbers and distances with which we shall have to deal in future Warfare, it would be a great gain to the Arm if in the manoeuvres, in which its action in combination with the other Arms should be taught, this point of view was brought more into the foreground.
Of course it is not intended that the interests of the other Arms should be sacrificed to those of the Cavalry; the question rather is whether these interests are not identical even for the Infantry; the importance of minor tactics has fallen very much into the background, and both Infantry and Artillery require far more practice in 'masses.' Detachment warfare can for the most part be quite sufficiently practised in the garrisons, but the opportunities for exercising the large units are far more difficult to find.
I consider, therefore, that it would be of advantage to all Arms if present Brigade manoeuvres, with all their superannuated customs, were abolished in favour of more Divisional and Corps manoeuvres. The Cavalry, at any rate, would welcome the innovation, for from its point of view these manoeuvres could be made far more practical, and it would be easier to arrange schemes for the latter more in accordance with reality.
It is also most desirable that from time to time the Cavalry should have opportunities of practising both pursuit and rearguard action on a grand scale. At present these only arise in the manoeuvres with mixed Arms, since in the Independent Cavalry manoeuvres they are difficult of representation.
The Director of the manoeuvres can also do much to make the operations instructive for the Cavalry, and also to stimulate the interests of all engaged, if he takes care that the demands made upon the Cavalry are kept within reasonable limits. It constantly happens that patrols are despatched at far too late an hour to make it possible for their reports to arrive in time. Commanders, again, frequently wish to be informed as to the exact position of every battalion on the other side, although they generally know his total force with accuracy, or they want to know the exact strength of the Garrison holding a certain village or locality, as if Cavalry could under any circumstances supply such information; and if at night no sketch of the enemy's outpost line has been handed in, the Cavalry are held to have failed in their duty. All these demands are, in my opinion, entirely unpractical; in War one never has such precise information, and no rational man dreams of wasting the strength of his Cavalry in endeavouring to secure such details. These things are mere remnants of the Paleolithic Age, and only justifiable as an extreme case when perhaps planning a surprise. Further, it is thoroughly unpractical to require under all circumstances complete information as to the progress of an engagement. With modern weapons this is impossible, unless favoured by unusual topographical conditions. Not merely are such demands unpractical, but they exercise a most prejudicial effect, for too accurate and too detailed information gets the Generals into bad habits of command, and the Cavalry itself is well-nigh ruined. Certainly, when circumstances demand it, the men must not be afraid to keep well up to the enemy, and bring back intelligence even out of the zone of his fire; but, generally, reliable observations are only made out of range. The Cavalry must learn principally to judge the enemy's arrangements from a distance; they must direct their attention to the essential only, and not waste their time in unnecessary side issues. If justice is to be done to these requirements, it is quite impossible to collect all the information the Generals so frequently require. Thus they get in the habit of observing in an unpractical manner, and the whole of this most important branch of their education suffers accordingly. So much is this the case that nowadays the patrol leaders often exchange mutual confidences to one another, as it is practically impossible, owing to conditions of time and space, to obtain the required information otherwise, and they consider it better to get it in this manner than to accustom their men to unpractical feats of riding.
Reconnaissance and its results can only be of value to the training when kept within the limits that the nature of things dictates.
Whilst the constant presence of danger is the characteristic element in which the faculties of observation have to work in War, it is the constant pressure of uncertainty as to the exact movements of the enemy which equally characteristically forms the conditioning element in which the intellectual activity of the Leaders has also to work, and neither one nor the other may be entirely ignored in our Peace-time training.
CHAPTER VI
THE HIGHER EDUCATION OF OUR OFFICERS
The consideration we have devoted in the foregoing chapters to the various fields for Cavalry action opened out by the changed conditions of modern War have shown us what tremendous demands will be made upon the leader of a great Cavalry 'Mass' in the future. He must be an absolute master of the technical side of his own Arm. He must be ready to enter into the spirit of the widest strategical considerations of the Superior Command, and according to circumstances to act in harmony with them on his own initiative. He must know the spirit, the methods of fighting, and the peculiarities of the other Arms, so as to be able to intervene at the right time and place in the action. He must with swift determination combine boldness with circumspection; and in addition, he must not only be a bold horseman, but must possess inexhaustible activity of mind and body.
If these are the demands modern War will make upon the higher leaders of the Arm, those which fall on the lower ranks have been intensified in similar fashion; for, quite apart from their bodily and mental qualifications, they will need, for the solution of the various problems with which they will be confronted, an immensely increased amount of military knowledge and executive ability.
The amount of initiative which will be required in simple Cavalry engagements between the larger groups, and in strategic operations of the Arm, from subordinate leaders has been already discussed above, and it will be clear that only a thorough comprehension of the whole situation will enable the individual to act opportunely when such moments may arrive. It is not merely a general military education which will be required, but greatly increased endurance, boldness, and, above all, a wider understanding for the whole connection of the great operations, and the power of judging a military situation with accuracy, which must prevail through all ranks, down to the leader of an independent patrol. The whole method of observation and the results deduced therefrom will assume quite a different form when managed by Officers who have learnt to understand and to judge operations on a large scale. Without such training only isolated facts will be reported—deductions will not be drawn. There will be no discrimination between important and unimportant details, and the Officer himself will not be able to come to a correct decision as to the direction in which to pursue his mission. But this is exactly what it is most important that all Officers should be relied on to perform. They must understand how, from a given mass of observations, to deduce the strength, bearing, and condition of the enemy in general, to divine the probable connection of his operations, and hence to determine the most important points and directions in which to follow up any available clue.
If an Officer comes upon an outpost or an occupied position, he should be able from the indications on the spot and from his map to determine where the flanks are likely to rest, and hence on what point to direct his further advance.
If he happens on troops at rest or on the march, he must be able to decide whether it is more important to follow or watch their subsequent movements, or to carry out his reconnaissance in some other direction. He must, in fact, judge what it is of the greatest importance for the superior staff to know when his instructions in face of altered circumstances leave him in momentary uncertainty.
Such illustrations could be extended indefinitely, but the sum of all points to the same conclusion—viz., that a comprehensive military education, and at least a general grasp of the principles of the Higher Strategy, are essential for every reconnoitring Officer. The history of previous campaigns points the same moral by innumerable examples, and how much more frequent must such incidents be in the future.
Let us take the case of the Battle of Gravelotte only—the point was to determine whether the French were still clinging to the fortress or were marching away from it. Not one of the patrols, however, whose doings can still be traced, or whose reports are still in existence, seems to have possessed the comprehension of the situation which would have enabled it to report on what it was of the utmost importance for the Army Headquarters to know. None of them even noted the direction in which the troops they saw were moving—a matter of most vital importance—or estimated the strength of the several encampments, or reported the fact that certain roads were clear, although they were all moving in the immediate vicinity, and might easily have ascertained these facts had they realized their importance. Thus, because they were uncorroborated, the most important observations led to false conclusions. The point of transcendent consequence—the actual position of the French right flank—could not be determined until hours after the battle had been begun under an entire misapprehension of the actual circumstances. Similar experiences have repeated themselves times without number.
When we now reflect upon the greatly increased importance of reliable information in Modern War, we cannot escape the conclusion that a proper training of our Cavalry Officers to meet their requirements is of vital importance. Their present-day education does not sufficiently guarantee their competence.
The knowledge of the military sciences acquired at the War schools is on a very modest scale, nor is it, indeed, the business of these schools to give higher education in such subjects. Hence it is all the more deplorable that the higher intellectual training of our Cavalry Officers practically ceases after the War School, because the practical day-to-day duties of their profession furnishes them with nothing which can replace the need for a higher theoretical training. Generally, their attention is absorbed by the smallest of details, which, though each is of immense importance to the efficiency of the whole Arm, are not calculated to widen their intellectual horizon, and in the few great manoeuvres in which an Officer might find an opportunity of enlarging his knowledge, he finds himself lacking in the foundation necessary to make full use of it.
The usual course of instruction, in fact, is not adapted to the needs of the Cavalry Officer, who already in early youth may find himself in situations requiring adequate strategical knowledge for their solution; hence there is urgent need for the supreme military authorities to concern themselves at once both with his theoretical and practical education.
The latter could best be provided for in connection with the development of the Field-Service training of the Troops already dealt with above. The former—i.e., the scientific side—could be most adequately met by the creation of a 'Cavalry School' on the lines of the special Artillery and Engineer Schools which already provide for the further education of the Officers of these Arms after they have spent a couple of years or more in responsible command of men in their own units.
If on the broader foundations of the military sciences—principally those relating to the conduct of operations, to Strategy and Tactics—thus supplied, the Regimental Commanders were to build up by practical instruction, as above indicated, and the whole spirit of the training were modified in conformity with the views therein already expressed, then I consider that, with the admirable material amongst our Officers which already exists, and which for the most part needs only opportunity to prove its value, most important results might be achieved.
Such a school would be most fittingly affiliated to the existing School of Equitation in Hanover. The bright, attractive side of Cavalry life, as we there find it, would be a useful counterpoise to the risk of too much theory, and the district lends itself admirably to practical exercises in reconnaissances and endurance rides.
So long as this most desirable reform remains only an ideal, we must strive to do the utmost we can within the limits of our existing educational system, for the need is urgent, and admits of no delay.
We must devote increased attention to this portion of our officers' training from the very commencement of their career, and see that they are so far initiated into the nature both of tactical and strategical relations that they may be able, on the one hand, to reconnoitre an enemy in the spirit of the intentions of the Supreme Command; on the other, that they are capable of commanding their units in any given strategical situation.
All means must be strained towards the attainment of this purpose.
One of the first stepping-stones in our progress must be the actual horsemanship of the Officer himself. A man who under every circumstance feels himself firm in the saddle does not need to exert force to fight with or restrain his horse, and having learnt both how to think and command at a gallop, will lead Cavalry and reconnoitre before the enemy with far greater certainty and much better results than one to whom these things are hardly second nature.
Bold and determined horsemanship acts and reacts on all a man's other soldierly characteristics, and forms thus a basis for further progress of the highest order, apart from the fact that it impresses the men most favourably, and induces them to follow with greater confidence.
Hence, even from the standpoint of the higher education, the standard of horsemanship can never be raised too high. Given this, and the remainder can be acquired in the practical day-to-day work of the unit, in the training of the men themselves, and in the exercises in Field-Service duties, in manoeuvres and Cavalry exercises, always provided that these are all conducted in conformity with the spirit of modern operations. But since we have seen this practical duty, as at present carried on, nowhere meets the above conditions, we must find a supplement to it by recourse to systematic training in Field-Service rides, War Games, and Staff Tours, for which, of course, the necessary funds must be provided.
These exercises must be begun in the regiment, and continued through each successive grade up to the 'Inspection,' the sphere of each being enlarged with the increase in the importance of the Command.
But they will only then possess value and importance when based on connected military situations arising from the operations of modern Armies, and afford opportunities to the participants for the solution of problems far above their existing rank, for thus only can their mental horizon be extended. Within the radius of action of his own Command each Officer is already in daily contact with all that it is necessary for him to understand, and in minor tactical situations he has abundant opportunities for training his faculties. It seems to me, therefore, mere waste of time to give him further employment with these matters, and the attempt could only end in depriving them of all interest. On the other hand, the Regimental Officer is seldom if ever placed in positions which would enable him to form any adequate conception of the execution and connection of the greater operations, to realize the importance of the action of the unit within the framework of the whole, or to notice how faults in details, apparently trivial in themselves, can mount up in the mass until they may jeopardize the success of any given undertaking.
The higher the intellectual pinnacle on which he is placed, the wider becomes his horizon, and consequently his appreciation of the relative importance of each individual link in the chain.
CONCLUSION
If now, at the conclusion of my investigations, we summarize the chief results arrived at, we find the following sequence of thought:
The value of Cavalry in relation to the other Arms has risen materially; as a consequence of the whole range of changes introduced into the conduct of modern War—viz., those due to changes in the composition of Armies, to railways, telegraphs, supply, weapons, etc. Its strategical tasks have increased in importance, and on the battle-field new opportunities for successes have been disclosed.
Mounted and dismounted action have now become functions of equal importance. Great results—whether strategical or tactical—can only be obtained by the employment of 'Masses.'
The changing conditions of War demand increased mobility, both organic, strategic, and tactical.
The difficulties of leadership, in consequence of these conditions, have increased very materially. On the other hand, the Cavalry has remained in every respect relatively behind the other Arms, and hence we stand face to face with a whole list of new requirements which it must be the task of our peace-time preparation to satisfy, and of which the following are the most important items:
Increase in the price paid for our remounts.
Considerable increase in our numerical strength, if possible, on the lines of our existing and well-tried organization.
Rearmament of our Cavalry with a 6-millimetre carbine, ballistically equal in all respects to the rifle of the Infantry.
Considerable increase in the amount of ammunition carried both in peace and War.
Improvement in the whole equipment of man and horse.
Formation of the horse batteries of four guns, with corresponding increase in the number of batteries; introduction also of a true quick-firer.
Supply of Maxim guns to the Cavalry. Organization of the whole of the supply columns and pioneer detachments required to give the necessary strategical mobility.
Improvement in the method of training horses and men, both individually and for the purpose of securing better conditions in the horses to stand the increased strain of modern operations.
Complete reform of our course of training, both tactical and for field service, to fit us for employment in 'Masses,' and to meet the new strategic requirements. The increased importance of fire-action must be taken into account.
Further development of our Cavalry Regulations, which require not only simplification in many details, but the addition of sections developing the principles of the employment by 'Wings' of the several units, an extension of the prescriptions for the use of fire-action, and more precise formulation of tactical principles.
Rearrangement of the instructions relating to reconnaissance, security, and the forwarding of reports, in the field-service regulations, with due regard to the employment of cyclists where practicable.
A more systematic, practical, and general education for our Officers; creation of a Cavalry School, in which War should be taught on scientific principles.
Distribution of the whole Arm into independent territorial districts, to be termed 'Inspections' (Corps) and 'Sub-inspections' (Divisions), which are to be entirely independent of the existing Army Corps.
Annual Cavalry Manoeuvres.
Improvement of discipline 'to meet the demands of modern Warfare.
This is a considerable list of extreme requirements put together in a few words, and I am well aware that they are not to be obtained by a single stroke of the pen—indeed, it needs a considerable degree of optimism to believe that they are to be obtained at all; but I am equally conscious that sound evolution is only possible when the extremest purpose of our endeavours is clearly placed before our minds, and if we have the courage to recognise openly how far we fall short of the standard the pitiless reality of War demands.
Do not let us delude ourselves with the idea that excellence is to be attained without exertion, or that the path of easy-going reforms, safeguarding always existing interests, will lead us to a certain victory.
Half-measures do more harm than good, and it will not be those races which will survive in the great 'world struggle for existence' which seek only for a harmonious development of all their living forces, but rather those which devote themselves with a single mind to the evolution of the utmost fighting power It is the triumph of force—fighting power—which conditions the development of all other social interests. If we possess the 'force,' the rest will follow. Whilst, however, we seek to develop by every means in our power the utmost strength of the nation, we must be quite clear in our own minds as to the limits of the attainable. In War, no more than in any other 'act of human intercourse,' is the 'best' ever reached by mortal executants. But the palm of success beckons across the field of destiny to the race which strives towards the highest, and has made the greatest sacrifices and dared the most to deserve it.
In this sense it is the duty of each individual unit amongst us, unconcerned about results or consequences, to work with whole heart and mind in the cause we serve; and the more resistance to be encountered, the greater the obstacle to be overcome, the less may we shun the struggle, for here also the old truth holds good: Per aspera ad Astra.
INDEX
Action, typical case of Cavalry, 225; example of Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
Advance, time to be selected for, 32; rate of, 121; of enemy marks period for pushing forward, 27
Advantages, in War, must be fought for, 29
Ammunition, carbine, insufficiency of, 175, 179; increase in amount of, for practice, 250
Ammunition columns, special, required for Cavalry, 179
Armies, change of character of modern, 3
Art of War, new conditions in, 3; their effect on Cavalry, 9; result of first engagement of overwhelming importance, 12
Artillery, effect of modern, on defence of villages and woods, 15; power of, can be over-estimated, 54; support of dismounted Cavalry by, 60, 100; protection of, 95; Horse Artillery must adapt itself to Cavalry's action, 100; position for, 101; one battery per brigade recommended, 179; quick-firing guns wanted, 180; should be attacked from flank, 234; co-operation in Cavalry training, 263
Attack, stereotyped forms of, prohibited, 72; on flank when advisable, 78; simultaneous, on front and flank, 79; 'mobile' or 'immobile' horses during, 91; by dismounted troops, 99; change of direction of, when permissible, 116; importance of vehemence of onslaught, 232; formation for, against Infantry and Artillery, 234; distribution and duties of dismounted men in, 259
Baggage-train should be represented at manoeuvres, 279
Bapaume, Battle of, 57
Barley as forage, 206
Battle-field, place of Cavalry in, 81, 84; case of Mars la Tour, 82; best formation for, 85; decided by circumstances of case, 82, 85; simple formations alone applicable on, 225; Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
Beans as a ration, 205
Bit and bridoon, merits of, 192, 197
Bivouac, disadvantages of, 122, 125
Breaking in. See 'Training'
Bridging material, sufficient, needed to be carried to deal with small streams, etc., 175
Bridoon. See 'Bit'
Brigade, highest unit for drill purposes, 238
Bugle calls, when allowable, 69; value of, 230; regimental calls, 230; movements to be practised without, 236
Cantonments, advantages of providing, 125
Carbine, method of attachment, 176; improved pattern needed, 177
Cartridges, method of carrying, 177
Cavalry must be trained to act in 'mass,' 7; during Wars of 1870 and 1877-1878, 7; experiences of the past insufficient, 8; proportion to other Arms, 10; importance of, greater than formerly, 11; new tasks for, 14; actual fighting value diminished, 16; best strategic value increased, 16; public opinion at fault, 16; exploits in 1870-1871 misjudged, 16; German organization of, requires reform, 17; clear conception of requirements during each phase needed, 17; advance during mobilization deprecated, 23; should not act till enemy's strategic concentration begins, 28; importance of superiority over enemy's Cavalry at commencement, 31; in what cases the principal Arm, 37; Divisional, 38; Independent, 38; fire action of, during battles, 55; greater tactical cohesion than Infantry, 58; scope of, enormously increased, 59; importance of good leadership, 63; place of, in line of battle, 81, 84; formation of, on battle-field, 85; factors determining strategic employment of, 126; difficulty of supplying reinforcements, 151; augmentation of German, necessary, 153; and not to be postponed till mobilization, 158; training of, requires reforming, 181 et seq.; Regulations require amendment to meet dismounted needs, 257; tasks for, in future War not properly appreciated, 268
Change of formation during action, 69; from 'rendezvous' to 'attack,' 79
Charge, the, when preferable to fire action, 52; example of Waterloo, 52; position of Commander during, 65; choice of moment for, 87; cohesion during, 221; speed of, 221
Chargers. See 'Horses'
Chotusitz, Battle of, 83
Civilians, possible participation in future Wars by, 10; armed resistance by, to be suppressed, 33
Column, regimental, value of, for War, 227; squadron, disadvantages of, 228
Combined action, factors essential to success of, 68
Command of Cavalry masses exceeding six regiments, 45; must be under a single leader, 46; efficiency of, more important with Cavalry than Infantry, 63
Commander, qualities needed in a good, 64, 286; place of, before and during charges, 65; when working with other Arms, 66; choice of formation to be left to, 72, 76, 77; must be informed of progress of Infantry combat, 86; qualities required in covering a retreat, 86; in dismounted action, 93; must decide as to extension in strategy, 106; and concentration in combat, 106; to be kept informed of general situation, 111, 117; must organize his own reconnaissance, 120; personal supervision of front by, 121; forage reserve to be formed by, 131; to arrange times for drill, 215; but not to deviate from Regulations, 220; importance of handling 'masses,' 216. See also 'Leader'
Commencement of War, essence of all Cavalry action during, 26; obtaining intelligence during, 27
Communications, increased liability to interruption of, 13; greater opportunities for Cavalry to interfere with, 14; especially after victory, 14; to be maintained with Headquarters on field of battle, 67
Comparison between Cavalry and Infantry, 59
Concentration, question of disturbing enemy's communications during, 19; views of other Powers on this, 20; value of raids during, 20; premature commitment of Cavalry during, 24; reasons against sacrificing Cavalry during, 25; defensive duties during, 26; advantages of pushing forward during enemy's, 28; of force for raids, 35; of considerable masses, when essential, 44; for combat, 106, 108, 109
Corn, amount of, to be carried by Cavalry, 130; author's experiment, 203
Coulmiers, Battle of, 86
'Critique' after field days, 243
Cyclists, value of, in conjunction with Cavalry, 22, 147; circulation of intelligence by, 39; should enable Divisional Cavalry to be economized, 42; further Regulations required, 146; limitations of, 148; to be attached to Cavalry, 178
Deception of enemy, means towards, 119
Defects in horses, correction of, 199
Defence of villages, 97
Defensive duties at commencement of War, 26; combat, 92; 'immobile' detachments during, 92; action, breaking off a, 94; action, duties of dismounted men during, 259
Despatch riders, 138, 145
Detachments, economy in use of, 38; reports from, to Headquarters, 111; outflanking, during attack, 232
Direction, change of, during action, 117
Dismounted action, increased importance of, 49; when desirable in attack, 49; when inevitable, 50; Sheridan's Cavalry in, 51; during rearguard actions, 52; during general engagements, 55; examples of Fredericksburg and Five Forks, 55; in South African War, 56; Franco-German War, 57; 'mobile' and 'immobile' horses, 91; in defensive combat, 92, 93; tactical distribution of men in, 96; 'Wing' or 'Line' systems, 96; in defence of villages, 97 et seq.; in attack, 99; training for, 247; importance of, not sufficiently appreciated, 248 et seq.; not to be confined to the defensive, 249; recruits' course, 250; Regulations as to, require expansion, 257 et seq.; as important as fighting in the saddle, 262
Dispersion of troops for raids, 35; for screening and security, 106, 109
Divisional Cavalry defined, 38; duties of, 39; apportionment of, 41; as little as possible should be retained for Infantry Divisions, 42; reconnaissance duties of, 141; security duties of, 144
Divisions of Cavalry, maintenance of, during peace, 161; present strength insufficient, 165; permanent creation of, not advisable, 167
'Double-column' formation, when recommended, 80, 229
'Drei Treffen Taktik,' 73
'Dressur' detachment, 190
Drill, shortening of season for, 198; importance of Squadron and Regimental, 214 et seq.; merits of Brigade and Divisional, 215 et seq.; ceremonial to be separated from practical, 237; Brigade, the highest unit for formal, 238
Education, military, for man and horse, 186; tactical, for troops generally, 213 et seq.; of recruits, 272; of non-commissioned ranks, 275; higher, of officers, 286 et seq.
Efficiency of troops essential to good leadership, 126
Enemy, advance of, marks period for pushing forward Cavalry, 27; Cavalry of, must be beaten off field to obtain information, 30; outposts of, to be broken through, 33; communications, of, to be attacked, 33
Equipment for bridging and telegraphs, 174
Equitation, Staff for, 193; proposed new procedure, 200; school of, in Hanover, 290
Exercises to develop 'tactical principles,' 236; of larger formations than Brigades, 239; 'field-service' exercises, 240 et seq.
Expediency, the highest ideal of strategy, 47
Extension of front when advisable, 107; in action when favourable, 240 et seq.
Field-firing, increased importance of, 251; scheme for, 252
'Field-service' exercises, 218; nature of, 240; ground for, 239;
Cavalry acting independently, 240; Cavalry in combination with other Arms, 241; existing deficiencies in, 266
Fire action often imperative nowadays, 47; occasions when it will decide the day, 50; General Lee's capitulation, 51; South African War, 56; Franco-German War, 57
Firearms, increased range of, 36; better class of, needed by Cavalry, 58
Flank attack, when advisable, 78, 79; after victory, 83; during charge, 233
Flanks of enemy to be worked round to obtain information, 29
Forage, reserve of, 131; amount to be carried on horses, 169; author's experiment, 203
Force necessary to be employed in various circumstances, 36
Formation for attack, 36; change of, during action, 69; latitude to be allowed to Commander, 76, 77; merits of 'double column,' 80; 'mass' when suitable, 81; on battle-field, 85; of dismounted men in action, 96; in defence of villages, 96; in dismounted attack, 100; best, suitable for War, 226; to be avoided, 226; regimental column, 227
Four-squadron regiments, 154
Frederick the Great on length of marches, 122
Front, extension and concentration of, 107
Frontal attack against Infantry and Artillery, 235
Galloping, exercises in, 209
German Cavalry, numerically inadequate, 151; expedients for augmenting, 153; proposed territorial organization, 167
Gravelotte, example of faulty reconnaissance reports, 288
Ground, value of tactical advantage of, 78; acquisition of, for field-training, 239
Halts on march, 128
Headquarters, reports to be sent to, from detachments, 111
Horsemanship, 184
Horses, demands on, 87; 'mobile' or 'immobile,' 91; position for led, 93 et seq.; protection of, 95; rest for, 122; security of, during rest, 122, 124; bivouac on march, 122; on outpost, 123; importance of care bestowed on, 123, 127; excessive demands on, 128; shortage of, in Germany, 152; 'augmentation,' 155; 'untrained,' of small use, 158; increased demands on, 181; training of, 185 et seq.; English thoroughbreds, 187; Prussian, 187; old, 194; food for, increase of, 203; endurance of, 202; feeding, author's experiment in, 203; galloping powers, 209; weight to be put on, 212
Increase of German Cavalry needed, 158
Independence, when to be given to subordinates, 68
'Independent Cavalry' defined, 38; conditions which determine allotment of, 42; in what cases it should be concentrated on decisive lines, 43; security duties of, 144
Individual superiority essential for patrols, 31
Infantry, effect on Cavalry of extended zone of fire of, 9; difficult for Cavalry to encounter in close bodies, 10; when once broken offer great opportunity to Cavalry, 15; defence of villages and woods by, more difficult now, 15; compared with Cavalry, 59
Initial success, great importance of, 12
Initiative, value of, 115
Inspections, new scheme of, for recruits and schools, 200; importance of thorough, 246
Inspector-General of Cavalry, position of, 282 and footnote
Intelligence indispensable at commencement of War, 27; spaces between enemy's columns to be penetrated to obtain, 27; when more important than security, 28; circulation of, 39; during progress of action, 40; experience of 1870, 40; to be transmitted direct to Headquarters, as well as through usual channel, 45
Lance-exercises, 254; better attachment of, necessary, 255
Leader, importance of-independence of, in combined action, 68, 76; more initiative to be given to, 73; to be careful about his horses, 87; duty when covering a retreat, 88; modern requirements in a good, 89, 90; to be kept informed of the general situation, 111, 117; clearness of intention, 116; must organize his own intelligence, 117; capacity of, 126; of great Cavalry masses, 286
Led horses, 91; place for, 93, 94; in dismounted practice, 259
Lines—three-line system, 73
Locality, faculty of finding way in unknown, 274
Lunging rein, 188
Manoeuvres, Brigade and Divisional, little criterion of work in War, 42; trotting and galloping at, 210; weight to be carried at, 210; movements which are of use for War, 226; theatrical display in great Cavalry, 263; deficiencies in existing, 266; Imperial, 267; baggage train to be represented at, 279; limitations of telegraphs at, 279; of Brigades to be abolished in favour of Divisional and Corps, 283; limitation of demands on Cavalry at, 284
Maps, misuse of, 274
Marches, flanking detachments to, 121; length of, 122; endurance of horses on, 127; excessive lengths of, 128; average lengths of, 128; trotting and halts on, 128
Mars la Tour, 82, 83, 86, 225 (footnote)
'Mass' when suitable, 81, 82
Masses, training of Cavalry in large, 214, 215; necessity for bringing Cavalry together frequently in, 245
Maxim guns with Cavalry, 178
Messengers, employment of, to be limited, 129
Mobility, essential in surprise actions, 118; German Cavalry deficient in, 169; of supply waggons, 173
Mounted Reserve, duties of, 95; strength of, 96
Movements most suitable for battle-field, 226; to be avoided, 226; to be practised on simple warnings, 236
Musketry, importance of knowledge of, by officers, 253; judging distances, 253
Napoleon on length of Cavalry marches, 122
Narbonne, General von Pelet, proposals of, 155
Numbers alone can prevail in victory or in covering retreat, 36; give opportunities of dismounted action, 57
Oats, 205
Observation of masses of enemy's army by officers patrol, 31; during combat, 40
Offensive against Infantry, Cavalry capable of taking the, 60
Officers of Cavalry have better knowledge of their men than in Infantry, 59; importance of training of, 64; increased importance of knowledge of musketry, 253; to be attached to Infantry for instruction, 256; higher education of, 286 et seq.; training in horsemanship of, 291
Officers patrols, when necessary, 31
Orderlies to be limited, 128
Orders, simplicity essential in, 68; how to be transmitted in the field, 69; by bugle call, 69; verbal, 69; to be circulated simultaneously to all subordinates, 112; importance of clearness in, 116
Organization of German Cavalry unchanged, 17; requires reform, 17; must be elastic, 47; example of 1870, 47; also of Napoleon, 48; of German Cavalry to be by territorial districts, 167
'Outer lines,' advantages of, 78
Outflanking tactics, when undesirable, 53; detachments, work of, during charge, 232
Outposts, necessity for breaking through enemy's, 33; fixed rules for, impossible, 126
Patrols, causes of possible danger in the future, 10; breaking up of enemy's communications by officers, 22; must ascertain changes in enemy's initial dispositions, 25; must protect frontier districts from raids, 25; must avoid becoming desperately involved, 26; superiority in individual patroller essential, 31; defeat of enemy's, necessary, 31; 'reconnoitring' distinct from 'security' patrols, 133; strength of, 136; duties of commander, 136; transmission of despatches by, 138; must report to Headquarters as well as through ordinary channel, 140; 'tactical,' 143; 'security,' 143; screening by, 144; Regulations need amendment, 145; training for scouting basis of all reconnaissance instruction, 269; suggestion as to instruction, 270
Place on battle-field of Cavalry, 84, 85
Prague, Battle of, 83
'Principles,' tactical, of Cavalry opposed to Cavalry, 231; of Cavalry opposed to Infantry and Artillery, 234
Prisoners, value of capturing, during enemy's mobilization, 24
Protection of main force, steps required differ from those for obtaining information, 29; opposite views held, 29
Pursuit of beaten enemy imperative, 84; methods of, 51; dismounted action during, 51; Waterloo, 52; wars of 1866 and 1870, 84; duties during, 88; to be practised on a grand scale, 283
Quick-firing guns, employment of 180
Raids, value of, on outbreak of War, 20; to exploit enemy's resources, 34; indispensable element in future, 34; depend on rapidity and surprise, 34; and on concentration of force at night-time, 35; dispersion during, 35
Rapidity essential in raids, 34; and in dismounted attack, 99
Rations, emergency, for horses, 174; author's experiment with forage, 203 et seq.
Rearguard actions, to be practised on a grand scale, 283
Reconnaissance by independent bodies of Cavalry necessary, 7; rendered more difficult by range of modern firearms, 10; and by smokeless powder, 10; value of intensified, 12; must be a separate service from screening, 31; an exception to this, 41; advantage of defeating enemy's reconnoitrers, 31; under fire very difficult to effect, 39; on the battle-field, 66; cavalry leader must organize his own, 120; training for scouting the basis of instruction in, 269; knowledge of principles of 'higher strategy' essential, 288
Reconnoitring patrols, 134 et seq.
Recruits, training of, 188 et seq., 273. See also 'Training'
Regiment, the fundamental tactical unit, 228
Regimental call, value of, 230 et seq.
'Regimental column' formation, 227; merits of double, 229
Regulations should not lay down fixed evolutions, 70; but only essential principles of action, 70; existing edition of, requires revision, 70, 79; importance of Section 346, 76; rearrangement recommended, 244; as to training of dismounted squadrons, 253
Reinforcements, difficulty of supplying Cavalry, 151
Remounts, supply of, in War, 159; English blood in, 187; training of, 187
Reports in the field to be made to Headquarters and to adjacent columns, 11; transmission of, 138 et seq.
Reserve forage, 131
Reserve squadrons, position for, during attack, 232
Reserve troops an easy prey to Cavalry when once beaten, 15
Rest, importance of, to horses, 124, 125
Retreat, advantages of 'outer lines' in, 78; duty of Cavalry covering a, 88
Riding, cross-country, 186; individual, 189
Riding School, 193 et seq.
Roszbach, Battle of, 83
Rushes, advancing by, 113
Rye as forage, 206
Schlichting, General von, writings of, 81; criticism of, 83; on application of drill-book principles, 237
School, Riding, 192; War (see 'War School'); of Cavalry, 290
Screening, importance of, 12; during absence of troops, 27; must give way to obtaining intelligence, 28; distinct from reconnoitring, 32; must be fought for, 33
Security when secondary to obtaining intelligence, 28; during rest, 122; general advantages of, 124
Sedan, Battle of, 87
Seidlitz, Von, at Zorndorf, 87
Simplicity essential to successful tactics, 68
Single combat exercises, 195 et seq.
Skeleton enemy, 244
Soor, action of, 83
Squadron School, the basis of tactical training, 214; drill, 217; tactical training of dismounted, 258; general education of, 272, 276; practical exercises for, 275
'Squadron column,' merits of, 228
Staff required for Cavalry corps, 228
Strategical handling of Cavalry, importance of, 37; fixed regulations inapplicable to, 105; general principles, 105
Subdivision of force, 107
Summary of opinions on Cavalry generally, 294
Supply trains must march as fast as Cavalry, 171; length of, 172; mobility of, 173
Supreme Commander, presence of Cavalry essential to success of, 37
Surprise the essence of Cavalry actions, 16; indispensable in raids, 34; requirements for success in, 118
System, the 'three-line,' 74
Tactical action by Divisional Cavalry precluded, 40; of Cavalry changed by new conditions, 49; 'Drei Treffen,' 73; training for, too elementary, 223
Tactical education for troops generally, 213 et seq.
Tactical principles, Cavalry v. Cavalry, 231 et seq.; Cavalry v. Infantry and Artillery, 232 et seq.; exercises to develop the, 236
Tactical and strategical principles of the future, 83
Telegraph, control of, 140; limitations as to the use of, in Manoeuvres, 279
'Three-line' system, 73
Training, true purpose of, 161 of Cavalry Staff, 166; Von Moltke's proposals, 166; changes must be met by new methods, 181; of horses and men, 184 et seq.; length of period of, 188, 194; proposed programme for, 200; preparation for endurance, 207; War conditions essential to, 208; tactical, too elementary at present, 223; for dismounted fighting, 247 et seq.; some deficiencies in present, 217; of squadrons a stepping-stone to field service, 276
Training grounds ('Truppenuebungs Plaetze'), 239
Transmission of orders during action, 69
'Treffen,' definition of, 74
Trotting on march, 128
Turning movements, when imperative, 115
Verbal orders, 69
Villages, dismounted defence of, 97 et seq.; withdrawal from, 99
Vionville, Battle of, 107
Von-Rosenberg at Mars la Tour, 225 (footnote)
Waggons, supply, pace of, 171
War conditions essential to training, 208
War School, extent of teaching at, 289; creation of school for Cavalry desirable, 290
Weight to be carried by horses, 212
Wheat as forage, 206
'Wing attack,' 76; best formation for requirements of combat, 227; in action against Infantry and Artillery, 234; freedom as to use of, 244
Woerth, Battle of, 87
Zone of fire, results of extension of, 9
Zorndorf, Battle of, 87
THE END
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