According to this calculation, the Field squadron would have to move out with from 34 to 30 augmentation horses (the sixty squadrons on the higher establishment with 27).

The matter, however, presents a totally different appearance when in peace five squadrons are in existence, of which one remains behind as a depot. Taking away the 35 horses for recruits, and following our previous calculation of 7 young remounts, there would remain on the lower establishment 91 efficient horses to be divided amongst the other four squadrons, or 23 each, so that these would take the field with only 11, 7, or 4 'augmentation horses,' according to the respective peace establishments of the regiments. With these numbers the squadron suffers no reduction of its efficiency, for these few can always be employed—in the squadron carts, etc.—at any rate, need not be in the ranks.

These figures, worked out in the spring of 1899, are still substantially correct, and it appears to me General von Pelet-Narbonne deals too leniently with this proposal for forming the fifth squadrons into new regiments, because many of the calls made on the squadrons are even heavier than he assumes; besides, there are always in every squadron some inefficient or sick horses, which will presently have to be cast. Further, I consider it impracticable to take eight remounts into the field, for these young animals are by no means equal to the demands which modern conditions must make upon them from the very first days of mobilization.

Hence the number of augmentation horses will be considerably increased above General von Pelet's estimate, but he is unquestionably correct in his opinion that a large number of these untrained animals will exercise a more detrimental influence under existing conditions than formerly, when, after completed mobilization, the squadrons often had a considerable time in hand to weld into cohesion their constituent elements. Nowadays the regiments will be rapidly forwarded to the front by rail, and from the very commencement of hostilities the fullest demands will be made on their efficiency. Unbroken horses, and others not trained to the long gallops and trots of to-day, cannot possibly carry weights of from 230 to 240 pounds for many hours a day straight across country. After a very short spell most of the augmentation horses would be useless, and their presence would only have brought confusion and unsteadiness into the ranks of their squadrons.

These disadvantages might indeed be partially mitigated if the squadrons were raised in Peace to their full War establishment and somewhat above it—say to 160 horses. But, on the one hand, this would mean a not inconsiderable increase in the Cavalry; on the other, our Peace conditions would be difficult to adapt to such an organization. Without going closer into these details, it will be sufficient to point out that all our barracks and riding-schools are designed for five squadrons; and further, that we do not need numerically stronger regiments, but a greater number, in order to satisfy all requirements.

Hence, if it is admitted that swamping our squadrons with thirty or more augmentation horses must diminish most seriously the efficiency of our Cavalry, then it follows that a still further increase in their number will make matters still worse. Such proposals have no doubt been made, and it certainly would be convenient if our Cavalry could thus easily on mobilization be increased by one-third to one-half its strength; but after what has been said, above all such suggestions must be seen to be impracticable, for squadrons which consisted, for instance, of one-half augmentation horses would be simply useless for War purposes. A proceeding, therefore, which brought such results in its train would imply no increase of the Arm, but rather the destruction of the existing standard of Peace-time efficiency.

Even as Divisional Cavalry such squadrons would be useless, for these require good individual horsemanship even more than those of the Independent Division for the performance of their special duties, and the necessary standard can never be attained with untrained horses.

All who put forward proposals of this nature are labouring under the dominion of a fundamental fallacy. They overlook the fact I have explained in the foregoing section, that Cavalry by its very nature can never be other than a highly-specialized Arm, and hence that the system adopted by the Infantry of raising the cadres to War strength by the absorption of reserve men is for the Cavalry fundamentally impossible. For in the Infantry the ranks are filled by the addition of trained men; in the Cavalry they must be completed with untrained horses, and the untrained horses break down under service conditions much more rapidly than the men.

Our experience in 1870-1871 was conclusive on this point. Already towards the end of August—i.e., in less than six weeks from the outbreak of the War—the greater part of the augmentation horses were quite useless for field purposes. If one looks up the reports in the War Archives, everywhere this complaint about the untrained animals is recurrent.

From all the above-mentioned circumstances it must be clear that a numerical increase in the Cavalry is most urgently called for, and in my opinion it would be best if this indispensable increase, the need for which is becoming apparent even to public opinion, were grafted upon the existing five-squadron system, which at least guarantees a certain amount of preparation of the augmentation horses, without entailing the reduction of the squadrons below the minimum standard necessary for efficiency. I would, however, be willing to support any other method which would give a sensible increase in the Cavalry strength of our Peace establishment, and only protest against any scheme which would seek to swell out the ranks or create new units on mobilization; for all these are mere self-delusion, increasing, no doubt, the numbers on paper, but in reality striking at the efficiency of the Arm in the most vital manner.

If, then, at the moment there may be conditions outside my ken which render a measure of the nature I have indicated impracticable, we must, nevertheless, not close our eyes to the fact that, after the recent reorganization of the Artillery, the creation of an adequate number of Cavalry regiments in the nearest future is an absolute necessity, and that in the meanwhile any such palliative as a recourse to the cadre system must be absolutely rejected.

As an indispensable complement of the proposal to form new regiments, so that we shall not be compelled to fall back on an inferior class of horse to meet their requirements, and at the same time to insure as far as possible a supply of suitable remounts to replace our losses in War, further encouragement of horse-breeding operations in our own territories is most urgently called for. This can only be attained by a further reasonable increase in the price paid for remounts.[16]

[Footnote 16: In passing, I may note that some portions of Lorraine are amongst the richest in horseflesh in all Germany. Here, by the introduction of suitable stallions, an excellent Artillery horse might be bred; but nothing is being done in this direction.]

Such a measure must form a preliminary to the coming increase of the Arm, and the sooner it is undertaken the better will be the result.

These points of view cannot be insisted upon too vehemently, since even in Military circles they have not everywhere received the consideration they deserve, and it is most necessary that public opinion, which finds its ultimate expression within the walls of the Reichstag, should receive adequate instruction as to the vital interests involved.

In any case, the difficulties attending any adequate increase of our Cavalry must not be underrated, and we must remain prepared to face the strain of a European Campaign with a strength inadequate for the difficult and most momentous problems we shall be called on to face—problems which, according to the measure of success or the reverse attending their solution, will exercise the most far-reaching consequences on the whole course of the War.

Under all circumstances we shall have to endeavour to attain at least that measure of success which the Army Headquarters unconditionally require to render possible their own effective operations.

Superior energy and skill in the conduct of our operations, concentration of our forces, increased care for the maintenance both of the moral and material in our Commands, increased boldness in our undertakings, together with wise moderation in the choice of our objectives, must all help to compensate for our numerical weakness, and while consciously leaving on one side everything not directly conducive to our immediate purpose, we must seek to appear at the psychological moment, and from the decisive direction, with forces in hand, and by the energetic use of the relative and local superiority such concentration confers, to gain and keep an advantage to the end of the campaign. The higher, however, the demands which, with this purpose in view, we are compelled to make on the moral, physical, and material strength of the troops, the more we are justified in demanding that, at least as regards organization and training, they shall be equal to all demands modern conditions may impose upon them. If in these points we have no sufficient security guaranteeing the highest possible performances, it would be impossible to count even on the most necessary results in time of War.

The question, then, arises whether from these points of view our German Cavalry is equal to the maximum strain it may be called on to endure.

As concerns our organization, there is a widespread demand that those commands which form the basis of our War organization—i.e., the Cavalry Divisions—should exist already in Peace as concrete units; and in support of this it is urged that men and leaders must know each other mutually if the full effect of their combined power is to be realized in War. It is also held that if once these Divisions were definitely formed, then as a consequence of their existence they would more frequently be brought together for manoeuvres on a large scale, to the benefit of the tactical training of all concerned.

It appears to me that the real centre of gravity in this question of organization lies less in this permanent constitution of the Division in Peace than people generally imagine.

The requirement that leaders and men should know one another I cannot accept as an indispensable condition of War-time efficiency. However desirable it may appear that such a relation should exist, it is one which has never been, and never can be, guaranteed in War. The practicable ideal rather consists in this, that the principles in accordance with which the commands are handled should be so thoroughly flesh and blood of both leaders and led, that under all circumstances a sufficient result is secure. To reach this ideal is the true purpose of our training.

In the permanent existence of Divisions it seems to me there is great danger that such a guarantee for their successful employment would be sacrificed.

We have seen that the demands likely to be made on the Cavalry require widely different arrangement of the disposable forces; that this requirement increases in importance as the Arm falls numerically beneath the needs of the situation, and that only a most adaptable organization can deal adequately with the emergencies this numerical insufficiency may entail. Hence it is to be feared that a permanent constitution in Divisions might lose this requisite adaptability, and, however highly we may appreciate the advantages of a firmly welded War organization, one should never allow the form to interfere with the practical application of the means—i.e., never allow the troops to become so rigid as to hamper their employment in the field. But this is just what would happen if the Divisions were maintained on a permanent War footing.

Every application of Cavalry Masses requires a certain measure of drill control, because it depends always on the movement of closed bodies of troops, and if the Cavalry Divisions are constantly drilled together under the same Leader in Peace, there is at least a very great risk that this certain degree of drill control, which we recognise as indispensable, will degenerate into hard-and-fast prescription, since the Leader has always the same number of units at his disposal, and will thus by degrees habituate himself to consider these as invariable quantities in the solution of every tactical problem.

Our experiences with the Regulations for 1876 show that this danger is by no means imaginary, for by the constant practice of the so-called 'Three-Line Tactics' we had already progressed far on the downward path which leads to tactical destruction. If the 'Form' would not fit the conditions, so much the worse for the conditions. Fortunately, thanks to subsequent changes, we have shed the worst of these tendencies, and are on the high-road towards freer and more adaptable tactical formations, but to me it seems that any attempt to fetter this progress by the adoption of a more or less rigid organization can only result in evil for the whole Arm. Rather should we lay down as a fixed principle that all Cavalry units must be able both to move and fight according to the same tactical principles, no matter in what order these units may be grouped together.

The question now arises whether our present formation of six regiments to a Division is really equal to all demands which may be made upon it; whether, in fact, in view of the strategical requirements it may be called on to fulfil, and the degree of resistance to their execution it is likely to encounter, six regiments will prove numerically equal to their task.

Considered in relation to the enormous Armies of the present day, and the still greater possibilities a general call to arms of a whole nation may involve, six regiments represent a very small actual factor of strength. If they should have to take the field for an independent mission, it would not even be possible to keep them all together. The protection of the flanks, and of the necessary baggage and supply trains, the far-reaching reconnaissances, and the need for extended requisitions, all unite to compel the creation of detachments, which in the aggregate must make considerable inroads on the total strength. Then there is the inevitable tale of losses on the march, the necessity for subdivision of one's forces for the passage or the turning of defiles; in fact, the demands are so many that the true fighting body of the Division—i.e., the squadrons available for the ultimate decisive shock—is represented by a very small fraction of its original forces. If a complete Division can place only 3,600 sabres in the field, or, dismounted, from 1,680 to 3,000 rifles, according to the number of horse-holders required—figures which even without the above-mentioned detachments are quite inconsiderable in relation to what even an inconsiderable Infantry opponent can bring into action—what prospect of success is there for the weakened Independent Division in the execution of quite minor operations, when even in 1870-1871, not once, but frequently, the main body of our Cavalry Divisions shrank often to six or seven weak squadrons.

It is chiefly the consequences of our, on the whole, satisfactory experiences in the above Campaign which have led us to accept the existing Division of six regiments as a satisfactory solution of this problem of strength; but we forget that in those days we had no Cavalry opponent to encounter, and that our sphere of action, owing to the want on our side of an adequate equipment of firearms, was small indeed in comparison with what we must expect in the future. We are encouraged in our illusion by the fact that in our Peace manoeuvres the strength of the opposing forces is generally nearly equal, and also because the actual demands War will make upon the Arm are still in these exercises very imperfectly realized, and from the nature of the case cannot receive full recognition. Further, there is the fact that our possible opponents have adopted the same organization, and last, but not least, there remains the view that every tactical unit of the Cavalry must not only be capable of being strategically employed as a whole, but must also be in point of size within the control of its Leader as a tactical unit.

Our unfortunate experiences with larger formations in 1866 are often cited in favour of our present system, the point being ignored that it was not the size of these bodies, but the faulty methods in which they were employed, both strategically and tactically, that led to our disappointment.

I think, therefore, that unprejudiced consideration must come to the conclusion that our Divisions as they now exist are too weak for the many and most decisive operations they will be called on to undertake. The absolute necessity to secure the victory over the enemy's Cavalry at the decisive point under all circumstances, and at the same time to retain a sufficient force in hand to reap all the consequences of that victory, will, I am convinced, lead to a materially greater concentration of power in the single unit.

If from this point of view the permanent constitution of Cavalry Divisions cannot be upheld, it follows that even less is to be said for the formation of still stronger units in Peace-time, for this measure would entail in even greater degree the very same strategical and tactical limitations we have noted in the case of the Divisions, and still further cramp the necessary adaptability of the organization to meet the conditions of our Peace-time training. At the same time, it is clear that it is of the utmost importance that the formation of these stronger formations, Corps, or Divisions of greater numerical strength, the necessity for which can be recognised in advance, should be arranged for in the mobilization plans, and not built up afterwards by the mere combination of existing Divisions.

For such bodies cannot be improvised altogether. In order to develop their full efficiency they require a carefully selected and ample staff of men who can be trusted to pull well together, and who have at their disposal all the auxiliary services necessary for greater independent operations. For these both trains and columns are needed, which must be larger than those of two or even three single Divisions; for, on the one hand, the greater size of the Corps entails closer concentration of its units, thus making heavier demands on the provision columns; and, on the other, the Corps must be capable of carrying out longer and more obstinate engagements than a single Division.

It is, therefore, most essential that the several Staffs required for the Corps to be created in War-time should be thoroughly trained so as to insure their working together, and the trains and columns necessary to complete these units should be held ready for them in time of Peace.[17]

[Footnote 17: In a report addressed to H.M. the King in 1868 by General von Moltke on the experiences deduced from the events of 1866, it is proposed that there should be at Army Headquarters the Staff of a Cavalry Corps Command, together with its necessary Administrative services, always ready for the field. As Field Marshal he returns to the idea in another place, adding, 'particularly when we have found the right "Murat" to lead it' (Moltke's 'Militarische Werke,' II., Second Part, First Group, B).]

To hand over the functions of Corps Commander to the senior of the two or three Divisional Commanders would hardly be an adequate means of securing satisfactory results even for a single day of battle; still less could it suffice in the case of an independent strategic operation. On the other hand, it is not at all essential that the Corps thus formed at the outset of operations should be retained intact throughout their whole period. One can make detachments from them, or reinforce them according to circumstances, and thus attain that very flexibility of organization which I have endeavoured to prove to be an absolutely indispensable factor to meet the conditions of our times.

It appears to me also that the same advantage which it is hoped to realize by the creation of permanent Divisions can be reached by other roads, and with still better results.

I would divide the whole territory of the German Empire into a number of territorial districts, and call them Cavalry Inspections, or Corps—the name is immaterial—each to comprise about twenty regiments, and subdivide these again into sub-Inspections (i.e., Divisions and Brigades), and thus obtain, not only the foundations and the Staffs for a practical War formation, but for a systematic preparation of the Arm in time of Peace. The Inspections would detail annually the necessary squadrons on a War strength for manoeuvres of the three Arms, according to a changing roster, and hold special Cavalry manoeuvres in a manner I propose to develop hereafter.

We should thus, from the point of view of organization, gain the advantage of having the cadres for both Corps and Divisions ready in time of Peace, without being bound once for all to a hard-and-fast strength for the Division.

It may be objected that it would be illogical to separate the Cavalry from the Army Corps and Divisional Commands at the very moment that we have assigned the whole of the Artillery to the Infantry Divisions, but for the latter Arm the conditions are quite different. It always fights in combination with the other Arms; by itself it cannot fight at all.

The Cavalry, on the other hand, as regards its principal masses, is quite independent, and only occasionally in moments of crisis intervenes in the action of the other Arms, even then still as an independent unit. The connection with the remainder of the Army would be sufficiently secured by its participation in the annual manoeuvres of the three Arms, and, as at present, Cavalry Brigade Commanders would still have to be employed in the arrangement of the Brigade manoeuvres. The participation of the Cavalry Regiments in the Garrison Field Service exercises would remain matter of arrangement between the respective Commands, but definite rules would have to be drawn up to secure their effective co-operation.

The necessary trains for the Inspections and Divisions would be kept ready in time of Peace, and, whether Horse Artillery—possibly also Maxim guns—should be permanently allotted to them or otherwise, might remain open for further discussion, though there is undoubtedly much to be urged in favour of the suggestion.

In this manner I believe an organization could be created which would meet all reasonable requirements. Certain new Staffs, fully equipped with both General Staff Officers and those necessary for the contemplated trains, etc., would be of course necessary, for in case of War such creations cannot be improvised to work together without most detrimental friction for any units, and least of all for those which from the first moment of hostilities will be called on for decisive action, and thus have less time and opportunity to shake down into their new duties.

A practical Peace Organization, such as in fact we do not at present possess, is a necessity of the first importance. But 'Mobility' in the Arm itself remains the prime condition of efficiency in its strategical activity, which, as we have seen above, must henceforward be considered the most important sphere of its duties.

To secure this mobility is, therefore, our unconditional duty, and it is in this direction in particular that, in my opinion, our Cavalry is as yet hardly sufficiently prepared for the tasks that await it.

Strategical 'mobility' certainly depends in the first place on the excellence of the horse supply and the suitable 'training' both of man and horse; but the tactical independence of the troops themselves, and the means of maintaining them in condition—i.e., conditions of supply—are at least of equal importance. Owing to our experiences in the French Campaign, where food and fodder were generally abundant, sufficient attention has not been given universally to this factor. Had we been compelled to undergo the same hardships as the Russians in 1877-1878, our views would doubtless have been very different.

The amount of forage that even under most favourable circumstances can be carried on the horses is very small. To count on finding even that amount always in the country through which we may have to operate would be more than imprudent. Even in 1870-1871 we could not always find what we needed in spite of the very favourable agricultural conditions, and with the enormous Armies of the present day we shall probably find the country even more exhausted of supplies than formerly, particularly in the latter phases of the struggle, except when one has the good-fortune to fall upon rich stretches of the country which by chance may have escaped the devastation of previous operations.

We may also be called on to work in sparsely settled districts with a large export trade in corn, in which at times stocks may sink very low. In short, unless we wish to be hampered at every step of our movements by the necessity for wide-reaching foraging expeditions, we shall have to rely upon our magazines and the supplies which can be transmitted from them to the front through the agency of our supply columns. The carrying capacity and mobility of the latter, therefore, condition inexorably the degree of mobility in strategical operations which, under all circumstances, the Cavalry can be counted on to develop. Whoever relies on more will lay himself open to most bitter disappointments exactly at the decisive moments.

The supply trains must, therefore, be able to march at least as fast as the troops themselves, for only on this condition is there any guarantee that even under difficult circumstances the necessary supplies will be forthcoming; yet though experience most abundantly demonstrates the difficulties of maintaining the supplies of the Infantry in spite of the fact that, as a rule, their columns can cover the ground faster than the men can march, there appears to be a tacit assumption that with the Cavalry the trains will always arrive in time, although they move far slower than the troops they follow and supply.

There was, indeed, a certain amount of justification for this idea in the days when Cavalry were more or less tied to the movements of the rest of the Army; but nowadays, when Cavalry operates independently, and must cover long distances in the shortest time, it has become simply preposterous.

We have only to consider that we have now to reckon with average daily marches of from twenty-five to thirty miles, and that a beaten or evading force may have to retrace the same distance, perhaps even on the very same day, at a much faster rate than that at which it advanced, to perceive its absurdity. What chance would there be for waggons which could not go out of a walk, and cannot reverse on the road itself, which check at every hill, and sink to the axles in mud or sand? How can strategically independent Cavalry provide for the security of its baggage when it must often be left some days' marches behind? And yet it is precisely when operating against an active opposing Cavalry or an insurgent population that protection for the baggage becomes most indispensable. Again, how are such trains to be cleared away from the front when the main bodies of the two armies are closing on one another for battle? or how, after it is decided, can they be brought forward again to follow their Cavalry in pursuit, and convey to it the supplies which in such moments it will most need, and on whose prompt arrival its striking radius will depend? How, with insufficient mobility, will they maintain the connection between the combatants in front and the standing magazines, or even with the movable supply depots following behind the marching Army?

Here we come upon one of the most difficult problems of the day, and it cannot be insisted on too strongly that its solution during Peace is an indispensable condition of the efficiency of the Arm in War. The Cavalry trains must be organized in such a manner that they will be able to march at least as fast as the Cavalry itself, and be adequate in number to carry from five to six days' corn. Only when this demand has been complied with will it be possible to count on the attainment of the strategical independence at which we aim, and to attempt all that this implies with less would only lead to the complete breakdown of the Arm, which, as we have already seen, under existing conditions, can never be efficiently replaced during the same Campaign.

It is not alone with the splendid chaussees of France that we must reckon, but with the sand roads of East and West Prussia, the swamps of Poland and Russia, and so forth, on all of which the same degree of mobility must be developed, for the speed of the Cavalry itself is practically independent of the nature of the roads. Without going further into the detailed measures necessary to attain this ideal, the importance of which must be evident to every practical soldier. I would call attention to only one fundamental consideration: the desire to curtail the length of supply columns by concentrating the loads, with the object of lessening the congestion of the roads and diminishing the time needed to bring their contents to the troops, is sound as long as it attains its object, fatal everywhere else.[18]

[Footnote 18: Generally defeats its own object; the heavy load destroys the roads, causes breakdowns and delays, etc.]

Now, the Cavalry Masses move under different conditions to the rest of the Army. Either they are in the front of or on the flanks; in the latter case, they have roads at their own disposal, in the former, being generally some days' march in advance, they clear the front when collision is imminent by moving to the flanks, and only quite exceptionally retire through the advancing columns, and in all cases they must be able to get off the roads quickly. The depth of these columns is comparatively unimportant.

Hence, from the strategical relations of the Cavalry Masses to the rest of the Army there arises no particular reason to endeavour to shorten their trains. If the heavy baggage of a Cavalry Division is two and a half or five kilometres in length it is tolerably immaterial, but it is imperative, as we have seen, that they should be able to move and get out of the way. Hence, it is not the number of waggons which concerns us, but their individual lightness and mobility, so that on all roads they can follow their units at a trot, and only in the case of Divisional Cavalry can the other point of view be admitted.

The possibility must also not be overlooked that it may not always be practical for Cavalry masses to fill up their supply columns direct from the Army reserves; and to meet this, second echelons of waggons will be required, in every degree as mobile as the first, and so organized as to require a minimum escort for their safety.

For such escorts Cavalry Reservists and men of the Landwehr exist in adequate numbers, and armed with a useful carbine and mounted on horses, only as a means of locomotion, they will answer their purpose well enough.

No matter, however, how ample the supply of these columns may be, or how mobile, circumstances will still arise during periods of great concentration in which it will be impossible to bring up supply waggons in sufficient numbers. In these cases we require an emergency horse ration, which within a small compass contains great nourishment.

Too much cannot be expected from such a ration; for instance, it cannot be bulky enough to fill the animal's stomach. All that is necessary is that it should be willingly eaten by the horses, keep well, and be easily carried. It should contain about three times the nutritive qualities, weight for weight, of oats, and should suffice to keep horses in condition for three or four days in succession. These demands are fairly satisfied by a food manufactured by Marck at Darmstadt. It should be always carried in the field and replenished as consumed, and with it even the most advanced patrols might be made independent of requisitions, a matter which appears to me of the greatest importance.

The fundamental condition of mobility being thus satisfied, the next step will be to insure the technical and tactical independence of the units under all circumstances which can be reasonably foreseen.

In this direction much has been done, and materials for the destruction of railways, folding pontoons, and a field telegraph, now form part of our equipment. The opportunities for the use of the latter in the course of rapid movements—i.e., just in the most important sphere of our activities—seem to me highly problematical, as I have already pointed out; and the waggons which transport the bridging equipment are too heavy to be always at hand when most needed. Essentially, it seems only fitted to facilitate the progress of smaller bodies of troops, and would hardly suffice to secure rapid and safe passage of Cavalry Masses with all their attendant trains over the rivers for which we ought to be prepared. For such purposes they would only suffice if all the boats of a whole Division were united into one bridging train.

Nevertheless, the collapsible boats are a most useful concession, and they would be still more so if the load was more suitably subdivided; as it is, the weight of the whole waggon ties us too much to the made roads. For the Divisional Cavalry, which always moves in close connection with the Infantry, and in need can always fall back upon the Divisional Bridge Train, it has no particular value, and it would therefore be better if, in War-time, all the collapsible boat equipment were handed over to the independent Cavalry Divisions, and their bridging equipment thus augmented.

More important, however, than this collapsible boat question is the matter of the pioneer detachments to be assigned to the Cavalry Divisions which require further equipment. A waggon of bridging material just sufficient to cross smaller ditches and watercourses, which can neither be jumped nor scrambled over, but which require only one, or at most two, bays, would be invaluable, for it is just these little hindrances, whose importance cannot be measured or deduced from the map, which may bring most important Cavalry undertakings unexpectedly to a check, particularly when in an enemy's country all the culverts, etc., have been destroyed. In the days of Frederick the Great such bridging equipment was often assigned to the Cavalry marching at the head of the Columns, in order to help them over similar obstacles.

Given, however, that all has been done to attain the degree of collective mobility we require, a point of equal importance is that the troops should be adequately provided with all they require for their tactical action. In this respect, it cannot be too much insisted upon that carbine ammunition should be placed in the very first line; our present allowance is altogether insufficient.

The importance of dismounted action, as we have already seen, has enormously increased. Almost daily, under certain conditions, we shall have to have recourse to our firearms, and often be obliged to expend very considerable quantities of ammunition to attain the object we fight for. The replenishment of this consumption is far more difficult in our case than with the Infantry, particularly in operations partaking of the nature of raids, in which our communications are likely to be interrupted. These conditions require first of all a considerable increase in the number of rounds carried on the man's person, and also in the number of Small Arm Ammunition waggons attached to the units, and the regulations for the replenishment of these require also corresponding development.

Further, it must be pointed out with all possible insistence that the present equipment of the trooper is thoroughly impracticable. That the carbine should be carried on the horse and the sword on the man is opposed to common sense, for the latter is only of use when mounted, the former only on foot. The sword should, therefore, be attached to the saddle, the carbine to the man, as is, in fact, the practice of all races of born horsemen. A practicable method of attachment is certainly capable of being devised; it is probably only the question of expense that stands in the way of its solution. The consequences, however, of the existing attachment to the saddle are that the weapon must be shorter than that of the Infantry soldier, and hence has a lesser range; but it is precisely the Cavalry that requires to be able to obtain good results at long ranges. Even against Infantry it must always be in a position to obtain decisive results in the shortest time. To obtain these ends it needs a weapon at least equal, if possible superior, to that of the Infantry; and instead it has only the carbine, a weapon of most restricted range, and most inadequately sighted. It is required of Cavalry that it should break off an engagement when the enemy approaches within 700 metres (Drill Regulations, No. 562), and all the training the man gets in Peace is at 600 metres at target practice, and only quite occasionally, if at all, at greater distances at field practice.

I consider it most important that the Cavalry should be supplied with a weapon which admits of accurate practice at long ranges, and for which the greatest number of rounds can be carried. This would entail, on the one hand, an increase in the length of the weapon carried; on the other, a reduction in calibre, which should be made as small as possible. We might thus safely go down to a 6-millimetre bore, and increase the ammunition accordingly. The desire to retain the same cartridge as the Infantry, to facilitate mutual assistance in ammunition supply on occasions, seems to me of quite secondary importance. As long as the Cavalry were still tied to the Infantry on the line of march this consideration had indeed some weight; but now that it moves far in front of, or on the flanks of, the Infantry columns, and has its own arrangements for ammunition supply, the case is quite different. The point nowadays is to make sure of that degree of effect which is unconditionally necessary to our purpose, and for this we require a weapon specially adapted to our particular need.

Our method of carrying our cartridges in the pouch attached to the cross-belt is also impracticable. The bandoliers of the Boers would be undoubtedly preferable, and could at the same time be made use of to secure the carbine on the back.

It is also a matter for serious consideration whether cycle detachments should not be attached to the Cavalry,[19] and I think I am not going too far in estimating fifteen to twenty cyclists per regiment as a suitable number to perform the many duties which may fall to their lot. On the advantages they confer I have already dwelt (Book I., Chap. VIII.), and further, I would advocate the addition of portable or wheelable Maxims to the Cavalry to add to their fire power. The latest patterns of this weapon are capable of easy transportation, and can come into action very rapidly. Naturally such heavy batteries as we now possess should be avoided. As regards this latter weapon, one should not think of it primarily as destined to take part in the real Cavalry duel; one should do nothing in this direction to rob the horsemen of their confidence in themselves by teaching them to lean on the firearm for support. Even the effect of the Artillery in this respect is not always and everywhere advantageous. One is too much inclined to make the action of the Cavalry depend on the effect of the guns, and thus to sacrifice the initiative when opposed to an enemy's horse. Nor would there be many opportunities in practice for the Maxims to render support to the charge. In the introductory phases of an engagement—i.e., when the enemy is still at a considerable distance—they promise little results, and in the moments when the 'Masses' are sent forward to the attack, they would get in the way and hinder their freedom of movement. On the other hand, they would be of great use in cases where it is necessary to overcome or parry an Infantry opponent, and in the battle, or in pursuit, when the Cavalry succeed in getting in on the flanks or rear of the enemy's chief masses, they might prove invaluable. Here, where reserves, columns, and trains all form suitable targets, they would not only add materially to the striking power of the Cavalry, but increase its radius of action very materially.

[Footnote 19: The wheel should be so low that the man could use his rifle without dismounting, and, if possible, it should be 'transportable' (?'folding').]

By their side the Artillery will always maintain its high importance for the fight against localities, woods, and defiles, and with this Arm the German Cavalry is, in my opinion, sufficiently supplied; only—and this is of the greatest importance—more adequate steps to insure ammunition supply are essential in the case of the Independent Cavalry Masses. Here, too, we shall have to reckon with far higher consumption than in 1870-1871, and the greater distances will make it impossible to replenish from the general Reserves of the Army. The Cavalry, therefore, require sufficient ammunition columns of its very own.

The nature of Cavalry operations indicate yet another requirement—namely, batteries so organized that to every brigade of two regiments one battery of four pieces should be assigned. Many will be the occasions in our strategical operations on which guns will be required, and in most of these it is more a question of having some Artillery at hand rather than of the development of superior fire power—i.e., a few shells into a village at the right time may be all that is needed for our purpose. Further, in operating on several roads it can seldom be foretold with exactness on which road the need may first arise.

Under these conditions it is of the greatest importance to be able, if necessary, to assign a battery to each brigade, and at the same time not to allow the half of the whole available Artillery to escape from control.[20]

[Footnote 20: With stronger Divisions, a corresponding increase in Artillery must, of course, be made.]

Further, these small batteries are both handier and more mobile in themselves; they are, therefore, better suited to Cavalry requirements, and at the same time the power of concentration when such is required is fully retained.

The advantage of this proposed division seems, therefore, to me sufficiently clear to need no further recommendation.[21]

[Footnote 21: King William I. had already suggested the formation of batteries of four guns for the Cavalry in 1869—in a marginal note on the report of Moltke's of 1868—already referred to in the note on p. 166 above.]

This organization of the Artillery requires, however, to be supplemented by the introduction of a true quick-firing gun, even if it is necessary to reduce the calibre somewhat to keep down the weight. For it is particularly with the Cavalry, and especially in the Cavalry duel, when the opportunities for Artillery action are often compressed into a very few moments, and yet a great effect must be attained, that a gun without recoil and a great rapidity of loading is most urgently required. If the Cavalry is thus equipped with all that the conditions of War demand and modern technical skill can supply, then it will find in these—at least in part—compensation for its numerical weakness on condition that at the same time it also succeeds in raising its training to a corresponding height.

It cannot be denied that in this direction all ranks have worked with most devoted and admirable industry, and that new points of view, new methods, and new aims towards which to strive have been opened up. But, on the whole, this question of the training of our Cavalry is still based upon the ideas of a period which lies behind us. There has been no conscious breach with the past, even in those very fields wherein the developments and demands of modern times have brought about a complete disturbance of all military relations.

That a method of training which does not take into account the phenomena of modern Warfare, and follow them even to their furthermost consequences, can never give satisfactory results, needs no demonstration. But a method free from these objections we have to find. In its training our Cavalry must excel all others if it would maintain its position on the field of battle, and it can do so, for it possesses by far the best material both in men and horses of any country in the Continent of Europe. There are only two essentials which we must bear in mind. First, we must be absolutely clear as to those points in which our system is behind the requirements of the time, and what objectives we must now pursue. Secondly, being satisfied as to the above, that we should take the straightest way which leads towards them, not hesitating to break with tradition wherever it hinders our advance.

If we now consider in the spirit of this first requirement the separate branches of Cavalry work which our training must embrace, the very first point which attracts attention is the vastly increased demands on the endurance of our horseflesh that will now be made, far exceeding what was required in our last Wars. Increase of endurance is thus an unconditional necessity.

Further, it is perfectly clear that in the combat of Cavalry against Cavalry, the decision will depend on the action of the great tactical units, and that with regard to dismounted fighting, a complete revolution in the conditions has occurred. In future this will tend evermore to come to the front, and both points of view must be kept in mind in our training.

Finally, it is evident that the centre of gravity of these two factors is no longer in the same position. As long as decisive results in the combat itself were expected from the Cavalry, it was quite right and expedient to train them to meet this special requirement. But now, when it is clear that the combat is only a means to an end—that end being the possibility opened up by successful fighting to reconnoitre, screen, or break the enemy's communications—this change in the conditions must be taken into account in the process of our education.

Of course this is not to be understood in the sense that we can afford to neglect the training for the actual combat: the defeat of the enemy's Cavalry remains now, as always, the necessary condition of all subsequent activity; but the Arm must be taught to understand that victory in combat is only the first link in the chain of operations, and to extend its outlook beyond the point of actual collision, and to appreciate the tasks which are the consequence of success.

To this end we must undergo a preparation of a quite different character, for nowadays, freed from the chains which formerly bound us to conform to the action of the other Arms, we appear within the framework of the Great Armies indeed, but operating in independent 'Masses,' and this change in conditions extends its influence even to the smallest reconnoitring patrol.

In this new field our training must seek to follow the demands of War. It must accustom the troops to the greatness of their mission both with regard to time and space, attain higher results with the individual, raise the education of its officers above the sphere of the technicalities special to the Arm, and give them a wider horizon of general military conditions.

In what way we can reach these new ideals, in the best and most practical manner, I propose to investigate in the following chapters, and need only point out here that it is not my object to discuss every detail of military education, but rather to bring out the essentials, and lay stress on those questions which, in my opinion, compel us to strike out new ways to find our objective.



CHAPTER II

RIDING, FEEDING, AND TRAINING

When we discuss the training of the Cavalry, the first point which naturally occurs to us is the question of 'horsemanship'—i.e., the breaking-in of the horses and the teaching of equitation to the men. Horsemanship is so absolutely the bed-rock of all Cavalry performances, that the advantages of improved methods of breaking and of equitation must bear fruit in every branch of their activity. Above all, they exercise the most enduring influence both on the conservation and endurance of the horses themselves.

Anglomaniacs and faddists, who, in spite of many a healthy impulse they have imparted, have nevertheless exercised, and still seek to exercise, an influence the reverse of favourable upon our Cavalry, maintain that for certain purposes one can obtain better results with horses broken by one of their short-cuts to the object, and then 'trained' in the sense that racehorses and hunters are prepared for their work, than with those who have been gradually brought forward by the methods in use in our Cavalry schools, and at the same time secure the advantage of 'unconditional obedience' in the horse, a result which they allege cannot be always counted on with our existing methods.

On the other hand, the fact remains that our recruits, in the short time available for their education, can only be well and quickly taught on well-trained pliable horses. That such horses, with sufficient exercise, go better and more safely across country than those brought forward by more hasty methods, is sufficiently proved by the fact that all our steeplechase riders in the Army take the greatest pains to prepare their horses thoroughly (by school methods understood), because experience shows that this preparation alone gives them a chance against the more highly-priced animals with which they are called on to compete. Only this thorough training guarantees good individual riding, and insures the 'pliability' which alone makes it possible to correct disobedience rapidly should it arise. And, further, there can be no question that this prolonged preparation improves the endurance of the horse—on that point at least experience leaves no room for doubt. The thoroughly broken horse, which moves in easy balance, with all its muscle thoroughly well and equally developed, not only saves its forelegs and joints, and supports the spinal arch better, but trots easier, and hence for longer periods with less fatigue, than the unpliable animal, who stiffens itself against the rider's load, and thus expends its power uselessly, and the rider himself is far less shaken about under the former, a point by no means to be neglected.

The recognition of these facts has at length led us to break with the Anglomania of former years, and the tendency towards improved preparation has become more evident, whilst the centrifugal strivings of individuals no longer find acceptance. On the other hand, it seems to me beyond a doubt that the objects which we wish to obtain from our Military school of horsemanship could in many respects be reached more directly and better than is at present the case.

In conformity with the whole essence of modern War, the individual training of both man and horse must form the foundation of our whole education—that is to say, steadiness in the movement of closed bodies must be the consequence of individual horsemanship. Only in this way can the bodily, intellectual, and moral qualities of both man and horse be brought into useful activity, and in this way only can we conquer the gregarious instincts of the horses and develop in their riders the individuality which modern conditions absolutely demand.

More stress requires to be laid on riding with one hand only and with arms (i.e., drawn swords), for the bit, with or without a feeling on the bridoon, is in War the only practical method of direction; and the use of his weapons when mounted must have become second nature to the man if they are not to be a constant impediment to him in the control of his horse. Finally, independent riding across country must be encouraged by every conceivable means.

To attain all this will only be possible if we succeed in overcoming the preliminary steps of the man's education—i.e., the elementary training of man and horse—more rapidly than has hitherto been the case, and thus gain time for the true practical preparation for the field. If from this standpoint we look at our present system, it will soon be clear where to apply the lever.

First, it should be possible, with the better bred and stauncher material we now receive, to make more rapid progress in the first year than has hitherto been generally the case. By the increased demands and the greater freedom in the choice of means allowed us by the new Regulations as compared with the conditions formerly prevalent, considerable changes have been made; the point now is, in what manner to derive the fullest advantage from this greater freedom for the practical curtailment of the periods previously allotted for each stage in the training.

But prudence is necessary in this direction. That the English thoroughbred, for instance, develops better under work in its early years, admits of no doubt whatever; but there is room to question whether this experience can be transferred without modification to our present Remounts, although many of them have a strong strain of English blood. Our Prussian horses, for instance, only reach their full development between the seventh and eighth years; it would, therefore, be a mistake to attempt to force them up to the full demands made on a Cavalry horse before that age. This slowness of growth must always be considered, and the animals be saved as much as possible; but there is still room to unite with this necessary concession increased demands on the degree of training.

Without any detriment to their efficiency, the young remounts can be taken in hand immediately on joining their regiments, instead of waiting till the conclusion of the manoeuvres, as is still a common practice. It seems feasible, also, to begin with the gallop earlier than was formerly the custom; and, finally, it is by no means absolutely necessary to go back to the bridoon again at the commencement of their second year's training.[22] One can well go on with riding on the bit at the point where the course was interrupted by the manoeuvres.

[Footnote 22: Under the new Regulations this is now left to the discretion of the Regimental Commander.]

All these measures together produce quite a remarkable saving of time, and there cannot well be any doubt that in this way, as far as concerns the riding education of the horse alone—i.e., without arms—the same standard of progress can be reached by Christmas of the second year as was formerly often only reached at the end of the second winter.

If from this foundation we go on to specific training of the charger—still working, of course, concurrently at the gymnastic side of his training also—to accustoming him to the curb, then by the end of February the remount ought easily to be ready to be placed in the ranks.

Side by side with this increase of rapidity in his training, we both can and must make the individual training the foundation of his whole education, so that from the very first the horse learns to go alone and with safety in all kinds of ground.

The very first lessons to accustom him to both saddle and rider are better given on the lunging rein than when led by an older horse, for nothing teaches the bad habit of 'sticking' more than this last practice. And since now the first months of training fall in the summer, we can avail ourselves of the fine weather to send out the young horses in charge of trustworthy riders, some of whom must be left behind even during the manoeuvres, to go singly or in small groups under suitable supervision, which can easily be arranged, out into the country, if possible into woods and fairly difficult ground, to habituate them to minor obstacles and the objects one meets with, instead of, as formerly, keeping them in the school or manege, and making them into 'stickers' first, only to have the trouble of breaking them of the habit, often after many a hard tussle, afterwards.

All through their subsequent training they must constantly be sent out singly into the country, and even in the school itself they should be exercised as little as possible in squads one behind the other.

It goes without saying that only the best horsemen should be trusted with the young horses, for bad habits developed at the beginning of their instruction are of all the most difficult to correct hereafter, and may ruin the result of all one's trouble.

That in this way we can meet the requirements of the service much more rapidly than by existing methods cannot be open to question and may be taken as practically settled, and similar considerations apply to the recruits.

The system laid down in the regulations does not go directly enough to the purpose, a consequence, no doubt, of the fact that we have now better horses on which to instruct them than at the time these instructions were evolved.

If one begins as soon as possible with the gallop and individual riding—if necessary on the lunge—and allows the recruit as soon as he has acquired anything approaching a firm seat to practise the aids for the leg and the side paces—passage and shoulder-in—one will attain quite different results than from riding only on straight lines and practising closing in the ranks. The practice in the use of the legs makes the men more independent and individual, compels them to trust to their seat, and not to hang on by the reins.

The individual riding makes the man drive his horse forward by the pressure of his legs, which he is not compelled to do in the squad, where the horses follow one another almost automatically. The horses, too, are saved from becoming dull and heavy, as they are only too apt to do under the recruits of the old system.

By Christmas the recruits can thus be brought forward as far and farther than they now are by the time of the inspection on the bridoon, and can then go on to riding on the curb, so that by February they should be able to ride the side paces, gallop and change, and all other school paces, without arms, and generally be so firm in the saddle that they may be advanced to drilling with arms, and can begin their real instruction as troopers. Of course, it is not to be expected that these school paces should be ridden as yet in perfect form, but the men must understand what these lessons are intended for, and the effort to get the correct bend should be recognisable. And we may add that to teach them to rely on their seat and not on their hands suitable exercises with the lance may be introduced even at an earlier period.

As regards the remainder of the squadron, the so-called 'Dressur'[23] detachment, it is hardly necessary to point out that one can ask of it at least all that can be attained by the remounts and the recruits—that is to say, that by the beginning of February the men and horses should reach the highest point of their purely riding training. Of course, to achieve this they must not be put back every autumn to the very ABC of their work—riding on the bridoon. They must go on with the curb, to which by this time they are accustomed, and in the place of the bridoon work, individual riding must be encouraged as much as possible.

[Footnote 23: 'Dressur' literally means 'preparation.' We use the term 'breaking-in.' Note the difference.—TRANSLATOR.]

Only those squads will require somewhat different treatment in which the best men of the second year are being trained on the best horses for the riding of the remounts in the following year. These men will certainly require more bridoon work in the autumn, but even these should be sufficiently forward by Christmas-time to pass on to the bit, so that, in spite of the very high degree of perfection required from their horses, they can be dismissed the school by the middle of February.

From the increased demands made on the individual training of man and horse, it follows as a necessary consequence that a different kind of inspection in equitation will be required to that hitherto in vogue.

The presentation of closed detachments must be restricted as much as possible, and all previous rehearsals of a special inspection programme absolutely prohibited. Horse and rider, since they have been trained individually, must be inspected and judged on their individual merits, not otherwise. In this manner not only is it easier to appreciate difficulties, but good work also has a fairer chance of securing recognition. It needs an expert to bring together the sum of all the performances, and express a fair judgment on the total result. In any case, however, such a judgment will be nearer the truth because it is uninfluenced by 'eye-wash' and mere externals.

Hence we arrive at the conclusion that in the manner we have above indicated the whole squadron can have completed its training in equitation by the middle of February.

That many objections will have to be met and many difficulties overcome before this end is attained goes without saying; but where in human affairs can it be said that this is not the case?

It may be urged that both for horses and men there is a distinct advantage in beginning again every year with bridoon riding.

The action of the rider is easier to control than on the bit, and if once the men take to holding on by the curb, the consequences are much worse than with the former. On the other hand, also, it is easier for the horses on the curb to assume a false bend or poise, or to refuse to go up to their bits, and thus deceive the instructor. Wrong application of the aids with the bit entail worse consequences on the horses than with the bridoon; hence almost exclusive work on the bit requires better teachers and lighter hands, and if one has few of these at one's disposal, undoubtedly a disadvantage will accrue.

It may further be objected that for such a thorough extension of the course of individual riding as I have demanded there is neither time, school accommodation, nor teachers available, and it must be granted that the regulation allowance of three schools per regiment is, in fact, insufficient for the attainment of the required standard by the methods I have in view. Nor will it suffice to allow each training detachment only three-quarters of an hour in the school at a time. Detachments of average strength require daily one hour and a quarter, if the necessary skill in individual riding is to be acquired, and recruit squads even longer. Further, it will not do to exclude recruits who begin early with the side paces and the gallop altogether from the school; on the contrary, they require to attend it at least once or twice a week.

But with only three schools per regiment, particularly in our northern provinces, these requirements cannot be fulfilled. Four I consider as the least number, and it would be still better if each squadron had its own school, so that difficult animals and backward men could be taken individually, and work on the lunge and circle thoroughly carried out.

Still, all these obstacles can be overcome. With increased practice, comprehension of the management of the bit in military riding would gradually increase both with teacher and pupils, and work with the reins in both hands be usefully employed to facilitate the transition from the bridoon to the bit and counteract the possible evils of riding on the bit alone.

The better training of the Remounts, which will be obtained by the means I have indicated, will in course of time give us better, more obedient, and more pliable horses, and better-trained recruits again will give us a better choice of riders for the young remounts.

Our instructional staff for equitation is thoroughly satisfactory. In this respect the Riding-School in Hanover has done excellent work. We have also amongst our senior non-commissioned officers some excellent instructors.

The necessary time for all my demands can very well be saved if we make up our minds to leave out all superfluities in the daily routine of duty; and as regards the question of school accommodation, it is well within the bounds of possibility for most regiments to provide themselves with a fourth school—eventually even with a fifth—out of their own financial resources. No investment could be more remunerative. Certainly under circumstances red tape may stand in the way; but when his superiors will support the Regimental Commander, and sometimes without, one will generally find appreciative backing, even from the War Office (Intendantur).

If the drawbacks and difficulties in the way of the proposed changes are, as I have endeavoured to show, to be surmounted, on the other hand, the advantages accruing therefrom are so enormous that the former need not be taken into consideration at all. In the first place, as we have seen, better individual horsemanship and more practice in riding on the bit are in themselves advantages which react directly on the War efficiency of the whole squadron. Secondly, the earlier completion of the remount training is a direct gain, for, in case of mobilization, we shall be better able to place remounts in the mobilized squadrons, leaving in exchange older horses behind, which is again an advantage for the training of the recruits destined hereafter to join us at the front. I cannot too earnestly warn against the taking of all the old horses into the field. No man can foretell how great the losses will be, but that they will be great admits of no doubt whatever. Nor is it at all certain that future Wars will be of short duration; on the contrary, they may drag on for a very long time. Hence it is absolutely indispensable that suitable horses for recruit training should be left behind, even if the marching out strength per squadron should be reduced by a file or two—it cannot be many in any case. For the rest, the quicker and better training of the recruits will be all to the good in case of War breaking out, as one will be able to detail men for the field squadrons towards the close of the winter season—i.e., some weeks sooner than under the old system; and finally the proposed procedure brings with it an enormous gain of time in the training of the whole arm.

To begin with, we gain in winter the months from the middle of February to the beginning of the Drill Season (April). This time can be devoted to direct training for the demands War must make upon us. We can practise again, and confirm the men in the fundamental principle of dressing in motion, the exact squareness of the horses to the alignment and rallying, with which one had already commenced in the early months of winter, before being driven into the schools by frost and snow; and, further, take advantage of fine days and similar circumstances to practise men in taking jumps, scrambling, etc., the development of the regulation drill gallop (fifteen miles an hour), whilst still maintaining the control and standard of equitation for which the school training is specially adapted. The winter exercises in field service duties, which, as long as they are allowed constantly to interrupt the formal lessons in equitation, do more harm than good, can be postponed to this period, when the recruits will now be able to take part in them—a point of essential importance in case War breaks out. Above all, the time thus saved must be devoted to individual riding and single combat.

Our Regulations (Sections 129 and 324) lay special stress on this latter point, and in most regiments it is constantly practised. The results, however, are sometimes questionable, and many Squadron Commanders are of opinion that such training can be overdone. Nor is this view without foundation. If single combats are carried out in the regulation way on imperfectly broken horses, the horse is not only spoilt, but the rider also, and a clumsy rider will very soon make a good horse hard in the mouth and refractory.

Now, since we have neither ideal horses nor riders at our disposal, there is much danger in overdoing these exercises, because the method of their execution is often thoroughly unpractical. The combatants ride round one another in unnatural circles, one retreats, the other pursues, and both tear at their horses' mouths to turn them sharply about, all things which, except the latter, they never do in action.

Nor should we overlook the really imminent danger which lies in teaching the men to run away before an opponent. Few of them are 'Horatios,' and if, in fact, they once turn about, it is, to say the least, highly problematical whether, in a real fight, they will ever stop again. In the field matters are very different. If one has but one adversary, one tries to ride him down, and, if unsuccessful, then after one turn about both get locked together, turning only on the fore hand; and the man who turns a second time can only trust to the speed of his horse—he has given up the fight.

Such duels are rare indeed; in most engagements the man fights between crowds of his own comrades and the other side, in wild confusion, under clouds of dust. He must attack at one moment to the right, at the next to the left, and guard himself. The essential here is not so much the skilful use of the lance, as complete command over the horse, and the determination to kill, which must rise to the height of fanaticism. He who can twist and turn his horse by his weight alone, without dragging at its mouth, whose arm does not tire, and who can make sure of striking what he aims at, even at speed, and with the energy born of hatred, thinking only of destroying his enemy, never on retreating—he alone can hope to remain the conqueror; but such a one very soon learns all that is practical in the use of sword or lance.

The exercises in single combats, therefore, must be based mainly on preparatory practice, intended to strengthen the arm, give command of the weapon, heighten the man's energy, and, above all, aim at securing the most perfect harmony between man and horse by constant exercise in those forms of individual riding which are really needed in the fight: the rapid turning about of the horse; serpentining between, and cutting and thrusting at, different objects in varying directions, as far as possible without reins, and never according to a prescribed formula.

The actual combats between squads should follow only when considerable excellence in these preliminary exercises has been attained—i.e., for recruits—about the end of the summer, before the manoeuvres; and they should always be kept down to the lowest limits, and then only carried out in thoroughly practical form—i.e., between squads, and not larger detachments. I believe that in this way a far higher standard will be reached, and with less damage to the horses than is possible under existing conditions, in which one generally begins with single combats, man against man, at the very commencement of the drill season. In any case, we shall at least obtain this advantage—that the work to be done in the latter will be materially reduced if the exercises I have suggested are begun already in the winter months.

The more the men have learnt to ride with a light hand on the bit, the greater command they possess over their lances—thanks to more constant practice—and the more thoroughly they have been grounded in the principles of direction, pace, alignment, and rallying. Further, the more quietly the horses move—and even at rapid paces have learnt to carry their heads not too high, with a firm bearing on the reins—the easier it will be for the Commander to drill his squadron, and to eliminate all the plunging and surging in movement which is fatal to all excellence in manoeuvring.

The drill season can thus be cut down, and the time thus saved devoted to field service practices and riding across country, because the whole system, thanks to this considerable saving of time it effects, enables one to extend the education of man and horse over the whole year instead of confining it to the winter months.

Though every efficient squadron possesses a considerable number of horses that do not require six months' practice in 'shouldering in,' and in 'collected paces,' on the other hand, everyone has some horses that do urgently need 're-making,' but which one has to entrust to inferior riders, because the better ones are all needed for the remounts and young horses.

This is a consequence of the whole system in which the training of the horses and of the men eventually react on one another. There will be remounts which need correction, and horses ridden by recruits to be cured of acquired bad habits; and on my system there will now be time and opportunity to hand these over, say from the beginning of February, to non-commissioned officers and the better riders, either by forming them in a special squad or entrusting them to individuals, and the process of re-making the horses can be continued throughout the whole summer, for now there will be ample time.

On the importance of this latter point I would especially insist. If this work of equitation ceases for the whole summer, and the difficult horses are kept incessantly at drill and field service, it is inevitable that their defects will develop and become more firmly fixed; hence one will never get a good average of well-broken horses in the ranks. That some of them must always be taken for drill goes without saying; but the point is, that from February onwards, and throughout the summer, they should be constantly taken in hand and corrected by good riders. If this idea is applied with thoroughgoing energy, particularly with the young horses—even if it entails at first a diminution in the number of files on parade—the number of difficult horses in the squadron will soon show a most encouraging diminution.

To all these advantages there comes yet another, to my mind even more important. According to established custom, after the inspection in riding on the bit which forms the conclusion of the winter's training, the whole squadron is completely reformed before it begins the drills. The new exercises in unaccustomed surroundings are begun by the men on strange horses, to which they have had no opportunity to accustom themselves. This drawback can be obviated, if the squadron is definitely made up already in February—i.e., after the close of the purely equitation course. The men can now ride the same horses in the school on the drill-ground, and in the country, which they are to retain throughout the summer, and the squadron will commence the drill season with much steadier ranks than would otherwise be the case, particularly if its Commander understands how to make the most of all the advantages his good methods and well-broken horses secure for him by changing them about individually as circumstances require.

Much, no doubt, may be urged against this proposal, and the expert will hardly need my assistance to recognise the difficulties that await him. But they can be overcome, and their advantages thus secured—and these seem to me the essential points—enormously outweigh the minor troubles that follow in their train.

I do not believe that either thorough or essential changes are needed in our Regulations to adapt them to the principles I have developed. All that is important is that we should definitely break with the routine of the several courses and inspections.

To constitute a framework, not with a view of developing a fresh network of red tape, I here submit an outline programme of the time-table I suggest, so far as concerns the equitation and the training of the horses in their several periods.

Commencement of Remount training, at the latest, the end of July. It is worth consideration whether the young horses could not be sent to the Regiments even earlier.

Inspection of recruits on the bridoon, and of the Second Ride Second Class shortly before Christmas.

Inspection of the second year's remounts on the bit of the whole of the remount training squads, and of the recruits, concluding with the latter and Second Ride Second Class about the middle of February. Then constitution of the squadron to meet the requirements of the coming drill season.

End of March, or beginning of April, bridoon inspection of the young remounts, in which generally side-paces, collected canter, and the canter and change, may be demanded.

Inspection of the squadron in 'Military riding' (i.e., with arms, and on the curb); preparatory exercises for single combat, thrusting at targets, regulation gallop, riding in the ranks, together with a careful investigation of the teaching received in the school. Inspection of all difficult horses.

Shortly before the manoeuvres, inspection of the young remounts on the bit. Inspection of the second year remounts in 'rides' (at the same time note their condition after the drill). Inspection of the difficult horses.

Inspection of single combats.

If one tries, naturally with due regard to local and climatic variations, to adapt the course of training to this plan of inspection, and endeavours to arrange that every man, if only for a few minutes every day, should practise lance exercises to develop his hand and arm, that he should ride every day individually, and every difficult horse should be taken in hand and corrected at once; that the principles of dressing, alignment, and of wheeling, are daily impressed on the men in the school, as I have already indicated; and, if further, wherever it is in any way possible, the men are exercised in boldly riding across country—for which purpose funds to cover possible damage to crops, etc., must be provided by the authorities—then I believe, and base my belief on the result of my practical experience, that not only will a higher standard of training for specifically military purposes be attained, but also a considerable improvement in equitation.

It will be worth while here to add a few words on the methods of training the horses I recommend, for it is precisely on this point that ideas so often divide, and the most opposite views on this subject find their expression in current literature. To stir up all these controversies is not my object, but I want to state quite generally that it is under all circumstances a downright evil to try to follow out any theoretical system to its logical development, whether the one selected be that of Captain Plinzner[24] or another's. We have neither such a uniform type of horse nor sufficiently skilled riders as to be able to employ the same method to all indiscriminately.

[Footnote 24: Captain Plinzner was Equerry to H.M. the Emperor, and is author of a well-known work on equitation.]

We must exercise our powers of selection, and find the best method to meet the idiosyncrasies of each man and each horse, always keeping in mind the aim to be obtained. What we want are horses that can use their back muscles, especially in the gallop, with pliable necks, light on the hand, able to turn easily, and safe across country (with special reference to rat-holes, etc., not fences), that do not refuse to quit the ranks, and are not headstrong. To reach this aim with our material, our present riding instructions applied in their spirit, not their letter, are for the present, I think, a sufficiently firm foundation.

A higher standard of riding alone will not, however, suffice. We have seen that modern War makes also increased demands on the endurance of the horses, and, in fact, in two directions: first, on their marching power, and secondly, on their capacity to execute the long gallops at the regulation pace which are indispensable for the manoeuvring of large masses and of attacks against modern firearms. That a thorough physical preparation of the horse increases indirectly its endurance has been already pointed out, and when exceptional exertions are called for, breeding plays a great part; but great as is the influence of these two factors, the ultimate foundation on which the endurance of our horses depends is the general 'condition' of the animal, and this again is a consequence of the quality of his food and his 'training,' used here in the same sense as in a racing stable. I lay special stress on this question of food, because great demands, both in the way of covering long distances and on the drill ground, can only be met without injury to the horses if they are supplied with a sufficient quantity of nourishment, and our peace-time ration is undoubtedly too small to satisfy this condition. No regiment could maintain itself always at the high pitch of condition we have undoubtedly attained if it did not have recourse to all manner of expedients to increase, at any rate for the time, the amount of the ration. Of these expedients there are quite an imposing number, and since, however desirable an increase of the ration may be, we are not likely to obtain it, it seems to me well worth while to develop them to the utmost.

How this is to be done will depend mainly on the local conditions of each garrison. The point is to make the most of the opportunities each locality offers, and as an example it may be of interest to give my personal experience on this head.

Thanks to the confidence reposed in me by my General and to his liberality, I was allowed to draw the equivalent of sixty rations of oats per day and per squadron in cash, and to handle this money to the best of my judgment.

Since peas, beans, and white American maize—the yellow Hungarian quality is generally considered inferior—were ninepence to one shilling cheaper per hundredweight than oats, I laid in a stock of them, and was able to give not only an increased weight of ration, but one of considerably greater nutritive value. Thus I gained the double advantage, not only of not being compelled to stint the corn ration in winter in order to save up for the harder work of the summers, but I was able to increase even the winter ration itself. This I consider an essential gain, for horses that after the winter season are well fed and in their full condition are equal to far higher exertions than those which have been kept low, and then fed up for perhaps a very short time before the increased strain is thrown upon them.

The food was thus divided: After the manoeuvres, in cases where an increased ration was required, American maize was issued, and the ration improved by half a pound. From about Christmas-time onwards peas and beans were served out, and the amount increased until midway through the Squadron drills, after which it was kept at the same level until the manoeuvres. In the end it amounted to the equivalent of 15 pounds of oats, which can be considered as the normal scale for our medium and light Cavalry horses. The peas and beans were soaked for twelve hours, the water being twice changed during this time to prevent their turning sour.

During the manoeuvres, according to circumstances, I laid down at suitable points in the district stores of forage, or gave the Squadron Commanders money with which to supply themselves locally, and thus was able to keep up the increase in the ration during the greater part of this trying period.

The experiment was continued for nearly two years, and its results were astonishingly satisfactory. Not only did the visible condition of the horses develop markedly, and maintain itself throughout the greatest exertions, both during the manoeuvres and the Divisional exercises, but in spite of increased performances the numbers of breakdowns and cases of lameness sensibly diminished; the paces were fresher; in short, the material improved most noticeably. Are not these breakdowns, lameness, and dulness in the horses, in the great majority of cases but the consequences of over-exertion of the animals when in a low state of condition? The cases of colic, too, diminished rather than increased, which speaks well for the harmlessness of the foods employed, but may in part also have been due to the fact that both the bulk of the ration and the amount of exertion demanded were only gradually diminished after the manoeuvres.

The experiment also showed that most horses would not touch the white beans at all, or only unwillingly, and the best proved to be either the green Smyrna or brown Dutch beans, which for the same weight and nutritive value bulked bigger, for instance, than the peas, and were very willingly eaten. Peas and beans as a ration alone were found not to answer, as the horse misses the mechanical action—irritation of the bowel and stomach—and requires also certain chemical constituents present in oats to assist digestion. Even with the proportion of oats and beans actually used—seventy-six to seventy-eight oats to sixty beans—it was found advisable to increase the 'Rauffutter' ration to replace the missing oat-husks. But to provide this addition there were ample means, since the manure fund of the regiment, or of the squadron, was available; and in spite of the increased ration it became possible to make savings which in a single year sufficed to build a spacious riding-school, and thus contributed in another way to the training and general efficiency of the squadrons.

In the third year the price of oats fell, and that of the other feed rose; hence, and for other reasons also, the conversion of the oat ration into other more nourishing materials had to be abandoned, although it would still have been possible to maintain a considerable increase in the nutritive value of the food issued. To keep the ration up to approximately the same level as in the preceding year, recourse had to be had to other means.

It was found by experiment that a couple of pounds of straw per horse could easily be saved per day, and again ample funds for a supplement to the ration were available, a measure particularly applicable when the price of straw rules high. This year, too, as the expenditure on the riding-school was closed, the manure fund was also available, and the horses did nearly as well as before.

I would not maintain that similar results are everywhere obtainable. The price of grains varies; the receipts from manure are everywhere different; in some garrisons peas and beans are difficult to obtain; the cost of transport also fluctuates. But all this is no reason why we should not seize an advantage even if we cannot always retain it. Even a few years of more and better food bring about an improvement in the horses, which lasts for a considerable time, and every effort, therefore, should be made to obtain these advantages offered by price variations whenever it is possible to do so.

It is well to call attention to the fact that to accustom horses to the most varied food—rye, barley, wheat, etc.—is part of their indispensable training for War, where such foods are all they can get, as the experience of our last War sufficiently demonstrated. To this end it is necessary—and I wish particularly to insist upon this point—that our Regimental Commanders should have the utmost latitude of action within certain fixed limits, and should not be dependent on the consideration of the Commissariat, with its innumerable regulations and formal considerations. I consider the objection sometimes urged against me that in the purchase of supplementary foods by the Regimental Commander there would be an opening for fraud and speculation on the part of under officials quite untenable, for a proper system of audit and check could be quite easily devised.

The capacity of the Commander to manage affairs in a businesslike manner can hardly be called in question, and his interest in the matter would grow in proportion to the degree of freedom allowed to him.

Next in importance to the question of food comes the preparation of the horses for efforts of long duration. That this preparation must go hand in hand with the food question is obvious, but apart from this interdependence, it is not possible to keep horses always up to the necessary standard of endurance; for this training not only throws heavy strains on the muscles, joints, and sinews, but on the nervous system of the animal, and in particular attacks the nerves of the stomach if maintained too long. If one wishes to preserve one's material, the horses must be allowed from time to time a thorough rest, during which their feeding must enable them to put on the degree of fat which is requisite for health.

The best time for this rest is about Christmas, during which one can reduce the work to the very minimum, and feed with 'Rastfutter' hay, maize, malt—dried brewer's—molasses, even potatoes; and also, after reaching the highest points of the training for galloping, there must be a certain relaxation of the strain to give the nerves time to recuperate.

Generally, the course of training must be conducted from the standpoint of what War demands, and never allowed to assume the characteristics of the racing stable, for the purposes of the two are entirely distinct, and this is particularly the case with regard to the gallop.

It is precisely in this respect that the necessities of War are not always seen with sufficient clearness.

We obtain from our troops by means of most careful preparation quite remarkable performances in galloping. I have myself seen whole regiments cover 8,800 yards (5 miles) at the regulation gallop, and the horses at the end of it had still both strength and wind to increase the pace. On such and similar performances we then base our tactical exercises both for the Brigade and Division, and many horses are sacrificed as a consequence. Now, I am the last man to suggest that accurate drill at the gallop is not the crowning work of all tactical education, but it must be accomplished under War conditions, and it cannot be too persistently insisted on that all these tactical pictures and the deductions founded thereon, which we attain in the manner indicated, have practically nothing to do with real War at all.

In these peace exercises we usually ride with considerably less than field service weights, on specially selected and favourable ground, and on specially trained horses. All these conditions are wanting in War. Then horses must carry their full marching-order kit, and generally they will be entirely lacking in specific training for this fast kind of work. The ordinary pace on the march and patrol is the marching trot; only single patrols have now and again to gallop, the troops as a whole only on the rare occasions when a charge has actually to be delivered. Then, the carefully-selected conditions of the drill ground are generally lacking; and, finally, in all War strength squadrons there are always some augmentation horses and remounts, whose weaknesses must be taken into account if they are not to be broken down at the very beginning of operations, as too often happened in 1870, in which case it would have been better to have left them behind from the first. Thus the galloping possibilities are reduced most considerably, and it is only with these reduced possibilities that the Leader can safely reckon.

That these conditions have a most important influence on tactics is apparent. The question is whether it is worth while to strain towards false ideals, at a considerable cost in horseflesh, when in War they are quite unattainable, and only serve to call up in men's minds false pictures of the reality.

To this I return an unqualified negative. Certainly, it is indisputable that the horses must be trained to gallop for long distances and in suitable poise, and that men should learn to retain a correct seat even in gallops of long duration; that they should have their horses under complete control, and learn to turn and check by the use of the weight of their bodies; but these demands can only be satisfied by continuous practice under conditions which render control over the poise both of man and horse comparatively easy to maintain—that is to say, singly on the galloping track or in squads, and also as closed tactical units.

Speaking generally, however, such exercises do not need to be extended materially beyond the limit which can be attained by horses not specifically trained to galloping under full marching order weights.

This limit depends on the degree of breeding, the strength and condition of the horses, and may be estimated at the most at two and a half miles for our Light Cavalry, and somewhat less for the Cuirassiers. To exceed these distances seems both superfluous and injurious, particularly when it goes so far as to risk permanent depreciation of the material.

It is far more important, in my opinion, to habituate the horses to gallop with their full marching order weights, under service conditions, and in all kinds of ground; for nothing is more difficult than to preserve the proper rates of movement and keep the ranks closed under such circumstances, as experience even in the manoeuvres abundantly shows.