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But how could the pathological phase of nationalism be ended? His first Tory advisers suggested the old trick of making converts, but the practice had long since been found useless. His next speculation was whether the French could be made to take sides as Liberals or Tories, apart altogether from nationalist considerations. But the political solidarity of the French had been a kind of trades-unionism, claiming to guard French interests against an actual menace to their very existence as a nation within the empire; and they were certain to act only with Baldwin and his friends, the one party which had regarded them as other than traitors or suspects, or at best tools.

No complete solution of the problem was possible; but when Elgin surrendered to the progressives, he was making concessions also to the French—by admitting them to a recognized place within the constitution, and doing so without reservation. The joint ministry of La Fontaine and Baldwin was, in a sense, the most satisfactory answer that could be made to the difficulty. From the moment of its creation Elgin and Canada were safe. He remained doubtful during part of 1848, for Papineau had been elected by acclamation to the Parliament which held its first session that year; and he "had {213} searched in vain ... through the French organs of public opinion for a frank and decided expression of hostility to the anti-British sentiments propounded in Papineau's address."[27] He did not at first understand that La Fontaine, not Papineau, was the French leader, and that the latter represented only himself and a few Rouges of violent but unsubstantial revolutionary opinions. Nevertheless, he gave his French ministers his confidence, and he applied his singular powers of winning men to appeasing French discontent. As early as May, 1848, he saw how the land lay—that French Canada was fundamentally conservative, and that discontent was mainly a consequence of sheer stupidity and error on the part of England. "Who will venture to say," he asked, "that the last hand which waves the British flag on American ground may not be that of a French Canadian?"[28]

His final settlement of the question came in 1849, and the introduction of that Rebellion Losses Bill which has been already mentioned. The measure was, in the main, an act of justice to French sufferers from the disturbances created by the Rebellion; for they had naturally shared but slightly {214} in earlier and partial schemes of compensation; and the opposition to the bill was directed quite frankly against the French inhabitants of Canada as traitors, who deserved, not recompense, but punishment. Now there were many cases of real hardship, like that of the inhabitants of St. Benoit, a village which Sir John Colborne had pledged himself to protect when he occupied it for military purposes, but which, in his absence, the loyalist volunteers had set on fire and destroyed. The inhabitants might be disloyal, but in the eyes of an equal justice a wrong had been done, and must be righted. The idea of the bill was not new—it was not Elgin's bill; and if his predecessors had been right, then the French politicians were justified in claiming that the system of compensation already initiated must be followed till all legitimate claims had been met.

It would be disingenuous to deny that Elgin calculated on the pacific influence which his support of the bill would exert in Lower Canada. "I was aware of two facts," he told Grey in 1852: "Firstly, that M. La Fontaine would be unable to retain the support of his countrymen if he failed to introduce a measure of this description; and secondly, that my refusal would be taken by him and his friends {215} as a proof that they had not my confidence." But his chief concern was to hold the balance level, to redress an actual grievance, and to repress the fury of Canadian Tories whose unrestrained action would have flung Canada into a new and complicated struggle of races and parties. "I am firmly convinced," he told Grey in June, speaking of American election movements at this time, "that the only thing which prevented an invasion of Canada was the political contentment prevailing among the French Canadians and Irish Catholics"; and that political contentment was the result of Elgin's action in supporting his ministers. A happy chance, utilized to the full by Elgin's cautious wisdom, had enabled him to do the French what they counted a considerable service; and the rage and disorder of the opposition only played the more surely into the hands of the governor-general, and established, beyond any risk of alteration, French loyalty to him personally.[29]

From that day, with trivial intervals or incidents of misunderstanding, the British and the French in Canada have played the political game together. It was in the La Fontaine-Baldwin ministry that {216} the joint action, within the Canadian parties, of the two races had its real beginning; and while the traditions and idiosyncrasies of Quebec were too ingrained and fundamental to admit of modification beyond a certain point, Canadian parliamentary life was henceforth based on the free co-operation of French and English, in a party system which tried to forget the distinction of race. From this time, too, Elgin began to discern the conservative genius of the French people, and to prophesy that, when Baldwin's moderate reforming influence should have been withdrawn, the French would naturally incline to unite with the moderate Conservatives—the combination on which, in actual fact, John A. Macdonald based his long control of power in Canada.

The nationalist question is so intermingled with the constitutional that it is not always easy to separate the two issues. The same qualities which settled the latter difficulty ended also French grievances—saving common-sense which did not refuse to do the obvious thing; bonhomie which understood that a well-mannered people may be wooed from its isolation by a little humouring; a mind resolute to administer to every British subject equal rights; and an austere refusal to let an {217} arrogant and narrow-minded minority claim to itself a kind of oligarchic glory at the expense of citizens who did not belong to the Anglo-Saxon stock.

There is a third aspect of Elgin's work in Canada of wider scope than either of those already mentioned, and one in which his claims to distinction have been almost forgotten—his contribution to the working theory of the British Empire. Elgin was one of those earlier sane imperialists whose achievements it is very easy to forget. It is not too much to say that, when Elgin came to Canada, the future of the British colonial empire was at best gloomy. Politicians at home had placed in front of themselves an awkward dilemma. According to the stiffer Tories, the colonies must be held in with a firm hand—how firm, Stanley had illustrated in his administration of Canada. Yet Tory stiffness produced colonial discontent, and colonial discontent bred very natural doubts at home as to the possibility of holding the colonies by the old methods. On the other hand, there were those, like Cobden, who, while they believed with the Tories that colonial home-rule was certain to result in colonial independence, were nevertheless too loyal to their doctrine of political liberty to resist colonial claims. They looked to an immediate but {218} peaceful dissolution of the empire. It seemed never to strike anyone but a few radicals, like Durham and Buller, that Britons still held British sentiments, even across the seas, and that they desired to combine a continuance of the British connection with the retention of all those popular rights in government which they had possessed at home. A Canadian governor-general, then, had to deal with British Cabinets which alternated between foolish rigour and foolish slackness, and with politicians who reflected little on the responsibilities of empire, when they flung before careless British audiences irresponsible discussions on colonial independence—as if it were an academic subject and not a critical issue.

Elgin had imperial difficulties, all his own, to make his task more complicated. Not only were there French and Irish nationalists ready for agitation, but the United States lay across the southern border; and annexation to that mighty and flourishing republic seemed to many the natural euthanasia of British rule in North America. Peel's sweeping reforms in the tariff had rekindled annexationist talk; for while Lord Stanley's bill of 1843 had attracted all the produce of the west to the St. Lawrence by its grant of preference to the {219} colony, "Peel's bill of 1846 drives the whole of the produce down the New York channels of communication ... ruining at once mill-owners, forwarders and merchants."[30] And every petty and personal disappointment, every error in colonial office administration, raised a new group to cry down the British system, and to call for a peaceful junction with the United States.

Elgin had not been long in Canada before he saw one important fact—that the real annexationist feeling had commercial, not political roots. Without diminishing the seriousness of the situation, the discovery made it more susceptible of rational treatment. A colony suffering a severe set-back in trade found the precise remedy it looked for in transference of its allegiance. "The remedy offered them," wrote Elgin, "is perfectly definite and intelligible. They are invited to form part of a community which is neither suffering nor free-trading ... a community, the members of which have been within the last few weeks pouring into their multifarious places of worship, to thank God that they are exempt from the ills which affect other men, from those more especially which affect their despised neighbours, the inhabitants of North {220} America, who have remained faithful to the country which planted them."[31] With free-trade in the ascendant, and, to the maturest minds of the time, unanswerably sound in theory, Elgin had to dismiss schemes of British preference from his mind; and, towards the end of his rule, when American policy was irritating Canada, he had even to restrict the scope within which Canadian retaliation might be practised. There could be no imperial Zollverein. But he saw that a measure of reciprocity might give the Canadians all the economic benefits they sought, and yet leave to them the allegiance and the government which, in their hearts, they preferred. The annexationist clamour fell and rose, mounting highest in Montreal, and reaching a crisis in the year of the Rebellion Losses disturbance; but Elgin, while sometimes he grew despondent, always kept his head, and never ceased to hope for the reciprocity which would at once bring back prosperity and still the disloyal murmurs. Once or twice, when the annexationists were at their worst, and when his Tory opponents chose support of that disloyal movement as the means of insulting their governor, he took stern measures for repressing an unnatural evil. "We intend," {221} he wrote in November, 1849, after an annexation meeting at which servants of the State had been present, "to dismiss the militia officers and magistrates who have taken part in these affairs, and to deprive the two Queen's Counsels of their silk gowns." But he relied mainly on the positive side of his policy, and few statesmen have given Canada a more substantial boon than did Elgin when, just before his recall, he went to Washington on that mission which Laurence Oliphant has made classic by his description, and concluded by far the most favourable commercial treaty ever negotiated by Britain with the United States.

There is perhaps a tendency to underestimate the work of his predecessors and assistants in preparing the way, but no one can doubt that it was Elgin's persistence in urging the treaty on the home Cabinet, and his wonderful diplomatic gifts, which ultimately won the day. Oliphant, certainly, had no doubt as to his chief's share in the matter. "He is the most thorough diplomat possible—never loses sight for a moment of his object, and while he is chaffing Yankees, and slapping them on the back, he is systematically pursuing that object";[32] and again, "There was concluded in {222} exactly a fortnight a treaty, to negotiate which had taxed the inventive genius of the Foreign Office, and all the conventional methods of diplomacy, for the previous seven years."[33]

It was a long, slow process by which Elgin restored the tone of Canadian loyalty. Frenchmen who had dreamed of renouncing allegiance he won by his obvious fairness, and the recognition accorded by him to their leaders. He took the heart out of Irish disaffection by his popular methods and love of liberty. Tory dissentients fell slowly in to heel, as they found their governor no lath painted to look like iron, but very steel. To desponding Montreal merchants his reciprocity treaty yielded naturally all they had expected from a more drastic change. It is true that, owing to untoward circumstances, the treaty lasted only for the limited period prescribed by Elgin; but it tided over an awkward interval of disaffection and disappointment.

He did more, however, than cure definite phases of Canadian disaffection; his influence through Earl Grey told powerfully for a fuller and more optimistic conception of empire. With all its virtues, the bureaucracy of the Colonial Office did not understand the government of colonies such {223} as Canada; and where colonial secretaries had the ability and will, they had not knowledge sufficient to lead them into paths at once democratic and imperial. Even Grey relapsed on occasion from the optimism which empire demands of its statesmen. It was not simply that he emphasized the wrong points—military and diplomatic issues, which in Canada were minor and even negligible matters; but at times he seemed prepared to believe that the days of the connection were numbered.[34]

In 1848 he had impaled himself on the horns of one of those dilemmas which present themselves so frequently to absentee governments and secretaries of state—either reciprocity and an Americanized colony, or a new rebellion as the consequence of a refusal in Britain to consent to a reciprocity treaty.[35] In 1849, "looking at these indications of the state of feeling in Canada, and at the equally significant indications as to the feeling of the House of Commons respecting the value of our colonies," he had begun to despair of their retention.[36] But there were greater sinners than those of the Colonial Office. While Elgin {224} was painfully removing all the causes of trouble in Canada, and proving without argument, but in deeds, that the British connection represented normal conditions for both England and Canada, politicians insisted on making foolish speeches. At last, an offence by the Prime Minister himself drove Elgin into a passion unusual in so equable a mind, and which, happily, he expressed in the best of all his letters. "I have never been able to comprehend why, elastic as our constitutional system is, we should not be able, now more especially when we have ceased to control the trade of our colonies, to render the links which bind them to the British Crown at least as lasting as those which unite the component parts of the Union.... You must renounce the habit of telling the colonies that the colonial is a provisional existence.... Is the Queen of England to be the sovereign of an empire, growing, expanding, strengthening itself from age to age, striking its roots deep into fresh earth and drawing new supplies of vitality from virgin soils? Or is she to be for all essential purposes of might and power monarch of Great Britain and Ireland merely, her place and that of her land in the world's history determined by the productiveness of 12,000 square miles of a coal {225} formation which is being rapidly exhausted, and the duration of the social and political organization over which she presides dependent on the annual expatriation, with a view to its eventual alienization, of the surplus swarm of her born subjects?"[37] That is the final question of imperialism; and Elgin had earned the right not only to put it to the home government with emphasis, but also to answer it in an affirmative and constructive sense.

The argument forbids any mention of the less public episodes in Elgin's Canadian adventure; his whimsical capacity for getting on with men, French, British, and American; the sly humour of his correspondence with his official chief; the searching comments made by him on men and manners in America; the charm of such social and diplomatic incidents as Laurence Oliphant has related in his letters and his Episodes in a Life of Adventure. But it may be permitted to sum up his qualities as governor, and to connect his work with the general movement towards self-government which had been proceeding so rapidly since 1839.

He was too human, easy, unclassical, and, on {226} the other hand, too little touched with Byronic or revolutionary feeling, even to suggest the age of Pitt, Napoleon, Canning; he was too sensible, too orthodox, too firmly based on fact and on the past, to have any affinity with our own transitionary politics. Like Peel, although in a less degree, he had at once a firm body of opinions, a keen eye for new facts, and a sure, slow capacity for bringing the new material to bear on old opinion.

He was able, as few have been, to set the personal equation aside in his political plans, holding the balance between friends and foes with almost uncanny fairness, and astonishing his petty enemies by his moderation. His mind could regard not merely Canada but also Britain, as it reflected on future policy; and, in his letters, he sometimes seems the one man in the empire at the time who understood the true relation of colonial autonomy to British supremacy. Not even his most foolish eulogist will attribute anything romantic to his character. There was nothing of Disraeli's "glitter of dubious gems" about the honest phrases in which he bade Russell think imperially. Unlike Mazzini, it was his business to destroy false nationalism, not to exalt that which was true, and {227} for that cool business the glow and fervour of prophecy were not required. We like to see our leaders standing rampant, and with sulphurous, or at least thundery, backgrounds. But Elgin's ironic Scottish humour forbade any pose, and it was his business to keep the cannon quiet, and to draw the lightning harmless to the ground. The most heroic thing he did in Canada was to refrain from entering Montreal at a time when his entrance must have meant insult, resistance, and bloodshed, and he bore quietly the taunts of cowardice which his enemies flung at his head.

He was far too clear-sighted to think that statesmanship consists in decisions between very definitely stated alternatives of right and wrong. "My choice," he wrote in characteristic words, "was not between a clearly right and clearly wrong course—how easy is it to deal with such cases, and how rare are they in life—but between several difficulties. I think I chose the least."[38] His kindly, shrewd, and honest countenance looks at us from his portraits with no appeal of sentiment or pathos. He asked of men that which they find it most difficult to give—moderation, common-sense, a willingness to look at both sides, and to {228} subordinate their egoisms to a wider good; and he was content to do without their worship.

It is now possible to summarize the movement towards autonomy so far as it was affected by the governors-general of the transition period.

The characteristic note in the earlier stages had been the domination of the governor-general's mind by a clear-cut theory—that of Lord John Russell. That theory was in itself consistent, and of a piece with the rest of the constitution; and its merits stood out more clearly because Canadian progressives had an unfortunate faculty for setting themselves in the wrong—making party really appear as faction, investing self-government with something of the menace of independence, and treating the responsibility they sought in the most irresponsible way. The British theory, too, as guaranteeing a definitely British predominance in Canada, brought into rather lurid relief the mistaken fervour of French-Canadian nationalism.

Yet Sydenham, who never consciously, or at least openly, surrendered one detail of the system entrusted to him by Russell, found events too much for him; and that which conquered Sydenham's resolution made short work of any resistance Bagot may have dreamed of offering. Metcalfe was wrong {229} in suspecting a conscious intention in Sydenham's later measures, but he was absolutely right when he wrote, "Lord Sydenham, whether intending it or not, did concede Responsible Government practically, by the arrangements which he adopted, although the full extent of the concession was not so glaringly manifested during his administration as in that of his successor."[39]

Canadian conditions were, in fact, evolving for themselves a new system—Home Rule with its limits and conditions left as vague as possible—and that new system contradicted the very postulates of Russell's doctrine. It was only when the system of Russell became incarnate in a governor, Lord Metcalfe, and when the opposing facts also took personal form in the La Fontaine-Baldwin ministry, that both in Canada and Britain men came to see that two contradictory policies faced each other, and that one or other alternative must be chosen. To Elgin fell the honour not merely of seeing the need to choose the Canadian alternative, but also of recognizing the conditions under which the new plan would bring a deeper loyalty, and a more lasting union with Britain, as well as political content to Canada.



[1] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 24 February, 1847. It would be wrong to call Cathcart the "acting governor-general"; yet apart from military matters that term describes his position in civil matters not inadequately.

[2] Walrond, Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin, p. 424. "During a public service of twenty-five years I have always sided with the weaker party."

[3] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey on Grey's Colonial Policy, 8 October, 1852.

[4] Gladstone to Cathcart, 3 February, 1846. The italics are my own.

[5] W. H. Draper to the Earl Cathcart, in Pope, Life of Sir John Macdonald, i. pp. 43-4.

[6] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 24 February, 1847.

[7] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 26 April, 1847.

[8] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, enclosing a note from Col. Tache, 27 February, 1847.

[9] Ibid.: Elgin to Grey, 28 June, 1847.

[10] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 7 May, 1847.

[11] Ibid.: Elgin to Grey, 27 March, 1847.

[12] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 13 July, 1847.

[13] La Revue Canadienne, 21 December, 1847.

[14] The speech of the governor-general in proroguing Parliament, 1848.

[15] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 22 February, 1848.

[16] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 17 March, 1848.

[17] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 5 February, 1848.

[18] Elgin refers (11 June, 1849) to "military men, most of whom, I regret to say, consider my ministers and myself little better than rebels."

[19] Episodes in a Life of Adventure, p. 57.

[20] The obvious point, made by the Tories in Canada, and by Gladstone in England, was that the new scheme of compensation was certain to recompense many who had actually been in arms in the Rebellion, although their guilt might not be provable in a court of law. See Gladstone in Hansard, 14 June, 1849.

[21] Elgin to Grey, concerning Grey's Colonial Policy, 8 October, 1852. Metcalfe's policy in the matter had really forced Elgin's hand.

[22] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 14 March, 1849.

[23] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 12 April, 1849.

[24] Elgin's letter of 8 October, 1852, criticizing Grey's book. The italics are my own.

[25] Elgin kept very closely in touch with the sentiments of the Canadian press, French and English. See his letters passim.

[26] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 4 May, 1848.

[27] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 7 January, 1848.

[28] Ibid.: Elgin to Grey, 4 May, 1848.

[29] See an interesting reference in a letter to Sir Charles Wood, written from India. Walrond, op. cit. pp. 419-20.

[30] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 16 November, 1848.

[31] Walrond, p. 105.

[32] Mrs. Oliphant, Life of Laurence Oliphant, i. p. 120.

[33] L. Oliphant, Episodes in a Life of Adventure, p. 56.

[34] For Grey's mature position, see below, in Chapter VII.

[35] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Grey to Elgin, 27 July, 1848.

[36] Ibid.: Grey to Elgin, 20 July, 1849.

[37] The letter, which may be found in Walrond's Life of Lord Elgin, pp. 115-20, ought to be read from its first word to its last.

[38] Elgin-Grey Correspondence: Elgin to Grey, 7 October, 1849.

[39] Kaye, Papers and Correspondence of Lord Metcalfe, p. 414.



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CHAPTER VII.

BRITISH OPINION AND CANADIAN AUTONOMY.

While these great modifications were being made in the form and spirit of Canadian provincial government, corresponding changes were taking place in British opinion. In the present chapter, it is proposed to examine these as they operated during the first two decades of the Victorian era. But an examination of early Victorian imperialism demands, as a first condition, the dismissal of such prejudices and misjudgments as are implicit in recent terms like "Little-Englander" and "Imperialist." It is, indeed, one of the objects of this chapter to show how little modern party cries correspond to the ideas prevalent from 1840 to 1860, and to exhibit as the central movement in imperial matters the gradual development of a doctrine for the colonies, and more especially for Canada, not dissimilar to that which dominated the economic theory of the day under the title of laissez faire.

{231}

It is important to limit the scope of the inquiry, for the problem of Canadian autonomy was strictly practical and very pressing. There is little need to exhibit the otiose or irresponsible opinions of men or groups of men, which had no direct influence on events. Little, for example, need be said of the views of the British populace. No doubt Joseph Hume expressed views in which he had many sympathizers throughout the country; but his constituents were too ill-informed on Canadian politics to make their opinions worthy of study; and their heated debates, carried on in mutual improvement societies, had even less influence in controlling the actions of government than had the speeches of their leader in Parliament.[1] After the sensational beginning of the reign in Canada, public opinion directed its attention to Canadian affairs only when fresh sensations offered themselves, and usually exhibited an indifference which was not without its advantages to the authorities. "People here are beginning to forget Canada, which is the best thing they can do," wrote Grey {232} to Elgin after the Rebellion Losses troubles had fallen quiet.

The British press, too, need claim little attention. On the confession of those mainly concerned, it was wonderfully ignorant and misleading on Canadian subjects. Elgin, who was not indifferent to newspaper criticism, complained bitterly of the unfairness and haphazard methods of the British papers, neglecting, as they did, the real issues, and emphasizing irritating but unimportant troubles. "The English press," he wrote, after an important viceregal visit to Boston in 1851, "wholly ignores our proceedings both at Boston and Montreal, and yet one would think it was worth while to get the Queen of England as much cheered in New England as she can be in any part of Old England."[2] Grey in turn had to complain, not merely of indifference, but of misrepresentation, and that too in a crisis in Canadian politics, the Rebellion Losses agitation; "I am misrepresented in The Times in a manner which I fear may do much mischief in Canada. I am reported as having said that the connexion between Canada and this country was drawing rapidly to a close. This is {233} the very opposite of what I really said."[3] How irresponsible and inconsistent a great newspaper could be may be gathered from the treatment by The Times of the Annexationist movement in 1849. Professing at first a calm resignation, it refused for the country "the sterile honour of maintaining a reluctant colony in galling subjection"; yet, shortly afterwards, it took the high imperial line of argument and predicted that "the destined future of Canada, and the disposition of her people" would prevent so unfortunate an ending to the connection.[4] The fact is that in all political questions demanding expert knowledge, newspaper opinion is practically worthless; except in cases where the services of some specialist are called in, and there the expert exercises influence, not through his articles, but because, elsewhere, he has made good his claims to be heard. Canadian problems owed nothing of their solution to the British press.

Another factor, irresponsible and indirect, yet closer to the scene of political action than the press, was assumed in those years to have a great {234} influence on events—the permanent element in the Colonial Office, and more especially the permanent under-secretary, James Stephen. Charles Buller's pamphlet on Responsible Government for the Colonies formulates the charge against the permanent men in a famous satiric passage. Buller had been speaking of the incessant change of ministers in the Colonial Office—ten secretaries of state in little more than so many years. "Perplexed with the vast variety of subjects presented to him—alike appalled by the important and unimportant matters forced on his attention—every Secretary of State is obliged at the outset to rely on the aid of some better informed member of his office. His Parliamentary Under-Secretary is generally as new to the business as himself: and even if they had not been brought in together, the tenure of office by the Under-Secretary having on the average been quite as short as that of the Secretary of State, he has never during the period of his official career obtained sufficient information to make him independent of the aid on which he must have been thrown at the outset. Thus we find both these marked and responsible functionaries dependent on the advice and guidance of another; and that other person must of course be one of the permanent {235} members of the office.... That mother-country which has been narrowed from the British Isles into the Parliament, from the Parliament into the executive government, from the executive government into the Colonial Office, is not to be sought in the apartments of the Secretary of State, or his Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Where you are to look for it, it is impossible to say. In some back-room—whether in the attic, or in what storey we know not—you will find all the mother-country which really exercises supremacy, and really maintains connexion with the vast and widely-scattered colonies of Britain."[5]

The directness and strength of the influence which men like Sir Henry Taylor and Sir James Stephen exercised, both on opinion and events, may be inferred from Taylor's confessions with regard to the slave question in the West Indies, and the extent to which even Peel himself had to depend for information, and occasionally for direction, on the permanent men.[6] It seems clear, too, that up till the year when Lord John Russell took over the Colonial Office, Stephen had a great {236} say in Canadian affairs, especially under Glenelg's regime. "As to his views upon other Colonial questions," says Taylor, "they were perhaps more liberal than those of most of his chiefs; and at one important conjuncture he miscalculated the effect of a liberal confidence placed in a Canadian Assembly, and threw more power into their hands than he intended them to possess."[7] On the assumption that he was responsible for Glenelg's benevolent view of Canadian local rights, one might attribute something of Lord John Russell's over logical and casuistical declarations concerning responsible government to Buller's "Mr. Mother-country." But it is absurd to suppose that Russell's independent mind operated long under any sub-secretarial influence; more especially since the rapid succession of startling events in Canada made his daring and unconventional statesmanship a fitter means of government than the plodding methods of the bureaucrat. After 1841, Stanley and Stephen were too little sympathetic towards each other's methods and ideas, and Gladstone too strongly fortified in his own opinions, for Stephen's influence to creep in; while the Whig government which entered as he left the Colonial Office, had, {237} in Grey, a Secretary of State too learned in the affairs of his department to reflect the last influences of his retiring under-secretary. Whatever, then, Mr. Over-Secretary Stephen did to dominate Lord Glenelg, and to initiate the concession of responsible government to Canada, his influence must speedily have sunk to a very secondary position, and the independent and conscious intentions of the responsible ministers held complete sway. It is interesting to note that, according to his son, he seems to have come to share "the opinions prevalent among the liberal party that the colonies would soon be detached from the mother-country."[8]

The actual starting-point of the development of British opinion with regard to Canadian institutions is perfectly definite. It dates from the co-operation and mutual influence of a little group of experts in colonial matters, of whom Charles Buller and Gibbon Wakefield were the moving spirits, and the Earl of Durham the illustrious mouthpiece. The end of the Rebellion furnished the occasion for their propaganda.

The situation was one peculiarly susceptible to {238} the treatment likely to be proposed by these radical and unconventional spirits. It was difficult to describe the constitutional position of Canada without establishing a contradiction in terms, and neither abstract and logical minds like that of Cornewall Lewis, nor bureaucratic intelligences like Stephen's, could do more than intensify the difficulty and emphasize it. The deus ex machina must appear and solve the preliminary or theoretic difficulties by overriding them. There are some who describe the pioneers of Canadian self-government as philosophic radicals; but they were really not of that school. It was through the absence of any philosophy or rigid logic that they succeeded.

Foremost in the group came Edward Gibbon Wakefield, one of those erratic but creative spirits whose errors are often as profitable to all (save themselves) as their sober acts. It is not here necessary to enter on the details of his emigration system; in that he was, after all, a pioneer in the south and east rather than in the west. But in the stirring years of colonial development, in which Canada, Australia, and New Zealand took their modern form, Wakefield was a leader in constitutional as well as in economic matters, and Canada was favoured not only with his opinions, but with {239} his presence. In the Art of Colonization he entered into some detail on these matters. There was a certain breezy informality about his views, which carried him directly to the heart of the matter. He understood, as few of his contemporaries did, that in all discussions concerning the "connexion," the final argument was sentimental rather than constitutional; and he accepted without further argument the incapacity of Englishmen for being other than English in the politics of their colony. "There would still be hostile parties in a colony," he wrote as he planned reforms, "yes, parties instead of factions: for every colony would have its 'ins' and 'outs,' and would be governed as we are—as every free community must be in the present state of the human mind—by the emulation and rivalries, the bidding against each other for public favour, of the party in power and the party in opposition. Government by party, with all its passions and corruptions, is the price that a free country pays for freedom. But the colonies would be free communities: their internal differences, their very blunders, and their methods of correcting them, would be all their own; and the colonists who possessed capacity for public business would govern in turns far better on the whole than {240} it would be possible for any other set of beings on earth to govern that particular community."[9] He was, then, for a most entire and whole-hearted control by colonists, and especially Canadians, of their own affairs. But when he came to define what these affairs included, he had limits to suggest, and although he was aware of the dangers implicit in such a limitation, he was very emphatic on the need of imperial control in diplomacy and war, and more especially in the administration of land.[10] How practical and sincere were his views on the supremacy of the home government, he proved by supporting, in person and with his pen, Sir Charles Metcalfe in his struggle to limit the claims of local autonomy.

Powerful and suggestive as Wakefield's mind was, he had, nevertheless, to own a master in colonial theory; for the most distinguished, and by far the clearest, view of the whole matter is contained in Charles Buller's Responsible Government for the Colonies, which he published anonymously in 1840. Buller was indeed the ablest of the whole group, and his early death was one of the greatest losses which English politics sustained in the nineteenth {241} century—"an intelligent, clear, honest, most kindly vivacious creature; the genialist Radical I have ever met,"[11] said Carlyle. The ease of his writing and his gift for light satire must not be permitted to obscure the consistency and penetration of his views. Even if Durham contributed more to his Report than seems probable, the view there propounded of the scope of Responsible Government is not nearly so cogent as that of the later pamphlet. Buller, like the other members of his group, believed in the acknowledgment of a supremacy, vested in the mother country, and expressed in control of foreign affairs, inter-colonial affairs, land, trade, immigration, and the like; but outside the few occasions on which these matters called for imperial interference, he was for absolute non-interference, and protested that "that constant reference to the authorities in England, which some persons call responsibility to the mother country, is by no means necessary to insure the maintenance of a beneficial colonial connexion."[12] His originality indeed is best tested by the vigour and truth of his criticisms of the existing administration. First of all representation had been given without {242} executive responsibility. Then for practical purposes the colonists were allowed to make many of their own laws, without the liberty to choose those who would administer them. Then a colonial party, self-styled the party of the connexion, or the loyal party, monopolized office. To Buller the idea of combining a popular representation with an unpopular executive seemed the height of constitutional folly; and, like Wakefield, he understood, as perhaps not five others in England did, the place of party government and popular dictation in colonial constitutional development. "The whole direction of affairs," he said, "and the whole patronage of the Executive practically are at present in the hands of a colonial party. Now when this is the case, it can be of no importance to the mother country in the ordinary course of things, which of these local parties possesses the powers and emoluments of office."[13] Unlike the majority of his contemporaries, he believed in assuming the colonists to be inspired with love for their mother country, common sense, and a regard for their own welfare; and it seemed obvious that men so disposed were infinitely better qualified than the Colonial Office to manage their own affairs. Nothing but evil {243} could result "from the attempt to conduct the internal affairs of the colonies in accordance with the public opinion, not of those colonies themselves, but of the mother country."[14] It may seem a work of supererogation to complete the sketch of this group with an examination of the opinions expressed in Lord Durham's Report; yet that Report is so fundamental a document in the development of British imperial opinion that time must be found to dispel one or two popular illusions.[15] It is a mistake to hold that Durham advocated the fullest concession of local autonomy to Canada. Sir Francis Hincks, a protagonist of Responsible Government, once quoted from the Report sentences which seemed to justify all his claims: "The crown must submit to the necessary consequences of representative institutions, and if it has to carry on the government in union with a representative body, it must consent to carry it on by means of those in whom that representative body has confidence"; and again, "I admit that the system which I propose would in fact place the internal government of the colony in the hands of the {244} colonists themselves, and that we should thus leave to them the execution of the laws of which we have long entrusted the making solely to them."[16] Public opinion in Canada also put this extreme interpretation on the language of the Report.

Yet, as a first modification, it was Lord Metcalfe's confident opinion that the responsibility of ministers to the Assembly for which Durham pled, was not that of a united Cabinet, but rather of departmental heads in individual isolation,[17] and certainly one sentence in the Report can hardly be interpreted otherwise: "This (the change) would induce responsibility for every act of the Government, and, as a natural consequence, it would necessitate the substitution of a system of administration by means of competent heads of departments, for the present rude machinery of an executive council."[18]

In the second place, while Durham did indeed speak of making the colonial executive responsible to a colonial Assembly, he discriminated between the internal government of the colony and its {245} imperial aspect.[19] In practice he modified his gift of home rule, by placing, like Wakefield and Buller, many things beyond the scope of colonial responsibility, for example, "the constitution of the form of government, the regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other British colonies, and foreign nations, and the disposal of the public lands."[20] There is too remarkable a consensus of opinion on this point within the group to leave any doubt as to the intention of Durham and his assistants; that an extensive region should be left subject to strictly imperial supervision. Durham's career ended before his actions could furnish a practical test of his theories, but Buller, like Wakefield, gave a plain statement of what he meant by supporting Metcalfe against his council, at a time when the colonial Assembly seemed to be infringing on imperial rights. "No man," said Buller, of the Metcalfe affair, "could seriously think of saying that in the appointment of every subordinate officer in every county in Canada, the opinion of the Executive Council was to be taken."[21]

{246}

To pass from controversy to certainty, there was one aspect of the Report which made it the most notable deliverance of its authors, and which set that group apart from every other political section in Britain, whether Radical, Whig, or Tory—I mean its robust and unhesitating imperialism. How deeply pessimism concerning the Empire had pervaded all minds at that time, it will be the duty of this chapter to prove, but, in the Report at least, there is no doubt of its authors' desire, "to perpetuate and strengthen the connexion between this Empire and the North American Colonies, which would then form one of the brightest ornaments in your Majesty's Imperial Crown." This confident imperial note, then, was the most striking contribution of the Durham Radicals to colonial development; and the originality and unexpectedness of their confidence gains impressiveness when contrasted with general contemporary opinion.

They contributed, too, in another and less simple fashion, to the constitutional question. Nowhere so clearly as in their writings are both sides of the theoretic contradiction—British supremacy and Canadian autonomy—so boldly stated, and, in spite of the contradiction, so confidently accepted. They would trust implicitly to the sense and {247} feelings, however crude, of the colony: they would surrender the entire control of domestic affairs: they would sanction, as at home, party with all its faults, popular control of the executive, and apparently the decisive influence of that executive in advising the governor in internal affairs. Yet, in the great imperial federation of which they dreamed, they never doubted the right of the mother country to act with overmastering authority in certain crises. That right, and the unquenchable affection of exiles for the land whence they came, constituted for them "the connexion."

These were the views which came to dominate political opinion in Britain, for Molesworth was right when he declared that to Buller and Wakefield, more than to any other persons, was the country indebted for sound views on colonial policy. The interest of the present inquiry lies in tracing the development of these views into something unlike, and distinctly bolder than, anything which these rash and unconventional thinkers had planned.

Whatever might be the shortcomings of the Radical group, the daring of their trust in the colonists stands out in high relief against a background of conservative restriction and distrust. It was natural for the Tories to think of colonies as {248} they did. Under the leadership of North and George III. they had experienced what might well seem to them the natural consequences of the old constitutional system of colonial administration. After 1782 they were disinclined to experiment in Assemblies as free as those of Massachusetts and Connecticut had been. The reaction caused by the French Revolution deepened their distrust of popular institutions; and the war of 1812 quickened their hatred of the United States—the zone of political no less than military danger for Canada. The conquests which they made had given them a second colonial empire, and they had administered that empire with financial generosity and constitutional parsimony, hoping against hope that a fabric so unexpected and difficult as colonial empire might after all disappoint their fears by remaining true to Britain. Developing in spite of themselves, and with the times, they had still learned little and forgotten little. So it was that Sir George Arthur, a Tory governor in partibus infidelium, was driven into panic by Durham's frank criticisms, and expounded to Normanby, his Whig chief, fears not altogether baseless: "The bait of responsible government has been eagerly taken, and its poison is working most mischievously.... {249} The measure recommended by such high authority is the worst evil that has yet befallen Upper Canada":[22] and again, "since the Earl of Durham's Report was published, the reform party, as I have already stated, have come out in greater force—not in favour of the Union, nor of the other measures contemplated by the Bill, that has been sent out to this country, but for the daring object so strenuously advocated by Mackenzie, familiarly denominated responsible government."[23]

The distrust and timidity of Arthur's despatches are shared in by practically the entire Tory party in its dealings with Canada, after the Rebellion. The Duke of Wellington opposed the Union of the provinces, because, among other consequences, "the union into one Legislature of the discontented spirits heretofore existing in two separate Legislatures will not diminish, but will tend to augment, the difficulties attending the administration of the government; particularly under the circumstances of the encouragement given to expect the establishment in the united province of a local responsible administration of government."[24] He {250} was greatly excited when the news of Bagot's concessions arrived. Arbuthnot describes his chief's mood as one of anger and indignation. "What a fool the man must have been," he kept exclaiming, "to act as he has done! and what stuff and nonsense he has written! and what a bother he makes about his policy and his measures, when there are no measures but rolling himself and his country in the mire."[25]

During these years, and until late in 1845, Lord Stanley presided at the Colonial Office. Naturally of an arrogant and unyielding temper, and with something of the convert's fanatic devotion to the political creed of his adoption, he administered Canada avowedly on the lines of Lord John Russell's despatch to Poulett Thomson, but with all the emphasis on the limitations prescribed in that despatch, and in a spirit singularly irritating. His conduct towards Bagot exhibited a consistent distrust of Canadian self-government; and the fundamental defects of his advice to Bagot's successor cannot be better exhibited than in the letter warning Metcalfe of "the extreme risk which would attend any disruption of the present Conservative party of Canada. Their own steadiness {251} and your own firmness and discretion have gone far towards consolidating them as a party and securing a stable administration of the colony."[26] In spite of the warnings of Durham and Buller, Stanley was aiming at restoring all the ancient landmarks—an unpopular executive, a small privileged party "of the connexion," and a colony quickly and surely passing from the control of Britain. Even after Stanley's resignation, and the accession of an avowed Peelite and free-trader, Gladstone, to his office, the change in commercial theory did not at first effect any change in the Colonial Office interpretation of the Canadian constitution. No doubt Gladstone recommended Cathcart to ascertain the deliberate sense of the Canadian community at large, and pay respect to the House of Assembly as the organ of that sense, but he committed himself and the new governor-general to a strong support of Metcalfe's system, and put him on his guard against "dishonourable abstract declarations on the subject of what has been termed responsible government."[27]

It would be tedious to follow the subject into every detail of Canadian administration; but all {252} existing evidence tends to prove that the representative men of the British Tory party opposed the new interpretation of Canadian rights at every crisis in the period. In the Rebellion Losses debate in 1849, Gladstone, taking in this matter a view more restricted than that of his leader Peel, held that Elgin should have referred to the Home Government at the very first moment, and before public opinion had been appealed to in the colony.[28] The fall of the Whig ministry in 1851 was followed by the first of three brief Derby administrations: and the Earl of Derby proved himself to be more wedded than he had been as Lord Stanley to the old restrictive system. The Clergy Reserve dispute was nearing its end, but Derby and Sir John Pakington, his colonial secretary, intervened to introduce one last delay, and to give the Bishop of Toronto his last gleam of hope. The appointment of Pakington, which, according to Taylor, was treated with very general ridicule, was in itself significant: even an ignorant and retrograde politician was adequate for his task when that task was obstruction. After the short-lived Derby administration was over, Pakington continued his defence of Anglican rights in Canada, and although {253} Canadian opinion had declared itself overwhelmingly on the other side, he refused to admit that "the argument of self-government was so paramount that it ought to over-rule the sacred dedication of this property."

So far nothing unexpected has been revealed in the early Victorian colonial policy of the Tories. The party naturally and logically opposed all forms of democratic control; they stood for the strict subordination of the outlying regions to the centre in the administration of dependencies; they were, as they had always and everywhere been, the party of the Church, and of church endowment. But it is surprising to find that the party of Wellington and of British supremacy varied their doctrine of central authority with very pessimistic prophecies concerning the connection between mother country and colonies.

Stanley has already been exhibited, during the Bagot and Metcalfe incidents, as a prophet of pessimism; and at the same period, Peel seems to have shared in the views of his Colonial Secretary. "Let us keep Nova Scotia and New Brunswick," he said, "but the connection with the Canadas against their wills, nay without the cordial co-operation of the predominant party in Canada, is {254} a very onerous one. The sooner we have a distinct understanding on that head the better. The advantage of commercial intercourse is all on the side of the colony, or at least is not in favour of the mother country. Why should we go on fighting not our own battle (I speak now of a civil battle) but theirs—in a minority in the Legislature, the progress of the contest widening daily old differences and begetting new ones! But above all, if the people are not cordially with us, why should we contract the tremendous obligation of having to defend, on a point of honour, their territory against American aggression?"[29]

Ten years later, Tory pessimists still talked of separation. Lord John Manners, in an oration which showed as much rhetorical effort as it did little sense and information, was prepared for disaster over no more tragic an issue than the Clergy Reserves. Concession to local demands on that point for him involved something not far from disruption of the Empire. "Far better than this, if you really believe it to be necessary to acknowledge the virtual independence of Canada, recall your Governor-General, call back your army, call home your fleet, and let Canada, if she be so {255} minded, establish her independence and cast off her character as a colony, or seek refuge in the extended arms of the United States."[30] But perhaps it is not fair to confront a man with his perorations.

The most remarkable confession of Tory doubt still remains to be told. It is not usually noticed that Disraeli's famous phrase "these wretched colonies will all be independent too in a few years, and are a mill-stone round our necks,"[31] was used in connection with Canadian fishery troubles, and belongs to this same region of imperial pessimism. There is, however, another less notorious but perfectly explicit piece of evidence betraying the fears which at this time disturbed the equanimity of the founder of modern imperialism. He had been speaking of the attempts of liberalism to effect the disintegration of the Empire; but the speech, which contained his counter-scheme of imperial consolidation, was itself an evidence of doubt deeper than that harboured by his opponents. "When those subtle views were adopted by the country, under the plausible plea of granting {256} self-government to the Colonies, I confess that I myself thought that the tie was broken. Not that I for one object to self-government. I cannot conceive how our distant colonies can have their affairs administered except by self-government. But self-government, in my opinion, when it is conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of Imperial consolidation."[32] Disraeli was speaking of the views on colonial government, which he had held, apparently at the time when Grey and Elgin introduced their new system. That system had since been developed under Gladstone's supervision; and, in 1872, the date of Disraeli's speech, it presented not fewer, but more decided signs of colonial independence. Yet the statesman who accused the Whigs and Liberals of planning the disruption of the Empire, never attempted, when in office, to stay the decline of imperial unity by any practical scheme of federation, and must be counted either singularly indifferent to the interests of the empire, or sceptical as to its future. A few years later, when the Imperial Titles Bill was under discussion, Disraeli again revealed a curious disbelief in, or misunderstanding of, the character of the self-governing colonies. He had been {257} challenged to defend his differentiation of the royal title in India from that authorized in the rest of the British Empire. It would have been easy to confess that an imperial dignity, appropriate to the East, would have been singularly out of place in communities more democratic than Britain herself. But he chose to argue from the unsubstantiality of separate colonial existence, and the natural inclination of prosperous colonists to make for England, the moment their fortunes had been made. "The condition of colonial society," he said, "is of a fluctuating character.... There is no similarity between the circumstances of our colonial fellow-subjects and those of our fellow-subjects in India. Our colonists are English; they come and go, they are careful to make fortunes, to invest their money in England; their interests are immense, ramified, complicated, and they have constant opportunities of improving and enjoying the relations which exist between themselves and their countrymen in the metropolis. Their relations to their Sovereign are ample, they satisfy them. The colonists are proud of those relations, they are interested in the titles of the Queen, they look forward to return when they {258} leave England, they do return—in short they are Englishmen."[33]

It seems fair to argue from these instances that Disraeli, with all his imagination and insight, did not, even in 1876, understand the constitutional and social self-sufficiency of the greater colonies; or the nature of the bond which held them fast to the mother country. His consummate rhetorical skill persuaded the nation to be imperial, while he himself doubted the very possibility of permanence in an empire organized on the only lines—those of strict autonomy—which the colonists were willing to sanction.

So the party of the earlier British Empire distrusted the foundations laid by Durham and his group for a new structure; and behind all their proclamations of authority, there were ill-concealed fears of another declaration or succession of declarations of independence.

It is now time to turn to the central body of imperial opinion—that which used Durham's views as the foundation of a new working theory of colonial development. Its chief exponents were the Whigs of the more liberal school, who counted {259} Lord John Russell their representative and leader.

It was only at the end of a period dominated by other interests that Lord John Russell was able to turn his attention to colonies, and more particularly to Canada. Even in 1839, the leader of the House of Commons, and the politician on whom, after all, the fate of the Whig party depended, had many other claims on his attention. He was no theorist at general on the subject, and his interest in Canada was largely the product of events, not of his own will. But he came at a decisive moment in Canadian history; his tenure of the Colonial Office coincided with the period in which Durham's Report exercised its greatest influence, and Russell, who had the politician's faculty for flinging himself with all his force into the issue dominating the present, inaugurated what proved to be a new regime in colonial administration.

In attributing so decisive a part to Russell's work at the Colonial Office, one need not estimate very highly his powers of initiative or imagination. It was Lord John Russell's lot, here as in Parliamentary Reform, to read with honest eyes the defects of the existing system, to initiate a great and useful change, and then to predicate finality {260} of an act, which was really only the beginning of greater changes. But in Canadian politics as in British, he must be credited with being better than his words, and with doing nothing to hinder a movement which he only partially understood.

His ideas have in part been criticized in relation to Lord Sydenham's governor-generalship: in a sense, Sydenham was simply the Russell system incarnate. But it is well to examine these ideas as a whole. Russell was a Durhamite "with a difference." Like Durham he planned a generous measure of self-government, but he was a stricter constitutional thinker than Durham. He reduced to a far finer point the difficulty which Durham only slightly felt, about the seat of ultimate authority and responsibility; and his instructions to Sydenham left no doubt as to the constitutional superior in Canada. With infinitely shrewder practical insight than his prompter, he refused to simplify the problem of executive responsibility, by making the council subject to the Assembly in purely domestic matters, and to the Crown and its representative in external matters. "Supposing," he said, "that you could lay down this broad principle, and say that all external matters {261} should be subject to the home government, and all internal matters should be governed according to the majority of the Assembly, could you carry that principle into effect? I say, we cannot abandon the responsibility which is cast upon us as Ministers of the Executive of this great Empire."[34] Ultimately the surrender had to be made, but it was well that Russell should have refused to consent to what was really a fallacy in Durham's reasoning. In consequence of this position, the Whig leader regarded Bagot's surrender as one, difficult perhaps to avoid, but unfortunate in its results, and he was an unflinching supporter of Metcalfe. He further declared that he thought Metcalfe's council had an exaggerated view of their power, and that to yield to them would involve dangers to the connection.[35] The novelty involved in his policy lay, however, outside this point of constitutional logic: it was a matter of practice, not of theory. Not only did he support Sydenham in those practical reforms in which the new political life of Canada began, but in spite of his theory he really granted all save the form of full responsibility. So completely had he, and his agent Sydenham, undermined their own imperial {262} position, that when Peel's ministry fell in 1846, it was one of the first acts of Lord John Russell, now prime minister, to consent to the demolition of his own old theories. If he may not dispute with Grey the credit of having conceded genuine responsibility to Canada, at least he did not exercise his authority to forbid the grant.

It seems to me, indeed, that Russell definitely modified his position between 1841 and 1847. At the earlier date he had been a stout upholder of the supremacy of Britain in Canada, for he believed in the connection, and the connection depended on the retention of British supremacy. In the debate of January 16th, 1838, he argued thus for the Empire: "On the preservation of our colonies depends the continuance of our commercial marine; and on our commercial marine mainly depends our naval power; and on our naval power mainly depends the strength and supremacy of our arms."[36] It is worthy of note that Charles Buller took occasion to challenge this description of the pillars of empire—it seemed a poor theory to him to make the empire a stalking-horse for the commerce and interests of the mother country. But as events taught Russell surely that the casuistry of 1839 {263} was false, and that Responsible Government was both a deeper and a broader thing than he had counted it, and yet inevitable, he accepted the more radical position. At the same time, he either came to lay less stress on the unity of Empire, or he was forced to acknowledge that, since Home Rule must be granted, and since with Home Rule separation seemed natural, Britain had better practise resignation in view of a possible disruption. The best known expression of this phase in Russell's thought is his speech on Colonial Administration in 1850: "I anticipate, indeed, with others that some of the colonies may so grow in population and wealth that they may say, 'Our strength is sufficient to enable us to be independent of England. The link is now become onerous to us; the time is come when we think we can, in amity and alliance with England, maintain our independence.' I do not think that that time is yet approaching. But let us make them as far as possible fit to govern themselves ... let them increase in wealth and population; and whatever may happen, we of this great empire shall have the consolation of saying that we have contributed to the happiness of the world."[37] It is possible to {264} argue that because Russell admitted that the time for separation was not yet approaching he was therefore an optimist. But the evidence leans rather to the less glorious side. It was this speech which kindled Elgin into a passion and made him bid Grey renounce for himself and his leader the habit of telling the colonies that the colonial is a provisional existence. The same speech, too, extorted complaints from Robert Baldwin, the man whom Sydenham and Russell had once counted half a traitor. "I never saw him so much moved," wrote Elgin, to whom Baldwin had frankly said about a recent meeting. "My audience was disposed to regard a prediction of this nature proceeding from a Prime Minister, less as a speculative abstraction than as one of that class of prophecies which work their own fulfilment."[38] The speech was not an accidental or occasional flash of rhetoric. The mind of the Whig leader, acquiescing now in the completeness of Canadian local powers, and reading with disquiet the signs of the times in the form of Canadian turbulence, seems to have turned to speculate on the least harmful form which separation might take. Of this there is direct evidence in a private letter from Grey to Elgin: "Lord {265} John in a letter I had from him yesterday, expresses a good deal of anxiety as to the prospects of Canada, and reverts to the old idea of forming a federal union of all the British provinces, in order to give them something more to think of than their mere local squabbles;[39] and he says that if to effect this a separation of the two Canadas were necessary he should see no objection to it. His wish in forming such a union would be to bring about such a state of things, that, if you should lose our North American provinces, they might be likely to become an independent state, instead of being merged in the Union."[40]

Russell moved then at this period through a most interesting development of views. His initial position was a blend of firm imperialism and generous liberal concession, the latter more especially inspired by Durham. As his genuine sympathies with liberty and democracy operated on his political views, these steadily changed in the direction of a more complete surrender to Canadian demands. But, since, in spite of his sympathies, he still remained logical, and since he had believed the connection to depend on {266} the governor-general's supremacy, the modification of that supremacy involved the weakening of his hopes of empire. If the change seem somewhat to his discredit, his best defence lies in the fact that Peel, who made a very similar modification of his mind on Canadian politics, was also contemplating in these years a similar separation. "The utility of our connexion with Canada," he said in 1844, "must depend upon its being continued with perfect goodwill by the majority of the population. It would be infinitely better that that connexion should be discontinued, rather than that it should be continued by force and against the general feeling and conviction of the people."[41] Indeed, Russell seems to have been accompanied on his dolorous journey by all the Peelites and not a few of the Whigs. "There begins to prevail in the House of Commons," wrote Grey to Elgin in 1849, "and I am sorry to say in the highest quarters, an opinion (which I believe to be utterly erroneous) that we have no interest in preserving our colonies and ought therefore to make no sacrifice for that purpose. Peel, Graham, and Gladstone, if they do not avow this opinion as openly as Cobden and his friends, yet betray very clearly that they {267} entertain it, nor do I find some members of the Cabinet free from it."[42]

Meanwhile, the direction of colonial affairs had fallen to the writer of the letter just quoted: from the formation of the Russell ministry in 1846 until its fall, Earl Grey was the dominant force in British colonial policy. Unlike Russell, Grey was not so much a politician interested in the great parliamentary game, as an expert who had devoted most of his attention to colonial and economic subjects. Consciously or unconsciously, he had imbibed many of Wakefield's ideas, and in that period of triumphant free trade, he came to office resolute to administer the colonies on free-trade principles. It said much for the fixity and consistency of his ideas of colonial administration that, unlike Russell, Buller, and others, he had not been misled by the Metcalfe incident. "The truth is," he said of Metcalfe, "he did not comprehend responsible government at all, nor from his Indian experience is this wonderful."[43]

The most comprehensive description of the Grey regime is that it practised laissez faire principles in colonial administration as they never had been {268} practised before. Under him Canada first enjoyed the advantages or disadvantages of free trade, and escaped from the shackles of the Navigation Laws. Grey and Elgin co-operated to bring the Clergy Reserve troubles to an end, although the Whigs fell before the final steps could be taken. Grey secured imperial sanction for changes in the Union Act of 1840, granting the French new privileges for their language, and the colony free control of its own finances. But all these were subordinate in importance to the attitude of the new minister towards the whole question of Canadian autonomy, and its relation to the Imperial Parliament. That attitude may be examined in relation to the responsibility of the Canadian executive, the powers of the Imperial Parliament, the occasions on which these powers might be fitly used, and the bearing of all the innovations on the position of Canada within the British Empire.

Grey's policy with regard to Responsible Government was simple. As Canadians viewed the term, and within the very modest limits set to it by them, he surrendered the whole position. So much has already been said on this point in connection with Elgin, that it need not be further elaborated. Yet, since there might linger a suspicion that the {269} policy was that rather of the governor than of the minister, Grey's position may be given in a despatch written to Sir John Harvey in Nova Scotia, before Elgin went to Canada.

"The object," wrote Grey, "with which I recommend to you this course is that of making it apparent that any transfer, which may take place, of political power from the hands of one party to those of another is the result, not of an act of yours, but of the wishes of the people themselves, as shown by the difficulty experienced by the retiring party in carrying on the government of the Province according to the forms of the Constitution. To this I attach great importance; I have therefore to instruct you to abstain from changing your Executive Council until it shall become perfectly clear that they are unable with such fair support from yourself as they have a right to expect, to carry on the government of the province satisfactorily, and command the confidence of the Legislature.... In giving all fair and proper support to your Council for the time being, you will carefully avoid any acts which can possibly be supposed to imply the slightest personal objection to their opponents, and also refuse to assent to any measures which may be {270} proposed to you by your Council, which may appear to you to involve an improper exercise of the authority of the Crown for party rather than for public objects. In exercising however this power of refusing to sanction measures which may be submitted to you by your Council, you must recollect that this power of opposing a check upon extreme measures, proposed by the party for the time in the Government, depends entirely for its efficacy upon its being used sparingly and with the greatest possible discretion. A refusal to accept advice tendered to you by your Council is a legitimate ground for its members to tender to you their resignation—a course they would doubtless adopt, should they feel that the subject on which a difference had arisen between you and themselves was one upon which public opinion would be in their favour. Should it prove to be so, concession to their views must sooner or later become inevitable, since it cannot be too distinctly acknowledged that it is neither possible nor desirable to carry on the government of any of the British Provinces in North America, in opposition to the opinion of the inhabitants."[44]

In strict accordance with this plan, Grey gave {271} Elgin the most loyal support in introducing responsible government into Canada, and, in a note written not long after Papineau had once more awakened the political echoes with a distinctly disloyal address, he expressed his willingness to include even the old rebel in the ministerial arrangement, should that be insisted on by the leaders of a party which could command a majority.[45]

Complete as was the concession made by Grey to local claims, it would, nevertheless, be a grave error to think that he left no space for the assertion of imperial authority. No doubt it was part of his system to reduce to a minimum the occasions on which interference should be necessary, but that such occasions might occur, and demand sudden and powerful action from Britain, he ever held. Even in matters of a character purely domestic, he believed, with Lord John Russell, that intervention might be necessary, and he desired to prevent danger, not by minimizing the powers of the imperial authority, but by exercising them with great discretion.[46] It was perhaps with this conservation of central power in view that {272} he was willing to transfer to the British treasury the responsibility of paying the salary of the governor-general, provided the colonists would take over some part of the expenses and difficulties of Canadian defence. But the extent to which he was prepared to exalt the supremacy is best illustrated in the control of imperial commerce. A great change had just been made in the economic system of Britain. Free trade was then to its adherents not an arguable position, but a kind of gospel; and men like Grey, who had something of the propagandist about them, were inclined to compel others to come in. Now, unfortunately for Canada, free trade appeared there first rather as foe than as friend. As has already been seen, the measures of 1846 overturned the arrangement made by Stanley in 1843, whereby a preference given to Canadian flour had stimulated a great activity in the milling and allied industries; and the removal of the restrictions imposed by the Navigation Acts did not take place till 1849. At the same time the United States, the natural market for Canadian products, showed little inclination to listen to talk of reciprocity; and the Canadians, seemingly deprived of pre-existing advantages by Peel's action, talked of retaliation as a means of {273} bettering their position, at least in relation to the United States. Grey, however, was an absolute believer in the magic powers of free trade. "When we rejected all considerations of what is called reciprocity," he wrote to Elgin, "and boldly got rid of our protective duties without inquiring whether other nations would meet us or not, the effect was immediately seen in the increase of our exports, and the prosperity of our manufactures."[47] Canada, then, in his opinion could retaliate most effectively, not by setting up a tariff against the United States, but by opening her ports more freely then before. He had a vision, comparable although in contrast, to that of believers in an imperial tariff, of an empire with its separate parts bound to each other by a general freedom of trade. Besides all this, he had a firm trust that the evils which other nations less free than Britain might for a time inflict on her trade by their prohibitions, would shortly end, since all would be convinced by the example of Britain and would follow it. Under these circumstances he set imperial policy against local prejudice, and wrote to his governor-general: "I do trust you will be able to prevent the attempt to enter upon that silliest of all silly policies, the {274} meeting of commercial restrictions by counter restrictions; indeed it is a matter to be very seriously considered, whether we can avoid disallowing any acts of this kind which may be passed."[48]

In spite, then, of the present thoroughness of Grey's conversion to the Canadian position with regard to Home Rule, there was for him still an empire operating through the Houses at Westminster and the Crown ministers, and striking in, possibly on rare occasions, but, when necessary, with a heavy hand. To such a man, too, belief in the permanence of empire was natural. There are fewer waverings on the point in Grey's writings than in those of any of his contemporaries, Durham, Buller, and Elgin alone excepted. He had, indeed, as his private correspondence shows, moments of gloom. Under the strain of the Montreal riots, and the insults to Elgin in 1849, he wrote: "I confess that looking at these indications of the state of feeling there, and at the equally significant indications to the feelings in the House of Commons, respecting the value of our colonies, I begin almost to despair of our long retaining those in North America; while I am persuaded that to both parties a hasty separation will be a very serious {275} evil."[49] Elgin's robust faith, and perfect knowledge, however, set him right. Indeed, in tracing the growth of Grey's colonial policy, it is impossible for anyone to mistake the evidences of Elgin's influence; and the chapter on Canada in his Colonial Policy owes almost more to Elgin than it does to the avowed author. His final position may be stated thus. The empire was to the advantage of England, for, apart from other reasons, her place among the nations depended on the colonies, and the act of separation would also be one of degradation. The empire was an unspeakable benefit to the colonies: "To us," he once wrote in a moment of doubt, "except the loss of prestige (no slight one I admit) the loss of Canada would be the loss of little but a source of heavy expense and great anxiety, while to the Canadians, the loss of our protection, and of our moderating influence to restrain the excesses of their own factions, would be one of the greatest that can be conceived."[50] But, apart from these lower loss and gain calculations, to Grey the British Empire was a potent instrument, essential to the peace and soundness of the world, and he expected the {276} provinces to which he had conceded British rights, to rally to uphold British standards through a united and loyal imperial federation. Those were still days when Britain counted herself, and not without justification, a means of grace to the less fortunate remainder of mankind. "The authority of the British Crown is at this moment the most powerful instrument, under Providence, of maintaining peace and order in many extensive regions of the earth, and thereby assists in diffusing among millions of the human race, the blessings of Christianity and civilization. Supposing it were clear (which I am far from admitting) that a reduction of our national expenditure (otherwise impracticable) to the extent of a few hundred thousands a year, could be effected by withdrawing our authority and protection from our numerous Colonies, would we be justified, for the sake of such a saving, in taking this step, and thus abandoning the duty which seems to have been cast upon us?"[51]

Such, then, was the imperial policy of Britain under the man who carried it farthest forward, before the great renaissance at the end of Queen Victoria's reign. To Grey, Canada was all that it had meant to Durham—a province peopled by {277} subjects of the Queen, and one destined by providence to have a great future—a fundamental part of the Empire, and one without which the imperial whole must be something meaner and less glorious. Like Durham he planned for it a constitution on the most generous lines, and conferred great gifts upon it. And, in exchange, he claimed a loyalty proportionate to the generosity of the Crown, and a propriety of political behaviour worthy of citizens of so great a state. In the last resort he held that in abnormal crises, or in response to great and beneficial policies, Canadians must forget their provincial outlook, or, if they could not, at least accept the ruling of an imperial parliament and a crown more enlightened and authoritative on these matters than a colonial ministry or people could be. Having conceded all the rights essential to a free existence, he mentioned duties, and called the sum of these duties Empire.

The concluding stage in the evolution of mid-Victorian opinion concerning Canada, which must now be described, differs essentially from the earlier stages, although, as it seems to me, the chief factor in the development is still Durham and his group. It is the period of separatism.

One thing has appeared very prominently in the {278} foregoing argument—the prevalence of a fear, or even a fixed belief, that the connection between Britain and Canada must soon cease. Excluding, for the present, the entire group of extreme radicals, there was hardly a statesman of the earlier years of Victoria, who had not confessed that Canada must soon leave England, or be left. Many instances have been already cited. Among the Tories, Stanley thought that Bagot had already begun the process of separation, and that Metcalfe's failure would involve the end of the connection. Peel, ever judicial, gave his verdict in favour of separation, should Canadians persist in resenting imperial action. As Lord John Russell's view of autonomy expanded, his hopes for continued British supremacy contracted; and, on the evidence of a letter from Grey quoted above, Russell was not alone among the Whigs in his opinion, nor Peel among his immediate followers. The reckless and partizan use of the term Little-Englander has largely concealed the fact that apart from Durham, whose faith was not called upon to bear the test of experience, and Buller, Grey, and Elgin, who had special grounds for their confidence, all the responsible politicians of the years between 1840 and 1860 moved steadily towards a "Little England" position. {279} The reasons for that movement are worthy of examination.

So far as the Tories were concerned, the change, already traced in detail, was not unnatural. In the eighteenth century, the colonies, possessed of just that responsible government for which Canadian reformers were clamouring, had with one accord left the Empire. The earlier nineteenth century had witnessed in the British American colonies a steadily increasing demand for the liberties, formerly possessed by the New England states. Representative assemblies had been granted; then a modified form of responsibility of the executive to these assemblies; then the complete surrender of executive to legislature. Attempts had been made to gain some countervailing powers by bargain; but, in Canada, the civil list had now been surrendered to local control, the endowment of the Church of England was practically at an end, patronage was in the hands of the provincial ministry, and all the exceptions which the central authority had claimed as essential to its continued existence followed in the wake of the lost executive supremacy. Neither Whigs nor Tories quite understood how an Empire was possible, in which there was no definite federating principle; or, if there {280} were, where the federating principle existed only to be neutralized as, one by one, the restrictions imposed by it were felt by the colonists to be annoying to their sense of freedom. Empire on these terms seemed to mean simply a capacity in the mother country for indefinite surrender. The accomplishment of the purpose proclaimed by Durham, Russell, and Grey, would, to a Tory even less peremptory than the Duke of Wellington, mean the end of the connection; and as they felt, so they spoke and acted. They were separatists, not of good-will, but from necessity and the nature of things.

Among the Whigs, an even more important process was at work. By 1850 the disintegration of the Whig party was already far advanced. Finality in reform had already been found impossible, and Russell and the advanced men were slowly drawing ahead of conservatives like Melbourne and Palmerston. After 1846, the liberalizing power of Peel's steady scientific intelligence was at work, transforming the ideas of his allies, as he had formerly shattered those of his old friends, and, of Peel's followers, Gladstone at least seemed to be looking in the same direction as his master—towards administrative liberalism. The {281} Whig creed and programme were in the melting pot. Now, what made the final product not Whig, but Liberal, was on the whole the increasing influence of the parliamentary Radicals; and in colonial matters the Radicals, who told on the revived and quickened Whig party, were pronouncedly in favour of separation. It is too often assumed that the imperial creed of Durham and Buller was shared in by their fellow Radicals. That is a grave mistake. One may trace a descent towards separatism from Molesworth to Roebuck and Brougham. In Molesworth, the tendency was comparatively slight. No doubt in 1837, under the stress of the news of rebellion, he had proclaimed the end of the British dominion in America as his sincere desire.[52] But he believed in a colonial empire, if England would only guarantee good government. "The emancipation of colonies," he said, in a cooler mood, "must be a question of time and a question, in each case, of special expediency ... a question which would seldom or never arise between a colony and its mother country if all colonies were well governed"; and he explained his language about Canada on grounds of bad government. "I hope that the people of {282} that country (Lower Canada) will either recover the constitution which we have violated, or become wholly independent of us."[53] It is not necessary to quote Hume's confused but well-intentioned wanderings—views sharing with those of the people whom Hume represented, their crude philanthropy and imperfect clearness. But Roebuck marked a definite stage in advance; for, while he was willing to keep "the connexion," where it could be kept with honour, he seems to have regarded separation as inevitable—"come it must," he said—and his best hopes were that the separation might take place in amity and that a British North American federation might counterbalance the Union to the south.[54] Grote's placid and facile radicalism accepted the growing breach with Canada as the most desirable thing which could happen both to the mother country and the colony; and Brougham directed all his eccentric and ill-ordered energy and eloquence, not only to denounce the Whig leaders, but to proclaim the necessity of the new Canadian republic. "Not only do I consider the possession as worth no breach of the Constitution ... but in a national view I really hold those colonies to {283} be worth nothing. I am well assured that we shall find them very little worth the cost they have entailed on us, in men, in money, and in injuries to our trade; nay, that their separation will be even now a positive gain, so it be effected on friendly terms, and succeeded by an amicable intercourse."[55]

Separation was indubitably a dogma of philosophic radicalism; and yet it was not so much the influence of this metaphysical and doctrinaire belief which moved Whig opinion. It was rather the plain business-like and matter-of-fact radicalism of the economist statesmen, led by Bright and Cobden. Of the two forces represented by Peel and by Cobden, which completed the formation of a modern Liberal party, the latter was on the whole the stronger; and Bright and Cobden took the views of their Radical predecessors, and out of airy and ineffectual longings created solid political facts. "I cannot disguise from myself," wrote Grey to Elgin in 1850, "that opinion in this country is tending more and more to the rejection of any burden whatever, on account of our colonies"; and the reason for the tendency was certainly the purely economic views to which {284} Cobden was accustoming Britain, and the cogency of the arguments by which he was driving amateur politicians from their earlier indefensible positions. That trade was all-important, and that the operations of trade disregarded the irrelevant facts of nationality and race; that no one community could interfere in the social and political life of another without disaster to both; that the defence of colonies was not only dangerous to peace as provoking suspicious neighbours, but needless expense to the mother country; in short that laissez-faire was the dominating principle in politics, and that laissez-faire shattered the earlier dreams of imperial supremacy and colonial dependency—these were the views introduced by Cobden and Bright into a newly awakened and imperfectly educated England; and they played just such havoc with earlier political ideas, as Darwin and evolution did with pre-existing theological orthodoxy.[56]

It was hardly wonderful then that the Whigs moved steadily onward until they almost acquiesced in the idea of imperial disruption; and, since Peel {285} had left his party moved almost wholly by Cobden's economic propaganda, it was not unnatural that the Peelites should share the views of their Whig allies. It is indeed possible to find some cold consolation in Gladstone's Chester speech in 1855, when he predicted that if only the colonies were left freedom of judgment, it would be hard to say when the day of separation might come.[57] But Grey had already suspected Gladstone of pessimism on the point, and we now know that as an imperialist Gladstone's course from 1855 had a downward tendency. He could not resist the arguments of his Radical friends and teachers.

Almost all the important relevant facts and events which concerned the connection after 1846 assisted these party movements towards belief in separation.

Grey, whose confidence in the beneficial results of free trade challenged that of Cobden himself, believed that with Protection there vanished an awkward enemy of the connection between Canada and Britain.[58] But Grey was unmistakably doctrinaire on the point. Elgin warned him, again and again, of "the uneasy feeling which the {286} free-trade policy of the mother country ... has tended to produce in the colonial mind,"[59] and that uneasiness passed gradually over to Britain. It would be to trespass unduly beyond the limits prescribed in this essay to deal with the introduction of the Canadian tariff in 1858 and 1859; yet the statements of Galt who introduced the budget in the latter year strike the reader now, as they must have struck the British reader then, with a sense that the connection was practically at an end: "The government of Canada cannot, through those feelings of deference which they owe to the Imperial authorities, in any measure waive or diminish the right of the people of Canada to decide for themselves both as to the mode and extent to which taxation shall be imposed.... The Imperial government are not responsible for the debts and engagements of Canada. They do not maintain its judicial, educational, or civil service. They contribute nothing to the internal government of the country; and the Provincial Legislature, acting through a ministry directly responsible to it, has to make provision for all these wants. They must necessarily claim and exercise the widest latitude, as to the nature, and {287} the extent of the burdens, to be placed upon the industry of the people."[60] There was almost everything to be said in favour of this enlightened selfishness; and yet a growing coolness on the part of British legislators was, under the circumstances, very comprehensible. It was all the more so, because the innovations in Canada influenced British diplomacy in its relations with the United States; and between 1854, the date of Elgin's Reciprocity Treaty, and 1867, British statesmen learned some of the curious ramifications of their original gift of autonomy to Canada. In diplomacy as in economic relations, their appreciation of the value of the connection did not increase.