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Battle Studies
by Colonel Charles-Jean-Jacques-Joseph Ardant du Picq
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First letter from Captain P——

"... It is there that I had time to admire the coolness of my brave Captain Daguerre, advancing on a mare under the enemy's eyes, and observing imperturbable, like a tourist, all the movements of our opponents.

"I will always pay homage to his calm and collected bravery...."

Remarks by the colonel.

"Did not Captain Daguerre change the bugle call 'Retreat,' ordered by —— to the bugle call 'Forward?'"

Answer of Captain P——

"In fact, when protected in the wood by pieces of wall we were firing on the Russians, we heard behind us the bugle sounding 'Retreat' at the order of ——. At this moment my captain, indignant, ordered 'Forward' sounded to reestablish confidence which had been shaken by the distraction or by the inadvertance of ——."

5. The Battle of Inkermann

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq.

First: Letter sent from Lyon, March 21, 1869, by Major de G——, 17th Line Regiment.

"... The 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment had hardly arrived close to the telegraph when it received a new order to rush to the help of the English army, which, too weak to hold such a large army, had been broken in the center of its line and driven back on its camps.

"The 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment, Major Vaissier, had the honor to arrive first in the presence of the Russians, after moving three kilometers on the run. Received by the enthusiastic cheers of the English, it formed for battle, then carried away by burning cries of 'Forward, with the bayonet' from its brave major it threw itself headlong, on the Russian columns, which broke.

"For two hours the 1st Battalion of the 7th Light Regiment, a battalion of the 6th Line Regiment, four companies of the 3rd Battalion of foot chasseurs, five companies of Algerian chasseurs held the head of the Russian army which continued to debouch in massed columns from the ravine and plateau of Inkermann.

"Three times the battalion of the 7th Light Regiment was obliged to fall back some paces to rally. Three times it charged with the bayonet, with the same ardor and success.

"At four in the afternoon the Russians were in rout, and were pursued into the valley of Inkermann.

"On this memorable day all the officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers of the 7th Light Regiment performed their duty nobly, rivalling each other in bravery and self-sacrifice."

Second: Notes on Inkermann, which Colonel A. du Picq indicates come from the letters of Captain B—— (these letters are missing).

"In what formation were the Russians? In column, of which the head fired, and whose platoons tried to get from behind the mead to enter into action?

"When Major Vaissier advanced was he followed by every one? At what distance? In what formation were the attackers? in disordered masses? in one rank? in two? in mass? Did the Russians immediately turn tail, receiving shots and the bayonet in the back? did they fall back on the mass which itself was coming up? What was the duration of this attack against a mass, whose depth prevented its falling back?

"Did we receive bayonet wounds?

"Did we fall back before the active reaction of the mass or merely because, after the first shock, the isolated soldiers fell back to find companions and with them a new confidence?

"Was the second charge made like the first one? Was the 6th Line Regiment engaged as the first support of the 7th Light Regiment? How were the Zouaves engaged?"

6. The Battle of Magenta

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters from Captain C——, dated August 23, 1868.

"At Magenta I was in Espinasse's division, of Marshal MacMahon's corps. This division was on the extreme left of the troops that had passed the Ticino at Turbigo and was moving on Magenta by the left bank. Close to the village a fusillade at close range apprised us that the enemy was before us. The country, covered with trees, hedges, and vines, had hidden them.

"Our 1st Battalion and the 2nd Foreign Regiment drove the Austrians into Magenta.

"Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of Zouaves, with which I was, remained in reserve, arms stacked, under control of the division commander. Apparently quite an interval had been left between Espinasse's division and la Motterouge's, the 1st of the corps, and, at the moment of engagement, at least an Austrian brigade had entered the gap, and had taken in flank and rear the elements of our division engaged before Magenta. Happily the wooded country concealed the situation or I doubt whether our troops engaged would have held on as they did. At any rate the two reserve battalions had not moved. The fusillade extended to our right and left as if to surround us; bullets already came from our right flank. The General had put five guns in front of us, to fire on the village, and at the same time I received the order to move my section to the right, to drive off the invisible enemy who was firing on us. I remember that I had quit the column with my section when I saw a frightened artillery captain run toward us, crying 'General, General, we are losing a piece!' The general answered, 'Come! Zouaves, packs off.' At these words, the two battalions leaped forward like a flock of sheep, dropping packs everywhere. The Austrians were not seen at first. It was only after advancing for an instant that they were seen. They were already dragging off the piece that they had taken. At the sight of them our men gave a yell and fell on them. Surprise and terror so possessed the Austrians, who did not know that we were so near, that they ran without using their arms. The piece was retaken; the regimental standard was captured by a man in my company. About two hundred prisoners were taken, and the Austrian regiment—Hartmann's 9th Infantry—was dispersed like sheep in flight, five battalions of them. I believe that had the country not been thick the result might have been different. The incident lasted perhaps ten minutes.

"The two battalions took up their first position. They had had no losses, and their morale was in the clouds. After about an hour General Espinasse put himself at the head of the two battalions and marched us on the village. We were in column of platoons with section intervals. The advance was made by echelon, the 2nd Battalion in front, the 3rd a little in rear, and a company in front deployed as skirmishers.

"At one hundred and fifty paces from the Austrians, wavering was evident in their lines; the first ranks threw themselves back on those in rear. At that instant the general ordered again, 'Come! Packs off. At the double!' Everybody ran forward, shedding his pack where he was.

"The Austrians did not wait for us. We entered the village mixed up with them. The fighting in houses lasted quite a while. Most of the Austrians retired. Those who remained in the houses had to surrender. I found myself, with some fifty officers and men, in a big house from which we took four hundred men and five officers, Colonel Hauser for one.

"My opinion is that we were very lucky at Magenta. The thick country in which we fought, favored us in hiding our inferior number from the Austrians. I do not believe we would have succeeded so well in open country. In the gun episode the Austrians were surprised, stunned. Those whom we took kept their arms in their hands, without either abandoning them or using them. It was a typical Zouave attack, which, when it succeeds, has astonishing results; but if one is not lucky it sometimes costs dearly. Note the 3rd Zouaves at Palestro, the 1st Zouaves at Marignano. General Espinasse's advance on the village, at the head of two battalions, was the finest and most imposing sight I have ever seen. Apart from that advance, the fighting was always by skirmishers and in large groups."

7. The Battle of Solferino

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters from Captain C——.

"The 55th infantry was part of the 3rd division of the 4th corps.

"Coming out of Medole, the regiment was halted on the right of the road and formed, as each company arrived, in close column. Fascines were made.

"An aide-de-camp came up and gave an order to the Colonel.

"The regiment was then put on the road, marched some yards and formed in battalion masses on the right of the line of battle. This movement was executed very regularly although bullets commenced to find us. Arms were rested, and we stayed there, exposed to fire, without doing anything, not even sending out a skirmisher. For that matter, during the whole campaign, it seemed to me that the skirmisher school might never have existed.

"Then up came a Major of Engineers, from General Niel, to get a battalion from the regiment. The 3rd battalion being on the left received the order to march. The major commanding ordered 'by the left flank,' and we marched by the flank, in close column, in the face of the enemy, up to Casa-Nova Farm, I believe, where General Niel was.

"The battalion halted a moment, faced to the front, and closed a little.

"'Stay here,' said General Niel; 'you are my only reserve!'

"Then the general, glancing in front of the farm, said to the major, after one or two minutes, 'Major, fix bayonets, sound the charge, and forward!'

"This last movement was still properly executed at the start, and for about one hundred yards of advance.

"Shrapnel annoyed the battalion, and the men shouldered arms to march better.

"At about one hundred yards from the farm, the cry 'Packs down,' came from I do not know where. The cry was instantly repeated in the battalion. Packs were thrown down, anywhere, and with wild yells the advance was renewed, in the wildest disorder.

"From that moment, and for the rest of the day, the 3rd Battalion as a unit disappeared.

"Toward the end of the day, after an attempt had been made to get the regiment together, and at the end of half an hour of backing and filling, there was a roll-call.

"The third company of grenadiers had on starting off in the morning one hundred and thirty-two to one hundred and thirty-five present. At this first roll-call, forty-seven answered, a number I can swear to, but many of the men were still hunting packs and rations. The next day at reveille roll-call, ninety-three or four answered. Many came back in the night.

"This was the strength for many days I still remember, for I was charged with company supply from June 25th.

"As additional bit of information—it was generally known a few days later that at least twenty men of the 4th company of grenadiers were never on the field of battle. Wounded of the company, returned for transport to Medole, said later that they had seen some twenty of the company together close to Medole, lying in the grass while their comrades fought. They even gave some names, but could not name them all. The company had only been formed for the war on April 19th, and had received that same day forty-nine new grenadiers and twenty-nine at Milan, which made seventy-eight recruits in two months. None of these men were tried or punished. Their comrades rode them hard, that was all."

8. Mentana

Extract from the correspondence of Colonel Ardant du Picq. Letters from Captain C——, dated August 23, 1868.

"November 3, at two in the morning, we took up arms to go to Monte-Rotondo. We did not yet know that we would meet the Garibaldians at Mentana.

"The Papal army had about three thousand men, we about two thousand five hundred. At one o'clock the Papal forces met their enemies. The Zouaves attacked vigorously, but the first engagements were without great losses on either side. There is nothing particular in this first episode. The usual thing happened, a force advances and is not halted by the fire of its adversary who ends by showing his heels. The papal Zouaves are marked by no ordinary spirit. In comparing them with the soldiers of the Antibes legion, one is forced to the conclusion that the man who fights for an idea fights better than one who fights for money. At each advance of the papal forces, we advanced also. We were not greatly concerned about the fight, we hardly thought that we would have to participate, not dreaming that we could be held by the volunteers. However, that did not happen.

"It was about three o'clock. At that time three companies of the battalion were employed in protecting the artillery—three or four pieces placed about the battle-field. The head of the French column was then formed by the last three companies of the battalion, one of the 1st Line Regiment; the other regiments were immediately behind. Colonel Fremont of the 1st Line Regiment, after having studied the battle-field, took two chasseur companies, followed by a battalion of his regiment and bore to the right to turn the village.

"Meanwhile the 1st Line Regiment moved further to the right in the direction of Monte-Rotondo, against which at two different times it opened a fire at will which seemed a veritable hurricane. Due to the distance or to the terrain the material result of the fire seemed to be negligible. The moral result must have been considerable, it precipitated a flood of fugitives on the road from Mentana to Monte-Rotondo, dominated by our sharpshooters, who opened on the fugitives a fire more deadly than that of the chassepots. We stayed in the same position until night, when we retired to a position near Mentana, where we bivouacked.

"My company was one of the two chasseur companies which attacked on the right with the 1st Line Regiment. My company had ninety-eight rifles (we had not yet received the chassepots). It forced the volunteers from solidly held positions where they left a gun and a considerable number of rifles. In addition, it put nearly seventy men out of action, judging by those who remained on the field. It had one man slightly wounded, a belt and a carbine broken by bullets.

"There remained with the general, after our movement to the right, three companies of chasseurs, a battalion of the 29th, and three of the 59th. I do not include many elements of the Papal army which had not been engaged. Some of my comrades told me of having been engaged with a chasseur company of the 59th in a sunken road, whose sides had not been occupied; the general was with this column. Having arrived close to the village, some shots either from the houses or from enemy sharpshooters, who might easily have gotten on the undefended flanks, provoked a terrible fusillade in the column. In spite of the orders and efforts of the officers, everybody fired, at the risk of killing each other, and this probably happened. It was only when some men, led by officers, were able to climb the sides of the road that this firing ceased. I do not think that this was a well understood use of new arms.

"The fusillade of the 1st Line Regiment against Monte-Rotondo was not very effective, I believe negligible. I do not refer to the moral result, which was great.

"The Garibaldians were numerous about Monte-Rotondo. But the terrain like all that around Italian villages was covered with trees, hedges, etc. Under these conditions, I believe that the fire of sharpshooters would have been more effective than volleys, where the men estimate distances badly and do not aim."



NOTES



[1] General Daumas (Manners and Customs of Algeria). Nocturnal Surprise and Extermination of a Camp.

[2] Among the Romans, mechanics and morale are so admirably united, that the one always comes to the aid of the other and never injures it.

[3] The Romans did not make light of the influence of a poet like Tyrtaeus. They did not despise any effective means. But they knew the value of each.

[4] Also their common sense led them to recognize immediately and appropriate arms better than their own.

[5] This is an excuse. The maniple was of perfect nobility and, without the least difficulty, could face in any direction.

[6] This was an enveloping attack of an army and not of men or groups. The Roman army formed a wedge and was attacked at the point and sides of the wedge; there was not a separate flank attack. That very day the maniple presented more depth than front.

[7] They had been sent to attack Hannibal's camp; they were repulsed and taken prisoner in their own camp after the battle.

[8] This extract is taken from the translation of Dom Thuillier. Livy does not state the precise number of Roman combatants. He says nothing had been neglected in order to render the Roman army the strongest possible, and from what he was told by some it numbered eighty-seven thousand two hundred men. That is the figure of Polybius. His account has killed, forty-five thousand; taken or escaped after the action, nineteen thousand. Total sixty-four thousand. What can have become of the twenty-three thousand remaining?

[9] The Numidian horsemen were a light irregular cavalry, excellent for skirmishing, harassing, terrifying, by their extraordinary shouts and their unbridled gallop. They were not able to hold out against a regular disciplined cavalry provided with bits and substantial arms. They were but a swarm of flies that always harasses and kills at the least mistake; elusive and perfect for a long pursuit and the massacre of the vanquished to whom the Numidians gave neither rest nor truce. They were like Arab cavalry, badly armed for the combat, but sufficiently armed for butchering, as results show. The Arabian knife, the Kabyle knife, the Indian knife of our days, which is the favorite of the barbarian or savage, must play its part.

[10] They formed the third Roman line according to the order of battle of the Legion. The contraction of the first line into a point would naturally hem them in.

[11] Brought back by Hannibal who had reserved to himself the command of the center.

[12] The triarians, the third Roman line.

[13] What effect this might have, was shown in the battle of Alisia, where Caesar's men, forewarned by him, were nevertheless troubled by war-whoops behind them. The din of battle in rear has always demoralized troops.

[14] His cavalry consisted of seven thousand horse, of which five hundred were Gauls or Germans, the best horsemen of that time, nine hundred Galicians, five hundred Thracians, and Thessalians, Macedonians and Italians in various numbers.

[15] Caesar's legions in battle order were in three lines: four cohorts in the first line, two in the second, and three in the third. In this way the cohorts of a legion were, in battle, always supported by cohorts of the same legion.

[16] Caesar stated that in order to make up the numerical inferiority of his cavalry, he had chosen four hundred of the most alert young men, from among those marching ahead of the standards, and by daily exercise had them accustomed to fighting between his horsemen. He had in this way obtained such results that his thousand riders dared, in open field, to cope with Pompey's seven thousand cavalry without becoming frightened at their number.

[17] Any one who wishes to read in extenso is referred to the fight of the ten thousand against Pharnabazus in Bithynia, Xenophon, par. 34, page 569, Lisken & Sauvan edition.—In Polybius, the battle of the Tecinus, Chapt. XIII, of Book III.—In Caesar or those who followed him the battles against Scipio, Labienus, and Afranius, the Getae and the Numidians, par. 61, page 282, and par. 69, 70, 71 and 72, pp. 283, 285, and 286, in the African war, Lisken & Sauvan edition.

[18] In ancient combat, there was almost only, dead or lightly wounded. In action, a severe wound or one that incapacitated a man was immediately followed by the finishing stroke.

[19] Hand-to-hand, sword-to-sword, serious fighting at short distances, was rare then. Likewise in the duels of our day blades are rarely crossed in actual practice.

[20] To-day, it is the riflemen who do nearly all the work of destruction.

[21] Considering Caesar's narrative what becomes of the mathematical theory of masses, which is still discussed? If that theory had the least use, how could Marius ever have held out against the tide of the armies of the Cimbri and Teutons? In the battle of Pharsalus, the advice given by Triarius to Pompey's army, a counsel which was followed and which was from a man of experience, who had seen things close at hand, shows that the shock, the physical impulse of the mass was a by-word. They knew what to think of it.

[22] The individual advance, in modern battle, in the midst of blind projectiles that do not choose, is much less dangerous than in ancient times, because it seldom goes up to the enemy.

At Pharsalus, the volunteer Crastinius, an old centurion, moved ahead with about a hundred men, saying to Caesar: "I am going to act, general, in such a way that, living or dead, to-day you may have cause to be proud of me."

Caesar, to whom these examples of blind devotion to his person were not displeasing, and whose troops had shown him that they were too mature, too experienced, to fear the contagion of this example, let Crastinius and his companions go out to be killed.

Such blind courage influences the action of the mass that follows. Probably for that reason, Caesar permitted it. But against reliable troops, as the example of Crastinius proves, to move ahead in this way, against the enemy, is to go to certain death.

[23] The men of the maniple, of the Roman company, mutually gave their word never to leave ranks, except to pick up an arrow, to save a comrade (a Roman citizen), or to kill an enemy. (Livy).

[24] A small body of troops falling into a trap might present a sort of melee, for a second, the time necessary for its slaughter. In a rout it might be possible at some moment of the butchery to have conflict, a struggle of some men with courage, who want to sell their lives dearly. But this is not a real melee. Men are hemmed in, overwhelmed, but not thrown into confusion.

[25] The Greek phalanx.

[26] The Romans lost no one as their companies entered the openings in the phalanx.

[27] The Roman velites, light-armed soldiers, of the primitive legion before Marius, were required to stand for an instant in the intervals of the maniples, while awaiting the onset. They maintained, but only for an instant, the continuity of support.

[28] A result forced by the improvement of war appliances.

[29] In troops without cohesion, this movement begins at fifty leagues from the enemy. Numbers enter the hospitals without any other complaint than the lack of morale, which very quickly becomes a real disease. A Draconian discipline no longer exists; cohesion alone can replace it.

[30] It is a troublesome matter to attack men who shoot six to eight shots a minute, no matter how badly aimed. Will he have the last word then, who has the last cartridge, who knows best how to make the enemy use his cartridges without using his own?

The reasoning is always the same. With arrows: Let us use up their arrows. With the club: Let us break their clubs. But how? That is always the question. In matters of war, above all, precept is easy; accomplishment is difficult.

[31] The more one imagines he is isolated, the more has he need of morale.

[32] Are not naval battles above all the battles of captains? All captains endeavor to promote a feeling of solidarity which will cause them all to fight unitedly on the day of action. Trafalgar—Lissa.

In 1588, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, preparing for a naval engagement, sent three commanders on light vessels to the advance-guard and three to the rearguard, with executioners, and ordered them to have every captain hanged who abandoned the post that had been assigned to him for the battle.

In 1702, the English Admiral Benbow, a courageous man, was left almost alone by his captains during three days of fighting. With an amputated leg and arm, before dying, he had four brought to trial. One was acquitted, three were hanged; and from that instant dates the inflexible English severity towards commanders of fleets and vessels, a severity necessary in order to force them to fight effectively.

Our commanders of battalions, our captains, our men, once under fire, are more at sea than these commanders of vessels.

[33] The effect of surprise would certainly not last long to-day. However, to-day wars are quickly decided.

[34] See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).

[35] See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).

[36] See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).

[37] See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).

[38] See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).

[39] It is true that such measures are recommended in camps of instruction and in publications. But in maneuvers they are neglected in the mania for alignment, and in that other mad desire of generals to mix in details which do not concern them.

[40] See Appendix VI. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)

[41] See Appendix VI. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)

[42] See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)

[43] A propos of gaps: At the battle of Sempach thirteen hundred badly armed Swiss opposed three thousand Lorraine knights in phalanxes. The attack of the Swiss in a formation was ineffective, and they were threatened with envelopment. But Arnold von Winkelried created a gap; the Swiss penetrated and the massacre followed.

[44] See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)

[45] See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)

[46] See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)

[47] It is hard to determine what method of fire, at command or at will, was used. But what we find in the works of the best military authorities, from Montecuculli to Marshal Saxe, is general opposition to the replacement of the pike by the rifle. All predicted the abandonment of the rifle for the pike, and the future always proved them wrong. They ignored experience. They could not understand that stronger than all logic is the instinct of man, who prefers long range to close fighting, and who, having the rifle would not let it go, but continually improved it.

[48] The danger arising from this kind of fire, led to proposals to put the smallest men in the front rank, the tallest in the rear rank.

[49] Nothing is more difficult than to estimate range; in nothing is the eye more easily deceived. Practice and the use of instruments cannot make a man infallible. At Sebastopol, for two months, a distance of one thousand to twelve hundred meters could not be determined by the rifle, due to inability to see the shots. For three months it was impossible to measure by ranging shots, although all ranges were followed through, the distance to a certain battery which was only five hundred meters away, but higher and separated from us by a ravine. One day, after three months, two shots at five hundred meters were observed in the target. This distance was estimated by everybody as over one thousand meters; it was only five hundred. The village taken and the point of observation changed, the truth became evident.

[50] His war instructions prove this. His best generals, Zieten, Warnery, knew of such methods, saw nothing practicable in them and guarded against them in war as indeed he did himself. But Europe believed him, tried to imitate his maneuvers on the field of battle, and aligned her troops to be beaten by him. This is what he was after. He even deceived the Prussians. But they came back to sound methods after 1808, in 1813 and afterwards.

[51] It is noted here that French uniforms are of an absurd color, serving only to take the eye at a review. So the chasseurs, in black, are seen much further than a rifleman of the line in his gray coat. The red trousers are seen further than the gray—thus gray ought to be the basic color of the infantry uniform, above all that of skirmishers.

At night fall the Russians came up to our trenches without being seen by any one, thanks to their partridge-gray coats.

THE END

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