(M679) Dionysius was now occupied, by the new defenses and fortifications of his capital, so that the whole slope of Epipolae was bordered and protected by massive walls and towers, and five divisions of the city had each its separate fortifications, so that it was the largest fortified city in all Greece—larger than Athens herself.

(M680) The plunder the tyrant had accumulated enabled him to make new preparations for a war with Carthage. But he was defeated in a great battle at Cronium, with terrible loss, by the youthful son of Magon, which compelled him to make peace, and cede to Carthage all the territory of Sicily west of the river Halycus, and pay a tribute of one thousand talents.

(M681) Very little is recorded of Dionysius after this peace, B.C. 382, for thirteen years, during which the Spartans had made themselves master of Thebes, and placed a garrison in Cadmea. In the year 368 he made war again with Carthage, but was defeated near Lilybaeum, and forced to return to Syracuse. In the year 367 it would seem that he was at last successful with his poems, for he gained the prize of tragedy at the Lenaean festival at Athens, which so intoxicated him with joy, that he invited his friends to a splendid banquet, and died from the effects of excess and wine, after a reign of thirty-eight years. He was a man of restless energy and unscrupulous ambition. His personal bravery was great, and he was vigilant and long sighted—a man of great abilities, sullied by cruelty and jealousy. In his spare time he composed tragedies to compete for prizes. No other Greek had ever arrived at so great power from a humble position, or achieved so striking exploits abroad, or preserved his grandeur so unimpaired at his death. But he was greatly favored by fortune, especially when the pestilence destroyed the hosts of Imilco. He maintained his power by intimidation of his subjects, careful organization, and liberal pay to his mercenaries. He cared nothing for money excepting as a means to secure dominion. His exactions were exorbitant, and his rapacity boundless. He trusted no one, and his suspicion was extended even to his wives. He allowed no one to shave him, and searched his most intimate friends for concealed weapons before they were allowed in his presence. He made Syracuse a great fortress, to the injury of Sicily and Italy, and fancied that he left his dominions fastened by chains of adamant. He could point to Ortygia with its impregnable fortifications, to a large army of mercenaries—to four hundred ships of war, and to vast magazines of arms and military stores.

(M682) He left no successor competent to rivet the chains he had forged. His son Dionysius succeeded to his throne at the age of twenty-five. His brother-in-law Dion was the next prominent member of his family, and possessed a fortune of one hundred talents—a man of great capacity, ambitious, luxurious, but fond of literature and philosophy. He was, however, so much influenced by Plato, whose Socratic talk and democratic principles enchained and fascinated him, that his character became essentially modified, and he learned to hate the despotism under which he grew up, and formed large schemes for political reform. He aspired to cleanse Syracuse of slavery, and clothe her in the dignity of freedom, by establishing an improved constitutional polity, with laws which secured individual rights. He exchanged his luxurious habits for the simple fare of a philosopher. Never before had Plato met with a pupil who so profoundly and earnestly profited from his instructions. The harsh treatment which Plato received from the tyrant was a salutary warning to Dion. He saw that patience was imperatively necessary, and he so conducted as to maintain the favor of Dionysius.

(M683) Dionysius II. was twenty-five years old when his father died, and though he possessed generous impulses, was both weak and vain, given to caprice, and insatiate of praise. He had been kept from business from the excessive jealousy of his father, and his life had been passed in idleness and luxury at the palace of Ortygia. His father's taste for poetry had introduced guests to his table whose conversation opened his mind to generous sentiments, but the indecision of his character prevented his profiting from any serious studies. Dion supported this feeble novice on the throne of his father, and tried to gain influence over him, and frankly suggested the measures to be adopted, and Dionysius listened at first to his wise counsels. Dion wished to make Syracuse a free city, with good laws, to expel the Carthaginians from Sicily, and replant the semi-barbarian Hellenic cities. He also endeavored to reform the life of Dionysius as well as Syracuse, and actually wrought a signal change in his royal pupil, so that he desired to see and converse with the great sage who had so completely changed the life of Dion, and inspired him with patriotic enthusiasm. Accordingly, Plato was sent for, who reluctantly consented to visit Syracuse. He had no great faith in the despot who sought his wisdom, and he did not wish, at sixty-one, to leave his favorite grove, with admiring disciples from every part of Greece, where he reigned as monarch of the mind. He went to Syracuse, not with the hope so much of converting a weak tyrant, as from unwillingness to desert his friend, and be taunted with the impotence of his philosophy. He was received with great distinction at court, and a royal carriage conveyed him to his lodgings. The banquets of the Acropolis became distinguished for simplicity, and the royal pupil commenced at once in taking lessons in geometry. The old courtiers were alarmed, and disgusted. "A single Athenian sophist," they said, "with no force but his tongue and reputation, has achieved the conquest of Syracuse." Dionysius seemed to have abdicated in favor of Plato, and the noble objects for which Dion labored seemed to be on the way of fulfillment. But Plato acted injudiciously, and spoiled his influence by unreasonable vigor. It was absurd to expect that the despot would go to school like a boy, and insist upon a mental regeneration before he gave him lessons of practical wisdom in politics. All the necessary reforms were postponed on the ground that the royal pupil was not yet ripe for them, and every influence was exerted to show him his own unworthiness—that his whole past life had been vicious—delicate ground for any teacher to assume, since he irritated rather than reformed. He was even averse to any political changes until Dionysius had gone through his schooling. Plato also maintained a proud, philosophical dignity, showing no respect to persons, and refusing to the defects of his pupil any more indulgence than he granted to those who listened to his teachings at home.

(M684) Such a mistake was attended soon with difficulties. The old courtiers recovered their influence. Dion was calumniated and slandered, as seeking to usurp the sovereign powers, and that Plato was brought to Syracuse as an agent in the conspiracy. Plato tried to counterwork this mischief, but in vain. Dionysius lost all inclination to reform, and Dion was hated, for he was superior to his nephew in dignity and ability, and was haughty and austere in his manners. He was accordingly banished from Syracuse, and Plato was retained in the Acropolis, but was otherwise well treated, and entreated to remain. The tyrant, however, refused to recall Dion, but consented to the departure of Plato. Another visit to Syracuse, which he made with the hope of securing the recall of Dion, was a splendid captivity, and although he was treated with extraordinary deference, he was not at rest until he obtained permission to depart. He had failed in his mission of benevolence and friendship. All the vast possessions of Dion were confiscated, and Plato had the mortification to hear of this injury in the very palace to which he went as a reformer.

(M685) Incensed at the seizure of his property, and hopeless of permission to return, and of all those reforms which he had projected, Dion now meditated the overthrow of the power of Dionysius, and his own restoration at the point of the sword. During his exile he had chiefly resided in Athens, enjoying the teaching of his friend Plato, and dispensing his vast wealth in generous charities. Nor did Plato fully approve of his plans for the overthrow of Dionysius, anticipating little good from such violence, although he fully admitted his wrongs. But other friends, less judicious and more interested, warmly seconded his projects. With aid from various sources, he at last could muster eight hundred veterans, with which he ventured to attack the most powerful despot in Greece, and in his own stronghold. And so enthusiastic was Dion, all disparity of forces was a matter of indifference. Moreover, he accounted it glory and honor to perish in so just and noble a cause as the liberation of Sicily from a weak and cruel despot, every way inferior to his father in character, though as strong in resources.

(M686) But the friends of Dion did not dream of throwing away their lives. They calculated on a rising of the Syracusans to throw off an insupportable yoke, and they had utter contempt for the tyrant himself, knowing his drunken habits, and effeminate character, and personal incompetency. So, after ten years' exile, Dion, with his followers, landed in Sicily, at Heracleia, also in the absence of Dionysius, who had quitted Syracuse for Italy, with eighty triremes, so that the city was easy of access.

(M687) This unaccountable mistake of the tyrant in leaving his capital at such a crisis, was regarded with great joy by the small army of Dion, which marched out at once from Heracleia, and was joined in the Agrigentian territory with two hundred horsemen. As he approached Syracuse, other bands joined him, so that he had five thousand men as he approached the capital. Timocrates, the husband of Dion's late wife, for his wife was taken away from him, was left in command at Syracuse with a large force of mercenaries. But as Dion advanced to the city, there was a general rising of the citizens, and Timocrates was obliged to return, leaving the fortresses garrisoned. Dion entered the city by the principal street, which was decorated as on a day of jubilee, and proclaimed liberty to all. He was also chosen general, with his brother Megacles, and approached Ortygia, and challenged the garrison to come out and fight. He then succeeded in capturing Epipolae and Eurylae, those fortified quarters, and erected a cross wall from sea to sea to block up Ortygia.

(M688) At the end of seven days, when all these results had been accomplished, Dionysius returned to Syracuse, but Ortygia was the only place which remained to him, and that, too, shut up on the land side by a blockading wall. The rest of the city was in possession of his enemies, though those enemies were subjects. His abdication was imperatively demanded by Dion, who refused all conciliation and promises of reform. Rallying, then, his soldiers, he made a sally to surprise the blockading wall, and was nearly successful, but Dion, at length, repulsed his forces, and recovered the wall. Ortygia was again blockaded, but as Dionysius was still master of the sea, he ravaged the coasts for provisions, and maintained his position, until the arrival of Heraclides, with a Peloponnesian fleet, gave the Syracusans a tolerable naval force. Philistus commanded the fleet of Dionysius, but in a battle with Heraclides, he lost his life.

(M689) Dionysius now lost all hope of recovering his power by force, and resorted to intrigues, stimulating the rivalry of Heraclides, and exposing the defeats of Dion, whose arrogance and severity were far from making him popular. Calumnies now began to assail Dion, and he was mistrusted by the Syracusans, who feared only an exchange of tyrants. There was also an unhappy dissension between Dion and Heraclides, which resulted in the deposition of Dion, and he was forced to retreat from Syracuse, and seek shelter with the people of Leontini, who stood by him. Dionysius again had left Ortygia for Italy, leaving his son in command, and succeeded in sending re-enforcements from Locri, under Nypsius, so that the garrison of Ortygia was increased to ten thousand men, with ample stores. Nypsius sallied from the fortress, mastered the blockading wall, and entered Neapolis and Achradina, fortified quarters of the city. The Syracusans, in distress, then sent to Leontini to invoke the aid of Dion, who returned as victor, drove Nypsius into his fortress, and saved Syracuse. He also magnanimously pardoned Heraclides, and prosecuted the blockade of Ortygia, and was again named general. Still Heraclides, who was allowed to command the fleet, continued his intrigues, and frustrated the operations against Dionysius. At last, Ortygia surrendered to Dion, who entered the fortress, where he found his wife and sister, from whom he had been separated twelve years. At first, Arete, his wife, who had consented to marry Timocrates, was afraid to approach him, but he received her with the tenderest emotion and affection. His son, however, soon after died, having fallen into the drunken habits of Dionysius.

(M690) Dion was now master of Syracuse, and on the pinnacle of power. His enterprise had succeeded against all probabilities. But prosperity, which the Greeks were never able to bear, poisoned all his good qualities and exaggerated his bad ones. He did not fall into the luxury of his predecessors. He still wore the habit of a philosopher, and lived with simplicity, but he made public mistakes. His manners, always haughty, became repulsive. He despised popularity. He conferred no real liberty. He retained his dictatorial power. He preserved the fortifications of Ortygia. He did not meditate a permanent despotism, but meant to make himself king, with a modified constitution, like that of Sparta. He had no popular sympathies, and sought to make Syracuse, like Corinth, completely oligarchial. He took no step to realize any measure of popular freedom, and, above all, refused to demolish the fortress, behind whose fortifications the tyrants of Syracuse had intrenched themselves in danger. He also caused Heraclides to be privately assassinated, so that the Syracusans began to hate him as cordially as they had hated Dionysius. This unpopularity made him irritable, and suspicious and disquieted. A conspiracy, headed by Callippus, put an end to his reign. He was slain by the daggers of assassins. Thus perished one of the noblest of the Greeks, but without sufficient virtue to bear success. His great defect was inexperience in government, and it may be doubted whether Plato himself could have preserved liberty in so corrupt a city as Syracuse. The character of Dion also changed greatly by his banishment, since vindictive sentiments were paramount in his soul. He had a splendid opportunity of becoming a benefactor to his country, but this was thrown away, and instead of giving liberty he only ruled by force, and moved from bad to worse, until he made a martyr of the man whom once he magnanimously forgave. Had he lived longer, he probably would have proved a remorseless tyrant like Tiberius. So rare is it for men to be temperate in the use of power, and so much easier is it to give expression to grand sentiments than practice the self-restraint which has immortalized the few Washingtons of the world.

(M691) The Athenian Callippus, who overturned Dion, remained master of Syracuse for more than a year, but its condition was miserable and deplorable, convulsed by passions and hostile interests. In the midst of the anarchy which prevailed, Dionysius contrived to recover Ortygia, and establish himself as despot. The Syracusans endured more evil than before, for the returned tyrant had animosities to gratify. There was also fresh danger from Carthage, so that the Syracusans appealed to their mother city, Corinth, for aid. Timoleon was chosen as the general of the forces to be sent—an illustrious citizen of Corinth, then fifty years of age, devoted to the cause of liberty, with hatred of tyrants and wrongs, who had even slain his brother when he trampled on the liberties of Corinth—and a brother whom he loved. But he was forced to choose between him and his country, and he chose his country, securing the gratitude of Corinth, but the curses of his mother and the agonies of self-reproach, so that he left for years the haunts of men, and buried himself in the severest solitude. Twenty years elapsed from the fratricide to his command of a force to relieve the Syracusans from their tyrant Dionysius.

(M692) Timoleon commenced his preparations of ships and soldiers with alacrity, but his means were scanty, not equal even to those of Dion when he embarked on his expedition. He was prevented with his small force from reaching Sicily by a Carthaginian fleet of superior force, but he effected his purpose by stratagem, and landed at Taurominium under great discouragements. He defeated Hicetas, who had invoked the aid of Carthage, at Adranum, and marched unimpeded to the walls of Syracuse. Dionysius, blocked up at Ortygia, despaired of his position, and resolved to surrender the fortress, stipulating for a safe conveyance and shelter at Corinth. This tyrant, broken by his drunken habits, did not care to fight, as his father did, for a sceptre so difficult to be maintained, and only sought his ease and self-indulgence. So he passed into the camp of Timoleon with what money he could raise, and the fortress was surrendered. A re-enforcement from Corinth enabled Timoleon to maintain his ground.

(M693) The appearance of the fallen tyrant in Corinth produced a great sensation. Some from curiosity, others from sympathy, and still more from derision, went to see a man who had enjoyed so long despotic power, now suing only for a humble domicile. But his conduct, considering his drunken habits, was marked by more dignity than was to be expected from so weak a man. He is said to have even opened a school to teach boys to read, and to have instructed the public singers in reciting poetry. His career, at least, was an impressive commentary on the mutability of fortune, to which the Greeks were fully alive.

(M694) Timoleon, in possession of Ortygia, with its numerous stores, found himself able to organize a considerable force to oppose the Carthaginians who sought to get possession of the fortress. Hicetas, now assisted by a Carthaginian force under Magon, attacked Ortygia, but was defeated by the Corinthian Neon, who acquired Achradina, and joined it by a wall to Ortygia. But Magon now distrusted Hicetas, and suddenly withdrew his army. Timoleon thus became master of Syracuse, and Hicetas was obliged to retire to Leontini. Timoleon ascribed his good fortune to the gods, but purchased a greater hold on men's minds than fortune gave him by his moderation in the hour of success—a striking contrast to Dion and the elder Dionysius. He invited the Syracusans to demolish the stronghold of tyranny, where the despots had so long intrenched themselves. He erected courts of justice on its site. He recalled the exiles, and invited new colonists to the impoverished city, so that sixty thousand immigrants arrived. He relieved the poverty and distress of the people by selling the public lands, and employed his forces to expel remaining despots from the island.

(M695) But Hicetas again invited the Carthaginians to Sicily. They came, with a vast army of seventy thousand men and twelve hundred ships, under Hasdrubal and Hamilcar, B.C. 340. Timoleon could only assemble twelve thousand to meet this overwhelming force, but with these he marched against the Carthaginians, and gained a great victory, by the aid of a terrible storm which pelted the Carthaginians in the face. No victory was ever more complete than this at Crimisus. Ten thousand of the invaders were slain, and fifteen thousand made prisoners, together with an enormous spoil.

(M696) Timoleon had now to deal with two Grecian enemies—Hicetas and Mamercus—tyrants of Leontini and Catana. Over these he gained a complete victory, and put them to death. He then, after having delivered Syracuse, and defeated his enemies, laid down his power, and became a private citizen. But his influence remained, as it ought to have been, as great as ever, for he was a patriot of most exalted virtue, a counselor whom all could trust—a friend who sacrificed his own interests. And he exerted his influence for the restoration of Syracuse, for the introduction of colonists, and the enforcement of wise laws. The city was born anew, and the gratitude and admiration of the citizens were unbounded. In his latter years he became blind, but his presence could not then even be spared when any serious difficulty arose—ruling by the moral power of wisdom and sanctity—one of the best and loftiest characters of all antiquity. And nothing was more remarkable than his patience under contradiction, and his eagerness to insure freedom of speech, even against himself.

(M697) Thus, by the virtues and wisdom of this remarkable man, were freedom and comfort diffused throughout Sicily for twenty-four years, until the despotism of Agathocles. Timoleon died B.C. 337—a father and benefactor—and the Syracusans solemnized his funeral with lavish honors, which was attended by a countless procession, and passed a vote to honor him for all future time with festive matches, in music and chariot-races, and such gymnastics as were practiced at the Grecian games. A magnificent monument was erected to his memory. "The mournful letters written by Plato after the death of Dion contrasts strikingly with the enviable end of Timoleon, and with the grateful inscription of the Syracusans on his tomb."



CHAPTER XXIV.

PHILIP OF MACEDON.

(M698) No one would have supposed, B.C. 400, that the destruction of Grecian liberties would come from Macedonia—a semi-barbarous kingdom which, during the ascendency of Sparta, had so little political importance. And if any new power threatened to rise over the ruins of the Spartan State, and become paramount in Greece, it was Thebes. The successes of Pelopidas and Epaminondas had effectually weakened the power of Sparta. She no longer enjoyed the headship of Greece. She no longer was the leader of dependent allies, submitting to her dictation in all external politics, serving under the officers she appointed, administering their internal affairs by oligarchies devoted to her purposes, and even submitting to be ruled by governors whom she put over them. She had lost her foreign auxiliary force and dignity, and even half of her territory in Laconia. The Peloponnesians, who once rallied around her were disunited, and Megalopolis and Messene were hostile. Corinth, Sicyon, Epidaurus, and other cities, formerly allies, stood aloof, and the grand forces of Hellas now resided outside of the Peloponnesus. Athens and Thebes were the new seats of power. Athens had regained her maritime supremacy, and Thebes was formidable on the land, having absorbed one-third of the Boeotian territory, and destroyed three or four autonomous cities, and secured powerful allies in Thessaly.

(M699) When the battle of Mantinea was fought, at which Epaminondas lost his life, Perdiccas, son of Amyntas, was the king of Macedonia. He was slain, in the flower of his life, in a battle with the Illyrians, B.C. 359. On the advice of Plato, who had been his teacher, he was induced to bestow upon his brother Philip a portion of territory in Macedonia, who for three years preceding had been living in Thebes as a hostage, carried there by Pelopidas at fifteen years of age, when he had reduced Macedonia to partial submission.

(M700) At Thebes the young prince was treated with courtesy, and resided with one of the principal citizens, and received a good education. He was also favored with the society of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, and witnessed with great interest the training of the Theban forces by these two remarkable men—one the greatest organizer, and the other the greatest tactician of the age. When transferred from Thebes to a subordinate government of a district in his brother's kingdom, he organized a military force on the principles he had learned in Thebes. The unexpected death of Perdiccas, leaving an infant son, opened to him the prospect of succeeding to the throne. He first assumed the government as guardian of his young nephew Amyntas, but the difficulties with which he was surrounded, having many competitors from other princes of the family of Amyntas, his father, that he assumed the crown, putting to death one of his half brothers, while the other two fled into exile.

(M701) His first proceeding as king was to buy the Thracians, his enemies, by presents and promises, so that only the Athenians and the Illyrians remained formidable. But he made peace with Athens by yielding up Amphipolis, for the possession of which the Athenians had made war in Macedonia.

(M702) The Athenians, however, neglected to take possession of Amphipolis, being engaged in a struggle to regain the island of Euboea, then under the dominion of Thebes. It also happened that a revolt of a large number of the islands of the AEgean, which belonged to the confederacy of which Athens was chief, took place—Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Cos, and Rhodes, including Byzantium. This revolt is called the social war, caused by the selfishness of Athens in acting more for her own interest than that of her allies, and neglecting to pay the mercenaries in her service. The revolt was also stimulated by the intrigues of the Carian prince, Mausolus. But it was a serious blow to the foreign ascendency of Athens, and in a battle to recover these islands, the Athenians, under Chabrias, were defeated at Chios. They were also unsuccessful on the Hellespont from quarrels among their generals—Timotheus, Iphicrates, and Chares. The popular voice at Athens laid the blame of defeat on the two former unjustly, in consequence of which Timotheus was fined one hundred talents, the largest fine ever imposed at Athens, and shortly after died in exile—a distinguished man, who had signally maintained the honor and glory of his country. Iphicrates also was never employed again. The loss of these two generals could scarcely be repaired. Soon after, peace was made with the revolted cities, by which their independence and autonomy were guaranteed. This was an inglorious result of the war to Athens, and fatally impaired her power and dignity, so that she was unable to make a stand against the aggressions of Philip.

(M703) One of the first things he did after defeating the Illyrians was to lay siege to Amphipolis, although he had ceded the city to Athens. For this treachery there was no other reason than ambition and the weakened power of Athens. Amphipolis had long remained free, and was not disposed to give up its liberties, and sent to Athens for aid. Philip, an arch politician, contrived by his intrigues to prevent Athens from giving assistance. The neglect of Athens was a great mistake, for Amphipolis commanded the passage over the Strymon, and shut up Macedonia from the east, and was, moreover, easily defensible by sea. Deprived of aid from Athens, the city fell into the hands of Philip, and was an acquisition of great importance. It was the most convenient maritime station in Thrace, and threw open to him all the country east of the Strymon, and especially the gold region near Mount Pangreus. This place henceforward became one of the bulwarks of Macedonia, until the Roman conquest.

(M704) Having obtained this place, he commenced, without a declaration of war against Athens, a series of hostile measures, while he professed to be her friend. He deprived her of her hold upon the Thermaic Gulf, conquered Pydna and Potidaea, and conciliated Olynthus. His power was thus so far increased that he founded a new city, called Philippi, in the regions where his gold mines yielded one thousand talents yearly. He then married Olympias, daughter of a prince of the Molossi, who gave birth, in the year B.C. 356, to a son destined to conquer the world.

(M705) The capture of Amphipolis by Philip was, of course, followed by war with Athens, which lasted twelve years. And this war commenced at a time Athens was in great embarrassments, owing to the social war.

(M706) But he was aided by another event of still greater importance—the sacred war, which for a time convulsed the Hellenic world, and which grew out of the accusation of Thebes, before the Amphictyonic Council, that Sparta had seized her citadel in time of profound peace. The sentence of the council, that Sparta should pay a fine of five hundred talents, was a departure of Grecian custom, and Sparta refused to pay it, which refusal led to her exclusion from the council, the Delphic temple, and the Pythian games, and this exclusion again arrayed the different States of Greece against each other, as to the guardianship of the Oracle itself.

Philip of Macedon seized this opportunity, when so many States were engaged in war, to prosecute his schemes. He attacked Methone, the last remaining possession of Athens on the Macedonian coast, and captured the city, and then advanced into Thessaly against the despots of Pherae, who invoked the aid of Onomarchus, now very powerful.

(M707) It was at this time, B.C. 353, that Demosthenes, the orator, appeared before the Athenian people. He was about twenty-seven years of age, and the wealth of his father secured him great advantages in education. His father died while he was young, and his property was confided to the care of guardians, named in his father's will. But they administered the property with such negligence, that only a small sum came to Demosthenes when he attained his civil majority, at the age of sixteen. After repeated complaints, he brought a judicial action against one of the guardians, and obtained verdict against him to the extent of ten talents. But the guardian delayed the payment, and Demosthenes lost nearly all his patrimony. He had, however, received a good education, and in spite of a feeble constitution, he mastered all the learning of the age. His family influence enabled him to get an early introduction to public affairs, and he proceeded to train himself as a speaker, and a writer of speeches for others. He put himself under the teaching of a famous rhetorician, Iaenus, and profited by the discourses of Plato and Isocrates then in the height of their fame. He also was a great student of Thucydides, and copied his whole history, with his own hand, eight times. He still had to contend against a poor voice, and an ungraceful gesticulation; but by unwearied labor he overcame his natural difficulties so as to satisfy the most critical Athenian audience. But this conquest in self-education was only made by repeated trials and humiliations, and it is said he even spoke with pebbles in his mouth, and prepared himself to overcome the noise of the Assembly by declaiming in stormy weather on the sea-shore. He sometimes passed two or three mouths in a subterranean chamber, practicing by day and by night, both in composition and declamation, such pains did those old Greeks take to perfect themselves in art; for public speaking is an art, as well as literary composition. He learned Sophocles by heart, and took lessons from actors even to get the true accent. It was several years before he was rewarded with success, and then his delivery was full of vehemence and energy, but elaborate and artificial. But it was not more labor which made Demosthenes the greatest orator of antiquity, and perhaps, of all ages and nations, but also natural genius. His self-training merely developed the great qualities of which he was conscious, as was Disraeli when he made his early failures in Parliament. Without natural gifts of eloquence, he might have worked till doomsday without producing the extraordinary effect which is ascribed to him, for his speeches show great insight, genius, and natural force, as well as learning, culture, and practice; so that they could be read like the speeches of Burke and Webster, with great effect. He had great political sagacity, moral wisdom, elevation of sentiment, and patriotic ardor, as well as art. He would have been great, if he had stammered all his life. He composed speeches for other great orators before he had confidence in his own eloquence.

(M708) In contrast with Demosthenes, who was rich, was Phocion, who remained poor, and would receive neither money nor gifts. He went barefoot, like Socrates, and had only one female slave in his household, was personally incorruptible, and also brave in battle, so that he was elected to the office of strategus, or general, forty-five times, without ever having solicited place or been present at the election. He had great contempt of fine speeches, yet was most effective as an orator for his brevity, good sense, and patriotism, and despised the "warlike eloquence, un-warlike despotism, paid speech-writing, and delicate habits of Demosthenes."

(M709) This Athenian, with Spartan character and habits, was opposed to the war with Philip, and was therefore the leading opponent of Demosthenes, whose foresight and sagacity led him to penetrate the schemes of the Macedonian king. But the Athenians were generally induced to a peace policy in degenerate times, and did not sympathize with the lofty principles which Demosthenes declared, and hence the influence of Phocion, though of commanding patriotism and morality, was mischievous, while that of Demosthenes was good. The citizens of Athens, enriched by commerce and enervated by leisure, were at this time averse to the burdens of military service, and formed a striking contrast to their ancestors one hundred years earlier, in the time of Pericles. In the time of Demosthenes, they sought home pleasures, the refinements of art, and the enjoyments of cultivated life, not warlike enterprises. And this decline in military spirit was equally noticeable in the cities of the Peloponnesus. And hence the cities of Greece resorted to mercenaries, like Carthage, and intrusted to them the defense of their liberties. The warlike spirit of ancient Sparta and Athens now was pre-eminent in Macedonia, where the people were poor, hardy, adventurous and bold.

It was against these warlike Macedonians, rude and hardy, that the refined Athenians were now to contend, led by a prince of uncommon military talents and insatiable ambition, and who joined craft to bravery and genius. Demosthenes in vain invoked the ancient spirit which had inspired the heroes of Marathon.

(M710) In the year 383 B.C., Philip attacked Lyeophron, of Pherae, in Thessaly. Onomarchus, then victorious over the Thebans, advanced against Philip, and defeated him in two battles, so that the Macedonian army withdrew from Thessaly. But Philip repaired his losses, marched again into Thessaly, defeated the Phocians, and slew Onomarchus. His conquest of Pherae was now easy, and he rapidly made himself master of all Thessaly, and expelled Lycophron. He then marched to Thermopylae, to the great alarm of Athens, which sent a force to resist him, which force succeeded in defending the pass, and keeping Philip, for a time, from entering Southern Greece. The Phocians also rallied, again availed themselves of the treasure of Delphi, and melted down the golden ornaments and vessels which Croesus, the Lydian king, had given one hundred years before, among which were three hundred and sixty golden goblets, from the proceeds of which a new army of mercenaries was raised.

(M711) The power of Philip was now exceedingly formidable, and his successes inspired great alarm throughout Greece, as would appear from the first Philippic of Demosthenes, delivered in B.C. 352. But the Grecian States had no general able to cope with him on the land, while he created a navy to annoy the Athenians at sea.

(M712) For a time, however, the efforts of Philip were diverted from Southern and Central Greece, in order to conquer the Olynthians. They were his neighbors, and had been his allies; but the expulsion of the Athenians from the coast of Thrace and Macedonia now alarmed the Olynthians, together with the increasing power of Philip, so that they concluded a treaty of peace with Athens. Hostilities broke out in the year 350 B.C., and Demosthenes put forward all his eloquence to excite his countrymen to vigorous war. Athens, partially aroused, sent a body of mercenaries to the assistance of Olynthus, one of the most flourishing of the cities of Chalcidia, southeast of Macedonia. But before effective aid could he rendered, the island of Euboea, through the intrigues of Philip, revolted from Athens. It was in an expedition to recover that island that Demosthenes served as a hoplite in the army, under Phocion as general. It was not till the summer of B.C. 348 that this territory was recovered by Athens. In the year following, Athens made great exertions in behalf of Olynthus, and amid great financial embarrassments. Three expeditions were sent into Chalcidia, under the command of Chares, numbering altogether four thousand Athenians and ten thousand mercenaries. But they were powerless against the conquering arms of Philip, who completely overran and devastated the peninsula, taking thirty-two cities, and selling the people for slaves. At last Olynthus fell, B.C. 347, and the spoils of this old Hellenic city were divided among the soldiers of the conqueror, who celebrated his victories by a splendid festival.

No such calamity had befallen Greece for a century as the conquest of Chalcidia, and it filled Athens with unspeakable alarms. AEschines, the rival of Demosthenes as an orator, now joined with him in denouncing Philip as the common enemy of Greece. Aristodemus was sent to him with propositions of peace, and Philip professed to entertain them favorably, with his characteristic duplicity.

(M713) Meanwhile the sacred war had impoverished the Phocians, and there were dissensions among themselves. Their temple of Delphi had already been stripped of the enormous sum of ten thousand talents, eleven million five hundred thousand dollars, probably equal in our times to two hundred and thirty million dollars; so that it must have been richer, when the relative value of gold and silver is considered, than any church in Christendom. The treasures of the temple, enriched for three hundred years by offerings from all parts of the world, still enabled the Phocians to maintain war with Thebes. At last the Thebans invoked the aid of Philip, and a Macedonian army, under Parmenio, advanced as far as Thessaly. But the Phocians, in alarm, entreated both Sparta and Athens for assistance. The crisis was great, for if Philip should once secure the Pass of Thermopylae, all Southern Greece was in imminent danger. The whole defense of Greece now turned upon this Pass, of as much importance to Philip as to Athens and Sparta, for it was the only road into Greece. Envoys were again sent from Athens to Philip, to learn on what conditions peace could be secured, among whom were Demosthenes and AEschines. But he would grant no better terms than that each party should retain what they already possessed, and the Athenians consented. Philip reaped all the advantages of a peace, which gave him the possession of the cities and territory he had taken. The Phocians were left out in the negotiations, a fatal step, since it required the united forces of Greece from preventing the further encroachments of the Macedonian king. He had now leisure for the completion of the conquest of Thrace. When this was completed, he marched toward Thermopylae, which was held by the Phocians, carefully veiling his real intentions, and even pretending that his advance to the south was for the purpose of reconstituting the Boeotian cities and putting down Thebes. His real object was to surprise the Pass, for he was a man who had very little respect to treaties, promises, or oaths. All this while he contrived to deceive Athens and the Phocians, with the connivance of AEschines, whom he had bribed or cheated. But he did not deceive Demosthenes, who entreated his countrymen to make a stand against him, even at the eleventh hour, for he was then within three days' march of the Pass. But the eloquence and warnings of Demosthenes were in vain. The people went with AEschines, who persuaded them that Philip was friendly to Athens and only hostile to Thebes. It was the design of Philip to detach Athens from the Phocians, and thus make his conquest easier; and he succeeded by his falsehoods and intrigues. Under these circumstances, the Phocians surrendered to Philip the pass, which they ought to have defended at all hazard, and the king retired to Phocis, but still professed the greatest friendship for Athens, with whom he made peace.

(M714) Master now of Phocis, with a triumphant army, he openly joined the Thebans and restored the Temple of Delphi to its inhabitants, and convoked the Amphictyonic Council, which dispossessed the Phocians of their place in the assembly, and conferred it upon Philip. The unhappy Phocians were now reduced to a state of utter ruin. Their towns were dismantled, and their villages were not allowed to contain over fifty houses each. They were stripped, and slain, and their fields laid waste. Philip was now master of the keys of Greece, and the recognized leader of the Amphictyonic Council. Athens had secured an inglorious peace with her enemy, through the corruption of her own envoys, B.C. 346, and was soon to reap the penalty of her credulity and indolence. She allowed herself to be deceived, and Philip, in co-operation with Thebes, the enemy of Athens, presently threw off the mask and disgracefully renewed the war with Athens, He had gained his object by bribery and falsehood. It is mournful that the Athenians should not have listened to the warnings of the most sagacious patriot who adorned those degenerate times, but the influence of AEschines was then paramount, and he was sold to Philip. He cried peace, when there was no peace. The great error of Athens was in not rendering timely assistance to the Phocians, who possessed the Pass of Thermopylae, although they had brought upon themselves the indignation of Greece by the seizure of the Delphic treasures.

(M715) The victories and encroachments of Philip, within the line of common Grecian defense, were profoundly lamented by Demosthenes, and he now felt that it was expedient to keep on terms of peace with so powerful and unscrupulous and cunning a man. Isocrates wished Philip to reconcile the four great cities of Greece, Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Argos, put himself at the head of their united forces, and Greece generally, invade Persia, and liberate the Asiatic Greeks. But this was putting the Hellenic world under one man, and renouncing the independence of States and the autonomy of cities—the great principles of Grecian policy from the earliest historic times, and therefore a complete subversion of Grecian liberties, and the establishment of a centralized power under Philip, whose patrimonial kingdom was among the least civilized in Greece.

(M716) The peace between Philip and Athens lasted, without any formal renunciation, for six years, during which the Macedonian king pursued his aggressive policy and his intrigues in all the States of Greece. His policy was precisely that of Rome when it meditated the conquest of the world, only his schemes were confined chiefly to Greece. Every year his power increased, while the States of Greece remained inactive and uncombined—a proof of the degeneracy of the times—certainly in regard to self-sacrifices to secure their independence. Demosthenes plainly saw the approaching absorption of Greece in the Macedonian dominion, unless the States should unite for common defense; and he took every occasion to denounce Philip, not only in Athens, but to the envoys of the different States. The counsels of the orator were a bitter annoyance to the despot, who sent to Athens letters of remonstrance.

(M717) At last an occasion was presented for hostilities by the refusal of the Athenians to allow Philip to take possession of the island of Halicarnassus, claiming the island as their own. Reprisals took place, and Philip demanded the possession of the Hellespont and Bosphorus, and the Greek cities on their coast, of the greatest value to Athens, since she relied upon the possession of the straits for the unobstructed importation of corn. The Athenians now began to realize the encroaching ambition of Philip, and to listen to Demosthenes, who, about this time, B.C. 341, delivered his third Philippic. From this time to the battle of Chaeronea, the influence of Demosthenes was greater than that of any other man in Athens, which too late listened to his warning voice. Through his influence, Euboea was detached from Philip, and also Byzantium, and they were brought into alliance with Athens. Philip was so much chagrined that he laid siege to Perinthus, and marched through the Chersonese, which was part of the Athenian territory, upon which Athens declared war. Philip, on his side, issued a manifesto declaring his wrongs, as is usual with conquerors, and announced his intention of revenge. The Athenians fitted out a fleet and sent it under Chares to the Hellespont. Philip prosecuted, on his part, the siege of Perinthus, on the Propontis, with an army of thirty thousand men, with a great number of military engines. One of his movable towers was one hundred and twenty feet high, so that he was able to drive away the defenders of the walls by missiles. He succeeded in driving the citizens of this strong town into the city, and it would have shared the fate of Olynthus, had it not been relieved by the Byzantine and Grecian mercenaries. Philip was baffled, after a siege of three months, and turned his forces against Byzantium, but this town was also relieved by the Athenians, and the inhabitants from the islands of the AEgean. These operations lasted six mouths, and were the greatest adverses which Philip had as yet met with. A vote of thanks was decreed by the Athenians to Demosthenes, who had stimulated these enterprises. Philip was obliged to withdraw from Byzantium, and retreated to attack the Scythians. An important reform in the administration of the marine was effected by Demosthenes, although opposed by the rich citizens and by AEschines.

(M718) While these events transpired, a new sacred war was declared by the Amphictyonic Council against the Locrians of Amphissa, kindled by AEschines, which more than compensated Philip for his repulse at Byzantium, bringing advantage to him and ruin to Grecian liberty. But the Athenians stood aloof from this suicidal war, when all the energies of Greece were demanded to put down the encroachments of Philip. As was usual in these intestine troubles, the weaker party invoked the aid of a foreign power, and the Amphictyonic Assembly, intent on punishing Amphissa, sought assistance from Philip. He, of course, accepted the invitation, and marched south through Thermopylae, proclaiming his intention to avenge the Delphian god. In his march he took Nicaea from the Thebans, and entered Phocis, and converted Elatea into a permanent garrison. Hitherto he had only proclaimed himself as a general acting under the Amphictyonic vote to avenge the Delphian god,—now he constructed a military post in the heart of Greece.

(M719) Thebes, ever since the battle of Leuctra, had been opposed to Athens, and even now unfriendly relations existed between the two cities, and Philip hoped that Thebes would act in concert with him against Athens. But this last outrage of Philip exceedingly alarmed Athens, and Demosthenes stood up in the Assembly to propose an embassy to Thebes with offers of alliance. His advice was adopted, and he was dispatched with other envoys to Thebes. The Athenian orator, in spite of the influence of the Macedonian envoys, carried his point with the Theban Assembly, and an alliance was formed between Thebes and Athens. The Athenian army marched at once to Thebes, and vigorous measures were made at Athens for the defensive war which so seriously threatened the loss of Grecian liberty. The alliance was a great disappointment to Philip, who remained at Phocis, and sent envoys to Sparta, inviting the Peloponnesians to join him against Amphissa. But the Thebans and Athenians maintained their ground against him, and even gained some advantages. Among other things, they reconstituted the Phocian towns. The Athenians and their allies had a force of fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, and Demosthenes was the war minister by whom these forces were collected. These efforts on the part of Thebes and Athens led to renewed preparations on the part of Philip. He defeated a large body of mercenaries, and took Amphissa. Unfortunately, the Athenians had no general able to cope with him, and it was the work of Demosthenes merely to keep up the courage of his countrymen and incite them to effort.

(M720) At last, in the month of August, Philip, with thirty thousand foot and two thousand horse, met the allied Greeks at Chaeronea, the last Boeotian town on the frontiers of Phocis. The command of the armies of the allies was shared between the Thebans and Athenians, but their movements were determined by a council of civilians and generals, of which Demosthenes was the leading spirit. Philip, in this battle, which decided the fortunes of Greece, commanded the right wing, opposed to the Athenians, and his son Alexander, the left wing, opposed to the Thebans. The Macedonian phalanx, organized by Philip, was sixteen deep, with veteran soldiers in the front. The Theban "Sacred Band" was overpowered and broken by its tremendous force, much increased by the long pikes which projected in front of the foremost soldiers. But the battle was not gained by the phalanx alone. The organization of the Macedonian army was perfect, with many other sorts of troops, bodyguards, light hoplites, light cavalry, bowmen, and slingers. One thousand Athenians were slain, and two thousand more were made captives. The Theban loss was still greater.

(M721) Unspeakable was the grief and consternation of Athens, when the intelligence reached her of this decisive victory. A resolution was at once taken for a vigorous defense of the city. All citizens sent in their contributions, and every hand was employed on the fortifications. The temples were stripped of arms, and envoys were sent to various places for aid.

(M722) Thebes was unable to rally, and fell into the hands of the victors, and a Macedonian garrison was placed in the Cadmea, or citadel. From Athens, envoys were sent to Philip for peace, which was granted on the condition that he should be recognized as the chief of the Hellenic world. It was a great humiliation to Athens to concede this, after having defeated the Persian hosts, and keeping out so long all foreign domination. But times had changed, and the military spirit had fled.

Athens was not prostrated by the battle of Chaeronea. She still retained her navy, and her civic rights. Thebes was utterly prostrated, and never rallied again.

(M723) Philip, having now subjugated Thebes, and constrained Athens into submission, next proceeded to carry his arms into the Peloponnesus. He found but little resistance, except in Laconia. The Corinthians, Argeians, Messenians, Elians, and Arcadians submitted to his power. Even Sparta could make but feeble resistance. He laid waste Laconia, and then convened a congress of Grecian cities at Corinth, and announced his purpose to undertake an expedition against the king of Persia, avenge the invasion of Greece by Xerxes, and liberate the Asiatic Greeks. A large force of two hundred thousand foot and fifteen thousand horse was promised him, and all the States of Greece concurred, except Sparta, which held aloof from the congress. Athens was required to furnish a well equipped fleet. All the States, and all the islands, and all the cities of Greece, were now subservient to Philip, and no one State could exercise control over its former territories.

(M724) It was in the year B.C. 337, that this great scheme for the invasion of Persia was concerted, which created no general enthusiasm, since Persia was no longer a power to be feared. The only power to be feared now was Macedonia. While preparations were going on for this foolish and unnecessary expedition, the prime mover of it was assassinated, and his career, so disastrous to Grecian liberty, came to an end. It seems that he had repudiated his wife, Olympias, disgusted with the savage impulses of her character, and married, for his last wife, for he had several, Cleopatra, which provoked bitter dissensions among the partisans of the two queens, and also led to a separation between himself and his son Alexander, although a reconciliation afterward took place. It was while celebrating the marriage of his daughter by Olympias, with Alexander, king of Epirus, and also the birth of a son by Cleopatra, that Pausanias, one of the royal body-guard, who nourished an implacable hatred of Philip, chose his opportunity, and stabbed him with a short sword he had concealed under his garment.

(M725) Alexander, the son of Philip by Olympias, was at once declared king, whose prosecution of the schemes of his father are to be recounted in the next chapter. Philip perished at the age of forty-seven, after a most successful reign of twenty-three years. On his accession he found his kingdom a narrow territory around Pella, excluded from the sea-coast. At his death the Macedonian kingdom was the most powerful in Greece, and all the States and cities, except Sparta, recognized its ascendency. He had gained this great power, more from the weakness and dissensions of the Grecian States, than from his own strength, great as were his talents. He became the arbiter of Greece by unscrupulous perjury and perpetual intrigues. But he was a great organizer, and created a most efficient army. Without many accomplishments, he affected to be a patron of both letters and religion. His private life was stained by character or drunkenness, gambling, perfidy, and wantonness. His wives and mistresses were as numerous as those of an Oriental despot. He was a successful man, but it must be borne in mind that he had no opponents like Epaminondas, or Agesilaus, or Iphicrates. Demosthenes was his great opponent, but only in counsels and speech. The generals of Athens, and Sparta, and Thebes had passed away, and with the decline of military spirit, it is not remarkable that Philip should have ascended to a height from which he saw the Grecian world suppliant at his feet.



CHAPTER XXV.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

(M726) We come now to consider briefly the career of Alexander, the son of Philip—the most successful, fortunate, and brilliant hero of antiquity. I do not admire either his character or his work. He does not compare the with Caesar or Napoleon in comprehensiveness of genius, or magnanimity, or variety of attainments, or posthumous influences. He was a meteor—a star of surprising magnitude, which blazed over the whole Oriental world with unprecedented brilliancy. His military genius was doubtless great—even transcendent, and his fame is greater than his genius. His prestige is wonderful. He conquered the world more by his name than by his power. Only two men, among military heroes, dispute his pre-eminence in the history of nations. After more than two thousand years, his glory shines with undiminished brightness. His conquests extended over a period of only twelve years, yet they were greater and more dazzling than any man ever made before in a long reign. Had he lived to be fifty, he might have subdued the whole world, and created a universal empire equal to that of the Caesars—which was the result of five hundred years' uninterrupted conquests by the greatest generals of a military nation. Though we neither love nor reverence Alexander, we can not withhold our admiration, for his almost superhuman energy, courage, and force of will. He looms up as one of the prodigies of earth—yet sent by Providence as an avenger—an instrument of punishment on those effeminated nations, or rather dynasties, which had triumphed over human misery. I look upon his career, as the Christians of the fifth century looked upon that of Alaric or Attila, whom they called the scourge of God.

(M727) His conquests and dominions were, however, prepared by one perhaps greater than himself in creative genius, and as unscrupulous and cruel as he. Philip found his kingdom a little brook; he left it a river—broad, deep, and grand. Under Alexander, this river became an irresistible torrent, sweeping every thing away which impeded its course. Philip created an army, and a military system, and generals, all so striking, that Greece succumbed before him, and yielded up her liberties. Alexander had only to follow out his policy, which was to subdue the Persians. The Persian empire extended over all the East—Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Parthia, Babylonia, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Bactria, and other countries—the one hundred and twenty provinces of Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus, from the Mediterranean to India, from the Euxine and Caspian Seas to Arabia and the Persian Gulf—a monstrous empire, whose possession was calculated to inflame the monarchs who reigned at Susa and Babylon with more than mortal pride and self-sufficiency. It had been gradually won by successive conquerors, from Nimrod to Darius. It was the gradual absorption of all the kingdoms of the East in the successive Assyrian, Babylonian, and Persian empires—for these three empires were really one under different dynasties, and were ruled by the same precedents and principles. The various kingdoms which composed this empire, once independent, yielded to the conquerors who reigned at Babylon, or Nineveh, or Persepolis, and formed satrapies paying tribute to the great king. The satraps of Cyrus were like the satraps of Nebuchadnezzar, members or friends of the imperial house, who ruled the various provinces in the name of the king of Babylon, or Persia, without much interference with the manners, or language, or customs, or laws, or religion of the conquered, contented to receive tribute merely, and troops in case of war. And so great was the accumulation of treasure in the various royal cities where the king resided part of the year, that Darius left behind him on his flight, in Ecbatana alone, one hundred and eighty thousand talents, or two hundred million dollars. It was by this treasure that the kings of Persia lived in such royal magnificence, and with it they were able to subsidize armies to maintain their power throughout their vast dominions, and even gain allies like the Greeks, when they had need of their services. Their treasures were inexhaustible—and were accumulated with the purpose of maintaining empire, and hence were not spent, but remained as a sacred deposit.

(M728) It was to overthrow this empire that Philip aspired, after he had conquered Greece, in part to revenge the injuries inflicted by the Persian invasions, but more from personal ambition. And had he lived, he would have succeeded, and his name would have been handed down as the great conqueror, rather than that of his more fortunate son. Philip knew what a rope of sand the Persian military power was. Xenophon had enlightened the Greeks as to the inefficiency of the Persian armies, if they needed any additional instruction after the defeat of Xerxes and his generals. The vast armies of the Persians made a grand show, and looked formidable when reviewed by the king in his gilded chariot, surrounded by his nobles, the princes of his family, and the women of his harem. And these armies were sufficient to keep the empire together. The mighty prestige attending victories for one thousand years, and all the pomp of millions in battle array, was adequate to keep the province together, for the system of warfare and the character of the forces were similar in all the provinces. It was external enemies, with a different system of warfare, that the Persian kings had to dread—not the revolt of enervated States, and unwarlike cities. The Orientals were never warlike in the sense that Greece and Rome were. The armies of Greece and Rome were small, but efficient. It was seldom that any Grecian or Roman army exceeded fifty thousand men, but they were veterans, and they had military science and skill and discipline. The hosts of Xerxes or Darius were undisciplined, and they were mercenaries, unlike the original troops of Cyrus.

(M729) Now it was the mission of Alexander to overturn the dynasties which reigned so ingloriously on the banks of the Euphrates—to overrun the Persian empire from north to south and east to west—to cut it up, and form new kingdoms of the dismembered provinces, and distribute the hoarded treasures of Susa, Persepolis, and Ecbatana—to introduce Greek satraps instead of Persian—to favor the spread of the Greek language and institutions—to found new cities where Greeks might reign, from which they might diffuse their spirit and culture. Alexander spent only one year of his reign in Greece, all the rest of his life was spent in the various provinces of Persia. He was the conqueror of the Oriental world. He had no hard battles to fight, like Caesar or Napoleon. All he had to do was to appear with his troops, and the enemy fled. Cities were surrendered as he approached. The two great battles which decided the fate of Persia—Issus and Arbela—were gained at the first shock of his cavalry. Darius fled from the field, in both instances, at the very beginning of the battle, and made no real resistance. The greater the number of Persian soldiers, the more disorderly was the rout. The Macedonian soldiers fought retreating armies in headlong flight. The slaughter of the Persians was mere butchery. It was something like collecting a vast number of birds in a small space, and shooting them when collected in a corner, and dignifying the slaughter with a grand name—not like chasing the deer over rocks and hills.

(M730) The military genius of Alexander was seen in the siege of the few towns which did resist, like Tyre and Gaza; in his rapid marches; in the combination of his forces; in the system, foresight, and sagacity he displayed, conquering at the light time, marching upon the right place, husbanding his energies, wasting no time in expeditions which did not bear on the main issue, and concentrating his men on points which were vital and important. Philip, if he had lived, might have conquered the Persian empire; but he would not have conquered so rapidly as Alexander, who knew no rest, and advanced from conquering to conquer, in some cases without ulterior objects, as in the Indian campaigns—simply from the love and excitement of conquest. He only needed time. He met no enemies who could oppose him—more, I apprehend, from the want of discipline among his enemies, than from any irresistible strength of his soldiers, for he embodied the conquered soldiers in his own army, and they fought like his own troops, when once disciplined. Nor did he dream of reconstruction, or building up a great central power. He would, if he had lived, have overrun Arabia, and then Italy, and Gaul. But he did not live to measure his strength with the Romans. His mission was ended when he had subdued the Persian world. And he left no successor. His empire was divided among his generals, and new kingdoms arose on the ruins of the Persian empire.

(M731) "Alexander was born B.C. 356, and like his father, Philip, was not Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, only partially imbued with Grecian sentiment and intelligence." He inherited the ambition of Philip, and the violent and headstrong temperament of his furious mother, Olympias. His education was good, and he was instructed by his Greek tutors in the learning common to Grecian princes. His taste inclined him to poetry and literature, rather than to science and philosophy. At thirteen he was intrusted to the care of the great Aristotle, and remained under his teaching three years. At sixteen he was left regent of the Macedonian kingdom, whose capital was Pella, while his father was absent in the siege of Byzantium. At eighteen he commanded one of the wings of the army at the battle of Chaeronea. His prospects were uncertain up to the very day when Philip was assassinated, on account of family dissensions, and the wrath of his father, whom he had displeased. But he was proclaimed king on the death of Philip, B.C., 336 and celebrated his funeral with great magnificence, and slew many of his murderers. The death of Philip had excited aspirations of freedom in the Grecian States, but there was no combination to throw off the Macedonian yoke. Alexander well understood the discontent of Greece, and his first object was to bring it to abject submission. With the army of his father he marched from State to State, compelling submission, and punishing with unscrupulous cruelty all who resisted. After displaying his forces in various portions of the Peloponnesus, he repaired to Corinth and convened the deputies from the Grecian cities, and was chosen to the headship of Greece, as his father, Philip, had been. He was appointed the keeper of the peace of Greece. Each Hellenic city was declared free, and in each the existing institutions were recognized, but no new despot was to be established, and each city was forbidden to send armed vessels to the harbor of any other, or build vessels, or engage seamen there. Such was the melancholy degradation of the Grecian world. Its freedom was extinguished, and there was no hope of escaping the despotism of Macedonia, but by invoking aid from the Persian king. Had he been wise, he would have subsidized the Greeks with a part of his vast treasures, and raised a force in Greece able to cope with Alexander. But he was doomed, and the Macedonian king was left free to complete the conquest of all the States. He first marched across Mount Haemus, and subdued the Illyrians, Paeonians, and Thracians. He even crossed the Danube, and defeated the Gaetae.

(M732) Just as he had completed the conquest of the barbarians north of Macedonia, he heard that the Thebans had declared their independence, being encouraged by his long absence in Thrace, and by reports of his death. But he suddenly appeared with his victorious army, and as the Thebans had no generals equal to Pelopidas and Epaminondas, they were easily subdued. Thebes was taken by assault, and the population was massacred—even women and children, whether in their houses or in temples. Thirty thousand captives were reserved for sale. The city was razed to the ground, and the Cadmea alone was preserved for a Macedonian garrison. The Theban territory was partitioned among the reconstructed cities of Orchomenus and Plataea. This severity was unparalleled in the history of Greece, but the remorseless conqueror wished to strike with terror all other cities, and prevent rebellion. He produced the effect he desired. All the cities of Greece hastened to make peace with so terrible an enemy. He threatened a like doom on Athens because she refused to surrender the anti-Macedonian leaders, including Demosthenes, but was finally appeased through the influence of Phocion, since he did not wish to drive Athens to desperate courses, which might have impeded his contemplated conquest of Persia, for the city was still strong in naval defenses, and might unite with the Persian king. So Athens was spared, but the empire of Thebes was utterly destroyed. He then repaired to Corinth to make arrangements for his Persian campaign, and while in that city he visited the cynical philosopher, Diogenes, who lived in a tub. It is said that when the philosopher was asked by Alexander if he wished any thing, he replied: "Nothing, except that you would stand a little out of my sunshine"—a reply which extorted from the conqueror the remark: "If I were not Alexander, I would be Diogenes."

(M733) It took Alexander a year and a few months to crush out what little remained of Grecian freedom, subdue the Thracians, and collect forces for his expedition into Persia. In the spring of 334 B.C., his army was mustered between Pella and Amphipolis, while his fleet was at hand to render assistance. In April he crossed the strait from Sestos to Abydos, and never returned to his own capital—Pella—or to Europe. The remainder of his life, eleven years and two months, was spent in Asia, in continued and increasing conquests; and these were on such a gigantic scale that Greece dwindled into insignificance.

(M734) When marshalled on the Asiatic shore, the army of Alexander presented a total of thirty thousand infantry, and four thousand five hundred cavalry—a small force, apparently, to overthrow the most venerable and extensive empire in the world. But these troops were veterans, trained by Philip, and commanded by able generals. Of these troops twelve thousand were Macedonians, armed with the sarissa, a long pike, which made the phalanx, sixteen deep, so formidable. The sarissa was twenty-one feet in length, and so held by both hands as to project fifteen feet before the body of the pikeman. The soldier of the phalanx was also provided with a short sword, a circular shield, a breastplate, leggings, and broad-brimmed hat. But, besides the phalanx of heavy armed men, there were hoplites lightly armed, hypaspists for the assault of walled places, and troops with javelins and with bows. The cavalry was admirable, distributed into squadrons, among whom were the body-guards—all promoted out of royal pages and the picked men of the army, sons of the chief people in Macedonia, and these were heavily armed.

(M735) The generals who served under Alexander were all Macedonians, and had been trained by Philip. Among these were Hephaestion, the intimate personal friend of Alexander, Ptolemy, Perdiccas, Antipater, Clitus, Parmenio, Philotas, Nicanor, Seleucus, Amyntas, Phillipes, Lysimachus, Antigonas, most of whom reached great power. Parmenio and Antipater were the highest in rank, the latter of whom was left as viceroy of Macedonia, Eumenes was the private secretary of Alexander, the most long-headed man in his army.

(M736) Alexander had landed, unopposed, against the advice of Memnon and Mentor—two Rhodians, in the service of Darius, the king—descendants of one of the brothers of Artaxerxes Mnemon—the children of King Ochus, after his assassination, having all been murdered by the eunuch Bagoas. As the Persians were superior by sea to the Macedonians, it was an imprudence to allow Alexander to cross the Hellespont without opposition; but Memnon was overruled by the Persian satraps, who supposed that they were more than a match for Alexander on the land, and hoped to defeat him. Arsites, the Phrygian satrap, commanded the Persian forces, assisted by other satraps, and Persians of high rank, among whom were Spithridates, satrap of Lydia and Ionia. The cavalry of the Persians greatly outnumbered that of the Macedonians, but the infantry was inferior. Memnon advised the satraps to avoid fighting on the land, and to employ the fleet for aggressive movements in Macedonia and Greece, but Arsites rejected his advice. The Persians took post on the river Granicus, near the town of Parium, on one of the declivities of Mount Ida. Alexander at once resolved to force the passage of the river, taking the command of the right wing, and giving the left to Parmenio. The battle was fought by the cavalry, in which Alexander showed great personal courage. At one time he was in imminent danger of his life, from the cimeter of Spithridates, but Clitus saved him by severing the uplifted arm of the satrap from his body with his sword. The victory was complete, and great numbers of the satraps were slain. There remained no force in Asia Minor to resist the conqueror, and the Asiatics submitted in terror and alarm. Alexander then sent Parmenio to subdue Dascyleum, the stronghold of the satrap of Phrygia, while he advanced to Sardis, the capital of Lydia, and the main station of the Persians in Asia Minor. The citadel was considered impregnable, yet such was the terror of the Persians, that both city and citadel surrendered without a blow. Phrygia and Lydia then fell into his hands, with immense treasure, of which he stood in need. He then marched to Ephesus, and entered the city without resistance, and thus was placed in communication with his fleet, under the command of Nicanor. He found no opposition until he reached Miletus, which was encouraged to resist him from the approach of the Persian fleet, four hundred sail, chiefly of Phoenician and Cyprian ships, which, a few weeks earlier, might have prevented his crossing into Asia. But the Persian fleet did not arrive until the city was invested, and the Macedonian fleet, of one hundred and sixty sail, had occupied the harbor. Alexander declined to fight on the sea, but pressed the siege on the land, so that the Persian fleet, unable to render assistance, withdrew to Halicarnassus. The city fell, and Alexander took the resolution of disbanding his own fleet altogether, and concentrating all his operations on the land—doubtless a wise, but desperate measure. He supposed, and rightly, that after he had taken the cities on the coast, the Persian fleet would be useless, and the country would be insured to his army.

(M737) Alexander found some difficulty at the siege of Halicarnassus, from the bravery of the garrison, commanded by Memnon, and the strength of the defenses, aided by the Persian fleet. But his soldiers, "protected from missiles by movable pent-houses, called tortoises, gradually filled up the deep and wide ditch round the town, so as to open a level road for his engines (rolling towers of wood) to come up close to the walls." Then the battering-rams overthrew the towers of the city wall, and made a breach in them, so that the city was taken by assault. Memnon, forced to abandon his defenses, withdrew the garrison by sea, and Alexander entered the city. The ensuing winter months were employed in the conquest of Lydia, Pamphylia, and Pisidia, which was effected easily, since the terror of his arms led to submission wherever he appeared. At Gordium, in Phrygia, he performed the exploit familiarly known as the cutting of the Gordian knot, which was a cord so twisted and entangled, that no one could untie it. The oracle had pronounced that to the person who should untie it, the empire of Persia was destined. Alexander, after many futile attempts to disentangle the knot, in a fit of impatience, cut it with his sword, and this was accepted as the solution of the problem.

(M738) Meanwhile Memnon, to whom Darius had intrusted the guardianship of the whole coast of Asia Minor, with a large Phoenician fleet and a considerable body of Grecian mercenaries, acquired the important island of Chios, and a large part of Lesbos. But in the midst of his successes, he died of sickness, and no one was left able to take his place. Had his advice been taken, Alexander could not have landed in Asia. His death was an irreparable loss to Persian cause, and with his death vanished all hope of employing the Persian force with wisdom and effect. Darius now changed his policy, and resolved to carry on offensive measures on the land. He therefore summoned a vast army, from all parts of his empire, of five hundred thousand infantry, and one hundred thousand cavalry. An eminent Athenian, Charidemus, advised the Persian king to employ his great treasure in subsidizing the Greeks, and not to dream, with his undisciplined Asiatics, to oppose the Macedonians in battle. But the advice was so unpalatable to the proud and self-reliant king, in the midst of his vast forces, that he looked upon Charidemus as a traitor, and sent him to execution.

(M739) It would not have been difficult for Darius to defend his kingdom, had he properly guarded the mountain passes through which Alexander must needs march to invade Persia. Here again Darius was infatuated, and he, in his self-confidence, left the passes over Mount Taurus and Mount Amanus undefended. Alexander, with re-enforcements from Macedonia, now marched from Gordium through Paphlagonia and Cappadocia, whose inhabitants made instant submission, and advanced to the Cilician Gates—an impregnable pass in the Taurus range, which opened the way to Cilicia. It had been traversed seventy years before by Cyrus the Younger, with the ten thousand Greeks, and was the main road from Asia Minor into Cilicia and Syria. The narrowest part of this defile allowed only four soldiers abreast, and here Darius should have taken his stand, even as the Greeks took possession of Thermopylae in the invasion of Xerxes. But the pass was utterly undefended, and Alexander marched through unobstructed without the loss of a man. He then found himself at Tarsus, where he made a long halt, from a dangerous illness which he got by bathing in the river Cydnus. When he recovered, he sent Parmenio to secure the pass over Mount Amanus, six days' march from Tarsus, called the Cilician Gates. These were defended, but the guard fled at the approach of the Macedonians, and this important defile was secured. Alexander then marched through Issus to Myriandrus, to the south of the Cilician Gates, which he had passed. The Persians now advanced from Sochi and appeared in his rear at Issus—a vast host, in the midst of which was Darius with his mother, his wife, his harem, and children, who accompanied him to witness his anticipated triumph, for it seemed to him an easy matter to overwhelm and crush the invaders, who numbered only about forty thousand men. So impatient was Darius to attack Alexander that he imprudently advanced into Cilicia by the northern pass, now called Beylan, with all his army, so that in the narrow defiles of that country his cavalry was nearly useless. He encamped near Issus, on the river Pinarus. Alexander, learning that Darius was in his rear, retraced his steps, passed north through the Gates of Cilicia, through which he had marched two days before, and advanced to the river Pinarus, on the north bank of which Darius was encamped. And here Darius resolved to fight. He threw across the river thirty thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, to insure the undisturbed formation of his main force. His main line was composed of ninety thousand hoplites, of which thirty thousand were Greek in the centre. On the mountain to his left, he posted twenty thousand, to act against the right wing of the Macedonian army. He then recalled the thirty thousand cavalry and twenty thousand infantry, which he had sent across the river, and awaited the onset of Alexander, Darius was in his chariot, in the centre, behind the Grecian hoplites. But the ground was so uneven, that only a part of his army could fight. A large proportion of it were mere spectators.

(M740) Alexander advanced to the attack. The left-wing was commanded by Parmenio, and the right by himself, on which were placed the Macedonian cavalry. The divisions of the phalanx were in the centre, and the Peloponnesian cavalry and Thracian light infantry on the left. The whole front extended only one and a half mile. Crossing the river rapidly, Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, light infantry, and some divisions of the phalanx, fell suddenly upon the Asiatic hoplites which were stationed on the Persian left. So impetuous and unexpected was the charge, that the troops instantly fled, vigorously pressed by the Macedonian right. Darius, from his chariot, saw the flight of his left wing, and, seized with sudden panic, caused his chariot to be turned, and fled also among the foremost fugitives. In his terror he cast away his bow, shield, and regal mantle. He did not give a single order, nor did he remain a moment after the defeat of his left, as he ought, for he was behind thirty thousand Grecian hoplites, in the centre, but abandoned himself to inglorious flight, and this was the signal for a general flight also of all his troops, who turned and trampled each other down in their efforts to get beyond the reach of the enemy.

(M741) Thus the battle was lost by the giving way of the Asiatic hoplites on the left, and the flight of Darius in a few minutes after. The Persian right showed some bravery, till Alexander, having completed the rout of the left, turned to attack the Grecian mercenaries in the flank and rear, when all fled in terror. The slaughter of the fugitives was prodigious. The camp of Darius was taken, with his mother, wife, sister, and children. One hundred thousand Persians were slain, not in fight, but in flight, and among them were several eminent satraps and grandees. The Persian hosts were completely dispersed, and Darius did not stop till he had crossed the Euphrates. The booty acquired was immense, in gold, silver, and captives.

(M742) Such was the decisive battle of Issus, where the cowardice and incompetency of Darius were more marked than the generalship of Alexander himself. No victory was ever followed by more important consequences. It dispersed the Persian hosts, and opened Persia to a victorious enemy, and gave an irresistible prestige to the conqueror. The fall of the empire was rendered probable, and insured successive triumphs to Alexander.

(M743) But before he proceeded to the complete conquest of the Persian empire, Alexander, like a prudent and far-reaching general, impetuous as he was, concluded to subdue first all the provinces which lay on the coast, and thus make the Persian fleet useless, and ultimately capture it, and leave his rear without an enemy. Accordingly he sent Parmenio to capture Damascus, where were collected immense treasures. It was surrendered without resistance though it was capable of sustaining a siege. There were captured vast treasures, with prodigious numbers of Persians of high rank, and many illustrious Greek exiles. Master of Damascus, Alexander, in the winter of B.C. 331, advanced upon Phoenicia, the cities of which mostly sent letters of submission. While at Maranthus, Darius wrote to Alexander, asking for the restitution of his wife, mother, sister, and daughter, and tendering friendship, to which Alexander replied in a haughty letter, demanding to be addressed, not as an equal, but as lord of Asia.

(M744) The last hope of Darius was in the Phoenicians, who furnished him ships; and one city remained firm in its allegiance—Tyre—the strongest and most important place in Phoenicia. But even this city would have yielded on fair and honorable conditions. This did not accord with Alexander's views, who made exorbitant demands, which could not be accepted by the Tyrians without hazarding their all. Accordingly they prepared for a siege, trusting to the impregnable defenses of the city. It was situated on an islet, half a mile from the main land, surrounded by lofty walls and towers of immense strength and thickness. But nothing discouraged Alexander, who loved to surmount difficulties. He constructed a mole from the main land to the islet, two hundred feet wide, of stone and timber, which was destroyed by a storm and by the efforts of the Tyrians. Nothing daunted, he built another, still wider and stronger, and repaired to Sidon, where he collected a great fleet, with which he invested the city by sea, as well as land. The doom of the city was now sealed, and the Tyrians could offer no more serious obstructions. The engines were then rolled along the mole to the walls, and a breach was at last made, and the city was taken by assault. The citizens then barricaded the streets, and fought desperately until they were slain. The surviving soldiers were hanged, and the women and children sold as slaves. Still the city resisted for seven months, and its capture was really the greatest effort of genius that Alexander had shown, and furnished an example to Richelieu in the siege of La Rochelle.

(M745) On the fall of this ancient and wealthy capital, whose pride and wealth are spoken of in the Scriptures, Alexander received a second letter from Darius, offering ten thousand talents, his daughter in marriage, with the cession of all the provinces of his empire west of the Euphrates, for the surrender of his family. To which the haughty and insolent conqueror replied: "I want neither your money nor your cession. All your money and territory are mine already, and you are tendering me a part instead of the whole. If I choose to marry your daughter I shall marry her, whether you give her to me or not. Come hither to me, if you wish for friendship."

(M746) Darius now saw that he must risk another desperate battle, and summoned all his hosts. Yet Alexander did not immediately march against him, but undertook first the conquest of Egypt. Syria, Phoenicia, and Palestine were now his, as well as Asia Minor. He had also defeated the Persian fleet, and was master of all the islands of the AEgean. He stopped on his way to Egypt to take Gaza, which held out against him, built on a lofty artificial mound two hundred and fifty feet high, and encircled with a lofty wall. The Macedonian engineers pronounced the place impregnable, but the greater the difficulty the greater the eagerness of Alexander to surmount it. He accordingly built a mound all around the city, as high as that on which Gaza was built, and then rolled his engines to the wall, effected a breach, and stormed the city, slew all the garrison, and sold all the women and children for slaves. As for Batis, the defender of the city, he was dragged by a chariot around the town, as Achilles, whom Alexander imitated, had done to the dead body of Hector. The siege of these two cities, Tyre and Gaza, occupied nine months, and was the hardest fighting that Alexander ever encountered.

(M747) He entered and occupied Egypt without resistance, and resolved to found a new city, near the mouth of the Nile, not as a future capital of the commercial world, but as a depot for his ships. While he was preparing for this great work, he visited the temple of Jupiter Ammon in the desert, and was addressed by the priests as the Son of God, not as a mortal, which flattery was agreeable to him, so that ever afterward he claimed divinity, in the arrogance of his character, and the splendor of his successes, and even slew the man who saved his life at the Granicus, because he denied his divine claims—the most signal instance of self-exaggeration and pride recorded in history, transcending both Nebuchadnezzar and Napoleon.

(M748) After arranging his affairs in Egypt, and obtaining re-enforcements of Greeks and Thracians, he set out for the Euphrates, which he crossed at Thapsacus, unobstructed—another error of the Persians. But Darius was paralyzed by the greatness of his misfortunes, and by the capture of his family, and could not act with energy or wisdom. He collected his vast hosts on a plain near Arbela, east of the Tigris, and waited for the approach of the enemy. He had one million of infantry, forty thousand cavalry, and two hundred scythed chariots, besides a number of elephants. He placed himself in the centre, with his choice troops, including the horse and foot-guards, and mercenary Greeks. In the rear stood deep masses of Babylonians, and on the left, and right, Bactrians, Cadusians, Medes, Albanians, and troops from the remote provinces. In the front of Darius, were the scythed chariots with advanced bodies of cavalry.

(M749) Alexander, as he approached, ranged his forces with great care and skill, forty thousand foot and seven thousand horse. His main line was composed, on the right, of choice cavalry; then, toward the left, of hypaspists; then the phalanx, in six divisions, which formed the centre; then Greek cavalry on the extreme left. Behind the main line was a body of reserves, intended to guard against attack on the flanks and rear. In front of the main line were advanced squadrons of cavalry and light troops. The Thracian infantry guarded the baggage and camp. He himself commanded the right, and Parmenio the left.

(M750) Darius, at the commencement of the attack, ordered his chariots to charge, and the main line to follow, calculating on disorder. But the horses of the chariots were terrified and wounded by the Grecian archers and darters in front, and most turned round, or were stopped. Those that pressed on were let through the Macedonian lines without mischief. As at Issus, Alexander did not attack the centre, where Darius was surrounded with the choicest troops of the army, but advanced impetuously upon the left wing, turned it, and advanced by a flank movement toward the centre, where Darius was posted. The Persian king, seeing the failure of the chariots, and the advancing troops of Alexander, lost his self-possession, turned his chariot, and fled, as at Issus. Such folly and cowardice led, of course, to instant defeat and rout; and nothing was left for the victor, but to pursue and destroy the disorderly fugitives, so that the slaughter was immense. But while the left and centre of the Persians were put to flight, the right fought vigorously, and might have changed the fortune of the day, had not Alexander seasonably returned from the pursuit, and attacked the left in the rear and flank. Then all was lost, and headlong flight marked the Persian hosts. The battle was lost by the cowardice of Darius, who insisted, with strange presumption, on commanding in person. Half the troops, under an able general, would have overwhelmed the Macedonian army, even with Alexander at the head. But the Persians had no leader of courage and skill, and were a mere rabble. According to some accounts, three hundred thousand Persians were slain, and not more than one hundred Macedonians. There was no attempt on the part of Darius to rally or collect a new army. His cause and throne were irretrievably lost, and he was obliged to fly to his farthest provinces, pursued by the conqueror. The battle of Arbela was the death-blow to the Persian empire. We can not help feeling sentiments of indignation in view of such wretched management on the part of the Persians, thus throwing away an empire. But, on the other hand, we are also compelled to admit the extraordinary generalship of Alexander, who brought into action every part of his army, while at least three-quarters of the Persians were mere spectators, so that his available force was really great. His sagacious combinations, his perception of the weak points of his adversary, and the instant advantage which he seized—his insight, rapidity of movement, and splendid organization, made him irresistible against any Persian array of numbers, without skill. Indeed, the Persian army was too large, since it could not be commanded by one man with any effect, and all became confusion and ruin on the first misfortune. The great generals of antiquity, Greek and Roman, rarely commanded over fifty thousand men on the field of battle; and fifty thousand, under Alexander's circumstances, were more effective, perhaps, than two hundred thousand. In modern times, when battles are not decided by personal bravery, but by the number and disposition of cannon, and the excellence of firearms, an army of one hundred thousand can generally overwhelm an army of fifty thousand, with the same destructive weapons. But in ancient times, the impetuous charge of twenty thousand men on a single point, followed by success, would produce a panic, and then a rout, when even flight is obstructed by numbers. Thus Alexander succeeded both at Issus and Arbela. He concentrated forces upon a weak point, which, when carried, produced a panic, and especially sent dismay into the mind of Darius, who had no nerve or self-control. Had he remained firm, and only fought on the defensive, the Macedonians might not have prevailed. But he fled; and confusion seized, of course, his hosts.

(M751) Both Babylon and Susa, the two great capitals of the empire, immediately surrendered after the decisive battle of Arbela, and Alexander became the great king and Darius a fugitive. The treasure found at Susa was even greater than that which Babylon furnished—about fifty thousand talents, or fifty million dollars, one-fifth of which, three years before, would have been sufficient to subsidize Greece, and present a barrier to the conquests of both Philip and Alexander.

(M752) The victor spent a month in Babylon, sacrificing to the Babylonian deities, feasting his troops, and organizing his new empire. He then marched into Persia proper, subdued the inhabitants, and entered Persepolis. Though it was the strongest place in the empire, it made no resistance. Here were hoarded the chief treasures of the Persian kings, no less than one hundred and twenty thousand talents, or about one hundred and twenty million dollars of our money—an immense sum in gold and silver in that age, a tenth of which, judiciously spent, would have secured the throne to Darius against any exterior enemy. He was now a fugitive in Media, and thither Alexander went at once in pursuit, giving himself no rest. He established himself at Ecbatana, the capital, without resistance, and made preparations for the invasion of the eastern part of the Persian empire, beyond the Parthian desert, even to the Oxus and the Indus, inhabited by warlike barbarians, from which were chiefly recruited the Persian armies.

(M753) It would be tedious to describe the successive conquests of Sogdiana, Margiana, Bactriana, and even some territory beyond the Indus. Alexander never met from these nations the resistance which Caesar found in Gaul, nor were his battles in these eastern countries remarkable. He only had to appear, and he was master. At last his troops were wearied of these continual marchings and easy victories, when their real enemies were heat, hunger, thirst, fatigue, and toil. They refused to follow their general and king any further to the east, and he was obliged to return. Yet some seven years were consumed in marches and conquests in these remote countries, for he penetrated to Scythia at the north, and the mouth of the Indus to the south.

(M754) It was in the expeditions among these barbarians that some of the most disgraceful events of his life took place. He seldom rested, but when he had leisure he indulged in great excesses at the festive board. His revelries with his officers were prolonged often during the night, and when intoxicated, he did things which gave him afterward the deepest remorse and shame. Thus he killed, with his own hand, Clitus, at a feast, because Clitus ventured to utter some truths which were in opposition to his notions of omnipotence. But the agony of remorse was so great, that he remained in bed three whole days and nights immediately after, refusing all food and drink. He also killed Philotas, one of his most trusted generals, and commander of his body-guard, on suspicion of treachery, and then, without other cause than fear of the anger of his father, Parmenio, he caused that old general to be assassinated at Ecbatana, in command of the post—the most important in his dominions—where his treasures were deposited. He savagely mutilated Bessus, the satrap, who stood out against him in Bactria. Callisthenes, one of the greatest philosophers of the age, was tortured and assassinated for alleged complexity in a conspiracy, but he really incurred the hatred of the monarch for denying his claim to divinity.

(M755) In the spring of B.C. 326, Alexander crossed the Indus, but met with no resistance until he reached the river Hydaspes (Jhylum) on the other side of which, Porus, an Indian prince, disputed his passage, with a formidable force and many trained elephants—animals which the Macedonians had never before encountered. By a series of masterly combinations Alexander succeeded in crossing the river, and the combat commenced. But the Indians could not long withstand the long pikes and close combats of the Greeks, and were defeated with great loss. Porus himself, a prince of gigantic stature, mounted on an elephant, was taken, after having fought with great courage. Carried into the presence of the conqueror, Alexander asked him what, he wished to be done for him, for his gallantry and physical strength excited admiration. Porus replied that he wished to be treated as a king, which answer still more excited the admiration of the Greeks. He was accordingly treated with the utmost courtesy and generosity, and retained as an ally. Alexander was capable of great magnanimity, when he was not opposed. He was kind to the family of Darius, both before and after his assassination by the satrap Bessus. And his munificence to his soldiers was great, and he never lost their affections. But he was cruel and sanguinary in his treatment of captives who had made him trouble, putting thousands to the sword in cold blood.

(M756) As before mentioned, the soldiers were wearied with victories and hardships, without enjoyments, and longed to return to Europe. Hence Sangala, in India, was the easternmost point to which he penetrated. On returning to the river Hydaspes, he constructed a fleet of two thousand boats, in which a part of his army descended the river with himself, while another part marched along its banks. He sailed slowly down the river to its junction with the Indus, and then to the Indian ocean. This voyage occupied nine months, but most of the time was employed in subduing the various people who opposed his march. On reaching the ocean, he was astonished and interested by the ebbing and flowing of the tide—a new phenomenon to him. The fleet was conducted from the mouth of the Indus, round by the Persian Gulf to the mouth of the Tigris—a great nautical achievement in those days; but he himself, with the army, marched westward through deserts, undergoing great fatigues and sufferings, and with a great loss of men, horses, and baggage. At Carmania he halted, and the army for seven days was abandoned to drunken festivities.