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An Inquiry into the Permanent Causes of the Decline and Fall of Powerful and Wealthy Nations.
by William Playfair
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When a nation becomes the slave of its revenue, and sacrifices very sic thing to that object, abuses that favour revenue are difficult to reform; but surely it would be well to take some mode to prevent the facility with which people get drunk, and the temptation that is laid to do so. The immense number of public houses, and the way in which they give credit, are undoubtedly, in part, causes of this evil. It would be easy to lessen the number, without hurting liberty, and it would be no injustice if publicans were prevented from legal recovery for beer or spirits consumed in their houses, in the same manner that payment cannot be enforced of any person under twenty-one years of age, unless for necessaries. There could be no hardship in this, and it would produce a great reform in the manners of the lower orders.

There are only three modes of teaching youth the way to well-doing,— by precept, by example, and by habit at an early age. Precept, without example and habit, has but little weight, yet how can a child have either of these, if the parents are encouraged and assisted in living a vicious life? Nations and individuals should guard

—- {183} The French, before the revolution, were not be =sic= considered as a more virtuous people than the English, yet there were fewer crimes, and less dissipation amongst the lower orders than in England, and more amongst the higher. The French, particularly the mothers, have less affection for their children, yet they brought them up better, both in habits and in principles. -=-

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against those vices to which they find they have a natural disposition; and drinking and gluttony are the vices to which the common people in this country are the most addicted.

Whatever other things may be taught, let this truth be instilled into all children brought up to earn their bread, that in proportion to their diligence will be their ease and enjoyment, and that this world is a world of sorrow and grief to the idle and the ignorant; that knowledge does not consist in being able to read books, but in understanding one's business and duty in life, and that industry consists in doing it.

Female education, in England, requires as much reform as that of the other sex; but, though the subject is not much less important, it is perhaps still more difficult. It has been remarked, by those who have travelled abroad, that, in other countries, women are in general not better, but rather worse dressed than men of the same rank: in England it is different; for, at an early age, the women are dressed, both as to style and quality of clothes, far above their rank. This might, perhaps, not be difficult to account for, but it undoubtedly is a misfortune, and one that is greatly increased by the mode of education and manner of thinking; for the main and indispensable virtue of that amiable sex excepted, (for which Englishwomen are highly distinguished,) perhaps no women in the world are brought up in a more frivolous unmeaning manner. The French women, with all their vivacity and giddy airs, have more accomplishment; {184} and, as they speak their mind pretty plainly, they have, on many occasions, testified surprise to find English ladies, who had studied music for years, who could scarcely play a tune, and who, after devoting years to the needle, were incapable of embroidering a pin-cushion.

Novels, a species of light, insipid, and dangerous reading, are the bane of English female education. They teach a sort of false romantic sentiment, and withdraw the mind from attention to the duties of

—- {184} The emigrants have taught to ladies of rank, fashions; and to those of an inferior class, arts and industry. The English women did not know half what they could do, till the French came amongst them, about twelve years ago. -=-

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life, at a time when it should be taught to learn their high importance. In female education the government should interfere; for the education of the mother will always have an influence on the education of the son, as her conduct in life must have on that of her husband.

As one general observation, relative to the education given at most public schools, it may be observed, that, whilst much time is taken up in teaching things that can never probably be of great utility, that species of knowledge that does not belong to any particular class, but which is of the utmost importance, is left to chance and to accident. While a boy is tormented with learning a dead language he is left to glean, as in a barren field, for all those rules of conduct on which the prosperity and happiness of his future life depends. {185}

A public education is, in many respects, better than a private one for boys, but, in some things, it is inferior: consequently those who can afford it, and wish to give their sons the most complete education, try to unite the advantages of both, by sending them to a public school, under the care of a private tutor. It is not in the power of the middling classes to do this; but modes should be adopted to give the boys, either by books or public lectures, those instructions, relative to moral conduct, to prudence, behaviour, &c. which a private tutor gives to those under his particular charge.

As to female education, it is a difficult subject: one great improvement would, nevertheless, be not to allow above a certain number in any one seminary; to have people of irreproachable conduct over them, and, wherever the parents can, to bring them home at the age of thirteen or fourteen. The public education ought certainly to finish at an early age, and, in all cases, with respect to females, a private is much preferable to a public education. {186}

—- {185} The most virtuous of the Roman emperors attributed to his preceptors every one of those excellent qualities he possessed. The ancient education of Greece and Rome was very different from that of the moderns.

{186} Since this was written, we understand a book for this very purpose is about to be printed, with the professed design of uniting the advantages of a public and private education. -=-

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CHAP. III.

Of the Effects of Taxation in England.

What has been said of the increase of taxes, their tendency to ruin a nation, and bring on its decline, together with the counteraction occasioned by the continuance of necessity, as being applicable to all nations in general, applies, in every sense, to England, and even more to England than to any other nation. Taxes are carried to greater excess than in any other country; and, as England flourishes by trade and manufactures, (the price of which taxes enhance,) they gradually tend to shut foreign markets against us. This has already been explained; we, however, still have to inquire into the particular manner in which it operates upon this country.

That the system of taxation, though irregular in England, is less so than in any other country, in proportion to the extent to which it has been carried, is true; but still, however, if a number of the most troublesome and ill-contrived taxes were done away, and others established in their place, it would be a great advantage.

Greater danger arises from the augmentation of taxes in a wealthy country than in a poor one, when they stretch beyond the proper line, because the general prosperity hinders the effect from being visible, till it has advanced beyond the power of remedy; whereas, in a poor country, the injury is soon felt.

The invention and industry of this country have been most wonderfully increased by the necessity of exertion, under the protection of good laws, which rendered property secure. But we trust too much to our resources, and, like men in health and vigour, are the most likely to injure our constitution.

The most part of the arts, in point of manufacturing, seem to have come to nearly the last degree of perfection, so far as abbreviation of labour can carry them. [end of page #229]

The division of labour, and the modes of working in the iron and metal branches, have not of late been in any material degree improved in our towns, the most famous for them; and as to any particular gift of bringing things to perfection, or reducing prices, it does not appear to be confined to England. Watches and fire-arms are two of the most ingenious and nice branches of metal manufactures; yet, at Liege, the latter is carried to greater perfection than at Birmingham, and London and Lancashire are outdone by Switzerland, in the former. Those, indeed, are not manufactures of which the taste or form is constantly altering; but they are a proof of the ability to work with equal advantage, both as to quality and price, with the manufacturers of this country.

The next great branches are the weaving. For silks, France has always had the advantage of us; and our fine woollen cloths have never equalled those of Louvier and Sedan for quality, although, in point of price, they have the advantage.

In linens, we enjoy no particular pre-eminence; and, in the American market, we are beginning to be undersold by those of Silesia. For a second quality of woollen cloth, and for the manufacture of cotton, in all its branches, we still have the superiority; but our great advantage, the cause of the general preference to our manufactures is the long credit we give, which, if it should ever cease to be practicable, would ruin not one, but all our manufactures, nearly at a stroke.

It is very natural and very well for Englishmen, who have never been out of their own country, to ascribe to superiority of quality, (and inferiority of price is the same thing,) the great success they have in selling their goods in foreign countries; but such as have had an opportunity to see how it really is, know the contrary; and those who have not, may know it by observing who are the individuals in any branch of business at home that do the most, and they will find it always to be those who have the power of giving the longest credit. It is true that, in the course of time, and by struggling hard, those who have little means of extending their business at first, do it by degrees; but, until they do, they never can, in point of quantity, rival those who give long credit.

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In the inability of other nations to give equal length of credit, consists our principal advantage; but we have seen, by the vicissitudes of ancient nations, that the wants of others, or their being behindhand, are but a very insecure tenure for the prosperity of any nation.

The exportation of Britain was but inconsiderable at the beginning of last sic century, or about one-ninth of what it was two years ago.{187} Previous to the American war, it gradually increased to about three times what it was in the year 1700; that is, in seventy-five years. The progression was pretty regular till the year 1750, when it had risen to nearly double; but, in twenty-five years after, it increased as much as it had in fifty years before. The American war threw it back forty years, but it soon got up again to where it probably would have been, had the American war not intervened; it, however, rose beyond any thing that had ever been seen. It doubled in less than ten years; and, from this, we are led to conclude, that the taxes had not then begun to hurt national industry. But we shall see the reason, for the great increase was not owing so much to any cause inherent in this nation, as to the absolute impossibility of other nations continuing their commerce. We had got all the East and West India trade of the French and Dutch, and America had again become our greatest customer for British manufactures.

Capital that could be removed was, in a manner, banished from the continent of Europe, and had taken refuge in England, and a great extent of the continent had been desolated with war. We are not, however, to expect this amazing export trade to continue; indeed, it has already fallen, in one year, as much as it ever rose in any three years; it fell fifteen millions in one year. The taxes may have operated much against our prosperity, without our knowing it, in a crisis of this sort, though they did not absolutely counteract the favourable effect produced by other causes.

The commerce of the American states, which were, (like England,) out of the vortex of danger, and secure, increased in fully as rapid

—- {187} In 1802, the exports amounted to 45,500,000 L. In 1702 to 5,500,000 L. -=-

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a manner as ours, and fell off in the same way. We must not then, consider as durable, or owing to ourselves, circumstances that arose out of the general and temporary situation of other nations.

It has been said in the general chapter on taxation, and again repeated in that on national debt, that both the one and the other operate, for a certain time, in augmenting the industry and wealth of a country, but that there is some point at which they begin to have a contrary effect; that point, however, being dependent on a variety of circumstances, is not a fixed one, it cannot be discovered by investigation before the time, but it may by symptoms and signs that become visible soon after.

It is a sign that a nation has passed the point at which taxes cease to be a spur to industry, when the duties on consumption, or optional duties, which one may avoid paying, by not using the article taxed, become less productive than formerly, and when it is found necessary to lay taxes on land, houses, and such sort of property as can be made to pay, independent of the will of the proprietor.

When taxes are laid upon property, not on consumption, it is to be supposed the latter can bear no more. Taxes on property are forced taxes; on consnmption sic, they are generally, to a certain degree, voluntary, though not always so.

The augmentation of wealth has, in this country, been great, but it has never been regular or uninterrupted; that of taxation has, on the contrary, been uninterrupted, and this is better seen from the chart than from any thing that can be said. There can be no doubt that, though hitherto our increasing prosperity has been so great as to counteract the effect of heavy taxation, yet that the same thing cannot be expected to continue long. How long it may continue, or whether it has not already ceased, or is on the point of ceasing, is uncertain; but there is nothing more positive, than that, if taxes increase, they must, in process of time, crush industry, and, therefore, at all events, they should be kept as low as possible.

The whole income of the country is estimated only at 150,000,000 L. The taxes to the state amount to 40,000,000 L. and those for the maintenance of the poor to 5,500,000 L. But this is the mere money ac-[end of page #232] count, without estimating loss of time, trouble, and inconvenience; so that it may fairly and reasonably be put down at one-third of the whole revenue or income of the individuals, yet the complaints are not so loud, and the clamour is not so great, as when they did not amount to one-twentieth of that revenue. This may, however, be accounted for.

One-third part of revenue is derived from the state itself, so that there are but two-thirds remain independent of it. The habit of bearing burthens, and experience of the inutility of complaint, are likewise reasons for acquiescence; besides these, we cannot but all be sensible, that complaints were very violent when there was little occasion for them. We cannot deny, that the nation has been prospering for a hundred years, while the cry of ruin has been resounding perpetually in every corner; it is therefore natural to mistrust our fears, and sit in silence, waiting the event.

The portion of our expense that consists in interest of money, on which no economy can operate, is so great, that it prevents any hope of much diminution from economy; and, indeed, in the time of peace, no economy that could be practised, more than what has commonly been done, would diminish our burthens one-fiftieth part. Even that would be very difficult, perhaps impracticable; for our free revenue, in time of peace, has not augmented in proportion to the diminution of the value of money; so that, in 1792, the expenses of the state were comparatively less than in the reign of Queen Anne.

Economy, then, is not the mode in which we must seek relief in time of peace. To carry on war in a less expensive manner in future, and take a solid and effectual method of reducing our debts, are the means, both of which are treated of in their proper place.

The modes of relief then, are three:

1. Economy in war.

2. A solid and fair method of reducing the present interest.

3. Attention, to render the system of taxation as little troublesome, and as fair and equal as possible.

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CHAP. IV.

Of the National Debt and Sinking Fund.—Advantages and Disadvantages of both.—Errors committed in calculating their Effects.—Causes of Error.—Mode proposed for preventing future Increase.

In no circumstance does the British empire differ so widely from all nations recorded in history, or from any now in existence, as with regard to the national debt.

Not only the invention of contracting debt to carry on war is but of recent origin, but no nation has ever carried it to near the extent that it has arrived at in England. The Italian states, in which this mode was first practised, never had the means of carrying it very far. In Spain, France, and Holland, national debt met with obstacles that arrested its progress long before it arrived at the pitch to which it has now come in this country.

The interest of the debt is above thrice the free revenue of the country, in time of peace, as that revenue was, previous to hostilities in 1793.

Whenever any operation is begun, the result of which is not known, owing to its being new, but which is in itself of great importance; the anxiety it occasions must be great, and, generally, the alarm is more than proportioned to the danger. If ever this truth was exemplified in any thing, it has been with regard to the national debt of England, which has been a continual object of terror since its first creation; not a public terror, merely amongst the ignorant, but the most profound and enlightened statesmen. Calculators, and writers on political economy, have served to augment the uneasiness by their predictions of a fatal termination.

While the debt has been augmenting with great rapidity, the wealth and resources of the nation have, at least, augmented equally fast, and the matter of fact has given the lie to all the forebodings of those who [end of page #234] occasioned the alarm. This very extraordinary circumstance merits an investigation.

It unfortunately happens, that, where people are deeply interested in a subject, they form their opinion before they begin to examine and investigate, and consequently the mind commences with a bias, and acts under its influence, the consequence of which is, that the conclusion is not so accurate as it otherwise would be. Not that, in calculating with figures, the disposition of the mind can make an unit of difference, the question being once fairly stated; but the previous impression on the mind tends to prevent the fair statement of the question.

That an uninterrupted practice of borrowing must end in an inability to pay is a self-evident axiom. It is not a matter that admits of dispute; but to fix the point where the inability will commence is a problem to resolve of a very difficult nature; it is indeed a problem, the re- solution sic of which depends upon some circumstances that cannot be ascertained. There are, it is true, certain fixed principles; but there are some points also that depend on events entirely unconnected with the debt, and, in themselves, uncertain. Two great considerations, that operate powerfully, have been omitted by most writers on this subject. The first, is the increased energy of human exertion, under an increased operation of necessity; the second, is the effect that the depreciation of money has, on lessening the apparent burthen occasioned by the interest of the debt. That these two causes, which have not been taken into account, have rendered the calculations erroneous, there is not a doubt; and how far they may still continue to operate is, at this time, as uncertain as ever; but they ought not to be considered as of operation beyond a certain unknown point, else the practice of contracting debt would be capable of infinite extension, which is impossible.

But the augmentation of the debt itself is not the only circumstance that excites attention, as intimately connected with the fate of this nation.

The increasing wealth and prosperity of the nation, under the heavy load of taxes, of which the debt is the principal occasion, is as much a matter of surprize as the ultimate result is an object of anxiety.

So long, however, as the nation is not actually born sic down by the [end of page #235] weight of taxes, its wealth must increase; and, what is considered as a very strange phenomenon, is only the natural and necessary consequence of increased taxation.

When men inhabit and cultivate land of their own, they are under no necessity of creating any greater value than they consume; but, when they pay RENT and TAXES, they are laid under a necessity of producing enough to supply their own wants, and to pay the rent and taxes to which they are subject. The same is the case with regard to manufacturers in every line of business, for though they do not, perhaps, consume any part of what they produce, (what comes to the same thing is that,) they are obliged to produce as much as will exchange, or sell, for all they want to consume, over and above paying their rent and taxes.

Without rent and taxes there are only three things that excite the exertion of man:—Necessity, arising from natural wants; a love of pleasure; or, a love of accumulation.

When a man labours no more than for his mere natural necessities, he is a poor man, in the usual acceptation sic of the word, that is, he has no wealth; {188} and a nation, peopled with such men, would justly be called a poor nation. When a man labours for nothing more than what he expends on pleasure, or to gratify his taste and passions, it is still the same, he consumes what he creates, and there is an end of the matter; and, whether he creates much or little, as his consumption is regulated by it, no difference is made to society; but, when rent and taxes constitute a part of the price of every commodity, the consumption of every man, whether he pays any taxes directly or not, himself, is attended with an increase to the revenues of those who receive the rent and taxes, and obliges him to create more than he consumes.

—- {188} Some philosophers call a man rich, who wants little, and has that little; they are quite right, in their way, but that does not apply here. Perhaps, according to their definition, the Lazzaroni of Naples are richer than the merchants of London; and, a man who is contented in a parish work-house, is, beyond dispute, rich; to say that such a man is wealthy would be absurd, because wealth, with writers on political economy, implies being possessed of real tangible property. -=-

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It arises from this, that the aggregate wealth of a people increases with rent and taxes; for, where there are neither, the desire of accumulation is the only thing that increases wealth. {189}

It is for this reason, that, by obliging a man to create more than he himself consumes, taxation increases the wealth of a nation; so that the flourishing state of England is a very natural effect of heavy taxation. The misery and poverty of those people who have little or nothing to pay, is equally natural, though it does not astonish one quite so much.

As there is nothing in the world without a bound, and a limit, it is clear, that, in laying it down as a principle, that rent and taxes occasion wealth instead of poverty, it is only to be understood, to a certain extent; that is to say, to the length to which the nature of things will admit of the exertion of man augmenting his industry, but not a step farther.

To ascertain this point would be to solve a most curious problem; observing, that the solution would, in every case, depend on a great variety of particular circumstances.

Something like a general investigation, however, is possible. It will not be accurate, nor is that wanted, but it may lay the foundation for understanding the matter better at a future period.

In London, rent and taxes are heavier than in any other part of the kingdom, and in Scotland they are less than in any other; yet, the working people, from all parts of the kingdom, come to London, and from the poorest places, in the greatest numbers. Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, are the poor countries, lightly taxed, and from them

—- {189} Accumulation is sometimes not a passion, but arises from necessity; by accumulation, is meant the increasing the value of the stock you possess, whether it consists of land, cattle, money, or merchandize.

Thus, for example, the Americans are increasing in wealth, from necessity, because their country is becoming better, by being cultivated, in order to produce what is necessary. They cannot have what they want, in the way they wish, without increasing or bettering the property of which they have taken possession.

If they had no more rent and taxes than they have, and if this were not the case, they would remain a poor people. Thus, the inhabitants of Syria, of Egypt, of Arabia Felix, formerly the finest countries in the world, having a property that does not better in their possession, and having scarcely either rent or taxes to pay, remain, from generation to generation, creating little, and consuming what they create. -=-

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people come, perpetually, to pay heavy taxes in London. Yes, but it will be said, in answer, these are poor countries. They are, however, richer than England was in the days of Queen Elizabeth; and, if the nature of things could have admitted of people changing centuries, as they change countries, the people of the seventeenth century, with light taxes, would have emigrated to the nineteenth century, with all its heavy taxes, just as those Irish and Scotch come to London.

This proves that, even in London, the excess of taxes is not yet such as to create a retrograde effect, and it proves it in a very striking manner. Though there may, at first sight, appear something ludicrous in the idea of emigrating from the seventeenth to the nineteenth, from the reign of Queen Elizabeth to that of his present majesty, it is a perfectly fair comparison, and will hold good, examine it as much as one will. The common expression, (and a very significant one it is,) that one part of the country is a century behind another, or twenty years, or fifty years, is exactly the same idea, expressed in other words, for it is a comparison between the changes which a lapse of time makes in one case, and a removal of place in the other. The present times are then better to live in than those of Elizabeth, as London is better than any distant part of the country.

That the ability of the nation to sustain a given burthen, for a certain number of years, is no proof of a permanent ability to support it, must be admitted, even if the same annual resources were to continue; but, that permanent ability becomes much less certain, when we consider that the annual resources are perpetually varying, that, therefore, they have so many uncertain quantities, that it is impossible to resolve the problem.

As to the effect, with respect to the increasing the burthens of the people, that has been treated under the general head of taxation. Whether the money goes to pay for a ship of war, a regiment of soldiers, or the interest of loans, makes no difference to him who pays the tax; and, indeed, makes little to the general system of national economy, as, in every case, what is paid to the state is employed on unproductive labourers or idle people. That is to say, it is consumed, and never appears again.

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National debt, then, so far as it increases the taxes of a country, is like any other national expenditure; and, in maintaining unproductive and idle people, it is also the same; but it has, in another point of view, a different effect, and that effect is an advantageous one.

In every nation, the greatest part of the capital is employed, or, as it is called, sunk. Land, houses, machines, merchandize, &c. are the principal employments of capital. As those are transferred from one to another, or as the use or produce of them is paid for, by one to another, money is wanted occasionally; and, if there were no other employments, money must either be lying idle in some persons sic hands, till an employment could be found for it, or the possessor of it must begin some enterprise, and sink it himself.

But, when money is thus employed, it is no longer in the power of the proprietor; and, though money may be borrowed on such sort of security, it is slowly, and with difficulty. The expense, the inconveniency sic, and time necessary, prevent the lenders of money from lending any for occasional purposes on such sort of security; but when a nation borrows, and the stock is divisible and transferable at will, money can always be realized when it is wanted for any purpose that affords a greater advantage than the stock affords. {190}

Without this had been one of the effects of national debt, how could the facility of borrowing have increased, {191} as it has done? or how could merchants and individuals raise the sums they now do? {192}

—- {190} In 1793, 5,000,000 L. was lent to merchants on exchequer-bills. The property, on which the money was secured, was really merchandize, but the lenders would have nothing to do with the goods; government stepped in, and took the goods as a security, creating a stock transferrable, that represented the same goods, and, as if by magic, the money was found in a moment. I know of no operation so fit for elucidating the advantage of national debt as this.

{191} Borrowing on life rents is bad, for this reason; where there is no employment of this sort, all money is constantly employed in some sort of trade or enterprise that will produce profit, but cannot be realised. Example, Paris, &c.

{192} When money was wanted, in Queen Anne's time, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, (Mr. Montague,) attended by the Lord Mayor and Sheriffs, went about, from shop to shop, to borrow it, much in the way that is occasionally practised by the beadles for a public charity!! Yet England's credit was good, it owed little, the war was popular, and the country rich. -=-

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It must be allowed that one hundred millions, or at least a much smaller sum than our debts amount to now, would have produced this effect, and might answer every purpose of this sort, but there is still a consideration arising from the fluctuations in a stock, when it is small, and also from the number of persons possessed of it. People buy in and sell out with total indifference when the quantity is great, and the fluctuations small; but, the moment the funds are agitated, whether in rising or falling, money becomes scarce for those who want it for other purposes.

That the number of persons ready to buy and sell must be proportioned, in some degree, to the quantity of stock, is of itself so evident, that it would be useless to enlarge upon it; but it must be granted that the national debt has long ago passed the sum that was necessary to produce this advantage.

We find, then, that the evils attending the increase of debt are greatly counteracted by the debt itself, and that, to a certain amount, it is productive of a very considerable advantage to a trading nation. As those who calculated its ill effects, and foretold the ruin it would bring upon the state, did not take into account those circumstances, the result of their enquiries was necessarily wrong, in point of time, though the effect of which they spoke is perfectly certain to take place, if the debt continues to increase. Their reasoning may be compared to that of an astronomer, who observed the position of a planet, but, in his calculations, made no allowance for the refraction of the atmosphere, who would therefore err as to the place of the star, but not as to its existence.

Let us now consider the natural consequence, supposing that future increase is prevented by means of the sinking fund established for that purpose. As to the probability of this, it depends on so many circumstances that are concealed in the womb of time, that it would be madness to give any other than a hypothetical solution of the question.

If the war continues, and expenses increase nearly as they have hitherto done, great as is the operation of a sinking fund, it will not have time to counteract the evil. If the war stops soon, it will dim- [end of page #240] inish the debt with a most prodigious rapidity, {193} if it continues; the question, whether taxes can be found to pay the interest or not? can only be answered as a matter of opinion, which is, in a case of this sort, equivalent to no answer at all.

With respect to the supposed case of the debt augmenting, the observations that apply to that have been made already; they now only remain to be made with respect to the debt being paid off.

It has been observed already, in the chapter on Taxation, that the case of taxes being taken off to a great amount would be a new one of sudden and hurtful operation. Wages of labour would be diminished, as well as the burthens on those who live on settled income; it would therefore render people of fixed income more affluent, without giving ease to those who want it; in short, as the augmentation of taxes falls most on people with fixed incomes, so the advantages of this would principally be felt by them; and, as the baneful operation carries a sort of counteracting antidote with it, so, likewise, this beneficial operation would be attended with some drawback and inconveniency sic.

The diminution of taxes, though the ultimate is not, however, the immediate consequence of the operation of the sinking fund, the efficacy of which depends on the taxes being kept up to their full extent for a considerable time. sic The first effect of the fund is, that a large sum, annually expended, as revenue drawn from the subject, is reimbursed to the stockholders, and becomes capital.

This would immediately raise the funds, and thereby would counteract the sinking fund itself in a very material degree. Money would become abundant for all the purposes of trade, and it would be difficult

—- {193} A sort of ridicule has been thrown on the operation of compound interest, because its effects are so amazing as not to be capable of being realized; but, on this subject, two things are to be said,—first of all, it has never been to the operation during the first hundred years that either incredulity or ridicule have applied, and the sinking fund was never meant to continue to operate so long. Secondly, though there are many drawbacks on the employment of large sums laid out at interest, that diminish, and would at last destroy, the result of the calculation in accumulating; it is not so in paying off debt, where the effect calculated is produced with the greatest certainty. -=-

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to find employment for it; and, if the progress continued, part of it would most undoubtedly be sent to other countries, and so be the means of impoverishing this.

If, then, we could suppose fifty years of peace, and that the national debt could be paid off, (as it might be in that time,) the situation of productive labourers would be worse; of unproductive, better; and, finally, capital would leave the country, which would be deprived of that transferable stock, the beneficial effects of which have been mentioned.

The necessity that creates industry would be diminished, so that nothing could tend more effectually to bring on the decline of the nation than if all the debt were to be paid off; an operation which, though possible in calculation, never certainly would take place; the evils attending it would be so manifest, so clear, and so palpably felt before that was accomplished.

To let the national debt continue to increase is, then, certain ruin, at some period unknown, but perhaps not very distant; to pay it off would be equally dangerous: what then are we to do?

We must try to raise the resources necessary for war within the year, by which means we may avoid augmenting the debt. That is not, however, to be done while the present heavy interest remains, and that cannot be got rid of, according to any method yet publicly known, without bankruptcy, breaking faith with creditors, or paying off the debt; a resource in itself dangerous, and one that, after all, would bring relief at a very distant day.

Since the debt has been contracted, let it be kept up; but let a mode be taken of reducing the interest, without breaking faith with the creditors of the state, so that we may never be obliged to borrow any more.

At present, the sum that goes annually for interest, and for the sinking fund, (that is for paying off capital,) amounts to twenty-four millions, and the expenses of a year of war do not exceed that sum. Twelve millions of this may be found by war-taxes, and twelve millions diminution of the interest would just leave a residue sufficient to pay for a constant state of war; and, if peace came, the war-taxes would be taken off. The enemies of England would then not be able to make notches [end of page #242] in a stick, and say, "When we come to such a notch England will be ruined."

If this could be done it would be a solid and permanent system of revenue, arising out of an unsolid and transitory one.

Any thing like want of faith with the creditors would, however, not only be disgraceful and dishonourable, but would reduce such numbers to beggary, and ruin credit so completely, that the nation would be lost for ever; and, certainly, if we are to be ruined, there is no balancing between ruin with honour and ruin with disgrace.

There is a mode that would be fair and practicable, and the present is the most favourable moment for executing it; indeed, it is perhaps the only one when it has been practicable or would be just. By practicability and justice, two words very well understood, we mean, in this instance, that it is a moment when those who would have to pay the difference would be willing to do it, would see their interest in doing it, and would feel that they ought to do it.

We mean not to propose any of those imaginary means, by which debts will be paid off without burthens laid on. We have no talent for schemes, where all is produced from nothing, and no faith in their practicability.

The late and present wars, which have occasioned one-half of the debt, and for which our exertions are to be continued, were undertaken for the preservation of property; for, though the French system is so completely bad that even the beggars in England would be losers by adopting it, yet, it will be allowed, that the evil to people of property would be much greater than to those who have no property. Let us look to Flanders, Holland, and other countries, and say no if we can.

It was on this idea that an income-tax, afterwards termed a property- tax, was laid on, by which the rich are made to pay, and the poor are exempted. The justice and expediency of this was universally admitted: there might be some difference of opinion as to modes and rates, but there was none as to the general principle.

We would, then, propose to RAISE LOANS, at a low rate of interest to reimburse the present creditors, ON THE SAME PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE PROPERTY-TAX EXISTS, in the following manner:

There are, by Mr. Pitt's calculation, (and his may be taken [end of page #243] in order to prevent caviling) 2,400,000,000 L. of capital in the kingdom. Let us then create a two and a half per cent. stock, into which every person possessed of property should be compelled to purchase at par, in proportion to their capital, so as to redeem fifty millions every year, thereby creating fifty millions of new debt at two and a half per cent. and reimbursing an equal sum bearing an interest of five per cent.

A loan of two per cent. per annum, on each man's capital would do this, and would never be an object for the safety of the whole, particularly as it would only last for ten years. As he would have interest at two and a half per cent. he would, in reality, only lose half, that is, one per cent. a year during twelve years; so that a man, with 10,000 L. would only have given 100 L. a year for twelve years.

At the end of ten years, the interest of the national debt would be reduced to one-half its present amount, which, together with the war- taxes, would be sufficient to prevent the necessity of creating more debt. This, however, is not all, a more prompt effect and advantage may be expected. It is more than probable, that the moment our enemy found that the nation, could, without any great exertion, put its finances on a permanent footing, the present contest would finish. It is now only continued, in hopes of ruining our finances, and it is on the accumulation of the debt that the expectation of that is alone founded.

We observed, in the beginning of this Chapter, that most people are biased by hope or fear, in examining a question of great importance; and that, therefore, they do not state it quite fairly, without being sensible of their error. In the case of the gloomy calculators of this country, fear and anxiety operated in causing a misstatement; but, with regard to our enemies, hope is the cause of their magnifying the effect of our national debt, and, it must be allowed, that hope had seldom ever a more easy business to perform. The general conclusion is certain, and all the question that remains, is with respect to time.

The only mode of putting an end to this hope of our enemy, and to the war, at once, will be by shewing that enemy that it is quite out of his power to augment our debt, but untill sic a method shall be adopted by [end of page #244] us, that is PRACTICABLE AND EASILY UNDERSTOOD, that will not be believed by our enemy.

The rapidity of the operation of a sinking fund is easily calculated, but not so easily credited, particularly by people not inclined to do so, and who would not themselves have the constancy and self-denial to leave it time to operate. Besides, by this operation, we shall not get free of debt till the taxes are raised far above their present amount. Our enemies may be pardoned for believing it impracticable, particularly as many of our friends are of the same opinion.

France, which has always been the rival of this country, and hates it now more than ever, (envy being now an ingredient of its hatred,) knows well that it is fallen and degraded, that it has less wealth and happiness than England; but then it considers, that, however bad its finances may be, they are getting no worse; that to continue the war for twenty years will bring no more ruin on the nation, while half the term would probably ruin us. Till we show the fallacy of this calculation, we cannot expect a durable peace. Our ruin is become an object, not only of ambition, but of necessity, as it were, to France; and nothing but despair of being able to accomplish their object will make them abandon the attempt.

We must be permitted here to ask a few questions:

Is not the time favourable for the plan here proposed?

Would it not be fair in its operation?

Would it not bring relief effectually and speedily?

Would it not reduce our burthens, without breaking faith with the creditors of the state?

Would it not reduce the interest, without setting too much capital afloat, that might leave the country?

Could our enemies then calculate on the national debt destroying England?

The affairs of nations, it has been observed, become so complicated, and the details so multiplied, that those who have the management of them are scarcely equal to the business of the day; and they have no leisure to inquire into the best modes of keeping off evil when it is yet distant; of this we have had ample experience.

[end of page #245]

Allowing all the credit possible to the sinking fund, (and a great deal is due,) still during war its operation is a sort of paradox; it does not obtain relief: it is liable to be questioned; but we are come to a point, where the stability of our finances ought to be put out of doubt, and beyond all question. The mode of settling our affairs ought not only to be such as in the end may succeed, but its efficacy and practicability ought to be such as our enemies can understand and give credit to. Without this, we shall have no end to the contest.

With respect to what our enemies will give credit to, a good deal depends on their own natural disposition. A fickle and arbitrary people, who are continually breaking their faith, can have little belief in the constancy of a sinking fund, but they will be perfectly well inclined to believe, that men of property may be compelled, and will even be glad to pay one per cent. a year, for ten years, to ensure the safety of that property. Supposing then that the sinking fund were the better plan of the two in reality, it would not be so in the present circumstances, because it would not obtain credit, and the other will.

As to the rest, deprive the French of their hopes of ruining our finances, and they will make peace on reasonable terms, whenever we please; their object for continuing the war will then be at an end; and, if they do continue it, we can go on as long as they can, without any addition to our burthens.

Whatever the cause of a war may be, the hope of success is the only possible motive for persisting in it. The French have been led into two errors; first, by the comparison of this country to Carthage, and of their own to Rome, (an absurd comparison that does not hold,) and, in the second place, by looking on our ruin, from the increase of our debt, as certain. We ought to undeceive them, and then they will have less inclination to persist in war. No pains has hitherto been taken to set them right; nor, indeed, with respect to the national debt, can it ever be done by the present method, till they see the effect; for though the progress of a sinking fund in peace is easily understood, in time of war there is much appearance of deception; it looks like slight sic of hand more than a real and solid transaction.

[end of page #246]



CHAP. V.

Of Taxes for the Maintenance of the Poor.—Their enormous Increase.—The Cause.—Comparison between those of England and Scotland.—Simple, easy, and humane Mode of reducing them.

Amongst the interior causes that threaten England with decline, none is more alarming than the increasing expenses of the poor; expenses evidently rising in a proportion beyond our prosperity, and totally without example, either in the history of past times, or in that of any modern nation.

The poor of England cost more to maintain than the free revenue of the country amounted to thirty years ago, and to nearly three times the amount of the whole revenues of the nation, at the time of the revolution.

The proportion between the healthy and the sick cannot have changed so much as to account for this augmentation; we must, therefore, seek for the cause elsewhere.

It probably arises from several causes; the increasing luxury, which leaves more persons in indigence when they come to an advanced age, owing to their being unwilling or unable to undergo the hardships to which nature subjects those who have been born to labour, and outlive their vigour; being thereby deprived of those indulgences which, in better days, they have experienced. In England, menial servants are accustomed to consume more than people of moderate fortune do in other countries, and they are the race of people most likely to be left to penury in their old age. In countries where there are, indeed, greater trains of menial attendants than in England, they, in general, belong to the great, who make some provision for them, or who, keeping them from ostentation, can retain them to a more advanced age; and, at all events, as they live a less luxurious life, they can make a better stand against that penury which it is their hard destiny to encounter. [end of page #247]

In a commercial country there is less attachment between master and servant, than in any other; and the instances of provision for them are very rare.

In proportion as a nation gets wealthy, the human race shares the same fate with other animals employed in labour; they are worked hard, and well fed while they are able to work, but their services are not regarded when they can do but little. {194}

Want of economy in the management of the funds destined for the purpose of their maintenance is another cause of increase in the expense of the poor. In a nation where every individual is fully occupied with his affairs, and has little time to attend to any thing else, those who manage the affairs of the poor find that few are inclined to look close into matters, and fewer still have the means of doing it if they would; so that abuses increase, as is always the case when there is no counteracting check to keep them within bounds.

Another cause, no doubt, is that, as the number of unproductive labourers increase, greater numbers of children are left in want.

To all those causes we must add the increase of towns, and the decrease of hamlets and villages. Towns are the places where indigence has the greatest consolation, and where the relief which is held out is attended with the least degree of humiliation and reproach.

When we compare the cases of England and Scotland, the causes cannot be doubted; for, there, servants live harder, the working class do not labour so hard, and are not so soon worn out, neither have the towns increased so much, at the expense of the hamlets and villages.

The greatest of all the causes of the increase of poor, however, arises from taxation and rent. It has been observed, in the chapter on Taxation, that, for a certain length, taxes and rent are productive of industry, and that, at last, they finish by crushing it entirely.

—- {194} If it were the custom to keep horses that were worn out till they died a natural death, the maintenance of them would cost more in England than in any other country; for their vigour is exhausted before the term of old age arrives. The calculation is in this country, to pay well, and be well served. -=-

[end of page #248]

The manner that this happens, is, that long before a country is as highly taxed as the majority of its inhabitants will bear, those who are the least able to pay are crushed, and reduced to absolute poverty.

There are two causes which may render a person unable to support the burthen of taxation: the one is, having a great family; the other is, being able to gain but little from weakness, or some other cause; and, where there are two causes that tend to produce the same effect, though they operate separately, they must, of course, sometimes act in conjunction.

The weakest part of society gives way first, in every country; and, on account of the arbitrary and ignorant, though lavish method of relieving that portion of society, in England, the evil is increased to more than double.

There is no relief at home in their own houses, no help, no aid, for the indigent, which might produce so admirable an effect, by counteracting the ruin brought on by heavy taxes and high prices; no, the family must support itself, or go wholesale to the workhouse. This is one of those clumsy rude modes of proceeding that a wealthy people, not overburthened with knowledge, naturally takes to overcome a difficulty, but without care or tenderness for the feelings of those relieved, or that regard for public interest, which ought to go hand in hand. For this it would be well to search a remedy.

A father and mother, and six children, will cost, at least, fifty pounds a year in a workhouse; but, perhaps, the aid of twelve or fifteen pounds would keep them from going there, and by that means save the greatest part of the money, while the country, which loses their industry, would be doubly a gainer.

There is a sort of rough, vulgar, and unfeeling character, prevalent amongst the parish-officers, that is a disgrace to the country and to the character of Englishmen. It is highly prejudicial to the nation; and, if there were no moral evil attending it, if the feelings of the poor were no object, sic the rich ought to attend to it for self-interest. If they will not, the government of the country is interested, both in honour and in interest, to do so.

Exemption from taxes will do little or nothing, the lower orders [end of page #249] are nearly all exempt, but that general dearness, that is the consequence of a general weight of taxes, is severely felt by them, and from that they cannot be exempted. They must get relief by assistance, and that assistance ought to be given in a manner that will not throw them altogether a burthen on the public. {195}

It is impossible to tax the people of a nation so highly, as they can all bear, because, before some will feel, others will be crushed; before the bachelor feels the tax, the father of a large family is obliged to starve his innocent offspring. Before he who has only two children feels the hard pressure, the family of twelve will be reduced to want; and so in proportion. The mode, then, to raise the most money possible, would be to tax the whole nearly as high as the bachelor can bear, and then to give a drawback in favour of the man with the children, they would then be on a perfect equality as to taxation, and the highest sum possible might be raised without hurting any one portion of the people more than another.

If the links of a chain are not all equally strong, before any strain is felt by the strong links the weak ones give way, and the chain is broken. The case is the same with the members of a community. Now, when you lay on taxes, the general tendency is to raise the price of food and labour; most labourers receive the advantage of the price of labour, but many pay unequally for the rise of food.

A tax on the wealthy, it will be said, is the thing proposed, but no, that would do nothing, it must be a premium or drawback to men with families who are poor, not merely to counteract the effect of any one tax, but the total effect of taxation with respect to maintaining their children. Wide, indeed, is the difference between a tax on those who are well able to pay, and a premium or drawback in favour of those who are not.

The manner of providing for the poor in England leads to a degree

—- {195} Probably, the reason that so small a sum serves the purpose in Scotland is, that relief is administered to the families, at their own houses, by the minister and elders of the parish. It is a rare instance of an administration, without emoluments and without controul. The funds are distributed with clean hands, in all cases, and impartially in most. -=-

[end of page #250]

of wastefulness and improvidence unknown in any other country. Improvidence ought as much as possible to be discouraged; for, with those who labour hard and are indigent, the desire to gratify some pressing want, or present appetite, is continually uppermost. This may be termed the war between the belly and the back, in which the former is generally the conqueror. It would be a small evil if this victory were decided seldom, as in other countries, but in the great towns of England there is as it were a continual state of hostility. In London, the battle is fought, on an average, at least, once a week; and idleness, and the profits of those sort of petty usurers, called pawnbrokers, are greatly promoted by it.

Some part of this evil cannot, perhaps, be remedied, but there are certain articles that ought not to be taken in pledge, such as the clothes of young children and working tools. {196}

There is no doubt but, that, in a populous inhospitable trading town, where there is no means of obtaining aid, from friendship, where the want is sometimes extreme, the resource of pledging is a necessary one. This is to be admitted in the degree, but by no means without limitation; for the facility creates the want, (even when it is a real want) for it brings on improvidence and carelessness. The lower classes come to consider their apparel as money, only that it requires changing before it is quite current. {197}

If this matter were well looked into, together with the other causes from which mendicity proceeds, which increases so rapidly, we should

—- {196} In Scripture it is forbidden to pledge the upper or the nether mill-stone. This is a proof, of very great antiquity, and indisputable authority, of the care taken to prevent that sort of improvidence that hurts the general interest of a people. It should be imitated in this country with regard, to all portable implements of labour, such as mill-stones were in those early times.

{197} In Scotland, twenty years ago, there were not so many pawnbrokers as there are in Brentford, or any little village round London. In Paris, as debauched a town as London, and where charity was as little to be expected, there was only one lending company, the profits of which, after dividing six per cent., went to the Foundling Hospital. It was, as in London, a resource in cases of necessity, but there was too much trouble to run it on every trifling occasion, as is done in London, and, indeed, in most towns in England. -=-

[end of page #251]

soon perceive a diminution of the poors' rates, and the wealthiest country of Europe would not exhibit the greatest and most multiplied scenes of misery and distress.

The numbers of children left in indigence, by their parents, would be comparatively lower, and there would not be that waste in the administration of the funds on which they are supported.

There is, probably, no means of greatly diminishing the number of helpless poor, but by an encouragement to lay up in the hour of health an abundance to supply the wants of feebleness and age, but this might go a great way to diminishing the evil. All persons who have places under government, of whatever nature, ought to be compelled to subscribe to such institutions; this would be doing the individuals, as well as the community, a real service, and would go a great way to the counteracting of the evil. {198} Preventatives are first to be applied, and after those have operated as far as may be, remedies.

The poor, &c. to whose maintenance 5,500,000 L. a year goes, (a sum greater than the revenues of any second rate monarchy in Europe,) may be divided into three classes:

First, Those who by proper means might be prevented from wanting aid.

Second, Those who, for various reasons, cannot get a living in the regular way, but might, with a little aid, either maintain themselves, or nearly so; and,

Third, Those who, from inability, extreme age, tender youth, or bodily disease, are unable to do any thing, and must be supported at the public expense. Nobody will dispute that there are of all those descriptions maintained at pressnt sic; and, therefore, all that can create a difference of opinion is about the proportions between the three.

It is probable that one-half, at least, could maintain, or nearly

—- {198} The widows scheme, as it is called in Scotland, for the aid of the widows and children of clergymen, is a most excellent institution; it has been attended with the best effects, both on individual happiness and national prosperity so far as it goes. The plan is such as might, with very little variation, be applied to all the officers of the revenue, clerks in office, &c. &c. -=-

[end of page #252]

maintain, themselves; one-quarter might be prevented from ever requiring any aid at all; and the other quarter would be assisted as at present.

This would reduce the expenses to less than one-third, and, probably, to one-quarter of what they are now; that is, of 5,500,000 L. there would be a saving of 3,500,000 L. but that is not all, for the national industry would be augmented by 2,000,000 L. and more; that is to say, by the industry of the half that maintained themselves, so that the nation would gain partly in money saved, and partly in money got, 5,500,000 L.

According to the true spirit of the English nation, in which there is a great fund of generosity and goodness at the bottom, it may perhaps be said, that the poor are not able to labour at all, and, that the plan would not answer. This is but a rough manner of answering a proposal, which neither is in reality, nor is meant to be, void of humanity. There were, by last years sic accounts, nearly 900,000 persons of one sort and another maintained or relieved, which does not make above six pounds a year for each person, now, where is there a person that can work at all, that cannot earn above four-pence a day in England? {199}

The plan for remedying this abuse ought to be very simple, for it will be administered by such ignorant and rough directors, that, if it is not simple, it must fail entirely.

—- {199} It would be foreign to the plan of this Inquiry to enter into the details of the poor persons, and shew the absurdity of the management; but, it is very evident, from those that are printed, that they get no work to do, the quantity of materials delivered to them to work upon will not admit of earning money to maintain themselves.

The following is a specimen of the attention given to this subject, and the means taken to enable the poor to pay for their maintenance, by their labour. In Middlesex, where the expense amounted, in 1803, to 123,700 L. or about 340 L. a day, the sum expended to buy materials amounted to no more than 4L.1s.11d. !!! It is impossible to comprehend how this capital stock could be distributed amongst above ten thousand labourers. It is not very easy to conceive the impertinence of those who presented this item, as a statement to the House of Commons, which would have done well to have committed to the custody of the sergeant-at-mace, the persons who so grossly insulted it. One thing, however, is very easily understood and collected from all this. The business altogether is conducted with ignorance, and executed carelessly and negligently, and that to an extreme and shameful degree. -=-

[end of page #253]

To have a good surgeon or physician is essential; and those who would not work, and who were able, should have the same allowance that a prisoner has in a jail; but those who would work should be paid a fair price, and allowed to lay out the money, to hoard it, or do as they please, except drinking to excess. [{200}]

Though many for want of vigour are refused employment in a workshop, some for want of character, and others for various reasons, become burthensome, yet there are not a few, who, from mere laziness, throw themselves upon the parish, where they live a careless life, free from hunger, cold, and labour. When the mind is once reconciled to this situation, the temptation is considerable, and there are many of those poor people, who will boast that the have themselves been overseers, and paid their share to the expenses.

Whatever evil is found to have a tendency to increase with the wealth of a nation ought, most carefully, to be kept under; and this is one not of the least formidable, and, of all others, most evidently arising from bad management and want of attention.

It would be necessary to have all sorts of employment, that the persons in such places can, with advantage, be occupied in doing, and a small allowance should be made to defray general expenses; amongst which, ought to be that of surveyors of districts, who should, like those employed by the excise-office, inspect into the state of the different poor-houses, and the whole should be reported, in a proper and regular manner, to the government of the country, from time to time.

Those little paltry parish democracies that tax one part of the people, and maltreat the other, ought to be under some proper con-

—- {200} [Transcriber's note: assumed location—footnote not assigned a place in the text.] The system, in England, of only employing people in the vigour of life is a source of much mischief, and is an increasing evil, which government, the East India company, and all the public bodies, are encouraging. Men are treated in this instance exactly like horses. They are worked hard and well rewarded in their vigour; but, in so wealthy a county sic as this, those occupied in commerce, and men in power, will not be troubled with any but such as can do their business with little trouble to the master. They do not consider what mischief they are preparing for their country. Shenstone, the poet, seems to have thought of this when he says, in a case of woe:

"But power and wealth's unvarying cheek was dry." -=-

[end of page #254]

troul; and the happiness and prosperity of England should not be left at their mercy.

In a country where every thing is done with such admirable accuracy in the revenue-department, as England, it would be useless to attempt pointing out the manner of executing the plan; it is sufficient to shew its practicability and the necessity of attending to it.

If, in the first instance, the advantage would be such as is here mentioned, it would, in a few years, be much greater, particularly in so far as fewer families would be left in a state of indigence; for, it is clear, that such families are a continual encumbrance on the rising generation, and tend to the diminution of the general mass of useful citizens.

If it should so happen, that taxes augment, or that trade falls off, (both of which may very likely happen,) then the interference of government may become a matter of absolute necessity; but then, perhaps, it may be too late. It would be much better if government would interfere, before the evil is actually come to the highest pitch. The parishes might, perhaps, look with jealousy on an interference of this sort, as being an infringement on their rights; for Englishmen are sometimes very tenacious of privileges that are highly pernicious to themselves. This difficulty, (for it probably would be one,) might be got over, by previously establishing inspectors in the different bishop's sees, who should be obliged to render an account to the bishop, to be communicated to government, by which means, the evil would either be removed, or its existence ascertained, so as to answer the complaints that might be made, and thereby prevent all discontent on the subject.

Without being able to say what might absolutely be the best remedy, it is, at least, fair to ask the question, whether it is fit that the administration of 5,500,000 L. a year should be intrusted to the hands of ignorant men? It may likewise be asked, if the feelings of the necessitous ranks of society (as keen in many instances as those of their betters,) should be wounded by men, who have not sufficient knowledge of any sort to act with the humanity necessary. The candidates for popular favour, amongst the lower housekeepers, are generally flattering, fauning sic, cringing men, and such are almost without exception, cunning, ignorant, and overbearing, wherever they have the least [end of page #255] authority over others. Such, in general, are the parish-officers, to whose care this important affair is committed.

Though this is an institution almost on the purely democratic principle of equal representation, it is a very bad specimen of that mode of government. The shameful lawsuits between parishes, about paupers, the disgraceful and barbarous treatment of women, who have been betrayed and abandoned, admit of no excuse. They are not productive even of gain or economy. Amongst some tribes of savage Indians, the aged and helpless are put to death, that they may not remain a burthen on those who are able and in health; and it is equally true, that, in England, the young innocents, who have not parents to protect them, are considered as a burthen; and, if they are not absolutely sent out of the world, the means necessary to preserve them in it are very inadequate to the purpose. If criminality could be engraved on a graduated scale, their deaths ought in general to be written down at some intermediate point between accidental homicide and wilful murder. The persecution of this unfortunate race may be said to commence before they are born; and, though the strength of a nation depends much on its population, less care is taken to encourage it, than to produce mushrooms, or to preserve hares and partridges.

[end of page #256]



CHAP. VI.

Causes of Decline, peculiar to England.

In addition to the causes of decline which Britain, as a wealthy country, has, in common with most other nations, it has some peculiar to itself, (or of which the degree at least is peculiar to it).

The national debt, the high rate of taxation, the prodigious expense of the poor, and the nature of the government, are peculiar to this country. There are other circumstances in its favour, of which we shall speak in the next chapter; but, in this, we shall review those that are against it, and of an unfavourable nature and operation.

The high rate of taxation, for the very reason that it is the highest ever known, inspires our enemies with hopes of our downfall, and makes them persevere in continuing to put us to expense.

The unprecedented commerce we enjoy, of which every other nation would wish to have a share, (and of which each, most mistakenly, thinks it would have a share, if Britain was undone,) is a cause of attracting envy and enmity, and repelling friendship. Our colonies in the West, and our possessions in the East, act like the conductors that draw the electric fluid to a building, but they do not, like those conductors, serve to protect it from violence. We have seen, that the advantage arising from them is more than doubtful, that they enrich individuals and impoverish the state; but all this would be nothing new, were it not for the vast scale on which those evils exist.

The poor's rate, which is in itself completely unexampled, though a common thing to all nations, is so exorbitant in England, that it may very properly be ranked amongst the dangers peculiar to this country. Who would believe, that Frederick the Great of Prussia carried on his brilliant and successful wars against the most formidable enemies, expended more than one-eighth of his revenues annually on the encouragement of industry, and left his treasury well stored, yet all this with an income, less by one-fourth than the sums that go to support [end of page #257] the poor in England, notwithstanding all the miserable manoeuvres that are practiced sic to avoid giving them assistance?

The form of government in England, though best for the liberty of the subject, and for the security of persons and property, is deficient in the means of repressing those infringements which particular bodies of people make upon the community at large. The representative system, when well understood, divides itself into parties, having different interests. There are the commercial, the landed, the East India, the West India, and the law, all of which have great parliamentary influence, and can be formidable to any minister; they therefore have a means of defending their interests, and they are concerned so deeply as to take a very active part whenever any questions are agitated relative to them.

The landed interest and the law are, indeed, the only ones that have any great party in the House of Peers; but then the House of Peers seldom interferes in matters that concern the interests of the others. The Lords seem not to think it their province; and, in general, more through diffidence than negligence, they avoid meddling, though, to do that honourable house justice, to it we owe much. Many bills, of a dangerous tendency, have been thrown out by it, after they had passed the other house; and it has been generally done with a wisdom, magnanimity, and moderation, which is only to be accounted for by a true love of the country and an upright intention. {201}

—- {201} It is wonderful to what a length good intention, (zeal apart,) will go in leading men right, even when they have not paid very particular attention to a subject. There is a feeling of what is wise, as well as of what is right, that partakes a little of instinct, perhaps, but is more unerring than far fetched theory on many occasions. This was seen in a most exemplary manner, at the time that the principles of the French revolution were most approved of here. Those principles were plausible, though flimsy, and founded on sophisms, and a species of reasoning, that plain unlettered men could not answer, and men who did give themselves the pains to reason might have answered; yet, three times in four, it was the man who could not answer it, who, guided by upright intentions, rejected it as bad, without being able to tell why. The most acute were, in this case, the most deceived; for it must now be allowed, that all approbation of the theories, relative to the rights of man, and the manner of asserting them were wrong. Many of those who fell into the error had, no doubt, unblameable intentions, but they did not consult common sense. -=-

[end of page #258]

In every assembly, a small number, who completely understand their own interest, can do a great deal, if they will act together; but, this is not all, they can use arguments with a minister that pave the way for obtaining the ends they have in view, while the general interests of the country alarm no one but upon great occasions.

Under arbitrary monarchs, all bodies with separate interests, are kept in due order, they have no means of defending themselves but by remonstrance, which, against power, is but a very inadequate protection.

There is nothing forced or chimerical in this statement of the case, and the consequence is, that no country ever saw any bodies rise to such a height, except the clergy in Roman Catholic countries, and the barons during the feudal system, when they had arms in their hands; who, if they could not absolutely resist their sovereign, were at least able to refuse him aid, and could annoy him greatly. But those examples will bear no comparison with the separate interests in England at this time. The barons have long lost their power, and the Roman Catholic clergy have lost the greatest part of their power and revenue also. If they had not, wealthy and powerful kingdoms would not have existed.

Under a free government, where people think that an opposition to a minister in parliament is a most excellent thing, the energies of the nation, as to war, are greatly lessened. This must, in its connections with other nations, produce very hurtful effects; but, where the evil is without a remedy, there is no advantage in dwelling upon it; and it does not appear that there is any possibility of separating from a free government, some sort of an opposing power, that must hamper the executive, and lessen the energies of the nation.

Under pure monarchies, kings can reward merit; they can encourage talents, and act according to circumstances. In England, the king, or his ministers, have no fund from which they can do this. An application to parliament is expensive and troublesome; and, in many cases, where the object would be fair, it would be unattainable. But this is not all, for when, by act of parliament, any thing of the sort is [end of page #259] once done, it is left without proper controul, and the expense is generally double what it ought to be.

On the whole, there is too little of discretional sic power in a representative government; good cannot be done but by rules, which, in many cases, it is impossible to comply with. This is a disadvantage which we labour under, and is a sort of drawback on our excellent form of government; but this is not like the opposition in the senate, it may be got over, and merits attention.

Such appear to be the disadvantages to which Britain is peculiarly liable, either in toto, or in the degree; but, on the other hand, she has many circumstances in her favour, if they are properly taken hold of; and, indeed, some, of which the effect will be favourable, whether any particular attention is paid to them or not. To those we shall advert with peculiar pleasure, and hope that they will not be neglected, but that they may afford a means of continuing our career of prosperity on the increasing scale, or that, at least, they may prevent us from sharing the fate of those nations that have gone before.

[end of page #260]



CHAP. VII.

Circumstances peculiar to England, and favourable to it.

It has been observed, that, in northern nations, where luxury is not attended with such a degree of sloth and effeminacy as in warm climates, the habits of industry can never so completely leave a country. The feelings of cold and a keen appetite are enemies to sloth and laziness; indeed they are totally incompatible with those habits and that degradation of character, that are to be found in southern climates. This advantage Britain shares with other nations of the north; but she has some peculiar to herself.

Situated in an island, the people have a character peculiar to themselves, that prevents foreigners and foreign influence from producing those baneful effects that are so evident in many nations, where they come and depart with more facility, and where a greater similarity in manners and in character enable them to act a conspicuous and a very dangerous part, in the cases of misunderstanding and party dispute.

In all the wars, bloody and long-contested as they were, between the houses of York and Lancaster, foreign influence never produced any effect such as that of Spain did in France, previous to the accession of Henry IV. or as the influence of France and Spain have produced in Italy, or that of France on Spain itself, or those of Russia and Prussia in Poland, with numerous other examples on the continent.

We know of no ideal boundaries in this country. In this country we are all one people, and can distinguish ourselves from any other; indeed, the national character is rather too averse to mixing with people from the continent; but this, that seems now a fault, may some day be considered as a very useful virtue.

Even in the times when an unfortunate jealousy and mistaken interest kept England and Scotland at variance, and when the latter kingdom was in the habit of adopting the politics of France, and [end of page #261] embracing its interests, there seems to have been some repelling principle that kept the little nation out of the gripe of the great one.

The French never had any preponderating power there, and, indeed, in latter times so little, as not to be able to defend Queen Mary or the Romish religion against the reformers; to do both of which there was no want of inclination. It appears, then, very clearly, that though, on the best terms of friendship, the Scotch had at the bottom that British mistrust of foreigners, that, ever since it was civilized, has freed the island from foreign influence.

The form of government, the security of property, and the free scope that is given to exertion in every line of business, will continue to enable this country to hold itself high, even if some of its present sources of wealth should be dried up; and, whatever may be the feelings of the representatives of the people upon ordinary occasions, the moment that any real danger occurs, they will, we are certain, act like men, determined to stand by their country.

How feeble was the former French government when assailed with difficulty? It was at once as if struck motionless, or, the little animation that was left was just sufficient to enable it to go from one blunder to another. How different has England been on every emergency? In place of the arm of government seeming to slacken in the day of danger, it has risen superior to it. We have never seen the same scenes happen here, that have taken place in Poland, Sweden, and so many other places. In the three attempts to invasion, {202} (Monmouth's and the two other rebellions,) where foreign influence was used, the event was the most fatal possible to those who made them; they were contemptible in the extreme; and, if it is considered in whose favour they were, it is probable the support from a foreign power rather did injury to the cause.

—- {202} Here we must not confound the case of the Stuarts with that of the King of France. In England, it was the government that was divided, the legislative being against the executive; one part of the government was feeble, but the other was not, and therefore we cannot say that the government was feeble. In France, the king and ministers governed alone, they were the whole government, and therefore as they were feeble, the government may be taxed with weakness. -=-

[end of page #262]

The form of government has this great advantage in it, that, as abilities are the way to preferment, the higher classes (at least) have a better education than the same rank of persons in any other nation, so far as regards the interest of the public, and the nature of the connection between the different orders of society; ignorance of which, is the surest way to be destroyed.

In all new and rising states the higher orders, even under despotic governments, and where all the distinctions of ranks are completely established, have a proper regard for the importance and welfare of the lower orders of people. As they increase in wealth and have lost sight of its origin, which is industry, they change their mode of thinking; and, by degrees, the lower classes are considered as only made for the convenience of the rich. The degradation into which the lower orders themselves fall, by vice and indolence, widens the difference and increases the contempt in which they are held. This is one of the invariable marks of the decline of nations; but the nature of the English government prevents that, by keeping up a connection and mutual dependence amongst the poor and the rich, which is not found either under absolute monarchies or in republics. In republics, the people become factious and idle, when they become any way wealthy. In this country, besides the insular situation, circumstances in general are such as to prevent the lower classes from falling into that sort of idleness, apathy, and contempt, that they do in other countries, even supposing these burthens were done away, that at present necessitate exertion.

To those causes let another still be added, the religious worship of the country, which, without any dispute or question, is greatly in its favour.

To speak nothing of the religious opinions or modes of worship in ancient times, there are three at present that merit attention and admit of comparison.

The Christian religion is distinguished for raising men in character, and the Mahomedan for sinking them low. Whenever the Mahomedan faith has extended, the people are degraded in their manners, and the governments despotic. The disposition of a Mahomedan king [end of page #263] or emperor is more different in its nature, from that of a Christian sovereign, than the form of a hat is from that of a turban.

Under the most despotic Christian sovereigns, matters are governed by law, there are no regular murders committed by the hand of power, without the intervention of justice; and if plenitude of power admits of the greatest excesses in the sovereign, in some Christian countries, the opinion of his fellow men, the fear of his God, or some sentiment or principle in his own breast, restrains him in the exercise of it.

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