[Footnote 1: Comm. on Matt. xix. 9.]

[Footnote 2: Contra Ad., xx. 2.]

[Footnote 3: De Mor. Eccl. Cath., i. 35.]

[Footnote 4: Epist., lxiii. 92.]

[Footnote 5: Revue Archeologique, 1880, p. 321.]

The more one studies the Fathers the more one becomes convinced that property was regarded by them as one of the normal and legitimate institutions of human society. Benigni's conclusion, as the result of his exceptionally thorough researches, is that according to the early Fathers, 'property is lawful and ought scrupulously to be respected. But property is subject to the high duties of human fellowship which sprang from the equality and brotherhood of man. Collectivism is absurd and immoral.'[1] Janet arrived at the same conclusion: 'In spite of the words of the Fathers, in spite of the advice given by Christ to the rich man to sell all his goods and give to the poor, in spite of the communism of the Apostles, can one say that Christianity condemned property? Certainly not. Christianity considered it a counsel of perfection for a man to deprive himself of his goods; it did not abrogate the right of anybody.'[2] The same conclusion is reached by the Abbe Calippe in an excellent article published in La Semaine Sociale de France, 1909. 'The right of property and of the property owner are assumed.'[3] 'It is only prejudiced or superficial minds which could make the writers of the fourth century the precursors of modern communists or collectivists.'[4]

[Footnote 1: L'Economia Sociale Christiana avanti Costantino (Genoa, 1897).]

[Footnote 2: Histoire de la Science politique, vol. i. p. 319.]

[Footnote 3: P. 114.]

[Footnote 4: P. 121.]

When we turn to St. Thomas Aquinas, we find that his teaching on the subject of property is not at all out of harmony with that of the earlier Fathers of the Church, but, on the contrary, summarises and consolidates it. 'It remained to elaborate, to constitute a definite theory of the right of property. It sufficed to harmonise, to collaborate, and to relate one to the other these elements furnished by the Christian doctors of the first four or five centuries; and this was precisely the work of the great theologians of the Middle Ages, especially of St. Thomas Aquinas.... In establishing his thesis St. Thomas did not borrow from the Roman jurisconsults through the medium of St. Isidore more than their vocabulary, their formulas, their juridical distinctions; he also borrowed from Aristotle the arguments upon which the philosopher based his right of property. But the ground of his doctrine is undoubtedly of Christian origin. There is, between the Fathers and him, a perfect continuity.'[1] 'Community of goods,' he writes, 'is ascribed to the natural law, not that the natural law dictates that all things should be possessed in common, and that nothing should be possessed as one's own; but because the division of possession is not according to the natural law, but rather arose from human agreement, which belongs to positive law. Hence the ownership of possessions is not contrary to the natural law, but an addition thereto devised by human reason.' This is simply another way of stating St. Augustine's distinction between natural and positive law. If it speaks with more respect of positive law than St. Augustine had done, it is because Aquinas was influenced by the Aristotelian conception of the State being itself a natural institution, owing to man being a social animal.[2]

[Footnote 1: Abbe Calippe, op. cit., 1909, p. 124.]

[Footnote 2: See Carlyle, Property in Mediaeval Theology. Community of goods is said to be according to natural law in the canon law, but certain titles of acquiring private property are also said to be natural, so that the passage does not help the discussion very much (Corp, Jur. Can., Dec. 1. Dist. i. c. 7.)]

The explanation which St. Thomas gives of the necessity for property also shows how clearly he agreed with the Fathers' teaching on natural communism: 'Two things are competent to man in respect of external things. One is the power to procure and dispense them, and in this regard it is lawful for a man to possess property. Moreover, this is necessary to human life for three reasons. First, because every man is more careful to procure what is for himself alone than that which is common to many or to all: since each one would shirk the labour, and would leave to another that which concerns the community, as happens when there is a great number of servants. Secondly, because human affairs are conducted in more orderly fashion if each man is charged with taking care of some particular thing himself, whereas there would be confusion if everybody had to look after any one thing indeterminately. Thirdly, because a more peaceful state is ensured to man if each one is contented with his own. Hence it is to be observed that quarrels more frequently occur when there is no division of the things possessed.[1] It is quite clear from this passage that Aquinas regarded property as something essential to the existence of society in the natural condition of human nature—that is to say, the condition that it had acquired at the fall. It is precisely the greed and avarice of fallen man that renders property an indispensable institution.

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 66, 2.]

There was another sense in which property was said to be according to human law, in distinction to the natural law, namely, in the sense that, whereas the general principle that men should own things might be said to be natural, the particular proprietary rights of each individual were determined by positive law. In other words, the fundamentum of property rights was natural, whereas the titulus of particular property rights was according to positive law. This distinction is stated clearly by Aquinas:[1] 'The natural right or just is that which by its very nature is adjusted to or commensurate with another person. Now this may happen in two ways; first, according as it is considered absolutely; thus the male by its very nature is commensurate with the female to beget offspring by her, and a parent is commensurate with the offspring to nourish it. Secondly, a thing is naturally commensurate with another person, not according as it is considered absolutely, but according to something resultant from it—for instance, the possession of property. For if a particular piece of land be considered absolutely, it contains no reason why it should belong to one man more than to another, but if it be considered in respect of its adaptability to cultivation, and the unmolested use of the land, it has a certain commensuration to be the property of one and not of another man, as the Philosopher shows.' Cajetan's commentary on this article clearly emphasises the distinction between fundamentum and titulus: 'In the ownership of goods two things are to be discussed. The first is why one thing should belong to one man and another thing to another. The second is why this particular field should belong to this man, that field to that man. With regard to the former inquiry, it may be said that the ownership of things is according to the law of nations, but with regard to the second, it may be said to result from the positive law, because in former times one thing was appropriated by one man and another thing by another.' It must not be supposed, however, from what we have just said, that there are no natural titles to property. Labour, for instance, is a title flowing from the natural law, as also is occupancy, and in certain circumstances, prescription. All that is meant by the distinction between fundamentum and titulus is that, whereas it can be clearly demonstrated by natural law that the goods of the earth, which are given by God for the benefit of the whole of mankind, cannot be made use of to their full advantage unless they are made the subject of private ownership, particular goods cannot be demonstrated to be the lawful property of this or that person unless some human act has intervened. This human act need not necessarily be an act of agreement; it may equally be an act of some other kind—for instance, a decree of the law-giver, or the exercise of labour upon one's own goods. In the latter case, the additional value of the goods becomes the lawful property of the person who has exerted the labour. Aquinas therefore pronounced unmistakably in favour of the legitimacy of private property, and in doing so was in full agreement with the Fathers of the Church. He was followed without hesitation by all the later theologians, and it is abundantly evident from their writings that the right of private property was the keystone of their whole economic system.[2]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 57, 3.]

[Footnote 2: A community of goods, more or less complete, and a denial of the rights of private property was part of the teaching of many sects which were condemned as heretical—for instance, the Albigenses, the Vaudois, the Begards, the Apostoli, and the Fratricelli. (See Brants, Op. cit., Appendix II.)]

Communism therefore was no part of the scholastic teaching, but it must not be concluded from this that the mediaevals approved of the unregulated individualism which modern opinion allows to the owners of property. The very strength of the right to own property entailed as a consequence the duty of making good use of it; and a clear distinction was drawn between the power 'of procuring and dispensing' property and the power of using it. We have dealt with the former power in the present section, and we shall pass to the consideration of the latter in the next. In a later chapter we shall proceed to discuss the duties which attached to the owners of property in regard to its exchange.



SECTION 2.—DUTIES REGARDING THE ACQUISITION AND USE OF PROPERTY

We referred at the end of the last section to the very important distinction which Aquinas draws between the power of procuring and dispensing[1] exterior things and the power of using them. 'The second thing that is competent to man with regard to external things is their use. In this respect man ought to possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to communicate them to others in their need.'[2] These words wherein St. Thomas lays down the doctrine of community of user of property were considered as authoritative by all later writers on the subject, and were universally quoted with approval by them,[3] and may therefore be taken as expressing the generally held view of the Middle Ages. They require careful explanation in order that their meaning be accurately understood.[4] Cajetan's gloss on this section of the Summa enables us to understand its significance in a broad sense, but fuller information must be derived from a study of other parts of the Summa itself. 'Note,' says Cajetan, 'that the words that community of goods in respect of use arises from the law of nature may be understood in two ways, one positively, the other negatively. And if they are understood in their positive sense they mean that the law of nature dictates that all things are common to all men; if in their negative sense, that the law of nature did not establish private ownership of possessions. And in either sense the proposition is true if correctly understood. In the first place, if they are taken in their positive sense, a man who is in a position of extreme necessity may take whatever he can find to succour himself or another in the same condition, nor is he bound in such a case to restitution, because by natural law he has but made use of his own. And in the negative sense they are equally true, because the law of nature did not institute one thing the property of one person, and another thing of another person.' The principle of community of user flows logically from the very nature of property itself as defined by Aquinas, who taught that the supreme justification of private property was that it was the most advantageous method of securing for the community the benefits of material riches. While the owner of property has therefore an absolute right to the goods he possesses, he must at the same time remember that this right is established primarily on his power to benefit his neighbour by his proper use of it. The best evidence of the correctness of this statement is the fact that the scholastics admitted that, if the owner of property was withholding it from the community, or from any member of the community who had a real need of it, he could be forced to apply it to its proper end. If the community could pay for it, it was bound to do so; but if the necessitous person could not pay for it, he was none the less entitled to take it. The former of these cases was illustrated by the principle of the dominium eminens of the State; and the latter by the principle that the giving of alms to a person in real need was a duty not of charity, but of justice.[5] We shall see in a moment that the most usual application of the principle enunciated by Aquinas was in the case of one person's extreme necessity which required almsgiving from another's superfluity, but, even short of such cases, there were rules of conduct in respect of the user of property on all occasions which were of extreme importance in the economic life of the time.

[Footnote 1: Goyau insists on the importance of the words 'procure' and 'dispense.' 'Dont le premier eveille l'idee d'une constante sollicitude, et dont le second evoque l'image d'une generosite sympathetique' (Autaur du Catholicisme Sociale, vol. ii. p. 93).]

[Footnote 2: II. ii. 66, 2. In another part of the Summa the same distinction is clearly laid down. 'Bona temporalia quae* homini divinitus conferuntur, ejus quidem sunt quantum ad proprietatem; sed quantum ad usum non solum desent esse ejus, sed aliorum qui en eis sustentari possunt en eo quod ei superfluit,' II. ii. 32, 6, ad 2.]

[Footnote 3: Janssen, op. cit., vol. ii. p. 91.]

[Footnote 4: The Abbe Calippe summarises St. Thomas's doctrine as follows: 'Le droit de propriete est un droit reel; mais ce n'est pas un droit illimite, les proprietaires ont des devoirs; ils ont des devoirs parce que Dieu qui a cree la terre ne l'a pas creee pour eux seuls, mais pour tous' (Semaine Sociale de France, 1909, p. 123). According to Antoninus of Florence, goods could be evilly acquired, evilly distributed, or evilly consumed (Irish Theological Quarterly, vol. vii. p. 146).]

[Footnote 5: On the application of this principle by the popes in the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries in the case of their own estates, see Ardant, Papes et Paysans, a work which must be read with a certain degree of caution (Nitti, Catholic Socialism, p. 290).]

These principles for the guidance of the owner of property are not collected under any single heading in the Summa, but must be gathered from the various sections dealing with man's duty to his fellow-men and to himself. One leading virtue which was inculcated with great emphasis by Aquinas was that of temperance. 'All pleasurable things which come within the use of man,' we read in the section dealing with this subject, 'are ordered to some necessity of this life as an end. And therefore temperance accepts the necessity of this life as a rule or measure of the things one uses, so that, to wit, they should be used according as the necessity of this life requires.'[1] St. Thomas explains, moreover, that 'necessary' must be taken in the broad sense of suitable to one's condition of life, and not merely necessary to maintain existence.[2] The principles of temperance did not apply in any special way to the user of property more than to the enjoyment of any other good;[3] but they are relevant as laying down the broad test of right and wrong in the user of one's goods.

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 141, 5.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ad. 2. As Buridan puts it (Eth., iv. 4), 'If any man has more than is necessary for his own requirements, and does not give away anything to the poor, and to his relations and neighbours, he is acting against right reason.']

[Footnote 1: 'Rationalis creaturae* vera perfectio est unamquamque rem tanti habere quanti habenda est, sicut pluris est anima quam esca; fides et aequitas* quam pecunia' (Gerson, De. Cont.).]

More particularly relevant to the subject before us is the teaching of Aquinas on liberality, which is a virtue directly connected with the user of property. Aquinas defines liberality as 'a virtue by which men use well all those exterior things which are given to us for sustenance.'[1] The limitations within which liberality should be practised are stated in the same article: 'As St. Basil and St. Ambrose say, God has given to many a superabundance of riches, in order that they might gain merit by their dispensing them well. Few things, however, suffice for one man; and therefore the liberal man will advantageously expend more on others than on himself. In the spiritual sphere a man must always care for himself before his neighbours; and also in temporal things liberality does not demand that a man should think of others to the exclusion of himself and those dependent on him.'[2]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 117, 1.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ad. 1.]

'It is not necessary for liberality that one should give away so much of one's riches that not enough remains to sustain himself and to enable him to perform works of virtue. This complete giving away without reserve belongs to the state of the perfection of spiritual life, of which we shall treat lower down; but it must be known that to give one's goods liberally is an act of virtue which itself produces happiness.'[1] The author proceeds to discuss whether making use of money might be an act of liberality, and replies that 'as money is by its very nature to be classed among useful goods, because all exterior things are destined for the use of man, therefore the proper act of liberality is the good use of money and other riches.'[2] Moreover, 'it belongs to a virtuous man not simply to use well the goods which form the matter of his actions, but also to prepare the means and the occasions to use them well; thus the brave soldier sharpens his blade and keeps it in the scabbard, as well as exercising it on the enemy; in like manner, the liberal man should prepare and reserve his riches for a suitable use.'[3] It appears from this that to save part of one's annual income to provide against emergencies in the future, either by means of insurance or by investing in productive enterprises, is an act of liberality.

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 117, ad. 2.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ad. 3.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid., ad. 2. 'Potest concludi quod accipere et custodire modificata sunt acta liberalitatis.... Major per hoc probatur quod dantem multotiens et consumentem, nihil autem accipientem et custodientem cito derelinqueret substantia temporalis; et ita perirent omnis ejus actus quia non habent amplius quid dare et consumere.... Hic autem acceptio et custodia sic modificari debet. Primo quidem oportet ut non sit injusta; secundo quod non sit de cupiditate vel avaritia suspecta propter excessum; tertio quod non permittat labi substantiam propter defectum ... Dare quando oportet et custodire quando oportet dare contrariantur; sed dare quando oportet et custodire quando oportet non contrariantur' (Buridan, Eth., iv. 2).]

The question is then discussed whether liberality is a part of justice. Aquinas concludes 'that liberality is not a species of justice, because justice renders to another what is his, but liberality gives him what is the giver's own. Still, it has a certain agreement with justice in two points; first that it is to another, as justice also is; secondly, that it is about exterior things like justice, though in another way. And therefore liberality is laid down by some to be a part of justice as a virtue annexed to justice as an accessory to a principal.'[1] Again, 'although liberality supposes not any legal debt as justice does, still it supposes a certain moral debt considering what is becoming in the person himself who practises the virtue, not as though he had any obligation to the other party; and therefore there is about it very little of the character of a debt.'[2]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 117, art. 5.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ad. 1.]

It is important to draw attention to the fact that liberalitas consists in making a good use of property, and not merely in distributing it to others, as a confusion with the English word 'liberality' might lead us to believe. It is, as we said above, therefore certain that a wise and prudent saving of money for investment would be considered a course of conduct within the meaning of the word liberalitas, especially if the enterprise in which the money were invested were one which would benefit the community as a whole. 'Modern industrial conditions demand that a man of wealth should distribute a part of his goods indirectly—that is, by investing them in productive and labour-employing enterprises.'[1]

[Footnote 1: Ryan, The Alleged Socialism of the Church Fathers, p. 20, and see Goyau, Le Pape et la Question Sociale, p. 79.]

The nature of the virtue of liberalitas may be more clearly understood by an explanation of the vices which stand opposed to it. The first of these treated by Aquinas is avarice, which he defines as 'superfluus amor habendi divitias.' Avarice might be committed in two ways—by harbouring an undue desire of acquiring wealth, or by an undue reluctance to part with it—'primo autem superabundant in retinendo ... secundo ad avaritiam pertinet superabundare in accipiendo.'[1] These definitions are amplified in another part of the same section. 'For in every action that is directed to the attainment of some end goodness consists in the observance of a certain measure. The means to the end must be commensurate with the end, as medicine with health. But exterior goods have the character of things needful to an end. Hence human goodness in the matter of these goods must consist in the observance of a certain measure, as is done by a man seeking to have exterior riches in so far as they are necessary to his life according to his rank and condition. And therefore sin consists in exceeding this measure and trying to acquire or retain riches beyond the due limit; and this is the proper nature of avarice, which is defined to be an immoderate love of having.'[2] 'Avarice may involve immoderation regarding exterior things in two ways; in one way immediately as to the receiving or keeping of them when one acquires or keeps beyond the due amount; and in this respect it is directly a sin against one's neighbour, because in exterior things one man cannot have superabundance without another being in want, since temporal goods cannot be simultaneously possessed by many. The other way in which avarice may involve immoderation is in interior affection....' These words must not be taken to condemn the acquisition of large fortunes by capitalists, which is very often necessary in order that the natural resources of a country may be properly exploited. One man's possession of great wealth is at the present day frequently the means of opening up new sources of wealth and revenue to the entire community. In other words, superabundance is a relative term. This, like many other passages of St. Thomas, must be given a contemporanea expositio. 'There were no capitalists in the thirteenth century, but only hoarders.'[3]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 118, 4.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ad. 1.]

[Footnote 3: Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, vol. ii. p. 234.]

It must also be remembered that what would be considered avarice in a man in one station of life would not be considered such in a man in another. So long as one did not attempt to acquire an amount of wealth disproportionate to the needs of one's station of life, one could not be considered avaricious. Thus a common soldier would be avaricious if he strove to obtain a uniform of the quality worn by an officer, and a simple cleric if he attempted to clothe himself in a style only befitting a bishop.[1]

[Footnote 1: Aquinas, In Orat. Dom. Expos., iv. Ashley gives many quotations from early English literature to show how fully the idea of status was accepted (Economic History, vol. i. pt. ii. p. 389). On the warfare waged by the Church on luxury in the Middle Ages, see Baudrillard, Histoire du Luxe prive et publique, vol. iii. pp. 630 et seq.]

The avaricious man offended against liberality by caring too much about riches; the prodigal, on the other hand, cared too little about them, and did not attach to them their proper value. 'In affection while the prodigal falls short, not taking due care of them, in exterior behaviour it belongs to the prodigal to exceed in giving, but to fail in keeping or acquiring, while it belongs to the miser to come short in giving, but to superabound in getting and in keeping. Therefore it is clear that prodigality is the opposite of covetousness.'[1] A man, however, might commit both sins at the same time, by being unduly anxious to acquire wealth which he distributed prodigally.[2] Prodigality could always be distinguished from extreme liberality by a consideration of the circumstances of the particular case; a truly liberal man might give away more than a prodigal in case of necessity.[3] Prodigality, though a sin, was a sin of a less grievous kind than avarice.[4]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 119, 1.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ad. 1.]

[Footnote 3: Ibid., ad. 3.]

[Footnote 4: Ibid., art. 3. 'Per prodigalitatem intelligimus habitum quo quis praeter vel contra dictamen rectae rationis circa pecunias excedit in datione vel consumptione vel custodia; et per illiberalitatem intelligimus habitum quo quis contra dietamen rectae rationis deficit circa pecunias in datione vel consumptione, vel superabundat in acceptione vel custodia ipsarum' (Buridan, Eth., iv. 3).]

In addition to the duties which were imposed on the owners of property in all circumstances there was a further duty which only arose on special occasions, namely, magnificentia, or munificence. This virtue is discussed by Aquinas[1], but we shall quote the passages of Buridan which explain it, not because they depart in any way from the teaching of Aquinas, but because they are clearer and more scientific. 'By munificence, we understand a habit inclining one to the performance of great works, or to the incurring of great expenses, when, where, and in the manner in which they are called for (fuerit opportunum), for example, building a church, assembling great armies for a threatened war, and giving splendid marriage feasts.' He explains that 'munificence stands in the same relation to liberality as bravery acquired by its exercise in danger of death in battle does to bravery simply and commonly understood.' Two vices stand opposed to munificentia: (1) parvificentia, 'a habit inclining one not to undertake great works, when circumstances call for them, or to undertaking less, or at less expense, than the needs of the situation demand,' and (2) ([Greek: banousia],) 'a habit inclining one to undertaking great works, which are not called for by circumstances, or undertaking them on a greater scale or at a greater expense than is necessary[2].'

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 134.]

[Footnote 2: Eth., iv. 7.]

Both in the case of avarice and prodigality the offending state of mind consisted in attaching a wrong value to wealth, and the inculcation of the virtue of liberality must have been attended with good results not alone to the souls of individuals, but to the economic condition of the community. The avaricious man not only imperilled his own soul by attaching too much importance to temporal gain, but he also injured the community by monopolising too large a share of its wealth; the prodigal man, in addition to incurring the occasion of various sins of intemperance, also impoverished the community by wasting in reckless consumption wealth which might have been devoted to productive or charitable purposes. He who neglected the duty of munificence, either by refusing to make a great expenditure when it was called for (parvificentia) or by making one when it was unnecessary ([Greek: banousia]) was also deemed to have done wrong, because in the one case he valued his money too highly, and in the other not highly enough. In other words, he attached a wrong value to wealth. Nothing could be further from the truth than the suggestion that the schoolmen despised or belittled temporal riches. Quite on the contrary, they esteemed it a sin to conduct oneself in a manner which showed a defective appreciation of their value[1]. Riches may have been the occasion of sin; but so was poverty. 'The occasions of sin are to be avoided,' says Aquinas, 'but poverty is an occasion of evil, because theft, perjury, and flattery are frequently brought about by it.

[Footnote 1: 'Non videtur secundum humanam rationem esse boni et perfecti divitias abjicere totaliter, sed eis uti bene et reficiendo superfluas pauperibus subvenire et amicis' (Buridan, Eth., iv. 3).]

Therefore poverty should not be voluntarily undertaken, but rather avoided.'[1] Buridan says: 'There is no doubt that it is much more difficult to be virtuous in a state of poverty than in one of moderate affluence;'[2] and Antoninus of Florence expresses the opinion that poverty is in itself an evil thing, although out of it good may come.[3] Even the ambition to rise in the world was laudable, because every one may rightfully desire to place himself and his dependants in a participation of the fullest human felicity of which man is capable, and to rid himself of the necessity of corporal labour.[4] Avarice and prodigality alike offended against liberality, because they tended to deprive the community of the maximum benefit which it should derive from the wealth with which it was endowed. Dr. Cunningham may be quoted in support of this view. 'One of the gravest defects of the Roman Empire lay in the fact that its system left little scope for individual aims, and tended to check the energy of capitalists and labourers alike. But Christian teaching opened up an unending prospect before the individual personally, and encouraged him to activity and diligence by an eternal hope. Nor did such concentration of thought on a life beyond the grave necessarily divert attention from secular duties; Christianity did not disparage them, but set them in a new light, and brought out new motives for taking them seriously.... The acceptance of this higher view of the dignity of human life as immortal was followed by a fuller recognition of personal responsibility. Ancient philosophy had seen that man is the master of material things; but Christianity introduced a new sense of duty in regard to the manner of using them.... Christian teachers were forced to protest against any employment of wealth that disregarded the glory of God and the good of man.'[5] It was the opinion of Knies that the peculiarly Christian virtues were of profound economic value. 'Temperance, thrift, and industry—that is to say, the sun and rain of economic activity—-were recommended by the Church and inculcated as Christian virtues; idleness as the mother of theft, gambling as the occasion of fraud, were forbidden; and gain for its own sake was classed as a kind of robbery[6].'

[Footnote 1: Summa cont. Gent., iii. 131.]

[Footnote 2: Eth., iv. 3.]

[Footnote 3: Summa, iv. 12, 3.]

[Footnote 4: Cajetan, Comm. on II. ii. 118, 1.]

[Footnote 5: Western Civilisation, vol. ii. pp. 8-9.]

[Footnote 6: Politische Oekonomie vom Standpuncte der geschichtlichen Methode, p. 116, and see Rambaud, Histoire, p. 759; Champagny, La Bible et l'Economie politique; Thomas Aquinas, Summa, II. ii. 50, 3; Sertillanges, Socialisme et Christianisme, p. 53. It was nevertheless recognised and insisted on that wealth was not an end in itself, but merely a means to an end (Aquinas, Summa, I. ii. 2, 1).]

The great rule, then, with regard to the user of property was liberality. Closely allied with the duty of liberality was the duty of almsgiving—'an act of charity through the medium of money.'[1] Almsgiving is not itself a part of liberality except in so far as liberality removes an obstacle to such acts, which may arise from excessive love of riches, the result of which is that one clings to them more than one ought[2]. Aquinas divides alms-deeds into two kinds, spiritual and corporal, the latter alone of which concern us here. 'Corporal need arises either during this life or afterwards. If it occurs during this life, it is either a common need in respect of things needed by all, or is a special need occurring through some accident supervening. In the first case the need is either internal or external. Internal need is twofold: one which is relieved by solid food, viz. hunger, in respect of which we have to feed the hungry; while the other is relieved by liquid food, viz. thirst, in respect of which we have to give drink to the thirsty. The common need with regard to external help is twofold: one in respect of clothing, and as to this we have to clothe the naked; while the other is in respect of a dwelling-place, and as to this we have to harbour the harbourless. Again, if the need be special, it is either the result of an internal cause like sickness, and then we have to visit the sick, or it results from an external cause, and then we have to ransom the captive. After this life we give burial to the dead.[3] Aquinas then proceeds to explain in what circumstances the duty of almsgiving arises. 'Almsgiving is a matter of precept. Since, however, precepts are about acts of virtue, it follows that all almsgiving must be a matter of precept in so far as it is necessary to virtue, namely, in so far as it is demanded by right reason. Now right reason demands that we should take into consideration something on the part of the giver, and something on the part of the recipient. On the part of the giver it must be noted that he must give of his surplus according to Luke xi. 4, "That which remaineth give alms." This surplus is to be taken in reference not only to the giver, but also in reference to those of whom he has charge (in which case we have the expression necessary to the person, taking the word person as expressive of dignity).... On the part of the recipient it is necessary that he should be in need, else there would be no reason for giving him alms; yet since it is not possible for one individual to relieve the needs of all, we are not bound to relieve all who are in need, but only those who could not be succoured if we did not succour them. For in such cases the words of Ambrose apply, "Feed him that is dying of hunger; if thou hast not fed him thou hast slain him." Accordingly we are bound to give alms of our surplus, as also to give alms to one whose need is extreme; otherwise almsgiving, like any other greater good, is a matter of counsel.'[4] In replying to the objection that it is lawful for every one to keep what is his own, St. Thomas restates with emphasis the principle of community of user: 'The temporal goods which are given us by God are ours as to the ownership, but as to the use of them they belong not to us alone, but also to such others as we are able to succour out of what we have over and above our needs.'[5] Albertus Magnus states this in very strong words: 'For a man to give out of his superfluities is a mere act of justice, because he is rather then steward of them for the poor than the owner;'[6] and at an earlier date St. Peter Damian had affirmed that 'he who gives to the poor returns what he does not himself own, and does not dispose of his own goods.' He insists in the same passage that almsgiving is not an act of mercy, but of strict justice.[7] In the reply to another objection the duty of almsgiving is stated by Aquinas with additional vigour. 'There is a time when we sin mortally if we omit to give alms—on the part of the recipient when we see that his need is evident and urgent, and that he is not likely to be succoured otherwise—on the part of the giver when he has superfluous goods, which he does not need for the time being, so far as he can judge with probability.'[8]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 32, 1.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ad. 4.]

[Footnote 3: II. ii. 32, art. 2.]

[Footnote 4: II. ii. 32, art. 5.]

[Footnote 5: Ibid., ad. 2.]

[Footnote 6: Jarrett, Mediaeval Socialism, p. 87.]

[Footnote 7: De Eleemosynis, cap. 1.]

[Footnote 8: II. ii. 32, 5, ad. 3.]

The next question which St. Thomas discusses is whether one ought to give alms out of what one needs. He distinguishes between two kinds of 'necessaries.' The first is that without which existence is impossible, out of which kind of necessary things one is not bound to give alms save in exceptional cases, when, by doing so, one would be helping a great personage or supporting the Church or the State, since 'the common good is to be preferred to one's own.' The second kind of necessaries are those things without which a man cannot live in keeping with his social station. St. Thomas recommends the giving of alms out of this part of one's estate, but points out that it is only a matter of counsel, and not of precept, and one must not give alms to such an extent as to impoverish oneself permanently. To this last provision, however, there are three exceptions: one, when a man is entering religion and giving away all his goods; two, when he can easily replace what he gives away; and, three, when he is in presence of great indigence on the part of an individual, or great need on the part of the common weal. In these three cases it is praiseworthy for a man to forgo the requisites of his station in order to provide for a greater need.[1]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 32, 6.]

The mediaeval teaching on almsgiving is very well summarised by Fr. Jarrett,[1] as follows: '(1) A man is obliged to help another in his extreme need even at the risk of grave inconvenience to himself; (2) a man is obliged to help another who, though not in extreme need, is yet in considerable distress, but not at the risk of grave inconvenience to himself; (3) a man is not obliged to help another when necessity is slight, even though the risk to himself should be quite trifling.'

[Footnote 1: Mediaeval Socialism, p. 90.]

The importance of the duty of almsgiving further appears from the section where Aquinas lays down that the person to whom alms should have been given may, if the owner of the goods neglects his duty, repair the omission himself. 'All things are common property in a case of extreme necessity. Hence one who is in dire straits may take another's goods in order to succour himself if he can find no one who is willing to give him something.'[1] The duty of using one's goods for the benefit of one's neighbours was a fit matter for enforcement by the State, provided that the burdens imposed by legislation were equitable. 'Laws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common good—and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power of the law-giver—and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the common good. For, since every man is part of the community, each man in all that he is and has belongs to the community: just as a part in all that it is belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part in order to save the whole; so that on this account such laws, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding in conscience.'[2]

[Footnote 1: Ibid., art. 7 ad. 3.]

[Footnote 2: I. ii. 96,4.]

There can be no doubt that the practice of the scholastic teaching of community of user, in its proper sense, made for social stability. The following passage from Trithemius, written at the end of the fifteenth century, is interesting as showing how consistently the doctrine of St. Thomas was adhered to two hundred years after his death, and also that the failure of the rich to put into practice the moderate communism of St. Thomas was the cause of the rise of the heretical communists, who attacked the very foundations of property itself: 'Let the rich remember that their possessions have not been entrusted to them in order that they may have the sole enjoyment of them, but that they may use and manage them as property belonging to mankind at large. Let them remember that when they give to the needy they only give them what belongs to them. If the duty of right use and management of property, whether worldly or spiritual, is neglected, if the rich think that they are the sole lords and masters of that which they possess, and do not treat the needy as their brethren, there must of necessity arise an inner shattering of the commonwealth. False teachers and deceivers of the people will then gain influence, as has happened in Bohemia, by preaching to the people that earthly property should be equally distributed among all, and that the rich must be forcibly condemned to the division of their wealth. Then follow lamentable conditions and civil wars; no property is spared; no right of ownership is any longer recognised; and the wealthy may then with justice complain of the loss of possessions which have been unrighteously taken from them; but they should also seriously ask themselves the question whether in the days of peace and order they recognised in the administration of these goods the right of their superior lord and owner, namely, the God of all the earth.'[1]

[Footnote 1: Quoted in Janssen, op. cit., vol. ii. p. 91.]

It must not, however, be imagined for a moment that the community of user advocated by the scholastics had anything in common with the communism recommended by modern Socialists. As we have seen above, the scholastic communism did not at all apply to the procuring and dispensing of material things, but only to the mode of using them. It is not even correct to say that the property of an individual was limited by the duty of using it for the common good. As Rambaud puts it: 'Les devoirs de charite, d'equite naturelle, et de simple convenance sociale peuvent affecter, ou mieux encore, commander un certain usage de la richesse; mais ce n'est pas le meme chose que limiter la propriete.'[1] The community of user of the scholastics was distinguished from that of modern Socialists not less strongly by the motives which inspired it than by the effect it produced. The former was dictated by high spiritual aims, and the contempt of material goods; the latter is the fruit of over-attachment to material goods, and the envy of their possessors.[2]

[Footnote 1: Op. cit., p. 43. The same writer shows that there is no authority in Christian teaching for the proposition, advanced by many Christian Socialists, that property is a 'social function' (ibid., p. 774). The right of property even carried with it the jus abutendi, which, however, did not mean the right to abuse, but the right to destroy by consumption (see Antoine, Cours d'Economie sociale, p. 526).]

[Footnote 2: Roscher, op. cit., p. 5: 'Vom neuern Socialismus freilich unterscheidet sich diese Auffassung nicht blosz durch ihre religioese Grundlage, sondern auch durch ihre, jedem Mammonsdienst entgegengesetze, Verachtung der materiellen Gueter.']

The large estates which the Church itself owned have frequently been pointed to as evidence of hypocrisy in its attitude towards the common user of property. This is not the place to inquire into the condition of ecclesiastical estates in the Middle Ages, but it is sufficient to say that they were usually the centres of charity, and that in the opinion of so impartial a writer as Roscher, they rather tended to make the rules of using goods for the common use practicable than the contrary.[1]

[Footnote 1: Roscher, op. cit., p. 6.]



SECTION 3.—PROPERTY IN HUMAN BEINGS

Before we pass from the subject of property, we must deal with a particular kind of property right, namely, that of one human being over another. At the present day the idea of one man being owned by another is repugnant to all enlightened public opinion, but this general repugnance is of very recent growth, and did not exist in mediaeval Europe. In dealing with the scholastic attitude towards slavery, we shall indicate, as we did with regard to its attitude towards property in general, the fundamental harmony between the teaching of the primitive and the mediaeval Church on the subject. No apology is needed for this apparent digression, as a comparison of the teaching of the Church at the two periods of its development helps us to understand precisely what the later doctrine was; and, moreover, the close analogy which, as we shall see, existed between the Church's view of property and slavery, throws much light on the true nature of both institutions.

Although in practice Christianity had done a very great deal to mitigate the hardships of the slavery of ancient times, and had in a large degree abolished slavery by its encouragement of emancipation,[1] it did not, in theory, object to the institution itself. There is no necessity to labour a point so universally admitted by all students of the Gospels as that Christ and His Apostles did not set out to abolish the slavery which they found everywhere around them, but rather aimed, by preaching charity to the master and patience to the slave, at the same time to lighten the burden of servitude, and to render its acceptance a merit rather than a disgrace. 'What, in fact,' says Janet, 'is the teaching of St. Peter, St. Paul, and the Apostles in general? It is, in the first place, that in Christ there are no slaves, and that all men are free and equal; and, in the second place, that the slave must obey his master, and the master must be gentle to his slave.[2] Thus, although there are no slaves in Christ, St. Paul and the Apostles do not deny that there may be on earth. I am far from reproaching the Apostles for not having proclaimed the immediate necessity of the emancipation of slaves. But I say that the question was discussed in precisely the same terms by the ancient philosophers of the same period. Seneca, it is true, proclaimed not the civil, but the moral equality of men; but St. Paul does not speak of anything more than their equality in Christ. Seneca instructs the master to treat the slave as he would like to be treated himself.[3] Is not this what St. Peter and St. Paul say when they recommended the master to be gentle and good? The superiority of Christianity over Stoicism in this question arises altogether from the very superiority of the Christian spirit....'[4] The article on 'Slavery' in the Catholic Encyclopaedia expresses the same opinion: 'Christian teachers, following the example of St. Paul, implicitly accept slavery as not in itself incompatible with the Christian law. The Apostle counsels slaves to obey their masters, and to bear with their condition patiently. This estimate of slavery continued to prevail until it became fixed in the systematised ethical teaching of the schools; and so it remained without any conspicuous modification until the end of the eighteenth century.' The same interpretation of early Christian teaching is accepted by the Protestant scholar, Dr. Bartlett: 'The practical attitude of Seneca and the early Christians to slavery was much the same. They bade the individual rise to a sense of spiritual freedom in spite of outward bondage, rather than denounce the institution as an altogether illegitimate form of property.'[5]

[Footnote 1: See Roscher, Political Economy, s. 73.]

[Footnote 2: Eph., vi. 5, 6, 9.]

[Footnote 3: Ep. ad Luc., 73.]

[Footnote 4: Janet, op. cit., p. 317.]

[Footnote 5: 'Biblical and Early Christian Idea of Property,' Property, Its Duties and Rights (London, 1915), p. 110; Franck, Reformateurs et Publicistes de l'Europe: Moyen age—Renaissance, p. 87. On the whole question by far the best authority is volume iii. of Wallon's Histoire de l'Esclavage dans l'Antiquite.]

Several texts might be collected from the writings of the Fathers which would seem to show that according to patristic teaching the institution of slavery was unjustifiable. We do not propose to cite or to explain these texts one by one, in view of the quite clear and unambiguous exposition of the subject given by St. Thomas Aquinas, whose teaching is the more immediate subject of this essay; we shall content ourselves by reminding the reader of the precisely similar texts relating to the institution of property which we have examined above, and by stating that the corresponding texts on the subject of slavery are capable of an exactly similar interpretation. 'The teaching of the Apostle,' says Janet, 'and of the Fathers on slavery is the same as their teaching on property.'[1] The author from whom we are quoting, and on whose judgment too much reliance cannot be placed, then proceeds to cite many of the patristic texts on property, which we quoted in the section dealing with that subject, and asks: 'What conclusion should one draw from these different passages? It is that in Christ there are no rich and no poor, no mine and no thine; that in Christian perfection all things are common to all men, but that nevertheless property is legitimate and derived from human law. Is it not in the same sense that the Fathers condemned slavery as contrary to divine law, while respecting it as comformable to human law? The Fathers abound in texts contrary to slavery, but have we not seen a great number of texts contrary to property?'[2] The closeness of the analogy between the patristic treatment of slavery and of property appears forcibly in the following passage of Lactantius: 'God who created man willed that all should be equal. He has imposed on all the same condition of living; He has produced all in wisdom; He has promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly benefits. In His sight no one is a slave, no one a master; for if we have all the same Father, by an equal right we are all His children; no one is poor in the sight of God but he who is without justice, no one rich but he who is full of virtue.... Some one will say, Are there not among you some poor and others rich; some servants and others masters? Is there not some difference between individuals? There is none, nor is there any other cause why we mutually bestow on each other the name of brethren except that we believe ourselves to be equal. For since we measure all human things not by the body but by the spirit, although the condition of bodies is different, yet we have no servants, but we both regard them, and speak of them as brothers in spirit, in religion as fellow-servants.'[3] Slavery was declared to be a blessing, because, like poverty, it afforded the opportunity of practising the virtues of humility and patience.[4] The treatment of the institution of slavery underwent a striking and important development in the hands of St. Augustine, who justified it as one of the penalties incurred by man as a result of the sin of Adam and Eve. 'The first holy men,' writes the Saint, 'were rather shepherds than kings, God showing herein what both the order of the creation desired, and what the deserts of sin exacted. For justly was the burden of servitude laid upon the back of transgression. And therefore in all the Scriptures we never read the word servus until Noah laid it as a curse upon his offending son. So that it was guilt, and not nature, that gave origin to that name.... Sin is the mother of servitude and the first cause of man's subjection to man.'[5] St. Augustine also justifies the enslavement of those conquered in war—'It is God's decree to humble the conquered, either reforming their sins herein or punishing them.'[6]

[Footnote 1: Op. cit., p. 318.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., p. 321.]

[Footnote 3: Div. Inst., v. 15-16.]

[Footnote 4: Chryst., Genes., serm. v. i.; Ep. ad Cor., hom. xix. 4.]

[Footnote 5: De Civ. Dei, xix. 14-15.]

[Footnote 6: Ibid.]

Janet ably analyses and expounds the advance which St. Augustine made in the treatment of slavery: 'In this theory we must note the following points: (1) Slavery is unjust according to the law of nature. This is what is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle, but conformable to that of the Stoics. (2) Slavery is just as a consequence of sin. This is the new principle peculiar to St. Augustine. He has found a principle of slavery, which is neither natural inequality, nor war, nor agreement, but sin. Slavery is no more a transitory fact which we accept provisionally, so as not to precipitate a social revolution: it is an institution which has become natural as a result of the corruption of our nature. (3) It must not be said that slavery, resulting from sin, is destroyed by Christ who destroyed sin.... Slavery, according to St. Augustine, must last as long as society.'[1]

[Footnote 1: Janet, op. cit., p. 302.]

Nowhere does St. Thomas Aquinas appear as clearly as the medium of contact and reconciliation between the Fathers of the Church and the ancient philosophers as in his treatment of the question of slavery. His utterances upon this subject are scattered through many portions of his work, but, taken together, they show that he was quite prepared to admit the legitimacy of the institution, not alone on the grounds put forward by St. Augustine, but also on those suggested by Aristotle and the Roman jurists.

He fully adopts the Augustinian argument in the Summa, where, in answer to the query, whether in the state of innocence all men were equal, he states that even in that state there would still have been inequalities of sex, knowledge, justice, etc. The only inequalities which would not have been present were those arising from sin; but the only inequality arising from sin was slavery.[1] 'By the words "So long as we are without sin we are equal," Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some are placed in subjection to others as a penalty.'[2] In the following article St. Thomas distinguishes between political and despotic subordination, and shows that the former might have existed in a state of innocence. 'Mastership has a twofold meaning; first as opposed to servitude, in which case a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is commonly referred to any kind of subject; and in that sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men can be called a master. In the first meaning of mastership man would not have been ruled by man in the state of innocence; but in the latter sense man would be ruled over by man in that state.'[3] In De Regimine Principum Aquinas also accepts what we may call the Augustinian view of slavery. 'But whether the dominion of man over man is according to the law of nature, or is permitted or provided by God may be certainly resolved. If we speak of dominion by means of servile subjection, this was introduced because of sin. But if we speak of dominion in so far as it relates to the function of advising and directing, it may in this sense be said to be natural.'[4]

[Footnote 1: i. 96, 3.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., ad. 1.]

[Footnote 3: i. 96, 4.]

[Footnote 4: De Reg. Prin., iii. 9. This is one of the chapters the authorship of which is disputed.]

St. Thomas was therefore willing to endorse the argument of St. Augustine that slavery was a result of sin; but he also admits the justice of Aristotle's reasoning on the subject. In the section of the Summa where the question is discussed, whether the law of nations is the same as the natural law, one of the objections to be met is that 'Slavery among men is natural, for some are naturally slaves according to the philosopher. Now "slavery belongs to the law of nations," as Isidore states. Therefore the right of nations is a natural right.'[1] In answer to this objection St. Thomas draws the distinction between what is natural absolutely, and what is natural secundum quid, the passage which we have quoted in treating of property rights.[2] He then goes on to apply this distinction to the case of slavery. 'Considered absolutely, the fact that this particular man should be a slave rather than another man, is based, not on natural reason, but on some resultant utility, in that it is useful to this man to be ruled by a wise man, and to the latter to be helped by the former, as the philosopher states. Wherefore slavery which belongs to the law of nations is natural in the second way, but not in the first.'[3] It will be noted from this passage that St. Thomas partly admits, though not entirely, the opinion of Aristotle. In the De Regimine Principum he goes much further in the direction of adopting the full Aristotelian theory: 'Nature decrees that there should be grades in men as in other things. We see this in the elements, a superior and an inferior; we see in every mixture that some one element predominates.... For we see this also in the relation of the body and the mind, and in the powers of the mind compared with one another; because some are ordained towards ordering and moving, such as the understanding and the will; others to serving. So should it be among men; and thus it is proved that some are slaves according to nature. Some lack reason through some defect of nature; and such ought to be subjected to servile works because they cannot use their reason, and this is called the natural law.'[4] In the same chapter the right of conquerors to enslave their conquered is referred to without comment, and therefore implicitly approved by the author.

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 57, 3.]

[Footnote 2: Supra, p. 64.]

[Footnote 3: II. ii 57, ad. 2.]

[Footnote 4: De Reg. Prin., ii. 10.]

'Thus,' according to Janet, 'St. Thomas admits slavery as far as one can admit it, and for all the reasons for which one can admit it. He admits with Aristotle that there is a natural slavery; with St. Augustine that slavery is the result of sin; with the jurisconsult that slavery is the result of war and convention.'[1] 'The author justifies slavery,' says Franck, 'in the name of St. Augustine, and in that of Aristotle; in the name of the latter by showing that there are two races of men, one born to command, and the other to obey; in the name of the former in affirming that slavery had its origin in original sin; that by sin man has forfeited his right to liberty. Further, we must admit slavery as an institution not only of nature and one of the consequences of the fall, we must admit a third principle of slavery which appears to St. Thomas as legitimate as the other two. War is necessary; therefore it is just; and if it is just we must accept its consequences. One of these consequences is the absolute right of the conqueror over the life, person, and goods of the conquered.'[2]

[Footnote 1: Op. cit., vol. i. p. 431.]

[Footnote 2: Franck, op cit., p. 69.]

Aquinas returns to the question of slavery in another passage, which is interesting as showing that he continued to make use of the analogy between slavery and property which we have seen in the Fathers. 'A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto, e.g. that one should not do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary; thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the natural law because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense the possession of all things in common and universal freedom is said to be of the natural law, because, to wit, the distinction of possession and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life. Accordingly, the law of nature was not changed in this respect, but by addition.'[1]

[Footnote 1: I. ii. 94, 5, ad. 3.]

AEgidius Romanus closely follows the teaching of his master on the subject of slavery. 'What does AEgidius do? He unites Aristotle and St. Augustine against human liberty. He declares with the latter that man has lost the right of belonging to himself, since he has fallen from the primitive order established by God Himself in nature. He admits with Aristotle the existence of two races of men, the one designed for liberty, the other for servitude.... This is not all—to this servitude which he calls natural, the author joins another, purely legal, but which does not seem to him less just, namely, that which is founded on the right of war, and which obliges the conquered to become the slaves of the conquerors—to give up their liberty in exchange for their lives. Our author admits it is just in itself, because in his opinion it is useful to the defence of one's country; it excites warriors to courage by placing before their eyes the terrible consequences of cowardice.'[1] The teachings of St. Thomas and AEgidius were accepted by all the later scholastics.[2] Biel, whose opinion is always very valuable as being that of the last of a long line, says that there are three kinds of slaves—slaves of God, of sin, and of man. The first kind of slavery is wholly good, the second wholly bad, while the third, though not instituted by, is approved by the jus gentium. He proceeds to state the four ways in which a man may become enslaved: namely, ex necessitate, or by being born of a slave mother; ex bello, by being captured in war; ex delicto, or by sentence of the law in the case of certain crimes committed by freedmen; and ex propria voluntate, or by the sale of a man of himself into slavery.[3]

[Footnote 1: Franck, op. cit., p. 90.]

[Footnote 2: Franck, op. cit., p. 91.]

[Footnote 3: Biel, Inventarium seu Repertorium generale super qualuor libros Sententiarum, iv. xv. I; and see Carletus, Summa Angelica, q. ccxii.]

It must not be forgotten that we are dealing purely with theory. In fact the Church did an inestimable amount of good to the servile classes, and, at the time that Aquinas wrote, thanks to the operation of Christianity in this respect, the old Roman slavery had completely disappeared. The nearest approach to ancient slavery in the Middle Ages was serfdom, which was simply a step in the transition from slavery to free labour.[1] Moreover, the rights of the master over the slave were strictly confined to the disposal of his services; the ancient absolute right over his body had completely disappeared. 'In those things,' says St. Thomas, 'which appertain to the disposition of human acts and things, the subject is bound to obey his superior according to the reason of the superiority; thus a soldier must obey his officer in those things which appertain to war; a slave his master in those things which appertain to the carrying out of his servile works.'[2] 'Slavery does not abolish the natural equality of man,' says a writer who is quoted by the Catholic Encyclopaedia as correctly stating the Catholic doctrine on the subject prior to the eighteenth century, 'hence by slavery one man is understood to become subject to the dominion of another to the extent that the master has a perfect right to the services which one man may justly perform for another.'[3] Biel, who lays down the justice of slavery so unambiguously, is no less clear in his statement of the limitations of the right. 'The body of the slave is not simply in the power of the master as the body of an ox is; nor can the master kill or mutilate the slave, nor abuse him contrary to the law of God. The temporal gains derived from the labour of the slave belong to the master; but the master is bound to provide the slave with the necessaries of life.'[4] Rambaud very properly points out that the reason that the scholastic writers did not fulminate in as strong and as frequent language against the tyranny of masters, was not that they felt less strongly on the subject, but that the abuses of the ancient slave system had almost entirely disappeared under the influence of Christian teaching.[5]

[Footnote 1: Wallon, op. cit., vol. iii. p. 93; Brants, op. cit., p. 87.]

[Footnote 2: II. ii. 104, 5.]

[Footnote 3: Gerdil., Comp. Inst. Civ. I., vii.]

[Footnote 4: Biel, op. cit., iv. xv. 5.]

[Footnote 5: Op. cit., p. 83.]

On the other hand, it must not be imagined, as has sometimes been suggested, that the slavery defended by Aquinas was not real slavery, but rather the ordinary modern relation between employer and employed. Such an interpretation is definitely disproved by a passage of the article on justice where Aquinas says that 'inducing a slave to leave his master is properly an injury against the person ... and, since the slave is his master's chattel, it is referred to theft.'[1]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 61,3. Brants, op. cit., pp. 87 et seq., is inclined to take a more liberal view of the scholastic doctrine on slavery, but we cannot agree with him in view of the contemporary texts.]



CHAPTER III

DUTIES REGARDING THE EXCHANGE OF PROPERTY



SECTION 1.—THE SALE OF GOODS

Sec. 1. The Just Price.

We dealt in the last chapter with the duties which attached to property in respect of its acquisition and use, and we now pass to the duties which attached to it in respect of its exchange. As we indicated above, the right to exchange one's goods for the goods or the money of another person was, according to the scholastics, one of the necessary corollaries of the right of private property. In order that such exchange might be justifiable, it must be conducted on a. basis of commutative justice, which, as we have seen, consisted in the observance of equality according to the arithmetical mean. We further drew attention to the fact that exchanges might be divided into sales of goods and sales of the use of money. In the former case the regulating principle of the equality of justice was given effect to by the observance of the just price; in the latter by that of the prohibition of usury. We shall deal with the former in the present and with the latter in the following section.

The mediaeval teaching on the just price, about which there has been so much discussion and disagreement among modern writers, was simply the application to the particular contract of sale of the principles which regulated contracts in general. Exchange originally took the form of barter; but, as it was found impossible accurately to measure the values of the objects exchanged without the intervention of some common measure of value, money was invented to serve as such a measure. We need not further refer to barter in this section, as the principles which applied to it were those that applied to sale. Indeed all sales when analysed are really barter through the medium of money. That Aquinas simply regarded his article on just price[1] as an explanation of the application of his general teaching on justice to the particular case of the contract of sale is quite clear from the article itself. 'Apart from fraud, we may speak of buying and selling in two ways. First, as considered in themselves; and from this point of view buying and selling seem to be established for the common advantage of both parties, one of whom requires that which belongs to the other, and vice versa. Now whatever is established for the common advantage should not be more of a burden to one part than to the other, and consequently all contracts between them should observe equality of thing and thing. Again, the quality of a thing that comes into human use is measured by the price given for it, for which purpose money was invented. Therefore, if either the price exceed the quantity of the thing's worth, or conversely the worth of the thing exceed the price, there is no longer the equality of justice; and consequently to sell a thing for more than its worth, or to buy it for less than its worth, is in itself unjust and unlawful.'[2] When two contracting parties make an exchange through the medium of money, the price is the expression of the exchange value in money. 'The just price expresses the equivalence, which is the foundation of contractual justice.'[3]

[Footnote 1: II. ii. 77, 1.]

[Footnote 2: This opinion was accepted by all the later writers, e.g. Gerson, De Cont., ii. 5; Biel, op. cit., IV. xv. 10: 'Si pretium excedit quantitatem valoris rei, vel e converso tolleretur equalitas, erit contractus iniquus.']

[Footnote 3: Desbuquois, 'La Justice dans l'Echange,' Semaine Sociale de France, 1911, p. 167. Gerson says: 'Contractus species est justitiae commutativae quae respicit aequalitatem rei quae venditur ad rem quae emitur, ut servetur aequalitas justi pretii; propter quam aequalitatem facilius observandum inventa est moneta, vel numisma, vel pecunia,' De Cont., ii. 5.]

The conception of the just price, though based on Aristotelian conceptions of justice, is essentially Christian. The Roman law had allowed the utmost freedom of contract in sales; apart from fraud, the two contracting parties were at complete liberty to fix a price at their own risk; and selfishness was assumed and allowed to be the animating motive of every contracting party. The one limitation to this sweeping rule was in favour of the seller. By a rescript of Diocletian and Maximian it was enacted that, if a thing were sold for less than half its value, the seller could recover the property, unless the buyer chose to make up the price to the full amount. Although this rescript was perfectly general in its terms, some authors contended that it applied only to sales of land, because the example given was the sale of a farm.[1] However, the rescript was quoted by the Fathers as showing that even the Roman law considered that contracts might be questioned on equitable grounds in certain cases.[2] The distinctively Christian notion of just price seems to have its origin in a passage of St. Augustine;[3] but the notion was not placed on a philosophical foundation until the thirteenth century. Even Aquinas, however, although he treats of the just price at some length, and expresses clear and categorical opinions upon many points connected with it, does not state the principles on which the just price itself should be arrived at. This omission is due, not to the fact that Aquinas was unfamiliar with these principles, but to the fact that he took them for granted as they were not disputed or doubted.[4] We have consequently to look for enlightenment upon this point in writings other than those of Aquinas. The subject can be most satisfactorily understood if we divide its treatment into two parts: first, a consideration of what constituted the just price in the sale of an article, the price of which was fixed by law; and second, a consideration of what constituted the just price of an article, the price of which was not so fixed.

[Footnote 1: Hunter, Roman Law, p. 492.]

[Footnote 2: Ashley, op. cit., p. 133.]

[Footnote 3: 'Scio ipse hominem quum venalis codex ei fuisset oblatus, pretiique ejus ignarum ideo quiddam exiguum poscentem cerneret venditorem, justum pretium, quod multo amplius erat nec opinanti dedisse' (De Trin., xiii. 3).]

[Footnote 4: Palgrave, Dictionary of Political Economy, tit. 'Justum Pretium.']

Sec. 2. The Just Price when Price fixed by Law.

Regarding the power of the State to fix prices, the theologians and jurists were in complete agreement. According to Gerson: 'The law may justly fix the price of things which are sold, both movable and immovable, in the nature of rents and not in the nature of rents, and feudal and non-feudal, below which price the seller must not give, or above which the buyer must not demand, however they may desire to do so. As therefore the price is a kind of measure of the equality to be observed in contracts, and as it is sometimes difficult to find that measure with exactitude, on account of the varied and corrupt desires of man, it becomes expedient that the medium should be fixed according to the judgment of some wise man.... In the civil state, however, nobody is to be decreed wiser than the lawgiving authority. Therefore it behoves the latter, whenever it is possible to do so, to fix the just price, which may not be exceeded by private consent, and which must be enforced.'...[1] Biel practically paraphrases this passage of Gerson, and contends that it is the duty of the prince to fix prices, mainly on account of the difficulty which private contractors find in doing so.[2]

[Footnote 1: De Cont., i. 19.]

[Footnote 2: Op. cit., IV. xv. 11.]

The rules which we find laid down for the guidance of the prince in fixing prices are very interesting, as they show that the mediaeval writers had a clear idea of the constituent elements of value. Langenstein, whose famous work on contracts was considered of high authority by later writers, says that the prince should take account of the condition of the place for which the price was to be fixed, the circumstances of the time, the condition of the mass of the people. The different kinds of need which may be felt for goods must also be considered, indigentice naturae, status, voluptatis, and cupiditatis; and a distinction drawn between extensive and intensive need—the former is greater 'quanto plures re aliqua indigent,' the latter 'quanto minus de illa re habetur.' The general rule is that the prince must seek to find a medium between a price so low as to render labourers, artisans, and merchants unable to maintain themselves suitably, and one so high as to disable the poor from obtaining the necessaries of life. When in doubt, Langenstein concludes, the price should err on the low rather than the high side.[1] Biel gives similar rules: The legislator must regard the needs of man, the abundance or scarcity of things, the difficulty, labour, and risks of production. When all these things are carefully considered the legislator is in a position to fix a just price.[2] According to Endemann, the labour of production, the cost and risk of transport, and the condition of the markets had all to be kept in mind when a fair price was being fixed.[3] We may mention in passing that the power of fixing the just price might be delegated; prices were frequently fixed by the town authorities, the guilds, and the Church.[4]

[Footnote 1: Roscher, Geschichte, p. 19.]

[Footnote 2: Op. cit., IV. xv. 10.]

[Footnote 3: Studien, vol. ii. p. 43.]

[Footnote 4: Endemann, Studien, vol. i. p. 40; Roscher, Political Economy, s. 114.]

The passage from Gerson which we quoted above shows that, when a just price had been fixed by the competent authority, the parties to a contract were bound to keep to it. In other words, the pretium legitimum was ipso facto the justum pretium. On this point there is complete agreement among the writers of the period. Caepolla says, 'When the price is fixed by law or statute, that is the just price, and nobody can receive anything, however small, in excess of it, because the law must be observed';[1] and Biel, 'When a price has been fixed, the contracting parties have sufficient certainty about the equality of value and the justice of the price.'[2] Cossa draws attention to the necessity of the fixed price corresponding with the real price in order that it should maintain its validity. 'The schoolmen talk of the legitimate and irreducible price of a thing which was fixed by authority, and was for obvious reasons of special importance in the case of the necessaries of life.... The legitimate price of a thing as fixed by authority had to be based upon the natural price, and therefore lost its validity and became a dead letter the moment any change of circumstances made it unfair.'[3]

[Footnote 1: De Contractibus Simulatis, 69.]

[Footnote 2: Op. cit., IV. xv. 10.]

[Footnote 3: Op. cit., p. 143.]



Sec. 3. The Just Price when Price not fixed by Law.

When the just price was not fixed by any outside authority, the buyer and seller had to arrive at it themselves. The problem before them was to equalise their respective burdens, so that there would be equality of burden between them, or, in other words, to reduce the value of the article sold to terms of money. In order that we may understand how this equality was arrived at, it is important to know the factors which were held to enter into the determination of value.

The first thing upon which the mediaeval teachers insist is that value is not determined by the intrinsic excellence of the thing itself, because, if it were, a fly would be more valuable than a pearl, as being intrinsically more excellent.[1] Nor is the value to be measured by the mere utility of the object for satisfying the material needs of man, for in that case, corn should be worth more than precious stones.[2] The value of an object is to be measured by its capacity for satisfying men's wants. 'Valor rerum aestimatur secundum humanam indigentiam.... Dicendum est quod indigentia humana est mensura naturalis commutabilium; quod probatur sic: bonitas sive valor rei attenditur ex fine propter quem exhibetur: unde commentator secundo Metaphysicae nihil est bonum nisi propter causas finales; sed finis naturalis ad quem justitia commutativa ordinet exteriora commutabilia est supplementum indigentiae humanae...; igitur supplementum indigentiae humanae est vera mensura commutabilium. Sed supplementum videtur mensurari per indigentiam; majoris enim valoris est supplementum quod majorem supplet indigentiam.... Item hoc probatur signo, quia videmus quod illo tempore quo vina deficiunt quia magis indigeremus eis ipsa fiunt cariora....[3]

[Footnote 1: 'In justitia commutativa non estimatur pretium commutabilium secundum naturalem valorem ipsorum, sic enim musca plus valeret quam totus aurum mundi' (Buridan, op. cit., v. 14).]

[Footnote 2: Slater, 'Value in Theology and Political Economy,' Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Sept. 1901.]

[Footnote 3: Buridan, op. cit., v. 14 and 16. Antoninus of Florence says that value is determined by three factors, virtuositas, raritas, and placibilitas (Summa, ii. 1, 16.)]

The capacity of an object for satisfying man's needs could not be measured by its capacity for satisfying the needs of this or that individual, but by its capacity for satisfying the needs of the average member of the community.[1] The Abbe Desbuquois, in the article from which we have already quoted, finds in this elevation of the common estimation an illustration of the general principle of the mediaevals, which we have seen at work in their teaching on the use of property, that the individual benefit must always be subordinated to the general welfare. According to him, it is but one application of the duty of using one's goods for the common good. 'In the same way, in allowing the right of exchange—a right, let us remark in passing, which is but an application of the right of property—and in allowing it as a means of life necessary to everybody, nature does not lose sight of the universal destination of economic goods. One conceives then that the variations of exchange are not permitted to be left to the arbitrary judgment of a single man, nor to be affected by the whims and abuses of individuals; that value is defined in view of the general good. The exchange value, as it is in the general or social order, proceeds from the judgment of the social environment (milieu social).'[2]

[Footnote 1: 'Indigentia istius hominis vel illius non mensurat valorem commutabilium; sed indigentia communis eorum qui inter se commutare possunt,' Buridan, op. cit., v. 16. 'Prout communiter venditur in foro,' Henri de Gand, Quod Lib., xiv. 14; Nider, De Cont. Merc., ii. 1.]

[Footnote 2: 'La Justice dans l'Echange,' Semaine Sociale de France, 1911, p. 168.]

The writers of the Middle Ages show a very keen perception of the elements which invest an object with the value which is accorded to it by the general estimation. In Aquinas we find certain elements recognised—'diversitas loci vel temporis, labor, raritas'—but it is not until the authors of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that we find a systematic treatment of value.[1] First and foremost there is the cost of production of the article, especially the wages of all those who helped to produce it. Langenstein lays down that every one can determine for himself the just price of the wares he has to sell by reckoning what he needs to support himself in the status which he occupies.[2] According to the Catholic Encyclopaedia,[3] the just price of an article included enough to pay fair wages to the worker—that is, enough to enable him to maintain the standard of living of his class. This, though not stated in so many words by Aquinas, was probably assumed by him as too obvious to need repetition.[4] 'The cost of production of manufactured products,' says Brants, 'is a legitimate constituent element of value; it is according to the cost that the producer can properly fix the value of his product and of his work.'[5]

[Footnote 1: Brants, op. cit., p. 69.]

[Footnote 2: De Cont., quoted by Roscher, Geschichte, p. 20.]

[Footnote 3: Tit. 'Political Economy.']

[Footnote 4: Palgrave, Dictionary, tit. 'Justum Pretium.']

[Footnote 5: Brants, op. cit., p. 202.]

The cost of the labour of production was, however, by no means the only factor which was admitted to enter into the determination of value. The passage from Gerson dealing with the circumstances to which the prince must have regard in fixing a price, which we quoted above, shows quite clearly that many other factors were recognised as no less important. This appears with special clearness in the treatise of Langenstein, whose authority on this subject was always ranked very high. Bernardine of Siena is careful to point out that the expense of production is only one of the factors which influence the value of an object.[1] Biel explains that, when no price has been fixed by law, the just price may be arrived at by a reference to the cost of the labour of production, and to the state of the market, and the other circumstances which we have seen above the prince was bound to have regard to in fixing a price. He also allows the price to be raised on account of any anxiety which the production of the goods occasioned him, or any danger he incurred.[2]

[Footnote 1: 'Res potest plus vel minus valere tribus modis; primo secundum suam virtutem; secondo modo secundum suam caritatem; tertio modo secundum suam placibilitatem et affectionem.... Primo observat quemdam naturalem ordinem utilium rerum, secundo observat quemdam communem cursum copiae et inopiae, tertio observat periculum et industriam rerum seu obsequiorum' (Funk, Zins und Wucher, p. 153).]

[Footnote 1: 'Sollicitudo et periculum,' Op. cit., IV. xv. 10.]

It will be apparent from the whole trend of the above that, whereas the remuneration of the labour of all those who were engaged in the production of an article, was one of the elements to be taken into account in reckoning its value, and consequently its just price, it was by no means the only element. Certain so-called Christian socialists have endeavoured to find in the writings of the scholastics support for the Marxian position that all value arises from labour.[1] This endeavour is, however, destined to failure; we shall see in a later chapter that many forms of unearned income were tolerated and approved by the scholastics; but all that is necessary here is to draw the attention of the reader to the passages on value to which we have referred. One of the most prominent exponents of the untenable view that the mediaevals traced all value to labour is the Abbe Hohoff, whose argument that there was a divorce between value and just price in the scholastic writings, is ably controverted by Rambaud, who remarks that nobody would have been more surprised than Aquinas himself at the suggestion that he was the forerunner of Karl Marx.[2]

[Footnote 1: Even Ashley states that 'the doctrine had thus a close resemblance to that of modern Socialists; labour it regarded both as the sole (human) cause of wealth, and also as the only just claim to the possession of wealth' (Op. cit., vol. i. part ii. p. 393).]

[Footnote 2: Op. cit., p. 50.]

The idea that the scholastics traced all value to the labour expended on production is rejected by many of the most prominent writers on mediaeval economic theory. Roscher draws particular attention to the fact that the canonist teaching assigned the correct proportions in production to land, capital, and labour, in contrast to all the later schools of economists, who have exaggerated the importance of one or the other of these factors.[1] Even Knies, who was the first modern writer to insist on the importance of the cost of production as an element of value, states that the Church sought to fix the price of goods in accordance with the cost of production (Herstellungskosten) and the consumption value (Gebrauchswerte).[2] Brants takes the same view. 'The expenses of production are in practice the norm of the fixing of the sale price in the great majority of cases, above all in a very narrow market, where competition is limited; moreover, they can, for reasons of public order, form the basis of a fixing that will protect the producer and the consumer against the disastrous consequences of constant oscillations. The vendor can in principle be remunerated for his trouble. It is well that he should be so remunerated; it is socially useful, and is used as a basis for fixing price; but it cannot in any way be said that this forms the objective measure of value, but that the work and expense are a sufficient title of remuneration for the fixing of the just price of the sale of a thing. Some writers have tried to conclude from this that the authors of the Middle Ages saw in labour the measure of value. This conclusion is exaggerated. We may fully admit that this element enters into the sale price; but it is in no way the general measure of value.... The expenses of production constitute, then, one of the legitimate elements of just price; they are not the measure of value, but a factor often influencing its determination.'[3] 'Labour,' according to Dr. Cronin, 'is one of the most important of all the determinants of value, for labour is the chief element in cost of production, and cost of production is one of the chief elements in determining the level at which it is useful to buy or sell. But labour is not the only determinant of value; there is, e.g., the price of the raw materials, a price that is not wholly determined by the labour of producing those materials.'[4]

[Footnote 1: Political Economy, s. 48.]

[Footnote 2: Politische Oekonomie vom Standpuncte der geschichtlichen Methode, p. 116.]

[Footnote 3: Op. cit., p. 112.]

[Footnote 4: Ethics, vol. ii. p. 181.]

The just price, then, in the absence of a legal fixing, was held to be the price that was in accordance with the communis estimatio. Of course, this did not mean that a plebiscite had to be taken before every sale, but that any price that was in accordance with the general course of dealing at the time and place of the sale was considered substantially fair. 'A thing is worth what it can generally be sold for—at the time of the contract; this means what it can be sold for generally either on that day or the preceding or following day. One must look to the price at which similar things are generally sold in the open market.'[1] 'We must state precisely,' says the Abbe Desbuquois, 'the character of this common estimation; it did not mean the universal suffrage; although it expresses the universal interest, it proceeds in practice from the evaluation of competent men, taken in the social environment where the exchange value operates. If one supposes a sovereign tribunal of arbitration where all the rights of all the weak and all the strong economic factors are taken into account, the just price appears as the sentence or decision of this court.'[2] 'For the scholastics, the common estimation meant an ethical judgment of at least the most influential members of the community, anticipating the markets and fixing the rate of exchange.'[3]