[Footnote 32:—Vide Jefferson's Autobiography, commenced January 6th, 1821. JEFFERSON'S Works, vol. 1, p. 49.]

[Footnote 33:—"I am not ashamed or afraid publicly to avow that the election of William H. Seward or Salmon P. Chase, or any such representative of the Republican party, upon a sectional platform, ought to be resisted to the disruption of every tie that binds this Confederacy together. (Applause on the Democratic side of the House.)" Mr. Curry, of Alabama, in the House of Representatives.

"Just so sure as the Republican party succeed in electing a sectional man, upon their sectional, anti-slavery platform, breathing destruction and death to the rights of my people, just so sure, in my judgment, the time will have come when the South must and will take an unmistakable and decided action, and then he who dallies is a dastard, and he who doubts is damned! I need not tell what I, a Southern man, will do. I think I may safely speak for the masses of the people of Georgia—that when that event happens, they, in my judgment, will consider it an overt act, a declaration of war, and meet immediately in convention, to take into consideration the mode and measure of redress. That is my position; and if that be treason to the Government, make the most of it."—Mr. Gartell, of Georgia, in the House of Representatives.

"I said to my constituents, and to the people of the capital of my State, on my way here, if such an event did occur," [i.e., the election of a Republican President, upon a Republican platform], "while it would be their duty to determine the course which the State would pursue, it would be my privilege to counsel with them as to what I believed to be the proper course; and I said to them, what I say now, and what I will always say in such an event, that my counsel would be to take independence out of the Union in preference to the loss of constitutional rights, and consequent degradation and dishonor, in it. That is my position, and it is the position which I know the Democratic party of the State of Mississippi will maintain."—Gov. McRae, of Mississippi.

"It is useless to attempt to conceal the fact that, in the present temper of the Southern people, it" [i.e., the election of a Republican President] "cannot be, and will not be, submitted to. The 'irrepressible conflict' doctrine, announced and advocated by the ablest and most distinguished leader of the Republican party, is an open declaration of war against the institution of slavery, wherever it exists; and I would be disloyal to Virginia and the South, if I did not declare that the election of such a man, entertaining such sentiment, and advocating such doctrines, ought to be resisted by the slaveholding States. The idea of permitting such a man to have the control and direction of the army and navy of the United States, and the appointment of high judicial and executive officers, POSTMASTERS INCLUDED, cannot be entertained by the South for a moment."—Gov. Letcher, of Virginia.

"Slavery must be maintained—in the Union, if possible; out of it, if necessary: peaceably if we may; forcibly if we must."—Senator Iverson, of Georgia.

"Lincoln and Hamlin, the Black Republican nominees, will be elected in November next, and the South will then decide the great question whether they will submit to the domination of Black Republican rule—the fundamental principle of their organization being an open, undisguised, and declared war upon our social institutions. I believe that the honor and safety of the South, in that contingency, will require the prompt secession of the slaveholding States from the Union; and failing then to obtain from the free States additional and higher guaranties for the protection of our rights and property, that the seceding States should proceed to establish a new government. But while I think such would be the imperative duty of the South, I should emphatically reprobate and repudiate any scheme having for its object the separate secession of South Carolina. If Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi alone—giving us a portion of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts—would unite with this State in a common secession upon the election of a Black Republican, I would give my consent to the policy."—Letter of Hon. James L. Orr, of S.C., to John Martin and others, July 23, 1860.]

[Footnote 34:—The Hon. John A. Andrew, of the Boston Bar, made the following analysis of the Dred Scott case in the Massachusetts Legislature. Hon. Caleb Cushing was then a member of that body, but did not question its correctness.

"On the question of possibility of citizenship to one of the Dred Scott color, extraction, and origin, three Justices, viz., Taney, Wayne, and Daniels, held the negative. Nelson and Campbell passed over the plea by which the question was raised. Grier agreed with Nelson. Catron said the question was not open. McLean agreed with Catron, but thought the plea bad. Curtis agreed that the question was open, but attacked the plea, met its averments, and decided that a free-born colored person, native to any State, is a citizen thereof by birth, and is therefore a citizen of the Union, and entitled to sue in the Federal Courts.

"Had a majority of the court directly sustained the plea in abatement, and denied the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court appealed from, then all else they could have said and done would have been done and said in a cause not theirs to try and not theirs to discuss. In the absence of such a majority, one step more was to be taken. And the next step reveals an agreement of six of the Justices, on a point decisive of the cause, and putting an end to all the functions of the court.

"It is this. Scott was first carried to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, where he remained about two years, before going with his master to Fort Snelling, in the Territory of Wisconsin. His claim to freedom was rested on the alleged effect of his translation from a slave State, and again into a free territory. If, by his removal to Illinois, he became emancipated from his master, the subsequent continuance of his pilgrimage into the Louisiana purchase could not add to his freedom, nor alter the fact. If, by reason of any want or infirmity in the laws of Illinois, or of conformity on his part to their behests, Dred Scott remained a slave while he remained in that State, then—for the sake of learning the effect on him of his territorial residence beyond the Mississippi, and of his marriage and other proceedings there, and the effect of the sojournment and marriage of Harriet, in the same territory, upon herself and her children—it might become needful to advance one other step into the investigation of the law; to inspect the Missouri Compromise, banishing slavery to the south of the line of 36 deg. 30' in the Louisiana purchase.

"But no exigency of the cause ever demanded or justified that advance; for six of the Justices, including the Chief Justice himself, decided that the status of the plaintiff, as free or slave, was dependent, not upon the laws of the State in which he had been, but of the State of Missouri, in which he was at the commencement of the suit. The Chief Justice asserted that 'it is now firmly settled by the decisions of the highest court in the State, that Scott and his family, on their return were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the property of the defendant.' This was the burden of the opinion of Nelson, who declares 'the question is one solely depending upon the law of Missouri, and that the Federal Court, sitting in the State, and trying the case before us, was bound to follow it.' It received the emphatic endorsement of Wayne, whose general concurrence was with the Chief Justice. Grier concurred in set terms with Nelson on all 'the questions discussed by him.' Campbell says, 'The claim of the plaintiff to freedom depends upon the effect to be given to his absence from Missouri, in company with his master in Illinois and Minnesota, and this effect is to be ascertained by reference to the laws of Missouri.' Five of the Justices, then (if no more of them), regard the law of Missouri as decisive of the plaintiff's rights."]

[Footnote 35:—"Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States in every State that might desire it, for twenty years."—Ch. J. Taney, 19 How. U.S.R., p. 451. Vide language of Mr. Madison, note 34, as to "merchandise."]

[Footnote 36:—Not only was the right of property not intended to be "distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution"; but the following extract from Mr. Madison demonstrates that the utmost care was taken to avoid so doing:

"The clause as originally offered [respecting fugitive slaves] read, 'If any person LEGALLY bound to service or labor in any of the United States shall escape into another State," etc., etc. (Vol. 3, p. 1456.) In regard to this, Mr. Madison says, "The term 'legally' was struck out, and the words 'under the laws thereof,' inserted after the word State, in compliance with the wish of some who thought the term 'legally' equivocal and favoring the idea that slavery was legal in a moral point of view."—Ib., p. 1589.]

[Footnote 37:—We subjoin a portion of the history alluded to by Mr. Lincoln. The following extract relates to the provision of the Constitution relative to the slave trade. (Article I, Sec. 9.)

25th August, 1787.—The report of the Committee of eleven being taken up, Gen. [Charles Cotesworth] Pinckney moved to strike out the words "the year 1800," and insert the words "the year 1808."

Mr. Gorham seconded the motion.

Mr. Madison—Twenty years will produce all the mischief that can be apprehended from the liberty to import slaves. So long a term will be more dishonorable to the American character than to say nothing about it in the Constitution.

* * * * *

Mr. Gouverneur Morris was for making the clause read at once—

"The importation of slaves into North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, shall not be prohibited," etc. This, he said, would be most fair, and would avoid the ambiguity by which, under the power with regard to naturalization, the liberty reserved to the States might be defeated. He wished it to be known, also, that this part of the Constitution was a compliance with those States. If the change of language, however, should be objected to by the members from those States, he should not urge it.

Col. Mason (of Virginia) was not against using the term "slaves," but against naming North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, lest it should give offence to the people of those States.

Mr. Sherman liked a description better than the terms proposed, which had been declined by the old Congress and were not pleasing to some people.

Mr. Clymer concurred with Mr. Sherman.

Mr. Williamson, of North Carolina, said that both in opinion and practice he was against slavery; but thought it more in favor of humanity, from a view of all circumstances, to let in South Carolina and Georgia, on those terms, than to exclude them from the Union.

Mr. Morris withdrew his motion.

Mr. Dickinson wished the clause to be confined to the States which had not themselves prohibited the importation of slaves, and for that purpose moved to amend the clause so as to read—

"The importation of slaves into such of the States as shall permit the same, shall not be prohibited by the Legislature of the United States, until the year 1808," which was disagreed to, nem. con.

The first part of the report was then agreed to as follows:

"The migration or importation of such persons as the several States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Legislature prior to the year 1808."

* * * * *

Mr. Sherman was against the second part ["but a tax or duty may be imposed on such migration or importation at a rate not exceeding the average of the duties laid on imports"], as acknowledging men to be property by taxing them as such under the character of slaves.

* * * * *

Mr. Madison thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the like idea that there could be property in men. The reason of duties did not hold, as slaves are not, like merchandise, consumed.

* * * * *

It was finally agreed, nem. con., to make the clause read—

"But a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each PERSON."—Madison Papers, Aug. 25, 1787.]

[Footnote 38:—Compare this noble passage and that at page 18, with the twaddle of Mr. Orr (note 30), and the slang of Mr. Douglas (note 37).]

[Footnote 39:—That demand has since been made. Says MR. O'CONOR, counsel for the State of Virginia in the Lemon Case, page 44: "We claim that under these various provisions of the Federal Constitution, a citizen of Virginia has an immunity against the operation of any law which the State of New York can enact, whilst he is a stranger and wayfarer, or whilst passing through our territory; and that he has absolute protection for all his domestic rights, and for all his rights of property, which under the laws of the United States, and the laws of his own State, he was entitled to, whilst in his own State. We claim this, and neither more NOR LESS."

Throughout the whole of that case, in which the right to pass through New York with slaves at the pleasure of the slave owners is maintained, it is nowhere contended that the statute is contrary to the Constitution of New York; but that the statute and the Constitution of the State are both contrary to the Constitution of the United States.

The State of Virginia, not content with the decision of our own courts upon the right claimed by them, is now engaged in carrying this, the Lemon case, to the Supreme Court of the United States, hoping by a decision there, in accordance with the intimations in the Dred Scott case, to overthrow the Constitution of New York.

Senator Toombs, of Georgia, has claimed, in the Senate, that laws of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin, for the exclusion of slavery, conceded to be warranted by the State Constitutions, are contrary to the Constitution of the United States, and has asked for the enactment of laws by the General Government which shall override the laws of those States and the Constitutions which authorize them.]

[Footnote 40:—"Policy, humanity, and Christianity, alike forbid the extension of the evils of free society to new people and coming generations."—Richmond Enquirer, Jan. 22, 1856.

"I am satisfied that the mind of the South has undergone a change to this great extent, that it is now the almost universal belief in the South, not only that the condition of African slavery in their midst, is the best condition to which the African race has ever been subjected, but that it has the effect of ennobling both races, the white and the black."—Senator Mason, of Virginia.

"I declare again, as I did in reply to the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Doolittle), that, in my opinion, slavery is a great moral, social, and political blessing—a blessing to the slave, and a blessing to the master."—Mr. Brown, in the Senate, March 6, 1860.

"I am a Southern States' Rights man; I am an African slave-trader. I am one of those Southern men who believe that slavery is right—morally, religiously, socially, and politically." (Applause.) ... "I represent the African Slave-trade interests of that section. (Applause.) I am proud of the position I occupy in that respect. I believe the African Slave-trader is a true missionary and a true Christian." (Applause.)—Mr. Gaulden, a delegate from First Congressional District of Georgia, in the Charleston Convention, now a supporter of Mr. Douglas.

"Ladies and gentlemen, I would gladly speak again, but you see from the tones of my voice that I am unable to. This has been a happy, a glorious day. I shall never forget it. There is a charm about this beautiful day, about this sea air, and especially about that peculiar institution of yours—a clam bake. I think you have the advantage, in that respect, of Southerners. For my own part, I have much more fondness for your clams than I have for their niggers. But every man to his taste."—Hon Stephen A. Douglas's Address at Rocky Point, R.I., Aug. 2, 1860.]

[Footnote 41:—It is interesting to observe how two profoundly logical minds, though holding extreme, opposite views, have deduced this common conclusion. Says Mr. O'Conor, the eminent leader of the New York Bar, and the counsel for the State of Virginia in the Lemon case, in his speech at Cooper Institute, December 19th, 1859:

"That is the point to which this great argument must come—Is negro slavery unjust? If it is unjust, it violates that first rule of human conduct—'Render to every man his due.' If it is unjust, it violates the law of God which says, 'Love thy neighbor as thyself,' for that requires that we should perpetrate no injustice. Gentlemen, if it could be maintained that negro slavery was unjust, perhaps I might be prepared—perhaps we all ought to be prepared—to go with that distinguished man to whom allusion is frequently made, and say, 'There is a higher law which compels us to trample beneath our feet the Constitution established by our fathers, with all the blessings it secures to their children.' But I insist—and that is the argument which we must meet, and on which we must come to a conclusion that shall govern our actions in the future selection of representatives in the Congress of the United States—insist that negro slavery is not unjust."]

THE END