The booty found in the captured city was immense: besides the money in the royal treasury, which was set apart for the coffers of the state, Marcellus carried off many of the works of art with which the city had been adorned, to grace his own triumph and the temples at Rome. This was the first instance of a practice which afterward became so general; and it gave great offense not only to the Greeks of Sicily, but to a large party at Rome itself.

The fall of Syracuse was followed, though not immediately, by the subjugation of the whole island by the Romans; but these successes were counterbalanced by the defeat and death of the two Scipios in Spain. We have already seen that P. Scipio, when he landed at Massilia and found himself unable to overtake Hannibal in Gaul, sent his brother Cneius with the army into Spain, while he himself returned to Italy. In the following year (B.C. 217) Publius himself crossed over into Spain, where he found that his brother had already obtained a firm footing. They continued in Spain for several years, during which they gained many victories, and prevented Hasdrubal from marching into Italy to support his victorious brother. When Hasdrubal was recalled to Africa to oppose Syphax, one of the Numidian kings, who was carrying on war against Carthage, the Scipios availed themselves of his absence to strengthen their power still farther. They gained over new tribes to the Roman cause, took 20,000 Celtiberians into their pay, and felt themselves so strong in B.C. 212 that they resolved to cross the Iberus and to make a vigorous effort to drive the Carthaginians out of Spain. They accordingly divided their forces; but the result was fatal. Publius was destroyed, with the greater part of his troops; and Cneius was also defeated, and fell in battle, twenty-nine days after the death of his brother. These victories seemed to establish the superiority of Carthage in Spain, and open the way for Hasdrubal to join his brother in Italy.

In Italy (B.C. 212) the two Consuls Appius Claudius and Q. Fulvius began to draw together their forces for the purpose of besieging Capua. Hannibal advanced to relieve it, and compelled the Consuls to withdraw; but he was unable to force either of them to fight. Shortly afterward he returned again to the south to urge on the siege of the citadel of Tarentum, which still held out; and he spent the winter and the whole of the ensuing spring (B.C. 211) in its immediate neighborhood. But during his absence the Consuls had renewed the siege of Capua, and prosecuted it with such activity, that they had succeeded in surrounding the city with a double line of intrenchments. The pressing danger once more summoned Hannibal to its relief. He accordingly presented himself before the Roman camp, and attacked their lines from without, while the garrison co-operated with him by a vigorous sally from the walls. Both attacks were however repulsed, and Hannibal, foiled in his attempt to raise the siege by direct means, determined on the bold manoeuvre of marching directly upon Rome itself, in hopes of thus compelling the Consuls to abandon their designs upon Capua, in order to provide for the defense of the city. But this daring scheme was again frustrated; the appearance of Hannibal before the gates of Rome for a moment struck terror through the city; but a considerable body of troops was at the time within the walls; and the Consul Fulvius, as soon as he heard of Hannibal's march, hastened, with a portion of the besieging army, from Capua, while he still left with the other Consul a force amply sufficient to carry on the siege. Hannibal was thus disappointed in the main object of his advance, and he had no means of effecting any thing against Rome itself, where Fulvius and Fabius confined themselves strictly to the defensive, allowing him to ravage the whole country without opposition, up to the very walls of Rome. Nothing therefore remained for him but to retreat, and he accordingly recrossed the Anio, and marched slowly and sullenly through the land of the Sabines and Samnites, ravaging the country which he traversed. From thence he retired to the Bruttii, leaving Capua to its fate. The city soon after surrendered to the Romans. Its punishment was terrible. All the leaders of the insurrection were beheaded; the chief men were imprisoned; and the rest of the people were sold. The city and its territory were confiscated, and became part of the Roman domain.

The commencement of the next season (B.C. 210) was marked by the fall of Salapia, which was betrayed by the inhabitants to Marcellus; but this loss was soon avenged by the total defeat and destruction of the army of the Proconsul Cn. Fulvius at Herdonea. The Consul Marcellus, on his part, carefully avoided an action for the rest of the campaign, while he harassed his opponent by every possible means. Thus the rest of that summer too wore away without any important results. But this state of comparative inactivity was necessarily injurious to the cause of Hannibal; the nations of Italy that had espoused that cause when triumphant now began to waver in their attachment; and in the course of the following summer (B.C. 209) the Samnites and Lucanians submitted to Rome, and were admitted to favorable terms. A still more disastrous blow to the Carthaginian cause was the loss of Tarentum, which was betrayed into the hands of Fabius, as it had been into those of Hannibal. In vain did the latter seek to draw the Roman general into a snare; the wary Fabius eluded his toils. The recovery of Tarentum was the last exploit in the military life of the aged Fabius, and was a noble completion to his long list of achievements. From the time of the battle of Cannae he had directed almost exclusively the councils of his country, and his policy had been pre-eminently successful; but the times now demanded bolder measures, and something else was necessary than the caution of the Lingerer to bring the war to a close.

After the fall of Tarentum Hannibal still traversed the open country unopposed, and laid waste the territories of his enemies. Yet we can not suppose that he any longer looked for ultimate success from any efforts of his own; his object was doubtless now only to maintain his ground in the south until his brother Hasdrubal should appear in the north of Italy, an event to which he had long anxiously looked forward. Yet the following summer (B.C. 208) was marked by some brilliant achievements. The two Consuls, Crispinus and Marcellus, who were opposed to Hannibal in Lucania, allowed themselves to be led into an ambush, in which Marcellus was killed, and Crispinus mortally wounded. Marcellus was one of the ablest of the Roman generals. Hannibal displayed a generous sympathy for his fate, and caused due honors to be paid to his remains.

The following year (B.C. 207) decided the issue of the war in Italy. The war in Spain during the last few years had been carried on with brilliant success by the young P. Scipio, of whose exploits we shall speak presently. But in B.C. 208, Hasdrubal, leaving the two other Carthaginian generals to make head against Scipio, resolved to set out for Italy to the assistance of his brother. As Scipio was in undisputed possession of the province north of the Iberus, and had secured the passes of the Pyrenees on that side, Hasdrubal crossed these mountains near their western extremity, and plunged into the heart of Gaul. After spending a winter in that country, he prepared to cross the Alps in the spring of B.C. 207, and to descend into Italy. The two Consuls for this year were C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius. Nero marched into Southern Italy to keep a watch upon Hannibal; Livius took up his quarters at Ariminum to oppose Hasdrubal. The latter experienced little loss or difficulty in crossing the Alps. The season of the year was favorable, and the Gauls were friendly to his cause. But instead of pushing on at once into the heart of Italy, he allowed himself to be engaged in the siege of Placentia, and lost much precious time in fruitless efforts to reduce that colony. When at length he abandoned the enterprise, he sent messengers to Hannibal to apprize him of his movements, and concert measures for their meeting in Umbria. But his dispatches fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who formed the bold resolution of instantly marching with a picked body of 7000 men to join his colleague, and fall upon Hasdrubal with their united forces before Hannibal could receive any information of his brother's movements. Nero executed his design with equal secrecy and rapidity. Hannibal knew nothing of his departure, and in a week's time Nero marched 250 miles to Sena, where his colleague was encamped in presence of Hasdrubal. He entered the camp of Livius in the night, that his arrival might not be known to the Carthaginians. After a day's rest the two Consuls proceeded to offer battle; but Hasdrubal, perceiving the augmented numbers of the Romans, and hearing the trumpet sound twice, felt convinced that the Consuls had united their forces, and that his brother had been defeated. He therefore declined the combat, and in the following night commenced his retreat toward Ariminum. The Romans pursued him, and he found himself compelled to give them battle on the right bank of the Metaurus. On this occasion Hasdrubal displayed all the qualities of a consummate general; but his forces were greatly inferior to those of the enemy, and his Gaulish auxiliaries were of little service. The gallant resistance of the Spanish and Ligurian troops is attested by the heavy loss of the Romans; but all was of no avail, and seeing the battle irretrievably lost, he rushed into the midst of the enemy, and fell, sword in hand, in a manner worthy of the son of Hamilcar and the brother of Hannibal. The Consul Nero hastened back to Apulia almost as speedily as he had come, and announced to Hannibal the defeat and death of his brother by throwing into his camp the severed head of Hasdrubal. "I recognize," said Hannibal, sadly, "the doom of Carthage."

The victory of the Metaurus was, as we have already said, decisive of the fate of the war in Italy, and the conduct of Hannibal shows that he felt it to be such. From this time he abandoned all thoughts of offensive operations, and, withdrawing his garrisons from Metapontum and other towns that he still held in Lucania, collected together his forces within the peninsula of the Bruttii. In the fastnesses of that wild and mountainous region he maintained his ground for nearly four years, while the towns that he still possessed on the coast gave him the command of the sea.

[Footnote 33: See the map in the "Smaller History of Greece," p. 117.]

[Footnote 34: The story that Archimedes set the Roman ships on fire by the reflected rays of the sun is probably a fiction, though later writers give an account of this burning mirror.]

[Footnote 35: Upon his tomb was placed the figure of a sphere inscribed in a cylinder. When Cicero was Quaestor in Sicily (B.C. 75), he found his tomb near one of the gates of the city, almost hid among briers, and forgotten by the Syracusans.]



CHAPTER XIV.

SECOND PUNIC WAR. THIRD PERIOD: FROM THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS TO THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR. B.C. 206-201.

After the battle of the Metaurus, the chief interest of the war was transferred to Spain and Africa. The Roman armies were led by a youthful hero, perhaps the greatest man that Rome ever produced, with the exception of Julius Caesar. The remaining period of the war is little more than the history of P. Scipio. This extraordinary man was the son of P. Scipio, who fell in Spain in B.C. 212, as already related. In his early years he acquired, to an extraordinary extent, the confidence and admiration of his countrymen. His enthusiastic mind led him to believe that he was a special favorite of heaven; and he never engaged in any public or private business without first going to the Capitol, where he sat some time alone, enjoying communion with the gods. For all he proposed or executed he alleged the divine approval: he believed himself in the revelations which he asserted had been vouchsafed to him; and the extraordinary success which attended all his enterprises deepened this belief.

P. Scipio is first mentioned in B.C. 218 at the battle of the Ticinus, where he is reported to have saved the life of his father, though he was then only 17 years of age. He fought at Cannae two years afterward (B.C. 216), when he was already a tribune of the soldiers, and was one of the few Roman officers who survived that fatal day. He was chosen along with Appius Claudius to command the remains of the army, which had taken refuge at Canusium; and it was owing to his youthful heroism and presence of mind that the Roman nobles, who had thought of leaving Italy in despair, were prevented from carrying their rash project into effect. He had already gained the favor of the people to such an extent that he was unanimously elected AEdile in B.C. 212. On this occasion he gave indications of the proud spirit, and of the disregard of all the forms of law, which distinguished him throughout life; for when the tribunes objected to the election, because he was not of the legal age, he haughtily replied, "If all the Quirites wish to make me AEdile, I am old enough." After the death of Scipio's father and uncle, C. Nero was sent out as Propraetor to supply their place; but shortly afterward the Senate resolved to increase the army in Spain, and to place it under the command of a Proconsul to be elected by the people. But when they were assembled for this purpose, none of the generals of experience ventured to apply for so dangerous a command. At length Scipio, who was then barely twenty-four, to the surprise of every one, offered himself as a candidate. But the confidence which he felt in himself he communicated to the people, and he was accordingly chosen with enthusiasm to take the command.

Scipio arrived in Spain in the summer of B.C. 210. He found that the three Carthaginian generals, Hasdrubal, son of Barca, Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, and Mago, were not on good terms, and were at the time engaged in separate enterprises in distant parts of the peninsula. Instead of attacking any of them singly, he formed the project of striking a deadly blow at the Carthaginian power by a sudden and unexpected attack upon New Carthage. He gave the command of the fleet to his intimate friend Laelius, to whom alone he intrusted the secret of the expedition, while he led the land-forces by extremely rapid marches against the city. The project was crowned with complete success. The Carthaginian garrison did not amount to more than a thousand men, and before any succor could arrive New Carthage was taken by assault. The hostages who had been given by the various Spanish tribes to the Carthaginians had been placed for security in the city. These now fell into the hands of Scipio, who treated them with kindness; and the hostages of those people who declared themselves in favor of the Romans were restored without ransom. Scipio also found in New Carthage magazines of arms, corn, and other necessaries, for the Carthaginians had there deposited their principal stores.

The immediate effects of this brilliant success were immense. Many of the Spanish tribes deserted the Carthaginian cause; and when Scipio took the field in the following year (B.C. 209) Mandonius and Indibilis, two of the most powerful and hitherto the most faithful supporters of Carthage, quitted the camp of Hasdrubal Barca, and awaited the arrival of the Roman commander. Hasdrubal was encamped in a strong position near the town of Baecula, in the upper valley of the Baetis (Guadalquiver), where he was attacked and defeated by Scipio. He succeeded, however, in making good his retreat, and retired into northern Spain. He subsequently crossed the Pyrenees, and marched into Italy to the assistance of his brother Hannibal, as already narrated.

In B.C. 207 Scipio gained possession of nearly the whole of Spain, by a decisive victory near a place variously called Silpia or Elinga, but the position of which is quite uncertain.

Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, and Mago, took refuge within the walls of Gades, which was almost the only place that now belonged to the Carthaginians; and all the native chiefs hastened to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome. But the victories of Scipio had had but a small share in winning Spain. His personal influence had won far more people than his arms had conquered. He had gained such an ascendency over the Spaniards by his humanity and courage, his courtesy and energy, that they were ready to lay down their lives for him, and wished to make him their king.

The subjugation of Spain was regarded by Scipio as only a means to an end. He had formed the project of transferring the war to Africa, and thus compelling the Carthaginians to recall Hannibal from Italy. He therefore resolved, before returning to Rome, to cross over into Africa, and secure, if possible, the friendship and co-operation of some of the native princes. His personal influence had already secured the attachment of Masinissa, the son of the king of the Massylians, or Western Numidians, who was serving in the Carthaginian army in Spain; and he trusted that the same personal ascendency might gain the more powerful support of Syphax, the king of the Massaesylians, or Eastern Numidians. With only two quinqueremes he ventured to leave his province and repair to the court of Syphax. There he met his old adversary, Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, who had crossed over from Gades for the same purpose; and the two generals spent several days together in friendly intercourse. Scipio made a great impression upon Syphax; but the charms of Sophonisba, the daughter of Hasdrubal, whom the latter offered in marriage to Syphax, prevailed over the influence of Scipio. Syphax married her, and from that time became the zealous supporter and ally of the Carthaginians.

During Scipio's absence in Africa a formidable insurrection had broken out in Spain; but on his return it was speedily put down, and terrible vengeance was inflicted upon the town of Illiturgis, which had taken the principal share in the revolt. Scarcely had this danger passed away when Scipio was seized with a dangerous illness. Eight thousand of the Roman soldiers, discontented with not having received their usual pay, availed themselves of this opportunity to break out into open mutiny; but Scipio quelled it with his usual promptitude and energy. He crushed the last remains of the insurrection in Spain; and to crown his other successes, Gades at last surrendered to the Romans. Mago had quitted Spain, and crossed over into Liguria, to effect a diversion in favor of his brother Hannibal, and there was therefore now no longer any enemy left in Spain.

Scipio returned to Rome in B.C. 206, and immediately offered himself as a candidate for the consulship. He was elected for the following year (B.C. 205) by the unanimous votes of all the centuries, although he had not yet filled the office of Praetor, and was only 30 years of age. His colleague was P. Licinius Crassus, the Pontifex Maximus, who could not, therefore, leave Italy. Consequently, if the war was to be carried on abroad, the conduct of it must of necessity devolve upon Scipio. The latter was anxious to land at once in Africa, and bring the contest to an end at the gates of Carthage; but the older members of the Senate, and among them Q. Fabius Maximus, opposed the project, partly through timidity and partly through jealousy of the youthful conqueror. All that Scipio could obtain was the province of Sicily, with permission to invade Africa if he should think it for the advantage of the Republic; but the Senate resolutely refused him an army, thus making the permission of no practical use. The allies had a truer view of the interests of Italy than the Roman Senate; from all the towns of Italy volunteers flocked to join the standard of the youthful hero. The Senate could not refuse to allow him to enlist these volunteers; and such was the enthusiasm in his favor that he was able to cross over to Sicily with an army and a fleet, contrary to the expectations and even the wishes of the Senate. While busy with preparations in Sicily, he sent over Laelius to Africa with a small fleet to concert a plan of co-operation with Masinissa. But meantime his enemies at Rome had nearly succeeded in depriving him of his command. Although he had no authority in Lower Italy, he had assisted in the reduction of Locri, and after the conquest of the town had left Q. Pleminius in command. The latter had been guilty of such acts of excesses against the inhabitants, that they sent an embassy to Rome to complain of his conduct. Q. Fabius Maximus eagerly availed himself of the opportunity to inveigh in general against the conduct of Scipio, and to urge his immediate recall. Scipio's magnificent style of living, and his love of Greek literature and art, were denounced by his enemies as dangerous innovations upon old Roman manners and frugality. It was asserted that the time which ought to be given to the exercise and the training of his troops was wasted in the Greek gymnasia or in literary pursuits. Though the Senate lent a willing ear to these attacks, they did not venture upon his immediate recall, but sent a commission into Sicily to inquire into the state of the army. During the winter Scipio had been busy in completing his preparations; and by this time he had collected all his stores, and brought his army and navy into the most efficient state. The commissioners were astonished at what they saw. Instead of ordering him to return to Rome, they bade him cross over to Africa as soon as possible.

Accordingly, in B.C. 204, Scipio, who was now Proconsul, sailed from Lilybaeum and landed in Africa, not far from Utica. He was immediately joined by Masinissa, who rendered him the most important services in the war. He commenced the campaign by laying siege to Utica, and took up his quarters on a projecting headland to the east of the town, on a spot which long bore the name of the Cornelian Camp. Meantime the Carthaginians had collected a powerful army, which they placed under the command of Hasdrubal, son of Cisco, Scipio's old opponent in Spain; and Syphax came to their assistance with a great force.

In the beginning of B.C. 203 Scipio planned a night-attack upon the two camps occupied by Hasdrubal and Syphax. With the assistance of Masinissa, his enterprise was crowned with success: the two camps were burned to the ground, and only a few of the enemy escaped the fire and the sword. Among these, however, were both Hasdrubal and Syphax; the former fled to Carthage, where he persuaded the Senate to raise another army, and the latter retreated to his native dominions, where he likewise collected fresh troops. But their united forces were again defeated by Scipio. Hasdrubal did not venture to make his appearance again in Carthage, and Syphax once more fled into Numidia. Scipio did not give the Numidian prince any repose; he was pursued by Laelius and Masinissa, and finally taken prisoner. Among the captives who fell into their hands was Sophonisba, the wife of Syphax, whom Masinissa had long loved, and had expected to marry when she was given to his rival. Masinissa now not only promised to preserve her from captivity, but, to prevent her falling into the hands of the Romans, determined to marry her himself. Their nuptials were accordingly celebrated without delay; but Scipio, fearful of the influence which she might exercise over his ally, sternly upbraided him with his weakness, and insisted on the immediate surrender of the princess. Unable to resist this command, Masinissa spared her the humiliation of captivity by sending her a bowl of poison, which she drank without hesitation, and thus put an end to her own life.

These repeated disasters so alarmed the Carthaginians that they resolved to recall Hannibal and Mago. Hannibal quitted Italy in B.C. 203, to the great joy of the Romans. For more than 15 years had he carried on the war in that country, laying it waste from one extremity to another; and during all this period his superiority in the field had been uncontested. The Romans calculated that in these 15 years their losses in the field alone had amounted to not less than 300,000 men; a statement which will hardly appear exaggerated when we consider the continued combats in which they were engaged by their ever-watchful foe.

As soon as Hannibal landed in Africa the hopes of the Carthaginians revived, and they looked forward to a favorable termination of the war. Hannibal, however, formed a truer estimate of the real state of affairs; he saw that the loss of a battle would be the ruin of Carthage, and he was therefore anxious to conclude a peace before it was too late. Scipio, who was eager to have the glory of bringing the war to a close, and who feared lest his enemies in the Senate might appoint him a successor, was equally desirous of a peace. The terms, however, which the Roman general proposed seemed intolerable to the Carthaginians; and as Hannibal, at a personal interview with Scipio, could not obtain any abatement of the hard conditions, he was forced, against his will, to continue the war. Into the details of the campaign, which are related very differently, our limits will not permit us to enter. The decisive battle was at length fought on the 19th of October, B.C. 202, on the Bagradas, not far from the city of Zama; and Hannibal, according to the express testimony of his antagonist, displayed on this occasion all the qualities of a consummate general. But he was now particularly deficient in that formidable cavalry which had so often decided the victory in his favor; his elephants, of which he had a great number, were rendered unavailing by the skillful management of Scipio; and the battle ended in his complete defeat, notwithstanding the heroic exertions of his veteran infantry. Twenty thousand of his men fell on the field of battle, as many were made prisoners, and Hannibal himself with difficulty escaped the pursuit of Masinissa. Upon his arrival at Carthage he was the first to admit the magnitude of the disaster, and to point out the impossibility of the farther prosecution of the war. The terms, however, now imposed by Scipio were much more severe than before. Carthage had no alternative but submission; but the negotiations were continued for some time, and a final treaty was not concluded till the following year (B.C. 201). By this treaty it was agreed that the Carthaginians were to preserve their independence and territory in Africa, but to give up all claims to any foreign possessions; that they were to surrender all prisoners and deserters, all their ships of war except ten triremes, and all their elephants; that they were not to make war in Africa, or out of Africa, without the consent of Rome; that they were to acknowledge Masinissa as king of Numidia; that they were to pay 10,000 talents in silver in the course of fifty years.

Scipio returned to Italy in B.C. 201, and entered Rome in triumph. He was received with universal enthusiasm; the surname of Africanus was conferred upon him, and the people, in their gratitude, were anxious to distinguish him with the most extraordinary marks of honor. It is related that they wished to make him Consul and Dictator for life, and to erect his statue in the Comitia, the Senate-house, and even in the Capitol, but that he prudently declined all these invidious distinctions.



CHAPTER XV.

WARS IN THE EAST. THE MACEDONIAN, SYRIAN, AND GALATIAN WARS. B.C. 214-188.

The Second Punic War made the Romans undisputed masters of the western shores of the Mediterranean. Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica were Roman provinces; Spain owned the Roman supremacy; Carthage was completely humbled, and her powerful neighbor Masinissa was the steadfast ally of Rome. The Roman Republic was now the most powerful state in the ancient world. Her legions had been trained to war by long struggles with Gauls, Spaniards, and Africans, and were superior to all other troops in discipline, experience, and valor. She now naturally turned her eyes toward the East, whose effeminate nations seemed to offer an easy conquest.

The Greek kingdoms in Asia, founded by the successors of Alexander the Great, bore within them the seeds of decay. The mighty kingdom of SYRIA, which had once extended from the Indus to the AEgean Sea, had now lost some of its fairest provinces. The greater part of Asia Minor no longer owned the authority of the Syrian kings. PONTUS was governed by its own rulers. A large body of Gauls had settled in the northern part of Phrygia, which district was now called GALATIA after them. A new kingdom was founded in Mysia, to which the name of PERGAMUS was given from its chief city; and Attalus, who was king of Pergamus during the Second Punic War, formed an alliance with Rome as a protection against Syria and Macedonia. The king of Syria at this time was Antiochus III., who, from his victory over the Parthians, had received the surname of the Great.

EGYPT was governed by the Greek monarchs who bore the name of Ptolemy. They had, even as early as the time of Pyrrhus, formed an alliance with Rome (see p. 66)(Fourteenth paragraph of Chapter IX.—Transcriber). The kingdom had since declined in power, and upon the death of Ptolemy IV., surnamed Philopator, in B.C. 205, the ministers of his infant son Ptolemy Epiphanes, dreading the ambitious designs of the Macedonian and Syrian kings, placed him under the protection of the Roman Senate, who consented to become his guardians.

The Republic of RHODES was the chief maritime power in the AEgean Sea. It extended its dominion over a portion of the opposite coasts of Caria and Lycia, and over several of the neighboring islands. Like the king of Pergamus, the Rhodians had formed an alliance with Rome as a protection against Macedonia.

MACEDONIA was still a powerful kingdom, governed at this time by Philip V., a monarch of considerable ability, who ascended the throne in B.C. 220, at the early age of seventeen. His dominion extended over the greater part of Greece; but two new powers had sprung up since the death of Alexander, which served as some counterpoise to the Macedonian supremacy. Of these the most important was the ACHAEAN LEAGUE, which embraced Corinth, Arcadia, and the greater part of the Peloponnesus.[36] The AETOLIAN LEAGUE included at this time a considerable portion of Central Greece. ATHENS and SPARTA still retained their independence, but with scarcely a shadow of their former greatness and power.

Such was the state of the Eastern world when it came into contact with the arms of Rome.

We have already seen that during the Second Punic War Philip had been engaged in hostilities with the Roman Republic. Demetrius of Pharos, who had been driven by the Romans from his Illyrian dominions,[37] had taken refuge at the court of Philip, and soon acquired unbounded influence over the mind of the young king. This wily Greek urged him to take up arms against the grasping Republic; and the ambition of Philip was still farther excited by the victories of Hannibal. After the battle of Cannae (B.C. 216) he concluded a treaty with Hannibal; but, instead of supporting the Carthaginian army and fleet, his proceedings were marked by an unaccountable degree of hesitation and delay. It was not till B.C. 214 that he appeared in the Adriatic with a fleet, and laid siege to Oricus and Apollonia, which the Romans had retained possession of at the close of the Illyrian war.[37] He succeeded in taking Oricus; but the arrival of a small Roman force, under the command of M. Valerius Laevinus, compelled him to raise the siege of Apollonia, and to burn his own ships to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. For the next three years the war was carried on with unaccountable slackness on both sides; but in B.C. 211 it assumed a new character in consequence of the alliance which the Romans formed with the AEtolian League. Into the details of the campaigns which followed it is unnecessary to enter; but the attention of the Romans was soon afterward directed to affairs in Spain, and the AEtolians were left almost alone to cope with Philip. The Achaeans also joined Philip against the AEtolians, and the latter people were so hard pressed that they were glad to make peace with the Macedonian king. Shortly afterward the Romans, who were desirous of turning their undivided attention to the invasion of Africa, also concluded peace with him (B.C. 205).

The peace, which thus terminated the First Macedonian War, was probably regarded by both parties as little more than a suspension of hostilities. Philip even went so far as to send to the Carthaginians in Africa a body of 4000 men, who fought at Zama under the command of Hannibal. At the same time he proceeded to carry out his plans for his own aggrandizement in Greece, with out any regard to the Roman alliances in that country. In order to establish his naval supremacy in the AEgean Sea, he attacked the Rhodians and Attalus, king of Pergamus, both of whom were allies of Rome. He had also previously made a treaty with Antiochus, king of Syria, for the dismemberment of the Egyptian monarchy, which was placed under the guardianship of the Roman people.

It was impossible for the Senate to pass over these acts of hostility, and accordingly, in the year after the conclusion of the Second Punic War, the Consul P. Sulpicius Galba proposed to the Comitia of the Centuries that war should be declared against Philip. But the people longed for repose, and rejected the proposition by the almost unanimous vote of every century. It was only by the most earnest remonstrance, and by representing to them that, unless they attacked Philip in Greece, he would invade Italy, like Hannibal, that they were induced to reverse their decision and declare war (B.C. 200).

Philip was at this time engaged in the siege of Athens, which had joined Attalus and the Rhodians. The Consul Galba crossed over to Epirus, and Athens was relieved by a Roman fleet; but before he withdrew, Philip, prompted by anger and revenge, displayed his barbarism by destroying the gardens and buildings in the suburbs, including the Lyecum and the tombs of the Attic heroes; and in a second incursion which he made with large re-enforcements he committed still greater excesses. For some time, however, the war lingered on without any decided success on either side. The Consul Villius, who succeeded Galba in B.C. 199, effected nothing of importance, and it was not till the appointment of the Consul T. Quinctius Flamininus to the command that the war was earned on with energy and vigor (B.C. 198). He forced his way through the passes of Antigonea, which were occupied by the enemy, invaded Thessaly, and took up his winter quarters in Phocis and Locris. In the following year (B.C. 197) the struggle was brought to a termination by the battle of Cynoscephalae (Dogs' Heads), a range of hills near Scotussa, in Thessaly. The Roman legions gained an easy victory over the once formidable Macedonian phalanx: 8000 Macedonians were killed and 5000 taken prisoners, while Flamininus lost only 700 men. Philip was obliged to sue for peace, and in the following year (B.C. 196) a treaty was ratified by which the Macedonians were compelled to renounce their supremacy, to withdraw their garrisons from the Grecian towns, to surrender their fleet, and to pay 1000 talents for the expenses of the war, half at once, and half by annual instalments in the course of ten years. Thus ended the SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR.

At the ensuing Isthmian games, which were celebrated at Corinth in the summer of this year, Flamininus was present, and a herald at his command solemnly proclaimed the independence and freedom of Greece. This unexpected news was received with overwhelming gratitude and joy; the throngs of people that crowded round Flamininus to catch a sight of their liberator, or to touch his garment, were so enormous as almost to endanger his life. Flamininus remained two years longer in Greece in order to settle the affairs of the country. He seems to have been actuated by a sincere desire to restore the internal peace and welfare of Greece; and whenever his actions appear at variance with this object, he was under the influence of the policy of the Republic. Thus, though he made war upon Nabis, the tyrant of Sparta, and deprived him of the southern portion of Laconia, he did not expel him from Sparta, that he might serve as a useful check upon the Achaeans. When Flamininus returned to Italy in B.C. 194, he withdrew the Roman garrisons from all the Grecian towns, even from Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias, the three strongest fortresses in the country, which were called the Fetters of Greece. On his departure he convoked an assembly of the Greeks at Corinth, in which he exhorted them to use their freedom wisely, and to remain faithful to Rome. Flamininus had been absent five years. His reputation was second only to that of Scipio Africanus. His triumph, which was most magnificent, lasted three days.

It has been already mentioned that Philip had formed an alliance with Antiochus III., king of Syria, surnamed the Great, for the dismemberment of the Egyptian monarchy. During the war between Philip and the Romans, Antiochus had occupied Asia Minor, and was preparing to cross into Greece. Upon the conclusion of this war, Flamininus sternly forbade him to set foot in Europe, and for a time he shrank from a contest with the victorious arms of Rome. But the AEtolians, who had fought on the Roman side, were discontented with the arrangements of Flamininus. Their arrogance led them to claim the chief merit of the victory of Cynoscephalae, and their cupidity desired a larger share in the spoils of the war. Flamininus had scarcely quitted Greece before the AEtolians endeavored to persuade Philip, Nabis, and Antiochus to enter into a league against the Romans. Philip at once refused, but Nabis took up arms, and Antiochus willingly entered into the designs of the AEtolians. At this time Hannibal appeared as an exile at the Syrian court. After the Second Punic War he had set himself to work, like his father Hamilcar at the end of the previous war, to prepare means for renewing the contest at no distant period. He introduced various reforms in the constitution, and seems to have deprived the Oligarchy of their exclusive power; but they avenged themselves by denouncing him to the Romans as engaged in negotiations with Antiochus to induce him to take up arms against Rome. The Senate sent envoys to Carthage to inquire into these charges; and Hannibal, seeing that his enemies were too strong for him, secretly took flight, and reached the court of Antiochus in safety. He was received with the highest honors, and urged the king to place an army at his disposal with which he might invade Italy. But Antiochus was persuaded by the AEtolians to cross over into Greece, and accordingly landed at Demetrias in Thessaly in B.C. 192. The Romans now declared war against Antiochus, and in the following year (B.C. 191) the Consul Acilius Glabrio marched into Thessaly. The king had intrenched himself in the passes of Thermopylae, that he might prevent the Romans from penetrating into Central Greece. But there was, as is well known, a difficult passage across Mount Oeta, by which the Persians had descended to fight with Leonidas. This passage was now forced by M. Cato, who was serving as one of the Consul's lieutenants, and as soon as he appeared in the rear of the Syrian army they fled in confusion, and the battle was won. Antiochus now hastened back to Asia, abandoning all farther hopes of conquest in Greece. As soon as he had placed the sea between himself and the Romans he thought that he was safe; but Hannibal warned him of his error, and said that he wondered that the Romans had not already followed him.

Next year (B.C. 190) L. Cornelius Scipio, the brother of the great Africanus, and C. Laelius, the intimate friend of the latter, were Consuls. L. Scipio was anxious to have the command of the war against Antiochus; but the Senate had not much confidence in his ability, and it was only in consequence of his brother Africanus offering to serve under him as his lieutenant that he obtained the command which he desired. Meantime Antiochus had collected a vast army from all parts of his dominions, and, advancing northward from Ephesus, laid waste the kingdom of Pergamus. But upon the approach of the Roman army, which entered Asia by crossing the Hellespont, Antiochus retreated southward; and the decisive battle was fought near Magnesia, at the foot of Mount Sipylus. The Romans obtained an easy and bloodless victory over the vast but disorderly rabble of the Syrian monarch. Only 400 Romans fell, while Antiochus lost 53,000 men. He at once gave up the contest in despair, and humbly sued for peace. The conditions were hard. He had to cede all his dominions west of Mount Taurus (that is, the whole of Asia Minor), to pay 15,000 Euboic talents within twelve years, to give up his elephants and ships of war, and to surrender to the Romans Hannibal and some others who had taken refuge at his court. Hannibal foresaw his danger, and made his escape to Crete, from whence he afterward repaired to the court of Prusias, king of Bithynia.

L. Scipio returned to Rome in the following year, bringing with him enormous treasures. In imitation of his brother, he assumed the surname of ASIATICUS.

The Romans were now at leisure to punish the AEtolians, who had to make head against the Romans by themselves. The Consul M. Fulvius Nobilior (B.C. 189) took their chief town, Ambracia, after an obstinate resistance, and compelled them to sue for peace. This was granted, but on the most humiliating conditions. They were required to acknowledge the supremacy of Rome, to renounce all the conquests they had recently made, to pay an indemnity of 500 talents, and to engage in future to aid the Romans in their wars. The power of the AEtolian league was thus forever crushed, though it seems to have existed, in name at least, till a much later period.

The colleague of M. Fulvius Nobilior was Cn. Manlius Vulso, who had received Asia as his province, that he might conclude the peace which his predecessor, Scipio Asiaticus, had made with Antiochus, and arrange the affairs of Asia. But Manlius was not content with the subordinate part allotted to him; and being anxious for booty as much as for glory, he attacked the Galatians in Asia Minor, without waiting for any instructions from the Senate, and in direct opposition to the ten commissioners who had been sent to arrange conjointly with him the affairs of Asia. This was the first instance in which a Roman general had made war without the authority of the Senate or the People; a dangerous precedent, which was afterward only too faithfully followed. The Galatians were, as has been already said, a body of Gauls, who, after laying waste a great part of Asia Minor, had settled in the north of Phrygia. They had fought in the army of Antiochus at Magnesia, and this supplied Manlius with a pretext for marching against them. He defeated them in two battles, and compelled them to sue for peace. The campaign greatly enriched Manlius and his legions, as the Gauls had accumulated enormous wealth by their many conquests in Asia.

Manlius remained another year (B.C. 188) in the East as Proconsul, and, in conjunction with the ten commissioners, formally concluded the peace with Antiochus, and settled the affairs of Asia. Eumenes, the king of Pergamus, received Mysia, Lydia, and part of Caria. The Rhodians obtained the remaining portion of Caria, together with Lycia and Pisidia. Manlius returned to Rome in B.C. 187, and his triumph, like that of Scipio Asiaticus, was most magnificent. But his soldiers, like that of Scipio, introduced into the city the luxuries of the East. These campaigns, as we shall presently see, exercised a most injurious influence upon the character of the Roman nobles and people, teaching them to love war for the sake of acquiring wealth, and prompting them to acts of robbery and rapine.

[Footnote 36: See the "Smaller History of Greece," p. 214.]

[Footnote 37: See p. 79. (Eighth paragraph of Chapter XI.—Transcriber)]



CHAPTER XVI.

WARS IN THE WEST. THE GALLIC, LIGURIAN, AND SPANISH WARS. B.C. 200-175.

While the Roman legions in the East were acquiring wealth and winning easy conquests, their less fortunate comrades in the West were carrying on a severe struggle with the warlike Gauls, Ligurians, and Spaniards. The Romans had hardly concluded the Second Punic War when they received intelligence that Hamilcar, a Carthaginian officer, had excited several tribes in Northern Italy to take up arms against Rome. These were the Gauls on both sides of the Po, and the Ligurians, a race of hardy mountaineers, inhabiting the upper Apennines and the Maritime Alps. They commenced the war in B.C. 200 by the capture and destruction of the Roman colony of Placentia, and by laying siege to that of Cremona, the two strong-holds of the Roman dominion in Northern Italy. The Romans now set themselves to work, with the characteristic stubbornness of their nation, to subdue thoroughly these tribes. The Insubres and the Cenomani, to the north of the Po, were the first to yield; but the Boii resisted for some years all the efforts of the Romans, and it was not till B.C. 191 that the Consul P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica received their final submission. He slaughtered the Boii without mercy, and made it one of the claims of his triumph that he had left only children and old men alive. This warlike people was now thoroughly subdued, and from henceforth Cisalpine Gaul became a Roman province, and gradually adopted the language and customs of Rome. The submission of the people was secured by the foundation of new colonies and the formation of military roads. In B.C. 190 a colony was established at Bononia, now Bologna, in the country of the Boii, and six years afterward others were also founded at Mutina (Modena) and Parma. A military road made by M. AEmilius Lepidus, Consul for B.C. 180, and called the Via AEmilia, was a continuation of the Via Flaminia, and ran from Ariminum past Placentia, Mutina, and Parma to Placentia. The subjugation of the Ligurians was a longer and more difficult task. These hardy mountaineers continued the war, with intermissions, for a period of eighty years. The Romans, after penetrating into the heart of Liguria, were seldom able to effect more than to compel the enemy to disperse, and take refuge in their villages and castles, of which the latter were mountain fastnesses, in which they were generally able to defy their pursuers. But into the details of these long-protracted and inglorious hostilities it is unnecessary to enter.

The conquests of Scipio Africanus had driven the Carthaginians out of Spain, and established the Roman supremacy in that country. Accordingly, soon after the end of the Second Punic War (about B.C. 198), the Romans proceeded to consolidate their dominion in Spain by dividing it into two provinces, each governed by a Praetor, which were called Hispania Citerior, or Hither Spain, and Hispania Ulterior, or Farther Spain, and divided from each other by the Iberus or the Ebro. But it was little more than the eastern part of the peninsula that was really subject to Rome. The powerful tribes of the Celtiberians in Central Spain, the Lusitanians in Portugal, and the Cantabrians and Gallaecians in the northwest, still maintained their independence. The division of the country into two provinces showed that the Romans intended to occupy it permanently, and occasioned a general insurrection.

The Consul M. Porcius Cato, of whom we shall speak more fully presently, was sent to put down this insurrection (B.C. 195). The whole country was in arms; but his military genius and indefatigable industry soon re-established the superiority of Rome. He gained several decisive victories, contrived to set tribe against tribe, and took native mercenaries into his pay. The details of his campaign are full of horrors. We read of the wholesale slaughter of men who had laid down their arms, of multitudes sold as slaves, and of many more who had put themselves to death to escape this fate. Cato was not the man to feel any compunctions of conscience in the performance of what he considered a rigorous public task. He boasted of having destroyed more towns in Spain than he had spent days in that country. When he had reduced the whole of Hither Spain to a hollow, sullen, and temporary submission, he returned to Rome, and was rewarded with a triumph.

The severe measures of Cato only exasperated the Spaniards. They again took up arms, and continued to resist the Roman Praetors for the next sixteen years, till Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, the father of the celebrated tribunes, after gaining several brilliant victories over the Celtiberians, granted them an honorable peace. By his wise measures and conciliatory conduct he won the affections of the natives, and induced them to submit to the Roman supremacy (B.C. 179).

It remains to mention two other wars in the West. The Sardinians and Corsicans revolted, and held out for two years against the Conqueror of Spain (B.C. 177-175). But Gracchus effected their complete subjugation, and brought to Rome so large a number of captives for sale as to give rise to the proverb "Sardi venales" for any thing that was cheap and worthless.

The Istrians, near the head of the Adriatic Gulf, had been conquered by the Romans just before the Second Punic War. But their complete subjugation was now necessary, on account of their proximity to the newly-formed province of Cisalpine Gaul. Accordingly, the Consuls invaded Istria in B.C. 178, and in the following year the whole people was reduced to submission.



CHAPTER XVII.

THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION AND ARMY.

The career of foreign conquest upon which the Republic had now entered continued with little or no interruption till the establishment of the Empire. We may here pause to take a brief survey of the form of government, as well as of the military organization by which these conquests were effected.

The earlier history of the Roman constitution has been already related. We have seen how, after a long struggle, the Plebeians acquired complete political equality with the Patricians. In the Second Punic War, the antagonism between the two orders had almost disappeared, and the only mark of separation between them in political matters was the regulation that, of the two Consuls and two Censors, one must be a Patrician and the other a Plebeian. Even this fell into disuse upon the rise of the new Nobility, of which we shall speak in the next chapter. The Patricians gradually dwindled away, and it became the custom to elect both Consuls and Censors from the Plebeians.[38]

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I. THE MAGISTRATES.—Every Roman citizen who aspired to the consulship had to pass through a regular gradation of public offices, and the earliest age at which he could become a candidate for them was fixed by a law passed in B.C. 179, and known by the name of the Lex Annalis. The earliest age for the Quaestorship, which was the first of these magistracies, was 27 years; for the AEdileship, 37; for the Praetorship, 40; and for the Consulship, 43.

All magistrates at Rome were divided into Curules and those who were not Curules. The Curule Magistrates were the Dictators, Censors, Consuls, Praetors, and Curule AEdiles, and were so called because they had the right of sitting upon the Sella Curulis, originally an emblem of kingly power, imported, along with other insignia of royalty, from Etruria.

1. The Quaestors were the paymasters of the state. It was their duty to receive the revenues, and to make all the necessary payments for the military and civil services. There were originally only two Quaestors, but their number was constantly increased with the conquests of the Republic. Besides two Quaestors who always remained at Rome, every Consul or Praetor who conducted a war or governed a province was attended by one of these magistrates.

2. The AEdileship was originally a Plebeian office, instituted at the same time as the Tribuneship of the Plebs.[39] To the two Plebeian AEdiles two Curule AEdiles were added in B.C. 365. The four AEdiles in common had the charge of the public buildings,[40] the care of the cleansing and draining of the city, and the superintendence of the police. They had also the regulation of the public festivals; and the celebration of the Ludi Magni, or Great Games, was their especial function. Originally they received a sum of money from the state to defray the expenses of these games, but the grant was withdrawn about the time of the First Punic War; a measure attended with important consequences, since the higher magistracies were thus confined to the wealthy, who alone could defray the charges of these costly entertainments. After the Macedonian and Syrian wars, the Curule AEdiles often incurred a prodigious expense, with the view of pleasing the people, and securing their votes in future elections.

3. The institution of the Praetorship in B.C. 366 has been already narrated. There was originally only one Praetor, subsequently called Praetor Urbanus, whose chief duty was the administration of justice. In B.C. 246 a second Praetor was added, who had to decide cases in which foreigners were concerned, and who was hence called Praetor Peregrinus. When the territories of the state extended beyond Italy, new Praetors were created to govern the provinces. Two Praetors were appointed to take the administration of Sicily and Sardinia (B.C. 227), and two more were added when the two Spanish provinces were formed (B.C. 197). There were thus six Praetors, two of whom staid in the city and the other four went abroad. Each Praetor was attended by six Lictors.

4. The Consuls were the highest ordinary magistrates at Rome, and were at the head both of the state and the army. They convoked the Senate and the Assembly of the Centuries; they presided in each, and had to see that the resolutions of the Senate and the People were carried into effect. They had the supreme command of the armies in virtue of the Imperium conferred upon them by a special vote of the People. At the head of the army, they had full power of life and death over their soldiers. They were preceded by twelve lictors, but this outward sign of power was enjoyed by them month by month in turn.

The magistrates above-mentioned were elected annually, but it was the practice frequently to prolong the command of the Consuls or Praetors in the provinces under the titles of Proconsuls or Propraetors. In the later times of the Republic it was usual for both Consuls and several Praetors to remain at Rome during their year of office, and at its close to take the command of provinces, with the titles of Proconsuls or Propraetors.

5. The Dictatorship, which occurs so often in the early history of the Republic, disappears altogether after the Second Punic War. As the Republic became powerful, and had no longer to dread any enemies in Italy, there was no necessity for such an extraordinary magistracy as the Dictatorship, but whenever internal dangers seemed to require a stronger executive, the Senate invested the Consuls with dictatorial power.[41]

6. The Censors were two in number, elected every five years, but they held their office for a year and a half. They were taken, as a general rule, from those who had been previously Consuls, and their office was regarded as the highest dignity in the state. Their duties, which were very extensive and very important, may be divided into three classes, all of which, however, were closely connected.

(a). Their first and most important duty was to take the Census. This was not simply a list of the population, according to the modern use of the word, but a valuation of the property of every Roman citizen. This valuation was necessary, not only for the assessment of the property-tax, but also for determining the position of every citizen in the state, which was regulated, in accordance with the constitution of Servius Tullius, by the amount of his property. Accordingly, the Censors had to draw up lists of the Classes and Centuries. They also made out the lists of the Senators and Equites, striking out the names of all whom they deemed unworthy, and filling up all vacancies in the Senate.

(b.) The Censors possessed a general control over the conduct and morals of the citizens. In the exercise of this important power they were not guided by any rules of law, but simply by their own sense of duty. They punished acts of private as well as public immorality, and visited with their censure not only offenses against the laws, but every thing opposed to the old Roman character and habits, such as living in celibacy, extravagance, luxury, etc. They had the power of degrading every citizen to a lower rank, of expelling Senators from the Senate, of depriving the Equites of their horses, and of removing ordinary citizens from their tribes, and thus excluding them from all political rights.

(c.) The Censors also had the administration of the finances of the state, under the direction of the Senate. They let out the taxes to the highest bidders for the space of a lustrum, or five years.[42] They likewise received from the Senate certain sums of money to keep the public buildings, roads, and aqueducts in repair,[43] and to construct new public works in Rome and other parts of Italy. Hence we find that many of the great public roads, such as the Via Appia and Via Flaminia, were made by Censors.

* * * * *

II. THE SENATE.—The Senate was in reality the executive government of Rome, and the Magistrates, of whom we have been speaking, were only its ministers. The Senate consisted of Three Hundred members, who held the dignity for life unless expelled by the Censors for reasons already mentioned, but they could not transmit the honor to their sons. All vacancies in the body were filled up by the Censors every five years from those who had held the Quaestorship or any higher magistracy. The Censors were thus confined in their selection to those who had already received the confidence of the people, and no one could therefore enter the Senate unless he had some experience in political affairs.

The power of the Senate was very great. It exercised a control over legislation, since no law could be proposed to the Assemblies of the People unless it had first received the approval of the Senate. In many cases "Senatus consulta"[44] were passed, which had the force of laws without being submitted to the Popular Assemblies at all. This was especially the case in matters affecting religion, police, administration, the provinces, and all foreign relations.

In foreign affairs the authority of the Senate was absolute, with the exception of declaring war and making peace, which needed the sanction of the Centuries. The Senate assigned the provinces into which the Consuls and Praetors were to be sent; they determined the manner in which a war was to be conducted, and the number of troops to be levied; they prolonged the command of a general or superseded him at their pleasure, and on his return they granted or refused him a triumph; they alone carried on negotiations with foreign states, and all embassadors to foreign powers were appointed by the Senate from their own body.

In home affairs they had the superintendence in all matters of religion. They had also the entire administration of the finances. When the Republic was in danger the Senate had the power of suspending the laws by the appointment of a Dictator, or by investing the Consuls with dictatorial power, as already mentioned.

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III. THE POPULAR ASSEMBLIES.—1. The Comitia Curiata, the Patrician assembly, had become a mere form as early as the First Punic War. The gradual decline of its power has been already traced. It continued to meet for the transaction of certain matters pertaining to the Patrician gentes, but was represented simply by 30 lictors.

2. The constitution of the Comitia Centuriata, as established by Servius Tullius,[45] had undergone a great change between the time of the Licinian Rogations and the Punic Wars, but both the exact time and nature of this change are unknown. It appears, however, that its object was to give more power and influence to the popular element in the state. For this purpose the 35 tribes were taken as the basis of the new Constitution of the Centuries. Each tribe was probably divided into five property Classes, and each Classis was subdivided into two Centuries, one of Seniores and the other of Juniores. Each tribe would thus contain 10 Centuries, and, consequently, the 35 tribes would have 350 Centuries, so that, with the 18 Centuries of the Knights, the total number of the Centuries would be 368.

The Comitia of the Centuries still retained the election of the higher magistrates, the power of enacting laws, of declaring war and making peace, and also the highest judicial functions. Accusations for treason were brought before the Centuries, and in all criminal matters every Roman citizen could appeal to them.[46] But, notwithstanding these extensive powers, their influence in the state was gradually superseded by the Assembly of the Tribes.

3. The Comitia Tributa obtained its superior influence and power mainly through its Tribunes. The Assembly of the Centuries, being summoned and presided over by the Consuls, was, to a great extent, an instrument in the hands of the Senate, while that of the Tribes, being guided by its own magistrates, and representing the popular element, was frequently opposed to the Senate, and took an active part in the internal administration of the state. The increasing power of the Tribunes naturally led to a corresponding increase in the power of the Tribes. The right of Intercession[47] possessed by the Tribunes was extended to all matters. Thus we find the Tribunes preventing the Consuls from summoning the Senate and from proposing laws to the Comitia of the Centuries. As the persons of the Tribunes were sacred, the Senate could exercise no control over them, while they, on the contrary, could even seize a Consul or a Censor, and throw him into prison. The only effective check which the Senate had upon the proceedings of the Tribunes was, that one Tribune could put his veto upon the acts of his colleagues. Consequently, by securing the support of one member of the body, the Senate were able to prevent the other Tribunes from carrying out their plans.

The Plebiscita enacted by the Tribes had the same force as the Leges of the Centuries.[48] There were thus two sovereign assemblies at Rome, each independent of the other; that of the Tribes, as already observed, was the most important at the period which we have now reached.

* * * * *

IV. FINANCES.—The ordinary expenditure of the Roman state was not large. All the magistrates discharged their duties without pay; and the allied troops, which formed so large a portion of a Roman army, were maintained by the allies themselves. The expenses of war were defrayed by a property-tax called Tributum, which was usually one in a thousand, or one tenth per cent., but after the last war with Macedonia the treasury received such large sums from the provinces that the tributum was abolished. From this time the expenses of the state were almost entirely defrayed by the taxes levied in the provinces. The other revenues of the state, which bore the general name of Vectigalia, may be dismissed with a few words. They consisted of the rents arising from the public lands, of the customs' duties, of the taxes upon mines, salt, etc.

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V. THE ARMY.—The Roman army was originally called Legio; and this name, which is coeval with the foundation of Rome, continued down to the latest times. The Legion was therefore not equivalent to what we call a regiment, inasmuch as it contained troops of all arms, infantry, cavalry, and, when military engines were extensively employed, artillery also. The number of soldiers who, at different periods, were contained in a legion, does not appear to have been absolutely fixed, but to have varied within moderate limits. Under Romulus the legion contained 3000 foot-soldiers. From the expulsion of the Kings until the second year of the Second Punic War the regular number may be fixed at 4000 or 4200 infantry. From the latter period until the consulship of Marius the ordinary number was from 5000 to 5200. For some centuries after Marius the numbers varied from 5000 to 6200, generally approaching to the higher limit. Amid all the variations with regard to the infantry, 300 horsemen formed the regular complement of the legion. The organization of the legion differed at different periods.

1. First Period. Servius Tullius.—The legion of Servius is so closely connected with the Comitia Centuriata that it has already been discussed,[49] and it is only necessary to state here that it was a phalanx equipped in the Greek fashion, the front ranks being furnished with a complete suit of armor, their weapons being long spears, and their chief defense the round Argolic shield (clipeus).

2. Second Period. The Great Latin War, B.C. 340.—The legion in B.C. 340 had almost entirely discarded the tactics of the phalanx. It was now drawn up in three, or perhaps we ought to say, in five lines. The soldiers of the first line, called Hastati, consisted of youths in the first bloom of manhood, distributed into 15 companies or maniples (manipuli), a moderate space being left between each. The maniple contained 60 privates, 2 centurions (centuriones), and a standard-bearer (vexillarius). The second line, the Principes, was composed of men in the full vigor of life, divided in like manner into 15 maniples, all heavily armed. The two lines of the Hastati and Principes taken together amounted to 30 maniples, and formed the Antepilani. The third line, the Triarii, composed of tried veterans, was also in 15 divisions, but each of these was triple, containing 3 maniples. In these triple maniples the veterans, or Triarii proper, formed the front ranks; immediately behind them stood the Rorarii, inferior in age and prowess, while the Accensi, or supernumeraries, less trustworthy than either, were posted in the extreme rear.

3. Third Period. During the Wars of the younger Scipio.—Under ordinary circumstances four legions were levied yearly, two being assigned to each Consul. It must be observed that a regular consular army no longer consisted of Roman legions only, but, as Italy became gradually subjugated, the various states under the dominion of Rome were bound to furnish a contingent, and the number of allies usually exceeded that of the citizens. They were, however, kept perfectly distinct, both in the camp and in the battle-field.

The men belonging to each legion were separated into four divisions. 1. 1000 of the youngest and poorest were set apart to form the Velites, the light-armed troops or skirmishers of the legion. 2. 1200 who came next in age (or who were of the same age with the preceding, but more wealthy) formed the Hastati. 3. 1200, consisting of those in the full vigor of manhood, formed the Principes. 4. 600 of the oldest and most experienced formed the Triarii. When the number of soldiers in the legion exceeded 4000, the first three divisions were increased proportionally, but the number of the Triarii remained always the same. The Hastati, Principes, and Triarii were each divided into 10 companies, called Maniples. The Velites were not divided into companies, but were distributed equally among the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii. Each maniple was subdivided into two centuries, commanded by a centurion. Each legion had six superior officers, called Tribuni Militum. The legion was also divided into 10 cohorts; and as the cohorts were all equal to each other, the strength of the cohort varied from time to time with the strength of the legion, and thus at different periods ranged between the limits of 300 and 600.

Three hundred horse-soldiers were apportioned to each legion, divided into 10 troops (turmae), out of which three officers were chosen named Decuriones.

The infantry furnished by the Socii was for the most part equal in number to the Roman legions, the cavalry twice or thrice as numerous, and the whole were divided equally between the two consular armies. Each Consul named 12 superior officers, who were termed Praefecti Sociorum, and corresponded by the Legionary Tribunes.

Fourth Period. From the times of the Gracchi until the downfall of the Republic.[50]—After the times of the Gracchi the following changes in military affairs may be noticed: In the first consulship of Marius the legions were thrown open to citizens of all grades, without distinction of fortune. The whole of the legionaries were armed and equipped in the same manner, all being now furnished with the pilum. The legionaries, when in battle-order, were no longer arranged in three lines, each consisting of ten maniples with an open space between each maniple, but in two lines, each consisting of five cohorts, with a space between each cohort. The younger soldiers were no longer placed in the front, but in reserve, the van being composed of veterans. As a necessary result of the above arrangements, the distinction between Hastati, Principes, and Triarii ceased to exist. The Velites disappeared. The skirmishers, included under the general term Levis Armatura, consisted for the most part of foreign mercenaries possessing peculiar skill in the use of some national weapon, such as the Balearic slingers, the Cretan archers (sagittarii), and the Moorish dartmen. When operations requiring great activity were undertaken, such as could not be performed by mere skirmishers, detachments of legionaries were lightly equipped, and marched without baggage for these special services.[51] The cavalry of the legion underwent a change in every respect analogous to that which took place with regard to the light-armed troops. The Roman Equites attached to the army were very few in number, and were chiefly employed as aids-de-camp and on confidential missions. The bulk of the cavalry consisted of foreigners, and hence we find the legions and the cavalry spoken of as completely distinct from each other. After the termination of the Social War, when most of the inhabitants of Italy became Roman citizens, the ancient distinction between the Legiones and the Socii disappeared, and all who had served as Socii became incorporated with the Legiones.

In the course of the history the Triumphs granted to victorious generals have been frequently mentioned, and therefore a brief description of them may appropriately close this sketch of the Roman army. A Triumph was a solemn procession, in which a victorious general entered the city in a chariot drawn by four horses. He was preceded by the captives and spoils taken in war, was followed by his troops, and, after passing in state along the Via Sacra, ascended the Capitol to offer sacrifice in the Temple of Jupiter. From the beginning of the Republic down to the extinction of liberty a Triumph was recognized as the summit of military glory, and was the cherished object of ambition to every Roman general. After any decisive battle had been won, or a province subdued by a series of successful operations, the general forwarded to the Senate a laurel-wreathed dispatch containing an account of his exploits. If the intelligence proved satisfactory the Senate decreed a public thanksgiving.[52] After the war was concluded, the general, with his army, repaired to Rome, or ordered his army to meet him there on a given day, but did not enter the city. A meeting of the Senate was held without the walls, that he might have an opportunity of urging his pretensions in person, and these were then scrutinized and discussed with the most jealous care. If the Senate gave their consent, they at the same time voted a sum of money toward defraying the necessary expenses, and one of the Tribunes applied for a plebiscitum to permit the Imperator to retain his imperium on the day when he entered the city. This last form could not be dispensed with, because the imperium conferred by the Comitia did not include the city itself; and accordingly the military power of the general ceased as soon as he re-entered the gates, unless the general law had been previously suspended by a special enactment.



[Footnote 38: Two Plebeian Consuls were first appointed in B.C. 172, and two Plebeian Censors in B.C. 131.]

[Footnote 39: See p. 31. (Eighth paragraph of Chapter IV.—Transcriber)]

[Footnote 40: Hence their name, from AEdes, a temple.]

[Footnote 41: This was done by the well-known formula "Videant," or "Dent operam Consules, ne quid res publica detriment capiat."]

[Footnote 42: These farmers of the public revenue were called Publicani.]

[Footnote 43: It is not easy to define with accuracy the respective duties of the Censors and AEdiles in relation to the public buildings; but it may be stated in general that the superintendence of the AEdiles was more in the way of police, while that of the Censors had reference to all financial matters.]

[Footnote 44: A Senatus consultum was so called because the Consul who brought a matter before the Senate was said Senatum consulere.]

[Footnote 45: See p. 19.(Ninth paragraph of Chapter III.—Transcriber)]

[Footnote 46: The technical word for this appeal was Provocatio. The word Appellatio signified an appeal from one magistrate to another.]

[Footnote 47: See p. 31.(Eighth paragraph of Chapter IV.—Transcriber)]

[Footnote 48: See p. 40.(Eighth paragraph of Chapter V.—Transcriber)]

[Footnote 49: See p. 19.(Ninth paragraph of Chapter III.—Transcriber)]

[Footnote 50: We anticipate the course of events in order to give under one view the history of the Roman legion.]

[Footnote 51: Hence the frequent occurrence of such phrases as expediti, expediti milites, expeditae cohortes, and even expeditae legiones.]

[Footnote 52: Called Supplicatio.]



CHAPTER XVIII.

INTERNAL HISTORY OF ROME DURING THE MACEDONIAN AND SYRIAN WARS. CATO AND SCIPIO.

The conquests of the Romans in the East had exercised a most pernicious influence upon the national character. They were originally a hardy, industrious, and religious race, distinguished by unbending integrity and love of order. They lived with great frugality upon their small farms, which they cultivated with their own hands; but they were stern and somewhat cruel, and cared little or nothing for literature and the arts. Upon such a people the sudden acquisition of wealth produced its natural effects. They employed it in the gratification of their appetites, and in coarse sensual pleasures. Some of the Roman nobles, such as Scipio Africanus, Flamininus (the conqueror of Philip), and others, acquired a love for Greek literature and art; but the great mass of the nation imitated only the vices of the Greeks. Cooks, who had formerly been the cheapest kind of slaves at Rome, now became the most valuable. A love of luxury and a general depravity gradually spread through all classes of society. A striking instance of the growing licentiousness of the times was brought to light in B.C. 186. It was discovered that the worship of Bacchus had been introduced from Southern Italy into Rome and other towns, and that secret societies were formed, which, under the cloak of this worship, indulged in the most abominable vices. A stringent inquiry was made into these practices; the most guilty were put to death; and a decree of the Senate was passed, forbidding the worship of Bacchus in Rome and throughout Italy.

Another circumstance will illustrate the manners of the times. L. Flamininus, the brother of the conqueror of Philip, and Consul in B.C. 192, took with him into Cisalpine Gaul a beautiful Carthaginian boy, to whom he was attached. The youth complained of leaving Rome just before the exhibition of the games of the gladiators. Shortly after reaching the province, when Flamininus was feasting with his favorite, a Boian chief came into the Consul's tent to implore his protection. Flamininus seized this opportunity to please the boy, and, telling him that he should be rewarded for not seeing the gladiators, he ordered an attendant to stab the Gaul, that his favorite might enjoy the dying agonies of the man.

The increasing love of gladiatorial combats was another indication of the national character. These brutalizing sports are said to have taken their origin from the Etruscans, who were accustomed to kill slaves and captives at the funerals of their relatives. They were first exhibited at Rome in the beginning of the First Punic War (B.C. 264). At first confined to funerals, they were afterward exhibited by the AEdiles at the public games, with the view of pleasing the people. The passion for this brutalizing amusement rose to a great height toward the end of the Republic and under the Empire. Great pains were taken with the training of gladiators, who were divided into different classes according to their arms and modes of fighting.

Among many other important consequences of these foreign wars, two exercised an especial influence upon the future fate of the Republic. The nobles became enormously rich, and the peasant proprietors almost entirely disappeared. The wealthy nobles now combined together to keep in their own families the public offices of the state, which afforded the means of making such enormous fortunes. Thus a new Nobility was formed, resting on wealth, and composed alike of plebeian and patrician families. Every one whose ancestry had not held any of the curule magistracies[53] was called a New Man, and was branded as an upstart.[54] It became more and more difficult for a New Man to rise to office, and the Nobles were thus almost an hereditary aristocracy in the exclusive possession of the government. The wealth they had acquired in foreign commands enabled them not only to incur a prodigious expense in the celebration of the public games in their aedileship, with the view of gaining the votes of the people at future elections, but also to spend large sums of money in the actual purchase of votes. The first law against bribery[55] was passed in B.C. 181, a sure proof of the growth of the practice.

The decay of the peasant proprietors was an inevitable consequence of these frequent and long-protracted wars. In the earlier times the citizen-soldier, after a few weeks' campaign, returned home to cultivate his land; but this became impossible when wars were carried on out of Italy. Moreover, the soldier, easily obtaining abundance of booty, found life in the camp more pleasant than the cultivation of the ground. He was thus as ready to sell his land as the nobles were anxious to buy it. But money acquired by plunder is soon squandered. The soldier, returning to Rome, swelled the ranks of the poor; and thus, while the nobles became richer and richer, the lower classes became poorer and poorer. In consequence of the institution of slavery there was little or no demand for free labor, and as prisoners taken in war were sold as slaves, the slave-market was always well supplied. The estates of the wealthy were cultivated by large gangs of slaves; and even the mechanical arts, which give employment to such large numbers in the modern towns of Europe, were practiced by slaves, whom their masters had trained for the purpose. The poor at Rome were thus left almost without resources; their votes in the popular assembly were nearly the only thing they could turn into money, and it is therefore not surprising that they were ready to sell them to the highest bidder.

Many distinguished men saw with deep regret the old Roman virtues disappearing, and strove vigorously against these corruptions of the national character. Of this party the most conspicuous member was M. Porcius Cato, who may be taken as a type of the old Roman character. He was born at Tusculum in B.C. 234. When a young man, the death of his father put him in possession of a small hereditary estate in the Sabine territory, at a distance from his native town. It was here that he passed the greater part of his boyhood, hardening his body by healthful exercise, and superintending and sharing the operations of the farm. Near his estate was an humble cottage, which had been tenanted, after three triumphs, by its owner M. Curius Dentatus, whose warlike exploits and simple character were often talked of with admiration in the neighborhood. The ardor of the youthful Cato was kindled. He resolved to imitate the character, and hoped to rival the glory, of Dentatus. Opportunity was not wanting. He took his first military lessons in the campaigns against Hannibal, and gained the favor and friendship of Fabius Maximus. He was also patronized by L. Valerius Flaccus, a Roman noble in his neighborhood, and a warm supporter of the old Roman manners, who had observed Cato's eloquence, as well as his martial spirit. Encouraged by Fabius and Flaccus, Cato became a candidate for office, and was elected Quaestor in B.C. 204. He followed P. Scipio Africanus to Sicily, but there was not that cordiality of co-operation between Cato and Scipio which ought to subsist between a Quaestor and his Proconsul. Fabius had opposed the permission given to Scipio to carry the attack into the enemy's home, and Cato, whose appointment was intended to operate as a check upon Scipio, adopted the views of his friend. Cato was Praetor in Sardinia in B.C. 198, where he took the earliest opportunity of illustrating his principles by his practice. He diminished official expenses, walked his circuits with a single attendant, administered justice with strict impartiality, and restrained usury with unsparing severity. He had now established a reputation for pure morality and strict old-fashioned virtue. He was looked upon as the living type and representative of the ideal ancient Roman. To the advancement of such a man opposition was vain. In B.C. 195 he was elected Consul with his old friend and patron L. Valerius Flaccus. During his consulship a strange scene took place peculiarly illustrative of Roman manners. In B.C. 215, at the height of the Punic War, a law had been passed, proposed by the Tribune Oppius, that no woman should possess more than half an ounce of gold, nor wear a garment of divers colors, nor drive a carriage with horses within a mile of the city, except for the purpose of attending the public celebration of religious rites. Now that Hannibal was conquered, and Rome abounded with Carthaginian wealth, there being no longer any necessity for women to contribute toward the exigencies of an impoverished treasury the savings spared from their ornaments and pleasures, two Tribunes thought it time to propose the abolition of the Oppian law; but they were opposed by two of their colleagues. The most important affairs of state excited far less interest and zeal than this singular contest. The matrons blockaded every avenue to the forum, and intercepted their husbands as they approached, beseeching them to restore the ancient ornaments of the Roman matrons. Even Flaccus wavered, but his colleague Cato was inexorable. Finally, the women carried the day. Worn out by their importunity, the two Tribunes withdrew their opposition, and the hated law was abolished by the suffrage of all the tribes.

Cato's campaign in Spain during his Consulship, which added greatly to his military reputation, has been already related. He afterward served in Greece under M. Glabrio, where he distinguished himself at the battle of Thermopylae fought against Antiochus (B.C. 191).

The victory of Zama had made P. Scipio Africanus the first man in the Republic, and for a time silenced all his enemies. But the party of Fabius still cherished their old animosity against him, and Cato inherited the hatred of his friend and patron. After the return of P. Scipio and his brother Lucius from the war against Antiochus, they were charged with having been bribed to let off the Syrian monarch too leniently, and of having appropriated to their own use a portion of the money which had been paid by Antiochus to the Roman state. The first blow was directed against Lucius Scipio. At the instigation of Cato, the two Petillii Tribunes of the people required Lucius to render an account of all sums of money which he had received from Antiochus. Lucius accordingly prepared his accounts; but, as he was in the act of delivering them up, the proud conqueror of Hannibal indignantly snatched them out of his hands, and tore them in pieces, saying "it was unworthy to call to account for a few thousands a man who had paid millions into the treasury." But this haughty conduct appears to have produced an unfavorable impression, and his brother, when brought to trial in the course of the tame year, was declared guilty, and sentenced to pay a heavy fine. The Tribune ordered him to be dragged to prison, and there detained till the money was paid; whereupon Africanus, still more enraged at this fresh insult to his family, and setting himself above the laws, rescued his brother from the hands of the Tribune's officer. The contest would probably have been attended with fatal results had not Tib. Gracchus, the father of the celebrated Tribune, and then Tribune himself, had the prudence, although he disapproved of the violent conduct of Africanus, to release his brother Lucius from the sentence of imprisonment.

The successful issue of the prosecution of Lucius emboldened his enemies to bring the great Africanus himself before the people. His accuser was the Tribune M. Naevius. When the trial came on, Scipio did not condescend to say a single word in refutation of the charges that had been brought against him, but descanted long and eloquently upon the signal services he had rendered to the commonwealth. Having spoken till nightfall, the trial was adjourned till the following day. Early next morning, when the Tribunes had taken their seats on the rostra, and Africanus was summoned, he proudly reminded the people that this was the anniversary of the day on which he had defeated Hannibal at Zama, and called upon them to neglect all disputes and lawsuits, and follow him to the Capitol, there to return thanks to the immortal gods, and pray that they would grant the Roman state other citizens like himself. Scipio struck a chord which vibrated in every heart; their veneration for the hero returned; and he was followed by such crowds to the Capitol that the Tribunes were left alone in the rostra. Having thus set all the laws at defiance, Scipio immediately quitted Rome, and retired to his country seat at Liternum. The Tribunes wished to renew the prosecution, but Gracchus wisely persuaded them to let it drop. Scipio never returned to Rome. He would neither submit to the laws, nor aspire to the sovereignty of the state, and he therefore resolved to expatriate himself forever. He passed his remaining days in the cultivation of his estate at Liternum, and at his death is said to have requested that his body might be buried there, and not in his ungrateful country (B.C. 183).

Hannibal perished in the same year as his great opponent. Scipio was the only member of the Senate who opposed the unworthy persecution which the Romans employed against their once dreaded foe. Each of these great men, possessing true nobility of soul, could appreciate the other's merits. A story is told that Scipio was one of the embassadors sent to Antiochus at Ephesus, at whose court Hannibal was then residing, and that he there had an interview with the great Carthaginian, who declared him the greatest general that ever lived. The compliment was paid in a manner the most flattering to Scipio. The latter had asked, "Who was the greatest general?" "Alexander the Great," was Hannibal's reply. "Who was the second?" "Pyrrhus." "Who was the third?" "Myself," replied the Carthaginian. "What would you have said, then, if you had conquered me?" asked Scipio, in astonishment. "I should then have placed myself above Alexander, Pyrrhus, and all other generals."

After the defeat of Antiochus, Hannibal, as we have already seen, took up his abode with Prusias, king of Bithynia, and there found for some years a secure asylum. But the Romans could not be at ease so long as Hannibal lived, and T. Flamininus was at length dispatched to the court of Prusias to demand the surrender of the fugitive. The Bithynian king was unable to resist; but Hannibal, who had long been in expectation of such an event, took poison to avoid falling into the hands of his implacable foes.

We now return to Cato, whose Censorship (B.C. 184) was a great epoch in his life. He applied himself strenuously to the duties of his office, regardless of the enemies he was making. He repaired the water-courses, paved the reservoirs, cleansed the drains, raised the rents paid by the publicani for farming the taxes, and diminished the contract-prices disbursed by the state to the undertakers of public works. There can be no doubt that great abuses existed in the management of the public finances, with which nothing but the undaunted courage and administrative abilities of Cato could have successfully grappled. He was disturbing a nest of hornets, and all his future life was troubled by their buzz, and their attempts to sting. But, though he was accused no fewer than forty-four times during the course of his life, it was only once that his enemies prevailed against him. His enactments against luxury were severe and stringent. He levied a heavy tax upon expensive slaves and costly furniture and dress. He justly degraded from the Senate L. Flamininus for the act of abominable cruelty in Gaul which has been already narrated.[56]

The strong national prejudices of Cato appear to have diminished in force as he grew older and wiser. He applied himself in old age to the study of Greek literature, with which in youth he had no acquaintance, although he was not ignorant of the Greek language. Himself an historian and orator, the excellences of Demosthenes and Thucydides made a deep impression upon his kindred mind. But throughout life his conduct was guided by prejudices against classes and nations whose influence he deemed to be hostile to the simplicity of the old Roman character. When Eumenes, king of Pergamus, visited Rome after the war with Antiochus, and was received with honor by the Senate, and splendidly entertained by the nobles, Cato was indignant at the respect paid to the monarch, refused to go near him, and declared that "kings were naturally carnivorous animals." He had an antipathy to physicians, because they were mostly Greeks, and therefore unfit to be trusted with Roman lives. He loudly cautioned his eldest son against them, and dispensed with their attendance. When Athens sent three celebrated philosophers, Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaues, to Rome, in order to negotiate a remission of the 500 talents which the Athenians had been awarded to pay to the Oropians, Carneades excited great attention by his philosophical conversation and lectures, in which he preached the pernicious doctrine of an expediency distinct from justice, which he illustrated by the example of Rome herself: "If Rome were stripped of all that she did not justly gain, the Romans might go back to their huts." Cato, offended with his principles, and jealous of the attention paid to the Greek, gave advice which the Senate followed: "Let these deputies have an answer, and a polite dismissal as soon as possible."