When the news of this disaster reached Rome the Senate refused to ratify the peace, and resolved that the two Consuls and all the officers who had sworn to the peace should be delivered up to the Samnites as persons who had deceived them. They were conducted to Caudium by a Fetialis; and when they appeared before the tribunal of C. Pontius, Postumius, with superstitious folly, struck the Fetialis with his foot, saying that he was now a Samnite citizen, and that war might be renewed with justice by the Romans, since a Samnite had insulted the sacred envoy of the Roman people. But Pontius refused to accept the persons who were thus offered, and told them, if they wished to nullify the treaty, to send back the army to the Caudine Forks. Thus Postumius and his companions returned to Rome, and the 600 knights were alone left in the hands of the Samnites.

The disaster of Caudium shook the fate of many of the Roman allies, and the fortune of war was for some years in favor of the Samnites. But in B.C. 314 the tide of success again turned, and the decisive victory of the Consuls in that year opened the way into the heart of Samnium. From this time the Romans were uniformly successful; and it seemed probable that the war was drawing to a close, when the Etruscans created a powerful diversion by declaring war against Rome in B.C. 311. But the energy and ability of Q. Fabius Maximus averted this new danger. He boldly carried the war into the very heart of Etruria, and gained a decisive victory over the forces of the League. The Samnites also were repeatedly defeated; and after the capture of Bovianum, the chief city of the Pentri, they were compelled to sue for peace. It was granted them in B.C. 304, on condition of their acknowledging the supremacy of Rome.

At the conclusion of the Second Samnite War the AEquians and Hernicans were reduced to subjection after a brief struggle. A part of the AEquian territory was incorporated in that of Rome by the addition of two new tribes, and two colonies were planted in the other portion. The Marsi, Marrucini, Peligni, and other nations of Central Italy, entered into a league with the Romans on equal terms. Thus, in B.C. 300, the power of Rome seemed firmly established in Central Italy. But this very power awakened the jealousy of the surrounding nations, and the Samnites exerted themselves to form a new and formidable coalition. The Etruscans and Umbrians agreed to make war against Rome, and called in the assistance of the Senonian Gauls.

THIRD SAMNITE WAR, B.C. 298-290.—As soon as the Etruscans and Umbrians were engaged with Rome, the Samnites invaded Lucania. The Lucanians invoked the assistance of the Romans, who forthwith declared war against the Samnites. The Republic had now to contend at one and the same time against the Etruscans, Umbrians, Gauls, and Samnites; but she carried on the struggle with the utmost energy, attacking the Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls in the north, and the Samnites in the south. At length, in B.C. 295, the Samnites joined their confederates in Umbria. In this country, near the town of Sentinum, a desperate battle was fought, which decided the fortune of the war. The two Roman Consuls were the aged Q. Fabius Maximus and P. Decius Mus. The victory was long doubtful. The wing commanded by Decius was giving way before the terrible onset of the Gauls, when he determined to imitate the example of his father, and to devote himself and the enemy to destruction. His death gave fresh courage to his men, and Fabius gained a complete and decisive victory. Gellius Egnatius, the Samnite general, who had taken the most active part in forming the coalition, was slain. But, though the League was thus broken up, the Samnites continued the struggle for five years longer. During this period C. Pontius, who had defeated the Romans at the Caudine Forks, again appeared, after twenty-seven years, as the leader of the Samnites, but was defeated by Q. Fabius Maximus with great loss and taken prisoner. Being carried to Rome, he was put to death as the triumphal car of the victor ascended the Capitol (B.C. 292). This shameful act has been justly branded as one of the greatest stains on the Roman annals. Two years afterward the Samnites were unable to continue any longer the hopeless struggle, and became the subjects of Rome. The third and last Samnite war was brought to a close in B.C. 290.

[Footnote 24: According to the Roman expression, the Jus Connubii and Jus Commercii were forbidden.]



CHAPTER IX.

FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE SAMNITE WAR TO THE SUBJUGATION OF ITALY. B.C. 290-265.

Ten years elapsed from the conclusion of the third Samnite war to the arrival of Pyrrhus in Italy. During this time the Etruscans and Gauls renewed the war in the north, but were defeated with great slaughter near the Lake Vadimo. This decisive battle appears to have completely crushed the Etruscan power; and it inflicted so severe a blow upon the Gauls that we hear no more of their ravages for the next sixty years.

In the south the Lucanians also rose against Rome. The extension of the Roman dominion in the south of the peninsula had brought the state into connection with the Greek cities, which at one period were so numerous and powerful as to give to this part of Italy the name of Magna Graecia.[25] Many of these cities had now fallen into decay through internal dissensions and the conquests of the Lucanians and other Sabellian tribes; but Tarentum, originally a Lacedaemonian colony, still maintained her former power and splendor. The Tarentines naturally regarded with extreme jealousy the progress of the Roman arms in the south of Italy, and had secretly instigated the Etruscans and Lucanians to form a new coalition against Rome. But the immediate cause of the war between the Lucanians and Romans was the assistance which the latter had rendered to the Greek city of Thurii. Being attacked by the Lucanians, the Thurians applied to Rome for aid, and the Consul C. Fabricius not only relieved Thurii, but defeated the Lucanians and their allies in several engagements (B.C. 252). Upon the departure of Fabricius a Roman garrison was left in Thurii. The only mode now of maintaining communication between Rome and Thurii was by sea; but this was virtually forbidden by a treaty which the Romans had made with Tarentum nearly twenty years before, in which treaty it was stipulated that no Roman ships of war should pass the Lacinian promontory. But circumstances were now changed, and the Senate determined that their vessels should no longer be debarred from the Gulf of Tarentum. There was a small squadron of ten ships in those seas under the command of L. Valerius; and one day, when the Tarentines were assembled in the theatre, which looked over the sea, they saw the Roman squadron sailing toward their harbor. This open violation of the treaty seemed a premeditated insult, and a demagogue urged the people to take summary vengeance. They rushed down to the harbor, quickly manned some ships, and gained an easy victory over the small Roman squadron. Only half made their escape, four were sunk, one taken, and Valerius himself killed. After this the Tarentines marched against Thurii, compelled the inhabitants to dismiss the Roman garrison, and then plundered the town.

The Senate sent an embassy to Tarentum to complain of these outrages and to demand satisfaction. L. Postumius, who was at the head of the embassy, was introduced with his colleagues into the theatre, to state to the assembled people the demands of the Roman Senate. He began to address them in Greek, but his mistakes in the language were received with peals of laughter from the thoughtless mob. Unable to obtain a hearing, much less an answer, Postumius was leaving the theatre, when a drunken buffoon rushed up to him and sullied his white robe in the most disgusting manner. The whole theatre rang with shouts of laughter and clapping of hands, which became louder and louder when Postumius held up his sullied robe and showed it to the people. "Laugh on now," he cried, "but this robe shall be washed in torrents of your blood."

War was now inevitable. The luxurious Tarentines sent an embassy to Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, begging him, in the name of all the Italian Greeks, to cross over into Italy in order to conduct the war against the Romans. They told him that they only wanted a general, and that all the nations of Southern Italy would flock to his standard. Pyrrhus needed no persuasion to engage in an enterprise which realized the earliest dreams of his ambition. The conquest of Italy would naturally lead to the sovereignty of Sicily and Africa, and he would then be able to return to Greece with the united forces of the West to overcome his rivals and reign as master of the world. But as he would not trust the success of his enterprise to the valor and fidelity of Italian troops, he began to make preparations to carry over a powerful army. Meantime he sent Milo, one of his generals, with a detachment of 3000 men, to garrison the citadel of Tarentum. Pyrrhus himself crossed over from Epirus toward the end of B.C. 281, taking with him 20,000 foot, 3000 horse, and 20 elephants.

Upon reaching Tarentum he began to make preparations to carry on the war with activity. The Tarentines soon found they had obtained a master rather than an ally. He shut up the theatre and all other public places, and compelled their young men to serve in his ranks. Notwithstanding all his activity, the Romans were first in the field. The Consul M. Valerius Laevinus marched into Lucania; but as the army of Pyrrhus was inferior to that of the Romans, he attempted to gain time by negotiation in order that he might be joined by his Italian allies. He accordingly wrote to the Consul, offering to arbitrate between Rome and the Italian states; but Laevinus bluntly told him to mind his own business and retire to Epirus. Fearing to remain inactive any longer, although he was not yet joined by his allies, Pyrrhus marched out against the Romans with his own troops and the Tarentines. He took up his position between the towns of Pandosia and Heraclea, on the River Siris. The Romans, who were encamped on the other side of the river, were the first to begin the battle. They crossed the river, and were immediately attacked by the cavalry of Pyrrhus, who led them to the charge in person, and distinguished himself as usual by the most daring acts of valor. The Romans, however, bravely sustained the attack; and Pyrrhus, finding that his cavalry could not decide the day, ordered his infantry to advance. The battle was still contested most furiously: seven times did both armies advance and retreat; and it was not till Pyrrhus brought forward his elephants, which bore down every thing before them, that the Romans took to flight, leaving their camp to the conqueror (B.C. 280).

This battle taught Pyrrhus the difficulty of the enterprise he had undertaken. Before the engagement, when he saw the Romans forming their line as they crossed the river, he said to his officers, "In war, at any rate, these barbarians are not barbarous;" and afterward, as he saw the Roman dead lying upon the field with all their wounds in front, he exclaimed, "If these were my soldiers, or if I were their general, we should conquer the world." And, though his loss had been inferior to that of the Romans, still so large a number of his officers and best troops had fallen, that he said, "Another such victory, and I must return to Epirus alone." He therefore resolved to avail himself of this victory to conclude, if possible, an advantageous peace. He sent his minister Cineas to Rome with the proposal that the Romans should recognize the independence of the Greeks in Italy, restore to the Samnites, Lucanians, Apulians, and Bruttians all the possessions which they had lost in war, and make peace with himself and the Tarentines. As soon as peace was concluded on these terms he promised to return all the Roman prisoners without ransom. Cineas, whose persuasive eloquence was said to have won more towns for Pyrrhus than his arms, neglected no means to induce the Romans to accept these terms. The prospects of the Republic seemed so dark and threatening that many members of the Senate thought it would be more prudent to comply with the demands of the king; and this party would probably have carried the day had it not been for the patriotic speech of the aged Ap. Claudius Caucus, who denounced the idea of a peace with a victorious foe with such effect that the Senate declined the proposals of the king, and commanded Cineas to quit Rome the same day.

Cineas returned to Pyrrhus, and told him he must hope for nothing from negotiation; that the city was like a temple of the gods, and the Senate an assembly of kings. Pyrrhus now advanced by rapid marches toward Rome, ravaging the country as he went along, and without encountering any serious opposition. He at length arrived at Praeneste, which fell into his hands. He was now only 24 miles from Rome, and his outposts advanced six miles farther. Another march would have brought him under the walls of the city; but at this moment he learned that peace was concluded with the Etruscans, and that the other Consul had returned with his army to Rome. All hope of compelling the Romans to accept the peace was now gone, and he therefore resolved to retreat. He retired slowly into Campania, and from thence withdrew into winter quarters to Tarentum.

As soon as the armies were quartered for the winter, the Romans sent an embassy to Pyrrhus to negotiate the ransom or exchange of prisoners. The embassadors were received by Pyrrhus in the most distinguished manner; and his interviews with C. Fabricius, who was at the head of the embassy, form one of the most famous stories in Roman history. Fabricius was a fine specimen of the sturdy Roman character. He cultivated his farm with his own hands, and, like his contemporary Curius, was celebrated for his incorruptible integrity. The king attempted in vain to work upon his cupidity and his fears. He steadily refused the large sums of money offered by Pyrrhus; and when an elephant, concealed behind him by a curtain, waved his trunk over his head, Fabricius remained unmoved. Such respect did his conduct inspire, that Pyrrhus attempted to persuade him to enter into his service and accompany him to Greece. The object of the embassy failed. The king refused to exchange the prisoners; but, to show them his trust in their honor, he allowed them to go to Rome in order to celebrate the Saturnalia, stipulating that they were to return to Tarentum if the Senate would not accept the terms which he had previously offered through Cineas. The Senate remained firm in their resolve, and all the prisoners returned to Pyrrhus, the punishment of death having been denounced against those who should remain in the city.

In the following year (B.C. 279) the war was renewed, and a battle was fought near Asculum. The Romans fled to their camp, which was so near to the field of battle that not more than 6000 fell, while Pyrrhus lost more than half this number. The victory yielded Pyrrhus little or no advantage, and he was obliged to retire to Tarentum for the winter without effecting any thing more during the campaign. In the last battle, as well as in the former, the brunt of the action had fallen almost exclusively upon his Greek troops; and the state of Greece, which this year was overrun by the Gauls, made it hopeless for him to expect any re-enforcements from Epirus. He was therefore unwilling to hazard his surviving Greeks by another campaign with the Romans, and accordingly lent a ready ear to the invitations of the Greeks in Sicily, who begged him to come to their assistance against the Carthaginians. It was necessary, however, first to suspend hostilities with the Romans, who were likewise anxious to get rid of so formidable an opponent, that they might complete the subjugation of Southern Italy without farther interruption. When both parties had the same wishes it was not difficult to find a fair pretext for bringing the war to a conclusion. This was afforded at the beginning of the following year (B.C. 278) by one of the servants of Pyrrhus deserting to the Romans, and proposing to the Consuls to poison his master. They sent back the deserter to the king, saying that they abhorred a victory gained by treason. Thereupon Pyrrhus, to show his gratitude, sent Cineas to Rome with all the Roman prisoners, without ransom and without conditions; and the Romans granted him a truce.

Leaving Milo with part of his troops in possession of Tarentum, Pyrrhus now crossed over into Sicily. He remained there upward of two years. At first he met with brilliant success, and deprived the Carthaginians of a great part of the island. Subsequently, however, he received a severe repulse in an attempt which he made upon the impregnable town of Lilybaeum. The fickle Greeks now began to form cabals and plots against him. This led to retaliation on his part, and he soon became as anxious to abandon the island as he had been before to leave Italy. Accordingly, when his Italian allies again begged him to come to their assistance, he readily complied with their request, and arrived in Italy in the autumn of B.C. 276. His troops were now almost the same in number as when he first landed in Italy, but very different in quality. The faithful Epirots had for the most part fallen, and his present soldiers consisted chiefly of mercenaries, whom he had levied in Italy. One of his first operations was the recovery of Locri, which had revolted to the Romans; and as he here found himself in great difficulties for want of money to pay his troops, he was induced to take possession of the treasures of the Temple of Proserpine in that town; but the ships conveying the money were wrecked. This circumstance deeply affected the mind of Pyrrhus; he ordered the treasures which were saved to be restored to the temple, and from this time became haunted by the idea that the wrath of Proserpine was pursuing him, and dragging him down to ruin.

The following year (B.C. 274) closed the career of Pyrrhus in Italy. The Consul M'. Curius marched into Samnium, and his colleague into Lucania. Pyrrhus advanced against Curius, who was encamped in the neighborhood of Beneventum, and resolved to fight with him before he was joined by his colleague. As Curius did not wish to risk a battle with his own army alone, Pyrrhus planned a night-attack upon his camp. But he miscalculated the time and the distance; the torches burnt out, the men missed their way, and it was already broad daylight when he reached the heights above the Roman camp. Still their arrival was quite unexpected; but, as a battle was now inevitable, Curius led out his men. The troops of Pyrrhus, exhausted by fatigue, were easily put to the rout; two elephants were killed and eight more taken. Encouraged by this success, Curius no longer hesitated to meet the king in the open plain, and gained a decisive victory. Pyrrhus arrived at Tarentum with only a few horsemen. Shortly afterward he crossed over to Greece, leaving Milo with a garrison at Tarentum. Two years afterward he perished in an attack upon Argos, ingloriously slain by a tile hurled by a woman from the roof of a house.

The departure of Pyrrhus left the Lucanians and other Italian tribes exposed to the full power of Rome. They nevertheless continued the hopeless struggle a little longer; but in B.C. 272 Tarentum fell into the hands of Rome, and in a few years afterward every nation in Italy, to the south of the Macra and the Rubicon, owned the supremacy of Rome. She had now become one of the first powers in the ancient world. The defeat of Pyrrhus attracted the attention of the nations of the East; and in B.C. 273, Ptolemy Philadelphus, king of Egypt, sent an embassy to Rome, and concluded a treaty with the Republic.

The dominion which Rome had acquired by her arms was confirmed by her policy. She pursued the same system which she had adopted upon the subjugation of Latium, keeping the cities isolated from one another, but at the same time allowing them to manage their own affairs. The population of Italy was divided into three classes. Cives Romani, Nomen Latinum, and Socii.

I. CIVES ROMANI, or ROMAN CITIZENS.—These consisted: (1.) Of the citizens of the thirty-three Tribes into which the Roman territory was now divided, and which extended north of the Tiber a little beyond Veii, and southward as far as the Liris; though even in this district there were some towns, such as Tibur and Praeneste, which did not possess the Roman franchise. (2.) Of the citizens of Roman colonies planted in different parts of Italy. (3.) Of the citizens of municipal towns upon whom the Roman franchise was conferred. In some cases the Roman franchise was granted without the right of voting in the Comitia (civitas sine suffragio), but in course of time this right also was generally conceded.

II. NOMEN LATINUM, or the LATIN NAME.—This term was applied to the colonies founded by Rome which did not enjoy the rights of Roman citizenship, and which stood in the same position with regard to the Roman state as had been formerly occupied by the cities of the Latin League. The name originated at a period when colonies were actually sent out in common by the Romans and Latins, but similar colonies continued to be founded by the Romans alone long after the extinction of the Latin League. In fact, the majority of the colonies planted by Rome were of this kind, the Roman citizens who took part in them voluntarily resigning their citizenship, in consideration of the grants of land which they obtained. But the citizen of any Latin colony might emigrate to Rome, and be enrolled in one of the Roman tribes, provided he had held a magistracy in his native town. These Latin colonies—the Nomen Latinum—were some of the most flourishing towns in Italy.

III. SOCII, or ALLIES, included the rest of Italy. Each of the towns which had been conquered by Rome had formed a treaty (foedus) with the latter, which determined their rights and duties. These treaties were of various kinds, some securing nominal independence to the towns, and others reducing them to absolute subjection.

The political changes in Rome itself, from the time of the Latin wars, have been already in great part anticipated. Appius Claudius, afterward named Caecus, or the Blind, introduced a dangerous innovation in the constitution during the Second Samnite War. Slavery existed at Rome, as among the other nations of antiquity; and as many slaves, from various causes, acquired their liberty, there gradually sprung up at Rome a large and indigent population of servile origin. These Freedmen were Roman citizens, but they could only be enrolled in the four city-tribes, so that, however numerous they might become, they could influence only the votes of four tribes. Appius Claudius, in his Censorship (B.C. 312), when making out the lists of citizens, allowed the Freedmen to enroll themselves in any tribe they pleased; but this dangerous innovation was abolished by the Censors Q. Fabius Maximus and P. Decius Mus (B.C. 304), who restored all the Freedmen to the four city-tribes. The Censorship of Appius is, however, memorable for the great public works which he executed. He made the great military road called the Appian Way (Via Appia), leading from Rome to Capua, a distance of 120 miles, which long afterward was continued across the Apennines to Brundusium. He also executed the first of the great aqueducts (Aqua Appia) which supplied Rome with such an abundance of water.

Cn. Flavius, the son of a Freedman, and Secretary to Appius Claudius, divulged the forms and times to be observed in legal proceedings. These the Patricians had hitherto kept secret; they alone knew the days when the courts would be held, and the technical pleadings according to which all actions must proceed. But Flavius, having become acquainted with these secrets, by means of his patron, published in a book a list of the formularies to be observed in the several kinds of actions, and also set up in the forum a whited tablet containing a list of all the days on which the courts could be held. In spite of his ignominious birth, he was made a Senator by Appius Claudius, and was elected Curule AEdile by the people.



[Footnote 25: See p. 6. (The end of Chapter I.—Transcriber)]



CHAPTER X.

THE FIRST PUNIC WAR. B.C. 264-241.

Rome, now mistress of Italy, entered upon a long and arduous straggle with Carthage, which ruled without a rival the western waters of the Mediterranean. This great and powerful city was founded by the Phoenicians[26] of Tyre in B.C. 814, according to the common chronology. Its inhabitants were consequently a branch of the Semitic race, to which the Hebrews also belonged. Carthage rose to greatness by her commerce, and gradually extended her empire over the whole of the north of Africa, from the Straits of Hercules to the borders of Cyrene. Her Libyan subjects she treated with extreme harshness, and hence they were always ready to revolt against her so soon as a foreign enemy appeared upon her soil.

The two chief magistrates at Carthage were elected annually out of a few of the chief families, and were called Suffetes.[27] There was a Senate of Three Hundred members, and also a smaller Council of One Hundred, of which the latter were the most powerful, holding office for life, and exercising an almost sovereign sway over the other authorities in the state. The government was a complete oligarchy; and a few old, rich, and powerful families divided among themselves the influence and power of the state. These great families were often opposed to each other in bitter feuds, but concurred in treating with contempt the mass of the people.

In her foreign wars Carthage depended upon mercenary troops, which her great wealth enabled her to procure in abundance from Spain, Italy, and Greece, as well as from Libya. Sardinia and Corsica were among her earliest conquests, and Sicily was also one of the first objects of her military enterprise. The Phoenician colonies in this island came under her dominion as the power of Tyre declined; and having thus obtained a firm footing in Sicily, she carried on a long struggle for the supremacy with the Greek cities. It was here that she came into contact with the Roman arms. The relations of Rome and Carthage had hitherto been peaceful, and a treaty, concluded between the two states in the first years of the Roman republic, had been renewed more than once. But the extension of Roman dominion had excited the jealousy of Carthage, and Rome began to turn longing eyes to the fair island at the foot of her empire. It was evident that a struggle was not far distant, and Pyrrhus could not help exclaiming, as he quitted Sicily, "How fine a battle-field are we leaving to the Romans and Carthaginians!"

The city of Messana, situated on the straits which divide Sicily from Italy, was occupied at this time by the Mamertini. They were a body of Campanian mercenaries, chiefly of Sabellian origin, who had served under Agathocles, and after the death of that tyrant (B.C. 289) were marched to Messana, in order to be transported to Italy. Being hospitably received within the city, they suddenly rose against the inhabitants, massacred the male population, and made themselves masters of their wives and property. They now took the name of Mamertini, or "Children of Mars," from Mamers, a Sabellian name for that deity. They rapidly extended their power over a considerable portion of the north of Sicily, and were formidable enemies to Syracuse. Hiero, having become king of Syracuse, determined to destroy this nest of robbers, advanced against them with a large army, defeated them in battle, and shut them up within Messana. The Mamertines were obliged to look out for help; one party wished to appeal to the Carthaginians, and the other to invoke the assistance of Rome. The latter ultimately prevailed, and an embassy was sent to implore immediate aid. The temptation was strong, for the occupation of Messana by a Carthaginian garrison might prove dangerous to the tranquillity of Italy. Still the Senate hesitated; for only six years before Hiero had assisted the Romans in punishing the Campanian mercenaries, who had seized Rhegium in the same way as the Mamertines had made themselves masters of Messana. The voice of justice prevailed, and the Senate declined the proposal. But the Consuls, thirsting for glory, called together the popular assembly, who eagerly voted that the Mamertines should be assisted; in other words, that the Carthaginians should not be allowed to obtain possession of Messana. The Consul App. Claudius, the son of the blind Censor, was to lead an army into Sicily. But during this delay the Carthaginian party in Messana had obtained the ascendency, and Hanno, with a Carthaginian garrison, had been admitted into the citadel. Hiero had concluded peace with the Mamertines through the mediation of the Carthaginians, so that there was no longer even a pretext for the interference of the Romans. But a legate of the Consul App. Claudius, having crossed to Sicily, persuaded the Mamertines to expel the Carthaginian garrison. Hiero and the Carthaginians now proceeded to lay siege to Messana by sea and land, and the Romans no longer hesitated to declare war against Carthage. Such was the commencement of the first Punic War (B.C. 264).

The Carthaginians commanded the sea with a powerful fleet, while the Romans had no ships of war worthy of the name. But the Consul App. Claudius, having contrived to elude the Carthaginian squadron, landed near the town of Messana, and defeated in succession the forces of Syracuse and Carthage. In the following year (263) the Romans followed up their success against Hiero. The two Consuls advanced to the walls of Syracuse, ravaging the territory of the city and capturing many of its dependent towns. The king became alarmed at the success of the Romans; and thinking that they would prove more powerful than the Carthaginians, he concluded a peace with Rome. From this time till his death, a period of nearly fifty years, Hiero remained the firm and steadfast ally of the Romans.

The Romans, now freed from the hostility of Syracuse, laid siege to Agrigentum, the second of the Greek cities in Sicily, which had espoused the cause of the Carthaginians at the commencement of the war. The siege lasted seven months, and numbers perished on both sides. But at length the Romans gained a decisive victory over the Carthaginian army which had been sent to raise the siege, and obtained possession of the town (B.C. 262).

The first three years of the war had already made the Romans masters of the greater part of Sicily. But the coasts of Italy were exposed to the ravages of the Carthaginian fleet, and the Romans saw that they could not hope to bring the war to a successful termination so long as Carthage was mistress of the sea. They had only a small number of triremes, galleys with three banks of oars, and were quite unable to cope with the quinqueremes, or large vessels with five banks of oars, of which the Carthaginian navy consisted. The Senate, with characteristic energy, determined to build a fleet of these larger vessels. A Carthaginian quinquereme, which had been wrecked upon the coast of Italy, served as a model; and in the short space of sixty days from the time the trees were felled, 130 ships were launched. While the ships were building, the rowers were trained on scaffolds placed upon the land like benches of ships at sea. We can not but feel astonished at the daring of the Romans, who, with ships thus hastily and clumsily built, and with crews imperfectly trained, sailed to attack the navy of the first maritime state in the world. This was in the fifth year of the war (B.C. 260). One of the Consuls, Cn. Cornelius, first put to sea with only 17 ships, but was surprised near Lipara, and taken prisoner with the whole of his squadron. His colleague, C. Duilius, now took the command of the rest of the fleet. He saw that the only means of conquering the Carthaginians by sea was to deprive them of all the advantages of manoeuvring, and to take their ships by boarding. For this purpose, every ship was provided with a boarding-bridge 36 feet in length, which was pulled up by a rope and fastened to a mast in the fore part of the ship. As soon as an enemy's ship came near enough, the rope was loosened, the bridge fell down, and became fastened by means of an iron spike in its under side. The boarders then poured down the bridge into the enemy's ship. Thus prepared, Duilius boldly sailed out to meet the fleet of the enemy. He found them off the Sicilian coast, near Mylae. The Carthaginians hastened to the fight as if to a triumph, but their ships were rapidly seized by the boarding-bridges, and when it came to a close fight their crews were no match for the veteran soldiers of Rome. The victory of Duilius was complete. Thirty-one of the enemy's ships were taken, and fourteen destroyed; the rest only saved themselves by an ignominious flight. On his return to Rome, Duilius celebrated a magnificent triumph. Public honors were conferred upon him; he was to be escorted home in the evening from banquets by the light of torches and the sound of the flute, and a column adorned with the beaks of the conquered ships, and thence called the Columna Rostrata, was set up in the forum.[28]



For the next few years the war languished, and nothing of importance was effected on either side; but in the ninth year of the struggle (B.C. 256) the Romans resolved by strenuous exertions to bring it to a conclusion. They therefore made preparations for invading Africa with a great force. The two Consuls, M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius, set sail with 330 ships, took the legions on board in Sicily, and then put out to sea in order to cross over to Africa. The Carthaginian fleet, consisting of 350 ships, met them near Ecnomus, on the southern coast of Sicily. The battle which ensued was the greatest sea-fight that the ancient world had yet seen. The boarding-bridges of the Romans again annihilated all the advantages of maritime skill. Their victory was decisive. They lost only 24 ships, while they destroyed 30 of the enemy's vessels, and took 64 with all their crews. The passage to Africa was now clear, and the remainder of the Carthaginian fleet hastened home to defend the capital. The Romans landed near the town of Clupea, or Aspis, which they took, and there established their head-quarters. From thence they laid waste the Carthaginian territory with fire and sword, and collected an immense booty from the defenseless country. On the approach of winter, Manlius, one of the Consuls, by order of the Senate, returned to Rome with half of the army, while Regulus remained with the other half to prosecute the war. He carried on his operations with the utmost vigor, and was greatly assisted by the incompetency of the Carthaginian generals. The enemy had collected a considerable force, which they intrusted to three commanders, Hasdrubal, Bostar, and Hamilcar; but these generals avoided the plains, where their cavalry and elephants would have given them an advantage over the Roman army, and withdrew into the mountains. There they were attacked by Regulus, and utterly defeated with great loss; 15,000 men were killed in battle, and 5000 men, with 18 elephants, were taken. The Carthaginian troops retired within the walls of the capital, and Regulus now overran the country without opposition. Many towns fell into the power of the Romans, and among others Tunis, which was at the distance of only 20 miles from Carthage. The Numidians took the opportunity of recovering their independence, and their roving bands completed the devastation of the country. The Carthaginians, in despair, sent a herald to Regulus to solicit peace; but the Roman general, intoxicated with success, would only grant it on such intolerable terms that the Carthaginians resolved to continue the war and hold out to the last. In the midst of their distress and alarm, succor came to them from an unexpected quarter. Among the Greek mercenaries who had lately arrived at Carthage was a Lacedaemonian of the name of Xanthippus. He pointed out to the Carthaginians that their defeats were owing to the incompetency of their generals, and not to the superiority of the Roman arms; and he inspired such confidence in the government, that he was forthwith placed at the head of their troops. Relying on his 4000 cavalry and 100 elephants, Xanthippus boldly marched into the open country to meet the enemy, though his forces were very inferior in number to the Romans. Regulus readily accepted battle thus offered; but it ended in his total overthrow. Thirty thousand Romans were slain; scarcely 2000 escaped to Clupea, and Regulus himself, with 500 more, was taken prisoner. This was in the year B.C. 255.

Another disaster awaited the Romans in this year. Their fleet, which had been sent to Africa to carry off the remains of the army of Regulus, had not only succeeded in their object, but had gained a victory over the Carthaginian fleet. They were returning home when they were overtaken off Camarina, in Sicily, by a fearful storm. Nearly the entire fleet was destroyed, and the coast was strewed for miles with wrecks and corpses.

The Romans, with undiminished energy, immediately set to work to build a new fleet, and in less than three months 220 ships were ready for sea. But the same fate awaited them. In B.C. 253 the Consuls had ravaged the coasts of Africa, but, on their return, were again surprised by a fearful storm off Cape Palinurus. A hundred and fifty ships were wrecked. This blow, coming so soon after the other, damped the courage even of the Romans; they determined not to rebuild the fleet, and to keep only 60 ships for the defense of the coast of Italy and the protection of the transports.

The war was now confined to Sicily; but, since the defeat of Regulus, the Roman soldiers had been so greatly alarmed by the elephants, that their generals did not venture to attack the Carthaginians. At length, in B.C. 250, the Roman proconsul, L. Metellus, accepted battle under the walls of Panormus, and gained a decisive victory. The Carthaginians lost 20,000 men; 13 of their generals adorned the triumph of Metellus; and 104 elephants were also led in the triumphal procession. This was the most important battle that had been yet fought in Sicily, and had a decisive influence upon the issue of the contest. It so raised the spirits of the Romans that they determined once more to build a fleet of 200 sail. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were anxious to bring the war to an end, and accordingly sent an embassy to Rome to propose an exchange of prisoners, and to offer terms of peace.

Regulus, who had been now five years in captivity, was allowed to accompany the embassadors, with the promise that he would return to Carthage if their proposals were declined. This embassy is the subject of one of the most celebrated stories in the Roman annals. The orators and poets relate how Regulus at first refused to enter the city as a slave of the Carthaginians; how afterward he would not give his opinion in the Senate, as he had ceased by his captivity to be a member of that illustrious body; how, at length, when induced by his countrymen to speak, he endeavored to dissuade the Senate from assenting to a peace, or even to an exchange of prisoners; and when he saw them wavering, from their desire to redeem him from captivity, how he told them that the Carthaginians had given him a slow poison, which would soon terminate his life; and how, finally, when the Senate, through his influence, refused the offers of the Carthaginians, he firmly resisted all the persuasions of his friends to remain in Rome, and returned to Carthage, where a martyr's death awaited him. It is related that he was placed in a barrel covered over with iron nails, and thus perished. Other writers state, in addition, that, after his eyelids had been cut off, he was first thrown into a dark dungeon, and then suddenly exposed to the full rays of a burning sun. When the news of the barbarous death of Regulus reached Rome, the Senate is said to have given Hamilcar and Bostar, two of the noblest Carthaginian prisoners, to the family of Regulus, who revenged themselves by putting them to death with cruel torments.

Regulus was one of the favorite characters of early Roman story. Not only was he celebrated for his heroism in giving the Senate advice which secured him a martyr's death, but also on account of his frugality and simplicity of life. Like Fabricius and Curius, he lived on his hereditary farm, which he cultivated with his own hands; and subsequent ages loved to tell how he petitioned the Senate for his recall from Africa when he was in the full career of victory, as his farm was going to ruin in his absence, and his family was suffering from want.

The Carthaginian dominion in Sicily was now confined to the northwestern corner of the island, and Lilybaeum and Drepanum were the only two towns remaining in their hands. Lilybaeum, situated upon a promontory at the western extremity of the island, was the strong-hold of the Carthaginian power; and accordingly the Romans determined to concentrate all their efforts, and to employ the armies of both Consuls in attacking this city. This siege, which is one of the most memorable in ancient history, commenced in B.C. 250, and lasted till the termination of the war. In the second year of the siege (B.C. 249), the Consul P. Claudius, who lay before Lilybaeum, formed the design of attacking the Carthaginian fleet in the neighboring harbor of Drepanum. In vain did the auguries warn him. The keeper of the sacred chickens told him that they would not eat. "At any rate," said he, "let them drink;" and he ordered them to be thrown overboard. His impiety met with a meet reward. He was defeated with great loss; 93 of his ships were taken or destroyed, and only 30 escaped. Great was the indignation at Rome. He was recalled by the Senate, ordered to appoint a Dictator, and then to lay down his office. Claudius, in scorn, named M. Claudius Glycias, a son of one of his freedmen. But the Senate would not brook this insult; they deprived the unworthy man of the honor, and appointed in his place A. Atilius Calatinus.

The other Consul, C. Junius, was equally unfortunate. He was sailing along the coasts of Sicily with a convoy of 800 vessels, intended to relieve the wants of the army at Lilybaeum, when he was overtaken by one of those terrible storms which had twice before proved so fatal to the Roman fleets. The transports were all dashed to pieces, and of his 105 ships of war only two escaped. Thus the Roman fleet was a third time destroyed. These repeated misfortunes compelled the Romans to abandon any farther attempts to contest the supremacy of the sea.

About this time a really great man was placed at the head of the Carthaginian army—a man who, at an earlier period of the war, might have brought the struggle to a very different termination. This was the celebrated Hamilcar Barca,[29] the father of the still more celebrated Hannibal. He was still a young man at the time of his appointment to the command in Sicily (B.C. 247). His very first operations were equally daring and successful. Instead of confining himself to the defense of Lilybaeum and Drepanum, with which the Carthaginian commanders had been hitherto contented, he made descents upon the coast of Italy, and then suddenly landed on the north of Sicily, and established himself, with his whole army, on a mountain called Hercte (the modern Monte Pellegrino), which overhung the town of Panormus (the modern Palermo), one of the most important of the Roman possessions. Here he maintained himself for nearly three years, to the astonishment alike of friends and foes, and from hence he made continual descents into the enemy's country, and completely prevented them from making any vigorous attacks either upon Lilybaeum or Drepanum. All the efforts of the Romans to dislodge him were unsuccessful; and he only quitted Hercte in order to seize Eryx, a town situated upon the mountain of this name, and only six miles from Drepanum. This position he held for two years longer; and the Romans, despairing of driving the Carthaginians out of Sicily so long as they were masters of the sea, resolved to build another fleet. In B.C. 242 the Consul Lutatius Catulus put to sea with a fleet of 200 ships, and in the following year he gained a decisive victory over the Carthaginian fleet, commanded by Hanno, off the group of islands called the AEgates.



This victory gave the Romans the supremacy by sea. Lilybaeum, Drepanum, and Eryx might now be reduced by famine. The Carthaginians were weary of the war, and indisposed to make any farther sacrifices. They therefore sent orders to Hamilcar to make peace on the best terms he could. It was at length concluded on the following conditions: that Carthage should evacuate Sicily and the adjoining islands; that she should restore the Roman prisoners without ransom, and should pay the sum of 3200 talents within the space of ten years (B.C. 241). All Sicily, with the exception of the territory of Hiero, now became a portion of the Roman dominions, and was formed into a Province, governed by a Praetor, who was sent annually from Rome.

[Footnote 26: The Phoenicians were called by the Latins Poeni, whence the adjective punicus, like munire from moenia, and punire from poena.]

[Footnote 27: Probably the same as the Hebrew Shofetim, i.e., Judges.]

[Footnote 28: The inscription upon this column, or, at any rate, a very ancient copy of it, is still preserved in the Capitoline Museum at Rome.]

[Footnote 29: Barca is the same as the Hebrew word Barak, "lightning."]



CHAPTER XI.

EVENTS BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND PUNIC WARS. B.C. 240-210.

Twenty-three years elapsed between the First and Second Punic Wars. The power of Carthage, though crippled, was not destroyed; and Hamilcar returned home, burning with hatred against Rome, and determined to renew the war upon a favorable opportunity. But a new and terrible danger threatened Carthage upon her own soil. The mercenary troops, who had been transported from Sicily to Africa at the conclusion of the war, being unable to obtain their arrears of pay, rose in open mutiny. Their leaders were Spendius, a runaway Campanian slave, and Matho, a Libyan. They were quickly joined by the native Libyans, and brought Carthage almost to the brink of destruction. They laid waste the whole country with fire and sword, made themselves masters of all the towns except the capital, and committed the most frightful atrocities. Carthage owed her safety to the genius and abilities of Hamilcar. The struggle was fierce and sanguinary, but was at length brought to a successful issue, after it had lasted more than three years, by the destruction of all the mercenaries. It was called the War without Peace, or the Inexpiable War (B.C. 238).

The Romans availed themselves of the exhausted condition of Carthage to demand from her the islands of Sardinia and Corsica, and the payment of a farther sum of 1200 talents. The mercenary troops in Sardinia, who had also revolted, had applied to Rome for assistance; and the Senate menaced her rival with war unless she complied with these unjust demands. Resistance was impossible, and Sardinia and Corsica were now formed into a Roman province, governed, like Sicily, by a Praetor sent annually from Rome (B.C. 238). This act of robbery added fresh fuel to the implacable animosity of Hamilcar against the grasping Republic. He now departed for Spain, where for many years he steadily worked to lay the foundation of a new empire, which might not only compensate for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia, but enable him at some time to renew hostilities against Rome.

Rome was now at peace, and in B.C. 235 the Temple of Janus, which had remained open since the days of Numa, was closed for a second time. Two new tribes were added to the Roman territory, thus making their total number thirty-five.

The Temple of Janus did not long remain closed. The Illyrians, who dwelt near the head of the Adriatic upon its eastern side, were a nation of pirates, who ravaged the coasts of this sea. The Senate having sent embassadors to the Illyrian queen, Teuta, to complain of these outrages, she not only refused to attend to their complaints, but caused one of the embassadors to be murdered. War was straightway declared, and a Roman army for the first time crossed the Adriatic (B.C. 229). Demetrius of Pharos, an unprincipled Greek, who was the chief counselor of Teuta, deserted his mistress, and surrendered to the Romans the important island of Corcyra. Teuta was obliged to yield to the Romans every thing they demanded, and promised that the Illyrians should not appear south of Lissa with more than two vessels. The suppression of piracy in the Adriatic was hailed with gratitude by the Grecian states, and deserves notice as the first occasion upon which the Romans were brought into immediate contact with Greece. The Consul Postumius, who had wintered in Illyria, sent envoys to Athens, Corinth, and other Grecian cities, to explain what had been done. The envoys were received with honor, and thanks were returned to Rome (B.C. 228).

The Romans had scarcely brought this trifling war to an end when they became involved in a formidable struggle with their old enemies the Gauls. Since the conquest of the Senones in B.C. 289, and of the Boii in B.C. 283, the Gauls had remained quiet. The Romans had founded the colony of Sena after the subjugation of the Senones; and in B.C. 268 they had still farther strengthened their dominion in those parts by founding the colony of Ariminum. But the greater part of the soil from which the Senones were ejected became Public Land. In B.C. 232 the Tribune C. Flaminius carried an Agrarian Law to the effect that this portion of the public land, known by the name of the "Gallic Land,"[30] should be distributed among the poorer citizens. This alarmed the Boii, who dwelt upon the borders of this district. They invoked the assistance of the powerful tribe of the Insubres, and being joined by them, as well as by large bodies of Gauls from beyond the Alps, they set out for Rome.

All Italy was in alarm. The Romans dreaded a repetition of the disaster of the Allia. The Sibylline Books being consulted, declared that Rome must be twice occupied by a foreign foe; whereupon the Senate ordered that two Gauls and a Grecian woman should be buried alive in the forum. The allies eagerly offered men and supplies to meet a danger which was common to the whole peninsula. An army of 150,000 foot and 6000 horse was speedily raised. A decisive battle was fought near Telamon in Etruria. The Gauls were hemmed in between the armies of the two Consuls. As many as 40,000 of their men were slain, and 10,000 taken prisoners (B.C. 225). The Romans followed up their success by invading the country of the Boii, who submitted in the following year (B.C. 224).

In B.C. 223 the Romans for the first time crossed the Po, and the Consul C. Flaminius gained a brilliant victory over the Insubres. The Consuls of the next year, Cn. Cornelius Scipio and M. Claudius Marcellus, continued the war against the Insubres, who called in to their aid a fresh body of Transalpine Gauls. Marcellus slew with his own hand Viridomarus, the chief of the Insubrian Gauls, and thus gained the third Spolia Opima. At the same time Scipio took Mediolanum (Milan), the chief town of the Insubres. This people now submitted without conditions, and the war was brought to an end. To secure their recent conquests, the Romans determined to plant two powerful Latin colonies at Placentia and Cremona, on opposite banks of the Po. These were founded in B.C. 218, and consisted each of 6000 men. The Via Flaminia, a road constructed by C. Flaminius during his consulship (B.C. 220), from Rome to Ariminum, secured the communication with the north of Italy.

While the Romans were engaged in the Gallic wars, the traitor Demetrius of Pharos had usurped the chief power in Illyria, and had ventured upon many acts of piracy. In B.C. 219 the Consul L. AEmilius Paullus crossed the Adriatic, and soon brought this second Illyrian war to an end. Demetrius fled to Philip of Macedon, where we shall shortly afterward see him prompting this king to make war against Rome. The greater part of Illyria was restored to the native chiefs; but the Romans retained possession of Corcyra, and of the important towns of Apollonia and Oricum on the coast.

Meanwhile Hamilcar had been steadily pursuing his conquests in Spain. The subjugation of this country was only a means to an end. His great object, as already stated, was to obtain the means of attacking, and, if possible, crushing that hated rival who had robbed his country of Sicily, Sardinia, and Corsica. His implacable animosity against Rome is shown by the well-known tale that, when he crossed over to Spain in B.C. 235, taking with him his son Hannibal, then only nine years old, he made him swear at the altar eternal hostility to Rome. During the eight years that Hamilcar continued in Spain he carried the Carthaginian arms into the heart of the country. While he conquered several states in war, he gained over others by negotiation, and availed himself of their services as allies or mercenaries. He fell in battle in B.C. 229, and was succeeded in the command by his son-in-law Hasdrubal. His plans were ably carried out by his successor. The conciliatory manners of Hasdrubal gained him the affections of the Spaniards; and he consolidated the Carthaginian empire in Spain by the foundation of New Carthage, now Cartagena, in a situation admirably chosen on account of its excellent harbor and easy communication with Africa, as well as from its proximity to the silver mines, which supplied him with the means of paying his troops. The conduct of his warlike enterprises was intrusted to the youthful Hannibal, who had been trained in arms under the eye of his father, and who already displayed that ability for war which made him one of the most celebrated generals in ancient or modern times. The successes of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal could not fail to attract the notice of the Romans, and in B.C. 227 they concluded a treaty with the latter, by which the River Iberus (Ebro) was fixed as the northern boundary of the Carthaginian empire in Spain.

Hasdrubal was assassinated in B.C. 221 by a slave whose master he had put to death. Hannibal had now acquired such a remarkable ascendency over the army that the soldiers unanimously proclaimed him commander-in-chief, and the government at Carthage hastened to ratify an appointment which they had not, in fact, the power to prevent. Hannibal was at this time in the 26th year of his age. There can be no doubt that he already looked forward to the invasion and conquest of Italy as the goal of his ambition; but it was necessary for him first to complete the work which had been so ably begun by his two predecessors, and to establish the Carthaginian power as firmly as possible in Spain. This he accomplished in two campaigns, in the course of which he brought all the nations south of the Iberus into subjection to Carthage.

Early in the spring of B.C. 219 he proceeded to lay siege to Saguntum, a city of Greek origin, founded by the Zacynthians. Though situated to the south of the Iberus, and therefore not included under the protection of the treaty between Hasdrubal and the Romans, Sagantum had concluded an alliance with the latter people. There could be little doubt, therefore, that an attack upon this city would inevitably bring on a war with Rome; but for this Hannibal was prepared, or, rather, it was unquestionably his real object. The immediate pretext of his invasion was the same of which the Romans so often availed themselves—some injury inflicted by the Saguntines upon one of the neighboring tribes, who invoked the assistance of Hannibal. But the resistance of the city was long and desperate, and it was not till after a siege of nearly eight months that he made himself master of the place. During all this period the Romans sent no assistance to their allies. They had, indeed, as soon as they heard of the siege, dispatched embassadors to Hannibal, but he referred them for an answer to the government at home, and they could obtain no satisfaction from the Carthaginians, in whose councils the war-party had now a decided predominance. A second embassy was sent, after the fall of Saguntum, to demand the surrender of Hannibal, in atonement for the breach of the treaty. After much discussion, Q. Fabius, one of the Roman embassadors, holding up a fold of his toga, said, "I carry here peace and war; choose ye which ye will." "Give us which you will," was the reply. "Then take war," said Fabius, letting fall his toga. "We accept the gift," cried the Senators of Carthage. Thus commenced the Second Punic War.



[Footnote 30: Gallicus ager.]



CHAPTER XII.

THE SECOND PUNIC WAR: FIRST PERIOD, DOWN TO THE BATTLE OF CANNAE. B.C. 218-216.

The Second Punic War was not so much a contest between the powers of two great nations—between Carthage and Rome—as between the individual genius of Hannibal on one hand, and the combined energies of the Roman people on the other. The position of Hannibal was indeed very peculiar. His command in Spain, and the powerful army there, which was entirely at his own disposal, rendered him in great measure independent of the government at Carthage, and the latter seemed disposed to devolve all responsibility upon him. Even now they did little themselves to prepare for the impending contest. All was left to Hannibal, who, after the conquest of Saguntum, had returned once more to New Carthage for the winter, and was there actively engaged in preparations for transporting the scene of war in the ensuing campaign from Spain into Italy. At the same time he did not neglect to provide for the defense of Spain and Africa during his absence. In the former country he placed his brother Hasdrubal, with a considerable army, great part of which was composed of Africans, while he sent over a large body of Spanish troops to contribute to the defense of Africa, and even of Carthage itself.

All his preparations being now completed, Hannibal quitted his winter quarters at New Carthage in the spring of B.C. 218, and crossed the Iberus with an army of 90,000 foot and 12,000 horse. The tribes between that river and the Pyrenees offered at first a vigorous resistance, and, though they were quickly subdued, Hannibal thought it necessary to leave behind him a force of 11,000 men under Hanno to maintain this newly-acquired province. His forces were farther thinned by desertion during the passage of the Pyrenees, which obliged him to send home a large body of his Spanish troops. With a greatly diminished army, but one on which he could securely rely, he now continued his march from the foot of the Pyrenees to the Rhone without meeting with any opposition; for the Gaulish tribes through which he passed were favorably disposed to him, or had been previously gained over by his enemies.

The Consul P. Cornelius Scipio had been ordered to proceed to Spain, but various causes had detained him in Italy, and upon landing at Massilia (Marseilles) he found that Hannibal was already advancing toward the Rhone. Meantime the Carthaginian general effected his passage across the river, notwithstanding the opposition of the Gauls; and when Scipio marched up the left bank of the river he found that Hannibal had advanced into the interior of Gaul, and was already three days in advance of him. Despairing, therefore, of overtaking Hannibal, he determined to sail back to Italy and await him in Cisalpine Gaul; but as the Republic had already an army in that province, he sent the greater part of his own forces into Spain under the command of his brother Cn. Scipio. This prudent step probably saved Rome; for if the Carthaginians had maintained the undisputed mastery of Spain, they might have concentrated all their efforts to support Hannibal in Italy, and have sent him such strong re-enforcements after the battle of Cannae as would have compelled Rome to submit.

Hannibal, after crossing the Rhone, continued his march up the left bank of the river as far as its confluence with the Isere. Here he interposed in a dispute between two rival chiefs of the Allobroges, and, by lending his aid to establish one of them firmly on the throne, secured the co-operation of an efficient ally, who greatly facilitated his farther progress. But in his passage across the Alps he was attacked by the barbarians, and as he struggled through the narrow and dangerous defiles the enemy destroyed numbers of his men. It was some days before he reached the summit of the pass. Thenceforth he suffered but little from hostile attacks, but the descent was difficult and dangerous. The natural difficulties of the road, enhanced by the lateness of the season (the beginning of October, at which time the snows had already commenced in the high Alps), caused him almost as much loss as the opposition of the barbarians on the other side of the mountains. So heavy were his losses from these combined causes, that, when he at length emerged from the valley of Aosta into the plains of the Po and encamped in the friendly country of the Insubres, he had with him no more than 20,000 foot and 6000 horse.[31] Such were the forces with which he descended into Italy to attempt the overthrow of a power that a few years before was able to muster a disposable force of above 700,000 fighting men.

Five months had been employed in the march from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, of which the actual passage of the Alps had occupied fifteen days. Hannibal's first care was now to recruit the strength of his troops, exhausted by the hardships and fatigues they had undergone. After a short interval of repose, he turned his arms against the Taurinians (a tribe bordering on, and hostile to, the Insubrians), whom he quickly reduced, and took their principal city (Turin). The news of the approach of P. Scipio next obliged him to turn his attention toward a more formidable enemy. In the first action, which took place in the plains westward of the Ticinus, the cavalry and light-armed troops of the two armies were alone engaged, and the superiority of Hannibal's Numidian horse at once decided the combat in his favor. The Romans were completely routed, and Scipio himself severely wounded; in consequence of which he hastened to retreat beyond the Ticinus and the Po, under the walls of Placentia. Hannibal crossed the Po higher up, and, advancing to Placentia, offered battle to Scipio; but the latter declined the combat, and withdrew to the hills on the left bank of the Trebia. Here he was soon after joined by the other Consul, Ti. Sempronius Longus, who had hastened from Ariminum to his support. Their combined armies were greatly superior to that of the Carthaginians, and Sempronius was eager to bring on a general battle, of which Hannibal, on his side, was not less desirous, notwithstanding the great inferiority of his force. The result was decisive; the Romans were completely defeated, with heavy loss; and the remains of their shattered army, together with the two Consuls, took refuge within the walls of Placentia. The battles of the Ticinus and Trebia had been fought in December, and the winter had already begun with unusual severity, so that Hannibal's troops suffered severely from cold, and all his elephants perished except one. But his victory had caused all the wavering tribes of the Gauls to declare in his favor, and he was now able to take up his winter quarters in security, and to levy fresh troops among the Gauls while he awaited the approach of spring.



As soon as the season permitted the renewal of military operations (B.C. 217), Hannibal entered the country of the Ligurian tribes, who had lately declared in his favor, and descended by the valley of the Macra into the marshes on the banks of the Arno. He had apparently chosen this route in order to avoid the Roman armies, which guarded the more obvious passes of the Apennines; but the hardships and difficulties which he encountered in struggling through the marshes were immense; great numbers of his horses and beasts of burden perished, and he himself lost the sight of one eye by a violent attack of ophthalmia. At length, however, he reached Faesulae in safety, and was able to allow his troops a short interval of repose.

The Consuls for this year were Cn. Servilius and C. Flaminius. The latter was the author of the celebrated Agrarian Law which occasioned the Gallic War, and in his first consulship he had gained a great victory over the Insubrian Gauls (see p. 79)(Sixth paragraph of Chapter XI.—Transcriber). He had been raised to his second consulship by popular favor, in spite of the opposition of the Senate; and he hurried from Rome before the Ides of March,[32] lest the Senate might throw any obstacle in the way of his entering upon his consulship. He was a man of great energy, but headstrong and reckless. When Hannibal arrived at Faesulae, Flaminius was with his army at Arretium. It was always the object of Hannibal to bring the Roman commanders to a battle, and therefore, in moving from Faesulae, he passed by the Roman general, and advanced toward Perugia, laying waste the fertile country on his line of march. Flaminius immediately broke up his camp, and, following the traces of Hannibal, fell into the snare which was prepared for him. His army was attacked under the most disadvantageous circumstances, where it was hemmed in between rocky heights, previously occupied by the enemy, and the Lake of Trasimenus. Its destruction was almost complete. Thousands fell by the sword, among whom was the Consul himself; thousands more perished in the lake, and no less than 15,000 prisoners fell into the hands of Hannibal, who on his side is said to have lost only 1500 men. Hannibal's treatment of the captives on this occasion, as well as after the battle of the Trebia, was marked by the same policy on which he afterward uniformly acted; the Roman citizens alone were retained as prisoners, while their Italian allies were dismissed without ransom to their respective homes. By this means he hoped to excite the nations of Italy against their Roman masters, and to place himself in the position of the leader of a national movement rather than that of a foreign invader. It was probably in order to give time for this feeling to display itself that he did not, after so decisive a victory, push on toward Rome itself; but, after an unsuccessful attempt upon the Roman colony of Spoletium, he turned aside through the Apennines into Picenum, and thence into the northern part of Apulia. Here he spent a great part of the summer, and was able effectually to refresh his troops, who had suffered much from the hardships of their previous marches; but no symptoms appeared of the insurrections he had looked for among the Italians.

Meantime the Romans had collected a fresh army, which they placed under the command of Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been elected Dictator by the Comitia of the Centuries. Fabius formed a different plan for the campaign. He determined to keep the heights, and not to risk a battle, but at the same time to watch the Carthaginian army, cut off its supplies, and harass and annoy it in every possible way. From pursuing this policy he received the surname of Cunctator, or the Lingerer.

Hannibal now recrossed the Apennines, descended into the rich plains of Campania, and laid waste, without opposition, that fertile territory. But he was unable either to make himself master of any of the towns, or to draw the wary Fabius to a battle. The Roman general contented himself with occupying the mountain passes leading from Samnium into Campania, by which Hannibal must of necessity retreat, and believed that he had caught him, as it were, in a trap; but Hannibal eluded his vigilance by an ingenious stratagem, passed the defiles of the Apennines without loss, and established himself in the plains of Apulia, where he collected supplies from all sides, in order to prepare for the winter. Meantime the Romans, having become impatient at the inactivity of Fabius, raised Minucius, the Master of the Horse, to an equality in command with Fabius. His rashness very nearly gave Hannibal the opportunity, for which he was ever on the watch, to crush the Roman army by a decisive blow; but Fabius was able to save his colleague from destruction; and Hannibal, after obtaining only a partial advantage, took up his winter quarters at the small town of Geronium. Minucius acknowledged his error, and resumed his post of Master of the Horse.

During the winter the Romans made preparations for bringing an unusually large force into the field. The people thought that it needed only a man of energy and decision at the head of an overwhelming force to bring the war to a close. They therefore raised to the consulship C. Terentius Varro, said to have been the son of a butcher, who had been for some time regarded as the champion of the popular party. The Senate regarded this election with dismay, as Varro possessed no military experience; and they therefore persuaded the people to appoint as his colleague L. AEmilius Paullus, who had distinguished himself by the way in which he had conducted the Illyrian war during his consulship.

Hannibal remained at Geronium until late in the spring (B.C. 216), when, compelled to move by the want of provisions, he surprised the Roman magazines at Cannae, a small town of Apulia, and established his head-quarters there until the harvest could be got in. Meanwhile the two Roman Consuls arrived at the head of an army of little less than 90,000 men. To this mighty host Hannibal gave battle in the plains on the right bank of the Aufidus, just below the town of Cannae. We have no statement of the numbers of his army, but it is certain that it must have been greatly inferior to that of the enemy; notwithstanding which, the excellence of his cavalry, and the disciplined valor of his African and Spanish infantry, gave him the most decisive victory. The immense army of the Romans was not only defeated, but annihilated, and between forty and fifty thousand men are said to have fallen in the field, among whom was the Consul AEmilius Paullus, both the Consuls of the preceding year, the late Master of the Horse, Minucius, above eighty senators, and a multitude of the wealthy knights who composed the Roman cavalry. The other Consul, Varro, escaped with a few horsemen to Venusia, and a small band of resolute men forced their way from the Roman camp to Canusium; all the rest were killed, dispersed, or taken prisoners. Hannibal has been generally blamed for not following up his advantage at once, after so decisive a victory, by an immediate advance upon Rome itself—a measure which was strongly urged upon him by Maharbal. "Only send me on with the cavalry," said this officer, "and within five days thou shalt sup in the Capitol." Whatever may be the motives that deterred Hannibal from marching upon Rome, we can not but be surprised at his apparent inactivity after the battle. He probably expected that so brilliant a success would immediately produce a general rising among the nations of Italy, and remained for a time quietly in Apulia, until they should have had time to declare themselves. Nor were his hopes disappointed; the Hirpinians, all the Samnites (except the Pentrian tribe), and almost all the Apulians, Lucanians, and Bruttians, declared in favor of Carthage. But, though the whole of the south of Italy was thus apparently lost to the Romans, yet the effect of this insurrection was not so decisive as it would at first appear; for the Latin colonies, which still, without exception, remained faithful, gave the Romans a powerful hold upon the revolted provinces; and the Greek cities on the coast, though mostly disposed to join the Carthaginians, were restrained by the presence of Roman garrisons. Hence it became necessary to support the insurrection in the different parts of Italy with a Carthaginian force. Hannibal marched first into Samnium, and from thence into Campania, where he obtained possession of the important city of Capua, the gates of which were opened to him by the popular party. Here he established his army in winter quarters. Thus ends the first period of the war, in which Hannibal had met with uninterrupted success. Three great victories in three years, followed by the revolt of a city scarcely inferior to Rome itself in importance, seemed to promise a speedy termination of the war.



[Footnote 31: The pass of the Alps which Hannibal crossed was probably the Graian Alps, or Little St. Bernard. See note "On the Passage of Hannibal across the Alps" at the end of this chapter.]

[Footnote 32: At this time the Consuls entered upon their office on the Ides of March. It was not till B.C. 153 that the consulship commenced on the Kalends of January.]



NOTE ON HANNIBAL'S PASSAGE ACROSS THE ALPS.

(See p. 84.)(Fourth paragraph of Chapter XII.—Transcriber)

The narrative in the text is taken from that of the Greek historian Polybius, which is certainly by far the most trustworthy that has descended to us; but that author has nowhere clearly stated by which of the passes across the Alps Hannibal effected his march; and this question has given rise to much controversy both in ancient and modern times. Into this discussion our limits will not allow us to enter, but the following may be briefly stated as the general results: 1. That after a careful examination of the text of Polybius, and comparison of the different localities, his narrative will be found, on the whole, to agree best with the supposition that Hannibal crossed the Graian Alps, or Little St. Bernard; though it can not be denied that there are some difficulties attending this line, especially in regard to the descent into Italy. 2. That Caelius Antipater certainly represented him as taking this route (Liv., xxi., 38); and as he is known to have followed the Greek history of Silenus, who is said to have accompanied Hannibal in many of his campaigns, his authority is of the greatest weight. 3. That Livy and Strabo, on the contrary, both suppose him to have crossed the Cottian Alps, or Mont Genevre. But the main argument that appears to have weighed with Livy, as it has done with several modern writers on the subject, is the assumption that Hannibal descended in the first instance into the country of the Taurinians, which is opposed to the direct testimony of Polybius, who says expressly that he descended among the Insubrians, and subsequently mentions his attack on the Taurinians. 4. That, as according to Livy himself (xxi., 29), the Gaulish emissaries who acted as Hannibal's guides were Boians, it was natural that these should conduct him by the passage that led directly into the territory of their allies and brothers-in-arms, the Insubrians, rather than into that of the Taurinians, a Ligurian tribe, who were at this very time in a state of hostility with the Insubrians. And this remark will serve to explain why Hannibal chose apparently a longer route, instead of the more direct one of Mont Genevre. Lastly, it is remarkable that Polybius, though he censures the exaggerations and absurdities with which earlier writers had encumbered their narrative, does not intimate that any doubt was entertained as to the line of march; and Pompey, in a letter to the Senate, written in 73 B.C., alludes to the route of Hannibal across the Alps as something well known. Hence it appears clear that the passage by which he crossed them must have been one of those frequented in subsequent times by the Romans. This argument seems decisive against the claims of Mont Cenis, which have been advocated by some modern writers, that pass having apparently never been used till the Middle Ages—See Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography, vol. ii., p. 334, 335.



CHAPTER XIII.

SECOND PUNIC WAR: SECOND PERIOD, FROM THE REVOLT OF CAPUA TO THE BATTLE OF THE METAURUS. B.C. 215-207.

Capua was celebrated for its wealth and luxury, and the enervating effect which these produced upon the army of Hannibal became a favorite theme of rhetorical exaggeration in later ages. The futility of such declamations is sufficiently shown by the simple fact that the superiority of that army in the field remained as decided as ever. Still it may be truly said that the winter spent at Capua (B.C. 216-215) was in great measure the turning-point of Hannibal's fortune, and from this time the war assumed an altered character. The experiment of what he could effect with his single army had now been fully tried, and, notwithstanding all his victories, it had decidedly failed; for Rome was still unsubdued, and still provided with the means of maintaining a protracted contest. But Hannibal had not relied on his own forces alone, and he now found himself, apparently at least, in a condition to commence the execution of his long-cherished plan—that of arming Italy itself against the Romans, and crushing the ruling power by means of her own subjects. It was to this object that his attention was henceforth mainly directed. From this time, also, the Romans changed their plan of operations, and, instead of opposing to Hannibal one great army in the field, they hemmed in his movements on all sides, guarded all the most important towns with strong garrisons, and kept up an army in every province of Italy to thwart the operations of his lieutenants and check the rising disposition to revolt. It is impossible here to follow in detail the complicated operations of the subsequent campaigns, during which Hannibal himself frequently traversed Italy in all directions, appearing suddenly wherever his presence was called for, and astonishing and often baffling the enemy by the rapidity of his marches. All that we can do is to notice very briefly the leading events which distinguished each successive campaign.

The campaign of B.C. 215 was not marked by any decisive events. The Consuls were Q. Fabius Maximus (whose plan of conducting the war had been fully vindicated by the terrible defeat of Cannae) and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus. With the advance of spring Hannibal took up his camp on Mount Tifata, where, while awaiting the arrival of re-enforcements from Carthage, he was at hand to support his partisans in Campania and oppose the Roman generals in that province. But his attempts on Cumae and Neapolis were foiled, and even after he had been joined by a force from Carthage (very inferior, however, to what he had expected), he sustained a repulse before Nola, which was magnified by the Romans into a defeat. As the winter approached he withdrew into Apulia, and took up his quarters in the plains around Arpi. But other prospects were already opening before him. In his camp on Tifata he had received embassies from Philip, king of Macedon, and Hieronymus of Syracuse, both of which he had eagerly welcomed, and thus sowed the seeds of two fresh wars, and raised up two formidable enemies against the Roman power.

These two collateral wars in some degree drew off the attention of both parties from that in Italy itself; yet the Romans still opposed to the Carthaginian general a chain of armies which fettered all his operations; and though Hannibal was ever on the watch for the opportunity of striking a blow, the campaign of B.C. 214 was still less decisive than that of the preceding year. Fabius was again elected Consul, and Marcellus was appointed his colleague. Early in the summer Hannibal advanced from Apulia to his former station on Mount Tifata to watch over the safety of Capua; from thence he had descended to the Lake Avernus, in hopes of making himself master of Puteoli, when a prospect was held out to him of surprising the important city of Tarentum. Thither he hastened by forced marches, but arrived too late; Tarentum had been secured by a Roman force. After this his operations were of little importance, until he again took up his winter quarters in Apulia.

During the following summer (B.C. 213), while all eyes were turned toward the war in Sicily, Hannibal remained almost wholly inactive in the neighborhood of Tarentum, the hopes he still entertained of making himself master of that important city rendering him unwilling to quit that quarter of Italy. Before the close of the ensuing winter he was rewarded with the long-looked-for prize, and Tarentum was betrayed into his hands by two of its citizens. The advantage, however, was incomplete, for a Roman garrison still held possession of the citadel, from which he was unable to dislodge them. The next year (B.C. 212) was marked by important events in Sicily and Spain, to which we must now direct our attention.

Hiero, so long the faithful ally of Rome, died shortly after the battle of Cannae (B.C. 216), and was succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus, a vain youth, who abandoned the alliance of Rome for that of Carthage. But he was assassinated after a reign of fifteen months, and a republican form of government was established in Syracuse. A contest ensued between the Roman and Carthaginian parties in Syracuse, but the former ultimately prevailed, and Epicydes and Hippocrates, two brothers whom Hannibal had sent to Syracuse to espouse his interests, had to quit the city, and took refuge at Leontini. Such was the state of affairs when the Consul Marcellus arrived in Sicily (B.C. 214). He forthwith marched against Leontini, which Epicydes and Hippocrates defended with a considerable force. He took the city by storm, and, though he spared the inhabitants, executed in cold blood 2000 Roman deserters whom he found among the troops that had formed the garrison. This sanguinary act at once alienated the minds of the Sicilians, and alarmed the mercenary troops in the service of Syracuse. The latter immediately joined Hippocrates and Epicydes, who had made their escape to Herbessus; the gates of Syracuse were opened to them by their partisans within the walls, and the party hostile to Rome was thus established in the undisputed command of that city. Marcellus now appeared before Syracuse at the head of his army, and, after a fruitless summons to the inhabitants, proceeded to lay siege to the city both by sea and land. His attacks were vigorous and unremitting, and were directed especially against the quarter of Achradina[33] from the side of the sea; but, though he brought many powerful military engines against the walls, these were rendered wholly unavailing by the superior skill and science of Archimedes, which were employed on the side of the besieged. All the efforts of the assailants were baffled; and the Roman soldiers were inspired with so great a dread of Archimedes and his engines,[34] that Marcellus was compelled to give up all hopes of carrying the city by open force, and to turn the siege into a blockade. The siege was prolonged far on into the summer of B.C. 212, nor did there appear any prospect of its termination, as the communications of the besieged by sea were almost entirely open. In this state of things Marcellus fortunately discovered a part of the walls more accessible than the rest; and, having prepared scaling ladders, effected an entrance at this point during the night which followed a great festival, and thus made himself master of Epipolae. The two quarters called Tyche and Neapolis were now at his mercy, and were given up to plunder; but Epicydes still held the island-citadel and the important quarter of Achradina, which formed two separate and strong fortresses. Marcellus, however, made himself master of the fort of Euryalus, and had closely invested Achradina, when the Carthaginian army under Himilco and Hippocrates advanced to the relief of the city. Their efforts were, however, in vain; all their attacks on the camp of Marcellus were repulsed, and they were unable to effect a junction with Epicydes and the Syracusan garrison. The unhealthiness of the country soon gave rise to a pestilence which carried off both the Carthaginian generals and led to the entire break-up of the army. Shortly afterward the treachery of a leader of Spanish mercenaries in the Syracusan service opened to Marcellus the gates of Achradina, and in the general attack that ensued he made himself master of the island of Ortygia also. The city was given up to plunder, and Archimedes was slain by a Roman soldier, being so intent upon a mathematical problem at the time that he did not answer a question that was asked him. He was deeply regretted by Marcellus, who gave orders for his burial, and befriended his surviving relatives.[35]