By the doctrine of "diriment impediments" the Pope or a duly constituted representative can declare that a marriage has been null and void from the very beginning because of some impediment defined in the canon law. Canon IV of the twenty-fourth session of the Council of Trent anathematises anyone who shall say that the Church cannot constitute impediments dissolving marriage, or that she has erred in constituting them. The impediments which can annul marriage are described in the official Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. vii, pages 697-698. Among them are impuberty and impotency. Then there is "disparity of worship," which renders void the marriage of a Christian—that is, a Roman Catholic, with an infidel,—that is, one who is unbaptised. Marriage of a Roman Catholic with a baptised non-Catholic constitutes a "relative" impediment and needs a special dispensation and provisoes, such as a guarantee to bring up the children in the Roman faith to give it validity. Another impediment is based on the presumption of want of consent, "the nullity being caused by a defect of consent." "This defect," says the Catholic Encyclopedia, "may arise from the intellect or the will; hence we have two classes. Arising from the intellect we have: insanity; and total ignorance, even if in confuso of what marriage is (this ignorance, however, is not presumed to exist after the age of puberty has been reached); and lastly error, where the consent is not given to what was not intended. Arising from the will, a defect of consent may be caused through deceit or dissimulation, when one expresses exteriorly a consent that does not really exist; or from constraint imposed by an unjust external force, which causes the consent not to be free." Consanguinity and affinity are diriment impediments. Consanguinity "prohibits all marriages in the direct ascending or descending line in infinitum, and in the collateral line to the fourth degree or fourth generation." Affinity "establishes a bond of relationship between each of the married parties and the blood relations of the other, and forbids marriage between them to the fourth degree. Such is the case when the marriage springs from conjugal relations; but as canon law considers affinity to spring also from illicit intercourse, there is an illicit affinity which annuls marriage to the second degree only." Then there is "spiritual relationship"; for example, the marriage of one who stood as sponsor in confirmation with a parent of the child is null and void.

Under the canon law, even more resources are open for the man who is tired of his wife; by the doctrine, namely, of "spiritual fornication." Adultery is, of course, recognised as the cause that admits a separation. But the canon law remarks that idolatry and all harmful superstition—by which is meant any doctrine that does not agree with that of the Church—is fornication; that avarice is also idolatry and hence fornication; that in fact no vice can be separated from idolatry and hence all vices can be classed as fornication; so that if a husband only tried a little bit, he could without much trouble find some "vice" in his wife that would entitle him to a separation.[391]

When all these fail, recourse can be had to a dispensation. The Church reserves the right to give dispensations for all impediments. Canon III of the twenty-fourth session of Trent says: "If anyone shall say, that only those degrees of consanguinity and affinity which are set down in Leviticus [xviii, 6 ff.] can hinder matrimony from being contracted, and dissolve it when contracted; and that the Church can not dispense in some of those degrees, or ordain that others may hinder and dissolve it; let him be anathema."

[Sidenote: Inheritance]

The minute and far-fetched subtleties which the Roman Church has employed in the interpretation of these relationships make escape from the marital tie feasible for the man who is eager to disencumber himself of his life's partner. The man of limited means will have a hard time of it. The great and wealthy have been able at all periods, by working one or more of these doctrines, to reduce the theory of the Roman Church to nullity in practice. Napoleon had his marriage to Josephine annulled on the ground that he had never intended to enter into a religious marriage with her, although the day before the ceremony he had had the union secretly blessed by Cardinal Fesch. On the basis of this avowed lack of intent, his marriage with Josephine was declared null and void, and he was free to marry Louisa. A plea along the same lines is being worked by the Count de Castellane now. Louis XII, having fallen in love with Anne of Brittany, suddenly discovered that his wife was his fourth cousin, that she was deformed, and that her father had been his godfather; and for this the Pope gave him a dispensation and his legitimate wife was sent away. The Pope did not thunder against Louis XIV for committing adultery with women like Louise de la Valliere and Madame de Montespan. It is certainly true that in the case of Philip Augustus of France and Henry VIII of England the Pope did protect injured wives; but both these monarchs were questioning the Vatican's autocracy. The matrimonial relations of John of England, Philip's contemporary, were more corrupt than those of the French king; but, while the Pope chastised John for his defiance of his political autonomy, he did not excommunicate him on any ground of morality. The statement of Cardinal Gibbons is not entirely in accordance with history; he does not take all facts into consideration, as is also true of his complacent assumption that outside of the Roman Church no economic forces and no individuals have had any effect in elevating the moral and economic status of women.

Questions such as those of inheritance belong properly to civil law; but the canon law claimed to be heard in any case into which any spiritual interest could be foisted. Thus in the year 1199 Innocent III enacted that children of heretics be deprived of all their offending parents' goods "since in many cases even according to divine decree children are punished in this world on account of their parents."[392]

[Sidenote: General attitude towards women at the present day]

The attitude of the Roman Catholic Church towards women's rights at the present day is practically the same as it has been for eighteen centuries. It still insists on the subjection of the woman to the man, and it is bitterly hostile to woman suffrage. This position is so well illustrated by an article of the Rev. David Barry in the Roman Catholic paper, the Dublin Irish Ecclesiastical Review, that I cannot do better than quote some of it. "It seems plain enough," he says, "that allowing women the right of suffrage is incompatible with the high Catholic ideal of the unity of domestic life. Even those who do not hold the high and rigid ideal of the unity of the family that the Catholic Church clings to must recognise some authority in the family, as in every other society. Is this authority the conjoint privilege of husband and wife? If so, which of them is to yield, if a difference of opinion arises? Surely the most uncompromising suffragette must admit that the wife ought to give way in such a case. That is to say, every one will admit that the wife's domestic authority is subordinate to that of her husband. But is she to be accorded an autonomy in outside affairs that is denied her in the home? Her authority is subject to her husband's in domestic matters—her special sphere; is it to be considered co-ordinate with his in regulating the affairs of the State? Furthermore, there is an argument that applies universally, even in the case of those women who are not subject to the care and protection of a husband, and even, I do not hesitate to say, where the matters to be decided on would come specially within their cognisance, and where their judgment would, therefore, be more reliable than that of men. It is this, that in the noise and turmoil of party politics, or in the narrow, but rancorous arena of local factions, it must needs fare ill with what may be called the passive virtues of humility, patience, meekness, forbearance, and self-repression. These are looked on by the Church as the special prerogative and endowment of the female soul ... But these virtues would soon become sullied and tarnished in the dust and turmoil of a contested election; and their absence would soon be disagreeably in evidence in the character of women, who are, at the same time, almost constitutionally debarred from preeminence in the more robust virtues for which the soul of man is specially adapted."

Cardinal Gibbons, in a letter to the National League for the Civic Education of Women—an anti-suffrage organisation—said that "woman suffrage, if realised, would be the death-blow of domestic life and happiness" (Nov. 2, 1909).

Rev. William Humphrey, S.J., in his Christian Marriage, chap. 16, remarks that woman is "the subordinate equal of man"—whatever that means.

A few Roman Catholic prelates, like Cardinal Moran, have advocated equal suffrage, but they are in the minority. The Pope has not yet definitely stated the position of the Church; individual Catholics are free to take any side they wish, as it is not a matter of faith; but the tendency of Roman Catholicism is against votes for women.



SOURCES

I. Corpus Iuris Canonici: recognovit Aemilius Friedberg. Lipsiae (Tauchnitz) Pars Prior, 1879. Pars Secunda, 1881.

II. Sacrosanctum Concilium Tridentinum, additis Declarationibus Cardinalium, Concilii Interpretum, ex ultima recognitione Joannis Gallemart, etc. Coloniae Agrippinae, apud Franciscum Metternich, Bibliopolam. MDCCXXVII.

III. The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York, Robert Appleton Company. (Published with the Imprimatur of Archbishop Parley.)

IV. Various articles by Catholic prelates, due references to which are given as they occur.

NOTES:

[366] Augustine quoted by Gratian, Causa, 33, Quaest. 5, chapters 12-16—Friedberg, i, pp. 1254, 1255. Ambrose and Jerome on the same matter, ibid., c. 15 and 17, Friedberg, i, p. 1255. Gratian, Causa 30, Quaest. 5, c. 7—Friedberg, i, p. 1106: Feminae dum maritantur, ideo velantur, ut noverint se semper viris suis subditas esse et humiles.

[367] Gratian, Distinctio, 30, c. 2—Friedberg, i, p. 107: Quecumque mulier, religioni iudicans convenire, comam sibi amputaverit quam Deus ad velamen eius et ad memoriam subiectionis illi dedit, tanquam resolvens ius subiectionis, anathema sit. Cf. Gratian, Causa, 15, Quaest. 3—Friedberg, i, p. 750.

[368] Gratian, Dist., 30, c. 6, Friedberg, i, p. 108. See also Deuteronomy xxii, 5.

[369] Gratian, Dist., 23, c. 29—Friedberg, i, p. 86: Mulier, quamvis docta et sancta, viros in conventu docere non praesumat.

[370] Id., Causa, 15, Quaest. 3—Friedberg, i, p. 750.

[371] Id., Causa, 20, Quaest. 1, c. 2—Friedberg, i, pp. 843-844, quoting Gregory to Augustine, the Bishop of the Angles: Addidistis adhuc, quod si pater vel mater filium filiamve intra septa monasterii in infantiae annis sub regulari tradiderunt disciplina, utrum liceat eis, postquam ad pubertatis inoleverint annos, egredi, et matrimonio copulari. Hoe omnino devitamus, quia nefas est ut oblatis a parentibus Deo filiis voluptatis frena relaxentur. Id., c. 4—Fried., i, p. 844: quoting Isidore—quicumque a parentibus propriis in monasterio fuerit delegatus, noverit se ibi perpetuo mansurum. Nam Anna Samuel puerum suum natum et ablactatum Deo pietate obtulit. Id., c. 7—Fried., i, pp. 844-845.

[372] Gratian, Dist., 27, c. 4 et 9, and Dist., 28, c. 12—Friedberg, i, pp. 99 and 104. Id., Causa, 27, Quaest. 1, c. 1 and 7—Friedberg, i, pp. 1047 and 1O50.

[373] Gratian, Causa, 20, Quaest. 2, c. 2—Friedberg, i, pp. 847-848.

[374] Cf. Council of Trent, Session 24, "On the Sacrament of Matrimony," Canon 6: "If anyone shall say that matrimony contracted but not consummated is not dissolved by the solemn profession of religion by one of the parties married: let him be anathema."

Gratian, Causa, 27, Quaest. ii, c. 28—Fried., i, p. 1071. Id., c. 46, 47, 50, 51—Fried., i, pp. 1076, 1077, 1078.

[375] Gratian, Causa, 30, Quaest. 2—Fried., i, p. 1100: Ubi non est consensus utriusque, non est coniugium. Ergo qui pueris dant puellas in cunabulis et e converso, nihil faciunt, nisi uterque puerorum postquam venerit ad tempus discretionis consentiat, etiamsi pater et mater hoc fecerint et voluerint. Id. Causa, 31, Quaest. 2—Fried., i, 1112-1114: sine libera voluntate nulla est copulanda alicui.

[376] Gratian, Causa, 30, Quaest. 5, c. 6—Friedberg, i, p. 1106: Nullum sine dote fiat coniugium; iuxta possibilitatem fiat dos, nee sine publicis nuptiis quisquam nubere vel uxorem ducere praesumat.

[377] Gratian, Causa, 30, Quaest. 5, c. 4—Friedberg, i, p. 1105.

[378] Gratian, Causa, 30, Quaest. 5, c. 7—Friedberg, i, p. 1106.

[379] Id., c. 1—Friedberg, i, p. 1104.

[380] Id., c. 8—Friedberg, i, p. 1107.

[381] Gratian, Causa, 30, Quaest. 5, c. 9—Friedberg, i, p. 1107.

[382] Gratian, _Causa, 28, _Quaest_. i, _c_. 17—Friedberg, i, p. 1089: illorum vero coniugia, qui contemptis omnibus illis solempnitatibus solo affectu aliquam sibi in coniugem copulant, huiuscemodi coniugium non legitimum, sed ratum tantummodo esse creditur.

[383] Sessio xxiv, cap. i—De Reformatione Matrimonii.

[384] See Gratian, Dist., v, c. 4—Friedberg, i, p. 8, e.g., ... ita ut morte lex sacra feriat, si quis vir ad menstruam mulierem accedat.

[385] Gratian, Dist., 31, c. 11—Friedberg, i, p. 114.

[386] Gratian, Causa, 27, Quaest. 2, c. 18-22, and 24-26—Friedberg i, pp. 1067-1070.

[387] Gratian, Dist., 34, c. 4—Friedberg, i, p. 126. Id., Causa, 29, Quaest. 1—Friedberg, i, p. 1092. Id., Causa, 29, Quaest. 2, c. 2.

[388] Id., Causa, 29, Quaest. 2, c. 1 and 8.

[389] "Divorce," by James Cardinal Gibbons, in the Century, May, 1909.

[390] For this and what immediately follows see Session 24 of the Council of Trent "On the Sacrament of Matrimony" and also the Catholic Encyclopedia under "Divorce."

[391] Gratian, Causa 28, Quaest. i, c. 5—Friedberg, i, pp. 1080-1081. Licite dimittitur uxor que virum suum cogere querit ad malum. Idolatria, quam secuntur infideles, et quelibet noxia superstitio fornicatio est. Dominus autem permisit causa fornicationis uxorem dimitti. Sed quia dimisit et non iussit, dedit Apostolo locum monendi, ut qui voluerit non dimittat uxorem infidelem, quo sic fortassis possit fidelis fieri. Si infidelitas fornicatio est, et idolatria infidelitas, et avaritia idolatria, non est dubitandum et avaritiam fornicationem esse. Quis ergo iam quamlibet illicitam concupiscentiam potest recte a fornicationis genere separate, si avaritia fornicatio est?

[392] Friedberg, ii, pp. 782 and 783: Quum enim secundum legitimas sanctiones, etc.

Lea, in his History of Confession and Indulgences, ii, p. 87, quotes Zanchini, Tract. de Haeret., cap. 33, to the effect that goods of a heretic were confiscated and disabilities inflicted on two generations of descendants.



CHAPTER VII

HISTORY OF WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN ENGLAND

Since I have now given a brief summary of the canon law, which until the Reformation marked the general principles that guided the laws of all Europe on the subject of women, I propose next to consider more particularly the history of women's rights in England; for the institutions of England, being the basis of our own, will necessarily be more pertinent to us than those of Continental countries, to which I shall not devote more than a passing comment here and there. My inquiry will naturally fall into certain well-defined parts. The status of the unmarried woman is different from that of her married sister and will, accordingly, demand separate consideration. The rights of women, again, are to be viewed both from the legal and the social standpoint. Their legal rights include those of a private nature, such as the disposal of property, and public rights, such as suffrage, sitting on a jury, or holding office. Under social rights are included the right to an education, to earn a living, and the like. Let us glance first at the history of the legal rights of single women.

[Sidenote: Single women: Pollock and Maitland i, pp. 482-485.]

From very early times the law has continued to put the single woman of mature age on practically a par with men so far as private single rights are concerned. She could hold land, make a will or contract, could sue and be sued, all of her own initiative; she needed no guardian. She could herself, if a widow, be guardian of her own children.

[Sidenote: Pollock and Maitland, ii, 260-313. Blackstone, ii, ch. 13.]

In the case of inheritance, however, women have to within extremely recent times been treated less generously than men. The male sex has been preferred in an inheritance; males excluded females of equal degree; or, in the words of Blackstone: "In collateral inheritances the male stock shall be preferred to the female; that is, kindred derived from the blood of the male ancestors, however remote, shall be admitted before those from the blood of the female, however near; unless where the lands have, in fact, descended from a female. Thus the relations on the father's side are admitted in infinitum before those on the mother's side are admitted at all." Blackstone justly remarks that this harsh enactment of the laws of England was quite unknown to the Roman law "wherein brethren and sisters were allowed to succeed to equal portions of the inheritance." As an example, suppose we look for the heir of John Stiles, deceased. The order of succession would be:

I. The eldest son, Matthew Stiles, or his issue.

II. If his line is extinct, then Gilbert Stiles and the other sons, respectively, in order of birth, or their issue.

III. In default of these, all the daughters together, Margarite and Charlotte Stiles, or their issue.

IV. On the failure of the descendants of John Stiles himself, the issue of Geoffrey and Lucy Stiles, his parents, is called in, viz.: first, Francis Stiles, the eldest brother of the whole blood, or his issue.

V. Then Oliver Stiles, and the other whole brothers, respectively, in order of birth, or their issue.

VI. Then the sisters of the whole blood all together, Bridget and Alice Stiles, or their issue.

And so on. It will be noted that females of equal degree inherited together; and that a daughter excluded a brother of the dead man. Men themselves, if younger sons, have suffered what seems to us a grave injustice in the prevalence of the right of primogeniture, whereby, if there are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only can inherit. This law might work for the benefit of certain females; thus, the daughter, granddaughter, or great-granddaughter of an eldest son will succeed before the younger son.

To public rights, such as sitting on a jury[393] or holding offices of state, women never were admitted; that is a question that has become prominent only in the twentieth century and will demand consideration in its proper place.

[Sidenote: Power of Parents.]

Unlike the Roman law, English law allows parents to disinherit children completely, if they so desire, without being under any compulsion to leave them a part of their goods. As to legal power over children, the mother, as such, is entitled to none, says Blackstone,[394] but only to reverence and respect. Now, however, by the statute 2 and 3 Vict., c. 54, commonly called Talfourd's Act, an order may be made on petition to the court of chancery giving mothers access to their children and, if such children are within the age of seven years, for delivery of them to their mother until they attain that age. But no woman who has been convicted of adultery is entitled to the benefit of the act. The father has legal power up to the time when his children come of age; then it ceases. Until that time, his consent is necessary to a valid marriage; he may receive the profit of a child's estate, but only as guardian or trustee, and must render an account when the child attains his majority; and he may have the benefit of his children's labour while they live with him.

[Sidenote: Husband and wife. Pollock and Maitland, ii, 399-436. Blackstone, i, ch 15. Bryce, pp. 818-830.]

We are ready now to observe the status of women in marriage. The question of their legal rights in this relation offers the most illuminating insight into their conditions in the various epochs of history. Matrimony is a state over which the Church has always asserted special jurisdiction. By the middle of the twelfth century it was law in England that to it belonged this prerogative. The ecclesiastical court, for example, pronounced in a given case whether there had been a valid marriage or not; the temporal court took this decision as one of the bases for determining a matter of inheritance, whether a woman was entitled to dower, and the like. The general precepts laid down by canon law in the case of a wife have already been noted. These rules need now to be supplemented by an account of the position of women in marriage under the common law.

Under the older common law the husband was very much lord of all he surveyed and even more. An old enactment thus describes a husband's duty[395]: "He shall treat and govern the aforesaid A well and decently, and shall not inflict nor cause to be inflicted any injury upon the aforesaid A except in so far as he may lawfully and reasonably do so in accordance with the right of a husband to correct and chastise his wife." Blackstone, who wrote in 1763, has this to say on the husband's power to chastise his wife: "The husband also, by the old law, might give his wife moderate correction. For, as he is to answer for her misbehaviour, the law thought it reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or children, for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to answer. But this power of correction was confined within reasonable bounds, and the husband was prohibited from using any violence to his wife aliter quam ad, virum, ex causa regiminis et castigationis uxoris suae, licite et rationabiliter pertinet.[396] The civil law gave the husband the same, or a larger, authority over his wife; allowing him for some misdemeanours flagellis et fustibus acriter verberare uxorem [to give his wife a severe beating with whips and clubs]; for others, only modicam castigationem adhibere [to apply moderate correction]. But with us in the politer reign of Charles the Second, this power of correction began to be doubted; and a wife may now have security of the peace against her husband, or, in return, a husband against his wife. Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond of the old common law, still claim and exert their ancient privilege; and the courts of law will still permit a husband to restrain a wife of her liberty, in case of any gross misbehaviour." Doubtless what Mr. Weller, Sr., describes as the "amiable weakness" of wife-beating was not necessarily confined to the "lower rank." For instance, some of the courtly gentlemen of the reign of Queen Anne were probably not averse to exercising their old-time prerogative. Says Sir Richard Steele (Spectator, 479): "I can not deny but there are Perverse Jades that fall to Men's Lots, with whom it requires more than common Proficiency in Philosophy to be able to live. When these are joined to men of warm Spirits, without Temper or Learning, they are frequently corrected with Stripes; but one of our famous Lawyers is of opinion, That this ought to be used sparingly." The law was, indeed, even worse than might appear from the words of Blackstone. The wife who feared unreasonable violence could, to be sure, bind her husband to keep the peace; but she had no action against him. A husband who killed his wife was guilty of murder, but the wife who slew her husband was adjudged guilty of petty treason; and whereas the man would be merely drawn and hanged, the woman, until the reign of George III, was drawn and burnt alive.[397]

The right of a husband to restrain a wife's liberty may not be said to have become completely obsolete until the case of Reg. v. Jackson in 1891.[398] Wife-beating is still a flagrantly common offence in England.

[Sidenote: Wife's property in marriage.]

Turning now to the question of the wife's property in marriage, we shall be forced to believe that Blackstone was an optimist of unusual magnitude when he wrote that the female sex was "so great a favourite of the laws of England." Not to weary the reader by minute details, I cannot do better than give Messrs. Pollock and Maitland's excellent summary of the final shape taken by the common law—a glaring piece of injustice, worthy of careful reading, and in complete accord with Apostolic injunctions: "I. In the lands of which the wife is tenant in fee, whether they belonged to her at the date of the marriage or came to her during the marriage, the husband has an estate which will endure during the marriage, and this he can alienate without her concurrence. If a child is born of the marriage, thenceforth the husband as 'tenant by courtesy' has an estate which will endure for the whole of his life, and this he can alienate without the wife's concurrence. The husband by himself has no greater power of alienation than is here stated; he cannot confer an estate which will endure after the end of the marriage or (as the case may be) after his own death. The wife has during the marriage no power to alienate her land without her husband's concurrence. The only process by which the fee can be alienated is a fine to which both husband and wife are parties and to which she gives her assent after a separate examination.

"II. A widow is entitled to enjoy for her life under the name of dower one third of any land of which the husband was seised in fee at any time during the marriage. The result of this is that during the marriage the husband cannot alienate his own land so as to bar his wife's right of dower, unless this is done with her concurrence, and her concurrence is ineffectual unless the conveyance is made by fine." [This inconvenience for an unscrupulous husband was evaded in modern conveyancy by a device of extreme ingenuity finally perfected only in the eighteenth century. Professor James Bryce remarks (p. 820): "As this right (i.e., the right of dower) interfered with the husband's power of freely disposing of his own land, the lawyers at once set about to find means of evading it, and found these partly in legal processes by which the wife, her consent being ascertained by the courts, parted with her right, partly by an ingenious device whereby lands could be conveyed to a husband without the right of dower attaching to them, partly by giving the wife a so-called jointure which barred her claim."]

"III. Our law institutes no community, even of movables, between husband and wife. Whatever movables the wife has at the date of the marriage become the husband's, and the husband is entitled to take possession of and thereby to make his own whatever movables she becomes entitled to during the marriage, and without her concurrence he can sue for all debts that are due her. On his death, however, she becomes entitled to all movables and debts that are outstanding, or (as the phrase goes) have not been 'reduced into possession.' What the husband gets possession of is simply his; he can freely dispose of it inter vivos or by will. In the main, for this purpose as for other purposes, a 'term of years' is treated as a chattel, but under an exceptional rule the husband, though he can alienate his wife's 'chattel real' inter vivos, cannot dispose of it by his will. If he has not alienated it inter vivos, it will be hers if she survives him. If he survives her, he is entitled to her 'chattels real' and is also entitled to be made the administrator of her estate. In that capacity he has a right to whatever movables or debts have not yet been 'reduced into possession' and, when the debts have been paid, he keeps these goods as his own. If she dies in his lifetime, she can have no other intestate successor. Without his consent she can make no will, and any consent that he may have given is revocable at any time before the will is proved.

"IV. Our common law—but we have seen that this rule is not very old—assured no share of the husband's personality to the widow. He can, even by his will, give all of it away from her except her necessary clothes, and with that exception his creditors can take all of it. A further exception, of which there is not much to be read, is made of jewels, trinkets, and ornaments of the person, under the name of paraphernalia. The husband may sell or give these away in his lifetime, and even after his death they may be taken for his debts; but he cannot give them away by will. If the husband dies during the wife's life and dies intestate she is entitled to a third, or, if there be no living descendant of the husband, to one half of his personality [but see the note of Bryce, above]. But this is a case of pure intestate succession; she only has a share of what is left after payment of her husband's debts.

"V. During the marriage the husband is in effect liable to the whole extent of his property for debts incurred or wrongs committed by his wife before the marriage, also for wrongs committed during the marriage. The action is against him and her as co-defendants. If the marriage is dissolved by his death, she is liable, his estate is not. If the marriage is dissolved by her death, he is liable as her administrator, but only to the extent of the property which he takes in that character." [Mr. Ashton, in his very interesting book, p. 31, quotes a peculiar note from a Parish Register in the reign of Queen Anne to this effect: "John Bridmore and Anne Sellwood, both of Chiltern all Saints, were married October 17, 1714. The aforesaid Anne Sellwood was married in her Smock, without any clothes or headgier on." "This is not uncommon," remarks Mr. Ashton, "the object being, according to a vulgar error, to exempt the husband from the payment of any debts his wife may have contracted in her ante-nuptial condition. This error seems to have been founded on a misconception of the law, as it is laid down 'the husband is liable for the wife's debts, because he acquires an absolute interest in the personal estate of his wife.' An unlearned person from this might conclude, and not unreasonably, that if his wife had no estate whatever he could not incur any liability."]

"VI. During the marriage the wife cannot contract on her own behalf. She can contract as her husband's agent and has a certain power of pledging his credit in the purchase of necessaries. At the end of the Middle Ages it is very doubtful how far this power is to be explained by an 'implied agency.' The tendency of more recent times has been to allow her no power that cannot be thus explained, except in the exceptional case of desertion."

A perusal of these laws shows that they are immensely inferior to the Roman law, which not only gave the wife full control of her property, but protected her from coercion and bullying on the part of the husband. The amendment of these injustices has been very recent indeed. Successive statutes in 1870, 1874, and 1882[399] finally abrogated the law which gave the husband full ownership of his wife's property by the mere act of marriage. Beginning with the year 1857, too, enlightenment in England had progressed to such a remarkable degree that certain acts were passed forbidding a husband to seize his wife's earnings and neglect her[400]; and she was actually allowed to keep her own wages after the desertion of her lord. Before that time he might desert his wife repeatedly, and return from time to time to take away her earnings and sell everything she had acquired. An act in 1886 (49 and 50 Vict., c. 52) gave magistrates the power to order a husband to pay his wife a weekly sum, not exceeding two pounds, for her support and that of the children if it appeared to the magistrates that the deserting husband had the means of maintaining her, but was unwilling to do so. Still, the husband can at any time terminate his desertion and force his wife to take him back on penalty of losing all rights to such maintenance. There was frantic opposition to all of these revolutionary enactments and many prophets arose crying woe; but the acts finally passed and England still lives.

[Sidenote: Divorce. Authorities as above; and Howard, ii, 3-117.]

Until the Reformation divorce was regulated by the canon law in accordance with the principles which I have explained. After the Reformation the matter at once assumed a different aspect because all Protestants agreed in denying that marriage is a sacrament. Scotland in this as in other respects has been more liberal than England; as early as 1573 desertion as well as adultery had become grounds for divorce. But in England the force of the canon law continued. In Blackstone's day there were still, as under the canon law, only two kinds of separation. Complete dissolution of the marriage tie (a vinculo matrimonii) took place only on a declaration of the Ecclesiastical Court that on account of some canonical impediment, like consanguinity, the marriage was null and void from the beginning. Separation "from bed and board" (a mensa et thoro) simply gave the parties permission no longer to live together and was allowed for adultery or some other grave offences, like intolerable cruelty or a chronic disease. However, some time before Blackstone's day it had become the habit to get a dissolution of marriage a vinculo matrimonii for adultery by Act of Parliament; but the legal process was so tedious, minute, and expensive that only the very rich could afford the luxury.[401] In the case of a separation a mensa et thoro alimony was allowed the wife for her support out of her husband's estate at the discretion of the ecclesiastical judges.

The initiative in divorce by Act of Parliament was usually taken by the husband; not until 1801 did a woman have the temerity so to assert her rights. The fact is, ever since the dawn of history society has, with its usual double standard of morality for men and women, insisted that while the husband must never tolerate infidelity on the part of the wife, the wife should bear with meekness the adulteries of her husband. Plutarch in his Conjugal Precepts so advises a wife; and this pious frame of mind has continued down the centuries to the present day. Devout old Jeremy Taylor in his Holy Living—a book which is read by few, but praised by many—thus counsels the suffering wife[402]: "But if, after all the fair deportments and innocent chaste compliances, the husband be morose and ungentle, let the wife discourse thus: 'If, while I do my duty, my husband neglects me, what will he do if I neglect him?' And if she thinks to be separated by reason of her husband's unchaste life, let her consider that the man will be incurably ruined, and her rivals could wish nothing more than that they might possess him alone." Dr. Samuel Johnson ably seconded the holy Jeremy's advice by declaring that there is a boundless difference between the infidelity of the man and that of the woman. In the husband's case "the man imposes no bastards upon his wife." Therefore, "wise married women don't trouble themselves about infidelity in their husbands."[403] Until very recent times not only men but also women have been unanimous in counselling abject submission to and humble adoration of the husband. A single example out of hundreds will serve excellently as a pattern. In 1821 a "Lady of Distinction" writes to a "Relation Shortly after Her Marriage" as follows[404]: "The most perfect and implicit faith in the superiority of a husband's judgment, and the most absolute obedience to his desires, is not only the conduct that will insure the greatest success, but will give the most entire satisfaction. It will take from you a thousand cares, which would have answered to no purpose; it will relieve you from a weight of thought that would be very painful, and in no way profitable.... It has its origin in reason, in justice, in nature, and in the law of God.... I have told you how you may, and how people who are married do, get a likeness of countenance; and in that I have done it. You will understand me, that by often looking at your husband's face, by smiling on the occasions on which he does, by frowning on those things which make him frown, and by viewing all things in the light in which you perceive he does, you will acquire that likeness of countenance which it is an honour to possess, because it is a testimony of love.... When your temper and your thoughts are formed upon those of your husband, according to the plan which I have laid down, you will perceive that you have no will, no pleasure, but what is also his. This is the character the wife of prudence would be apt to assume; she would make herself the mirror, to show, unaltered, and without aggravation, diminution, or distortion, the thoughts, the sentiments, and the resolutions of her husband. She would have no particular design, no opinion, no thought, no passion, no approbation, no dislike, but what should be conformable to his own judgment ... I would have her judgment seem the reflecting mirror to his determination; and her form the shadow of his body, conforming itself to his several positions, and following it in all its movements ... I would not have you silent; nay, when trifles are the subject, talk as much as any of them; but distinguish when the discourse turns upon things of importance."

It is not strange, therefore, that no woman protested publicly against a husband's infidelity until 1801. Up to 1840 there were but three cases of a woman's taking the initiative in divorce, namely, in 1801, 1831, and 1840; and in each case the man's adultery was aggravated by other offences. In two other suits the Lords rejected the petition of the wife, although the misconduct of the husband was clearly proved. But redress was still by the elaborate machinery of Act of Parliament and hence a luxury only for the wealthy until 1857, when a special Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes was established.[405] Nevertheless, the law as it stands to-day is not of a character to excite admiration or to prove the existence of the proverbial "British Fair Play." A husband can obtain a divorce upon proof of his wife's infidelity; but the wife can get it only by proving, in addition to the husband's adultery, either that it was aggravated by bigamy or incest or that it was accompanied by cruelty or by two years' desertion. Misconduct by the husband bars him from obtaining a divorce. The court is empowered to regulate at its discretion the property rights of divorced people and the custody of the children.[406] All attempts have failed to make the law recognise that the misconduct of the husband shall be regarded equally as culpable as the wife's.

[Sidenote: Rape and the age of legal consent.]

We may pause a moment to glance at the provisions made by the criminal law for protecting women. The offence that most closely touches women is rape. The punishment of this in Blackstone's day was death[407]; but in the next century the death penalty was repealed and transportation for life substituted.[408] The saddest blot on a presumably Christian civilisation connected with this matter is the so-called "age of legal consent." Under the older Common Law this was ten or twelve; in 1885 it was thirteen, at which period a girl was supposed to be at an age to know what she was doing. But in the year 1885 Mr. Stead told the London public very plainly those hideous truths about crimes against young girls which everybody knew very well had been going on for centuries, but which no one ever before had dared to assert. The result was that Parliament raised the "age of legal consent" to sixteen, where it now stands.[409] The idea that any girl of this age is sufficiently mature to know what she is doing by consenting to the lust of scoundrels is a fine commentary on the acuteness of the legal intellect and the high moral convictions of legislators.

[Sidenote: Women's rights to an education.]

The rights of women to a higher education is distinctly a movement of the last half of the nineteenth century. It is true that throughout history there are many examples of remarkably well-educated women—Lady Jane Grey, for example, or Queen Elizabeth, or Olympia Morata, in Italy, she who in the golden period of the Renaissance became a professor at sixteen and wrote dialogues in Greek after the manner of Plato. But on looking closely into these instances we shall find first that these ladies were of noble rank and only thanks to their lofty position had access to knowledge; and secondly that they stand out as isolated cases—the great masses of women never dreamed beyond the traditional Kleider, Kueche, Kinder, and Kirche. That an elementary education, consisting of reading, writing, and simple arithmetic, was offered them freely by hospital, monastery, and the like schools even as early as Chaucer—this we know; nevertheless, beyond that they were not supposed to aspire. So very recently, indeed, have women secured the rights to a higher education that many thousands to-day can easily recall the intensely bitter attacks which were directed against colleges like Wellesley and Bryn Mawr in their inception. Until the middle of the nineteenth century the whole education—what there was of it—of a girl was arranged primarily with a view to capture a husband and, once having him secure, to be his loving slave, to dwell with adoring rapture on his superior learning, and to be humbly grateful if her liege deigned from time to time to throw his spouse some scraps of knowledge which might be safely administered without danger of making her think for herself. These facts no one can well deny; but a few instances of prevalent opinion, in addition to those which I have already quoted, will afford the amusement of concrete examples.

Mrs. Chapone, in the eighteenth century, advised her niece to avoid the study of classics and science lest she "excite envy in one sex and jealousy in the other." Lady Mary Wortley Montagu laments thus: "There is hardly a creature in the world more despicable and more liable to universal ridicule than a learned woman," and "folly is reckoned so much our proper sphere, we are sooner pardoned any excesses of that than the least pretensions to reading and good sense." Pursuant to the prevailing sentiment on the education of women, the subjects which they studied and the books which they were allowed to read were carefully regulated. As to their reading, it was confined to romantic tales whereof the exceeding insipidity could not awaken any symptom of intelligence. Lyly dedicated his Euphues to the "Ladies and Gentlewomen of England" and Sidney's Arcadia owed its vast success to its female readers.

The subjects studied followed the orthodox views. Beginning with the reign of Queen Anne boarding-schools for girls became very numerous. At these schools "young Gentlewomen" were "soberly educated" and "taught all sorts of learning fit for young Gentlewomen." The "learning fit for young Gentlewomen" comprised "the Needle, Dancing, and the French tongue; a little Music on the Harpsichord or Spinet, to read, write, and cast accounts in a small way." Dancing was the all-important study, since this was the surest route to their Promised Land, matrimony. The study of French consisted in learning parrot-like a modicum of that language pronounced according to the fancy of the speaker. As, however, the young beau probably did not know any more himself, the end justified the means. Studies like history, when pursued, were taken in homoeopathic doses from small compendiums; and it was adequate to know that Charlemagne lived somewhere in Europe about a thousand or so years ago. Yet even this was rather advanced work and exposed the woman to be damned by the report that she was educated. Ability to cook was not despised and pastry schools were not uncommon. Thus in the time of Queen Anne appears this: "To all Young Ladies: at Edw. Kidder's Pastry School in little Lincoln's Inn Fields are taught all Sorts of Pastry and Cookery, Dutch hollow works, and Butter Works," etc.

At last in the first decades of the nineteenth century the civilised world began slowly to take some thought of women's higher education and to wake up to the fact that because a certain system has been in vogue since created man does not necessarily mean that it is the right one; a very heretical and revolutionary idea, which has always been and still is ably opposed by that great host of people who have steadily maintained that when men and women once begin to think for themselves society must inevitably run to ruin. In 1843 there was established a certain Governesses' Benevolent Institution. This was in its inception a society to afford relief to governesses, i.e., women engaged in tutoring, who might be temporarily in straits, and to raise annuities for those who were past doing work. Obviously this would suggest the question of what a competent governess was; and this in turn led to the demand for a diploma as a warrant of efficiency. That called attention to the extreme ignorance of the members of the profession; and it was soon felt that classes of instruction were needed. A sum of money was accordingly collected in 1846 and given the Institution for that purpose. Some eminent professors of King's College volunteered to lecture; and so, on a small scale to be sure, began what is now Queen's College, the first college for women in England, incorporated by Royal Charter in 1853. In 1849 Bedford College for women had been founded in London through the unselfish labours of Mrs. Reid; but it did not receive its charter until 1869. Within a decade Cheltenham, Girton, Newnham, and other colleges for women had arisen. Eight of the ten men's universities of Great Britain now allow examinations and degrees to women also; Oxford and Cambridge do not.

[Sidenote: Women in the professions.]

Since then women's right to any higher education which they may wish to embrace has been permanently assured. As early as 1868 Edinburgh opened its courses in pharmacy to women. In 1895 there were already 264 duly qualified female physicians in Great Britain. In many schools they are allowed to study with men, as at the College of Physicians and Surgeons at Edinburgh; there are four medical schools for women only. We find women now actively engaged in agriculture, apiculture, poultry-keeping, horticulture; in library work and indexing; in stenography; in all trades and professions. The year 1893 witnessed the first appointment of women as factory inspectors, two being chosen that year in London and in Glasgow. Nottingham had chosen women as sanitary inspectors in 1892. Thus in about two decades woman has advanced farther than in the combined ages which preceded. Before these very modern movements we may say that the stage was the only profession which had offered them any opportunity of earning their living in a dignified way. It seems that a Mrs. Coleman, in 1656, was the first female to act on the stage in England; before that, all female parts had been taken by boys or young men. A Mrs. Sanderson played Desdemona in 1660 at the Clare Market Theatre. In 1661, as we may see from Pepys' Diary (Feb. 12, 1661), an actress was still a novelty; but within a few decades there were already many famous ones.

[Sidenote: Woman suffrage in England]

We have seen that now woman has obtained practically all rights on a par with men. There are still grave injustices, as in divorce; but the battle is substantially won. One right still remains for her to win, the right, namely, to vote, not merely on issues such as education—this privilege she has had for some time—but on all political questions; and connected with this is the right to hold political office. We may fittingly close this chapter by a review of the history of the agitation for woman suffrage.

In the year 1797 Charles Fox remarked: "It has never been suggested in all the theories and projects of the most absurd speculation, that it would be advisable to extend the elective suffrage to the female sex." Yet five years before Mary Wollstonecraft had published her Vindication of the Rights of Women. Presently the writings of Harriet Martineau upon political economy proved that women could really think on politics.

We may say that the general public first began to think seriously on the matter after the epoch-making Reform Act of 1832. This celebrated measure admitted L10 householders to the right to vote and carefully excluded females; yet it marked a new era in the awakening of civic consciousness: women had taken active part in the attendant campaigns; and the very fact that "male persons" needed now to be so specifically designated in the bill, whereas hitherto "persons" and "freeholders" had been deemed sufficient, attests the recognition of a new factor in political life.

In 1865 John Stuart Mill was elected to Parliament. That able thinker had written on The Subjection of Women and was ready to champion their rights. A petition was prepared under the direction of women like Mrs. Bodichon and Miss Davies; and in 1867 Mill proposed in Parliament that the word man be omitted from the People's Bill and person substituted. The amendment was rejected, 196 to 83.

Nevertheless, the agitation was continued. The next year constitutional lawyers like Mr. Chisholm Anstey decided that women might be legally entitled to vote; and 5000 of them applied to be registered. In a test case brought before the Court of Common Pleas the verdict was adverse, on the ground that it was contrary to usage for women to vote. The fight went on. Mr. Jacob Bright in 1870 introduced a "Bill to Remove the Electoral Disabilities of Women" and lost. In 1884 Mr. William Woodall tried again; he lost also, largely through the efforts of Gladstone; and the same statesman was instrumental in killing another bill in 1892, when Mr. A.J. Balfour urged its passage.

At the present day women in England cannot vote on great questions of universal state policy nor can they hold great offices of state. Yet their gains have been enormous, as I shall next demonstrate; and in this connection I shall also glance briefly at their vast strides in the colonies.

In 1850 Ontario gave all women school suffrage. In 1867 New South Wales gave them municipal suffrage. In 1869 England granted municipal suffrage to single women and widows; Victoria gave it to all women, married or single. In England in 1870 the Education Act, by which school boards were created, gave women the same rights as men, both as regards electing and being elected. In 1871 West Australia gave them municipal suffrage; in 1878 New Zealand gave school suffrage. In 1880 South Australia gave municipal suffrage. In 1881 widows and single women obtained municipal suffrage in Scotland and Parliamentary suffrage on the Isle of Man. Municipal suffrage was given by Ontario and Tasmania in 1884 and by New Zealand and New Brunswick in 1886; by Nova Scotia and Manitoba in 1887. In 1888 England gave women county suffrage and British Columbia and the North-West Territory gave them municipal suffrage. In 1889 county suffrage was given the women of Scotland and municipal suffrage to single women and widows in the Province of Quebec. In 1893 New Zealand gave full suffrage. In 1894 parish and district suffrage was given in England to women married and single, with power to elect and to be elected to parish and district councils. In 1895 South Australia gave full state suffrage to all women. In 1898 the women of Ireland were given the right to vote for all officers except members of Parliament. In 1900 West Australia granted full state suffrage to all. In 1902 full national suffrage was given all the women in federated Australia and full state suffrage to those of New South Wales. In 1903 Tasmania gave full state suffrage; in 1905 Queensland did the same; in 1908 Victoria followed. In 1907 England made women eligible as mayors, aldermen, and county and town councillors. In London, for example, at the present time women can vote for the 28 borough councils and 31 boards of guardians of the London City Council; they can also be themselves elected to these; be members of the central unemployed body or of the 23 district committees, and can be co-opted to all other bodies, like the local pension committees. Women can be aldermen of the Council; and there is nothing to prevent one from holding even the office of chairman.

At the present moment the cause of woman suffrage in England is being furthered chiefly by two organizations which differ in methods. The National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies has adopted the "constitutional" or peaceful policy; but the National Women's Social and Political Union is "militant" and coercive.

SOURCES

I. The English Statutes. Published by Authority during the Various Reigns.

II. Studies in History and Jurisprudence: by James Bryce. Oxford University Press, 1901. Pages 782-859 on "Marriage and Divorce."

III. History of English Law: by Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland. 2 vols. Cambridge University Press, 1898—second edition.

IV. Commentaries on the Laws of England: by Sir William Blackstone. With notes selected from the editions of Archbold, Christian, Coleridge, etc., and additional notes by George Sharswood, of the University of Pennsylvania. 2 vols. Philadelphia, 1860—Childs and Peterson, 602 Arch Street.

V. A History of Matrimonial Institutions, chiefly in England and the United States: by George Elliott Howard. 4 vols. The University of Chicago Press, 1904.

VI. Social England: edited by H.D. Traill. 6 vols. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1901.

VII. Social Life in the Reign of Queen Anne, taken from original sources: by John Ashton. London, Chatto and Windus, 1897.

VIII. The Renaissance of Girls' Education in England: by Alice Zimmern. London, A.D. Innes and Co., 1898.

IX. Progress in Women's Education in the British Empire: edited by the Countess of Warwick. Being the Report of the Education Section, Victorian Era Exhibition, 1897. Longmans, Green, & Co., 1898.

X. Current Literature from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, references to which are noted as they occur.

NOTES:

[393] If a woman sentenced to execution declared she was pregnant, a jury of twelve matrons could be appointed on a writ de venire inspiciendo to determine the truth of the matter; for she could not be executed if the infant was alive in the womb. The same jury determined the case of a widow who feigned herself with child in order to exclude the next heir and when she was suspected of trying to palm off a supposititious birth. But from all other jury duties women have always been excluded "on account of the weakness of the sex"—propter defectum sexus.

[394] Blackstone, i, ch. 16.

[395] Reg. Brev. Orig., f. 89: quod ipse praefatam A bene et honeste tractabit et gubernabit, ac damnum vel malum aliquod eidem A de corpore suo, aliter quam ad virum suum ex causa regiminis et castigationis uxoris suae licite et rationabiliter pertinet, non faciet nec fieri procurabit.

[396] "Except in so far as he may lawfully and reasonably do so in order to correct and chastise his wife."

[397] The learned commentator Christian adds a few more cases where formerly the criminal law was harshly prejudiced against women. Thus: "By the Common Law, all women were denied the benefit of clergy; and till the 3 and 4 W. and M., c. 9 [William and Mary] they received sentence of death and might have been executed for the first offence in simple larceny, bigamy, manslaughter, etc., however learned they were, merely because their sex precluded the possibility of their taking holy orders; though a man who could read was for the same crime subject only to burning in the hand and a few months' imprisonment."

[398] I Q.B. p. 671—in the Court of Appeal.

[399] Married Women's Property Act, 45 and 46 V., c. 75—Aug. 18, 1882.

[400] Note this incident, from the Westminister Review, October, 1856: "A lady whose husband had been unsuccessful in business established herself as a milliner in Manchester. After some years of toil she realised sufficient for the family to live upon comfortably, the husband having done nothing meanwhile. They lived for a time in easy circumstances after she gave up business and then the husband died, bequeathing all his wife's earnings to his own illegitimate children. At the age of 62 she was compelled, in order to gain her bread, to return to business."

[401] For a full account of the elaborate machinery see Chitty's note to Blackstone, vol. i, p. 441, of Sharswood's edition.

[402] Holy Living, ch. 3, section I: Rules for Married Persons.

[403] Boswell, vii, 288. Perhaps if the venerable Samuel had had the statistics of venereal disease given by adulterous husbands to wives and children he might not have been so sure of his contention.

[404] Quoted by Professor Thomas in the American Magazine, July, 1909.

[405] See 20 and 21 V., c. 85—Aug. 28. 1857.

[406] See 7 Edw., c. 12—Aug. 9, 1907—Matrimonial Causes Act, which also gives the court discretion in alimony.

[407] Blackstone, iv, ch. 15.

[408] 4 and 5 V., c. 56, s. 3.

[409] The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1885, 48 and 49 V. c. 69, section 5: "Any person who (1) unlawfully and carnally knows or attempts to have unlawful carnal knowledge of any girl being of or above the age of thirteen years and under the age of sixteen, or (2) unlawfully and carnally knows or attempts to have carnal knowledge of any female idiot or imbecile woman or girl under circumstances which do not amount to rape, but which prove that the offender knew at the time of the commission of the offence that the woman or girl was an idiot or imbecile, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and being convicted thereof shall be liable at the discretion of the Court to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour." Section 4: "Any one who unlawfully and carnally knows any girl under the age of thirteen shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life." Any one who merely attempts it can be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour.



CHAPTER VIII

WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES

It has been my aim, in this short history of the growth of women's rights, to depict for the most part the strictly legal aspect of the matter; but from time to time I have interposed some typical illustration of public opinion, in order to bring into greater prominence the ferment that was going on or the misery which existed behind the scenes. A history of legal processes might otherwise, from the coldness of the laws, give few hints of the conflicts of human passion which combined to set those processes in motion. Before I present the history of the progress of women's rights in the United States, I shall place before the reader some extracts which are typical and truly representative of the opposition which from the beginning of the agitation to the present day has voiced itself in all ranks of life. Let the reader bear carefully in mind that from 1837 to the beginning of the twentieth century such abuse as that which I shall quote as typical was hurled from ten thousand throats of men and women unceasingly; that Mrs. Stanton, Miss Anthony, and Mrs. Gage were hissed, insulted, and offered physical violence by mobs in New York[410] and Boston to an extent inconceivable in this age; and that the marvellously unselfish labour of such women as these whom I have mentioned and of men like Wendell Phillips is alone responsible for the improvement in the legal status of women, which I propose to trace in detail. Some expressions of the popular attitude follow:

[Sidenote: Examples of opposition to women's rights.]

From a speech of the Rev. Knox-Little at the Church of St. Clements in Philadelphia in 1880: "God made himself to be born of a woman to sanctify the virtue of endurance; loving submission is an attribute of a woman; men are logical, but women, lacking this quality, have an intricacy of thought. There are those who think women can be taught logic; this is a mistake. They can never by any power of education arrive at the same mental status as that enjoyed by men, but they have a quickness of apprehension, which is usually called leaping at conclusions, that is astonishing. There, then, we have distinctive traits of a woman, namely, endurance, loving submission, and quickness of apprehension. Wifehood is the crowning glory of a woman. In it she is bound for all time. To her husband she owes the duty of unqualified obedience. There is no crime which a man can commit which justifies his wife in leaving him or applying for that monstrous thing, divorce. It is her duty to subject herself to him always, and no crime that he can commit can justify her lack of obedience. If he be a bad or wicked man, she may gently remonstrate with him, but refuse him never. Let divorce be anathema; curse it; curse this accursed thing, divorce; curse it, curse it! Think of the blessedness of having children. I am the father of many children and there have been those who have ventured to pity me. 'Keep your pity for yourself,' I have replied, 'they never cost me a single pang.' In this matter let woman exercise that endurance and loving submission which, with intricacy of thought, are their only characteristics."

From the Philadelphia Public Ledger and Daily Transcript, July 20, 1848: "Our Philadelphia ladies not only possess beauty, but they are celebrated for discretion, modesty, and unfeigned diffidence, as well as wit, vivacity, and good nature. Who ever heard of a Philadelphia lady setting up for a reformer or standing out for woman's rights, or assisting to man the election grounds [sic], raise a regiment, command a legion, or address a jury? Our ladies glow with a higher ambition. They soar to rule the hearts of their worshippers, and secure obedience by the sceptre of affection.... But all women are not as reasonable as ours of Philadelphia. The Boston ladies contend for the rights of women. The New York girls aspire to mount the rostrum, to do all the voting, and, we suppose, all the fighting, too.... Our Philadelphia girls object to fighting and holding office. They prefer the baby-jumper to the study of Coke and Lyttleton, and the ball-room to the Palo Alto battle. They object to having a George Sand for President of the United States; a Corinna for Governor; a Fanny Wright for Mayor; or a Mrs. Partington for Postmaster.... Women have enough influence over human affairs without being politicians.... A woman is nobody. A wife is everything. A pretty girl is equal to ten thousand men, and a mother is, next to God, all powerful.... The ladies of Philadelphia, therefore, under the influence of the most 'sober second thoughts' are resolved to maintain their rights as Wives, Belles, Virgins, and Mothers, and not as Women."

From the "Editor's Table" of Harper's New Monthly Magazine, November, 1853: "Woman's Rights, or the movement that goes under that name, may seem to some too trifling in itself and too much connected with ludicrous associations to be made the subject of serious arguments. If nothing else, however, should give it consequence, it would demand our earnest attention from its intimate connection with all the radical and infidel movements of the day. A strange affinity seems to bind them all together.... But not to dwell on this remarkable connection—the claim of 'woman's rights' presents not only the common radical notion which underlies the whole class, but also a peculiar enormity of its own; in some respects more boldly infidel, or defiant both of nature and revelation, than that which characterises any kindred measure. It is avowedly opposed to the most time-honoured proprieties of social life; it is opposed to nature; it is opposed to revelation.... This unblushing female Socialism defies alike apostles and prophets. In this respect no kindred movement is so decidedly infidel, so rancorously and avowedly anti-biblical.

"It is equally opposed to nature and the established order of society founded upon it. We do not intend to go into any physiological argument. There is one broad striking fact in the constitution of the human species which ought to set the question at rest for ever. This is the fact of maternity.... From this there arise, in the first place, physical impediments which, during the best part of the female life, are absolutely insurmountable, except at a sacrifice of almost everything that distinguishes the civilized human from the animal, or beastly, and savage state. As a secondary, yet inevitably resulting consequence, there come domestic and social hindrances which still more completely draw the line between the male and female duties.... Every attempt to break through them, therefore, must be pronounced as unnatural as it is irreligious and profane.... The most serious importance of this modern 'woman's rights' doctrine is derived from its direct bearing upon the marriage institution. The blindest must see that such a change as is proposed in the relations and life of the sexes cannot leave either marriage or the family in their present state. It must vitally affect, and in time wholly sever, that oneness which has ever been at the foundation of the marriage idea, from the primitive declaration in Genesis to the latest decision of the common law. This idea gone—and it is totally at war with the modern theory of 'woman's rights'—marriage is reduced to the nature of a contract simply.... That which has no higher sanction than the will of the contracting parties, must, of course, be at any time revocable by the same authority that first created it. That which makes no change in the personal relations, the personal rights, the personal duties, is not the holy marriage union, but the unholy alliance of concubinage."

In a speech of Senator George G. Vest, of Missouri, in the United States Senate, January 25, 1887, these: "I now propose to read from a pamphlet sent to me by a lady.... She says to her own sex: 'After all, men work for women; or, if they think they do not, it would leave them but sorry satisfaction to abandon them to such existence as they could arrange without us.'

"Oh, how true that is, how true!"

In 1890 a bill was introduced in the New York Senate to lower the "age of consent"—the age at which a girl may legally consent to sexual intercourse—from 16 to 14. It failed. In 1892 the brothel keepers tried again in the Assembly. The bill was about to be carried by universal consent when the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, feeling the importance of the measure, called for the individual yeas and nays, in order that the constituents of the representatives might know how their legislators voted. The bill thereupon collapsed. In 1889 a motion was made in the Kansas Senate to lower the age of consent from 18 to 12. But the public heard of it; protests flowed in; and under the pressure of these the law was allowed to remain as it was.

Such are some typical examples of the warfare of the opposition to all that pertains to advancing the status of women. As I review the progress of their rights, let the reader recollect that this opposition was always present, violent, loud, and often scurrilous.

In tracing the history of women's rights in the United States my plan will be this: I shall first give a general review of the various movements connected with the subject; and I shall then lay before the reader a series of tables, wherein may be seen at a glance the status of women to-day in the various States.

[Sidenote: Single women.]

[Sidenote: History of agitation for women's rights.]

In our country, as in England, single women have at all times had practically the same legal rights as men; but by no means the same political, social, educational, or professional privileges; as will appear more conclusively later on.

We may say that the history of the agitation for women's rights began with the visit of Frances Wright to the United States in 1820. Frances Wright was a Scotchwoman, born at Dundee in 1797, and early exhibited a keen intellect on all the subjects which concern political and social reform. For several years after 1820 she resided here and strove to make men and women think anew on old traditional beliefs—more particularly on theology, slavery, and the social degradation of women. The venomous denunciations of press and pulpit attested the success of her efforts. In 1832 Lydia Maria Child published her History of Woman, a resume of the status of women; and this was followed by numerous works and articles, such as Margaret Fuller's, The Great Lawsuit, or Man vs. Woman: Woman vs. Man, and Eliza Farnham's Woman and her Era. Various women lectured; such as Ernestine L. Rose—a Polish woman, banished for asserting her liberty. The question of women's rights received a powerful impetus at this period from the vast number of women who were engaged in the anti-slavery agitation. Any research into the validity of slavery perforce led the investigators to inquire into the justice of the enforced status of women; and the two causes were early united. Women like Angelina and Sarah Grimke and Lucretia Mott were pioneers in numerous anti-slavery conventions. But as soon as they dared to address meetings in which men were present, a tempest was precipitated; and in 1840, at the annual meeting of the Anti-Slavery Association, the men refused to serve on any committee in which any woman had a part; although it had been largely the contributions of women which were sustaining the cause. Affairs reached a climax in London, in 1840, at the World's Anti-Slavery Convention. Delegates from all anti-slavery organisations were invited to take part; and several American societies sent women to represent them. These ladies were promptly denied any share in the proceedings by the English members, thanks mainly to the opposition of the clergy, who recollected with pious satisfaction that St. Paul permitted not a woman to teach. Thereupon Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton determined to hold a women's rights convention as soon as they returned to America; and thus a World's Anti-Slavery Convention begat an issue equally large.

Accordingly, the first Women's Rights Convention was held at Seneca Falls, New York, July 19-20, 1848. It was organised by divorced wives, childless women, and sour old maids, the gallant newspapers declared; that is, by Mrs. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Mrs. Lucretia Mott, Mrs. McClintock, and other fearless women, who not only lived the purest and most unselfish of domestic lives, but brought up many children besides. Great crowds attended. A Declaration of Sentiments was moved and adopted; and as this exhibits the temper of the convention and illustrates the then prevailing status of women very clearly, I shall quote it:

DECLARATION OF SENTIMENTS

"When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one portion of the family of man to assume among the people of the earth a position different from that which they have hitherto occupied, but one to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to such a course.

"We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. Whenever any form of government becomes destructive of those ends, it is the right of those who suffer from it to refuse allegiance to it, and to insist upon the institution of a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organising its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light or transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they were accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their duty to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of the women under this government, and such is now the necessity which constrains them to demand the equal station to which they are entitled.

"The history of mankind is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations on the part of man toward woman, having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over her. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world.

"He has never permitted her to exercise her inalienable right to the elective franchise.

"He has compelled her to submit to laws, in the formation of which she had no voice.

"He has withheld from her rights which are given to the most ignorant and degraded men—both natives and foreigners.

"Having deprived her of this first right of a citizen, the elective franchise, thereby leaving her without representation in the halls of legislation, he has oppressed her on all sides.

"He has made her, if married, in the eye of the law, civilly dead.

"He has taken from her all right in property, even to the wages she earns.

"He has made her, morally, an irresponsible being, as she can commit many crimes with impunity, provided they be done in the presence of her husband. In the covenant of marriage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming, to all intents and purposes, her master—the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.

"He has so framed the laws of divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes, and, in case of separation, to whom the guardianship of the children shall be given, as to be wholly regardless of the happiness of women—the law in all cases going upon a false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all power into his hands.

"After depriving her of all rights as a married woman, if single, and the owner of property, he has taxed her to support a government which recognises her only when her property can be made profitable to it.

"He has monopolised nearly all the profitable employments, and from those she is permitted to follow she receives but a scanty remuneration. He closes against her all the avenues of wealth and distinction which he considers most honourable to himself. As a teacher of theology, medicine, or law, she is not known.

"He has denied her the facilities for obtaining a thorough education, all colleges being closed against her.

"He allows her in church, as well as state, but a subordinate position, claiming Apostolic authority for her exclusion from the ministry, and, with some exceptions, from any public participation in the affairs of the church.

"He has created a false public sentiment by giving to the world a different code of morals for men and women, by which moral delinquencies which exclude women from society are not only tolerated, but deemed of little account in man.

"He has usurped the prerogative of Jehovah himself, claiming it as his right to assign for her a sphere of action, when that belongs to her conscience and to her God.

"He has endeavoured, in every way that he could, to destroy her confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect, and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life.

"Now, in view of this entire disfranchisement of one half the people of this country, their social and religious degradation; in view of the unjust laws above mentioned, and because women do feel themselves aggrieved, oppressed, and fraudulently deprived of their most sacred rights, we insist that they have immediate admission to all the rights and privileges which belong to them as citizens of the United States.

"In entering upon the great work before us, we anticipate no small amount of misconception, misrepresentation, and ridicule; but we shall use every instrumentality within our power to effect our object. We shall employ agents, circulate tracts, petition the State and National legislatures, and endeavour to enlist the pulpit and press in our behalf. We hope this Convention will be followed by a series of Conventions embracing every part of the country."

Such was the defiance of the Women's Rights Convention in 1848; other conventions were held, as at Rochester, in 1853, and at Albany in 1854; the movement extended quickly to other States and touched the quick of public opinion. It bore its first good fruits in New York in 1848, when the Property Bill was passed. This law, amended in 1860, and entitled "An Act Concerning the Rights and Liabilities of Husband and Wife" (March 20, 1860), emancipated completely the wife, gave her full control of her own property, allowed her to engage in all civil contracts or business on her own responsibility, rendered her joint guardian of her children with her husband, and granted both husband and wife a one-third share of one another's property in case of the decease of either partner.

Thus New York became the pioneer. The movement spread, as I have mentioned, with amazing rapidity; but it was not so uniformly successful. Conventions were held, for example, in Ohio, at Salem, April 19-20, 1850; at Akron, May 28-29, 1851; at Massillon on May 27, 1852. Nevertheless, in 1857, the Legislature of Ohio passed a bill enacting that no married man should dispose of any personal property without having first obtained the consent of his wife; the wife was empowered, in case of a violation of this law, to commence a civil suit in her own name for the recovery of the property; and any married woman whose husband deserted her or neglected to provide for his family was to be entitled to his wages and to those of her minor children. A bill to extend suffrage to women was defeated, by a vote of 44 to 44; the petition praying for its enactment had received 10,000 signatures.

The course of events as it has been described in New York and Ohio, is practically the same in the case of the other States. The Civil War relegated these issues to a secondary place; but during that momentous conflict the heroism of Clara Barton on the battlefield and of thousands of women like her paved the way for a reassertion of the rights of woman in the light of her unquestioned exertions and unselfish labours for her country in its crisis. After the war, attention began to be concentrated more on the right to vote. By the Fourteenth Amendment the franchise was at once given to negroes; but the insertion of the word male effectually barred any national recognition of woman's right to vote. A vigorous effort was made by the suffrage leaders to have male stricken from the amendment; but the effort was futile. Legislators thought that the black man's vote ought to be secured first; as the New York Tribune (Dec. 12, 1866) puts it snugly: "We want to see the ballot put in the hands of the black without one day's delay added to the long postponement of his just claim. When that is done, we shall be ready to take up the next question" (i.e., woman's rights).

The first Women's Rights Convention after the Civil War had been held in New York City, May 10, 1866, and had presented an address to Congress. Such was the dauntless courage of the leaders, that Mrs. Stanton offered herself as a candidate for Congress at the November elections, in order to test the constitutional rights of a woman to run for office. She received twenty-four votes.

Six years later, on November I, 1872, Miss Susan B. Anthony did a far more Audacious thing. She went to the polls and asked to be registered. The two Republican members of the board were won over by her exposition of the Fourteenth Amendment and agreed to receive her name, against the advice of their Democratic colleague and a United States supervisor. Following Miss Anthony's example, some fifty other women of Rochester registered. Fourteen voted and were at once arrested under the enforcement act of Congress of May 31, 1870 (section 19). The case of Miss Anthony was argued, ably by her attorney; but she was adjudged guilty. A nolle prosequi was entered for the women who voted with her.

Immediately after the decision in her case, the inspectors who had registered the women were put on trial because they "did knowingly and willfully register as a voter of said District one Susan B. Anthony, she, said Susan B. Anthony, then and there not being entitled to be registered as a voter of said District in that she, said Susan B. Anthony, was then and there a person of the female sex, contrary to the form of the statute of the United States of America in such case made and provided, and against the peace of the United States of America and their dignity." The defendants were ordered to pay each a fine of twenty-five dollars and the costs of the prosecution; but the sentence was revoked and an unconditional pardon given them by President Grant, in an order dated March 3, 1874. Miss Anthony was forced to pay her fine, in spite of an appeal to Congress.

Such were the stirring times when the agitation for women's rights was first brought to the fore as a national issue. Within a few years, various States, like New York and Kansas, put the question of equal suffrage for women before its voters; they in general rejected the measure. At present there are four States which give women complete suffrage and right to vote on all questions with the same privileges as men, viz., Wyoming (1869), Colorado (1893), Utah (1896), and Idaho (1896). In 1838 Kentucky gave school suffrage to widows with children of school age; in 1861 Kansas gave it to all women. School suffrage was granted all women in 1875 by Michigan and Minnesota, in 1876 by Colorado, in 1878 by New Hampshire and Oregon, in 1879 by Massachusetts, in 1880 by New York and Vermont, in 1883 by Nebraska, in 1887 by North and South Dakota, Montana, Arizona, and New Jersey. Kansas gave municipal suffrage in 1887; and Montana gave tax-paying women the right to vote upon all questions submitted to the tax-payers. In 1891 Illinois granted school suffrage, as did Connecticut in 1893. Iowa gave bond suffrage in 1894. In 1898 Minnesota gave women the right to vote for library trustees, Delaware gave school suffrage to tax-paying women, and Louisiana gave tax-paying women the right to vote upon all questions submitted to the tax-payers. Wisconsin gave school suffrage in 1900. In 1901 New York gave tax-paying women in all towns and villages of the State the right to vote on questions of local taxation; and the Kansas Legislature voted down almost unanimously a proposal to repeal municipal suffrage. In 1903 Kansas gave bond suffrage; and in 1907 the new State of Oklahoma continued school suffrage. In 1908 Michigan gave all women who pay taxes the right to vote upon questions of local taxation and the granting of franchises.

The history of the "age of legal consent" has an importance which through prudery and a wilful ignorance of facts the public has never fully realised. I shall have considerable to say of it later. It will suffice for the moment to remark that until the decade preceding 1898 the old Common Law period of ten, sometimes twelve, years was the basis of "age of consent" legislation in most States and in the Territories under the jurisdiction of the national government. In 1885 the age in Delaware was seven.

[Sidenote: Age of Legal consent.]

[Sidenote: The beginnings of higher education for women.]

The Puritans, burning with an unquenchable zeal for liberty, fled to America in order to build a land of freedom and strike off the shackles of despotism. After they were comfortably settled, they forthwith proceeded, with fine humour, to expel mistress Anne Hutchinson for venturing to speak in public, to hang superfluous old women for being witches, and to refuse women the right to an education. In 1684, when a question arose about admitting girls to the Hopkins School of New Haven, it was decided that "all girls be excluded as improper and inconsistent with such a grammar school as ye law enjoins and as in the Designs of this settlement." "But," remarks Professor Thomas, "certain small girls whose manners seem to have been neglected and who had the natural curiosity of their sex, sat on the schoolhouse steps and heard the boys recite, or learned to read and construe sentences from their brothers at home, and were occasionally admitted to school."

In the course of the next century the world moved a little; and in 1789, when the public school system was established in Boston, girls were admitted from April to October; but until 1825 they were allowed to attend primary schools only. In 1790 Gloucester voted that "two hours, or a proportional part of that time, be devoted to the instruction of females." In 1793 Plymouth accorded girls one hour of instruction daily.

The first female seminary in the United States was opened by the Moravians in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, in 1749. It was unique. In 1803, of 48 academies or higher schools fitting for college in Massachusetts, only three were for girls, although a few others admitted both boys and girls.

The first instance of government aid for the systematic education of women occurred in New York, in 1819. This was due to the influence of a remarkable woman. Mrs. Emma Willard had begun teaching in Connecticut and by extraordinary diligence mastered not only the usual subjects of the curriculum, but in addition botany, chemistry, mineralogy, astronomy, and the higher mathematics. She had, moreover, striven always to introduce new subjects and new methods into her school, and with such success that Governor Clinton, of New York, invited her to that State and procured her a government subsidy. Her school was established first at Watervliet, but soon moved to Troy. This seminary was the first girls' school in which the higher mathematics formed a part of the course; and the first public examination of a girl in geometry, in 1829, raised a storm of ridicule and indignation—the clergy, as usual, prophesying the speedy dissolution of all family bonds and therefore, as they continued with remorseless logic, of the state itself. But Mrs. Willard continued her ways in spite of clerical disapproval and by-and-by projected a system of normal schools for the higher education of teachers, and even suggested women as superintendents of public schools. New York survived and does not even remember the names of the patriots who fought a lonely woman so valiantly.

The first female seminary to approach college rank was Mt. Holyoke, which was opened by Mary Lyon at South Hadley, Mass., in 1836. Vassar, the next, dates from 1865; and Radcliffe, the much-abused "Harvard Annex," was instituted in 1879. These were the first colleges exclusively for women. Oberlin College had from its foundation, in 1833, admitted men and women on equal terms; although it took pains to express its hearty disapproval of those women who, after graduation, had the temerity to advocate political rights for women—rights which that same Oberlin insisted should be given the negro at once. In 1858, when Sarah Burger and other women applied for admission to the University of Michigan, their request was refused.

[Sidenote: First women in medicine.]

It was hard enough for women to assert their rights to a higher education; to enter a profession was almost impossible. Nevertheless, it was done. The pioneer in medicine was Harriet K. Hunt who practised in Boston from 1822 to 1872 without a diploma; but in 1853 the Woman's Medical College of Pennsylvania conferred upon her the degree of Doctor of Medicine. The first woman to receive a diploma from a college after completing the regular course was Elizabeth Blackwell, who attained that distinction at Geneva, New York, in 1848. The first adequate woman's medical institution was Miss Blackwell's New York Infirmary, chartered in 1854. In 1863, Dr. Zakrzewska, in co-operation with Lucy Goddard and Ednah D. Cheney, established the New England Hospital for Women and Children, which aimed to provide women the medical aid of competent physicians of their own sex, to assist educated women in the practical study of medicine, and to train nurses for the care of the sick.[411]

[Sidenote: In law.]

In law, it would seem that Mistress Brut practised in Baltimore as early as 1647; but after her the first woman lawyer in the United States was Arabella A. Mansfield, of Mt. Pleasant, Iowa. She was admitted to the bar in 1864. By 1879 women were allowed to plead before the Supreme Court of the United States.[412]

[Sidenote: In the ministry.]

Coming now to the consideration of the ministry, the first woman to attempt to assert a right to that profession was Anne Hutchinson, of Boston, in 1634. She was promptly banished. Among the Friends and the Shakers women like Lucretia Mott and Anne Lee preached; and among the primitive Methodists and similar bodies women were always permitted to exhort; but the first regularly ordained woman in the United States appears to have been Rev. Antoinette Brown Blackwell, of the Congregational Church who was ordained in 1852. In 1864 Rev. Olympia Brown settled as pastor of the parish at Weymouth Landing, in Massachusetts; and the Legislature acknowledged marriages solemnised by women as legal. Phebe Hanaford, Mary H. Graves, and Lorenza Haynes were the first Massachusetts women to be ordained preachers of the Gospel; the latter was at one time chaplain of the Maine House of Representatives. The best known woman in the ministry at the present day is Rev. Anna Howard Shaw, a Methodist minister, president of the National American Woman's Suffrage Association.[413]

[Sidenote: As newspaper editors.]

Women have from very early times been exceedingly active in newspaper work. Anna Franklin printed the first newspaper in Rhode Island, in 1732; she was made official printer to the colony. When the founder of the Mercury, of Philadelphia, died in 1742, his widow, Mrs. Cornelia Bradford, carried it on for many years with great success, just as Mrs. Zenger continued the New York Weekly Journal—the second newspaper started in New York—for years after the death of her husband. Anna K. Greene established the Maryland Gazette, the first paper in that colony, in 1767. Penelope Russell printed The Censor in Boston, in 1771. In fact, there was hardly a colony in which women were not actively engaged in printing. After the Revolution they were still more active. Mrs. Anne Royal edited The Huntress for a quarter of a century. Margaret Fuller ran The Dial, in Boston, in 1840 and numbered Emerson and William Channing among her contributors. From 1840 to 1849 the mill girls of Lowell edited the Lowell Offering. These are but a few examples of what women have done in newspaper work. How very influential they are to-day every one knows who is familiar with the articles and editorial work appearing in newspapers and magazines; and that women are very zealous reporters many people can attest with considerable vigour.[414]

[Sidenote: Women in industry.]

The enormous part which women now play in industry and in all economic production is a concomitant of the factory system, specialised industry, and all that makes a highly elaborated and complex society. Before the introduction of machine industry, and in the simple society of the colonial days, women were no less a highly important factor in economic production; but not as wage earners. Their importance lay in the fact that spinning, weaving, brewing, cheese and butter making, and the like were matters attended to by each household to supply its own wants; and this was considered the peculiar sphere of the housewife. In 1840 Harriet Martineau found only seven employments open to women in the United States, viz., teaching, needlework, keeping boarders, working in cotton mills and in book binderies, type-setting, and household service.