We are told by the gentleman from Maryland, that all the South wants is to have the force of the decision of the Supreme Court acknowledged as to that part of the territory south of the line, in consideration of which the South will yield what she gains by that decision in the territory north; and also that we must do this, or the slave States will be driven to join those States that have seceded. Now, it is due to frankness to say, that the North does not acquiesce in that statement; that the point as made by the gentleman from Maryland, has been decided by the Supreme Court. We know that the Chief Justice of that court has expressed his own opinion that way; but we don't know that it has been decided by that court. But if it has been so decided, the very ground of the decision is a misapprehension. If I rightly understand the language of Chief Justice TANEY, he insists that the Constitution expressly affirms the right of property in slaves. I think it does not. The North thinks it does not.

Mr. SMITH then proceeded to discuss the facts in the Dred Scott case, and the various opinions declared by the judges, showing that the decision did not extend so far as claimed by Mr. JOHNSON, and that the question of the right to hold slaves in the Territories was not presented by the record in that case.

Mr. WICKLIFFE:—There were two questions involved in the Dred Scott case. One was, the authority of Scott to sue; the other was, upon the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. Both these were decided in that case, and both were decided by the Supreme Court years ago.

Mr. SMITH:—I am aware of the views taken by the gentleman from Kentucky. I am stating as a matter of fact how this decision is regarded by a large portion of the people of the North. I am aware that the Southern construction of the decision is different, and some at the North concur in it. I am trying to see how the majority propositions will suit the people who agree with the Northern view.

I understand it is claimed that the court decided that slaves were property, and that the Constitution did not permit any restraint to be laid upon the owners of that property in the Territories. Yes, the court did decide that the owner had the right to take his slaves into the Territory and hold them there; and to that extent they were property. It is a prevalent idea at the North that the Southern construction of this decision is not fair, and that it would be dangerous to adopt it.

We do not subscribe to the doctrine that the Constitution expressly affirms the right of property in slaves. We may be wrong; it may be a mere misapprehension. But with their present opinions, the people of the North will hesitate long before they make this express affirmation a part of the organic law.

Again; if the Constitution affirms this right, and was understood to do so by its framers, what was the need of the rendition clause? The Constitution is the supreme law in the free States as well as in the slave States. Under this construction the rights of the owner could have been enforced like any other right of property in the courts of law, without any provision for the rendition of slaves.

These are some of the opinions that are entertained at the North. They may be right or they may be wrong, but they have been deliberately adopted, and they prevail extensively. They cannot be changed by our action here. In all we do they must be respected. They are constitutionally entertained.

This proposition to carry slavery into the Territories, opens the discussion of the merits of that institution. Gentlemen say they wish to stop the discussion; that there has been too much of it already; that such a discussion would be especially unfortunate now. I do not propose to enter upon it here. But I desire to know in what manner you could more effectually invite discussion than by placing your proposed amendments before the people?

You must not forget that the people of the North believe slavery is both a moral and a political evil. They recognize the right of the States to have it, to regulate it as they please, without interference, direct or indirect; but when it is proposed to extend it into territory where it did not before exist, it becomes a political question, in which they are interested, in which they have a right to interfere, and in which they will interfere. Such an attempt they consider it their duty to resist by all constitutional means.

The establishing of slavery in the Territories is the practical exclusion of free labor in them. True, there is no direct provision for the exclusion of free labor in your propositions, but such will certainly be their effect. I appeal to gentlemen from the South to say from their own experience whether free labor can be employed side by side with slave labor. This presents another consideration. You of the South ask us to guarantee a right which you say is very important and very dear to you. You ask that your children may enter into and possess these new Territories. We know it. But the North asks the same privilege. We want our children to go there, and live on the labor of their own free hands. They are excluded if slavery goes there before us.

Mr. PRESIDENT, the people of the North do understand, that we are in a contest—a great and important contest. Yet it is one that can be carried on without trampling upon each other's rights—without attempting to secure any unfair advantage. That is the way the North proposes to carry on this contest in relation to the extension of slavery. This contest is between the owners of slaves on the one side, and all the free men of this great nation on the other.

There is another fact that should be kept in view. The Territories are the property not of the individual States, but of the General Government. They are held by the Government in trust, I grant. But in trust for whom? For the whole people of the Union; not in trust for thirty-four distinct States. The idea that these Territories are subject to partition—that South Carolina has the right to demand her thirty-fourth part of them in severalty, is one that by the North cannot be entertained. It is this idea which has produced that other more mischievous one—that an equilibrium must be maintained between the free and the slave States; in other words, between freedom and slavery. Where did this idea creep into the Constitution? It never has found, and it never will find, favor with the people of the North.

We may talk around this question—we may discuss its incidents, its history, and its effects, as much and as long as we please. And after all is said—disguise it as we may—it is a contest between the great opposing elements of civilization—whether the country shall be possessed and developed and ruled by the labor of slaves or of freemen.

Leave it where it is, and all is well. We can live in peace while it is a State institution; extend it, and who can answer for the consequences? Leave it where it is! I humbly suggest that in that direction lays the only path of peace. So long as the Territories are common property, so long will the people insist upon protecting their interests in them. In a Government like ours, conflicts will ensue. The Constitution provides the proper and peaceful way of settling them; and it is not by a partition of every subject in which a mutual interest exists.

Mr. SEDDON:—Does the gentleman consider this a nation, or a federal union of States?

Mr. SMITH:—If I did not consider this a nation I should certainly not be here.

Mr. SEDDON:—Is not the whole machinery of the Government federative? Is not its whole action that of a confederation? Is not the recent election of Mr. LINCOLN a proof of the fact? He was elected by less than a majority of the people.

Mr. SMITH:—In all the action of the Government with other governments, we are a nation as much as France or England. In every thing pertaining to the acquisition of territory we are a nation. The rights of the States are preserved in the Constitution, I admit, but their power is to be exercised subject to the powers reserved by the Constitution to the General Government. In all that respects these powers the Government is supreme.

I have only sought to state some of the opinions which are conscientiously entertained at the North upon subjects connected with these propositions. They are entertained there, and they must be respected by the Conference.

This doctrine of the preservation of the balance of power is a new doctrine. It was unknown to the framers of our Constitution. In my opinion it is a most mischievous doctrine to the country, and can only produce the most pernicious results. It is closely akin to the doctrine once broached in the Senate of a duality of the Executive, which, extended, would require a President for every sectional interest. Such ideas were never popular at the North. I do not think they would operate very well in practice at the South.

Mr. CLEVELAND:—Will the gentleman give way for a motion to adjourn?

Mr. SMITH:—Certainly.

On motion of Mr. CLEVELAND the Conference adjourned to ten o'clock to-morrow.



FOURTEENTH DAY.

WASHINGTON, THURSDAY, February 21st, 1861.

The Conference was called to order by the President, at ten o'clock and fifteen minutes A.M., and prayer was offered by Rev. Dr. STOCKTON.

The Journal of yesterday was read and approved.

Mr. WICKLIFFE:—As I stated yesterday, I now wish to call up my resolutions relating to the termination of the debate, and to have a vote taken upon them.

Mr. CHASE:—Will Governor WICKLIFFE permit me to make a formal motion, which cannot give rise to discussion? It is this: The resolutions passed by the Legislature of Ohio, under which myself and my colleagues hold our seats, make it my duty to lay before the Conference the resolves I now offer. I ask to have them read, laid upon the table, and printed.

The resolutions were read, and the motion of Mr. CHASE concurred in.

The resolutions are as follow:—

Resolved, That it is inexpedient to proceed to final action on the grave and important matters involved in the resolutions of the State of Virginia, in compliance with which this Convention has assembled, and in the several reports of the majority and minority of the committee to which said resolutions were referred, until opportunity has been given to all of the States to participate in deliberation and action under them, and ample time has been allowed for such deliberation and action.

Resolved, therefore, That this Convention adjourn to meet in the city of Washington, on the 4th day of April next; and that the President be requested to address a letter to the Governors of the several States not now represented in this body, urging the appointment and attendance of Commissioners.

Mr. EWING:—I wish to state here that I do not concur in these resolutions.

Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I now offer two resolutions, one providing that debate shall cease upon the report of the committee, at 10 o'clock to-morrow. The other, that five minutes shall be allowed to the mover of an amendment to explain it, with five minutes to the committee to reply. Upon reflection, I will offer a third: That a motion to strike out and insert shall not be divided. If desired, a vote may be taken on the resolutions separately, as I wish to have each stand upon its own merits. I will not discuss these resolutions, for I think all must be impressed with the necessity for passing them now.

The resolutions were as follow:—

Resolved, 1st, That at 10 o'clock, the 22d February, 1861, all debate upon the report of the Committee of one from each State shall cease, and the Convention will proceed to vote, and continue to vote until the whole subject shall have been disposed of.

2d. If an amendment be offered by the Commissioners of any State, or the minority of such Commissioners, five minutes is allowed for explanation, and the like time is allowed to the committee to resist the amendment, if they desire to do so; and the mover of the amendment, or any member of the same State, may have five minutes for reply.

3d. A motion to strike out and insert shall not be divided.

Mr. CHITTENDEN:—I shall not debate these resolutions. As I am engaged in taking notes of the discussion, I cannot enter into a contest for the floor, and I would not if I could. My State has not occupied a moment of time on the general subject, nor are her delegates very anxious to address the Convention at all.

Whether the Conference will give one of us a few minutes or not, is simply a question of policy, of which I am not a disinterested judge. It is possible that some suggestions might be made which would be worthy of attention.

Mr. GOODRICH:—I move to amend by inserting Saturday, instead of to-morrow, in the first resolution.

Mr. RANDOLPH:—There is force in the remark of the gentleman from Vermont. No State should be cut off. I suggest that the States whose delegates have not addressed the Conference, should have the preference.

Mr. JOHNSON, of Missouri:—I represent a youthful State. She is not the daughter of any particular State or section, but of the Union. We Missourians love the Union, but we have fully arrived at the conclusion that the time has come when something must be done to prevent our entire separation. We have hitherto remained silent. We came here to preserve the Union. Not that we love the Union less, but we love our rights more. We love our rights more than the Union, our property, or our lives. We desire to come to a speedy adjustment. Ten days of Congress only remain. It will be difficult even to introduce our propositions, still more to get them considered. I sustain the motion of the gentleman from Kentucky; and Missouri will vote for it.

Mr. WICKLIFFE:—I will make the proposition as acceptable as possible. I will insert one o'clock instead of ten.

Exclamations were heard from several members of, "Let us agree," and the question being taken on the first resolution as amended, it was adopted.

Mr. BACKUS:—I move to insert in the second resolution, ten minutes instead of five, wherever the word occurs. That time is none too long to state the purpose of an amendment properly.

Mr. NOYES:—Is this resolution designed to exclude all discussion upon an amendment, except by the member moving it and the committee?

Mr. WICKLIFFE:—No! Such is not the intention. Any one can speak five minutes. I rely on our sense of propriety not to abuse this construction of the resolution.

The amendment of Mr. BACKUS was decided in the negative by a vote viva voce.

The resolution was then adopted, together with the resolution relating to motions to strike out and insert.

Mr. BROWNE:—I move that when the Convention adjourn, it adjourn to meet at half-past seven o'clock this evening.

Mr. CHASE:—I hope the Conference will not hold night sessions. Our day sessions are protracted and very laborious. I agree with Commodore STOCKTON, that night sessions are dangerous.

Mr. MOREHEAD, of Kentucky:—I do not agree with Mr. CHASE. I have particularly observed the demeanor of all the gentlemen in the Conference, and know that they are as well fitted for business at five o'clock in the afternoon as at ten o'clock in the morning.

A vote by the States was called for, which resulted as follows:

AYES:—Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Virginia—13.

NOES:—Connecticut, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Vermont—7.

Mr. WILMOT:—In pursuance of the instructions of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, I offer the following. I wish to have it laid on the table, and printed, that I may move it as an amendment to the committee's report at the proper time.

The motion of Mr. WILMOT was agreed to, and the amendment is as follows:

"And Congress shall further provide by law, that the United States shall make full compensation to a citizen of any State, who in any other State shall suffer, by reason of violence or intimidation from mobs and riotous assemblies, in his person or property, or in deprivation, by violence, of his rights secured by this Constitution."

Mr. DENT:—I ask that the following may be adopted as an additional rule:

"When the vote on any question is taken by States, any Commissioner dissenting from the vote of his State, may have his dissent entered on the Journal."

Mr. CHASE:—I suggest whether it would not be better to call the yeas and nays, on the motion of any Commissioner. I have heretofore introduced a resolution to that effect, which, with the gentleman's permission, I will now call up.

Mr. DENT:—I won't insist.

Mr. CHASE'S resolution was taken up as follows:

"The yeas and nays of the Commissioner of each State, upon any question, shall be entered upon the Journal when it is desired by any Commissioner, and the vote of each State shall be determined by the majority of Commissioners present from each State."

Mr. GUTHRIE:—I hope the gentleman will waive the first part of the resolution. I think it is the best way not to disclose our divisions any farther than is indispensably necessary.

Mr. CHASE:—I copied the rule verbatim from the one adopted by the Congress of the Confederation. I think it right and fair. But I have no objection to modifying it, so as to have the yeas and nays called on the motion of any entire delegation.

Mr. DENT:—I did not withdraw my motion. I think it will accomplish all we need. It will be taken, of course, that those who do not dissent vote with the delegation.

Mr. REID:—I think it is entirely too late to talk about saving time. How long will it take to have the names of dissenting delegates called? For one, I desire to exercise my rights under the authority of the State I represent. I will not consent to waive them. When the vote of my State is cast, I wish to have the record show who is responsible for it.

The question was taken on the resolution offered by Mr. CHASE, and it was rejected, and the additional rule proposed by Mr. DENT was adopted.

Mr. COALTER:—I offer the following, which I shall move as an amendment to the report. I ask that it be laid on the table, and printed:

"The term of office of all Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the United States, hereafter elected, shall be six years; and any person once elected to either of said offices, shall ever after be ineligible to the same office."

The above motion to lay on the table and print was agreed to.

Mr. BRONSON:—I also have an amendment, of which I ask to have the same disposition made. It is as follows:

"Congress shall have no power to legislate in respect to persons held to service or labor in any case, except to provide for the rendition of fugitives from such service or labor, and to suppress the foreign slave trade; and the existing status or condition of all the Territories of the United States, in respect to persons held to service or labor, shall remain unchanged during their territorial condition; and whenever any Territory, with suitable boundaries, shall contain the population requisite for a representative in Congress, according to the then federal ratio of representation, it shall be entitled to admission into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with or without persons held to service or labor, as the Constitution of such new State may prescribe."

Mr. BRONSON'S motion was agreed to.

Mr GUTHRIE:—I call for the order of the day.

The PRESIDENT:—The order of the day is called for, and the gentleman from New York has the floor.

Mr. SMITH:—At the adjournment yesterday, I had proceeded to state two or three grounds upon which I think the proposals of amendment to the Constitution reported by the majority of the committee would be unacceptable to the North, and I had also stated some special objections to action in this way and at the present time.

The next consideration to which I would invite attention is this: Is it necessary or wise for the Conference, composed as it is of friends of the Union, or is it expedient thus to encounter the settled sentiments and convictions of the people of so large a section of the country? It is not necessary, for various reasons. This territorial question is, after all, a question to be looked at in a prospective view. Why is it necessary to disturb the Constitution by inserting such a provision as you propose? Why is it necessary for gentlemen from the South to have it in, in order to enable them to stand with their people at home?

Slavery is now in New Mexico. That must be acknowledged as a fact. The South think it rightfully there—the North believe it is there wrongfully. But its existence in the territories is a fact nevertheless. President LINCOLN cannot help it if he would. The Supreme Court will affirm its rightful existence there, whenever the question comes before that body. That Court cannot be changed before these territories are admitted as States, if the disposition exists to change it. You claim that the question is already decided. How, then, can it be important to you to press the adoption of these sections as a part of the Constitution? My judgment is, that it is best to leave this subject alone—that that is the true way to save the Union.

Gentlemen of the South, remember that if you must stand at home with your people, so also must we. There is a North as well as a South!—a northern people as well as southern people. You press us hard on these subjects. But can men who are rational ask us to abandon our own people, to go counter to their convictions and sentiments? We cannot do it! You would not respect us if we did! I am very sure that if this Conference is to attain any beneficial result, it must abandon all idea of coercion or intimidation as applied to the friends of the Union.

It is said we are contending for a party platform—that we are letting party stand between us and the Union. I could trample parties and platforms under foot to preserve the Union, but I cannot understand how honest men can abandon principles because a party has adopted them into its platform. Do not tell us that by adhering to the Union and the Constitution, we are simply adhering to a party platform. Our principles are at least as dear to us, as yours are to you; you must not expect us to sacrifice them either to promote our own material interests or to promote yours.

Let us then sink the question of slavery in the Territories. Let the courts take care of it if need be, or let it be dealt with when it properly comes up. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." In that direction lays the path of peace.

But perhaps it may be suggested that such a course would really leave no plan to be adopted. Perhaps so. Is it, then, not true that we are having all this trouble over a contingency that may or may not arise? That the Constitution is sufficient for all purposes but this, you aver; and yet you say in the same breath that the Court has settled this question entirely and finally in your favor. Why not be satisfied, then, with the settlement? Can you make it more of a finality in the way you propose? No, gentlemen; believe me when I tell you that the true remedy does not consist in endeavoring to humiliate the people of one section for the benefit of another. Remember we are dealing with the American people; I would not throw the Constitution into the vortex of disunion that is opening before us; I would preserve it rather as a rock on which we can all safely stand. Do not throw away the compass by which alone we can safely be guided!

If I were to suggest a suitable remedy, what I think a wise plan, it would be the one adopted on a similar occasion, when one of the States set itself up in opposition to the General Government, with such very beneficial results; and that would be, to have the Government appeal to the people for support—to throw itself into the arms of the people. The result then has become historical. It is remembered with pride and pleasure by all. I would have a similar course pursued now. The result would be equally grand, equally gratifying. It would rally every patriot, every friend of the Union from every section, to its support. You, gentlemen of the South, now friends of the Union, still give it the strength of your support, the favor of your countenance, and you shall be supported and sustained as you can be in no other way. You shall have the support of the power of the Government and of every friend of the Union in the country.

You remember how those patriotic statesmen, CLAY and WEBSTER—differing from the Executive, opposing his election with all the strength of their gigantic intellects—when the authority of the Government was questioned, and South Carolina, under the lead of Mr. CALHOUN, undertook to set herself up in opposition to it—how they waived all former differences, and instead of encouraging secession by their delay and timidity, without asking for new guarantees or for amendments of the Constitution, came voluntarily and earnestly to the support of the Executive and the administration, because the Executive was right, and was the chosen instrument of the people to preserve the integrity of the Union.

Mr. BARRINGER:—If the gentleman will excuse me, I will state that the course of the Executive against South Carolina was universally acquiesced in except in that State. And yet the opinion that President JACKSON far exceeded his powers, was equally unanimous. That precedent has been greatly misinterpreted.

Mr. SMITH:—I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. He entertains his opinions, I do mine, as to what then saved the Union. I should not probably be able to make him think with me; but I feel sure that the idea prevails quite extensively, that South Carolina returned to the path of duty then, because the power of the Government was wielded by an honest and energetic Executive. She came to the conclusion that any other course would probably be attended with danger.

Our present differences had no very remote origin. They belong to our own generation, and we ought to be compelled to deal with them. I think the so-called compromise of 1850 was the cause of all our troubles—that instead of saving the country it brought it into greater danger than it ever was before.

Mr. BARRINGER:—I wish to make a suggestion on that point.

Mr. SMITH:—I hope the gentleman will not forget that he will have a full opportunity to answer me. I am nearly through, and generally no good comes of interruptions. They only consume time.

I was about to say, that I do not propose to go into the question of who was to blame for that repeal. I agree with gentlemen from the South, that there is no profit now in discussing the origin of our troubles—in inquiring who set the house on fire before we put on the water.

Mr. CLAY:—Does the gentleman do justice to Mr. CLAY, when at one moment he says that Mr. CLAY held up the arms of the administration, strengthened the Executive, and aided the Government in putting down secession, and in the next, states that the compromise of 1850 was the cause of all our troubles, when it is well known that Mr. CLAY strongly favored that compromise?

Mr. SMITH:—When I speak of the unhappy effect of the compromise measures of 1850, I ascribe no wrong motives to Mr. CLAY or any one else. If he approved that compromise, I have no doubt he did it in the full belief that it would be beneficial to the country. Experience has shown that he was mistaken. Saying this is doing no injustice to Mr. CLAY. I spoke only of effects. I spoke of the zeal and the energy with which the patriots and eminent statesmen of all parties of this country have been accustomed to come forward and sustain the administration when any necessity existed for doing so. Now let this Conference—let all true friends of the Union everywhere, with one voice, without attempting to place any section or any man in a false or disagreeable position, unite in one determined effort in behalf of the Union, and in an attempt to bring the rash and dangerous men who would seek the destruction of the Government back to a sense of duty. Let us address the country, let us show that we are devoted to the Union, far beyond any considerations of party or self; let us invoke the aid of all true and patriotic men; let us ask them to lay aside for the time all other considerations, and give themselves for the present to the country! The spirit of the old time is yet alive. We can call it out in more than its old strength and vigor, and it will save the country. Our private interests may suffer, but the great interests of the Union will be strengthened and preserved, and the Constitution, which has been our pride and strength, will not be dragged down into the great whirlpool of disunion. I appeal to the venerable and able men around me, who bear historic names—who have been themselves long connected with the Union and its Government, to join us in our struggle to save the Constitution.

The views I have expressed may be chimerical. I have advanced them with no little diffidence, but I felt called upon to state them in the discharge of a duty I owe to a people who love and will make great sacrifices to save the Constitution and the Union.

A majority vote, one way or the other here, would be of little consequence. It would carry no weight with it. But if the members of this Conference would all unite in such an appeal to the country, the response would be instantaneous and effective. The heart of the country is loyal; the heart of the South is loyal, I believe. We have abundant evidence that it is not too late to rely upon the Union men in Missouri and Tennessee!

Mr. CARRUTHERS:—The vote of Tennessee is entirely misunderstood.

Mr. SMITH:—Perhaps so. I have no acquaintance with the people of Tennessee. But I will not occupy the time of the Conference farther. I have spoken plainly, but I have spoken what I believe to be the honest convictions of a large majority of the people of this Union. Once more I say, let us not destroy the Constitution!

Mr. CLEVELAND:—I have not got up to make a speech. We have had too much speech-making here. It may be very well for gentlemen to get up and make long arguments and eloquent appeals, and show their abilities and powers, but it all does no sort of good—nobody is benefited, and no opinions are changed. I shall take no such course. I want to see whether this little handful of men who meet every day in this hall, cannot get together and fix up this matter which has been so much talked about. Let us pay no attention to the great men or the politicians. They have interests of their own. Some of them have interests which are superior to those of their country.

In the common affairs of life there are always a great many differences of opinion. Some treat these differences one way—some another. Foolish men go to law, and always come out worse off than when they started. Sensible men get together, and talk matters over; one gives up a little, the other gives up a little, and finally they get together. Now, friends, that is just what I want to see done here.

We are all friends—friends of the Union and of each other. Nobody wants to give up the Union, or hurt Mr. LINCOLN. The South has got frightened—not exactly frightened, but she thinks the Republicans, since they have got the power, are going to trample upon her rights. She wants the North to agree not to do so. Now I should like to know what objection there was to that? Who is afraid to do that? If we could go to work at this thing like sensible men, we could settle the whole matter in two hours.

Now about these propositions. I do not see any thing alarming in them. I have not set to work to pick flaws in them. Leave that to the lawyers. I don't care much about them, nor does the North care about them. If the South will take them and be satisfied—if they will stop this clamor about slavery and slavery extension, I think she had better have them. For one, I am sick of the whole subject.

Let us then go about the work like sensible men; let us stop making long speeches and picking flaws in each other. It is a matter of business, and pretty important business. Let us consider it as such, and from this moment let us throw aside all feeling, and set about coming to some understanding. We can do it to-day as well as next week. I do not know that these propositions are the best that can be made; but if they are not, let us talk the matter over like good Union men, and see what is best. When we can find that out, let us agree. If we stay here and make speeches until doomsday, we shall be no better off. I am for action, and coming to an immediate decision.

Mr. COALTER:—If the vote of Missouri is to be taken as an evidence of her devotion to the Union, it must also be understood with this qualification: Her interests and her sympathies unite her closely with the South. She feels, in common with others, her share of anxiety for the future. She is devoted to the Union, and at the same time she insists that it is fair and right that these guarantees should be given.

It has been distinctly avowed on this floor that the people of certain sections of the North abhor slavery. Ought we not to be distrustful when a party entertaining such sentiments comes into supreme power? If Massachusetts abhors slavery, how long will it be before she will abhor slaveholders?

Ignorance is the source of all our difficulties. The people of the North know little of the condition of the negro in a state of slavery. We know that the four millions of blacks in the South are better off in all respects than any similar number of laborers anywhere.

But I rise only to correct a false impression in regard to Missouri. I have only besides to express my full conviction that if the North will not give us these guarantees, we are henceforth a divided people.

Mr. GOODRICH:—Mr. President, the object of this Convention, assembled on the call or invitation of Virginia, is, as set forth in the preamble and resolutions of her General Assembly,

"To restore the Union and Constitution in the spirit in which they were established by the fathers of the Republic;" or, as otherwise expressed, "to adjust the present unhappy controversies in the spirit in which the Constitution was originally made, and consistently with its principles."

This agrees, in substance, with the purpose of the Republican party, which, in the words of the Philadelphia platform, is declared to be that of "restoring the action of the Federal Government to the principles of WASHINGTON and JEFFERSON."

Virginia announces to the other States that she "is desirous of employing every reasonable means," and is "willing to unite" with them "in an earnest effort" for the accomplishment of this common end and object of that State and the Republican party; and she is moved to make this her "final effort," by "the deliberate opinion of her General Assembly, that unless the unhappy controversy which now divides the States of this Confederacy shall be satisfactorily adjusted, a permanent dissolution of the Union is inevitable," and by a desire to "avert so dire a calamity."

Massachusetts, equally willing to unite with the other States in an earnest effort to further the same end, accepted the invitation of Virginia, and sent Commissioners here to represent her.

The honorable Chairman (Mr. GUTHRIE) of the committee to report a plan of adjustment, in his opening speech, advocated with earnestness and eloquence a restoration of the Constitution to the principles of the fathers. The distinguished gentleman (Mr. RIVES) from Virginia demands a "restoration of the Constitution to the landmarks of our fathers," and his colleague (Mr. SEDDON) urges a return to the "policy of our fathers in 1787."

This assumes that we have departed from the principles and landmarks of our fathers, and from the policy of 1787. The call of the Convention assumes this; the platform of the Republican party assumes it, and the gentlemen whose remarks I have quoted assume it, and it is true.

The particular object of a return to the principles and landmarks of the policy of 1787, as stated in the preamble and resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia, is, "to afford to the people of the slaveholding States adequate guarantees for the security of their rights." This implies that such a return will afford these adequate guarantees. I agree that it will; and I am ready, and Massachusetts is ready, to adjust this unhappy controversy, and to give the guarantees demanded in exactly this way.

Stated in these general terms, there is a perfect agreement between us. But we find a wide difference when we go one step farther, and learn precisely what Virginia claims would be a restoration of the Constitution to the principles of the fathers, and a return to the policy of 1787. This she has told us in one of the resolutions sent out with the call for this Convention. That resolution is as follows:

"Resolved, That in the opinion of the General Assembly of Virginia, the propositions embraced in the resolutions presented to the Senate of the United States by Hon. JOHN J. CRITTENDEN, so modified as that the first article proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States shall apply to all the territory of the United States, now held or hereafter acquired south of latitude 36 deg. 30', and provide that slavery of the African race shall be effectually protected as property therein during the continuance of the territorial government, and the fourth article shall secure to the owners of slaves the right of transit with their slaves between and through the non-slaveholding States and territories, constitute the basis of such an adjustment of the unhappy controversy which now divides the States of this Confederacy, as would be accepted by the people of this Commonwealth."

It was in reference to these propositions that the gentleman (Mr. SEDDON) from Virginia, has asked us the question, "Are we not entitled to these added guarantees according to the spirit of the compact of our fathers?"

The true answer to this question is the pivot on which this whole controversy must turn. If the slave States are not entitled to these added guarantees, "according to the spirit of the compact of our fathers," then Virginia, as I understand her Commissioners, and the resolutions of her General Assembly, does not claim them. She stands upon her rights according to that compact. And all such rights Massachusetts is ready to accord to her, fairly and fully.

By the spirit of the compact of our fathers is meant, the Constitution as they understood it, and as the people of that day understood it. And this is what is meant by the "landmarks of the fathers." All admit that the Federal Government should be administered now, as it was administered by its framers. This is what gentlemen from the slave States, in giving utterance to their intense devotion to the Union, say.

Then, what is the Constitution, as understood by those who framed it? What does it mean when interpreted by the light of the policy of 1787? and what is the spirit of the compact which they made? This is the question we are called to consider. In my remarks I do not mean to wander from it.

So far as the Constitution touches the question out of which the present unhappy controversy has arisen, I say it means this: That slavery, as it existed or might exist within the limits of the original States, should not be interfered with to the injury of the lawful rights of slaveholders under State authority; on the contrary, that it should have the right of recaption, and a qualified protection; but that outside of those limits, otherwise than in this right of recaption, it should never exist, neither in the territories nor in the new States.

And let me say here, that when I speak of the original States, I mean the territory of those States as then bounded. Alabama and Mississippi belonged to Georgia, Tennessee belonged to North Carolina, Kentucky belonged to Virginia, Vermont belonged to New York, and Maine belonged to Massachusetts, and were parts of the thirteen original States, at the time the Constitution was adopted. When, therefore, I speak of territory outside the original States, I do not refer to territory within any of the States named.

Mr. BOUTWELL:—I trust my colleague does not claim to speak for Massachusetts, when he denies the right of any State of this Union to establish and maintain slavery within its jurisdiction, or to prohibit it altogether, according to its discretion. This right was reserved to the States; and States in this Union, whether original or new, stand on a footing of perfect equality.

Mr. GOODRICH:—I certainly do not claim to speak for Massachusetts, though I believe the opinion of the great majority of her people agrees with my own on this subject. However, what I claim is, that Ohio and the other States of the northwestern territory have no constitutional power to legalize slavery within their limits; that they were admitted into the Union without any such power, and that every other new State formed from territory outside the limits of the original States, according to the "spirit of the compact of our fathers," should have been admitted without that power, or the right to acquire it. This I will now proceed to show.

On the first day of March, 1784, the northwest territory, constituting the present States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, was ceded by Virginia to the United States. The jurisdiction of the United States was then exclusive and paramount, or soon became so—such other States as had claimed any right of jurisdiction having ceded it. The cession of Virginia was made by THOMAS JEFFERSON, SAMUEL HARDY, ARTHUR LEE, and JAMES MONROE, who were delegates in Congress from that State, and had been appointed Commissioners for this purpose. On the same day the cession was made, Mr. JEFFERSON, in behalf of a committee, reported a plan for temporary governments in the United States territory then and afterwards to be ceded, and for forming therein permanent governments.

That plan provided, "that so much of the territory ceded, or to be ceded, by individual States to the United States, shall be divided into distinct States." It is obvious that this plan contemplated the possession of territory in no other way than by cession from the States. It was expected that Georgia and North Carolina would cede their western lands, now the States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, as they did some years later; and Mr. JEFFERSON'S plan was intended to embrace those lands or territories to be ceded. Consequently, the following provisions, which were part of the plan reported, were intended by him to apply to Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, viz.:

"After the year 1800 of the Christian era, there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said States, otherwise that in the punishment of crimes."

Here the States were evidently those to be formed in United States territory. And farther on in the plan it is stated,

"That the preceding articles shall be formed into a charter of compact, and shall stand as fundamental Constitutions between the thirteen original States, and each of the several States now newly described, unalterable ... but by the joint consent of the United States in Congress assembled, and of the particular State within which such alteration is proposed to be made."

This was a proposition to exclude slavery forever after 1800, not only from the territories which had been, and might afterwards be, ceded, but from the States to be formed in them, and to make it a fundamental Constitution between the original States and each new State. It excited a short discussion, and was postponed from time to time to the 19th of April, when Mr. SPEIGHT, of North Carolina, moved to strike it out. The motion was seconded by Mr. REED, of South Carolina. The vote by States, on the motion to strike out, was:

YEAS.—Maryland, Virginia, and South Carolina—3.

NAYS.—New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, and Pennsylvania—6.

This was under the Confederation articles, which provided that the vote on all questions should be taken by States, each State casting one vote; that no proposition could be adopted without the vote of seven States in favor of it, and that the vote of no State could be counted unless two members, at least, were present. As there were but six States in favor of the proposition to prohibit slavery after 1800, it was stricken out.

There was but one member present from New Jersey, and the vote of that State was not counted. The member present voted for Mr. JEFFERSON'S proposition. Another vote from that State would have made the required number, and carried the measure.

In North Carolina, WILLIAMSON voted for prohibition, and SPEIGHT against it. One more vote from that State would have made seven States for the proposition, and it would have been carried.

JEFFERSON voted for his own proposition to prohibit; and if one of the other two members present from Virginia had voted with him, that, too, would have made the required number of seven States.

The vote North and South, by members, was in favor of prohibition: North, 14; South, 2—total, 16. Against prohibition, South, 7.

The majority was more than two-thirds; enough to carry it over an executive veto under the present Constitution, and yet it was defeated. And this vote was given in favor of absolute and unconditional prohibition, and that alone, without the right of reclaiming fugitive slaves, or any proposition, or any expectation to confer it. Under the Confederation, no such right existed, nor was it agreed to till more than three years afterwards, and then with the greatest reluctance, and as a matter of compromise, as I will presently show.

Such was the action of the American Congress in 1784—a unanimous vote from the North, and two in nine from the South—in favor of excluding slavery forever after 1800, in all new States to be formed, in territory ceded or to be ceded, embracing Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi, in the extreme South. Nothing can be clearer than that the interdiction was to apply to all such States, and to constitute a fundamental Constitution between them and the original States, unalterable without the consent of Congress. The new State was to be deprived of all power to admit slavery. This proposition was made and voted for by JEFFERSON. But how many votes would such a proposition receive in this Convention? Not many, I fear, even from the free States. My friend and colleague, though strongly anti-slavery, and earnestly devoted to freedom in the Territories, is afraid I shall commit Massachusetts to this old Jeffersonian doctrine of no slavery, and no right to establish it in the new States.

From this time till July, 1787, the question of slavery in the Territories and new States remained open and unsettled. In 1785, RUFUS KING renewed Mr. JEFFERSON'S proposition to prohibit, and it was referred to a committee by the vote of eight States; but it never became a law, a few from the South always preventing it.

The Federal Convention to revise the old, or frame a new Constitution, assembled in Philadelphia on the second Monday of May, 1787. And here let me read a single paragraph from a lecture by Mr. TOOMBS, of Georgia, delivered in Boston in 1856. It is as follows:

"The history of the times and the debates in the Convention which framed the Constitution, show that the whole subject of slavery was much considered by them, and perplexed them in the extreme, and that those provisions which relate to it were earnestly considered by the State Conventions which adopted it. Incipient legislation providing for emancipation had already been adopted by some of the States. Massachusetts had declared that slavery was extinguished by her Bill of Rights. The African slave trade had already been legislated against in many of the States, including Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina, the largest slaveholding States. The public mind was unquestionably tending toward emancipation. This feeling displayed itself in the South as well as in the North. Some of the present slaveholding States thought that the power to abolish, not only the African slave trade, but slavery in the States, ought to be given to the Federal Government; and that the Constitution did not take this shape, was made one of the most prominent objections to it by LUTHER MARTIN, a distinguished member of the Convention from Maryland; and Mr. MASON, of Virginia, was not far behind him in his emancipation principles. Mr. MADISON sympathized to a great extent. Anti-slavery feelings were extensively indulged in by many members of the Convention, both from the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States."

Mr. MADISON'S testimony is important here. He was a member of the old Congress in New York, until the assembling of the Constitutional Convention, and took his seat as a member of that body.

The History of the Ordinance of 1787, by Hon. EDWARD COLES, contains the following statement, as made to him by Mr. MADISON:

"The old Congress held its sessions, in 1787, in New York, while at the same time the Convention which framed the Constitution of the United States held its sessions in Philadelphia. Many individuals were members of both bodies, and thus were enabled to know what was passing in each—both sitting with closed doors and in secret sessions. The distracting question of slavery was agitating and retarding the labors of both, and led to conferences of intercommunications of the members."

I quote this testimony now, to show that Conferences were held between the members of Congress and the Federal Convention, upon the subject of slavery. I shall quote farther from it on another point, after turning for a moment to the proceedings of Congress.

On the 9th July, 1787, the Convention having been in session about two months, the ordinance for the government of the Western Territory, which had been reported in a new draft on the 26th of the preceding April, and ordered to a third reading on the 10th May, and then postponed, was referred to a new committee, consisting of Messrs. CARRINGTON, of Virginia; DANE, of Massachusetts; R.H. LEE, of Virginia; KEAN, of North Carolina; and SMITH, of New York. Two days afterwards, July 11th, Mr. CARRINGTON reported what has since been known as the "Ordinance of 1787," with the exception of the 6th article of compact, prohibiting slavery. When it came up the next day, the 12th, for a second reading, Mr. DANE rose and stated as follows:

"In the committee, as ever before, since the day when JEFFERSON first introduced the proposal to prohibit slavery in the territory, it was found impossible to come to any arrangement; that the committee desired to report only so far as they were unanimous; that they, therefore, had omitted altogether the subject of slavery; but that it was understood that any member of the committee might, consistently with his having concurred in the report, move in the house to amend it in the particular of slavery. He therefore moved as an amendment, to add a prohibition of slavery in the following words:

"That there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."

And as a compromise, Mr. DAVIS proposed to add the following proviso:

"Provided always, that any person escaping into the same, from whom labor-service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully retained and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid."

This was at once unanimously accepted by the slave States. The next day, the 13th, the ordinance was passed, every slave State present, viz.: Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, and every member from those States voting for it. The same prohibition—which a large majority of the South had resisted when presented alone—was now, when accompanied with the proviso, unanimously agreed to.

Here was a sudden change. But the proviso giving the right of reclamation in the said territory, only partially explains it. For a full explanation we must turn again to the Convention. And the first thing is a further extract from Mr. MADISON, respecting a letter, before quoted, as follows:

"The distracting question of slavery was agitating and retarding the labors of both bodies—Congress and the Convention; and led to conferences and intercommunications of the members, which resulted in a Compromise, by which the Northern, or anti-slavery portion of the country, agreed to incorporate into the ordinance and Constitution, the provision to restore fugitive slaves; and this mutual and concurrent action was the cause of the similarity of the provisions contained in both, and had its influence in creating the great unanimity by which the ordinance passed, and also in making the Constitution the more acceptable to the slaveholders."

Mr. MADISON, also, in the Virginia Convention, urged the ratification of the Constitution for the following among other reasons, viz.:

"At present, if any slave escape to any of those States where slaves are free, he becomes emancipated by their laws; for the laws of the States are uncharitable to one another in this respect. This clause was expressly inserted to enable owners of slaves to retain them. This is a better security than any that now exists."

General PINCKNEY, one of the delegates in the Federal Convention, from South Carolina, in a debate in the House of Representatives of that State on the Constitution, said:

"We have obtained a right to remove our slaves in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before. In short, considering all the circumstances, we have made the best terms we could, and on the whole I do not think them bad."

In the speech made by Mr. WEBSTER on the 7th of March, 1850, he remarked that:

"So far as we can now learn, there was a perfect concurrence of opinion between those respective bodies—the Congress and the Constitution—and it resulted in this ordinance of 1787."

When Mr. WEBSTER had closed his speech, Mr. CALHOUN arose, and among other things, said:

"He, Mr. WEBSTER, states very correctly that the ordinance commenced under the old confederation; that Congress was sitting in New York at the time, while the Convention sat in Philadelphia; and that there was concert of action.... When the ordinance was passed, as I have good reason to believe, it was upon a principle of compromise; first, that this ordinance should contain a provision similar to the one put in the Constitution, with respect to fugitive slaves; and next, that it should be inserted in the Constitution; and this was the compromise upon which the prohibition was inserted in the ordinance of 1787."

This agrees with Mr. MADISON. The idea he conveys could scarcely have been more identical with Mr. MADISON if he had used MADISON'S words. When the Southern members of Congress voted unanimously for the 6th Article, or anti-slavery clause in the ordinance, with the proviso in respect to slaves escaping into the Territory, it was with the understanding that the Convention would insert a similar provision in the Constitution respecting slaves escaping from one State to another; and this—its insertion in both—was the compromise upon which the prohibition was inserted in the ordinance. Such is the concurrent testimony of Mr. MADISON and Mr. CALHOUN.

We will now turn to the ordinance of 1787, and see whether it applies, as the one proposed by Mr. JEFFERSON in 1784 did, to the new States as well as to the Territories, and is the basis of State as well as Territorial Governments, and was so intended. It declares as follows:

"For extending the fundamental principles of civil and religions liberty, which form the basis whereon these republics, their laws and constitutions, are erected; to fix and establish these principles as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments, which forever hereafter shall be formed in the said Territory; to provide also for the establishment of States and permanent governments therein, and for their admission to a share in the Federal councils, on an equal footing with the original States, at as early periods as may be consistent with the general interest.

"It is hereby ordained and declared by the authority aforesaid: That the following articles shall be considered as articles of compact between the original States and the people and States in the said Territory, and forever remain unalterable, unless by the common consent."

Then follows six articles of compact. Part of the fifth and the sixth are in these words:

"ART. 5.... Whenever any of the said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects whatever; and shall be at liberty to form a permanent Constitution and State Government; provided the Constitutional Government, so to be formed, shall be republican and in conformity to the principles contained in these articles."

"ART. 6. There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted; Provided, always, That any person escaping into the same from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid."

Such is so much of the ordinance as bears directly upon the point I am discussing. And the Convention, as if for the very purpose of giving the unequivocal sanction of the Constitution and of the country to this compromise, and of establishing it as the permanent policy of the Government, expressly provided that the "engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation."

This ordinance, then, which was an unalterable compact, prohibiting slavery, and fixing and establishing freedom as the basis of all laws, constitutions, and governments in the Territory forever—State Constitutions and Governments of course included—was made valid by the Constitution itself. And on this point I refer to the highest Southern authority, the late Judge BERRIEN, who was thoroughly pro-slavery in his views, and should certainly be ranked among the ablest lawyers and statesmen Georgia has ever produced, who spoke to this precise point during the compromise discussion in the United States Senate in 1850, as follows:

"Validity was given to their act by the clause in the Constitution, which declares that contracts and engagements entered into by the Government of the Confederation, should be obligatory upon the Government of the United States established by the Constitution."

It is the "act" of Congress in passing the ordinance referred to here. This being so, it was the same in effect as though the ordinance had been written word for word in the Constitution itself. A contract can be made valid, only by making it binding and obligatory upon the parties to it, according to its terms and meaning. To make an unalterable compact valid is to make it perpetually binding.

Having shown that the articles of compact in the ordinance were unalterable; that validity was given to them by the Constitution itself; that in express terms they applied to States as well as to Territories, and must, therefore, being made valid by the Constitution, necessarily have been understood and intended by Congress and the Convention to prohibit slavery as effectually in one as the other, I will now show very briefly that they were also so understood in all parts of the country.

Mr. WILSON, of Pennsylvania, a prominent member of the Federal Convention, and also of the State Convention for ratifying the Constitution, remarked in the latter as follows:

"I consider this clause as laying the foundation for banishing slavery out of the land.... The new States which are to be formed will be under the control of Congress in this particular, and slavery will never be introduced among them."

Mr. WILSON speaks of the clause authorizing the prohibition of the African slave trade.

In the Massachusetts Convention to adopt the Constitution, Gen. HEATH said:

"Slavery cannot be extended. By their ordinance Congress has declared that the new States shall be republican States, and have no slavery."

Colonel BLAND, a member of the Convention from Virginia, said he "wished slavery had never been introduced into America," and that "he was willing to join in any measure that would prevent its extending farther." To allow it in new States would not prevent its extending farther, and therefore it was prohibited in such States.

Doctor RAMSAY, a member of the Convention of South Carolina, in his History of the United States, says:

"Under these liberal principles, Congress, in organizing colonies, bound themselves to impart to their inhabitants all the privileges of coequal States.... These privileges are not confined to any particular country or complexion. They are communicable to the emancipated slave, for in the new State of Ohio, slavery is altogether prohibited."

This compact, then, applies to State as well as Territorial governments, and was so understood in all sections of the country—northern, central, and southern—when the Constitution was ratified.

Let me now call attention to the very significant proviso to the sixth article. What does the word original mean, and what does the whole article mean with that word in the proviso?

"There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, &c.; Provided, always, That any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid."

This means that there shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except for the purpose of reclaiming such fugitives—and I admit that slaves were intended—as are lawfully claimed in any one of the original States. The very fact of the proviso implies that Congress understood that the right of reclamation could not exist, unless it was excepted.

And of course it could only exist for the purpose excepted. The intention was to grant the right to the original States, but to limit it to them. It is impossible to conceive of a measure for framing the proviso as it is, if that had not been the intention. As the ordinance itself made provision for the formation of new States, such States must have been in the minds of members when acting upon it. If the object had been to authorize the reclamation of slaves escaping to this territory from other States than original States, it is certain the word "original" would have been omitted. It was intended for the purpose of limiting the right.

Now observe that this article, proviso and all, is part of an unalterable compact to which the Constitution has given validity. Nobody pretends Congress has ever had the power to alter it. Mr. TOOMBS denies any such power in express terms. A law which Congress cannot alter has substantially the force and effect of a constitutional proviso. This, then, is the only law for the reclamation of fugitive slaves in the five States of the northwest territory; and there can be no other, the Constitution having made it perpetually valid.

Such obviously is the meaning and legal effect of the fugitive slave provision in the ordinance. And the meaning of that, derived as it is not merely from the consent of the Federal and State conventions, but from their concurrent action, necessarily fixes the meaning of the provision on the same subject in the Constitution, and shows how it must have been understood. As the two were parts of the same compromise, of course neither was understood to be inconsistent with the other. The provision in the Constitution is in these words:

"No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due."

So far as this describes, or was understood to describe, persons held to service or labor as slaves, it necessarily must also have been understood to apply only to the original States. This follows from what has already been shown. And it must have been so understood for another reason, because it was only "in" and "under" the laws of those States that persons could be held to service or labor as slaves. Under the laws of the Territories and new States, their being so held was forever prohibited. Hence, none but those escaped from one of the original States could ever be legally liable to reclamation, according to the understanding and intention of the original parties to this compact. This manifestly was the meaning of "the fathers," when the ordinance and Constitution were framed and ratified.

The two provisions must be construed together. That in the ordinance was intended for the Territories and new States, and that in the Constitution for the original States. If that in the Constitution had been intended for the Territories, it would have read, "escaping into another State or into the Territory," and that in the ordinance would have been entirely omitted. The proviso to the prohibition in the Missouri Compromise in 1820 is a striking confirmation of this. That was copied, word for word, from the ordinance of 1787, or original compromise, except substituting for the words "in any one of the States," the words "in any State or Territory of the United States," as follows:

"Provided, always, That any person escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive," &c. And in the compromise of 1820:

"Provided, always, That any person escaping into the same from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any State or Territory of the United States, such fugitive," &c.

Why say "in any State or Territory of the United States," instead of "in any one of the original States," as in the ordinance of 1787, unless the Congress of 1820 understood the latter to limit the right of recovering fugitive slaves to the original States, and meant by the Missouri bill to extend it to all the States and Territories? They did extend it, but in palpable violation of the "spirit of the compact of the fathers," and of the "policy of 1787."

Originally the Southern States committed themselves to the policy of slavery restriction, by a compact in the nature of a contract for a consideration. By their own votes, they relinquished all pretence of right to any slaves beyond the jurisdiction of the original States. Slaveholders, as such, voluntarily shut themselves out of the new States, in consideration of the right of recovering their fugitive slaves in whatever part of America they might take refuge. The object, as I have clearly shown, was to secure to slavery in the original States the right of recovering fugitives, whether their escape should be from one of those States to another, or to the Territories and new States; but to make that the limit, both of the right of recovery on one side, and of the obligation to permit or allow it, on the other.

It follows, then:

First: That as between the new States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin, no right of reclamation exists, or can exist, there being no power in Congress, as the South admit, to alter the compact in the ordinance of 1787, which denies this right.

Second: That no person, escaping from those States into any other State or Territory, can be reclaimed as a fugitive slave, because no person can be held as a slave under their laws.

Third: That no slave escaping from the slave States of Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, or Florida, into Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, or Missouri, can be lawfully reclaimed as a fugitive slave, because Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, and Florida are not original States.

Fourth: If slaves escape from any State or Territory other than the original States, into the States of the northwestern territory, no lawful power can touch them. The moment they reach those States they become free, because labor or service cannot lawfully be claimed of them in an original State.

Fifth: After the Missouri Compromise of 1820, slaves escaping from Arkansas and Missouri, for example to Kansas, Nebraska, Iowa, and Minnesota, could be reclaimed, but escaping to Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio, they could not be. And the Congress of 1820 so understood it. The particular in which the Missouri proviso was altered in copying from the ordinance of 1787, is proof enough of this.

But did the framers of the Government intend to distinguish in this manner between new and original slave States? Certainly not; and the reason is, they did not mean to have any new slave States. Otherwise they certainly did mean to make this distinction, for nothing can be clearer than that Louisiana and Missouri cannot go to Ohio to recover fugitive slaves within the meaning of this "compact of the fathers;" while Georgia can. Manifestly we have departed from the system devised by the fathers in allowing Missouri, Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Florida to be admitted with slavery, which explains, and nothing else can, this anomalous condition of things.

There can be no escape from these conclusions, but to deny that the ordinance has ever had any validity under the Constitution; which would be scarcely less than to deny that the Constitution itself had ever been a valid instrument. Having the like unequivocal sanction of national authority, and expressing alike in the words of Mr. Toombs, "the collective will of the whole," they must stand or fall together.

Originally the territory was not divided by the line of 36 deg. 30', or by any other line giving part to freedom and part to slavery. It was all secured, and by consent of the South, to freedom. There is nothing, therefore, in the original compromise, to justify the remark of the Editor of the Boston Courier in a recent number of that paper, that "below the line of 36 deg. 30', the South have the right of prescription." Freedom has an older prescriptive right to all the Territories. The line established by the compromise, between slavery permitted and slavery prohibited, was the boundary line between the then existing States and the Territory of the United States; or the line between exclusive national jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the States. It is an erroneous assumption, therefore, that the free States, by the introduction of slavery south of 36 deg. 30', as well as north of it, would receive more than a fair share or moiety of rights and privileges, as between States or parties entitled to equal privileges. The idea that the extension of slavery under the Federal Government can be claimed by anybody south or north as a right, is wholly inadmissible. The Courier will hold the following declarations from Mr. WEBSTER to be good authority, if others do not:

"Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from becoming slave territory, I am ready to assert the principle of excluding slavery." "We are to use the first and last, and every occasion which offers, to oppose the extension of slave power."

"I have to say, that while I hold with as much integrity, I trust, and faithfulness, as any citizen of this country, to all the original amendments and compromises in which the Constitution under which we now live was adopted, I never could, and never can persuade myself to be in favor of the admission of other States into this Union as slave States with the inequalities which were allowed and accorded to the slaveholding States then in existence by the Constitution. I do not think that the free States ever expected, or could expect, that they would be called upon to admit further slave States.... I think they have the clearest right to require that the State coming into the Union, shall come in upon an equality; and if the existence of slavery be an impediment to coming in on an equality, then the State proposing to come in should be required to remove that inequality by abolishing slavery or take the alternative of being excluded. I put my opposition on the political ground that it deranges the balance of the Constitution."

Wherever there is a foot of land to be staid back from slavery! Every occasion to be used to oppose the extension of the slave power! New States to abolish the inequality of slavery, or be excluded! I suppose Northern conservatives of the class referred to have endorsed those doctrines and declarations of Mr. WEBSTER a thousand times, as sound, national, conservative, and constitutional. But no Republican, so far as I know, has ever proposed to go an inch beyond the line of policy they indicated. The Chicago, or Republican Platform, certainly does not. And yet that same line of policy, when advocated by Republicans, is denounced as unsound, sectional, radical, and unconstitutional.

We have a great deal said about the equality of the States; of the new with the original States. This is said to be a fundamental doctrine of the Constitution.

It is claimed that citizens of the slaveholding States have an equal right in the Territories with the citizens of the non-slaveholding States; and I admit they have. But it is also claimed that they have the same right to the protection of property in slaves as property in cotton. This I deny. There is no such doctrine of State equality in the Constitution, nor was any thing like it contemplated by its framers. On the contrary, the Constitution denied this doctrine by clear implication, certainly for the first twenty years. It withheld from Congress the power to prohibit the importation of slaves into the "existing" States till 1808, while their importation into the Territories and new States might be prohibited at once. Ohio was admitted in 1802. Congress had power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State from that time, and did do it in effect by the very terms and conditions of her admission, which required that her Constitution and Government should not be repugnant to the ordinance of the 13th of July, 1787, which interdicted slavery. But Congress had no power to prohibit the importation of slaves into Georgia till after 1808. Georgia and Ohio, therefore, in this respect, were not political equals from 1802 to 1808.

Nor have the States been all political equals in the sense claimed, since 1808. It will surprise many to be told that there is nothing in the Constitution about State equality, and especially nothing that affirms the equality of the new with the original States, even after 1808. And yet this is true. The only passages which refer to the new States, except impliedly in the importation clause, are these: "New States may be admitted by Congress into the Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State." There is nothing, certainly, in this language to show that the new States were to be admitted on an equality, or an equal footing with the original States.

And yet provision was made, when the Constitution was framed, for the admission of all the new States to be formed in United States Territory then possessed, "on an equal footing with the original States." But it was a footing of equality which was in nowise inconsistent with an absolute denial of the right to establish the inequality of slavery. And this is proved by the only compact in the English language contemporaneous with the Constitution which touches the subject, namely, that part of the fifth article of compact in the ordinance of 1787 which I have already quoted. There can be no shadow of claim that any thing else secured, or pretended to secure, the right of new States to admission into the Union on an equal footing with the original States. That, I admit, did. It is, to repeat it, in these words:

"Whenever any of said States shall have sixty thousand free inhabitants therein, such State shall be admitted, by its delegates, into the Congress of the United States, on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever, and shall be at liberty to form a permanent Constitution and State Government; provided the Constitution and Government so to be formed, shall be republican in conformity to the principles of these articles," the 6th, which prohibited slavery, included.

And this is all there is, contemporaneous with the Constitution, on the subject of the equality of the States. The very instrument, then, which secured the admission of new States, on an equal footing with the original States, itself provided that they were never to tolerate slavery.

The new States, then, neither were to have, nor have they, any political equality which the prohibition violates, as Southern gentlemen contend. Certainly those formed and admitted under the plan of Government devised by the fathers, have not. In this sense they are not political equals. The original States were, from the beginning, and have ever been, political equals in this and every sense. Not, however, because the Constitution says they are, for it says nothing on the subject; but because they were independent sovereignties, and as such, made a compact which united them under one Federal Government, with discriminating restrictions upon the subject of slavery, or upon any other subject. But the fact that the evil and inequality of slavery existed in the original States, and was tolerated from necessity, was no reason why it should be allowed in the Territories and new States, where it did not and need never exist. So the power of the Territories and new States was sufficiently restricted to secure equality in personal rights and freedom to all the "inhabitants." Of course it cannot be pretended that the mere fact that one or more States had established, and had power to perpetuate slavery, secured to new States the right to establish and perpetuate the same enormity, as a necessary result of State equality. That would make the right or power of one State, resulting from State equality, necessarily coextensive with tolerated evil in another. Manifestly "the fathers" had no such idea as this. Theirs was the common sense and rational idea that a moral and political evil which existed in the old States, and could not be removed, need not for that reason be tolerated in new States.

The Constitution guarantees to each State a republican form of Government merely; but the ordinance of 1787 provides that the "Constitution and Government of each new State shall be republican." Why this difference? In the original States slavery existed, or in most of them; and so far they were anti-republican in fact and practice, though republican in form. The framers of the Constitution, having no power to abolish this anti-republican institution of slavery in those States, did nothing more than guarantee them Governments republican in form. But having the power to exclude it from the new States, they did exclude it, and provided that their constitutions and governments should be republican. That this was the reason for the difference may be inferred from the remark of LUTHER MARTIN, a distinguished member of the Federal Convention, that "slavery is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism," and of General HEATH in the Massachusetts Convention, that "Congress has declared that the new States shall be republican and have no slavery." No other reason can be given. Thus republicanism in fact, and not in form merely, was made a condition of admitting new States. This is part of the unalterable compact to which validity was given by the Constitution. The Constitution, therefore, while it guarantees a republican form of government, does in fact, by giving validity to the ordinance, guarantee republican governments to the new States. This is another very significant fact harmonizing perfectly with all the other facts in the original plan for extending the Union by admitting States from Territories.

The States are all equals, or not, according to the terms of their admission. The original States became members of the Union upon the single condition of ratifying the Constitution, which left them at liberty to tolerate slavery or not. But the States formed in the only Territory which belonged to the United States at the time the Constitution was framed, were admitted on condition that slavery should be perpetually interdicted within their limits, and as parties to an unalterable compact to that effect.

Slavery was regarded, South as well as North, when the Constitution was adopted, as a moral and political evil. This had been the general sentiment of the country many years before, and continued to be long after that period. The representatives of the extensive district of Darien in Georgia, on the 12th of January, 1775, spoke of slavery as "founded in injustice and cruelty, and highly dangerous to our liberties." JEFFERSON pronounced it "an injustice and enormity." The present Chief Justice of the United States, Mr. TANEY, who acted many years ago as counsel of Rev. Mr. GRUBER, who was indicted in the State of Maryland for preaching a sermon on the evils of slavery, spoke as follows in his defence:

"Mr. GRUBER did quote the language of our great act of National Independence, and insisted on the principles contained in that venerated instrument. He did rebuke those masters who, in the exercise of power, are deaf to the call of humanity, and he warned them of the evils they might bring upon themselves. He did speak in abhorrence of those who live by trading in human flesh, and enrich themselves by tearing the husband from the wife, the infant from the bosom of the mother, and this was the head and front of his offending. So far is he from being the object of punishment in any form of proceeding, that we are prepared to maintain the same principles, and to use, if necessary, the same language here in the Temple of Justice, and in the presence of those who are the ministers of the law."

"A hard necessity, indeed, compels us to endure the evils of slavery for a time. While it continues it is a blot on our national character; and every real lover of freedom confidently hopes that it will be effectually, though it must be gradually, wiped away, and earnestly looks for the means by which the necessary object may be best obtained. And until it shall be accomplished, until the time shall come when we can point, without a blush, to the language held in the Declaration of Independence, every part of humanity will seek to lighten the galling chain of slavery, and better, to the utmost of his power, the wretched condition of the slave."

Mr. JOHNSON, of Maryland:—Where did you get that?

Mr. GOODRICH:—I got it from a printed sermon recently preached by Dr. ORVILLE DEWEY, of Boston.

And Mr. CALHOUN, in the United States Senate, in 1838, said that "many in the South once believed that slavery was a moral and political evil;" and Mr. BUTLER, late a United States Senator from South Carolina, said in the Senate in 1850, that he "remembered the time when slavery was regarded as a moral evil, even in South Carolina."

In such a state of public sentiment, it is certainly no marvel that slavery was not allowed to extend into the Territories and new States. It was not prohibited in the northwest territory, because it was supposed to be, or would become, an evil in that territory particularly, or a greater evil there than anywhere else; but because it was regarded as an evil everywhere, and therefore wrong to permit its extension anywhere, when there was power to prevent it. There can be no doubt it would have been prohibited in the Territories and new States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee, if Georgia and North Carolina, previous to the Federal Convention, had ceded them to the United States upon the same conditions Virginia had ceded the northwest territory. Proof of this is found in the fact that the plan of territorial governments interdicting slavery forever after 1800, embraced all territory ceded, or to be ceded by individual States; and still further proof is in the fact, that the cessions by Georgia and North Carolina, after the adoption of the Constitution, were upon the express condition that slavery should not be prohibited; thereby showing that the policy of the Federal Government, as they understood it, was restrictive of slavery in the far southern latitudes as well as in the more northern, and that they expected the power to restrict would be exercised, if not withheld in the deeds of cession. A proposition was, in fact, made to apply the anti-slavery clause of 1787, to all the southern part of the Mississippi territory, now the southern parts of Alabama and Mississippi, by the act of April 7th, 1798, it being supposed at one time that it belonged to the United States; but the debate shows that the proposition was withdrawn because the jurisdiction was in Georgia, or because not five members of Congress, after the question was examined, believed otherwise. Georgia claimed absolute title and right of jurisdiction, and denied all right on the part of the United States to interfere with slavery. Congress did, however, prohibit the importation of slaves into the territory, and declare every slave so imported to be entitled to his freedom. This was probably wholly unauthorized, as it was six years before Georgia ceded it to the United States, and ten years before Congress had power to prohibit the importation of slaves into that State. But these facts show a strong disposition on the part of "the fathers" to curtail and circumscribe slavery, even in the far south, and at the hazard, too, of exercising doubtful power.