[Footnote 1694: The first ballot was as follows: Grant, 304; Blaine, 284; Sherman, 93; Edmunds, 34; Washburne, 30; Windom, 10. Whole number of votes, 755; necessary to a choice, 378.]

[Footnote 1695: Thirty-fifth ballot: Grant, 313; Blaine, 257; Sherman, 99; Edmunds, 11; Washburne, 23; Windom, 3; Garfield, 50. Thirty-sixth ballot: Grant, 306; Blaine, 42; Sherman, 3; Washburne, 5; Garfield, 399.

Conkling's peculiar manner of announcing New York's vote excited criticism. "Two delegates," he declared, "are said to be for Sherman, eighteen for Blaine, and fifty are for Grant." The chairman of the West Virginia delegation, whom the Senator had sought to unseat, mimicking the latter's emphasis, announced: "One delegate is said to be for Grant, and eight are known to be for Blaine."]

[Footnote 1696: Some months later Chauncey I. Filley, a delegate from St. Louis, caused the Grant medals to be struck for the 306, on which was emblazoned "The Old Guard."]

After Garfield's nomination the Stalwarts of the New York delegation did not conceal their disappointment. When everybody else was cheering they kept their seats, and while others displayed Garfield badges, they sullenly sought their headquarters to arrange for the Vice-Presidency. Leaders of the Garfield movement, now eager to strengthen the ticket, looked to them for a candidate. New York belonged in the list of doubtful States, and to enlist the men who seemed to control its destiny they instinctively turned to the defeated faction. William M. Dennison, a former governor of Ohio, promptly made their wishes known, confidently counting upon Conkling's cooeperation, since the Senator had been the first on his feet to make Garfield's nomination unanimous. In doing so he expressed the hope that the zeal and fervour of the convention would characterise its members "in bearing the banner and carrying the lances of the Republican party into the ranks of the enemy."

Conkling's treatment of Dennison's request has been variously reported. One version is that he demanded the nomination of Chester A. Arthur; another, that he sternly refused to make any suggestion. Contemporary press reports confirm the first, basing it upon his desire to vindicate Arthur and humiliate Sherman; the second is supported by Alfred R. Conkling's biography of his uncle.[1697] But neither report is correct. Conkling bitterly resented Garfield's nomination, predicted his defeat at the polls, and did not hesitate to dissuade friends from accepting the nomination for Vice-President. "The convention has nominated a candidate, but not a President," he said to Stewart L. Woodford. "Since the nomination I have heard from an influential friend at Albany, who declares that Garfield cannot carry New York. Now, the question is, whom shall we place upon the altar as a vicarious sacrifice? Mr. Morton has declined. Perhaps you would like the nomination for Vice-President?" Being assured that Woodford would accept it if tendered to him, Conkling added: "I hope no sincere friend of mine will accept it."[1698]

[Footnote 1697: "It has been asserted that this nomination was a boon to Roscoe Conkling to secure his support of Garfield. To deny this is almost supererogatory. He sternly refused to make any suggestion."—Conkling, Life of Conkling, p. 607-608.]

[Footnote 1698: Woodford's interview with the writer, October 4, 1908.]

In the event of Grant's nomination Levi P. Morton had been prominently mentioned as a proper candidate for Vice-President. He was then fifty-six years of age, and had achieved high reputation in banking and financial circles. Though not eloquent according to the canons of oratory, he spoke with clearness, was widely intelligent, and had given careful attention to public questions. Conservative in his nature and sturdy in his principles, he always advised against rashness and counselled firmness. A single session in Congress had proven his zeal in the performance of public duty, and his fitness for Vice-President was recognised then as it was eight years later when he became the running mate of Benjamin Harrison. Upon his nomination, therefore, Garfield, before the convention had recessed, sent word by Dennison that he desired Morton nominated for second place. Morton, answering that his nomination must not be made without previous consultation with his associates, immediately informed Conkling of Garfield's desire. Conkling replied, "If you think the ticket will be elected; if you think you will be happy in the association, accept." To this Morton answered, "I have more confidence in your judgment than in my own." Conkling then added: "Governor Boutwell of Massachusetts is a great friend of yours. Why don't you talk with him?" Acting upon this suggestion Morton sought Boutwell, who advised against it. Morton acquiesced and refused the use of his name.[1699]

[Footnote 1699: Mr. Morton's letter to the author, dated September 14, 1908.]

After returning to their headquarters at the hotel the Stalwarts, upon the suggestion and insistence of George H. Sharpe, quickly agreed upon Chester A. Arthur, who gave an affirmative response to their appeal. Conkling was not present at the time, but subsequently in Arthur's room, where Howard Carroll and several other delegates lingered, he bitterly opposed placing a Stalwart upon the ticket and expressed in unmeasured terms his disapprobation of Arthur's acceptance.[1700] On their way to the convention Sharpe told Woodford of the pungent flavour of Conkling's invective, and of Arthur's calm assertion of the propriety of his action. At the wigwam Conkling refused Sharpe's request to place Arthur in nomination.[1701]

[Footnote 1700: Letter of Howard Carroll to the author, dated October 15, 1908.]

[Footnote 1701: Interview of author with General Woodford.]

Upon the reassembling of the convention California presented Elihu B. Washburne for Vice-President, a nomination which Dennis McCarthy of New York, amidst cordial and hearty applause from the galleries, seconded in a forceful speech. This indicated that Arthur was persona non grata to the anti-Grant delegates of the Empire State. Jewell of Connecticut, Ferry of Michigan, Settle of North Carolina, and Maynard of Tennessee, were likewise presented. As the call of States proceeded New York made no response in its turn, but when Woodford subsequently proposed the name of Arthur, Dennison responded with a spirited second, followed by delegates from New Jersey, Illinois, Mississippi, Maryland, Missouri, Kentucky, and Pennsylvania. This array of backing brought McCarthy to his feet, who withdrew his second to Washburne and moved that Arthur's nomination, under a suspension of the rules, be made by acclamation. This required a two-thirds vote and was lost. Then Campbell of West Virginia, amidst the loudest cheers of the evening, seconded the nomination of Washburne. "Let us not do a rash thing." he said. "The convention has passed a resolution favouring civil service reform. Let us not stultify ourselves before the country."[1702]

[Footnote 1702: New York Tribune, June 9.]

At first Arthur's strength was confined to the Grant delegation, twenty-five States showing an increase of only seventy votes, thirty of which came from the South. But as the roll-call proceeded New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania brought other States into line, the ballot giving Arthur 468, Washburne 193, and other favourite sons 90.

Arthur's nomination was a distinct disappointment. To many it was an offence. Within the State leading Republican journals resented it by silence, while others were conspicuously cold; without the State it encountered even greater disadvantages, since his dismissal as collector of customs had advertised him as the enemy of reform, the apostle of bossism, and the friend of whatever was objectionable in politics.[1703] Yet his friends found a creditable record. He had successfully opposed the well-known action of Jonathan Lemmon, who sought to recover eight slaves which he incautiously brought into New York on his way from Virginia to Texas; he had established the right of coloured people to ride in the street-cars; and he had rendered valuable service in the early years of the war as engineer-in-chief and quartermaster-general on the staff of Governor Morgan. He possessed, too, an inherited instinct for keeping faith with men. In his relations with politicians of high or low degree there was not a trace of dissimulation or double-dealing. His career is a study of the evolution of character. It is not strange, perhaps, that in the days of custom-house investigations and bitter partisan strife, when he was known as an henchman of Conkling, there was a lack of public appreciation of the potentialities of a unique personality, but the Arthur heritage included then as afterward absolute truthfulness, shrewdness of judgment, high-minded patriotism, and consciousness of moral obligation.[1704]

[Footnote 1703: After the nomination John Sherman wrote to a personal friend: "The nomination of Arthur is a ridiculous burlesque, inspired, I fear, by a desire to defeat the ticket. His nomination attaches to the ticket all the odium of machine politics, and will greatly endanger the success of Garfield. I cannot but wonder how a convention, even in the heat and hurry of closing scenes, could make such a blunder."—Burton, Life of Sherman, p. 296.]

[Footnote 1704: "I do not think he [Arthur] knows anything. He can quote a verse of poetry, or a page from Dickens and Thackeray, but these are only leaves springing from a root out of dry ground. His vital forces are not fed, and very soon he has given out his all." Mrs. James G. Blaine, Letters (February 21, 1882), Vol. 1, p. 309.]



CHAPTER XXXIV

TILDEN, KELLY, AND DEFEAT

1880

The defeat of Governor Robinson did not apparently change party sentiment respecting Tilden's renomination for the Presidency. No other candidate was seriously discussed. Indeed, the Democratic press continued to treat it as a matter of course, coupling with it the alleged subversion of an election, transcending in importance all questions of administration, and involving the vital principle of self-government through elections by the people. This new issue, dwarfing all other policies, had been for three years the cornerstone of every Democratic platform in state, county, or congressional convention. No argument seemed to weaken it, no event could destroy it. The Republican claim that the vote of three Southern States, as declared at the polls, was the result of terrorism and did not in any sense represent an honest expression of the popular will, made no impression upon it. The well-known fact that Congress, because of the confusion of the situation, had wisely sought a remedy in the Electoral Commission, which was passed by Democratic rather than Republican votes, in nowise weakened the force of its appeal. Not even did the disclosure that Tilden's house had become the headquarter of confidential agents, who sought to corrupt the electors, produce any change in it. The one declaration, patiently and persistently kept before the people, was that Tilden had been elected by the popular vote and defrauded by a false count of the electoral vote, and that the supreme issue in 1880 must be whether "this shall be a government by the sovereign people through elections, or a government by discarded servants holding over by force and fraud."[1705] The reiteration of this proposition made Tilden, it was claimed, the necessary and inevitable candidate of the Cincinnati convention, called to meet on June 22. The party seemed to believe, what Tilden himself had announced from his doorstep three years before, that the country would "never condone fraud," and it did not propose to sacrifice a winning issue.[1706]

[Footnote 1705: Tilden's letter of June 18, 1880.—Public Writings and Speeches, Vol. 2, pp. 502-506.]

[Footnote 1706: "If the Democrats do not nominate Mr. Tilden, they do relinquish the fraud issue—the strength of their canvass."—New York Sun, June 22, 1880.]

Nevertheless, many New York Democrats disliked Tilden. Their number, which the cipher disclosures materially increased, grew into threatening proportions after Kelly's dissatisfaction had settled into a relentless feud. This condition made Tilden's chances of carrying the State uncertain if not absolutely nil, and encouraged his critics to magnify his weaknesses until the belief generally obtained that serious, perhaps fatal opposition would array itself at the State convention on April 20. Statements as to Tilden's ill-health likewise found currency. When not displaying evidence of unimpaired mental vigour in the courtroom, he was said to be on the verge of total paralysis.[1707] To his burdens the government also added another by pursuing his income tax. This suit, commenced in January, 1877, and destined to drag through five years until dismissed by the prosecution without costs to either party, was fixed for the April term in 1880, although the United States attorney admitted his unpreparedness for trial.[1708] "Thus was he persecuted with unrelenting virulence by the Administration," says his biographer, "and by the Republican press, which neglected no opportunity of refreshing the memory of its readers in regard to his imputed capacities for wickedness."[1709]

[Footnote 1707: The Nation, April 22.]

[Footnote 1708: See district attorney's letter, Bigelow, Life of Tilden, Vol. 2, pp. 254-259, 264.]

[Footnote 1709: Ibid.]

Meanwhile, to escape interruptions to which Gramercy Park exposed him, Tilden settled in the summer of 1879 at Greystone on the Hudson, three miles beyond the northernmost limit of the city, on the highest ground south of the Highlands. Here he brought a portion of his library; here he mingled with his flocks and herds; and here in the seclusion of a noble estate, with the comforts of a palatial stone dwelling, he discoursed with friends, who came from every part of the country to assure him that he alone could keep the party together. Ever silent as to his own intentions Tilden talked of the crime of 1876 until his visitors, imbued with his own spirit, left him thoroughly impressed with the importance of his renomination.

But Tilden did not trust the result to sentiment. Throughout New York Daniel E. Manning and other lieutenants held a tight rein, and when the Syracuse convention assembled an early roll-call, on a resolution to determine the character of the Committee on Credentials, showed 295 votes for Tilden to 80 against him. If this overwhelming majority shocked the dissenters, it was not less a surprise to the regulars. In the convention of 1876 Tilden mustered, including Tammany, only 201 out of 375; now, after his enemies had exhausted their opposition, he proved stronger than in the closing months of his famous career as a reform governor. The result of this vote settled all controversies, leaving the convention free to appoint electors and to select delegates to Cincinnati.[1710] It was not to adjourn, however, until it had shown a serene and polite contempt for John Kelly. During the morning John B. Haskin, on behalf of the Tammany convention, had presented a resolution expressing a desire for the union of the party and asking the appointment of a harmony committee. Ignoring the assembly from which he came, the convention treated the resolution as a personal communication from Haskin, whom it assured, after politely reciprocating his desire for the union of the Democratic party, "that the deliberative wisdom of the national convention will result in such action as will secure the triumph of the Democratic party in the ensuing election."[1711] This bitter rebuff, coupled with the overwhelming majority for Tilden, indicated a conscious strength which deeply impressed the party in other States, and greatly aided in demoralising opposition in New York.

[Footnote 1710: Delegates-at-large: Lucius Robinson, Calvin E. Pratt, Rufus W. Peckham, and Lester B. Faulkner. The last named was chairman of the Democratic State committee.]

[Footnote 1711: New York Tribune, April 21.]

Nor did the convention adjourn until its Committee on Resolutions sprung a further surprise. The delegates anticipated and applauded an elaborate statement of the fraud issue, but the presentation of Tilden as a candidate for President came with the suddenness of his unexpected majority. Manning did not intend to go so far. His courage came with his strength. Proof of this, if any were needed, existed in the fact that the endorsement was in manuscript, while the rest of the platform was read from a printed slip. To define the situation more clearly the committee submitted a unit rule, declaring "that in case any attempt is made to dismember or divide the delegation by contesting the seats of a portion of the delegates, or if delegates countenance such an attempt by assuming to act separately from the majority, or fail to cooeperate with such majority, the seats of such delegates shall be deemed to be vacated."[1712] Never did convention adopt a more drastic rule. The reading of these ball and chain provisions provoked hisses and widened the chasm between Tilden's convention and John Kelly's side-show.

[Footnote 1712: New York Sun, April 21.]

Kelly's bolt in 1879 had proved his power to destroy; yet to his friends, if not to himself, it must have been deeply humiliating to see the fierce light of public interest turned entirely on Tilden. Kelly also realised the more poignant fact that jealousy, distrust, and accumulated resentment lined the way he had marked out for himself. Nevertheless, he walked on apparently heedless of the signs of conflict. Since the regular Democratic convention would not admit him, he threateningly assembled one of his own in Shakespeare Hall, to be used, if the party did not yield, in knocking at the door of the Cincinnati convention. William Dorsheimer acted as its temporary chairman. Dorsheimer had become a political changeling. Within a decade he had been a Republican, a Liberal, and a Democrat, and it was whispered that he was already tired of being a Kellyite. His appeal for Horatio Seymour indicated his restlessness. The feuds of Tilden and Church and Kernan and Kelly and Robinson had left Seymour the one Democrat who received universal homage from his party, and it became the fashion of Tilden's enemies to refer to the Oneidan as the only one who could unite the party and carry the State. It did not matter to Dorsheimer that Seymour, having retired from active politics in 1868, was placidly meditating at Deerfield, devoted to agricultural and historical interests. Nor did his clamour cease after the bucolic statesman had declared that if he must choose between a funeral and a nomination he would take the first,[1713] since the mention of Seymour's name always waked an audience into cheers. Later in the day Amasa J. Parker, on taking the chair as president, artfully made use of the same ruse to arouse interest.

[Footnote 1713: Letter to Dr. George L. Miller, New York Tribune, June 21, 1880.]

It was not an enthusiastic convention. Many delegates had lost heart. Kelly himself left the train unnoticed, and to some the blue badges, exploiting the purpose of their presence, indicated a fool's errand. In the previous September they had refused to support Robinson, and having defeated him they now returned to the same hall to threaten Tilden with similar treatment. This was their only mission. Humiliation did not possess them, however, until John B. Haskin reported that the regulars refused to recognise their existence. Then John Kelly threw off his muzzle, and with the Celtic-English of a Tammany brave exhibited a violent and revolutionary spirit. "Tilden was elected by the votes of the people," said Kelly, "and he had not sufficient courage after he was elected to go forward, as a brave man should have gone forward, and said to the people of the country, 'I have been elected by the votes of the people, and you see to it that I am inaugurated.' Nothing of the like did Mr. Tilden."[1714]

[Footnote 1714: New York Sun, April 21, 1880.]

In other words, Kelly thought Tilden an unfit candidate because he did not decide for himself that he had been elected and proceed to take his seat at the cost of a tremendous civil convulsion. Perhaps it was this policy more than Kelly's personality which had begun to alienate Dorsheimer. One who had been brought up in the bosom of culture and conservatism could have little confidence in such a man. The platform, though bitter, avoided this revolutionary sentiment. It protested against the total surrender of the party to one man, who has "cunning" and "unknown resources of wealth," and who "attempts to forestall public opinion, to preoccupy the situation, to overrule the majority, and to force himself upon the party to its ruin." It declared that "Tildenism is personalism, which is false to Democracy and dangerous to the Republic," and it pronounced "Tilden unfit for President" because "his political career has been marked with selfishness, treachery, and dishonour, and his name irretrievably connected with the scandals brought to light by the cipher despatches."[1715] Haskin proposed a more compact statement, declaring that "the Democratic party does not want any such money-grabber, railroad wrecker, and paralytic hypocrite at the helm of State."[1716]

[Footnote 1715: New York Times, April 21.]

[Footnote 1716: New York Times, April 21.

For delegate-at-large to Cincinnati the convention selected the following: Amasa J. Parker of Albany, William Dorsheimer of New York, Jeremiah McGuire of Chemung, George C. Green of Niagara.]

After the two conventions adjourned the question of chiefest interest was, would Tilden seek the nomination at Cincinnati? The action of the convention demonstrated that the regular party organisation was unaffected by the Kelly bolt, that Tilden controlled the party in the State, and that his nomination was a part of the programme. Moreover, it showed that the New York Democracy did not intend asking support upon any principle other than the issue of fraud. But intimations of Tilden's purpose to decline a nomination found expression in the speech and acts of men presumedly informed. Lester B. Faulkner's statement, in calling the convention to order, that he did not know whether the Governor would accept a renomination, coupled with the convention's reply to Haskin, expressing confidence that the action at Cincinnati would result in the Democracy's carrying New York, had made a deep impression. To many these insinuations indicated that because of his health or for some unknown cause he was not seriously a candidate. Others found reason for similar belief in the indisposition of prominent delegates to resent such a suggestion. One veteran journalist, skilled in reading the words and actions of political leaders, asserted with confidence that he would not be a candidate. To him Tilden's name concealed a strategic movement, which, in the end, would enable his friends to control the nomination for another.[1717]

[Footnote 1717: New York Tribune (correspondence), April 21.]

Such interpretation found hosts of doubters. Without Tilden, it was said, the fraud issue would lose its influence. Besides, if he intended to withdraw, why did Kelly assemble his convention? Surely some one, said they, would have given him an inkling in time to save him from the contempt and humiliation to which he had subjected himself. There was much force in this reasoning, and as the date of the national convention approached the mystery deepened.

Tilden was not a paralytic, as Haskin proclaimed. He could not even be called an invalid. His attention to vexatious litigation evidenced unimpaired mental power, and his open life at Greystone proved that his physical condition did not hide him from men. He undoubtedly required regular rest and sleep. His nervous system did not resist excitement as readily as in the days of his battle with Tweed and the Canal ring. It is possible, too, that early symptoms of a confirmed disease had then appeared, and that prudence dictated hygienic precautions. Once, in December, 1879, when contemplating the strain of the campaign of 1876, he questioned his ability to go through another. Again, in the early spring of 1880, after prolonged intellectual effort, he remarked in rather a querulous tone, "If I am no longer fit to prepare a case for trial, I am not fit to be President of the United States." Such casual remarks, usually made to a confidential friend, seemed to limit his references to his health.[1718] He doubtless felt disinclined, as have many stronger men, to meet the strain that comes when in pursuit of high public office, but there is no evidence that ill-health, if it really entered into his calculations, was the determining factor of his action. Conditions in the Republican party had changed in the Empire State since the nomination of Garfield. Besides, the cipher disclosures had lost him the independent vote which he received in 1876. This left only the regulation party strength, minus the Kelly vote. In 1876 Tilden's majority was 26,568, and in 1879 Kelly polled 77,566. If Kelly's bolt in 1880, therefore, should carry one-half or only one-quarter of the votes it did in 1879, Tilden must necessarily lose New York which meant the loss of the election. These were conditions, not theories, that confronted this hard-headed man of affairs, who, without sentiment, never failed to understand the inexorable logic of facts. Nevertheless, Tilden wanted the endorsement of a renomination. This would open the way for a graceful retreat. Yet, to shield him from possible defeat, he secretly gave Manning a letter, apparently declining to run again, which could be used if needed.

[Footnote 1718: John Bigelow, Life of Tilden, Vol. 2, pp. 265, 271.]

On reaching Cincinnati Manning found that a multiplicity of candidates made it difficult to determine Tilden's strength. The ranks of the opposition, based on cipher disclosures and Kelly's threats, rapidly strengthened, and although many friends of other candidates thought it less hazardous to nominate him than to repudiate him, ominous warnings piled up like thunder clouds on a summer day. Meantime New York's active canvass for Henry B. Payne of Ohio seemed to conflict with Tilden's candidacy, while Tilden's remarks, spoken in moments of physical discouragement, added to the impression that he did not seek the nomination. But why did he not say so? Manning, supposing he was the sole possessor of the letter and believing the time not yet ripe for producing it, kept his own counsels. Tilden, however, had given a duplicate to his brother Henry, who now announced through the press that Tilden had forwarded a communication. This reached Cincinnati on the eve of the convention.

It was long and characteristic. He recalled his services as a private citizen in overthrowing the Tweed ring and purifying the judiciary, and as governor of the State in breaking up the Canal ring, reducing the taxes, and reforming the administration. He told the familiar story of the "count out"; maintained that he could, if he pleased, have bought "proof of the fraud" from the Southern returning boards; and accused Congress of "abdicating its duty" in referring the count to the Electoral Commission. Since 1876, he said, he had been "denied the immunities of private life without the powers conferred by public station," but he had done all in his power to keep before the people "the supreme issue" raised by the events of that year. Now, however, he felt unequal to "a new engagement which involves four years of ceaseless toil. Such a work of renovation after many years of misrule, such a reform of systems and policies, to which I would cheerfully have sacrificed all that remained to me of health and life, is now, I fear, beyond my strength."[1719]

[Footnote 1719: Tilden's Public Writings and Speeches, Vol. 2, pp. 502-506.]

Tilden did not intend this to be a letter of withdrawal. With the hope of stimulating loyalty he sought to impress upon the delegates his vicarious sacrifice and the need of holding to the fraud issue. This was the interpretation quickly given it by his enemies. Kelly declared it a direct bid for the nomination. But a majority of the New York delegation regretfully accepted it as final. Nevertheless, many ardent Tilden men, believing the letter had strengthened him, insisted upon his nomination. The meeting of the delegation proved a stormy one. Bold charges of infidelity to Tilden reacted against Payne, and to escape controversy Manning indiscreetly asked if he might yield to the pressure which his letter had stimulated. To this Tilden could make but one reply: "My action is irrevocable. No friend must cast a doubt on my sincerity."[1720]

[Footnote 1720: John Bigelow, Life of Tilden, Vol. 2, p. 272.]

There is something pathetic in this passing of Tilden, but there seems no reason for surprise. Tilden was essentially an opportunist. He attacked the Tweed ring after its exposure; he made war upon the Canal ring after its record had become notorious; and he reduced the State taxes after the war debt had been paid. Upon these reforms he rode into power, and upon the cry of fraud he hoped to ride again to success. He was much too acute not to know that the cipher disclosures had robbed him of the role of reformer, but he seems to have been blind to the obvious fact that every one else was also aware of it. Besides, he lacked boldness and was at times the victim of indecision. He was singularly unfortunate, moreover, in failing to attract a circle of admirers such as usually surround public men of great prominence. Nevertheless, the opinion then obtained, and a quarter of a century perhaps has not changed it, that had Manning, when he reached the convention city, boldly and promptly demanded Tilden's nomination it could have been secured. Whether, if tendered him, he would have accepted it, "no one," says Bigelow, "is competent to affirm or deny. He probably did not know himself."[1721]

[Footnote 1721: Ibid.]

Meanwhile, New York lost whatever prestige it had inherited through him. Payne had the support of barely a majority of the delegation,[1722] Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania, who had relied upon it, was angry, and the first roll-call showed that Winfield S. Hancock and Thomas F. Bayard held the leading places.[1723] This contrasted sharply with its early success. George Hoadley of Ohio, Tilden's devoted friend, had been made temporary chairman; Kelly, rising to address the convention, had felt most keenly the absence of a friend in the chair; and a two-thirds majority excluded the Shakespeare Hall delegation. Such influence, however, was at an end. The delegation affected control when Rufus H. Peckham declared from the platform that as Tilden had renounced all claims New York would support Randall; but the convention failed to join in the excited cheers of the Philadelphians, while the roll-call soon disclosed Hancock as the favourite. Before the result was announced officially Wisconsin asked permission to change its twenty votes to the soldier, and in the twinkling of an eye the stampede began. At the conclusion of the changes Hancock had received all the votes cast save 33.[1724] William H. English of Indiana, a rich man, who had served four terms in Congress during the administrations of Presidents Pierce and Buchanan, was nominated for Vice-President. The platform favoured a tariff for revenue only, exploited the election fraud, demanded honest money of coin or paper convertible into coin, and stoutly opposed Chinese immigration.

[Footnote 1722: The vote of the delegation stood as follows: Paine, 38; Tilden, 11; English, 11; Bayard, 6; Hancock, 3; Randall, 1. Under the unit rule this gave Payne the entire number, 70.]

[Footnote 1723: The first ballot gave Hancock, 171; Bayard, 153-1/2; Payne, 81-1/2; Thurman, 68-1/2; Field, 65; Morrison, 62; Hendricks, 49-1/2; Tilden, 38; with a few votes to minor candidates. Whole number of votes, 728. Necessary to a choice, 486.]

[Footnote 1724: Before changes were made the second ballot gave Hancock 319; Randall, 129-1/2; Bayard, 113; Field, 65-1/2; Thurman, 50; Hendricks, 31; English, 19; Tilden, 6; scattering, 3. After the changes the result was as follows: Hancock, 705; Hendricks, 30; Tilden, 1; Bayard, 2.]

After Hancock's nomination Kelly's inning began. The convention had treated him coldly. On the first day, when New York was called, desiring to protest against seating a member of the regular delegation, he sought recognition from a seat among the alternates, but Hoadley, without the slightest sign of seeing or hearing him, ordered the roll-call to proceed. The overwhelming rejection of his delegation was not less crushing. The vote combined a compliment to Tilden and an official utterance against the action of his great enemy, and as the States, answering promptly and sharply, dealt death to bolting and paralysis to Tammany it became evident to the blindest that Tilden possessed the confidence of his party. In spite of the friendly relations between Hendricks and Kelly, Indiana voted a solid No. Nine other States, including Kentucky, Louisiana, and North Carolina, did likewise. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of the Southern delegates ranged themselves against the Boss. To add to the public proof of Kelly's weakness New York asked to be excused from voting.[1725]

[Footnote 1725: The vote stood, without New York, 205 to 457 in favor of rejecting the Shakespeare Hall delegation. With New York it would have been thirty-nine more than a two-thirds majority.]

Nevertheless, Kelly had his friends. They were not as strong in numbers or in voice as those who cheered Conkling at Chicago, but in the absence of a master-mind the galleries seized upon the Tammany leader and cheered whenever he appeared. To give greater spectacular effect to his first greeting, Wade Hampton of South Carolina got upon his crutches and stumped down the aisle to shake him solemnly by the hand. Kelly, however, did not reach the culminating point of his picturesque role until Hancock's nomination. After Randall, Hampton, and others had spoken, cries for Kelly brought to the platform a delegation of Tammany leaders walking arm in arm, with John Kelly, Augustus Schell, Amasa J. Parker, and George C. Green in front. The convention, save the New York delegation, leaped to its feet, and when Kelly declared that hereafter whoever alluded to the differences which had heretofore existed in the New York Democracy should be considered a "traitor to his party," the great enthusiasm forced cheers from one-half of the New York delegation. To make the love-feast complete, John R. Fellows, finally responding to impatient calls from all parts of the hall, also took the platform.

Fellows, still in his forties, had had a varied, perhaps a brilliant career. Born in Troy he found his way in early boyhood to Arkansas, joined the Confederate army, fought at Shiloh, escaped from Vicksburg, surrendered at Port Hudson, and remained a prisoner of war until June, 1865. Returning to Arkansas he served in the State Senate, and in 1868 came to New York, where he secured an appointment in the office of the District Attorney. Public attention became instantly fixed on the attractive figure of the intrepid young assistant. He leaped into renown. He soon became the principal Democratic speaker in the city, and from the first followed the fortunes of the pale, eager form of the distinguished reform Governor. At Cincinnati he represented the conservative Tilden men, and although upon reaching the platform he faced a man of greater force, he betrayed no docile character, ready to receive passively whatever the Boss might allot. His speech was cleverly framed. He expressed no desire that Tilden Democrats be forgiven for the political sins which their opponents had committed; neither did he mar the good feeling of the occasion. But when, at the conclusion of his remarks, John Kelly stepped forward, seized his hand, and began working it up and down like a handle, Fellows stood stiffly and passionlessly as a pump, neither rejecting nor accepting the olive branches thrust upon him. Thus ended the great scene of the reconciliation of the New York Democracy.

When plucked the fruit of this reunion was found not to be very toothsome. Returning to New York, Tammany held a ratification meeting (July 1) in which the regulars would not unite. Subsequently the regulars held a meeting (July 28) at which Tilden presided, and which Tammany did not attend. Similar discord manifested itself respecting the choice of a chief judge for the Court of Appeals. The Republican State Committee had chosen Charles J. Folger, but when the regulars advocated the same method of selection Kelly defiantly issued a call (August 14) for a State convention. Such bossism, the product of a strange, fitful career, was only less dramatic than that of Tweed. At a subsequent conference Kelly submitted a letter stating that if a convention were regularly summoned and Tammany given its full share of delegates and committeemen, his call would be withdrawn.[1726] To this the regulars finally yielded, and a State convention, held at Saratoga on September 28, made Kelly its head and front. His advent evoked the loudest cheers, his demand for five members of the State committee met little resistance, and Dorsheimer, besides serving as chairman of the Committee on Resolutions, presented the name of Charles J. Rapallo, who became the nominee for chief judge of Appeals. Thus within a few months Kelly had defeated Robinson for governor, prevented Tilden's nomination for President, and imposed his will upon the regular organisation.

[Footnote 1726: For a copy of this letter, see New York Tribune, August 28.]

In the selection of municipal candidates he was not less successful. Irving Hall insisted upon naming the mayor, and for many weeks the bickering and bargaining of conference committees resulted in nothing. Finally, Kelly proposed that the regulars select several satisfactory persons from whom he would choose. Among those submitted was the name of William Russell Grace, a respected merchant, a native of Ireland, a Roman Catholic in religion, and a man of large wealth, but without official experience of any kind. This was better, it was said, than official experience of the wrong kind. Irving Hall included his name with considerable reluctance. It distrusted his loyalty, since a rumour, too well founded not to cause alarm, revealed Kelly's interest in him. But Kelly's cunning equalled his audacity. He had secured the nomination of Rapallo by voting for William C. Ruger of Onondaga, and he now caused it to be understood that under no circumstances would Grace be acceptable. The merchant's name once upon the list, however, the Boss snapped it up with avidity, while the Germans muttered because three of the five city candidates were Irishmen. Thus the campaign opened badly for the Democrats.

Nor did it open more auspiciously for the Republicans. Garfield's part in the Credit Mobilier scandal was reviewed without regard to the vindicatory evidence, while Nast's incriminating cartoon of 1873[1727] emphasised the failure of the great artist to introduce the Republican candidate into his campaign pictures of 1880. It advertised the fact that Nast retained his early opinion of the nominee's conduct. Further to alienate the independent vote it was charged that Garfield, during the visit of Grant and Conkling at Mentor (September 28), had surrendered to the Stalwarts. Appearances did not discourage such a belief. Conkling's hostility disclosed at Chicago was emphasised by his withdrawal from New York City on the day that Garfield entered it (August 5). Subsequently, in his initial speech of the campaign (September 17), Conkling's first important words were a sneer at Hayes and an implied threat at Garfield.[1728] Yet two weeks later the Senator, while on a speaking tour through Ohio and Indiana, went out of his way, riding three-fourths of a mile through a heavy rain, to call upon Garfield. This looked as if somebody had surrendered. As a matter of fact Conkling did not meet Garfield in private, nor did they discuss any political topic,[1729] but the apparent sudden collapse of Conkling's dislike supplied Garfield's opponents with abundance of powder. Meantime the loss of the September election in Maine crushed Republican hope. A victory had been confidently expected, and the failure to secure it, although the adverse majority was less than two hundred, sent a chill to every Republican heart.

[Footnote 1727: Harper's Weekly, May 15, 1873.]

[Footnote 1728: Conkling's speech is printed in full in the New York Tribune of September 18, 1880.]

[Footnote 1729: Alfred R. Conkling, Life of Roscoe Conkling, pp. 623-625.

"I was informed by Mr. Conkling that he had not been alone one minute with General Garfield, intending by that care-taking to avoid the suggestion that his visit was designed to afford an opportunity for any personal or party arrangement."—Boutwell, Reminiscences, Vol. 2, p. 272.]

Spurred to greater effort by this blighting disappointment, the Republicans regained courage by a spirited presentation of the industrial question, which was strongly reinforced by returning activity in trade and commerce. To offset its effect and to win the industrial masses to Democratic support, lithographic copies of the so-called "Morey letter," approving Chinese immigration, which purported to be written by Garfield, were spread broadcast (October 20) over the country. Garfield promptly branded it a forgery. Though the handwriting and especially the signature resembled his, accumulating evidence and the failure to produce the man to whom the letter purported to be addressed, rapidly made clear its fictitious character. Nevertheless, many Democratic journals and orators, notably Abraham S. Hewitt, assuming its genuineness, used it with tremendous force as favouring Chinese competition with home labour.

To add to the slanderous character of the closing days of the campaign John Kelly, through the New York Express, rained fierce personal assaults upon the distinguished editor of the New York Herald, who opposed Grace. In bitterness the mayoralty fight surpassed the presidential contest. Hints of a division of public money for sectarian purposes had deeply stirred the city and given prominence to William Dowd, the Republican candidate, whose interest in the common schools characterised his public activities. Dowd had the support of many members of Irving Hall, who, as they gnashed their teeth in resentment of Kelly's cunning, became unweariedly active in combining the strange and various elements of opposition. Not Daniel himself was more uncomfortably encompassed than Grace.

The October elections in Ohio and Indiana plainly indicated the trend of public opinion, and on November 3 the Republicans carried New York and the country.[1730] The significant point in the State returns, however, was the severe punishment administered to Kelly. Whomsoever he supported suffered humiliation. Hancock received 21,000 votes less than Garfield, Rapallo 55,000 less than Folger, and Grace 38,000 less than Hancock. In the presence of such a showing the Brooklyn Eagle, a Democratic journal friendly to Tilden, thus philosophised: "Bosses and thorough organisation are incompatible. The success of organisation depends upon reason. The success of the boss is due to underhand arts. No young man can hope for the favour of a boss who does not begin by cultivating the temper of a lick-spittle."[1731]

[Footnote 1730: Garfield, 555,544; Hancock, 534,511; Weaver (Greenback), 12,373. Judge of Appeals: Folger, 562,821; Rapallo, 517,661; Armstrong (Greenback), 13,183. Mayor of New York: Grace, 101,760; Dowd, 98,715. Legislature: Assembly, Republicans, 81; Democrats, 47. Senate (hold over): Republicans, 32; Democrats, 18. Republican majority on joint ballot, 52.]

[Footnote 1731: November 6, 1880.]



CHAPTER XXXV

CONKLING DOWN AND OUT

1881

In the speakership contest of January, 1881, the anti-Conkling leaders discovered a disposition to profit by the election of Garfield. They wanted to learn their voting strength, and to encourage assemblymen to oppose George H. Sharpe, the Stalwart candidate, the Tribune, in double-leaded type, announced, apparently with authority, that the President-elect would not allow them to suffer.[1732] This sounded a trifle warlike. It also quickly enhanced the stress between the opposing factions, for those who are themselves not averse to wire-pulling are morbidly suspicious of intrigue in others.

[Footnote 1732: New York Tribune (editorial), January 3, 1881.]

But nothing came of the Tribune's announcement. Sharpe's creditable service on Grant's staff, his cleverness as a Stalwart manager, and his acceptability as a speaker of the preceding Assembly, brought him troops of friends. Although making no pretensions to the gift of oratory, he possessed qualities needed for oratorical success. He was forceful, remarkably clear, with impressive manners and a winning voice. As a campaign speaker few persons in the State excelled him. Men, too, generally found him easy of approach and ready to listen. At all events his tactful management won a majority of the Republican assemblymen before the opposition got a candidate into the field. Under these circumstances members did not fancy staking good committee appointments against the uncertainty of Presidential favours, and in the end Sharpe's election followed without dissent.

In the election of a United States senator to succeed Francis Kernan on March 4, the Stalwarts did not find such smooth sailing. For several years, ever since the gubernatorial nomination in 1876, jealousy, accumulated resentment, and inevitable distrust had divided them, but not until Thomas C. Platt of Owego and Richard Crowley of Niagara announced their candidacy did the smouldering bitterness burst into a blaze. Cornell and his friends promptly declared for Platt, while Arthur, Sharpe, Thomas Murphy, and John F. Smyth, known as ultra Conkling men, wheeled into line for Crowley. Conkling held aloof. He probably preferred Levi P. Morton, although each candidate claimed to be his preference. In the end Morton's name was tangled up in the controversy, but he did not really get into it. Besides, a place in the Cabinet seemed open to him.

At this time Cornell was at the height of his power. Prior to his inauguration he had not stood for much in the way of statesmanship. He was known principally as the maker and chauffeur of Conkling's machine, which he subsequently turned over to Arthur, who came later into the Conkling connection from the Morgan wing. Moreover, the manner of his election, the loss of many thousand Republican votes, and his reappointment of Smyth seriously discredited him. But friend and foe admitted that he had shown real ability as governor. He had about him no angles and no surprises. He exercised authority cautiously, marshalled facts with skill, and presented clear and enlightened reasons for his action. He seemed to be above rather than below the level of his party, and his official colleagues, working in harmony with his policies, found him honourable, if sometimes stubborn and aggressive.

But in his relations to men as well as to policies he had betrayed a disposition to change position. He did not attend the Chicago convention. Nor did Arthur's nomination, brought about largely by Sharpe's activity, particularly please him. While he behaved with decorum and perhaps with loyalty, it was evident that if he did not raise the standard of revolt, he had chosen to fight for his hand. This became the more apparent as the senatorial contest progressed. A grim darksomeness about the expression of his countenance showed that he took a sullen satisfaction in humiliating those who had humiliated him. It was deftly done, but in the result it left its impression.

Crowley, then in his forty-sixth year, was well equipped for the Senate. As a forceful speaker he was an object of respect even by his opponents. In whatever legislative body he appeared he ranked amongst the foremost debaters, generally speaking with an enlightenment and a moderation that did credit to his intellect and to the sweetness of his nature. He had served four years in the State Senate, one term in Congress, and eight years as United States attorney in the Northern District, being justly distinguished as one of the able men of Western New York. He was sadly handicapped, however, by the infirmity of his backers. Sharpe excited the deepest resentment by withholding the appointment of the Assembly committees;[1733] and Smyth and Murphy represented all that was undesirable in politics.

[Footnote 1733: "Senator Woodin spoke of Truman G. Younglove, the only speaker in the history of the State who had dared to hold back the committees in order to influence a senatorial caucus, as a 'political corpse,' and said that Sharpe would share his fate."—New York Tribune, January 13, 1881.]

Cornell was fortunate in his candidate. Platt's cool, quiet methods had aroused little antipathy, while around him gathered loyalty and gratitude. Very early in the contest, too, it began to be whispered that if elected he might act independently of Conkling. To think of a light-weight sparring up to a recognised champion tickled the imagination of the Independents who numbered about forty, of whom Chauncey M. Depew was the choice of a majority.[1734] Ira Davenport of Steuben, a State senator of decided character and strength, supported his brother-in-law, Sherman S. Rogers of Erie, and others talked of Vice-President Wheeler. George William Curtis argued that the aim of the Independents should be to vote for the cause even if they voted for different candidates, and thus show to the country and to Garfield that a large and resolute opposition to the ruling organisation existed in the party.[1735]

[Footnote 1734: "Blaine, representing Garfield, came to New York and asked me to enter the contest for the purpose of securing the election of a senator who would support the Administration. That was the reason why I became a candidate."—Interview of Mr. Depew with the author, February 19, 1909.]

[Footnote 1735: Harper's Weekly, February 5, 1881.]

On the other hand, Depew's friends thought it wiser to "split the machine." It was a taking proposition. If the two senators, they argued, differed upon questions of patronage, the one agreeing with the President would undoubtedly prevail. Thus the Senator and the Governor, backed by the patronage of the State and Federal administrations, would control a machine of great possibilities. Conkling appreciated the danger, and Warner Miller and William H. Robertson approved the plan.

Miller was then in the prime of life. He combined the occupations of manufacturer and farmer, evidenced marked capacity for business, and gave substantial promise of growing leadership. From the schools of Oswego he had entered Union College, and after teaching in Fort Edward Collegiate Institute he became a soldier. Since 1874 he had been in the Assembly and in Congress. He was fully six feet tall, well proportioned, with a large head, a noticeably high forehead, a strong, self-reliant, colourless face, and a resolute chin. A blond moustache covered a firm mouth. He had the appearance of a man of reserve power, and as a speaker, although without the gift of brilliantly phrased sentences, he made a favourable impression. His easy, simple manner added to the vigour and clearness of his words. Perhaps in the end he fell short of realising the full measure of strength that his ardent friends anticipated, for he possessed none of the characteristics of the boss and seemed incapable of submitting to the daily drudgery that political leadership demands. But for several years the reasonableness of his opinions had an unmistakable influence upon the judgment of men. Certainly, in 1881, his opinion greatly strengthened the Depew scheme, and it soon became apparent that a sufficient number of Independents could be relied upon to choose Platt. In the conference that followed the latter promised to support the Garfield administration. "Does that statement cover appointments?" asked Woodin. Platt said it did. "Even if Judge Robertson's name should be sent in?" insisted Woodin. Platt replied, "Yes."[1736] That settled it, and Platt's nomination occurred on the first ballot.[1737] Among the earliest to send him congratulations was Senator Conkling.

[Footnote 1736: Interview of Mr. Depew with the author, March 28, 1909. See also New York Tribune, January 9, 1882. "Among others present at the conference," added Depew, "were Webster Wagner, John Birdsall, Dennis McCarthy, and William H. Robertson of the State Senate, James W. Husted, and George Dawson of the Albany Evening Journal. Woodin remarked, 'We can trust Platt, and when he's elected senator we shall not need a step-ladder to reach his ear.'"]

[Footnote 1737: Total vote in caucus, 105. Necessary to a choice, 53. Platt, 54; Crowley, 26; Rogers, 10; Wheeler, 10; Lapham, 4; Morton, 1.

The election, which occurred on January 18, resulted: Senate, Platt, 25; Kernan, 6; Assembly, Platt, 79, Kernan, 44.]

After the campaign of 1880 Conkling seemed to dismiss the feeling exhibited toward Garfield at Chicago, and in February (1881), at the invitation of the President-elect, he visited Mentor. The Senator asked the appointment of Levi P. Morton as secretary of the treasury, and Garfield consented to give him the Navy, or select Thomas L. James for postmaster-general. "This conference was not wholly satisfactory,"[1738] but Conkling's position at the inauguration ceremonies, voluntarily taken directly behind Garfield while the latter read his inaugural address, indicated a real friendship. His motion in the Senate that James be confirmed as postmaster-general without the usual reference to a committee seemed to support this belief, an impression subsequently stimulated by the prompt confirmation of William M. Evarts for commissioner to the International Monetary Conference, Henry G. Pearson for postmaster of New York, and Levi P. Morton for minister to France.[1739] Two weeks later came a bunch of five Stalwarts.[1740] The next day (March 23) Garfield nominated William H. Robertson for collector of customs at New York and Edwin A. Merritt for consul-general to London. "That evens things up," said Dennis McCarthy, the well-known Half-breed of the State Senate. "This is a complete surprise," added Robertson. "To my knowledge no one has solicited for me any place under Garfield. It comes entirely unsought."[1741] It was no less a surprise to the Stalwarts. Not a hint of it had been dropped by the President. "We had been told only a few hours before," wrote Conkling, "that no removals in the New York offices were soon to be made or even considered, and had been requested to withhold the papers and suggestions bearing on the subject until we had notice from the President of his readiness to receive them."[1742] Indeed, the nomination came with such suddenness that the action seemed to be hasty and ill considered.

[Footnote 1738: Alfred R. Conkling, Life of Conkling, p. 634.]

[Footnote 1739: Morton declined the navy portfolio, preferring the mission to France.]

[Footnote 1740: Stewart L. Woodford, U.S. attorney, and Louis F. Payn, U.S. marshal for the Southern District; Asa W. Tenney, U.S. attorney for the Eastern District; Clinton D. MacDougall, U.S. marshal for the Northern District; and John Tyler, collector of customs, Buffalo. These were reappointments.]

[Footnote 1741: New York Tribune, March 24, 1881.]

[Footnote 1742: From Conkling's letter of resignation.—New York Tribune, May 17, 1881.]

There is much literature on the subject. Reminiscences of public men during the last decade have opened a flood of memories, some of them giving specific statements from the principal actors. Blaine assured George S. Boutwell that he had no knowledge of Robertson's nomination until it had been made, and Garfield told Marshall Jewell that Blaine, hearing of the nomination, came in very pale and much astonished.[1743] Garfield wrote (May 29, 1881) Thomas M. Nichols, once his private secretary, that "the attempt to shift the fight to Blaine's shoulders is as weak as it is unjust. The fact is, no member of the Cabinet behaves with more careful respect for the rights of his brother men than Blaine. It should be understood that the Administration is not meddling in New York politics. It only defends itself when assailed."[1744] The President said to Conkling, declares Hoar, that he desired to make one conspicuous appointment of a New York man who had supported him against Grant, and that thereafter, upon consultation with the two Senators, appointments should be made of fit men without regard to factions. To this Conkling refused his consent, stoutly objecting to Robertson's appointment to any important office in this country. "Conkling's behaviour in the interview," said President Garfield "was so insolent that it was difficult for him to control himself and keep from ordering him out of his presence."[1745] Conkling says the President, on the Sunday preceding the appointment, informed him "that the collectorship of New York would be left for another time."[1746] In a statement purporting to come from the President, Jewell relates that when the five Stalwart nominations went to the Senate, Garfield was immediately burdened with letters and despatches in protest, coupled with the suggestion that everything had been surrendered to Conkling, and that without delay or consultation he sent in Robertson's name. "It was only an instance," says Boutwell, "of General Garfield's impulsive and unreasoning submission to an expression of public opinion, without waiting for evidence of the nature and value of that opinion."[1747]

[Footnote 1743: Boutwell, Reminiscences of Sixty Years, Vol. 2, p. 274.]

[Footnote 1744: New York Tribune, January 7, 1882.]

[Footnote 1745: Hoar, Autobiography, Vol. 2, p. 57.]

[Footnote 1746: Boutwell, Reminiscences, Vol. 2, p. 273.]

[Footnote 1747: Ibid., p. 274.]

On the other hand, the country at large accepted it as a Blaine triumph. Senators, especially those who had served in the House with the President and his Secretary of State, had no doubt of it. Such a tremendously bold act was entirely foreign to Garfield's character. Nor could it have but one meaning. The man who had split the New York delegation for Blaine was to have his reward and to occupy the place of patronage and of power. More than that it was Blaine's long look ahead. Such action required the highest order of political courage. It opened an old quarrel, it invited opposition, it challenged to battle. Men like Senator Frye of Maine, who had many times witnessed the resolution and dominating fearlessness of Blaine, knew that it was his act. "For sixteen years," said Frye, "the sting of Blaine's attack kept Conkling unfriendly. Besides, he had no confidence in him. Whenever reconciliation seemed imminent, it vanished like a cloud-shadow. I could never unite them. Blaine was ready, but Conkling would accept no advances. When Robertson's appointment came he knew as well as I that it was the act of Blaine."[1748] Depew, with whom Blaine had conferred, took the same view. On the day after the nomination was sent in, Mrs. Blaine, rather exultingly and without any expression of surprise, wrote her daughter of the incident. "Your father has just gone to the Department. Did you notice the nominations sent in yesterday? They mean business and strength."[1749]

[Footnote 1748: Conversation with the author, December 7, 1908.]

[Footnote 1749: Mrs. James G. Blaine, Letters (March 24, 1881), Vol. 1, p. 197.]

Boutwell illustrates Conkling's lack of confidence in Blaine. After the latter had become secretary of state he said to the Massachusetts Senator that Conkling was the only man who had had three elections to the Senate, and that he and his friends would be considered fairly in the New York appointments. "When in conversation with Conkling, I mentioned Blaine's remark, he said, 'Do you believe one word of that?' I said, 'Yes, I believe Mr. Blaine.' He said with emphasis, 'I don't.' Subsequent events strengthened Mr. Conkling in his opinion."[1750]

[Footnote 1750: Reminiscences, Vol. 2, p. 273.]

The cordial relations apparently existing until then between the President and the Senator encouraged the hope that confirmation of the nomination might not be opposed. Because of this feeling the New York Legislature, by a formal resolution, endorsed it, and Republicans generally spoke not unkindly of it. But Conkling, knowing that though the voice was Garfield's, the hand was Blaine's, quickly precipitated a contest in which the interest of the whole country centred. It recalled the Arthur controversy, renewed the feverish energy of Stalwart and Half-breed, and furnished glimpses of the dramatic discord which stirred restlessly behind the curtains of Senate secrecy. Under the rules of the Senate, Robertson's nomination went to the Committee on Commerce, of which Conkling was chairman and in control. Here the matter could be held in abeyance, at least until the Stalwarts marshalled their influence to have it withdrawn. For this purpose Vice-President Arthur and Postmaster-General James called at the White House. Governor Cornell, through a personal friend, sent a message to the President, declaring the nomination a great mistake and urging its withdrawal.[1751] Other distinguished men, including Senator Allison of Iowa, visited the President on a similar mission. When these overtures failed compromises were suggested, such as making Robertson a Federal judge, a district attorney, a foreign minister, or the solicitor general.

[Footnote 1751: Alfred R. Conkling, Life of Conkling, p. 637.]

Meanwhile assuring messages and comforting letters from Blaine's New York friends stimulated Garfield's courage. On March 27, four days after the nomination, Whitelaw Reid, the accomplished editor of the Tribune, telegraphed John Hay, in part, as follows: "From indications here and at Albany we have concluded that the Conkling plan is: First, to make tremendous pressure on the President for withdrawal of Robertson's name under threats from Conkling and persuasion from James. Second, if this fail, then to make their indignation useful by extorting from the President, as a means of placating them, the surveyorship and naval office. With these two they think they could largely neutralise Robertson. Cornell is believed willing to acquiesce in Robertson, hoping to get other offices.

"I wish to say to the President in my judgment this is the turning point of his whole administration—the crisis of his fate. If he surrenders now Conkling is president for the rest of the term and Garfield becomes a laughing stock. On the other hand, he has only to stand firm to succeed. With the unanimous action of the New York Legislature, Conkling cannot make an effectual fight. That action came solely from the belief that Garfield, unlike Hayes, meant to defend his own administration. The Assembly is overwhelmingly Conkling, but they did not dare go on the record against Robertson so long as they thought the Administration meant business. Robertson should be held firm. Boldness and tenacity now insure victory. The least wavering would be fatal."[1752]

[Footnote 1752: For full text of telegram see New York Tribune, January 7, 1882. This confidential despatch found its way into the public press. "It must have been stolen from the wires," wrote Hay. "Nobody but myself has ever seen it—not even Garfield. I read it to him. It has been under lock and key ever since."—Mrs. James G. Blaine, Letters, Vol. 1, p. 286.]

When Hay read this message to Garfield, the latter said, "They may take him out of the Senate head first or feet first; I will never withdraw him."[1753] That the President might not weaken, Depew and other Independents spent much time in Washington during the controversy. "The party standing of Blaine's New York supporters at Chicago absolutely depended upon Robertson's confirmation," declared Depew.[1754]

[Footnote 1753: Ibid.]

[Footnote 1754: Conversation with the author, March 28, 1909.]

Conkling had not been idle. As usual he cast an anchor to the windward by coquetting with Democratic senators and soothing his Republican colleagues.[1755] He knew how to control in caucus as well as in committee, and on May 2, the Republican senators appointed a Committee of Safety, which recommended that a majority decide the order of executive business including "uncontested nominations." These nominations, it was explained, embraced such as were favourably reported by a committee or accepted by the Republican senators of the State from which the nominee hailed. In other words, the caucus action practically notified the President that no nomination would be confirmed that did not please a senator, if a Republican. To exclude Robertson under such a rule it was only necessary that the New York senators object to his confirmation. Immediately the press of the country teemed with protests. The Constitution, it declared, imposed a moral obligation upon senators to confirm a nomination which was not personally unfit or improper, or which did not imperil the public interest, and it was puerile for a majority to agree in advance to refuse to consider any nomination to which any member, for any reason whatever, saw fit to object. Such a rule substantially transferred the Executive power to one branch of Congress, making the President the agent of the Senate. It was "senatorial courtesy" run mad.

[Footnote 1755: "If any Democratic senator is thinking only of New York politics, and of the mere party relations of the pending question of Presidential nominations, the Democrats of New York must frankly tell him that nothing but injury to the Democracy of New York has come or can come of coalitions with Senator Conkling. The past is eloquent on the subject. Whether set on foot by Mr. Tilden in 1873, or by Mr. Kelly at a later date, Democratic coalitions with Mr. Conkling have benefited only the Republicans. Mr. Tilden finally came to grief through them, and so did Mr. Kelly; and, what is more important, so did the Democratic party.... It is high time that the false lights which Senator Conkling displayed to certain Democratic senators, and with the help of whom the nominations of President Hayes were thwarted, should be understood. The chequered career of Senator Conkling should compel cautious people to inquire carefully into the evidence for any declaration which may be made by him as to President Garfield and his undertaking."—New York World, April 1, 1881.]

As the days passed senators exhibited, under pressure from the country as well as from the White House, a growing desire to have the matter settled, and as a final effort in the interest of harmony the Committee of Safety itself called upon the President, proposing that he withdraw Robertson's name and have the others confirmed. To this Garfield emphatically declined to accede. A few days later (May 5) Vice-President Arthur and Senator Platt suggested that he withdraw all the New York nominations. The President replied that he would willingly withdraw all except Robertson's, and if the latter failed an entire new slate could then be made up. This did not satisfy, but within an hour after his visitors had departed, the President, to prevent the confirmation of some while Robertson's was left tied up in committee, put his suggestion into a message, withdrawing the names of the five Stalwarts. This was another surprise, more alarming than the first, since it showed the Administration's readiness to fight.

Meantime the Republican majority exhibited signs of disintegration. The session was running into hot weather, Democrats had demonstrated their power to prevent a reorganisation of the Senate, and discord in Republican States threatened disaster. Until recently Conkling had felt sure of victory. But now, appreciating the delicacy of the situation, he opened the caucus (May 9) with an earnest, conciliatory speech. He disclaimed desiring any conflict with the President, against whom he made no accusations of bad faith; described the impracticability of his sustaining any relations with Robertson, in whose way, however, he would place no obstacle to any office other than that of collector; discussed the danger to which a lack of political harmony would expose the party in New York; and in almost pathetic tones urged that the courtesy of the Senate be not withheld from him in this hour of his extreme need.

It was plain that he had won the sympathy of his colleagues, but succeeding caucuses, now held daily, lined his pathway with portents and warnings. The iron-clad rule ceased to be operative; a resolution to postpone action until the next session avoided defeat because hastily withdrawn; and a compromise, the last to be suggested, proposing confirmation on condition that Robertson then decline the office, met with no favour. It was plain that at last the stress had reached a climax. Senators no longer exchanged their impressions, or asked "How long?" or "What next?" In their opinion either Garfield or Conkling must recede, and they had learned that the President would not. Moreover, it was rumored, after the caucus of May 13, that Conkling had talked harshly, with much of the temper of a spoiled child. As senators separated on that eventful Friday they declared without hesitation, though not without misgiving, that the last caucus had been held and the last obstacle to Robertson's confirmation removed.

The position of Platt had at last become intolerable. Mindful of the promise to Depew and his friends he had tactfully and patiently sought to avoid a contest by satisfactorily arranging matters between the President and Conkling. Now the end of compromises had come and a vote impended. At this critical if not desperate moment he suggested resignation.[1756] The Legislature that chose him in January was still in session, and the combined votes of the Stalwarts would be sufficient to re-elect them. This would liberate him from a promise and strengthen both with a legislative endorsement. It was neither an intrepid nor an exalted proposition, but Conkling accepted it. Perhaps his nature required a relief from its high-strung irritability in some sort of violence, and resignation backed by the assurance that he would soon be restored to office and to greater power on the shoulders of the party offered the seductive form which that violence could take.

[Footnote 1756: "I walked over to Conkling and said, 'I shall send my resignation to Governor Cornell to-night.' Conkling turned to me and replied: 'Don't be too hasty about this matter, young man.' We then went to the rear of the Senate Chamber and talked it over. Conkling insisted that we should wait, and fight it out in Committee. I replied, 'We have been so humiliated that there is but one thing for us to do—rebuke the President by immediately turning in our resignations and then appeal to the Legislature to sustain us.' I induced Conkling to join me in offering our joint resignations, and that night the papers were forwarded to Cornell by special messenger." Platt's Reminiscences.—Cosmopolitan Magazine, April, 1909, p. 516.

It was at this time that Platt's opponents gave him the sobriquet of "Me Too," meaning that he merely followed Conkling's lead. This was unjust to the junior Senator, who at least took the lead in suggesting and insisting upon resigning.]

Before the Senate reconvened on Monday (May 16) the resignation of Conkling and Platt was in the hands of Governor Cornell. It came with the suddenness of Robertson's nomination. Neither Vice-President Arthur shared their intention, nor did Cornell suspect it. The first intimation came in two brief notes, read by the clerk, informing the Senate of their action. But the crash—the consternation, if any were anticipated, did not appear.[1757] No doubt many senators sincerely regretted the manner of Conkling's going, but that all were weary of his restless predominance soon became an open secret.[1758] Nor did his reasons appeal to any one except as regarded his own personality and power, since the Senator's statement showed a deliberate, personal choice, not based on a question of public policy.

[Footnote 1757: "The sensational resignations of Conkling and Platt produce no excitement here (Washington), and I have yet to hear one criticism complimentary of Conkling, though I have seen all sorts of people and of every shade of cowardice."—Mrs. James G. Blaine, Letters (May 17, 1881), Vol. 1, p. 199.

Robertson and Merritt were promptly and unanimously confirmed on May 18. Two days afterward the names of the five Stalwarts, which had been withdrawn, were resubmitted, except those of Payn and Tyler.]

[Footnote 1758: "Conkling was unrelenting in his enmities. He used to get angry with men simply because they voted against him on questions in which he took an interest. Once he did not for months speak to Justin S. Morrill, one of the wisest and kindliest of men, because of his pique at one of Merrill's votes."—George F. Hoar, Autobiography, Vol. 2, p. 55.]

Stripped of its rhetoric and historicity the letter of Conkling and Platt presented but two causes of complaint, one that the President, in withdrawing some of the New York nominations, tried to coerce the Senate to vote for Robertson; second, that Robertson, in voting and procuring others to vote against Grant at Chicago, was guilty of "a dishonest and dishonourable act."[1759] The poverty of these reasons excited more surprise than the folly of their resignation.[1760] Every one knew that in urging senators to say by their vote whether William H. Robertson was a fit person to be collector, the President kept strictly within his constitutional prerogative, and that in withdrawing the earlier nominations he exercised his undoubted right to determine the order in which he should ask the Senate's advice. Moreover, if any doubt ever existed as to Robertson's right to represent the sentiment of his district instead of the decree of the State convention, the national convention had settled it in his favour.

[Footnote 1759: The full text of the letter is published in the New York papers of May 17, 1881.]

[Footnote 1760: "I was very much surprised at Senator Conkling's action," said Senator Frye of Maine, "because of Judge Robertson's personal hostility to him and not on account of his lack of fitness. During President Hayes' administration not an important appointment was made in Maine to which Senators Blaine and Hamlin were not bitterly opposed. One man was appointed after Mr. Blaine had stated that he was probably the only prominent Republican in the State personally hostile to him. Yet, with a single exception, all were confirmed, notwithstanding the opposition of the Maine Senators. But neither of them resigned. They were too good Republicans for that."—New York Tribune, May 17, 1881.]

Conkling's friends are credited with having overborne his purpose, expressed soon after the election of Garfield, to leave the Senate and engage in the practice of his profession.[1761] But that such intention did not influence his resignation was evidenced by the fact that immediately afterward he bivouacked at Albany and sought a re-election. With his faithful lieutenants he constantly conferred, while the faithless ones, scarcely less conspicuous, who openly refused their support, he stigmatised. From the first Cornell was an object of distrust. He had wired Conkling advising Robertson's confirmation, and the Senator crushed the telegram in his hand. This put the Governor into the disloyal class.[1762] It added to Conkling's irritation also that Cornell remained silent. The Governor's friends expressed some surprise that the Senator did not suggest an interview. It would have been much more surprising if he had, for it is doubtful if Conkling ever suggested an interview in his life. On the other hand, Cornell, unwilling to use the machinery of his great office to force Conkling's return, did not care to approach the Senator. It was not unknown, however, that he refused to become a candidate for United States senator, and that, although ten or fifteen members continued to vote for him, he steadily encouraged his Stalwart friends not to desert Conkling.

[Footnote 1761: A.R. Conkling, Life of Conkling, p. 632.]

[Footnote 1762: Conkling spoke of Cornell as "The lizard on the hill."]

Although the Legislature which elected Platt on January 18 was still in session, the sentiment dominating it had radically changed. The party was deeply stirred. The Senator's sudden resignation had added to the indignation aroused by his opposition to the Administration, and members had heard from their constituents. Besides, a once powerful Senator was now a private citizen. At the outset Independents and several Stalwarts refused to enter a caucus, and early in the contest the Democrats, marshalled by Manning, refused to come to the rescue. Thus, without organisation, Republicans began voting on May 31. Seven weeks and four days later (July 22), after fifty-six ballots, their work was concluded. The first ballot marked the highest score for Conkling and Platt, the former receiving 39 and the latter 29 out of 105 Republican votes.[1763] This severe comment upon their course plainly reflected the general sentiment of the party. It showed especially the dissatisfaction existing toward Conkling. Yet a few Stalwarts remained steadfast to the end. On the morning of July 1, when Platt, to the surprise of his friends, suddenly withdrew, he had 28 votes. On July 22 Conkling had the same.

[Footnote 1763: The ballot resulted as follows: To succeed Platt (long term), Thomas C. Platt, 29; Chauncey M. Depew, 21; Alonzo B. Cornell, 12; Elbridge G. Lapham, 8; Warner Miller, 5; Richard Crowley, 3; scattering, 25. Francis Kernan (Dem.), 54. Total, 157.

To succeed Conkling (short term), Roscoe Conkling, 39; William A. Wheeler, 19; Alonzo B. Cornell, 9; Richard Crowley, 5; Warner Miller, 1; scattering 37. John C. Jacobs (Dem.), 53. Total, 159.]

The act of the assassin of President Garfield on the morning of July 2 had a visible effect upon the proceedings at Albany.[1764] Although for a time conditions indicated that the distinguished sufferer might recover, legislators evinced a great desire to conclude the disagreeable work, and on July 5, sixty-six Republicans held a conference. Up to this time Depew had been the favourite for the long term, registering fifty-five votes on the fourteenth ballot (June 14), but in the interest of harmony he now withdrew his name.[1765]

[Footnote 1764: "Suddenly the adherents of the murdered President saw the powers of government about to be transferred to the leader of their defeated adversaries, and that transfer effected by the act of an assassin. Many of them could not instantly accept the truth that it was the act solely of a half-crazed and disappointed seeker for office; many of them questioned whether the men who were to profit by the act were not the instigators of it."—From address of Elihu Root, delivered at the unveiling of President Arthur's statue in Madison Square, New York, June 13, 1899.]

[Footnote 1765: On June 9, S.H. Bradley of Cattaraugus, made a personal explanation in the Assembly, charging Loren B. Sessions, of the Senate, with offering him $2,000 to cast his vote for Depew. Sessions denied the charge. Investigation proved nothing, and an indictment, subsequently returned against Sessions, resulted in a trial and an acquittal.]

This opened the way for Warner Miller, who received in caucus on the fifth ballot sixty-two of the sixty-six votes cast for the long term. By previous agreement a Stalwart was entitled to the short term, and had Cornell allowed his Stalwart friends to enter the caucus he might have had the nomination. But he would not oppose Conkling. Moreover, the belief obtained that the Democrats and Stalwarts would yet unite and adjourn the session without day, thus giving the Senator time to elect other friends to a new Legislature, and the Governor would not disturb this hallucination. With Cornell out of the way Elbridge G. Lapham easily won the nomination on the second ballot. Lapham had been the first to desert Conkling, who now exclaimed, not without the bitter herb of truth: "That man must not reap the reward of his perfidy."[1766]

[Footnote 1766: New York Tribune, July 7, 1881.]

The caucus did not at once bring union, but on July 12 Miller's vote reached seventy; on the 15th it registered seventy-four; and on the 16th, with the help of Speaker Sharpe, who had encouraged Conkling's going to Albany, Miller was elected.[1767] Lapham's vote, however, hung fire until July 22, when, during a brief and most exciting conference in the Assembly Chamber, State Senator Halbert, the Conkling Gibraltar, exclaimed with the suddenness of a squall at sea: "We must come together or the party is divided in the State. I am willing to vote now."[1768] Reason and good nature being thus restored, each Republican present rose and voted his choice, Lapham receiving sixty-one, Conkling twenty-eight. In the general rejoicing State Senator Pitts, a leader of the Independents, no doubt voiced the feeling of all at that moment: "I am as happy as Mr. Halbert. This nomination has been made good-naturedly. It is an augury of good feeling in the future. New York proposes to stand by the Republican administration. I hope we shall never hear more the words Stalwart, Featherhead, Half-breed."[1769] When the joint convention again reassembled the fifty-sixth ballot gave Elbridge G. Lapham ninety-two, and Clarkson N. Potter, the new Democratic nominee, forty-two.[1770]

[Footnote 1767: "At a conference held on May 22, at the house of Chester A. Arthur, No. 123 Lexington Avenue, the following persons were present: Chester A. Arthur, Thomas C. Platt, Louis F. Payn, Charles M. Denison, George H. Sharpe, John F. Smyth, A.B. Johnson, and Roscoe Conkling. Each person was asked to pass judgment upon the future course of the two Senators. Each one spoke in turn. The sense of the meeting was that they should proceed to the State capital."—A.R. Conkling, Life of Conkling, pp. 642-643.

"Payn warned both Conkling and Platt that they would be defeated. Speaker Sharpe admonished Payn that he was wrong. Payn predicted that while he and other friends were still battling for the organisation Sharpe would desert them. Payn proved himself a prophet. Sharpe went over to the opposition." Platt's Reminiscences.—Cosmopolitan Magazine, April, 1909, p. 517.]

[Footnote 1768: New York papers of July 23.]

[Footnote 1769: New York Tribune, July 23.]

[Footnote 1770: The candidacy of John C. Jacobs had been the subject of some criticism on the part of the Democrats because he was a member of the Legislature, and on June 22, after the twenty-third ballot, he withdrew. A caucus then substituted the name of Potter.]

For Conkling it was worse than defeat. The humiliation of having gone to Albany, of being deserted by friend after friend, of enduring the taunts of an inhospitable press, and, finally, of having his place taken by one, who, in his opinion, had proven most faithless, was like the torture of an unquenchable fire. Lord Randolph Churchill, after his historic resignation as chancellor of the exchequer, declared that he would not live it over again for a million a year. It is likewise a matter of history that Senator Conkling never ceased to deplore his mistake.[1771]

[Footnote 1771: Conkling at once resumed the practice of law in New York City. The strain and exposure of making his way on foot through the snowdrifts of the historic blizzard which visited that city in the spring of 1888, resulted in an abscess in the inner ear, from which he died on April 18. A bronze statue, erected in his memory, is located in Madison Square.

"We have followed poor Conkling down to the gates of death and have been truly sorry to see them close upon him. I have never heard your father, in all the twenty-two years since he spoke hard words to him, say a syllable which he need regret, but his deathbed seemed hardly less inaccessible than his life."—Mrs. James G. Blaine, Letters, Vol. 2, p. 203. Dated, San Remo, May 1, 1888. Addressed to Walker Blaine.]



CHAPTER XXXVI

CLEVELAND'S ENORMOUS MAJORITY

1881-2

While Conkling was being deposed, John Kelly, to whom responsibility attached for Hancock's defeat, also suffered the penalty of selfish leadership.[1772] Although his standard of official honesty had always been as low as his standard of official responsibility, it never aroused violent party opposition until his personal resentments brought Democratic defeat. This classified him at once as a common enemy. In vain did he protest as Tweed had done against being made a "scape-goat." His sentence was political death, and as a first step toward its execution, Mayor Cooper refused to reappoint him comptroller, an office which he had held for four years. Republican aldermen joined in confirming his successor. Similar treatment, accorded his office-holding associates, stripped him of patronage except in the office of register.

[Footnote 1772: "He wantonly sacrificed the Hancock ticket to his unscrupulous quest of local power. The Democracy here and elsewhere perfectly understand his perfidy, and they only await an opportunity for a reckoning. They intend to punish him and make an example of him as a warning to bolting renegades and traitors."—New York Herald, November 5, 1880.]

Then his Democratic opponents proposed depriving him of control in conventions, and having failed to reorganise him out of Tammany (April, 1881), they founded the County Democracy. William C. Whitney, corporation counsel, Hubert O. Thompson, the young commissioner of public works, and other leaders of similar character, heading a Committee of One Hundred, became its inspiration. Under the Tammany system twenty-four men constituted the Committee on Organisation, while a few persons at any Assembly primary might represent all the votes of the district. The new organisation proposed to make its Committee on Organisation consist of six hundred and seventy-eight members and to place the control of all nominations in the hands of the people. It was a catchy scheme and quickly became popular. To carry it into effect a public enrolment was made of the Democratic voters in each election district, who had an opportunity, by registering their names, to join the Election District Committee. When thus affiliated each one could vote for a member of the Committee on Organisation and for delegates to nominating conventions. On October 7 (1881) Abram S. Hewitt, chairman of the Committee of One Hundred, issued an address, declaring that the organisation had 26,500 enrolled members, and had elected delegates to attend the State convention which met at Albany on October 11.

Kelly did not attend the convention. On his way from the depot to the hotel he found the air too chilly and the speech of people far from complimentary. It was plain, also, that the crushing defeat of Hancock had obliterated factional division in the up-State counties and that Daniel E. Manning was in control. Nevertheless, Tammany's delegates, without the slightest resemblance to penitents, claimed regularity. The convention answered that the County Democracy appeared upon the preliminary roll. To make its rebuff more emphatic Rufus W. Peckham, in presenting the report on contested seats, briefly stated that the committee, by a unanimous vote, found "the gentlemen now occupying seats entitled to them by virtue of their regularity."[1773] Kelly's conceit did not blind his penetration to the fact that for the present, at least, he had reached his end.

[Footnote 1773: Appleton's Cyclopaedia, 1881, p. 655.

The State ticket was as follows: Secretary of State, William Purcell, Monroe; Comptroller, George H. Lapham, Yates; Attorney-General, Roswell A. Parmenter, Rensselaer; Treasurer, Robert A. Maxwell, Genesee; Engineer, Thomas Evershed, Orleans; Judge, Court of Appeals, Augustus Schoonmaker, Ulster.]

The Republican convention (October 5) proved not less harmonious. Arthur had become President (September 19),[1774] Conkling did not appear, and Warner Miller's surprising vote for temporary chairman (298 to 190), sustaining the verdict of the Legislature in the prolonged senatorial struggle, completely silenced the Stalwarts. Conkling's name, presented as a contesting delegate from Oneida, provoked no support, while Depew, whom the Senator a year earlier had sneeringly referred to as a "creature of no influence," became permanent chairman without opposition. In the selection of State candidates few organization men found favour.[1775] Finally, in their overconfidence the Independents carelessly postponed a resolution reorganising the party in New York City to an hour when their rural support had left the convention, and the most important business before it failed by five majority. "Thus by sheer negligence," said George William Curtis, "the convention has left a formidable nucleus for the reconstruction of the machine which had been overthrown."[1776] The platform deplored the death of Garfield, expressed confidence in President Arthur, praised Cornell's wisdom, prudence, and economy, and insisted upon equal taxation of corporations and individuals.

[Footnote 1774: "It was a common saying of that time among those who knew him best, '"Chet" Arthur, President of the United States! Good God!'"—White, Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 193.]

[Footnote 1775: The ticket was as follows: Secretary of State, Joseph B. Carr, Rensselaer; Comptroller, Ira Davenport, Steuben; Attorney-General, Leslie W. Russell, St. Lawrence; Treasurer, James W. Husted, Westchester; Engineer and Surveyor, Silas Seymour, Saratoga; Judge of the Court of Appeals, Francis M. Finch, Tompkins.]

[Footnote 1776: Harper's Weekly, October 15.]

Although the deep silence that characterised the October contest in Ohio pervaded the campaign in New York, Republicans believed that President Arthur, by the moderation and dignity of his course, had favourably impressed the public.[1777] His nomination of Postmaster General James and the tender of the Treasury to Edwin D. Morgan commanded universal approval. When Morgan declined, the nomination of Charles J. Folger, suggested by Morgan, added to his prestige. In fact, the most ardent champions of Garfield had taken little exception to the acts of the new Administration, and although Arthur's supporters had suffered defeat in convention, it was inferred that the President and his friends sincerely desired the triumph of their party. Moreover, the action of Tammany and the County Democracy in nominating separate local tickets had stimulated Republican confidence. It meant that Kelly, in his inevitable desire to defeat his enemy, would trade, combine, and descend to other underhand jobbery, which usually benefited the opposite party.

[Footnote 1777: "I dined at the President's on Wednesday. The dinner was extremely elegant, hardly a trace of the old White House taint being perceptible anywhere, the flowers, the silver, the attendants, all showing the latest style and an abandon in expense and taste."—Mrs. James G. Blaine, Letters (March 13, 1882), Vol. 2, pp. 4, 5.]

However, the harmony blandly predicted did not appear. James W. Husted was overwhelmingly defeated, while his party, for the first time in twelve years, lost both branches of the Legislature.[1778] This amazing disclosure exhibited the bitter animosity of faction. In Albany, Erie, Oneida, and Oswego counties, Stalwart and Independent resolutely opposed each other, even to the point in some instances of supporting the Democratic ticket.

[Footnote 1778: Plurality of Carr, secretary of state, 13,022. Other Republicans had about the same, except Husted, whom Maxwell, treasurer, defeated by 20,943. The Legislature stood: Senate, Democrats, 17; Republicans, 15. Assembly, Democrats, 67; Republicans, 61.]

On the other hand, the County Democracy was exultant. In spite of the combined opposition of Tammany and Irving Hall, the Whitney organisation carried the county by several thousand majority, securing four of the seven senators, twelve of the twenty-four assemblymen, and twelve of the twenty-two aldermen. This left Tammany absolutely without patronage. It was not unnatural that many of Kelly's co-workers should doubt the possibility of longer working harmoniously under his leadership, and the great secession of prominent men from Tammany after the formation of the County Democracy created little surprise. But that the movement should include the rank and file was an astonishing revelation.

Nevertheless, Kelly, gathering up his three senators and eight assemblymen, carried the war to Albany. Strangely enough Republican discord had given him the balance of power in each legislative body, and until the Democrats acceded to his terms (February 2) the Assembly remained without a speaker.[1779] Two weeks later, upon the announcement of the Assembly committees, Tammany, declaring its agreement violated, joined the Republicans in modifying the rules of the Senate so as to permit the Lieutenant-Governor to appoint its committees and complete its organisation.

[Footnote 1779: Kelly demanded the chairmanship of cities in both Houses, a satisfactory composition of the committees on railroads and on commerce and navigation, a share in the subordinate offices, and the exclusion of John C. Jacobs of Kings from the presidency of the Senate.]

No one knowing Kelly expected him to act otherwise. Nor can it be seriously doubted that he fully expected the Democracy, at the very next opportunity, to make substantial concessions. At all events Kelly presented with great confidence Tammany's claims to representation in the State convention which assembled at Syracuse on September 22 (1882).[1780] He knew it was a critical moment for the Democracy. The poverty of the Republican majority in the preceding election, and the Administration's highhanded efforts to defeat Cornell for renomination, seemed to put the State within the grasp of a united party. Yet the Tilden leaders, although divided among themselves, shrank from giving him power. This feeling was intensified by the renewed activity of the old canal ring. The presence, too, of Stephen T. Arnot of Chemung, who served as a member of the Kelly State Committee in 1879, added to their hostility. Indeed, so pronounced was the resentment that on the first day of the convention Tammany was refused tickets of admission.