[Footnote 1310: New York Tribune (editorials), May 19, 20, 25, 1871.]

This was the condition of affairs when the Republican convention met at Syracuse on September 27. Except Greeley every prominent leader in the State attended. The question whether the rival general committee created by the State organisation should be recognised involved the whole party, and the audience assembled surpassed any previous attendance. The presence of a multitude of federal officials as delegates and leaders indicated that the Administration at Washington also took a deep interest. There was much doubt and solicitude as to the result, for no opportunity had been given the factions to measure strength since the convention of 1870. The nomination of a minority candidate for speaker of the Assembly in the preceding January had been claimed as a Fenton victory, but the selection of James W. Husted, then at the threshold of a long and conspicuous career, did not turn on such a hinge. Husted had strength of his own. Although never to become an orator of great power and genuine inspiration, his quickness of perception, coupled with the manners of an accomplished gentleman, brilliant in conversation and formidable in debate, made him a popular favourite whose strength extended beyond faction. Now, however, the issue was sharply drawn, and when Alonzo B. Cornell called the convention to order, the opposing forces, marshalled for a fight to the finish, announced Andrew D. White and Chauncey M. Depew as their respective candidates for temporary chairman. White's recent appointment as a commissioner to San Domingo had been a distinct gain to the President's scheme of annexation, and he now appeared at the convention in obedience to Cornell's solicitation.[1311] To gain a bit of advantage Depew, in the interest of harmony, he said, withdrew in favour of G. Hilton Scribner of Westchester, who had headed a young men's association formed to allay strife between the rival senators. The suggestion being accepted, Depew then moved to make Scribner and White temporary and permanent chairmen. Upon the temporary chairman depended the character of the committees, and Cornell, with a frown upon his large, sallow, cleanly shaven face, promptly ruled the motion out of order. When a Fenton delegate appealed from the Chair's ruling, he refused to put the question.

[Footnote 1311: White, Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 164.]

Instantly the convention was upon its feet. Demands for roll-call and the shouts of a hundred men stifled the work of the gavel. Police interference increased the noise. In the midst of the confusion the stentorian voice of John Cochrane, a Fenton delegate, declared "the roll entirely wrong."[1312] This aggravated the situation. Finally, when delegates and chairman had physically exhausted themselves, Waldo M. Hutchins was allowed to suggest that in all cases of contested seats the names of delegates be passed. To this Cornell reluctantly agreed amidst loud applause from the Fenton faction, which desired its action interpreted as an unselfish concession in the interest of harmony; but the tremendous surprise subsequently displayed upon the announcement of White's election by 188 to 159 revealed its insincerity. It had confidently counted on twenty-one additional votes, or a majority of thirteen.[1313] Thus, in a moment, were brightest hopes and fairest prospects blasted.

[Footnote 1312: New York Tribune, September 28, 1871.]

[Footnote 1313: "In particular they [the Fenton men] felt sure of one vote not received from Allegany County, two from Broome, three from Columbia, two from Cortlandt, three from Dutchess, three from Jefferson, one from Ontario, three from Washington, and three from Wayne."—Ibid.

"Mr. Murphy's office-holders were numerous and active, and turned the whole organisation into an instrument for the service of his [Conkling's] personal ambition. When the State convention was to meet, Mr. Conkling and Mr. Murphy were among the first at Syracuse. It was remarked that while they worked hard, they took no thought of the reform movement. Their sole object was to control the convention. The confidence which the delegates placed in them was astonishing, but more astonishing still was the manner in which Andrew D. White lent himself to this faction and did its work."—New York Evening Post, September 29, 1871.]

It was easy to speculate as to the cause of this overthrow. To declare it the triumph of patronage; to assert that delegates from Republican strongholds supported Fenton and that others from counties with overwhelming Democratic majorities sustained Conkling; to stigmatise the conduct of Cornell as an unprecedented exhibition of tyranny, and to charge White with seeking the votes of Fenton members on the plea that his action would promote harmony,[1314] probably did not economise the truth. Explanations, however, could not relieve the anguish of defeat or nerve the weak to greater effort. Many delegates, filled with apprehension and anxious to be on the winning side, thought annihilation more likely than any sincere and friendly understanding, a suspicion that White's committee appointments quickly ratified. Although the Fenton faction comprised nearly one-half the convention, the Committee on Credentials stood 12 to 2 in favour of Conkling. Of course the famous president of Cornell University did not select this committee. He simply followed custom and fathered the list of names Cornell handed him.[1315] "But in blindly consenting to be thus used by the State committee," wrote Greeley, "he became the instrument of such an outrage as no respectable presiding officer of any prominent deliberative body has ever committed."[1316]

[Footnote 1314: "Mr. White personally sought the votes of Fenton members for the temporary chairmanship on the pledge that he would so act as to promote harmony."—New York Tribune, October 21, 1871.]

[Footnote 1315: "I received the list of the convention committees from the State committee with express assurance that the list represented fairly the two wings of the party. I had no reason then, and have no reason now, to believe that the State committee abused my confidence."—White, Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 166.]

[Footnote 1316: New York Tribune, September 29, 1871.]

To the Fenton faction this severe criticism of a presumably fair man seemed justified after his jug-handle committee had made its jug-handle report. It favoured seating all contesting delegates outside of the City, admitted the Greeley delegates and their opponents with the right to cast half of one vote, and recognised the organisation established by the State committee as the regular and the only one. By this time the dullest delegate understood the trend of affairs. Indeed, dismissals and appointments in the civil service had preceded the assembling of the convention until politicians understood that the way to preferment opened only to those obedient to the new dictator. Accordingly, on the next roll-call, the weak-kneed took flight, the vote standing 202 to 116. Upon hearing the astounding result a Fenton delegate exclaimed, "Blessed are they that expect nothing, for they shall not be disappointed."[1317]

[Footnote 1317: New York Tribune, September 28, 1871.]

In discussing the resolution to abolish the Greeley committee the question narrowed itself to members holding office under Tammany, the Greeley organisation maintaining that it had simply inherited the custom, not created it, while Cornell and his associates, having "Hank" Smith in mind, declared it impossible to avoid the custom without destroying the committee. To some of the Conkling leaders this seemed unnecessarily severe. Having showed their teeth they hesitated to lacerate the party, especially after the mad rush to the winning side had given them an overwhelming majority. At last, it fell to Hamilton Ward, a friend of the Senator, for six years a member of Congress, a forcible speaker, and still a young man of nerve, who was to become attorney-general and a judge of the Supreme Court, to propose as a substitute that the State committee be directed to consolidate and perfect the two city organisations. The Fenton people promptly acquiesced, and their opponents, after eliminating Smith by disallowing a member of the organisation to hold office under Tammany, cheerfully accepted it.

This compromise, thus harmoniously perfected in the presence and hearing of the convention, was loudly applauded, and the chairman had risen to put the motion when Conkling interrupted, "Not yet the question, Mr. President!" Until then the Senator had been a silent spectator. Indeed, not until the previous roll-call did he become a member of the convention. But he was now to become its master. His slow, measured utterances and deep chest-tones commanded instant attention. If for a moment, as he calmly declared opposition to the substitute, he seemed to stand alone, his declaration that a horde of Tammany ballot-box stuffers, pirates, and robbers had controlled and debauched the Republican organisation in the city of New York called forth the loudest applause of the evening. His next statement, that the time had come when such encroachments must cease, renewed the cheering. Having thus paid his respects to the Greeley committee, Conkling argued that a new State committee could not do in the four weeks preceding election what it had taken the old committee months to accomplish. The campaign must be made not with a divided organisation, but with ranks closed up. Reading from an editorial in the Tribune, he claimed that it approved the committee's report, and he begged the convention to take the editor at his word, shake hands, bury animosities and disappointments, make up a ticket equally of both factions, and accept the reorganisation of the city committee, so that double delegations might not appear at the next national convention to parade their dissensions. He disclaimed any unkind feeling, and in favouring the admission of both city delegations, he said, he supposed he had worked in the interest of harmony.

This appeal has been called one of Conkling's "most remarkable speeches."[1318] Unlike the Senator's usual efforts laboured preparation did not precede it. The striking passage and the impressive phrase are entirely wanting. Epigrammatic utterances are the supreme test of a great orator or poet, but Conkling's speech of September 27 added nothing to that vocabulary. It may be said to lack every element of a well-ordered oration. As preserved in the newspapers of the day[1319] it is hard, if not impossible, to find sufficient rhetorical merit to entitle it to a place in any volume of ordinary addresses. It wanted the persuasive power that allures by an exquisite choice of words, or charms by noble and sympathetic elocution. Even the style of his appeal for harmony was too self-assured and his faith in his own superiority too evident. Nevertheless, of the living who heard his explosive exclamation, "Not yet the question, Mr. President," and the flaming sentences arraigning the Greeley Republicans as partners of Tammany, it lingers in the memory as a forceful philippic, full of pose and gesture and dramatic action. Its influence, however, is not so clear. The power of patronage had already twice carried the convention, and that this incentive would have done so again had Conkling simply whispered to his lieutenants, must be evident to all who read the story. Ward's motion was lost by 154 to 194, the Conkling vote being eight less than on the preceding roll-call.[1320]

[Footnote 1318: "Such a speech, in its terms, its forcible eloquence, its overwhelming results, was perhaps never heard in a similar assemblage. Many of Senator Conkling's friends insist that this was one of his most remarkable speeches."—Alfred R. Conkling, Life of Roscoe Conkling, p. 341.]

[Footnote 1319: Syracuse Standard, New York Times, September 28, 1871.]

[Footnote 1320: "Just as the whole convention had agreed upon the compromise, Conkling arose and ordered his office-holders to reject it."—New York Evening Post, September 29.]

Conkling desired a solid delegation at the next Republican National Convention, and the recognition of the organisation established by the State committee assured it, whereas the Ward amendment, by including the Greeley constituency, inspired the fear of a divided one.[1321] Perhaps the failure of his friends to appreciate this fear justified Conkling's interference, but a single word of dissent was sufficient to alarm them, while a less arrogant and dominating spirit might easily have avoided making the bitter assault which provoked a storm of hostile criticism. Greeley's stinging retort illuminated the Senator's insincerity. "Conkling declared it right," said the editor, "to abolish the regular organisation because corrupted and controlled by Tammany money, and then invited its delegates to an equal share in making the platform and selecting a ticket. If he believed what he said, he was guilty of party treason in the offer; if he did not, he added the folly of insult to the crime of foul slander."[1322] This was the view of the Greeley delegates, and refusing to accept the offered terms, Moses H. Grinnell, Marshall O. Roberts, and their associates, amid ironical cheers, withdrew from the convention.

[Footnote 1321: New York Tribune, June 1, 1871.]

[Footnote 1322: New York Tribune, September 29, 1871.]

After this business progressed smoothly and easily. There were no divisions, no debates, and no questions of importance. Nominations aroused little enthusiasm,[1323] and the platform which Greeley called "the miracle of clumsiness,"[1324] indorsed the administration of President Grant, denounced the crimes of the Tweed ring, and recommended local option. Meanwhile the seceders, assembled in Wild's Opera House, gave vent to bitter criticism and the whispered scandal of hotel lobbies.[1325] When this proceeding finally ended they separated with the consciousness that their last performance, at least, had made them ridiculous.

[Footnote 1323: The State ticket was as follows: Secretary of State, G. Hilton Scribner, Westchester; Comptroller, Nelson K. Hopkins, Erie; Treasurer, Thomas Raines, Monroe; Attorney-General, Francis C. Barlow, New York; Engineer, William B. Taylor, Oneida; Canal Commissioner, Alexander Barkley, Washington; Prison Inspector, Thomas Kirkpatrick, Cayuga.]

[Footnote 1324: New York Tribune, September 29, 1871.]

[Footnote 1325: Ibid.]



CHAPTER XXI

TILDEN CRUSHES TAMMANY

1871

While Conkling was disposing of Greeley and the Fenton organisation, Samuel J. Tilden prepared to crush Tammany. Tweed had reason to fear Tilden. In 1869 he accused the Ring of being "opposed to all good government."[1326] Afterward, in 1870, the defeat of the Young Democracy's charter added to his bitterness. On the evening of the day on which that vote occurred, Tweed jeered Tilden as the latter passed through the hotel corridor, while Tilden, trembling with suppressed emotion, expressed the belief that the Boss would close his career in jail or in exile.[1327] One wonders that Tilden, being a natural detective, should have delayed strenuous action until the Times' exposure, but when, at last, a knowledge of the colossal frauds suddenly opened the way to successful battle, he seized the advantage with the skill and persistency of a master.

[Footnote 1326: Paine, Life of Nast, p. 194.]

[Footnote 1327: This remark was addressed to Henry Richmond, whose father, Dean Richmond, died in Tilden's home in Gramercy Park. Richmond succeeded his father as State committeeman.]

In his crusade he did not unite with Republicans, for whom he had no liking. He was not only an intense partisan, but he had a positive genius for saying bitter things in the bitterest way. To him the quarter of a century covered by Van Buren, Marcy, and Wright, shone as an era of honour and truth, while the twenty-four years spanned by the Republicans and the party from whence they sprung brought shame and disgrace upon the State. "The Republicans made the morals of the legislative bodies what they have recently become. When Seward and Weed took the place of Wright, Marcy, and Flagg, public and official morality fell in the twinkling of an eye. Even our city government, until 1870, was exactly what a Republican legislature made it. The league between corrupt Republicans and corrupt Democrats, which was formed during Republican ascendency, proved too strong for honest men. The charter of 1870 which I denounced in a public speech, had the votes of nearly all the Republicans and Democrats."[1328] Still, he admitted that Tammany was synonymous with Democracy, and that its corruption, especially since its blighting influence had become so notorious and oppressive, impeded and dishonoured the party. Under its rule primaries had been absurdities and elections a farce. Without being thoroughly reorganised, therefore, the party, in his opinion, could not exist.[1329]

[Footnote 1328: Tilden's letter to the Democracy, dated September 11, 1871.—New York Tribune, September 22, 1871.]

[Footnote 1329: Tilden's interview.—Ibid., Sept 23.]

In this spirit Tilden entered upon the great work of his life. Two classes of Democrats faced him—the more clamorous reformers and the enemies of all reform. To the latter reorganisation seemed a reckless step. It argued that the loss of the Tammany vote meant the dissolution of the party, and that a great organisation ought not to be destroyed for the wrong of a few individuals, since the party was not responsible for them. Besides, the executive power of the State, with its vast official patronage scattered throughout all the counties, would oppose such a policy. On the other hand, the first class, possessing little faith in the party's ability to purge itself, threatened to turn reform into political revolution. It desired a new party. Nevertheless, Tilden did not hesitate. He issued letters to thousands of Democrats, declaring that "wherever the gangrene of corruption has reached the Democratic party we must take a knife and cut it out by the roots;"[1330] he counselled with Horatio Seymour and Charles O'Conor; he originated the movement that ultimately sent a reform delegation to the State convention; he consented to stand for the Assembly; and finally, to secure the fruit of three months' work, he raised one-half the funds expended by the Democratic reform organisation.

[Footnote 1330: Tilden's letter, Ibid., Sept. 22.]

The Ring had not been an indifferent observer of these efforts. While it cared little for the control of a State convention without a governor to nominate, its continued existence absolutely depended upon a majority in the Senate. Tweed planned to carry the five senatorial districts in the city, and to re-elect if possible the eight Republican senators whom he had used the year before.[1331] This would insure him control. To achieve his purpose word was sent to Tilden early in August that he could name the delegates to the State convention and the candidates upon the State ticket if he would not interfere with Tammany's legislative nominations. If Tilden had not before distrusted Tweed, such a proposition must have aroused his suspicion. But Tilden, conscious of the need of an anti-Tweed legislature, had surmised the Ring's plan as early as Tweed devised it, and he replied with firmness that everything beside the legislative ticket was of minor importance to him. Similar propositions, presented by powerful men from all parts of the State with the plea that a compromise would "save the party," received the same answer.[1332] Meanwhile, he laboured to shorten the life of the Ring. To him Richard Connolly appealed for protection against Tweed's treachery, and at Tilden's suggestion the comptroller turned over his office to Andrew H. Green, thus assuring the protection of the records which subsequently formed the basis of all civil and criminal actions. Tilden's sagacity in procuring the opinion of Charles O'Conor also secured the Mayor's acquiescence in Green's possession of the office, while his patient investigation of the Broadway Bank accounts discovered the judicial proofs that opened the prison doors.

[Footnote 1331: Tilden's Speech.—New York Times, November 3, 1871.]

[Footnote 1332: Tweed's Speech.—Ibid.]

These were fatal blows to the Ring. The leading Democratic papers of the interior, notably the Buffalo Courier and Albany Argus, came boldly out demanding the dismissal of the shameless robbers who were disgracing the name and destroying the future of their party. Moreover, Tilden, like an avenging angel, with all the skill and knowledge of his kind, had united into one great reform party the four Democratic organisations of the city, pledged to oppose Tammany.[1333] This formidable combination, having complied with every requirement of the State committee, selected delegates to the State convention. The hearts of Tweed and his associates may well have sunk within them as they studied this list. There were able lawyers like William E. Curtis; powerful merchants like Havermeyer; influential editors like Ottendorfer; solid business men like Schell; and determined members of the Committee of Seventy like Roswell D. Hatch, who had been conspicuous in tracking the thieves. But the name that must have shone most formidably in the eyes of Tweed was that of Charles O'Conor. It stood at the head of the list like a threatening cloud in the sky, ready to bring ruin upon the Ring. The moral support of his great legal fame, affirming the validity of Andrew H. Green's possession of the comptroller's office, had intimidated O'Gorman, Tweed's corporation counsel, and shattered the plot to forcibly eject Tilden's faithful friend under colour of judicial process. Thus the reform party seemed to be in the ascendant. With confidence Tilden expressed the belief that the State convention would repudiate Tammany.[1334]

[Footnote 1333: The German Democratic General Committee, with 30,000 votes; the Democratic Union, with 27,000; the Ledwith party, with 10,000; and the Young Democracy, led by ex-Sheriff O'Brien. For five years Mozart Hall, under Fernando Wood, had not placed a ticket in the field.]

[Footnote 1334: Interview, New York Tribune, September 23, 1871.]

Although it had become well known that Tilden would not compromise, Tweed lost none of his former prestige. His control of the State convention which assembled at Rochester on October 4 (1871) seemed as firm as on that day in 1870 when he renominated John T. Hoffman. It was still the fashion to praise all he said and all he did. Before his arrival the Reformers claimed a majority, but as the up-State delegates crowded his rooms to bend the obsequious knee he reduced these claims to a count, finding only forty-two disobedient members. He was too tactful, however, to appear in the convention hall. His duty was to give orders, and like a soldier he pitched his headquarters near the scene of action, boasting that his friends were everywhere ready for battle.

In his opening speech Tilden touched the Ring frauds with the delicacy of a surgeon examining an abscess, and the faint response that greeted his condemnation of corruption satisfied him that the convention did not appreciate the danger of party blood-poisoning. The truth of this diagnosis more fully appeared when Tammany, "in the interest of harmony," waived its right to participate in the proceedings. The whirlwind of applause which greeted this "unselfish act" had scarcely subsided when a delegate from Kings county, acting for Tweed, moved the previous question on a resolution reciting that hereafter, on the call of the roll, the city of New York be omitted since it presented no delegation bearing the prestige of regularity. This threw the Reformers into an animated counsel. They knew of the proposed withdrawal of Tammany, which seemed to them to smooth the way for the acceptance of their credentials, but the resolution came with startling suddenness. It narrowed the question of their admission to a mere technicality and cut off debate. Tilden, appreciating the ambuscade into which he had fallen, exhausted every expedient to modify the parliamentary situation, knowing it to be in the power of the convention to accept another delegation regardless of its regularity, as the Republicans had done at Syracuse in the previous week. But the delegates derisively laughed at his awkward predicament as they adopted the resolution by a vote of 90 to 4.

By this act the convention clearly indicated its purpose to treat the fraud issue as a local matter and to keep it out of the State campaign. It intended to denounce the crime and the criminals, and to allow no one to become a delegate who had aided or in anywise profited by the conspiracy, but it would not recognise a delegation which desired to reorganise the party in the metropolis by humiliating a great association whose regularity had been accepted for many years, and which had finally turned the State over to the Democracy. This view had the support of every office-holder and of every appointee of the Executive, whose great desire to "save the party" had its inspiration in a greater desire to save themselves. On the other hand, the minority argued that allowing Tammany voluntarily to withdraw from the convention was equivalent to its endorsement, thus giving its nominations regularity. This would compel the Democratic masses, in order to participate in the primaries, to vote its ticket. Tilden sought to avoid this regularity just as Conkling had destroyed the Greeley committee, and if office-holders had supported him as they did the Senator he must have won as easily.

The convention's treatment of Horatio Seymour also exhibited its dislike of the reformer. Seymour came to the convention to be its president, and upon his entrance to the hall had been hailed, amidst tumultuous cheers, as "Our future president in 1872." While waiting the conclusion of the preliminary proceedings he observed Francis Kernan sitting outside the rail with the rejected Reformers. Hesitatingly, and in the hope, he said, of arousing no unpleasant discussion, he moved the admission of the veteran Democrat, whom he described as grown gray in the party harness, and whose very presence was a sufficient credential to his title to a seat. Kernan, being in sympathy with Tilden, was non persona grata to Tammany, and Seymour had scarcely resumed his seat when the ubiquitous delegate from Kings, with a flourish of rhetoric, promptly substituted another, who, he alleged, was the regularly elected delegate as well as "the friend of that great Democrat, John T. Hoffman." The convention, frantic with delight at the mention of the Governor's name, saw the Oneidan grow lividly pale with chagrin at this exhibition of Tammany's manners. Seymour had lived long in years, in fame, and in the esteem of his party. He could hardly have had any personal enemies. He possessed no capricious dislikes, and his kindly heart, in spite of a stateliness of bearing, won all the people who came near him. To be thus opposed and bantered in a Democratic assembly was a deep humiliation, and after expressing the hope that the Tammany man would fight for the Democratic party as gallantly in future as he had fought against it in the past, the illustrious statesman withdrew his motion. When, later, his name was announced as presiding officer of the permanent organisation, the convention discovered to its dismay that Seymour, feigning sickness, had returned to Utica.[1335]

[Footnote 1335: "Governor Seymour was given to understand that he could not be president of the convention unless he would forego his philippic against the Tammany thieves. This he declined to do."—New York Times (editorial), October 9, 1871.]

At the end of the day's work it was plain that Tweed had controlled the convention. The Reformers had been excluded, the committee on contested seats had refused them a hearing, Seymour was driven home, and a eulogy of Tammany's political services had been applauded to the echo. The platform did, indeed, express indignation at the "corruption and extravagance recently brought to light in the municipal affairs of the city of New York," and condemned "as unworthy of countenance or toleration all who are responsible," but the contrast between the acts of the convention and the words of its platform made its professions of indignation seem incongruous if not absolutely empty. When one speaker, with rhetorical effect, pronounced the frauds in New York "the mere dreams of Republican imagination" delegates sprang to their feet amidst ringing cheers. In the joy of victory, Tweed, with good-natured contempt, characterised Seymour, Tilden, and Kernan as "three troublesome old fools."[1336]

[Footnote 1336: New York Tribune, October 6, 1871.]

After adjournment the Reformers made no concealment of their bitter dissatisfaction. Oswald Ottendorfer, editor of the most powerful German Democratic organ then in the State, threatened to issue an address denouncing their betrayal, and William E. Curtis, referring to the refusal of the credentials' committee, declared that a voice from the Democratic masses of New York, seeking relief from a gang of thieves, was stronger, higher, and more sublime than mere questions of technicality. Under the spur of this threatened revolt, the convention, when it reconvened the next day, listened to the Reformers. Their recital was not a panegyric. Ottendorfer said that the operation of the previous question exposed the party to the suspicion that Tammany's seats would be open for their return after the storm of indignation had subsided. O'Conor, in a letter, declared that absolute freedom from all complicity in the great official crime and an utter intolerance of all persons suspected of sympathy with it must be maintained, otherwise its action would inflict a fatal wound upon the party. Curtis characterised the question as one of life or death to a great community weighed down by oppression and crime, and maintained that the convention, if it sought to avoid its duty by the subterfuge already enacted, would show both sympathy and complicity with the oligarchy of terror and infamy. These statements did not please the Ring men, who, with much noise, passed contemptuously out of the hall.

Riotous interruption, however, did not begin until Tilden announced that the real point of the controversy was to estop Tammany, after nominating five senators and twenty-one assemblymen, from declaring the Democratic masses out of the party because they refused to vote for its candidates. The whip of party regularity was Tweed's last reliance, and when Tilden proclaimed absolution to those who disregarded it, the friends of Tammany drowned his words with loud calls to order. The excitement threatened to become a riot, but Tilden, caring as little for disapprobation as the son of Tisander in the story told by Herodotus, calmly awaited silence. "I was stating," he continued, without the slightest tremor of a singularly unmusical voice, "what I considered the objection to Tammany Hall, aside from the cloud that now covers that concern, and I am free to avow before this convention that I shall not vote for any one of Mr. Tweed's members of the Legislature. And if that is to be regarded the regular ticket, I will resign my place as chairman of the State committee and help my people stem the tide of corruption. When I come to do my duty as an elector, I shall cast my vote for honest men."[1337] Then, to show his independence if not his contempt of the Tweed-bound body, Tilden suddenly waived aside the question of the Reformers' admission and moved to proceed to the nomination of a State ticket.[1338]

[Footnote 1337: New York Tribune, October 6, 1871.]

[Footnote 1338: Except the candidate for Secretary of State, the old Tweed ticket was renominated as follows: Secretary of State, Diedrich Willers, Seneca; Comptroller, Asher P. Nichols, Erie; Treasurer, Wheeler H. Bristol, Tioga; Attorney-General, Marshall B. Champlain, Allegany; Engineer, Van R. Richmond, Wayne; Canal Commissioner, George W. Chapman; Prison Inspector, David B. McNeil, Cayuga.]

The convention was stunned. It became dizzy when he denied Tammany's right to be regarded as the regular organisation, but his proclamation, defiantly and clearly made, that hereafter he should bolt its nominations even if the convention refused to impeach its regularity, struck a trenchant blow that silenced rather than excited. Such courage, displayed at such a critical moment, was sublime. An organised revolt against an association which had for years been accepted as regular by State conventions meant the sacrifice of a majority and an invitation to certain defeat, yet he hurled the words of defiance into the face of the convention with the energy of the Old Guard when called upon to surrender at Waterloo. The course taken by Tilden on this memorable occasion made his own career, and also a new career for his party. From that hour he became the real leader of the Democracy. Although more than a twelvemonth must pass before his voice gave the word of command, his genius as a born master was recognised.

The attitude of the Reformers strengthened the Republicans, whose distractions must otherwise have compassed their defeat. Murphyism and Tweedism resembled each other so much that a contest against either presented a well-defined issue of political morality. The greater importance of the Tammany frauds, however, obscured all other issues. To preserve their organisation in the up-State counties the Democrats made creditable local nominations and professed support of the State ticket, but in the city the entire voting population, irrespective of former party alignments, divided into Tammany and anti-Tammany factions. As the crusade progressed the details of the great crime, becoming better understood, made Tammany's position intolerable. Every respectable journal opposed it and every organisation crucified it. In a double-page cartoon, startling in its conception and splendidly picturesque, Nast represented the Tammany tiger, with glaring eyes and distended jaws, tearing the vitals from the crushed and robbed city, while Tweed and his associates sat enthroned.[1339] "Let's stop those damned pictures," proposed Tweed when he saw it. "I don't care so much what the papers write about me—my constituents can't read; but they can see pictures."[1340]

[Footnote 1339: Harper's Weekly, November 4, 1871.]

[Footnote 1340: Paine, Life of Nast, p. 179.]

On October 26 all doubt as to the result of the election was dissipated. Until then belief in Tweed's direct profit in the Ring's overcharges was based upon presumption. No intelligent man having an accurate knowledge of the facts could doubt his guilt, since every circumstance plainly pointed to it, but judicial proof did not exist until furnished by the investigation of the Broadway Bank, which Tilden personally conducted. His analysis of this information disclosed the fact that two-thirds of the money paid under the sanction of the Board of Audit had passed into the possession of public officials and their accomplices, some of it being actually traced into Tweed's pocket, and upon this evidence, verified by Tilden's affidavit, the Attorney-General based an action on which a warrant issued for Tweed's arrest. This announcement flashed over the State eleven days before the election. It was a powerful campaign document. People had not realised what an avenging hand pursued Tammany, but they now understood that Tweed was a common thief, and that Tilden, by reducing strong suspicion to a mathematical certainty, had closed the mouths of eulogists and apologists.

The result of the election carried dismay and confusion to Tammany. Its register, its judges, its aldermen, a majority of its assistant aldermen, fourteen of its twenty-one assemblymen, and four of its five senators were defeated, while Tweed's majority fell from 22,000 in 1869 to 10,000. As expected the Republicans reaped the benefit of the anti-Tammany vote, carrying the State by 18,000 majority and the Legislature by 79 on joint ballot.[1341] To obliterate Tweedism, Tilden had overthrown his party, but he had not fallen, Samson-like, under the ruin.

[Footnote 1341: Scribner, 387,107; Willers, 368,204. Legislature: Senate, 24 Republicans, 8 Democrats. Assembly, 97 Republicans, 31 Democrats.—New York Tribune, November 27, 1871.

Compared with the returns for 1870, the Democratic vote, outside of New York and the six counties in its immediate vicinity, fell off 24,167, while the Republican vote fell off 9,235. In New York and adjoining counties the Republican vote increased 30,338.—Ibid.

In New York City the majority for the Democratic candidate for secretary of state was 29,189, while the majority for the Republican or Union Reform candidate for register was 28,117.—Ibid.]



CHAPTER XXII

GREELEY NOMINATED FOR PRESIDENT

1872

Although the Tammany exposure had absorbed public attention, the Republican party did not escape serious criticism. Reconstruction had disappointed many of its friends. By controlling the negro vote Republican administrations in several Southern States had wrought incalculable harm to the cause of free-government and equal suffrage. The State debt of Alabama had increased from six millions in 1860 to forty millions, that of Florida from two hundred thousand to fifteen millions, and that of Georgia from three millions to forty-four millions. "I say to-day, in the face of heaven and before all mankind," declared Tilden, "that the carpet-bag governments are infinitely worse than Tweed's government of the city of New York."[1342]

[Footnote 1342: New York Tribune, September 5, 1872.]

Following such gross misgovernment the reactionary outbreaks influenced Congress to pass the so-called Ku-Klux Act of April 20, 1871, designed to suppress these outrages. This measure, although not dissimilar to others which protected the negro in his right of suffrage, met with stout Republican opposition, the spirited debate suddenly heralding a serious party division. Trumbull held it unconstitutional, while Schurz, reviewing the wretched State governments of the South, the venal officials who misled the negro, and the riotous corruption of men in possession of great authority, attacked the policy of the law as unwise and unsound.

Not less disturbing was the failure of Congress to grant universal amnesty. To this more than to all other causes did the critics of the Republican party ascribe the continuance of the animosities of the war, since it deprived the South of the assistance of its former leading men, and turned it over to inexperienced, and, in some instances, to corrupt men who used political disabilities as so much capital upon which to trade. The shocking brazenness of these methods had been disclosed in Georgia under the administration of Governor Bullock, who secured from Congress amnesty for his legislative friends while others were excluded. Schurz declared "When universal suffrage was granted to secure the equal rights of all, universal amnesty ought to have been granted to make all the resources of political intelligence and experience available for the promotion of the welfare of all."[1343]

[Footnote 1343: Congressional Globe, January 30, 1872, p. 699.]

The South had expected the President to develop a liberal policy. The spirit displayed at Appomattox, his "Let us have peace" letter of acceptance, and his intervention in Virginia and Mississippi soon after his inauguration, encouraged the belief that he would conciliate rather than harass it. His approval of the Ku-Klux law, therefore, intensified a feeling already strained to bitterness, and although he administered the law with prudence, a physical contest occurred in the South and a political rupture in the North. The hostility of the American people to the use of troops at elections had once before proved a source of angry contention, and the criticism which now rained upon the Republican party afforded new evidence of the public's animosity.

These strictures would have awakened no unusual solicitude in the minds of Republicans had their inspiration been confined to political opponents, but suddenly there came to the aid of the Democrats a formidable array of Republicans. Although the entering wedge was a difference of policy growing out of conditions in the Southern States, other reasons contributed to the rupture. The removal of Motley as minister to England, coming so soon after Sumner's successful resistance to the San Domingo scheme, was treated as an attempt to punish a senator for the just exercise of his right and the honest performance of his duty. Nine months later Sumner was discontinued as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. If doubt existed as to the ground of Motley's removal, not a shadow clouded the reason for Sumner's deposition. The cause assigned was that he no longer maintained personal and social relations with the President and Secretary of State, but when Schurz stigmatised it as "a flimsy pretext" he voiced the opinion of a part of the press which accepted it as a display of pure vindictiveness. "The indignation over your removal," telegraphed John W. Forney, "extends to men of all parties. I have not heard one Republican approve it."[1344] Among Sumner's correspondents Ira Harris noted the popular disapproval and indignation in New York. "Another term of such arrogant assumption of power and wanton acquiescence," said Schurz, "may furnish the flunkies with a store of precedents until people cease to look for ordinary means of relief."[1345]

[Footnote 1344: Pierce, Life of Sumner, Vol. 4, p. 477.]

[Footnote 1345: New York Tribune, April 13, 1872.]

More disturbing because more irritating in its effects was the Administration's disposition to permit the control of its patronage by a coterie of senators, who preferred to strengthen faction regardless of its influence. Under this policy something had occurred in nearly every Northern State to make leading men and newspapers bitter, and as the years of the Administration multiplied censure became more drastic. Perhaps the influence of Conkling presented a normal phase of this practice. The Senator stood for much that had brought criticism upon the party. He approved the Southern policy and the acquisition of San Domingo. He indulged in a personal attack on Sumner, advised his deposition from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, commended the removal of Motley, and voted against the confirmation of E. Rockwood Hoar for associate justice of the Supreme Court.[1346] He also opposed civil service reform.

[Footnote 1346: George F. Hoar, Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 306; Vol. 2, p. 77.]

A statesman so pronounced in his views and in control of abundant patronage was not likely to change a contest for personal advantage into a choice of public policies. Such an one appointed men because of their influence in controlling political caucuses and conventions. "The last two State conventions were mockeries," declared Greeley, "some of the delegates having been bought out of our hands and others driven out of the convention.... I saw numbers, under threats of losing federal office, dragooned into doing the bidding of one man."[1347] The removal of officials whose names stood high in the roll of those who had greatly honoured their State deeply wounded many ardent Republicans, but not until the appointment and retention of Thomas Murphy did criticism scorn the veil of hint and innuendo. This act created a corps of journalistic critics whose unflagging satire and unswerving severity entertained the President's opponents and amazed his friends. They spoke for the popular side at the moment of a great crisis. Almost daily during the eighteen months of Murphy's administration the press of the whole country, under the lead of the Tribune, pictured the collector as a crafty army contractor and the partner of Tweed. "I think the warmest friends of Grant," wrote Curtis, "feel that he has failed terribly as President, not from want of honesty but from want of tact and great ignorance. It is a political position and he knew nothing of politics."[1348] The sacrifice of the best men among his cabinet advisers added greatly to this unrest. In one of his letters, Lowell, unintentionally overlooking Hamilton Fish, declared that E. Rockwood Hoar and Jacob D. Cox were "the only really strong men in the Cabinet."[1349] After the latter's forced resignation and the former's sudden exit to make room for a Southern Republican in order to placate carpet-bag senators for the removal of Sumner, the great critics of the Administration again cut loose. "How long," asked Bowles, "does the President suppose the people will patiently endure this dealing with high office as if it were a presidential perquisite, to be given away upon his mere whim, without regard to the claims of the office? It was bad enough when he only dealt so with consulates and small post-offices; but now that he has come to foreign ministers and cabinet officers it is intolerable."[1350]

[Footnote 1347: New York Tribune, April 13, 1872.]

[Footnote 1348: Cary, Life of Curtis, p. 213.]

[Footnote 1349: Letters of, Vol. 2, p. 57.

"There was undoubtedly great corruption and maladministration in the country in the time of President Grant. Selfish men and ambitious men got the ear of that simple man and confiding President. They studied Grant, some of them, as the shoemaker measures the foot of his customer."—Hoar, Autobiography, Vol. 1, p. 197.]

[Footnote 1350: Springfield (Mass.) Republican, November 12, 1870.]

Under these conditions Republicans had been losing strength. In the election of 1870 their numbers, for the first time since 1864, had fallen below a two-thirds majority in the national House, while the Democrats gained four United States senators. In the same year Carl Schurz, with the assistance of the Democrats, had carried Missouri on the issue of universal amnesty. As the disaffection with the Administration became more pronounced, this faction, assuming the name of Liberal Republicans, met in convention at Jefferson City on January 24, 1872, and invited all Republicans who favoured reform to meet in national mass convention at Cincinnati on May 1. This call acted like a lighted match in a pile of shavings, prominent Republicans in every State, including many leading newspapers, giving it instant and hearty response. Among other journals in New York the Nation and the Evening Post guardedly approved the movement, and the World, although a Democratic organ, offered conditional support. The Tribune also encouraged the hope that it would eventually swing into line.

Horace Greeley's principles were in substantial accord with those of his party. He had little liking for civil service reform; the integrity of the national debt invoked his unflagging support; and the suppression of the Ku-Klux, although favouring a liberal Southern policy, had received his encouragement.[1351] Nor had he said anything in speech or writing disrespectful of the President. He did not favour his renomination, but he had faith in the essential honesty and soundness of Republican voters. Moreover, the demand for "a genuine reform of the tariff" made it impossible to reconcile his policy with that of the Liberal Republicans of Missouri.

[Footnote 1351: New York Tribune, May 31, 1870; February 27, 1871; May 1, 1872.]

Nevertheless, Greeley's position in the Republican party had become intolerable. Conkling controlled the city and State machines, Fenton belonged in a hopeless minority, and Grant resented the Tribune's opposition to his succession. Besides, the editor's friends had been deeply humiliated. The appointment of Murphy was accepted as "a plain declaration of war."[1352] The treatment of the Greeley committee, overthrown by the power of patronage, also festered in his heart. "For more than a year," he said, "to be an avowed friend of Governor Fenton was to be marked for proscription at the White House."[1353] Thus, with the past unforgiven and the future without hope, the great journalist declared that "We propose to endure this for one term only."[1354]

[Footnote 1352: Ibid., April 25, 1872.]

[Footnote 1353: Ibid.]

[Footnote 1354: Ibid.]

From the first it was apparent that the Republican schism, to be successful, needed the support of the Tribune. Although its influence had materially suffered during and since the war, it still controlled a great constituency throughout the North, and the longer its chief hesitated to join the new party the more earnest and eloquent did the appeals of the Liberals become. At last, relying upon a compromise of their economic differences, Greeley accepted the invitation to meet the Missouri reformers in convention.[1355] His action was the occasion for much rejoicing, and on April 13 the Liberals of New York City began their campaign amidst the cheers of an enthusiastic multitude assembled at Cooper Institute.[1356] The Fenton leaders, conspicuously posted on the platform, indicated neither a real love of reform nor an absence of office-seekers, but the presence among the vice-presidents of E.L. Godkin of the Nation and Parke Godwin of the Post removed all doubt as to the sincere desire of some of those present to replace Grant with a President who would discourage the use of patronage by enforcing civil service reform, and encourage good government in the South by enacting universal amnesty. To Schurz's charge that the national Republican convention would be made up of office-holders, Oliver P. Morton declared, three days later in the same hall, that there would be more office-seekers at Cincinnati than office-holders at Philadelphia.[1357]

[Footnote 1355: Ibid., March 30, 1872.]

[Footnote 1356: New York Tribune, April 14, 1872.]

[Footnote 1357: Dudley Foulke, Life of Morton, Vol. 2, p. 255.]

The managers of the Liberal Republican movement preferred Charles Francis Adams for President. Adams' public life encouraged the belief that he would practise his professed principles, and although isolated from all political associations it was thought his brilliant championship of the North during the temporising of the English government would make his nomination welcome. David Davis and Lyman Trumbull of Illinois were likewise acceptable, and Salmon P. Chase had his admirers. Greeley's availability was also talked of. His signature to the bail-bond of Jefferson Davis, releasing the ex-president of the Confederacy from prison, attracted attention to his presidential ambition, while his loud declaration for universal amnesty opened the way for a tour of the South. At a brilliant reception in Union Square, given after his return, he described the carpet-bagger as "a worthless adventurer whom the Southern States hate and ought to hate," likening him to the New York legislator "who goes to Albany nominally to legislate, but really to plunder and steal."[1358] His excessive zeal for Democratic support led to the intimation that he had economised his epithets in criticising the Tweed ring.[1359] As early as February, Nast, with his usual foresight, pictured "H.G., the editor" offering the nomination to "H.G., the farmer," who, rejoicing in the name of Cincinnatus, had turned from the plough toward the dome of the Capitol in the distance.[1360] To the charge that he was a candidate for President, Greeley frankly admitted that while he was not an aspirant for office, he should never decline any duty which his political friends saw fit to devolve upon him.[1361]

[Footnote 1358: New York Tribune, June 13, 1871.]

[Footnote 1359: Paine, Life of Nast, p. 162.]

[Footnote 1360: Ibid., p. 223.]

[Footnote 1361: New York Tribune, May 30, 1871.]

Nevertheless, the men whose earnest efforts had prepared the way for the Liberal movement did not encourage Greeley's ambition. Especially were his great newspaper associates dumb. A week before the convention Bowles of the Springfield Republican mentioned him with Sumner and Trumbull as a proper person for the nomination, but Godkin of the Nation, Halstead of the Cincinnati Commercial, and Horace White of the Chicago Tribune remained silent. The Evening Post spoke of him as "the simple-minded philanthropist, with his various scraps of so-called principles."[1362] Jacob D. Cox, Stanley Matthews, and George Hoadley, the conspicuous Liberal triumvirate of Ohio, repudiated his candidacy, and Schurz, in his opening speech as president of the convention, without mentioning names, plainly designated Adams as the most suitable candidate and Greeley as the weakest.[1363]

[Footnote 1362: New York Post, May 2, 1872.]

[Footnote 1363: New York Times, May 3.]

The first New Yorker to appear at Cincinnati was Reuben E. Fenton, followed by John Cochrane, Waldo M. Hutchins, Sinclair Tousey, and other seceders from the Syracuse convention of 1871. These political veterans, with the cunning practised at ward caucuses, quickly organised the New York delegation in the interest of Greeley. On motion of Cochrane, Hutchins became chairman of a committee to name sixty-eight delegates, the people present being allowed to report two delegates from their respective congressional districts. These tactics became more offensive when the committee, instead of accepting the delegates reported, arbitrarily assumed the right to substitute several well-known friends of Greeley. Not content with this advantage, the majority, on motion of Cochrane, adopted the unit rule, thus silencing one-third of the delegation.[1364] Henry R. Selden, whose reputation for fair dealing had preceded him, characterised this performance as "a most infamous outrage," and upon hearing a protest of the minority, presented by Theodore Bacon of Rochester, Schurz denounced the proceeding "as extraordinary" and "as indicating that the reform movement, so far as it concerned New York, was virtually in the hands of a set of political tricksters, who came here not for reform, but for plunder."[1365]

[Footnote 1364: New York Evening Post, May 2, 1872.]

[Footnote 1365: Ibid.]

Next to the "tricksters" the platform-makers embarrassed the convention. It was easy to recognise the equality of all men before the law, to pledge fidelity to the Union, to oppose the re-election of the President, to denounce repudiation, to demand local self-government for the Southern States, to ask "the immediate and absolute removal of all disabilities imposed on account of the rebellion," and to favour "a thorough reform of the civil service;" but for a tariff reform assemblage to frame a resolution which the apostle of protection could accept required great patience and persistence. The vexatious delay became so intolerable that delegates insisted upon making a ticket before adopting a platform. Cochrane bitterly opposed such a resolution since Greeley's candidacy, if not his support of the movement, depended upon the convention's attitude on the tariff. Indeed, not until the committee on resolutions had accepted what the editor himself dictated was the knotty point finally settled. "Recognising," said the platform, "that there are in our midst honest but irreconcilable differences of opinion with regard to the respective systems of protection and free-trade, we remit the discussion of the subject to the people in their congressional districts and to the decision of Congress thereon, wholly free from executive interference or dictation."

Although the resolution was out of keeping with the spirit of the movement, it seemed proper to pay this extortionate price for Greeley's support, since his conspicuous championship of protection made it impossible for him to acquiesce in any impairment of that doctrine; but the advantage that such a concession gave his candidacy appears not to have occurred to the leaders who embodied whatever of principle and conviction the convention possessed. Indeed, no scheme of the managers contemplated his nomination. To many persons Greeley's aspiration took the form of "a joke."[1366] Nor was his name seriously discussed until the delegates assembled at Cincinnati. Even then the belief obtained that after a complimentary vote to him and other favourite sons, Adams would become their beneficiary. But the work of Fenton quickly betrayed itself. In obedience to a bargain, Gratz Brown of Missouri, at the end of the first ballot, withdrew in favour of Greeley, and although Adams held the lead on the next four ballots, the strength of Davis and Trumbull shrivelled while Greeley's kept increasing. Yet the managers did not suspect a stampede. Eighty per cent. of the New Yorker's votes came from the Middle and Southern States.[1367] Moreover, the Trumbull men held the balance of power. After several notable changes Adams still led by half a hundred. On the sixth ballot, however, to the surprise and chagrin of the Adams managers, Trumbull's delegates began breaking to Greeley, and in the confusion which quickly developed into a storm of blended cheers and hisses, Illinois and the Middle West carried the Tribune's chief beyond the required number of votes.[1368] Gratz Brown was then nominated for Vice-President.

[Footnote 1366: New York Evening Post, May 4, 1872.]

[Footnote 1367: Southern States, 104; Middle, 96; New England, 15; Western, 19; Pacific, 24.]

[Footnote 1368:

Whole number of votes 714 Necessary to a choice 358

First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Adams 203 243 264 279 309 187 Greeley 147 245 258 251 258 482 Trumbull 110 148 156 141 91 10 Davis 92-1/2 75 44 51 30 6 Brown 95 2 2 2 Curtin 62 Chase 2-1/2 1 2 29]

Greeley's nomination astounded the general public as much as it disappointed the Liberal leaders. Bowles called the result "a fate above logic and superior to reason,"[1369] but the Evening Post thought it due to "commonplace chicanery, intrigue, bargaining, and compromise."[1370] Stanley Matthews, who was temporary chairman of the convention, declared himself greatly chagrined at the whole matter. "I have concluded," he said, "that as a politician and a President maker, I am not a success."[1371] Hoadly published a card calling the result "the alliance of Tammany and Blair," and William Cullen Bryant, Oswald Ottendorfer of the Staats-Zeitung, and other anti-protectionists of New York, made a fruitless effort to put another candidate before the country.[1372] In the end the Nation and the Evening Post supported President Grant.

[Footnote 1369: Merriam, Life of Bowles, Vol. 2, p. 210.]

[Footnote 1370: New York Evening Post, May 4, 1872.]

[Footnote 1371: Warden, Life of Chase, p. 732.]

[Footnote 1372: Appleton's Cyclopaedia, 1872, p. 779.]

The nomination deeply mortified the Democrats. They had encouraged the revolt, expecting the selection of Adams, or Trumbull, or David Davis, whom they could readily adopt, but Greeley, a lifelong antagonist, plunged them into trouble. No other Republican had so continuously vilified them. From his introduction to political life in 1840 he had waged a constant and personal warfare, often using his strong, idiomatic English with the ferocity of a Wilkes. A caricature by Greeley was as much feared as a cartoon by Nast. He spared no one. He had assailed Seymour with a violence that might well seem to have made any form of political reconciliation impossible. With equal skill he had aimed his epithets at every Democratic statesman and politician from Van Buren to Fernando Wood, the sting of his relentless and merciless criticism goading each one into frenzy. For them now to assume to overlook such treatment and accept its author as a political associate and exemplar seemed a mockery. Several Democratic journals, following the lead of the World, refused to do so, while others, shrouding their disinclination in a non-committal tone, awaited the assembling of the State convention which met at Rochester on May 15. Seymour did not attend this meeting, and although Tilden carefully avoided an expression of opinion, the delegates, after approving the Cincinnati platform, insisted upon referring the choice of candidates to the national convention, sending John T. Hoffman as a delegate-at-large to represent them.

One month later the Democratic national convention met at Baltimore.[1373] Although the delegates, especially those from the South, indicated a growing sentiment in favour of Greeley, the absence of veteran leaders from the North created much comment. Hendricks of Indiana sent his regrets; Seymour also remained at home; and Tilden, Kernan, and Sanford E. Church found it convenient to be otherwise engaged. But August Belmont appeared, and for the last time, after twelve years of service and defeat as chairman of the national committee, called the convention to order. John T. Hoffman also appeared. He was the best known if not the wisest delegate in the convention, and as he actively joined the Southern leaders in encouraging the new order of things, it was easy to understand how his star might still have been in the ascendant had his political associates been content with power without plunder. Samuel S. Cox, recently characterised by Greeley as "our carpet-bag representative in Congress" who had "cast in his lot with thieves,"[1374] also smoothed the way for his critic's nomination. He could forgive if he did not forget.

[Footnote 1373: July 9, 1872.]

[Footnote 1374: New York Tribune, November 1, 1871. Cox's election to Congress from New York occurred in 1870, three years after he became a resident of the State.]

Next to Cox sat John Kelly, the new boss of Tammany. The combativeness indicated by the form of the head was accentuated by the conspicuous jaw, the firm, thin-lipped mouth, and the closely cropped hair and beard, already fading into white; but there was nothing rough or rowdyish in his manner or appearance. He dressed neatly, listened respectfully, and spoke in low, gentle tones, an Irish sense of humour frequently illuminating a square, kindly face. It was noticeable, too, that although he began life as a mason and had handled his fists like a professional, his hands were small and shapely. Kelly had served two years as alderman, four years in Congress, and six years as sheriff. He had also represented his county in the national conventions of 1864 and 1868. His character for honesty had not been above suspicion. Men charged that he was "counted in" as congressman, and that while sheriff he had obtained a large sum of money by illegal methods.[1375] In 1868 he suddenly sailed for Europe because of alleged ill-health, where he remained until late in 1871. He was a rich man then.[1376] Now, at the age of fifty-one, he was destined to make himself not less powerful or widely known than the great criminal whom he succeeded.[1377] With the aid of Tilden, O'Conor, and other men conspicuous in the reform movement, he had reorganised Tammany in the preceding April, increasing a new general committee to five hundred members, and with great shrewdness causing the appointment of committees to cooeperate with the Bar Association, with the Committee of Seventy, and with the Municipal Taxpayers' Association. These represented regenerated Tammany. Kelly affected extreme modesty, but as he moved about the hall of the national convention, urging the nomination of Greeley, the delegates recognised a master in the art of controlling men.

[Footnote 1375: Myers, History of Tammany, pp. 301, 305.]

[Footnote 1376: Ibid., pp. 261 and note, 300 and 301.]

[Footnote 1377: "About the same time, and in adjoining city districts, two bosses entered upon public life. While Tweed was learning to make chairs, Kelly was being taught grate-setting. While Tweed was amusing himself as a runner with a fire engine, Kelly was captain of the Carroll Target Guard. Tweed led fire laddies and Kelly dragged about target-shooters upon the eve of elections. Both entered the Board of Aldermen about the same time. About the same time, too, they went to Congress. Within a few years of each other's candidacy they ran for sheriff. Tweed was defeated. Kelly was elected. While Kelly was making bills as sheriff, Tweed was auditing them in the Board of Supervisors. Tweed became the Tammany boss, and Kelly succeeded him. Tweed fell a victim to his greed, Kelly escaped by the Statute of Limitations."—New York Times, October 30, 1875.]

If any doubt had existed as to Greeley's treatment at Baltimore, it quickly disappeared on the assembling of the convention, for the question of nomination or indorsement alone disturbed it. If it adopted him as its own candidate fear was entertained that Republicans would forsake him. On the other hand, it was claimed that many Democrats who could only be held by party claims would not respect a mere indorsement. Southern delegates argued that if Democrats hoped to defeat their opponents they must encourage the revolt by giving it prestige and power rather than smother it by compelling Liberals to choose between Grant and a Democrat. The wisdom of this view could not be avoided, and after adopting the Cincinnati platform without change, the convention, by a vote of 686 to 46, stamped the Cincinnati ticket with the highest Democratic authority.[1378] Little heartiness, however, characterised the proceedings. Hoffman, in casting New York's vote, aroused much enthusiasm, but the response to the announcement of Greeley's nomination was disappointing. The Tribune attributed it to the intense heat and the exhaustion of the delegates,[1379] but the Nation probably came nearer the truth in ascribing it to "boiled crow."[1380] This gave rise to the expression "to eat crow," meaning "to do what one vehemently dislikes and has before defiantly declared he would not do."[1381]

[Footnote 1378: Of the 46 opposition votes, James A. Bayard received 6 from Delaware and 9 from New Jersey; Jeremiah S. Black 21 from Pennsylvania; William S. Groesbeck 2 from Ohio. There were 8 blanks.]

[Footnote 1379: New York Tribune, July 11, 1872.]

[Footnote 1380: July 11.]

[Footnote 1381: Century Dictionary.]



CHAPTER XXIII

DEFEAT AND DEATH OF GREELEY

1872

The Republicans of New York welcomed the outcome of the Democratic national convention. There was a time in its preliminary stages when the Liberal movement, blending principle and resentment, had assumed alarming proportions. Discontent with the Administration, stimulated by powerful journals, seemed to permeate the whole Republican party, and the haste of prominent men to declare themselves Liberals, recalling the unhappy division in the last State convention and the consequent falling off in the Republican vote, added to the solicitude. Moreover, the readiness of the Democrats to approve the principles of the Missouri reformers suggested a coalition far more formidable than the Philadelphia schism of 1866. That movement was to resist untried Reconstruction, while the Missouri division was an organised protest against practices in the North as well as in the South which had become intolerable to men in all parties. Gradually, however, the Republican revolt in New York disclosed limitations which the slim attendance at Cincinnati accentuated. Several congressional districts had been wholly unrepresented, and few prominent men had appeared at Cincinnati other than free-traders and Fenton leaders. Such an exhibition of weakness had an exhilarating effect upon Republicans, who received the nomination of Greeley with derision.

In this frame of mind the friends of the Administration, meeting in State convention at Elmira on May 15, sent a delegation to Philadelphia, headed by the venerable Gerrit Smith, which boasted that it was without an office-holder. Three weeks later the Republican national convention, amidst great enthusiasm, unanimously renominated Grant for President. A single ballot sufficed also for the selection of Henry Wilson of Massachusetts for Vice-President.[1382] The platform, to offset the Liberals' arraignment, favoured civil service reform, the abolition of the franking privilege, the prohibition of further land grants to corporations, an increase in pensions, and "the suppression of violent and treasonable organisations" in the South.

[Footnote 1382: Wilson received 364-1/2 votes to 321-1/2 for Colfax of Indiana, who had declared his intention to retire from public life. When, later, he changed his mind, Wilson possessed the advantage.]

At their State convention, held in Utica on August 21, Republicans felt no fear of factional feuds since the aggressive Fenton leaders had passed into the Liberal camp. But reasons for alarm existed. The election in 1871, carried by the inspiration of a great popular uprising in the interest of reform, had given them control of the Legislature, and when it assembled honest men rejoiced, rogues trembled, and Tweed failed to take his seat. The people expected the shameless Erie ring and its legislation to be wiped out, corrupt judges to be impeached, a new charter for New York City created, the purity of the ballot-box better protected, canal management reformed, and a variety of changes in criminal practice. But it proved timid and dilatory. At the end of the session the Tweed charter still governed, the machinery of the courts remained unchanged, and reforms in canal management, in elections, and in the city government had been sparingly granted. In cases of proven dishonesty its action was no less disappointing. It allowed a faithless clerk of the Senate to resign without punishment;[1383] it permitted the leaders of the Tammany ring to continue in office; it decided that a man did not disqualify himself for a seat in the Senate by taking bribes;[1384] and it failed to attack the Erie ring until the reign of Jay Gould was destroyed by the bold action of Daniel E. Sickles.[1385] Never did a party more shamelessly fail in its duty. Even credit for the impeachment of the Tweed judges belonged to Samuel J. Tilden. "That was all Tilden's work, and no one's else," said Charles O'Conor. "He went to the Legislature and forced the impeachment against every imaginable obstacle, open and covert, political and personal."[1386]

[Footnote 1383: New York Tribune, February 15, 1872.]

[Footnote 1384: Ibid., April 11.]

[Footnote 1385: For narration of this coup de main, see Morgan Dix, Life of John A. Dix, Vol. 2, pp. 163-167.]

[Footnote 1386: The Century, March, 1885, p. 734.]

Such a record did not inspire the party with confidence, and its representatives looked for a head to its State ticket who could overcome its shortcomings. Of the names canvassed a majority seemed inclined to William H. Robertson of Westchester. He had been an assemblyman, a representative in Congress, a judge of his county for twelve years, and a State senator of distinguished service. Although prudent in utterance and somewhat cautious in entering upon a course of action, his indefatigable pursuit of an object, coupled with conspicuous ability and long experience, marked him as one of the strong men of New York, destined for many years to direct the politics of his locality.

Nevertheless, a feeling existed that his course in the Senate had lacked force. The New York Times severely criticised it, regarding him too much of a tenderfoot in pushing the reform movement, and on the eve of the convention it opposed his candidacy.[1387] The Times, then the only paper in New York City upon which the party relied with confidence to fight its battles, exerted an influence which could scarcely be overrated. However, it is doubtful if its opposition could have avoided Robertson's nomination had not the name of John A. Dix been sprung upon the convention. It came with great suddenness. No open canvass preceded it. Thurlow Weed, who had proposed it to nearly every convention since 1861, was in Utica, but to Henry Clews, the well-known banker, belonged the credit of presenting it "on behalf of the business men of New York." The captivating suggestion quickly caught the delegates, who felt the alarming need of such a candidate, and the audience, rising to its feet, broke into cheers, while county after county seconded the nomination. One excited delegate, with stentorian voice, moved that it be made by acclamation, and although the Chair ruled the motion out of order, the withdrawal of Robertson's name quickly opened a way for its passage.

[Footnote 1387: August 21, 1872; New York Tribune, August 22.

"Senator Robertson failed to be governor only from lack of boldness."—Ibid., May 8, 1880.]

This incident produced a crop of trouble. Because Clews happened to be the guest of Conkling, Robertson, grievously disappointed, assumed that the Senator had inspired the coup d'etat, and from that moment began the dislike which subsequently ripened into open enmity. "As a matter of fact," wrote Clews, "Conkling knew nothing of my intention, but he was either too proud or too indifferent to public sentiment to explain."[1388]

[Footnote 1388: Henry Clews, Fifty Years in Wall Street, pp. 307-309; New York Herald, August 22.]

Dix's political course had been a tortuous one. He followed the Van Burens in 1848, becoming the Barnburners' candidate for governor, and immediately preceding the reduction of Fort Sumter advocated the restoration of the Missouri compromise, perpetuating slavery in all territory south of 36 deg. 30'. After the war he joined President Johnson, presided at the famous Philadelphia convention in 1866, and in return received appointments as minister to The Hague and later to France. For several years, under the changing conditions of Weed's leadership, he figured as a possible candidate for governor, first of one party and then of the other, but the Republicans declined to accept him in 1862 and 1864, and the Democrats refused to take him in 1866. After President Grant had relieved him of the French mission by the appointment of Elihu B. Washburne, he inclined like Weed himself to the Liberal movement until the nomination of Greeley, whom they both despised.

Seymour charged Dix with being "a mercenary man," who "rented out his influence gained from political positions to companies of doubtful character for large pay."[1389] At a later day he sketched his readiness "to change his politics" for "a large consideration and pay down." It was a drastic arraignment. "Starting out with a view of being an Anti-Mason," wrote Seymour, "he shifted to the Democratic party for the office of adjutant-general. He hesitated between Cass and Van Buren until he was nominated for governor by the Free-Soilers. He went back to the Democratic party for the New York post-office under Pierce. He went over to Buchanan for a place in the cabinet; and from his Free-Soil views he became so violent for the South that he would not vote for Douglas, but supported Breckinridge. After presiding at an anti-war meeting he went over to Lincoln, when he was made a major-general. To get a nomination for the French mission he took part with President Johnson. To get confirmed he left him for Grant. In 1868 he intrigued for a presidential nomination from the Democratic party; as in 1866 he had tried to be nominated by the same party for the office of governor. I think this history shows that he valued his political principles at a high rate, and never sold them unless he got a round price and pay down."[1390]

[Footnote 1389: Bigelow's Life of Tilden, Vol. 1, p. 228.]

[Footnote 1390: Ibid., p. 232.]

Of the same age as Dix, Weed knew his history perfectly, which during and after the war resembled his own. But he had faith that Dix's war record would more than offset his political vagaries. "When there was danger that Washington would fall into the hands of the rebels," he said, "Dix severed his relations with the Democratic administration, and in concert with Secretary Holt, Mr. Stanton, and Mr. Seward, rendered services which saved the nation's capital. A few weeks afterward, when in command of Fort McHenry, by a prompt movement against a treasonable design of members of the Legislature, he prevented Maryland from joining the Secessionists."[1391] Moreover, Weed insisted that conservative Democrats and business men, having confidence in his integrity, would vote for him regardless of party.

[Footnote 1391: Barnes' Life of Weed, Vol. 2, p. 485.]

The platform, endorsing the National Administration, failed to mention the record of the Legislature. Praise for members of Congress accentuated this omission. To enlarge the canal for steam navigation it favoured an appropriation by the general government.[1392]

[Footnote 1392: The ticket was as follows: Governor, John A. Dix of New York; Lieutenant-Governor, John C. Robinson of Broome; Canal Commissioner, Reuben W. Stroud of Onondaga; Prison Inspector, Ezra Graves of Herkimer; Congressman-at-large, Lyman Tremaine of Albany; Thurlow Weed declined to head the electoral ticket, but suggested the name of Frederick Douglass, who was nominated by acclamation.—Barnes, Life of Weed, Vol. 2, p. 486.]

The Democrats and Liberals met in separate State conventions at Syracuse on September 4. In numbers and enthusiasm the Liberals made a creditable showing. Many Republicans who had assisted at the birth of their party and aided in achieving its victories, adorned the platform and filled the seats of delegates. John Cochrane called the convention to order, Truman G. Younglove, speaker of the Assembly in 1869, acted as temporary chairman, Chauncey M. Depew became its president, and Reuben E. Fenton, with Waldo M. Hutchins, Archibald M. Bliss, Edwin A. Merritt, D.D.S. Brown, and Frank Hiscock, served upon the committee of conference. Among others present were Sinclair Tousey, William Dorsheimer, George P. Bradford, and Horatio N. Twombly. In his speech on taking the chair, Depew, who had attended every Republican State convention since 1858, declared that he saw before him the men whom he had learned to recognise as the trusted exponents of party policy in their several localities.[1393]

[Footnote 1393: New York Tribune, September 6.]

In apportioning the State offices the Democrats, after much wrangling, conceded to the Liberals the lieutenant-governor, prison inspector, and fifteen of the thirty-four electors. This settlement resulted, amidst much enthusiasm, in the nomination of Depew for lieutenant-governor.

The Democrats experienced more difficulty in selecting a candidate for governor. The withdrawal of Hoffman, who "usually made his appointments to office," said John Kelly, "on the recommendation of the Tammany ring and at the solicitation of the Canal ring," was inevitable,[1394] and long before he declined several aspirants had betrayed their ambition.[1395] But a decided majority of the delegates, "fully four-fifths" declared the New York Times,[1396] preferred Sanford E. Church, then chief judge of the Court of Appeals, who became known as the "ring candidate."[1397] On the other hand, Kernan had the support of Tilden, against whom the same combination arrayed itself that controlled at Rochester in 1871. Although the Tweed ring had practically ceased to exist, its friendships, rooted in the rural press and in the active young men whom it had assisted to positions in Albany and New York, blocked the way. Besides, Kernan himself had invited open hostility by vigorously supporting Tilden in his crusade against Tammany. Thus the contest became complicated and bitter.

[Footnote 1394: New York Tribune, August 23, 1872; New York World, September 10, 1874; Times, September 11.]

[Footnote 1395: Among them were Augustus Schell of New York, Francis Kernan of Oneida, Allen C. Beach of Jefferson, then lieutenant-governor, Homer A. Nelson of Dutchess, formerly secretary of state, and Lucius Robinson of Chemung, the distinguished comptroller.]

[Footnote 1396: September 6, 1872.]

[Footnote 1397: Bigelow, Life of Tilden, Vol. 1, p. 226.]

It was an anxious moment for Tilden. Kelly stood for Schell, Kings County presented Church, and Robinson and Beach held their friends firmly in hand. With the skill of an astute leader, however, Tilden weakened the support of Church by publishing his letters declining to be a candidate, and by invoking the influences which emphasised the division between Beach and Schell, gained Robinson for Kernan. The audacity of such tactics staggered the opposition, and when Beach surrendered, Tammany and Kings hastened into line. This led to Kernan's nomination by acclamation.[1398] As further evidence of harmony Kelly moved the appointment of Tilden as a State committeeman-at-large, and subsequently, on the organisation of the committee, continued him as its chairman.

[Footnote 1398: The first ballot resulted as follows: Kernan, 42-1/2; Beach, 32; Schell, 24-1/2; Nelson, 10; Church, 11; Robinson, 6; necessary to a choice, 64.

The ticket nominated by the two conventions was as follows: Governor, Francis Kernan of Oneida, Democrat; Lieutenant-Governor, Chauncey M. Depew of Westchester, Liberal; Canal Commissioner, John Hubbard of Chenango, Democrat; Prison Inspector, Enos C. Brooks of Cattaraugus, Liberal; 1 Congressman-at-large, Samuel S. Cox of New York, Democrat.]

Both conventions endorsed the Cincinnati platform, denounced the Legislature for its failure to expel dishonest members, and charged the National Administration with corruption and favoritism. As a farewell to the Governor, the Democrats resolved that "the general administration of John T. Hoffman meets the approbation of this convention."[1399]

[Footnote 1399: New York Tribune, September 6, 1872.]

Hoffman's political career closed under circumstances that a more heroic soul might have avoided. In his last message he had repudiated the Ring. He had also made some atonement by authorising such suits against it as Charles O'Conor might advise,[1400] and by vetoing the Code Amendment Bill, devised by Cardozo and designed to confer authority upon the judges to punish the press for attacking the Ring; but the facts inspiring Nast's cartoon, which pictured him as the Tammany wooden Indian on wheels, pushed and pulled by the Erie and Tweed combination, had fixed the Governor in the popular mind as the blind tool of rings. "I saw him in 1885," says Rhodes, "at the Schweizerhof in Lucerne. Accompanied by his wife he was driving through Switzerland; and in this hotel, full of his own countrymen, he sat neglected, probably shunned by many. The light was gone from his eyes, the vigour from his body, the confidence from his manner; consciousness of failure brooded in their stead. He had not become dissipated. Great opportunities missed; this was the memory that racked him, body and spirit, and left him nerveless and decrepit, inviting death."[1401] He died in Germany in 1888.

[Footnote 1400: Attorney-General Champlain had publicly announced his purpose to authorise O'Conor to bring such suits before the Committee of Seventy had had its interview with the Governor.—Tilden's Public Writings and Speeches, Vol. 1, p. 590.]

[Footnote 1401: James F. Rhodes, History of the United States, Vol. 6, p. 401, note.]

For mayor of New York, John Kelly nominated Abram R. Lawrence, a lawyer of ability and integrity, whom the Liberals endorsed. The anti-Tammany forces, not yet willing to surrender to the new Boss, divided their strength, the Apollo Hall Democracy nominating James O'Brien, its founder, while the associations centring about the Committee of Seventy supported William F. Havermeyer, whom the Republicans endorsed. Havermeyer had twice been mayor.[1402] He belonged among the enemies of jobbery, and although sixty-seven years of age his mental and physical powers remained unimpaired. The contest, thus narrowed to Lawrence and Havermeyer, assured a good mayor.

[Footnote 1402: Elected in 1844 and 1847. Declined a renomination in 1849.]

The campaign opened encouragingly for Democrats and Liberals. "The antagonisms which civil war has created between the kindred populations of our country," declared Tilden, in his speech at the Syracuse convention, "must be closed up now and forever."[1403] This was the keynote of his party, and, apart from the personal question of candidates, was the only serious issue of the campaign. In his letter of acceptance Greeley added a new phrase to the vocabulary of the common people: "I accept your nomination," he said, "in the confident trust that the masses of our countrymen North and South are eager to clasp hands across the bloody chasm."[1404]

[Footnote 1403: New York Tribune, September 5, 1872.]

[Footnote 1404: Ibid., May 22, 1872.]

This was a taking cry, and as the great editor moved across Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana, the general demonstration of interest created considerable uneasiness at Republican headquarters. "His name had been honoured for so many years in every Republican household," says Blaine, "that the desire to see and hear him was universal, and secured to him the majesty of numbers at every meeting."[1405] Greeley's friends interpreted these vast audiences as indications of a great tidal wave which would sweep Grant and his party from power. In the latter part of September they confidently counted upon carrying the October States. The South's endorsement of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, its declaration that the public credit must be sacredly maintained, and its denunciation of repudiation in every form and guise, created the belief that the North and South would, indeed, "clasp hands across the bloody chasm."

[Footnote 1405: Twenty Years in Congress, Vol. 2, p. 534.]

In New York, however, although the Democratic leaders stood loyally by their candidate, pushing Kernan boldly to the front wherever Greeley seemed weak, the inequality of the fight was apparent. Tammany and old-time Democrats could not forget that the Tribune's editor had classed them with blacklegs, thieves, burglars, gamblers, and keepers of dens of prostitution.[1406] Moreover, only three Republican newspapers had declared for Greeley,[1407] while many leaders like Lyman Tremaine and James W. Husted, whose criticism of the President had encouraged the belief that they would favour the Cincinnati nominee, preferred Grant.[1408] Besides, the business men of the country thought the Republican party without Greeley safer than the Democratic party with Greeley.

[Footnote 1406: "We asked our contemporary [World] to state frankly whether the pugilists, blacklegs, thieves, burglars, keepers of dens of prostitution, etc., etc., who make up so large a share of our city's inhabitants, were not almost unanimously Democrats."—Tribune, January 4, 1868.

"So every one who chooses to live by pugilism, or gambling, or harlotry, with nearly every keeper of a tippling house, is politically a Democrat.... A purely selfish interest attaches the lewd, ruffianly, criminal and dangerous class to the Democratic party by the instinct of self-preservation."—Ibid., January 7. Conkling quoted these extracts in his Cooper Institute speech of July 23.—New York Times, July 24, 1872.]

[Footnote 1407: New York Tribune, Syracuse Herald, and Watertown Times.]

[Footnote 1408: New York Tribune, August 22.]

After the Cincinnati convention a Republican Congress passed a General Amnesty Act, approved May 22, and in the interest of "a free breakfast table" placed tea and coffee on the free list. The reduction of the public debt at the rate of one hundred millions a year, as well as large annual reductions in the rate of taxation, also inspired confidence, while to the President and his Secretary of State belonged great credit for the Geneva arbitration. This amicable and dignified adjustment of differences between England and the United States, leading to new rules for the future government of Anglo-American relations, and making impossible other than a friendly rivalry between the two nations, sent a thrill of satisfaction through the American people. Until then the settlement of such irritating questions had not come by the peaceful process of law.

As the campaign progressed both sides indulged in bitter personalities. In his Cooper Institute speech, an address of great power, Conkling's invective and sarcasm cut as deeply as Nast's cartoons.[1409] Greeley's face, dress, and manners readily lent themselves to caricature. "I have been assailed so bitterly," wrote Greeley, "that I hardly knew whether I was running for President or the Penitentiary."[1410] The Tribune told of a negro woman who was heard cursing him in the streets of an Ohio river town because he had "sold her baby down South before the war."[1411] Grant did not escape. Indeed, he was lampooned until he declared that "I have been the subject of abuse and slander scarcely ever equalled in political history."[1412]

[Footnote 1409: New York Times, July 24. "The longest and greatest campaign speech of his life."—Alfred R. Conkling, Life of Conkling, p. 436.]

[Footnote 1410: Hollister's Life of Colfax, p. 387, note.]

[Footnote 1411: The same article enumerates some of the charges published against him: "In Washington he was a briber. In Albany he was the head of the lobby. In New York he was a partner in the Ring frauds. He defended the rascalities of Tweed. He sold the influence of his paper to Tammany Hall. He intrigued to restore the thieves to power. He was involved in schemes for robbing the national treasury. He was plotting the payment of the Confederate debt. He had promised pensions to Rebel soldiers. He was an original Secessionist. He was once a slave-trader in Memphis. He was the friend of the Ku-Klux and ballot-box stuffers.... Dix blamed him for expressing ten or twelve years ago sentiments identical with those of Dix himself."—New York Tribune, November 22, 1872.]

[Footnote 1412: Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Richardson, Vol. 7, p. 223.]

Early elections increased Republican confidence. North Carolina, then a doubtful State, gave a Republican majority in August.[1413] Vermont and Maine followed in September, and Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana practically settled the question in October. Finally, the election on November 5 gave Greeley, by small majorities, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee, and Texas, or sixty-six electoral votes to two hundred and seventy-two for Grant, whose popular majority exceeded three-quarters of a million. Dix carried New York by 55,451 majority.[1414] Of thirty-two congressmen the Republicans elected twenty-three, with a legislative majority of seventy on joint ballot. To the surprise of Tammany, Havermeyer was elected mayor by over 8,000 plurality, although Greeley carried the city by 23,000 majority.[1415] A comparison of the vote with that cast for Seymour in 1868 showed that a marked percentage of Democrats refused to support Greeley, and that a larger percentage did not vote at all.[1416] Other slights added to his disappointment. "I was an Abolitionist for years," he said, "when to be one was as much as one's life was worth even here in New York, and the negroes have all voted against me. Whatever of talents and energy I have possessed, I have freely contributed all my life long to Protection; to the cause of our manufactures. And the manufacturers have expended millions to defeat me. I even made myself ridiculous in the opinion of many whose good wishes I desired, by showing fair play and giving a fair field in the Tribune to Woman's Rights; and the women have all gone against me."[1417]

[Footnote 1413: After the North Carolina election would-be Liberals rejoined the Republican party in great numbers.]

[Footnote 1414: Grant, 440,759; Greeley, 387,279; majority, 53,480. Dix, 447,801; Kernan, 392,350; majority, 55,451. Robinson, 442,297; Depew, 397,754; majority, 44,543. Tremaine, 438,456; Cox, 400,697; majority, 37,759.]

[Footnote 1415: Havermeyer, 53,806; Lawrence, 45,398; O'Brien, 31,121.]

[Footnote 1416: Seymour (1868), 429,883. Greeley (1872), 387,279. Kernan (1872), 392,350. Cox (1872), 400,697.]

[Footnote 1417: George W. Julian, Political Recollections, p. 348.]

Before the vote of the State was officially canvassed Greeley had gone to his rest.[1418] The campaign had overtaxed his strength, and upon his return from the western speaking tour he watched at the bedside of his wife until her decease on October 30. After the election he resumed editorial charge of the Tribune, which he formally relinquished on the 15th of the preceding May, but it was plain that the robust animal spirits which characterised his former days were gone.[1419] The loss of his wife, the mortification of defeat, the financial embarrassment of his paper, and the exhaustion of his physical powers had broken him. The announcement of his death, however, although the public got an early intimation of the cruel work which his troubles were making upon a frame that once seemed to be of iron, came with the shock of sudden calamity. The whole country recognised that in the field of his real conquests the most remarkable man in American history had fallen, and it buried him with the appreciation that attends a conqueror. At the funeral President Grant, Vice-President Colfax, and the Vice-President-elect, Henry Wilson, rode in the same carriage.[1420]

[Footnote 1418: He died November 29, 1872.]

[Footnote 1419: "In the darkest hour my suffering wife left me, none too soon for she had suffered too deeply and too long. I laid her in the ground with hard dry eyes. Well, I am used up. I cannot see before me. I have slept little for weeks and my eyes are still hard to close, while they soon open again." Letter to his friend, Mason W. Tappan of New Hampshire.—Hollister's Life of Colfax, p. 387, note.]

[Footnote 1420: New York Tribune, December 5, 1872.]



CHAPTER XXIV

TILDEN DESTROYS HIS OPPONENTS

1873-4

The Legislature which convened January 6, 1873, re-elected Roscoe Conkling to the United States Senate. There was no delay and no opposition. Cornell was in the watch-tower as speaker of the Assembly and other lieutenants kept guard in the lobbies.[1421] The Republican caucus nominated on the 8th and the election occurred on the 21st.[1422] A few months later (November 8) the President, in complimentary and generous terms, offered Conkling the place made vacant by the death of Chief Justice Chase (May 7). His industry and legal training admirably fitted him for the position, but for reasons not specified he declined the distinguished preferment just as he had refused in December, 1870, the offer of a law partnership with an annual compensation of fifty thousand dollars. Probably the suggestion that he become a presidential candidate influenced his decision, especially as the President favoured his succession.[1423]

[Footnote 1421: Cornell resigned as surveyor of the port and was elected to the Assembly.]

[Footnote 1422: The Democrats voted for Charles Wheaton of Dutchess, distinguished locally as a county judge.]

[Footnote 1423: Alfred R. Conkling, Life of Conkling, p. 451.]

At this time Conkling, then forty-four years old, may be said to have reached the height of his power, if not of his fame. His opponents were under his feet. Greeley was dead, Fenton's long and successful career had closed in the gloom of defeat and the permanent eclipse of his influence in public affairs, and others were weakened if not destroyed by their party desertion. Moreover, the re-election of a President whom he had supported and defended with an opulent vocabulary that made his studied addresses models of speech, continued his political control. About half a dozen able lieutenants, holding fat offices in the great patronage centres, revolved with the fidelity of planets, while in every custom-house and federal office in the State trained politicians performed the function of satellites. To harness the party more securely hundreds of young men, selected from the various counties because of their partisan zeal, filled the great departments at Washington. "In obedience to this system," said George William Curtis, "the whole machinery of the government is pulled to pieces every four years. Political caucuses, primary meetings, and conventions are controlled by the promise and expectation of patronage. Political candidates for the lowest or highest positions are directly or indirectly pledged. The pledge is the price of the nomination, and when the election is determined, the pledges must be redeemed. The business of the nation, the legislation of Congress, the duties of the departments, are all subordinated to the distribution of what is well called spoils."[1424]

[Footnote 1424: Report of Civil Service Commission, 1871, p. 18.]

President Grant is quoted as declaring that the Senator never sought an appointment from him.[1425] This statement is probably true, but not on the theory of the Latin maxim, Qui facit per alium, facit per se.[1426] No occasion existed for him to make requests since his agents, well known to the President, cabinet, and collectors, could obtain the necessary appointments without the Senator's participation or even knowledge. Nevertheless, he relied upon public patronage as an instrument of party and factional success, and uniformly employed it throughout his career. The principal objection of the independent press to his appointment as chief justice implied his devotion to practical politics and an absence of the quality of true statesmanship.[1427] Indeed, in spite of his transcendent gifts, his hold upon party and people was never stronger than the machine's, since the influence of his control tended to transform political action into such subserviency that men of spirit, though loving their party, frequently held aloof from its service.