The intrepidity of the native converts was rivalled by the courage of their foreign teachers. Again and again these latter defied the Japanese authorities by visiting Japan—not for the first time but occasionally even after having been deported. Contrary to the orders of the governors of Macao and Manila, nay of the King of Spain himself, the priests arrived, year after year, with the certainty of being apprehended and sent to the stake after brief periods of propagandism. In 1626, when the campaign of persecution was at its height, more than three thousand converts were baptized by these brave priests, of whom none is known to have escaped death except those that apostatized under torture, and they were very few, although not only could life be saved by abandoning the faith but also ample allowances of money could be obtained from the authorities. Anyone denouncing a propagandist received large reward, and the people were required to prove their orthodoxy by trampling upon a picture of Christ.

CONTINUATION OF THE FEUDS BETWEEN THE DUTCH AND THE PORTUGUESE

While the above events were in progress, the disputes between the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the Spaniards went on without cessation. In 1636, the Dutch discovered in a captured Portuguese vessel a report written by the governor of Macao, describing a festival which had just been held there in honour of Vieyra, who had been martyred in Japan. The Dutch transmitted this document to the Japanese "in order that his Majesty may see more clearly what great honour the Portuguese pay to those he had forbidden his realm as traitors to the State and to his crown." It does not appear that this accusation added much to the resentment and distrust against the Portuguese. At any rate, the Bakufu in Yedo took no step distinctly hostile to Portuguese laymen until the following year (1637), when an edict was issued forbidding "any foreigners to travel in the empire lest Portuguese with passports bearing Dutch names might enter."

THE SHIMABARA REVOLT

At the close of 1637, there occurred a rebellion, historically known as the "Christian Revolt of Shimabara," which put an end to Japan's foreign intercourse for over two hundred years. The Gulf of Nagasaki is bounded on the west by the island of Amakusa and by the promontory of Shimabara. In the early years of Jesuit propagandism in Japan, Shimabara and Amakusa had been the two most thoroughly Christianized regions, and in later days they were naturally the scene of the severest persecutions. Nevertheless, the people might have suffered in silence, as did their fellow believers elsewhere, had they not been taxed beyond endurance to supply funds for an extravagant feudatory. Japanese annalists, however, relegate the taxation grievance to an altogether secondary place, and attribute the revolt solely to the instigation of five samurai who led a roving life to avoid persecution for their adherence to Christianity. Whichever version be correct, it is certain that the outbreak attracted all the Christians from the surrounding regions, and was officially regarded as a Christian rising. The Amakusa insurgents passed over from that island to Shimabara, and on the 27th of January, 1638, the whole body—numbering, according to some authorities, twenty thousand fighting men with thirteen thousand women and children; according to others, little more than one-half of these figures—took possession of the dilapidated castle of Kara, which stood on a plateau with three sides descending one hundred feet perpendicularly to the sea and with a swamp on the fourth side.

The insurgents fought under flags inscribed with red crosses and their battle cries were "Jesus," "Maria," and "St. Iago." They defended the castle successfully against repeated assaults until the 12th of April, when, their provisions and their ammunition alike being exhausted, they were overwhelmed and put to the sword, with the exception of 105 prisoners. During this siege the Dutch gave practical proof of their enmity to the Christianity of the Spaniards and Portuguese. For, the guns in the possession of the besiegers being too light to accomplish anything effective, application was made to Koeckebacker, the Dutch factor at Hirado, to lend ships carrying heavier metal. He complied by despatching the De Ryp, and her twenty guns threw 426 shots into the castle in fifteen days. There has been handed down a letter carried by an arrow from the castle to the besiegers. It was not an appeal for mercy but a simple enumeration of reasons:—

"For the sake of our people we have now resorted to this castle. You will no doubt think that we have done this with the hope of taking lands and houses. Such is by no means the case. It is simply because Christianity is not tolerated as a distinct sect, which is well known to you. Frequent prohibitions have been published by the shogun, to our great distress. Some among us there are who consider the hope of future life as of the highest importance. For these there is no escape. Because they will not change their religion they incur various kinds of severe punishments, being inhumanly subjected to shame and extensive suffering, till at last for their devotion to the Lord of Heaven, they are tortured to death. Others, even men of resolution, solicitous for the sensitive body and dreading the torture, have, while hiding their grief, obeyed the royal will and recanted. Things continuing in this state, all the people have united in an uprising in an unaccountable and miraculous manner. Should we continue to live as heretofore and the above laws not be repealed, we must incur all sorts of punishments hard to be endured; we must, our bodies being weak and sensitive, sin against the infinite Lord of Heaven and from solicitude for our brief lives incur the loss of what we highly esteem. These things fill us with grief beyond endurance. Hence we are in our present condition. It is not the result of a corrupt doctrine."

It seems probable that of the remaining Japanese Christians the great bulk perished at the massacre of Kara. Thenceforth there were few martyrs, and though Christianity was not entirely extirpated in Japan, it survived only in remote places and by stealth.

ENGRAVING: NANBAN BELL

ENGRAVING: THE "KAIYO KWAN," THE FIRST WARSHIP OF JAPAN (Built in Holland for the Tokugawa Feudal Government)



CHAPTER XXXVIII

THE TOKUGAWA SHOGUNATE

THE Tokugawa family traced its descent from Nitta Yoshishige of the Minamoto sept (the Seiwa Genji) who flourished at the beginning of the thirteenth century. His son's place of residence was at the village of Tokugawa in Kotsuke province: hence the name, Tokugawa. After a few generations, Chikauji, the then representative of the family, had to fly to the village of Matsudaira in Mikawa province, taking the name of Matsudaira. Gradually the family acquired possession of about one-half of Mikawa province, and in the seventh generation from Chikauji, the head of the house, Hirotada, crossing swords with Oda Nobuhide, father of Nobunaga, sought succour from the Imagawa family, to which he sent his son, Ieyasu, with fifty other young samurai as hostages. This was in 1547, Ieyasu being then in his fifth year.

On the way from Okazaki, which was the stronghold of Hirotada, the party fell into the hands of Nobuhide's officers, and Ieyasu was confined in a temple where he remained until 1559, when he obtained permission to return to Okazaki, being then a vassal of the Imagawa family. But when (1569) the Imagawa suffered defeat in the battle of Okehazama, at the hands of Oda Nobunaga, Ieyasu allied himself with the latter. In 1570, he removed to Hamamatsu, having subjugated the provinces of Mikawa and Totomi. He was forty years old at the time of Nobunaga's murder, and it has been shown above that he espoused the cause of the Oda family in the campaign of Komak-yama. At forty-nine he became master of the Kwanto and was in his fifty-sixth year when Hideyoshi died. Ieyasu had nine sons: (1) Nobuyasu; (2) Hideyasu (daimyo of Echizen); (3) Hidetada (second shoguri); (4) Tadayoshi (daimyo of Kiyosu); (5) Nobuyoshi (daimyo of Mito); (6) Tadateru (daimyo of Echigo); (7) Yoshinao (daimyo of Owari); (8) Yorinobu (daimyo of Kii), and (9) Yorifusa (daimyo of Mito). He had also three daughters; the first married to Okudaira Masanobu; the second to Ikeda Terumasa, and the third to Asano Nagaakira.

EVENTS IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO THE BATTLE OF SEKIGAHARA

The political complications that followed the death of the Taiko are extremely difficult to unravel, and the result is not commensurate with the trouble. Several annalists have sought to prove that Ieyasu strenuously endeavoured to observe faithfully the oath of loyalty made by him to Hideyoshi on the latter's death-bed. They claim for him that until his hands were forced he steadfastly and faithfully worked in the interests of Hideyoshi. But his acts do not lend themselves to any such interpretation. The best that can be said of him is that he believed himself to have been entrusted by the Taiko with discretionary power to determine the expediency of Hideyori's succession, and that he exercised that power in the interests of the Tokugawa family, not of the Toyotomi.

Circumstances helped him as they do generally help great men. From the time of the birth of the lady Yodo's second son, the official world in Kyoto had been divided into two factions. The Hidetsugu catastrophe accentuated the lines of division, and the Korean campaign had a similar effect by affording a field for bitter rivalry between the forces of Konishi Yukinaga, who belonged to the Yodo faction, and Kato Kiyomasa, who was a protege of Hideyoshi's wife, Yae. Further fuel was added to this fire of antagonism when the order went forth that the army should leave Korea, for the Kato faction protested against surrendering all the fruits of the campaign without any tangible recompense, and the Konishi party insisted that the Taiko's dying words must be obeyed implicitly. In this dispute, Ishida Katsushige, the chief actor in the Hidetsugu tragedy, took a prominent part. For, when in their capacity as belonging to the Board of Five Administrators, Ishida and Asano Nagamasa were sent to Kyushu to superintend the evacuation of the Korean peninsula, they, too, fell into a controversy on the same subject. Ieyasu stood aloof from both parties. His policy was to let the feud develop and to step in himself at the supreme moment.

On the other hand, it was the aim of Ishida Katsushige to involve the Tokugawa chief, thus compassing his downfall and opening an avenue for the ascension of Ishida himself to the place of dictator. Allied with Ishida in this plot was his colleague on the Board of Five Administrators, Masuda Nagamori. Their method was to create enmity between Ieyasu and Maeda Toshiiye, to whom the Taiko had entrusted the guardianship of Hideyori and of the Osaka Castle. This design was barely thwarted by the intervention of Hosokawa Tadaoki (ancestor of the present Marquis Hosokawa). Ieyasu was well informed as to Ishida's schemes on two other occasions; the first immediately before, the second just after, the death of the Taiko. In each case rumours of an armed outbreak were suddenly circulated in Fushimi for the purpose of creating confusion such as might furnish an opportunity to strike suddenly at Ieyasu. These essays failed in both instances, and the Tokugawa chief, instead of retaliating by direct impeachment of Ishida, applied himself to cementing close relations with certain great daimyo by matrimonial alliances. Such unions had been implicitly interdicted by the Taiko, and the procedure of Ieyasu elicited a written protest from the boards of the Five Senior Ministers and the Five Administrators. They threatened Ieyasu with dismissal from the former board unless he furnished a satisfactory explanation. This he declined to do and for some time a very strained situation existed in Kyoto, an armed struggle being ultimately averted by the good offices of the Three Middle Ministers.

It was evident, however, that the circumstances had become critical, and it was further evident that, as long as Ishida Katsushige's intrigues continued, a catastrophe might at any moment be precipitated. Sensible of these things, a party of loyal men, spoken of in history as the "seven generals"—Ikeda Terumasa (ancestor of the present Marquis Ikeda); Kato Kiyomasa; Kuroda Nagamasa (son of Kuroda Yoshitaka, and ancestor of the present Marquis Kuroda); Fukushima Masanori, Asano Yukinaga (son of Asano Nagamasa and ancestor of the present Marquis Asano); Hosokawa Tadaoki, and Kato Yoshiaki (ancestor of the present Viscount Kato)—vowed to take Ishida's life, while he was still in Osaka Castle, whither he had gone (1599) to attend the death-bed of his friend, Maeda Toshiiye. Ishida, finding himself powerless to resist such a combination after the death of Maeda, took an extraordinary step; he appealed to the protection of Ieyasu—that is to say, to the protection of the very man against whom all his plots had been directed. And Ieyasu protected him.

We are here confronted by a riddle which has never been clearly interpreted. Why did Ishida seek asylum from Ieyasu whom he had persistently intrigued to overthrow, and why did Ieyasu, having full knowledge of these intrigues, grant asylum? Possibly an answer to the former question can be furnished by the fact that Ishida was in sore straits. Attending Maeda Toshiiye's death-bed, he had seen the partisans of the deceased baron transfer their allegiance to Ieyasu through the intervention of Hosokawa Tadaoki, and he had learned that his own life was immediately threatened by the seven generals. Even if he succeeded (which was very problematical) in escaping from Osaka to his own castle of Sawa-yama, in Omi province, the respite could have been but brief and such a step would have been equivalent to abandoning the political arena. Only a very strong arm could save him, and with consummate insight he may have appreciated the Tokugawa chief's unreadiness to precipitate a crucial struggle by consenting to his death.

But what is to be said of Ieyasu? Unwilling to admit that his astuteness could ever have been at fault, some historians allege that the Tokugawa chief saved Ishida's life with the deliberate purpose of letting him discredit himself and his partisans by continued intrigues. These annalists allege, in fact, that Ieyasu, acting on the advice of Honda Masanobu, by whose profound shrewdness he was largely guided, saved the life of Ishida in order that the latter's subsequent intrigues might furnish a pretext for destroying Hideyori. That, however, is scarcely conceivable, for Ishida had many powerful confederates, and the direct outcome of the leniency shown by Ieyasu on that occasion was an armed struggle from which he barely emerged victorious. The truth seems to be that, for all his profound wisdom, Ieyasu erred in this instance. Ishida Kotsushige outwitted him. For, during the very days of his asylum in Fushimi, under the protection of Ieyasu, Ishida opened secret communication with Uesugi Kagekatsu and invited him to strike at the Tokugawa. Uesugi consented. It must be observed that the character of Ishida has been portrayed for posterity mainly by historians who were under Tokugawa influence. Modern and impartial annalists are by no means so condemnatory in their judgment of the man. In whatever arts of deception Ishida excelled, Ieyasu was at least his equal; while in the matter of loyalty to the Toyotomi family, Ishida's conduct compares favourably with that of the Tokugawa leader; and if we look at the men who attached themselves to Ishida's cause and fought by his side, we are obliged to admit that he must have been highly esteemed by his contemporaries, or, at any rate, that they recognized in him the champion of Hideyori, at whose father's hands they had received such benefits.

ORGANIZATION OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE AT THE CLOSE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

The realm of Japan was then held by 214 feudatories, each having an annual income of at least 10,000 koku (omitting minor landowners). These 214 estates yielded to their holders a total income of nearly nineteen million koku, and of that aggregate the domains of the five noblemen forming the Board of Senior Statesmen constituted one-third. Tokugawa Ieyasu was the wealthiest. His domains in the eight provinces forming the Kwanto yielded an income of 2,557,000 koku. Next on the list came Mori Terumoto with 2,205,000 koku, and Uesugi Kagekatsu with 1,200,000 koku. The latter two were partisans of Ishida. But direct communication between their forces was difficult, for while the Mori domains covered the nine provinces on the extreme west of the main island, Uesugi's lay on the north of the Kwanto, whence they stretched to the shore of the Japan Sea. Fourth and fifth on the Board of Senior Statesmen were Maeda Toshiiye, whose fief (835,000 koku) occupied Kaga and Etchu; and Ukita Hideiye (574,000 koku), whose castle stood at Oka-yama, in Bizen. All these, except Maeda embraced the anti-Tokugawa cause of Ishida Katsushige, and it thus becomes easy to understand the desire of Ishida to win over Maeda Toshinaga, son of Toshiiye, to his camp. On the side of Ieyasu's foes were also marshalled Shimazu Yoshihisa, feudal chief of Satsuma (700,000 koku); Satake Yoshinobu of Hitachi province (545,700 koku); Konishi Yukinaga in Higo (200,000 koku), who was counted one of the greatest captains of the era, and, nominally, Kohayakawa Hideaki in Chikuzen (522,500 koku). With Ieyasu were the powerful daimyo: Date Masamune of Sendai (580,000 koku); Kato Kiyomasa of Kumamoto (250,000 koku); Hosokawa Tadaoki of Tango (230,000 koku); Ikeda Terumasa of Mikawa (152,000 koku), and Kuroda Nagamasa of Chikuzen (250,000 koku). This analysis omits minor names.

BATTLE OF SEKIGAHARA

The plan of campaign formed by Ishida and his confederates was that Uesugi and Satake should attack the Kwanto from the north and the east simultaneously, while Mori and Ukita should move against Fushimi and occupy Kyoto. In May, 1600, Ieyasu went through the form of requiring Uesugi to repair to Kyoto and explain his obviously disaffected preparations. The reply sent by Uesugi was defiant. Therefore, the Tokugawa chief proceeded to mobilize his own and his allies' forces. He seems to have clearly foreseen that if he himself moved eastward to Yedo, Momo-yama would be assaulted in his absence. But it being necessary to simulate trust in Mori and Ukita, then nominally his supporters, he placed in Momo-yama Castle a garrison of only two thousand men under his old and staunch friend, Torii Mototada. Ieyasu planned that Uesugi should be attacked simultaneously from five directions; namely from Sendai by Date; from Kaga by Maeda; from Dewa by Mogami; from Echigo by Hori, and from Hitachi by Satake. But among these five armies that of Satake declared for Ishida, while those of Maeda and Hori were constrained to adopt a defensive attitude by the menace of hostile barons in their vicinity, and thus it fell out that Date and Mogami alone operated effectively in the cause of Ieyasu.

The Tokugawa chief himself lost no time in putting his troops in motion for Yedo, where, at the head of some sixty thousand men, he arrived in August, 1600, his second in command being his third son, Hidetada. Thence he pushed rapidly northward with the intention of attacking Uesugi. But at Oyama in Shimotsuke news reached him that Ishida and his partisans had drawn the sword in the west, and had seized Osaka, together with the wives and families of several of the captains who were with Ieyasu's army. A council was immediately held and these captains were given the option of continuing to serve under Ieyasu or retiring to join the western army and thus ensuring the safety of their own families. They chose the former, and the council further decided that, leaving Date and Mogami to deal with Uesugi and Satake, and posting for the same purpose at Utsunomiya, Hideyasu, second son of Ieyasu, the main army should countermarch to meet the western forces at some point remote from Yedo.

The Tokugawa battalions, following two routes—the Tokaido and the Nakasendo—made rapid progress westward, and on September 21st, the van of the division under Fukushima and Ikeda reached Kiyosu. But the Nakasendo column of thirty-eight thousand men under Hidetada encountered such desperate resistance before the castle of Ueda, at the hands of Sanada Masayuki, that it did not reach Sekigahara until the great battle was over. Meanwhile, the western army had pushed steadily eastward. Its first exploit was to capture and burn the Momo-yama castle, which was splendidly defended by the veteran Torii Mototada, then in his sixty-second year. With a garrison of only two thousand men he held at bay during eleven days an investing force of forty thousand. The torch was set to the castle on the 8th of September by traitors in the garrison, and Mototada committed suicide. Thereafter, the van of the western army advanced to Gifu along the Nakasendo, and the main body, making a detour through Ise, ultimately pushed forward into Mino.

With this army were no less than forty-three generals of renown, and the number of feudal barons, great and small, who sent troops to swell its ranks was thirty-one. Undoubtedly these barons were partially influenced by the conception generally prevalent that the fortunes of the two great families of Toyotomi and Tokugawa depended on the issue of this struggle. But it must also be admitted that had Ishida Katsushige been as black as the Tokugawa historians paint him, he could never have served for the central figure of such an array. He is seen inciting the besiegers of Momo-yama Castle to their supreme and successful effort. He is seen winning over to the Toyotomi cause baron after baron. He is seen leading the advance of the western army's van. And he is seen fighting to the end in the great battle which closed the campaign. Some heroic qualities must have accompanied his gift of statesmanship. The nominal leader of the western army, which mustered 128,000 strong, was Mori Terumoto, and under him were ranged Ukita Hideiye, Mori Hidemoto, Shimazu Yoshihiro, Konishi Yukinaga, and many other captains of repute. Under the Tokugawa banners there marched 75,000 men, their van led by Ii Naomasa and Honda Tadakatsu.

On October 21, 1600, the great battle of Sekigahara was fought. The strategy on the side of the western forces was excellent. Their units were disposed along a crescent-shaped line recessed from the enemy, so that an attacking army, unless its numerical strength was greatly superior, had to incur the risk of being enveloped from both flanks—a risk much accentuated by the fact that these flanking troops occupied high ground. But on the side of the western army there was a feature of weakness which no strategy could remove: all the battalions constituting the right wing were pledged to espouse the cause of Ieyasu at the crisis of the struggle. There were six of these battalions, large or small, and they were commanded by Akakura, Ogawa, Kuchiki, Wakizaka, Kohayakawa, and Kikkawa. Thus, not only were the eastern troops able to deliver their attack in full force against the centre and left of their foes, but also the latter were exposed to the most demoralizing of all eventualities, treachery.

After a fierce fight the western army was completely defeated. Some accounts put its losses at 35,000 men; others, with greater probability, estimating that only 100,000 men were actually engaged on both sides—namely, 60,000 on the Tokugawa side, and 40,000 on the Toyotomi—conclude that the losses were 6000 and 9000, respectively. Shimazu of Satsuma, at the head of a handful of samurai, cut his way through the lines of Ieyasu, and reaching Osaka, embarked hastily for Kyushu. Ishida Katsushige lay concealed in a cave for a few days, but was ultimately seized and beheaded, in company with Konishi Yukinaga and Ankokuji Ekei, at the execution ground in Kyoto. This one battle ended the struggle: there was no rally. Punishment followed quickly for the feudatories who had fought against the Tokugawa. Thus Mori Terumoto's domain, originally covering eight provinces and yielding a revenue of 1,205,000 koku, was reduced to the two provinces of Suwo and Nagato, yielding 300,000 koku. The three provinces of Ukita Hideiye were entirely forfeited, and he himself was banished to the island Hachijoshima. Oda Hidenobu, grandson of Nobunaga, Masuda Nagamori, and Sanada Masayuki, with his son, were ordered to take the tonsure and retire to the monastery of Koya-san. The fief of Uesugi Kagekatsu was reduced from 1,200,000 koku in Aizu to 300,000 koku in Yonezawa; and the 800,000 koku of the Satake family in Hitachi were exchanged for 200,000 koku in Akita. Only the Shimazu family of Satsuma remained without loss. Secured by inaccessibility, it continued to hold the provinces of Satsuma, Osumi, and Hyuga, with a revenue of 700,000 koku.

REDISTRIBUTION OF THE FIEFS

These measures represented only a fraction of the readjustments then effected. Ieyasu, following the example, set on a small scale by the Taiko, parcelled out the country in such a manner as to provide security against future trouble. Dividing the feudatories into hereditary vassals (fudai no kerai) and exterior nobles (tozama), he assigned to the former small but greatly increased estates situated so as to command the main highways as well as the great cities of central Japan, and he located the exterior nobles—many of them with largely reduced domains—in districts remote not only from Yedo and Kyoto but also from each other, wherever such method of distribution was possible. Moreover, in the most important places—as Osaka, Fushimi, Sakai, Nagasaki, Yamada (in Ise), and Sado (the gold mines), there were appointed administrators (bugyo), direct nominees of the Tokugawa; while Kyoto was put under the sway of a deputy of the shogun (shoshidai). Again, although the tozama daimyo received tolerably munificent treatment in the matter of estates, their resources were seriously crippled by the imposition of costly public works. These works consisted mainly of restoring dilapidated castles or building new ones on a scale so colossal as to be exceeded by only the stronghold at Osaka. It is recorded that when Fukushima Masanori, lord of Kiyosu in Owari, complained of the crippling effects of these severe requisitions, Kato Kiyomasa told him that there was no alternative except to retire to his castle and defy Yedo. The most costly of the edifices that came into existence in these circumstances was the castle of Nagoya, which is still one of the wonders of Japan. Twenty great barons took part in erecting it; the leading artists of the time were engaged in its interior decoration, and the roof of its donjon was crowned with, two gold dolphins, measuring nearly nine feet in height.

IEYASU BECOMES SHOGUN

On the 28th of March, 1603, the Emperor nominated Ieyasu to be minister of the Right and sei-i tai-shogun, presenting to him at the same time the conventional ox-chariot and military baton. Nine days later, the Tokugawa chief repaired to the palace to return thanks for these honours. The Emperor with his own hands gave him the drinking-cup and expressed profound gratification that through his military skill the wars which had convulsed the nation were ended, and the foundations of the empire's peace securely laid. Ieyasu was then in his sixty-second year. In the following May, Hideyori was made nai-daijin, and in the same month a marriage was contracted between him, then in his eleventh year, and Tenju-in, the seven-year-old daughter of Hidetada, son and successor of Ieyasu.

YEDO AND KYOTO

Ieyasu now took up his residence at Momo-yama Castle and Hidetada was ordered to live in Yedo. But the former made it a custom to go eastward every autumn on the pretext of enjoying the sport of falconry, and to remain in Yedo until the next spring. In February, 1605, the Tokugawa chief's return to Kyoto from the Kwanto capital was made the occasion of a great military display. Both Ieyasu and Hidetada travelled at the same time with a following of 170,000 soldiers, who were encamped outside the city whence they marched in, ten thousand daily, during seventeen consecutive days. This martial parade is said to have produced a great effect upon the nobles of the Kinai and the western provinces. But Ieyasu did not long retain the office of shogun. In 1605, he conveyed to the Imperial Court his desire to be relieved of military functions, in favour of his son Hidetada, and the Emperor at once consented, so that Hidetada succeeded to all the offices of his father, and Ieyasu retired to the castle of Sumpu, the capital of Suruga. His income was thenceforth reduced to 120,000 koku annually, derived from estates in the provinces of Mino, Ise, and Omi. But this retirement was in form rather than in fact. All administrative affairs, great or small, were managed in Sumpu, the shogun in Yedo exercising merely the power of sanction. Ieyasu made, frequent journeys to Yedo under the pretext of hawking but in reality for government purposes.

THE YEDO BAKUFU

It was on the 30th of August, 1590, that Ieyasu made his first formal entry into Yedo from Sumpu. Yedo Castle had previously been occupied by an agent of the Hojo clan. It was very small, and its surroundings consisted of barren plains and a few fishing villages. On the northwest was the moor of Musashi, and on the southeast a forest of reeds marked the littoral of Yedo Bay. The first task that devolved upon Ieyasu was the reclamation of land for building purposes. Some substantial work was done, yet the place did not suggest any fitness for the purpose of an administrative centre, and not until the battle of Sekigahara placed him in command of immense resources, did Ieyasu decide to make Yedo his capital. He then had large recourse to labour requisitioned from the feudatories. By these means hills were levelled, swamps reclaimed, and embankments built, so that the whole aspect of the region was changed, and sites were provided for the residences of various barons and for the establishment of shops and stores whose owners flocked to the new city from Osaka, Kyoto, and other towns. Thereafter, a castle of colossal dimensions, exceeding even the Osaka fortress in magnitude and magnificence, was rapidly constructed, the feudatories being required to supply labour and materials in a measure which almost overtaxed their resources.

Historians differ as to the exact date of the establishment of the Yedo Bakufu, but the best authorities are agreed that the event should be reckoned from the battle of Sekigahara, since then, for the first time, the administrative power came into the hand of the Tokugawa baron, he having previously been simply the head of a board instituted by the Taiko. There can be no doubt, that in choosing Yedo for his capital, Ieyasu was largely guided by the example of Yoritomo and by the experience of the Ashikaga. Kamakura had been a success as signal as Muromachi had been a failure. In the former, Ieyasu had much to imitate; in the latter, much to avoid. We have seen that he distributed the estates of the feudatories so as to create a system automatically unfavourable to disturbance, in which contrivance he borrowed and extended the ideas of Nobunaga and Hideyoshi. It remains to note that what Hojo Tokimasa and Oye Hiromoto were to Minamoto Yoritomo as advisers and organizers, and what Ashikaga Tadayoshi and Kono Moronao were to Ashikaga Takauji in the same roles, such, also, were Honda Masanobu and Honda Masazumi to Tokugawa Ieyasu.

HIDEYORI AND IEYASU

In May, 1605, Hideyori was nominated u-daijin. At that time the nation was divided pretty evenly into two factors; one obedient to the Tokugawa, the other disposed to await Hideyori's coming of age, which event was expected to restore the authority of the Toyotomi family. Fukushima Masanori and Kato Kiyomasa were the most enthusiastic believers in the latter forecast. Up to that time Ieyasu had not given any definite indication of the attitude he intended to assume towards the Taiko's heir. It was not till the year 1611 that he found an opportunity of forming a first-hand estimate of Hideyori's character. He then had a meeting with the latter at Nijo Castle, and is said to have been much struck with the bearing and intelligence of Hideyori. In fact, whereas common report had spoken in very disparaging terms of the young man's capacities—Hideyori was then seventeen years old—the Tokugawa chief found a dignified and alert lad whose aspect suggested that if he was suffered to remain in possession of Osaka a few years longer, Yedo would run the risk of being relegated to a secondary place.

Ieyasu after that interview is said to have felt like "a man who, having still a long distance to travel, finds himself enveloped in darkness." He saw that the time for considering justice and humanity had passed, and he summoned Honda Masanobu to whom he said: "I see that Hideyori is grown up to be a son worthy of his father. By and by it will be difficult for such a man to remain subservient to another." Masanobu, whom history describes as the "Tokugawa's storehouse of wisdom," is recorded to have replied: "So I, too, think, but there is no cause for anxiety. I have an idea." What this idea was events soon disclosed. Summoning one of the officials in the service of Hideyori's wife—Hidetada's daughter—Masanobu spoke as follows: "Hideyori is the only son of the late Taiko and it is the desire of the O-gosho" (the title given to Ieyasu after his retirement from the shogunate) "that he, Hideyori, should have a numerous and thriving family. Therefore, if any woman takes his fancy, she must be enrolled among his attendants to whatever class she may belong. Moreover, if there be among these ladies any who show jealousies or make disturbances, no complaint need be preferred to the O-gosho. I will undertake to settle the matter."

From that time Hideyori lived among women. A word may here be said about the marriage between Hideyori and the granddaughter of Ieyasu, the bride and the bridegroom alike being mere children. According to a recognized historical authority, writing in the Tokugawa Jidaishi, such marriages were inspired by one or more of the following motives: (1) that the bride or bridegroom should serve as a hostage; (2) that the wedding should contribute to cement an alliance between the families of the bride and the bridegroom; (3) that the wedding should become a means of spying into the affairs of one of the families; (4) that it should be an instrument for sowing seeds of enmity between the two families. The objects of Ieyasu in wedding his granddaughter at seven years of age to Hideyori at eleven were doubtless of the nature indicated in the third and fourth of the above definitions. On the one hand, he seemed to the Osaka party to be conforming to the will of the Taiko; on the other, he was able to introduce into the household of Hideyori an unlimited number of spies among the retinue of his granddaughter.

KATAGIRI KATSUMOTO

Just before his death, Hideyoshi specially conjured Koide Hidemasa and Katagiri Katsumoto to labour for the safety of the Toyotomi family. Hidemasa soon followed his patron to the grave, and the duty of managing the affairs of the family devolved entirely upon Katsumoto in his capacity of administrator (bugyo). He devoted himself to the task with the utmost sincerity and earnestness, and he made it the basic principle of his policy to preserve harmony between the Tokugawa and the Toyotomi. His belief was that Ieyasu had not many years more to live, and that on his demise the administrative power would revert wholly to Hideyori as a natural consequence. Hence the wisest course was to avoid any collision in the meanwhile.

THE OATH OF FEALTY

On the 14th of May, 1601, that is to say, shortly after the battle of Sekigahara, all the feudatories were invited to subscribe a written oath of loyalty to the Tokugawa. This oath consisted of three articles. The first was a promise to observe strictly all instructions issued by the Bakufu in Yedo. The second was an engagement not to harbour or protect any person who had either violated or opposed the will of the shogun. The third was a pledge not to give employment to any samurai reported to be a traitor or an assassin. By these stipulations the signatories swore to abide strictly, and declared that any violation of the provisions of the oath would render the violator liable to severe punishment. Among the signatories there were not found any members of the Osaka party. These put forward the last will of the Taiko as a reason for refusing to sign, and from that time it became evident that the situation must terminate in an armed struggle.

ONO HARUNAGA

Among the Osaka partisans was one called Ono Harunaga, the son of the lady Yodo's nurse. This youth led a life of great profligacy, and although not wanting in any of the attributes of the samurai, he altogether lacked political insight. Thus, his relations with Katsumoto were strained, and Harunaga constantly essayed to undermine Katsumoto's influence. Hideyori himself did not want for ability, but acting by the advice of his mother, Yodo, and of his friend, Harunaga, he adopted a false policy of opposition to Ieyasu.

STATE OF OSAKA

The fact that the feudatories who called themselves friends of the Osaka party had refused to sign the oath of fealty, and the fact that the lady Yodo and Harunaga threw their influence into the anti-Tokugawa scale, had the effect of isolating Osaka so far as the laws of the Bakufu were concerned. Men who had broken those laws or otherwise offended against the shogun took refuge in Osaka. Such was the case with the son of Hosokawa Tadaoki; with Goto Matabei, chief vassal of Kuroda Nagamasa, and with Nambu Saemon, principal retainer of Nambu Nobunao. These three and many others repaired to the castle of Osaka, and being there secure against any unarmed attempt of the Tokugawa to arrest them, they virtually defied Ieyasu's control. By degrees a constant stream of ronin, or free-lances, flowed into that city, and a conspicuous element among its inhabitants consisted of Christian feudatories, who, regardless of the edicts of the Bakufu, openly preached their faith and were in no wise checked by the Toyotomi rulers. Even the Buddhist and Shinto priests in Osaka and its territories were independent of the Bakufu authority, and there were cases of boundary disputes in which the Tokugawa officials declined to give judgment since they were not in a position to enforce it. It may well be supposed that this state of affairs grew steadily more obnoxious to the Tokugawa. Ieyasu only awaited a pretext to assert the supremacy of his authority.

INSCRIPTION ON THE BELL

It has already been stated that, in the year 1586, a colossal image of Buddha was erected by Hideyoshi at the Hoko-ji in Kyoto. This idol was made of wood, and the great earthquake of 1596 destroyed it. Subsequently, Ieyasu advised Hideyori to replace the wooden idol with a bronze one. Ono Harunaga stood opposed to this idea, but Katagiri Katsumoto, constant to his policy of placating Ieyasu, threw his influence into the other scale. It is impossible to tell whether, in making this proposal, Ieyasu had already conceived the extraordinary scheme which he ultimately carried out. It would appear more probable, however, that his original policy was merely to impoverish the Toyotomi family by imposing upon it the heavy outlay necessary for constructing a huge bronze Buddha. Many thousands of ryo had to be spent, and the money was obtained by converting into coin a number of gold ingots in the form of horses, which Hideyoshi had stored in the treasury of the Osaka castle as a war fund. Five years later, that is to say, in 1614, the great image was completed and an imposing ceremony of dedication was organized. A thousand priests were to take part, and all the people in the capital, as well as many from the surrounding provinces, assembled to witness the magnificent fete. Suddenly an order was issued in the name of Ieyasu, interdicting the consummation of the ceremony on the ground that the inscription carried by the bell for the idol's temple was designedly treasonable to the Tokugawa. This inscription had been composed and written by a high Buddhist prelate, Seikan, reputed to be one of the greatest scholars and most skilful calligraphists of his time.

It was inconceivable that such a man should err flagrantly in the use of the ideographic script. Ieyasu, however, despatched to Kyoto two rival prelates, Soden and Tengai, with instructions to convoke a meeting of the priests of the Five Temples and invite them to express an opinion about the inscription. Soden held the post of administrator of temples. This placed him officially at the head of all the other priests, and thus the opinions he expressed at the instance of Ieyasu possessed special weight. It was in vain that Seikan repudiated all intention of disrespect and pointed out that the inscription did not for a moment lend itself to the interpretation read into it by the Tokugawa chief. Only one priest, Kaizan of Myoshin-ji, had sufficient courage to oppose Soden's view, and the cause of the Tokugawa chief triumphed.

Without a full knowledge of the Chinese ideographic script it is impossible to clearly understand either the charges preferred by the Tokugawa or the arguments employed in rebuttal. Western readers may, however, confidently accept the unanimous verdict of all modern scholars, that the interpretation assigned to the inscription in the first place by the Tokugawa officials, and in the second by Hayashi Doshun, representing the Confucianists, and Soden and Tengai, representing the Buddhists, was grossly unreasonable. That many experts should be found to range themselves on the side of a ruler so powerful as Ieyasu was not wonderful, but it says little for the moral independence of the men of the time that only one Buddhist priest among many thousand had the courage to withhold his consent to a judgment which outraged truth and justice.

Naturally the news of the decision threw Osaka into a state of great excitement. Lady Yodo hastened to despatch to Sumpu her principal lady-in-waiting, Okura-no-Tsubone, accompanied by another dame of the chamber. These two were received by Acha-no-Tsubone at the court of Ieyasu, and through her they conveyed fervent apologies to the Tokugawa chief. Ieyasu treated the whole matter lightly. He granted an interview to the two ladies from Osaka and sent them on to Yedo to visit the wife of Hidetada, the lady Yodo's younger sister. The Osaka deputies naturally drew favourable inferences from this courteous mood, and taking an opportunity to refer to the affair of the inscription on the bell, elicited from Ieyasu an assurance that the matter need not be regarded with concern.

Not for a moment suspecting any deception, Okura-no-Tsubone and her companion took their way to Osaka. On the other hand, Honda Masanobu and the priest, Tengai, were instructed to inform Katsumoto that the umbrage of Ieyasu was deeply roused, and that some very strong measure would be necessary to restore the Bakufu's confidence in Hideyori. Katsumoto vainly sought some definite statement as to the nature of the reparation required. He was merely told to answer the question himself. He accordingly proposed one of three courses, namely, that the lady Yodo should be sent to Yedo as a hostage; that Hideyori should leave Osaka and settle at some other castle; or, finally, that he should acknowledge himself a vassal of the Tokugawa. To these proposals the only reply that could be elicited from Ieyasu was that Yodo and her son should choose whichever course they pleased, and, bearing that answer, the disquieting import of which he well understood, Katsumoto set out from Sumpu for Osaka. Travelling rapidly, he soon overtook Okwra-no-Tsubone and explained to her the events and their import. But the lady was incredulous. She was more ready to suspect Katsumoto's sincerity than to believe that Ieyasu had meant to deceive her.

Had Katsumoto been free to continue his journey to Osaka, reaching it in advance of Okura-no-Tsubone's party, the result might have been different. But Ieyasu did not contemplate any such sequence of events. He instructed Itakura Katsushige to invite Katsumoto to call at Kyoto on the way to Osaka with the object of discussing an important affair. Katsumoto had no choice but to delay his journey, and Katsushige took care that the delay should be long enough to afford time for Okura-no-Tsubone's party to reach Osaka, and to present their report, together with their suspicions of Katsumoto's disloyalty.

Lady Yodo was incensed when she learned the terms that Katsumoto had offered. "I am Hideyori's mother," she is reported to have cried. "I will never bend my knee to the Kwanto. Rather will I and my son make this castle our death-pillow." Then, with Ono Harunaga, she formed a plot to kill Katsumoto and to draw the sword against the Tokugawa. Subsequently, when Katsumoto returned to Osaka and reported the result of his mission, he stated his conviction that the only exit from the dilemma was one of the three courses indicated above. Yodogimi, on being informed of this opinion, intimated her desire to see Katsumoto. But when the day named for the meeting came and Katsumoto was on the point of leaving his residence for the purpose of repairing to the conference, he received information that the intention was to kill him en route. He therefore fled to his domain in the remote province of Ibaraki. It is recorded that Katsumoto's plan was to offer to send Yodo as a hostage to Yedo. Then the question would arise as to a place of residence for her in the eastern capital, and the processes of preparing a site and building a house were to be supplemented by accidental conflagrations, so that the septuagenarian, Ieyasu, might easily pass away before the actual transfer of the hostage took place. Such was Katsumoto's device, but he had to flee from Osaka before he could carry it into effect.

THE SIEGE OF OSAKA CASTLE

In the year 1614, Ieyasu issued orders for the attack of Osaka Castle, on the ground that Katsumoto's promise had not been fulfilled. The Tokugawa chief set out from Sumpu and his son, Hidetada, from Yedo. Their armies, combined with the forces of several of the feudatories, are said to have aggregated one hundred and fifty thousand men. In Osaka, also, a great host was assembled, and among its leaders were several renowned warriors, including Sanada Yukimura, Goto Matabei, Hanawa Naotsugu, and others, who, although not originally vassals of the Toyotomi, supported Hideyori loyally. As for the castle, its enormous strength rendered it well-nigh impregnable, and after weeks of effort the Tokugawa forces had nothing to show for their repeated attacks except a long list of casualties.

Ieyasu now had recourse to intrigue. The mother of Kyogoku Takatsugu, daimyo of Obama, in Wakasa, was the younger sister of the lady Yodo. Ieyasu induced her to open communications with Yodo, and to represent to the latter the advisability of concluding peace with the Tokugawa instead of remaining perpetually beleaguered in a fortress, thus merely postponing an end which could not be finally averted. A council was convened in the castle to consider this advice. Opinions were divided. Some held that Ieyasu could not be believed, and that if the struggle were maintained for a few years, the face of affairs might change radically. Others urged that the loyalty of the garrison was not above suspicion, and that if the fight went on much longer, treachery might be practised, to which risk a speedy peace, even at some cost, would be preferable. Ono Harunaga was among the advocates of surrender, but Hideyori himself showed that his character had not been mistaken by Ieyasu. He indignantly reminded Harunaga and the latter's fellow thinkers that arms had been taken up by their advice and in opposition to the loyal efforts of Katsumoto in the cause of peace.

Lady Yodo, however, threw her influence into the scale with Ono Harunaga, and finally peace was concluded on terms highly favourable to the Toyotomi. It was agreed that Hideyori should remain in the possession of the castle and of all his domains, and that the garrison, as well as the unattached samurai who formed part of it, should not be punished but should be provided for subsequently. It might have occurred to the leaders of the Osaka party that these lenient conditions covered some occult designs; nothing was less likely than that a statesman like Ieyasu would be content with so signal a failure. But a short-sighted sentiment of confidence seems to have obscured the judgment of the Osaka folks. They actually gave heed to Ieyasu's complaint that he, the o-gosho, and his son, the shogun, must not be allowed to have taken so much trouble for nothing; that it was customary to give hostages to an army which agreed to raise a siege, and that at least a portion of the castle's defences should be destroyed. As to the last point, the Tokugawa chief was kind enough to say that the work of demolition should not cost the garrison anything, since labour would be supplied gratis by the shoguni.

After considerable correspondence it was agreed that Harunaga's son should go to Yedo as a hostage, and that a portion of the outer moat of Osaka Castle should be filled up. Ieyasu did not lose a moment in giving effect to this latter provision. He ordered some of the fudai daimyo of the Kwanto to proceed to Osaka with several thousands of men, who should go to work forthwith to tear down the parapets and fill up the moats of the castle. These orders were implicitly obeyed, and as Ieyasu had omitted to indicate any limit for the work of destruction, it went on without check, and presently the second line of parapets began to follow the first. The Osaka leaders protested and essayed to stay the destruction. But the officers who were in command of the operation said that without a direct message from Honda Masazumi, who represented Ieyasu, they could not suspend their task. Efforts were then made to approach Honda, but he was conveniently absent "on account of his health," and the ensuing correspondence occupied several days, during which the pulling-down and filling-up went on by day and by night. More than one-half of the second moat had disappeared before Masazumi could be found. His answer was that he had been merely told to fill up the moat. Possibly he had mistaken the scope of his instructions and he would refer the matter to Ieyasu. This involved further delay and more filling, until, finally, Masazumi acknowledged that he had made a mistake, declared himself prepared to undergo punishment, and withdrew his men to Fushimi.

Ieyasu supplied the sequel of the farce. When complaint was made against Masazumi, the Tokugawa leader simulated astonishment, expressed much regret, and said that he would condemn Masazumi to commit suicide were it permissible to mar this happy occasion by any capital sentence. "Peace," declared the astute old statesman, "has now been fortunately concluded. Let us not talk any more about the castle's moats or parapets." Against such an attitude the Osaka men could not enter any protest, and the farce ended there. Had the Osaka leaders possessed any measure of the wisdom that marked all the doings of Ieyasu, they would not have suffered matters to rest at such a stage. But they foolishly imagined that some retaliation might be effected by calling upon the Tokugawa to supplement that part of the peace provisions which related to allowances for the samurai who had fought on the side of the garrison. A demand in that sense was preferred to Ieyasu. But he had now laid aside his transient suavity. The Osaka people were brusquely informed that they must look to the Toyotomi family for recompense, and that as for rewarding unattached samurai who had drawn the sword against the shogun, the Osaka people, were they obedient to the dictates of loyalty, would of their own account peremptorily reject such an unwarranted proposition, even though Ieyasu himself were disposed to consent to it.

Of course this answer profoundly enraged the Osaka party. They appreciated for the first time that they had been deceived throughout, and that by a series of adroit manoeuvres they had been removed from an almost impregnable position to a practically helpless plight. Not a few turned their backs on the castle, but a great majority determined to renew the conflict and to die at their posts. The circumstances, however, had now undergone a radical change. The castle had been converted from the strongest fortress in Japan into a mere semblance of strength, and no garrison, however brave and however resolute, could have defended it successfully against the forces that the Tokugawa were able to marshal.

As for Ieyasu, he knew that his task had been immensely lightened. On the 3rd of May, 1615, he started from Sumpu for Osaka at the head of an army numbering scarcely one-third of the force previously led against the castle. Nevertheless, one contingency presented itself in a dangerous light. It was always possible that Hideyori himself should make a sortie from the fortress, and, in that event, the prestige attaching to the memory of his father, Hideyoshi, might have demoralized a large section of the Tokugawa troops. To avert this danger, Ieyasu had recourse to his wonted methods of deception. It has been shown that he held Harunaga's son, as a hostage. This youth was required to write a letter to his father stating that collusion existed between parties within and without the fortress, and that the traitors had plotted to induce Hideyori to make a sortie, whereupon the castle would be given up and Hideyori would be delivered into the hands of his enemies. Harunaga does not appear to have entertained any doubt as to the trustworthiness of this letter. He carried it hastily to Hideyori, who was in the act of preparing to sally out of the castle and throw himself upon the beleaguering forces.

The receipt of the letter naturally led to a change of plan, and although desperate fighting subsequently took place, the castle was finally set on fire by traitors and its fate was seen to be hopeless. Hideyori's wife, granddaughter of Ieyasu, repaired to the Tokugawa headquarters to plead for the life of her husband and his mother. But Ieyasu was inexorable. He granted asylum to his granddaughter, but replied to her prayer by ordering a renewal of the attack upon the castle. On June 4th, Hideyori committed suicide, and his mother, Yodo, was killed by one of his retainers. Some thirty men and women killed themselves at the same time.

Men spoke of the first fruitless assault upon the castle as the "Winter Campaign," and of the second and successful assault as the "Summer Campaign." But the two operations were radically different in their character. For, whereas in the first assault the garrison—numbering something like one hundred and eighty thousand men—stood strictly on the defensive, wisely relying on the immense strength of the fortress, on the second occasion most of the fighting took place outside the walls, the garrison preferring to rely upon strategy and courage rather than on ruined parapets and half-filled moats. Thus, the details of the second campaign occupy a large space in Japanese histories, but these tedious features of strategy and tactics are abbreviated here. There can be no doubt that Ieyasu, so far from seeking to save Hideyori's life, deliberately planned his destruction. Moreover, when it became known that an illegitimate son of Hideyori, called Kunimatsu, had been carried from the castle by some common soldiers and secreted at a farmhouse in Fushimi, Ieyasu caused this child of six to be seized and beheaded by a common executioner at Sanjo-kawara in Kyoto. This episode reflects no credit whatever on the Tokugawa leader. That he should extirpate every scion of the Toyotomi family was not inconsistent with the canons of the tune or with the interests of his own security. But death at the hands of a common executioner ought never to have been decreed for the son of the u-daijin, and the cruelty of the order finds no excuse. No tenet of bushido can be reconciled with such inhumanity.

To this chapter of history belongs the attitude of Ieyasu towards the memory of his old friend and benefactor, Hideyoshi. He caused to be levelled with the ground the temple of Toyokuni Daimyo-jin, where the spirit of Hideyoshi was worshipped, and he ordered the removal of the tomb of the Taiko from Amidagamine to a remote corner of the Daibutsu enclosure. Finally, he sought and obtained the Emperor's sanction to revoke the sacred title conferred posthumously on Hideyoshi. One looks in vain for any fragment of magnanimity among such acts. Ieyasu is reported to have avowedly adopted for guidance the precept, "Before taking any step propound to your heart the query, how about justice?" He certainly did not put any such query to his own conscience in connexion with the castle of Osaka or its inmates.

THE GENNA YEAR-PERIOD (1615-1623)

The battle of Sekigahara is often spoken of as the last great internecine campaign in Japanese history, but this is hardly borne out by the facts. Indeed, from what has been said above, it will be seen that Sekigahara was merely a prelude to Osaka, and that the former stood to the latter almost in the relation of a preliminary skirmish. It is from August, 1615, that we must date the commencement of the long period of peace with which Japan was blessed under Tokugawa rule. The year-name was then changed to Genna.

DEATH OF IEYASU

In February, 1616, Ieyasu fell sick, and in April the Emperor sent an envoy to confer on him the title of dajo daijin. He expired a few days afterwards at the age of seventy-five and was apotheosized as Tosho Dai-Gongen (Light of the East and Great Incarnation). He was buried on the summit of Mount Kuno in Suruga, and ultimately his ashes were carried to Nikko for interment. It is recorded, though not on independent authority, that when his end was drawing near he spoke to those at his side in the folio whig terms: "My death is now in sight, but happily the country is at peace, and Hidetada has already discharged the duties of shogun for several years. I have, therefore, no cause for anxiety. If, after I am gone, Hidetada should make any failure in his administration of public affairs, or if he should lose control of the people, any one of you to whom the Imperial order may be addressed, should assume the functions of shogun, for, as you well know, that post is not the property of this or that person in particular, nor will my rest in the grave be disturbed though such an event occurs."

Another record, however, represents Ieyasu as following the example of the Taiko and conjuring his most trusted retainers to devote their strength to the support of the Tokugawa family. To Hidetada he is said to have suggested the advisability of compelling the daimyo to remain in Yedo for three full years after his (Ieyasu's) demise, in order to test thoroughly their attitude. Hidetada replied that while most unwilling to reject his father's advice, his intention was to allow the feudatories to leave Yedo at once, and if any one of them evinced hostile feeling by shutting himself up in his castle, he, Hidetada, would follow him thither and level his parapets with the ground. Such an object lesson was, in his opinion, the best stepping-stone to supremacy. Ieyasu is reported to have received this answer with profound satisfaction, and to have declared that he was now assured of the permanence of peace. He then had all his sons called to his side and enjoined upon them the duty of serving the shogun faithfully. To his grandson, Iemitsu, he specially addressed himself, saying: "It will fall to your lot, some day, to govern the country. On that day remember that benevolence should be the first principle of a ruler."

CHARACTER OF IEYASU

Frugality is one of the virtues which Ieyasu certainly possessed. Striking example of its display is connected with Yedo Castle. This fortress, as built originally by Ota Dokwan, was not of imposing dimensions even as a military stronghold, and the dwelling-house in the keep presented most homely features, having a thatched roof and a porch of rough boat-planks. Yet Ieyasu was content to make this edifice his palace, and while he devoted much care to strengthening the fortifications, he bestowed none on the enlargement and adornment of the dwelling. The system he adopted to populate the city may be said to have been colonial. He encouraged his vassals to settle there, giving them lands to cultivate and breeding-grounds for horses, so that within a brief time the city obtained numerous inhabitants and developed a prosperous condition. It was in planning the details of all enterprises that he particularly excelled. To everything he brought an almost infinite capacity of patient study and minute examination; his principle being that to achieve success the first desideratum is to avoid mistakes. Doubtless he owed this faculty of profound painstaking to the vicissitudes of his early life. The years that he passed under the control of the Imagawa and afterwards under that of Oda taught him patience and self-restraint, and made the study of literature obligatory for him, at the same time begetting in his mind a feeling of reverence for the Buddhist faith.

Japanese historians generally credit him with the virtues of humanity, magnanimity, justice, and affability. That he was always pleased to receive advice from others and that he set an example of courtesy and zeal, there can be no doubt. Neither will anyone deny that his resourcefulness amounted to genius. On the other hand, his record shows that he was unscrupulous in utilizing opportunities, whether created by himself or made accessible by fortune, and from the same record we are compelled to infer that he could be cruel and implacable on occasion. His favourite sayings afford perhaps the best index that we possess to his disposition:—

Man's life is like a long journey toiling under a heavy burden.

Never be in a hurry.

He that regards destitution as his habitual lot will never feel the pressure of want.

When the spirit of ambition arises in your bosom, recall the days of your distress.

To forbear is the source of harmlessness and the road to success.

Regard anger as an enemy.

He that knows how to win only and does not know how to lose, will achieve nothing useful.

Blame yourself and acquit others.

To fall short is better than to exceed.

ENGRAVING: SIGNATURE OF ASHIKAGA TAKAUJI

ENGRAVING: THEATRICAL PLAY OF OLD JAPAN



CHAPTER XXXIX

FIRST PERIOD OF THE TOKUGAWA BAKUFU; FROM THE FIRST TOKUGAWA SHOGUN, IEYASU, TO THE FOURTH, IETSUNA (1603-1680)

LEGISLATION

THE Tokugawa family having brought the whole empire under its sway, Ieyasu applied himself to legislative work with a degree of thoroughness and earnestness that far exceeded anything in the history of his predecessors. The terms of the oath of allegiance that he dictated to the feudatories after the battle of Sekigahara have been already referred to. Ten years later, that is to say, in 1611, he required all the provincial governors to subscribe this same oath, and, in 1613, he enacted a law for the Court nobles (kugeshu-hatto), to which the Imperial assent was obtained. This was the first instance of a military man legislating for the nobles of the capital; but it must be noted that the latter by their own misconduct furnished an opportunity for such interference. A Court scandal assumed such dimensions, in 1607, that the Emperor ordered the Bakufu to investigate the matter and to inflict suitable punishment. Ieyasu summoned a number of the offenders to Sumpu, where he subjected fourteen of them to severe examination. Ultimately some were sentenced to exile and others were deprived of their ranks, while the principal malefactor, Inokuma, general of the Left, was condemned to death. This affair demonstrated that the effective power was in the hands of the military, and throughout the Tokugawa rule they never failed to exercise it. In September of the year that witnessed the fall of Osaka Castle, Ieyasu and Hidetada summoned all the provincial governors to Momo-yama, and handed to them a body of rules entitled the "Laws of the Military Houses." These laws ran as follows:-*

*The translation of these laws is taken from a paper read by Mr. Consul-General J. C. Hall and recorded in the "Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan" for 1911.

"(1) Literature, arms, archery, and horsemanship are, systematically, to be the favourite pursuits.

"Literature first, and arms next was the rule of the ancients. They must both be cultivated concurrently. Archery and horsemanship are the more essential for the military houses. Weapons of warfare are ill-omened words to utter; the use of them, however, is an unavoidable necessity. In times of peace and good order we must not forget that disturbance may arise. Dare we omit to practise our warlike exercise and drill?"

Although this provision ostensibly encouraged the pursuit of literary and military arts, those who read the law too implicitly and devoted themselves too earnestly to the pursuit of arms quickly found that they were not in touch with the time or with the intention of the legislators. In fact, the purpose of the latter was to bracket literature and the art of war together, giving no preference to either.

"(2) Drinking parties and gaming amusements must be kept within due bounds.

"In our Instructions it is laid down that strict moderation in these respects is to be observed. To be addicted to venery and to make a pursuit of gambling is the first step towards the loss of one's domain."

This rule may be said to define what is known in Europe as "conduct unbecoming an officer." Not to know how to order one's tongue was as grave an offence as debauchery, according to the canons of the samurai.

"(3) Offenders against the law are not to be harboured in feudal domains.

"Law is the very foundation of ceremonial decorum and of social order. To infringe the law in the name of reason is as bad as to outrage reason in the name of law. To disregard the law (laid down by us) is an offence which will not be treated with leniency."

This provision was directly suggested by the Government's desire to suppress Christianity.

"(4) Throughout the domains whether of the greater or lesser barons (daimyo and shomyo) or of the holders of minor benefits, if any of the gentry or soldiers (shi and sotsu) in their service be guilty of rebellion or murder, such offenders must be at once expelled from their domain.

"Fellows of savage disposition (being retainers) are an apt weapon for overthrowing the domain or the family employing them, and a deadly instrument for cutting off the common people. How can such be tolerated?"

In the early days of the Yedo Bakufu it was not uncommon for a feudatory to enrol among his vassals refugee samurai who had blood on their hands. These would often be pursued into the fiefs where they had taken refuge, and much disorder resulted. The above provision removed these murderers from the protection of the feudatory in whose service they had enlisted.

"(5) Henceforth no social intercourse is to be permitted outside of one's own domain with the people (gentry and commoners) of another domain.

"In general, the customs of the various domains are all different from one another, each having its own peculiarities. To divulge the secrets of one's own domain is a sure indication of an intent to curry favour."

It has been shown that by the Chinese masters of strategy whose works were studied in Japan the art of espionage was placed on a high pinnacle. This teaching appears to have produced such evil results that the Tokugawa legislated against it.

"(6) The residential castles in the domains may be repaired; but the matter must invariably be reported. Still more imperative is it that the planning of structural innovations of any kind must be absolutely avoided.

"A castle with a parapet exceeding three thousand feet by ten is a bane to a domain. Crenelated walls and deep moats (of castles) are causes of anarchy."

This provision was important as a means of enfeebling the barons. They were not at liberty to repair even a fence of the most insignificant character or to dredge a moat, much more to erect a parapet, without previous sanction from the Bakufu.

"(7) If, in a neighbouring domain, innovations are being hatched or cliques being formed, the fact is to be reported without delay.

"Men are always forming groups; whilst, on the other hand, few ever come to anything. On this account, they fail to follow their lords or fathers, and soon come into collision with those of neighbouring villages. If the ancient prohibitions are not maintained, somehow or other innovating schemes will be formed."

Everything in the form of combination, whether nominally for good or for evil, was regarded with suspicion by the Bakufu, and all unions were therefore interdicted. Of course, the most important incident which the law was intended to prevent took the form of alliances between barons of adjacent provinces.

"(8) Marriages must not be contracted at private convenience.

"Now, the marriage union is a result of the harmonious blending of the In and Yo (i.e. the Yin and Yang of Chinese metaphysics, the female and male principles of nature). It is therefore not a matter to be lightly undertaken. It is said in the 'Scowling' passage of the (Chow) Book of Changes, 'Not being enemies they unite in marriage.' Whilst (the elders are) thinking of making advances to the opponent (family), the proper time (for the marriage of the young couple) is allowed to slip by. In the 'Peach Young' poem of the Book of Odes it is said, 'If the man and woman, duly observing what is correct, marry at the proper time of life, there will be no widows in the land.' To form cliques (political parties) by means of matrimonial connexions is a source of pernicious stratagems."

This provision was, in fact, a codification of the veto pronounced by Hideyoshi on his death-bed against marriages between the families of different daimyo. Ieyasu himself had been the first to violate the veto, and he was the first to place it subsequently on the statute book. The third Tokugawa shogun, Iemitsu, extended the restriction by ordering that even families having estates of only three thousand koku should not intermarry without Yedo's previous consent.

"(9) As to the rule that the daimyo shall come (to the shogun's court at Yedo) to do service:—

"In the Shoku Nihongi (The Continuation of the Chronicles of Japan) it is recorded amongst the enactments,

"'Except when entrusted with some official duty to assemble, no one (dignitary) is allowed at his own pleasure to assemble his tribe within the limits of the capital, no one is to go about attended by more than twenty horsemen, etc.'

"Hence it is not permissible to lead about a large force of soldiers. For daimyo whose revenues range from 1,000,000 koko down to 200,000 koku, the number of twenty horsemen is not to be exceeded. For those whose revenues are 100,000 koku and under, the number is to be in the same proportion.

"On occasions of official service, however (i.e. in time of warfare), the number of followers is to be in proportion to the social standing of each daimyo."

The above rule of repairing to the capital to pay respects (go-sankin) was an old fashion, and barons were accustomed to go with large retinues. Thus, it often happened that collisions occurred between the corteges of hostile feudatories, and it was to prevent these sanguinary encounters that the Tokugawa set strict limits to the number of samurai accompanying a military chief.

"(10) There must be no confusion in respect of dress uniforms, as regards the materials thereof.

"The distinction between lord and vassal, between superior and inferior, must be clearly marked by the apparel. Retainers may not, except in rare cases by special favour of their lords, indiscriminately wear silk stuffs, such as shiro-aya (undyed silk with woven patterns), shiro-kosode (white wadded silk coats), murasaki-awase (purple silk coats, lined), murasaki-ura (silk coats lined with purple); nori (white gloss silk), mumon (silk coat without the wearer's badge dyed on it), kosode (a coloured silk-wadded coat). In recent times, retainers and henchmen (soldiers) have taken to wearing rich damasks and silk brocade. This elaborate display was not allowed by the ancient laws and it must be severely kept within bounds."

"(11) Miscellaneous persons are not at their pleasure to ride in palanquins.

"There are families who for special reasons from of old have (inherited) the privilege of riding in palanquins without permission from the authorities: and there are others who by permission of the authorities exercise that privilege. But, latterly, even sub-vassals and henchmen of no rank have taken to so riding. This is a flagrant impertinence. Henceforward the daimyo of the provinces, and such of their kinsfolk as are men of distinction subordinate to them, may ride without applying for Government permission. Besides those, the following have permission, viz., vassals and retainers of high position about their lords; doctors and astrologers; persons of over sixty years of age, and sick persons and invalids. If ordinary retainers, or inferior henchmen (sotsu) are allowed to ride in palanquins, it will be considered to be the fault of their lords.

"This proviso, however, does not apply to Court nobles, abbots, or ecclesiastics in general.

"(12) The samurai throughout the provinces are to practise frugality.

"Those who are rich like to make a display, whilst those who are poor are ashamed of not being on a par with the others. There is no other influence so pernicious to social observances as this; and it must be strictly kept in check."

Frugality always occupied a prominent place in the Bakufu's list of essentials. Frequent and strenuous efforts were made by successive shoguns to encourage people in this virtue, but with the long peace enjoyed by the country under Tokugawa rule, a tendency to increasing luxury constantly prevailed, and the Government's aims in this respect were not realized except for brief periods. During the administration of the first three Tokugawa shoguns, and under the eighth shogun (Yoshimune), some success attended official injunctions of economy, but on the whole a steady growth of extravagance characterized the era.

"(13) The lords of domain (kokushu, masters of provinces) must select men of capacity for office.

"The way to govern is to get hold of the proper men. The merits and demerits (of retainers) should be closely scanned, and reward or reproof unflinchingly distributed accordingly. If there be capable men in the administration, that domain is sure to flourish; if there be not capable men, then the domain is sure to go to ruin. This is an admonition which the wise ones of antiquity all agree in giving forth."

"The tenor of the foregoing rules must be obeyed.

"Keicho, 20th year, 7th month (September 23, 1615)."

The above body of laws may be regarded as the Tokugawa Constitution. They were re-enacted by each shogun in succession on assuming office. The custom was to summon all the daimyo to Yedo, and to require their attendance at the Tokugawa palace, where, in the presence of the incoming shogun, they listened with faces bowed on the mats to the reading of the laws. Modifications and additions were, of course, made on each occasion, but the provisions quoted above remained unaltered in their essentials. Up to the time of the third shogun (Iemitsu), the duty of reading aloud the laws at the solemn ceremonial of the new shogun's investiture devolved on a high Buddhist priest, but it was thereafter transferred to the representative of the Hayashi family (to be presently spoken of). Any infraction of the laws was punished mercilessly, and as their occasionally loose phraseology left room for arbitrary interpretation, the provisions were sometimes utilized in the interest of the shogun and at the expense of his enemies.

RULES FOR THE IMPERIAL COURT AND COURT NOBLES

In the same month of the same year there was promulgated a body of laws called the "Rules of the Imperial Court, and the Court Nobles" (Kinchu narabi ni Kugeshu Sho-hatto). This enactment bore the signatures of the kwampaku and the shogun and had the Imperial sanction. It consisted of seventeen articles, but only five of them had any special importance:

"(1) Learning is the most essential of all accomplishments. Not to study is to be ignorant of the doctrines of the ancient sages, and an ignorant ruler has never governed a nation peacefully."

This specious precept was not intended to be literally obeyed. The shoguns had no desire for an erudite Emperor. Their conception of learning on the part of the sovereign was limited to the composition of Japanese verselets. A close study of the doctrines of the ancient Chinese sages might have exposed the illegitimacy of the Bakufu administration. Therefore, Yedo would have been content that the Mikado should think only of spring flowers and autumn moonlight, and should not torment his mind by too close attention to the classics.

"(2) A man lacking in ability must not be appointed to the post of regent or minister of State even though he belong to the Go-sekke (Five Designated Families), and it is needless to say that none but a member of those families may serve in such a position."

"(3) A man of ability, even though he be old, shall not be allowed to resign the post of regent or minister of State in favour of another. If he attempts to resign, his resignation should be refused again and again."

The above two provisions practically conferred on the Bakufu the power of not only appointing the regent and ministers of State but also of keeping them in office. For, as the law had been framed in Yedo, in Yedo also was vested competence to judge the ability or disability of a candidate. Hence, when the Emperor proposed to appoint a regent or a minister, the Bakufu had merely to intimate want of confidence in the nominee's ability; and similarly, if the sovereign desired to dismiss one of those high officials, the shogun could interfere effectually by reference to the letter of the law. Thus, the power of appointing and dismissing the great officials in Kyoto, which is one of the important prerogatives of the crown, was practically usurped by the shogun.

"(4) An adopted son shall always be chosen from the family of his adopter; and a female shall never be adopted to be the head of a family, no such custom having existed in Japan at any time."

This provision had two main objects. The first was to avert adoptions having the effect of combinations; the second, to prevent adoption of Imperial princes into other families. The Bakufu sought, as far as possible, to bring about the taking of the tonsure by all princes of the Blood who were not in the direct line of the succession, and to keep these princes from attaining to the posts of regents or ministers of State.

"(5) All reports shall be submitted to the Emperor by the regent, the denso, or an administrator (bugyo). Any other person who, in disregard of this rule, attempts to address the Throne direct, shall be sent into exile, whatever his rank."

The denso mentioned in this provision was an official appointed by the Bakufu for that special purpose. The whole arrangement as to communication with the Throne constituted a powerful buttress of Bakufu influence. Generally, the latter could contrive, as has been shown above, to control the appointment and continuance in office of a regent or a minister, while as for the administrators (bugyo), they were nominees of Yedo. It thus resulted that the Throne was approachable through the channel of the Bakufu only.

LAWS WITH REFERENCE TO BUDDHISM

The above laws remained unchanged throughout the Tokugawa era. A special law was also enacted with reference to Buddhist sects and the principal Buddhist temples. Ieyasu secured to these temples the possession of their manors by granting title-deeds bearing what was called the "go-shuinji," or "vermilion signature." The term was not really applicable in the case of Ieyasu. It is true that Hideyoshi, doubtless in imitation of Chinese custom, stamped a vermilion seal upon documents of this character; but the Tokugawa shoguns employed a black signature written with a pen. Nevertheless, the term "go-shuinji" continued to be used from the time of the Taiko downwards. It was an outcome of Ieyasu's astuteness that the great Hongwan temple was divided into two branches, eastern and western, by which process its influence was prevented from becoming excessive. During the administration of the third shogun, every daimyo was required to adhere to a definite sect of Buddhism, and to the Buddhist and Shinto temples was entrusted the duty of keeping an accurate census of their parishioners. The direct purpose of these latter laws was to facilitate the extermination of Christianity. Anyone whose name was not enrolled on one of the above lists fell under suspicion of embracing the foreign faith.

A JAPANESE HISTORIAN'S OPINION

Referring to the above laws the Tokugawa Jidaishi says:

"The above laws and regulations were the Constitution of the Tokugawa Bakufu. By the aid of their provisions the influence of Yedo was extended to every part of the nation from the Imperial Court to the world of religion. No such codes had ever previously existed in Japan. Any unit of the nation, whether a Court noble, a great feudatory, a priest, or a common samurai, had to yield implicit obedience or to suffer condign punishment. Thus, it fell out that everybody being anxious to conform with the rules, the universal tendency was to share in preserving the peace. From the point of view of this system, Ieyasu was eminently above all modern and ancient heroes. Hideyoshi won brilliant victories in war, but he saw no better method of maintaining peace at home than to send the country's armies to fight abroad. He seems to have conceived a hope that his generals would find goals for their ambition in Korea or China, and would exhaust their strength in endeavouring to realize their dreams. But his plan brought about the contrary result; for the generals formed fresh enmities among themselves, and thus the harvest that was subsequently reaped at Sekigahara found hands to sow it.

"Ieyasu, however, prized literature above militarism. He himself became a pioneer of learning, and employed many scholars to assist in constructing a solid framework of peace. The territorial nobles had to follow his example. Even Kato Kiyomasa, Asano Yukinaga, and Kuroda Nagamasa, each of whom during his lifetime was counted a divinely inspired general, found themselves constrained to study the Chinese classics under the guidance of Funabashi Hidekata and Fujiwara Seigwa. How much more cogent, then, was the similar necessity under which lesser men laboured. Thus, Ieyasu's love of literature may be regarded as a cause of the peace that prevailed under the Tokugawa for 260 years."

REVIVAL OF LEARNING

Ieyasu employed four instruments for educational purposes—the establishment of schools, the engagement of professors, the collection of ancient literary works, and the printing of books. In accordance with his last will his son Yoshinao, daimyo of Owari, built, in 1636, the Daiseiden College beside the temple of Kiyomizu in Ueno Park, near the villa of Hayashi Kazan, the celebrated Confucian scholar; but, in 1691, the college was moved to the slope called Shohei-zaka, where a bridge—Shohei-bashi—was thrown across the river. "Shohei" is the Japanese pronunciation of "Changping," Confucius's birthplace, and the school was known as the Shohei-ko. It received uniform patronage at the hands of the Tokugawa, whose kinsmen and vassals were required to study there, their proficiency, as determined by its examinations, being counted a passport to office. Yoshinao laid the foundation of a great library at the school and the number of volumes was constantly increased.

During the lifetime of Ieyasu, one of the most noted scholars was Fujiwara Seigwa. By the invitation of the Tokugawa chief he lectured on the classics in Kyoto, and it is recorded that Ieyasu, who had just (1600) arrived in that city, attended one of these lectures, wearing his ordinary garments. Seigwa is related to have fixed his eyes on Ieyasu and addressed him as follows: "The greatest work of Confucius teaches that to order oneself is the most essential of achievements. How shall a man who does not order himself be able to order his country? I am lecturing on ethics to one who behaves in a disorderly and discourteous manner. I believe that I preach in vain." Ieyasu immediately changed his costume, and the event contributed materially to the reputation alike of the intrepid teacher and of the magnanimous student, as well as to the popularity of Seigwa's doctrines.

Hayashi Kazan was a disciple of Seigwa whose reputation as a scholar he rivalled. Ieyasu employed him extensively in drafting laws; and many of his disciples subsequently served as teachers of the Chinese classics. The scripture of Hayashi's school of ethics was Chu Hi's commentary on the "Great Learning" of Confucius. In this system, ethics become a branch of natural philosophy. "Corresponding to the regular change of the seasons in nature is right action in man (who is the crown of nature), in the relation of sovereign and subject, parent and child, elder brother and younger brother, husband and wife, friend and friend. To his sovereign, or lord, he is bound to be faithful; to his parents, dutiful, and to his elder brother, respectful. Affection should characterize the relations of husband and wife and trust those of friend with friend."

A moment's consideration of this ethical system shows that it cannot be reconciled with such a form of administration as that existing under the Bakufu. Genuine loyalty to the sovereign found no place in the practical code of Tokugawa. Whether Ieyasu appreciated that fact or whether he ignored it in consideration of the civilizing and tranquillizing influences of Confucianism, there is nothing to show. Ultimately, however, it was to the ethics of the Chinese sage that the Tokugawa downfall became indirectly attributable.

Ieyasu showed much earnestness in searching for and collecting ancient books. Before and after the war of Osaka, he ordered priests to copy old books and records preserved in Buddhist temples and noblemen's houses. Subsequently, during the Kwanei era—1621-1643—there was built within the castle of Yedo a library called Momijiyama Bunko where the books were stored. He was also instrumental in causing the compilation and publication of many volumes whose contents contribute materially to our historical knowledge. The writing of history in the Imperial Court had been abandoned for many years, and the scholars employed by Ieyasu had recourse to private diaries for materials. Hayashi Kazan (Doshuri) was entrusted with the duty of distinguishing between the true and the false in using these records, and there resulted two memorable works. The second of these consisted in the main of genealogical tables. It extended to 372 volumes and subsequently became the Kwanei Shoke Keizu-den. The first, a national history, was originally called the Honcho Hennen-roku. Before its compilation Kazan (Doshun) died, and the book was concluded by his son, Harukatsu, in the year 1635. It consisted of three hundred volumes in all, and covered the period from the age of the Gods to the year 1610. It is now known as the Honcho Tsugan. The two works having been published to the order and under the patronage of the Bakufu, their contents were by no means free from the stain of favour and affection, but they nevertheless possess inestimable historical value.

THE SECOND TOKUGAWA SHOGUN, HIDETADA

Hidetada, third son of Ieyasu, was born in 1579; succeeded to the shogunate in 1605; abdicated in 1622, and died in 1632. His appearance on the historical stage was not very glorious, for, as already shown, when marching to join his father's army before the battle of Sekigahara, he allowed himself to be detained so long at the siege of Ueda Castle that he failed to be present at the great combat, and Ieyasu, as a mark of displeasure, refused to meet him until Honda Masazumi pleaded Hidetada's cause. During the first eleven years of his shogunate he exercised little real authority, the administration being conducted by Ieyasu himself from his nominal place of retirement in Sumpu. Thus, the period of Hidetada's independent sway extended over six years only. But during the ten subsequent years he continued to exercise much camera influence over the Government, though his power was inferior to that which had been wielded by Ieyasu in nominal retirement. Honda Masazumi, who had befriended him at the critical time mentioned above, occupied the highest post in the administration, the second place being assigned to Sakai Tadayo, while in Kyoto the Tokugawa interests were guarded by Itakura Katsushige and Matsudaira Masatsuna.

The era of Hidetada was essentially one of organization, and by the exercise of sincerity and justice he contributed much to the stability of the Tokugawa rule. Not the least memorable step taken by him related to the fortress of Yedo. In the year following his succession, he ordered the feudatories of the east to construct the castle which remains to this day one of the marvels of the world. "Around it stretched a triple line of moats, the outermost measuring nine and a half miles in length, the innermost one and a half, their scarps constructed with blocks of granite nearly as colossal as those of the Osaka stronghold, though in the case of the Yedo fortification every stone had to be carried hundreds of miles over the sea. The gates were proportionately as huge as those at Osaka, well-nigh the most stupendous works ever undertaken, not excepting even the Pyramids of Egypt. There is not to be found elsewhere a more striking monument of military power, nor can anyone considering such a work, as well as its immediate predecessor, the Taiko's stronghold at Osaka, and its numerous contemporaries of lesser but still striking proportions in the principal fiefs, refuse to credit the Japanese with capacity for large conceptions and competence to carry them into practice."

CONJUGAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE IMPERIAL FAMILY AND THE TOKUGAWA

It had been one of the most cherished wishes of Ieyasu to follow the Fujiwara precedent by establishing conjugal relations between the Imperial family and the Tokugawa. But the ex-Emperor, Go-Yozei, turned a deaf ear to this proposal on the ground that a lady born in a military house had never been chosen consort of a sovereign. Ieyasu, however, did not abandon his purpose. He entrusted its prosecution to Todo Takatora, and in 1616, the year of Ieyasu's death, Todo induced Konoe Nobuhiro, minister of the Right, to promote this undertaking. Nobuhiro, being the Emperor's younger brother, was able to exert much influence, and finally the ex-Emperor gave his consent. In June, 1620, Kazuko, daughter of Hidetada, became first lady-in-waiting, and ultimately Empress under the name of Tofuku-mon-in. It is recorded that 1180 chests were required to carry her trousseau from Yedo, and that the costs of her outfit and of her journey to Kyoto aggregated more than a million sterling. She gave birth to two princes and five princesses, and the house of Konoe, which had been instrumental in procuring her summons to the Court, became the leader of the Go-sekke.

DEATH OF HIDETADA AND HIS CHARACTER

After resigning the shogunate in 1622, Hidetada retired to the inner castle (Nishi Maru) in Yedo and there continued to direct affairs. He died ten years later, at the age of fifty-eight, and was interred at the temple Zojo-ji, in the Shiba district of the eastern capital. Japanese historians agree that Hidetada's character was adapted for the work of consolidation that fell to his lot. He resembled his father, Ieyasu, in decision and perseverance; he never dealt lightly with any affair, and while outwardly gentle and considerate, he was at heart subtle and uncompromising. An interesting illustration of the administrative canons of the time is afforded in the advice said to have been given by Hosokawa Tadaoki when consulted by Hidetada. "There is an old proverb," Tadaoki replied, "that if a round lid be put on a square vessel, those within will have ease; but if a square lid be used to cover a square vessel, there will result a feeling of distress." Asked for a standard by which to judge qualifications for success, the same nobleman answered that an oyster shell found on the Akashi shore is the best type of a man qualified to succeed, for the shell has been deprived of all its angles by the beating of the waves. Of Hidetada himself there is told an anecdote which shows him to have been remarkably free from superstition. A comet made its appearance and was regarded with anxiety by the astrologists of Kyoto, who associated its advent with certain misfortune. Hidetada ridiculed these fears. "What can we tell," he said, "about the situation of a solitary star in the wide universe, and how can we know that it has anything to do with this little world?"

THE THIRD SHOGUN, IEMITSU

Iemitsu, son of Hidetada, was born in 1603; succeeded to the shogunate in 1622, and held that post until his death, in 1651. His principal ministers were Ii Naotaka (who had occupied the post of premier since the days of Ieyasu), Matsudaira Nobutsuna, and Abe Tadaaki, one of the ablest officers that served the Tokugawa. He devoted himself to consolidating the system founded by his grandfather, Ieyasu, and he achieved remarkable success by the exercise of exceptional sagacity and determination. In 1626, he proceeded to Kyoto at the head of a large army, simply for the purpose of conveying to the feudal nobles a significant intimation that he intended to enforce his authority without hesitation. Up to that, time the feudal chiefs were not officially required to reside in Yedo for any fixed time or at any fixed interval. But now it was clearly enacted that the feudatories of the east and those of the west should repair to the Bakufu capital, at different seasons in the year; should remain there a twelvemonth,—in the case of feudal lords from the Kwanto only six months—and should leave their wives and families as hostages during the alternate period of their own absence from the shogun's city, which they spent in the provinces.

This system was technically called sankin kotai, that is "alternate residence in capital." From the point of view of the Tokugawa the plan was eminently wise, for it bound the feudal chiefs closer to the shogun, keeping them under his eye half the time and giving hostages for their good behaviour the other half; and it helped the growth of Yedo both in financial and political power, by bringing money into it and by making it more than before an administrative headquarters. On the other hand there was a corresponding drain on the provinces, all the greater since the standard of living at Yedo was higher than in rural districts and country nobles thus learned extravagance. To prevent other families from growing too rich and powerful seems to have been a part of Ieyasu's definite plan for holding in check possible rivals of the Tokugawa, so that it is not impossible that he foresaw this very result. At any rate it is known that in the instructions for government which he handed down to his successors he urged them to keep strict surveillance over their feudal lords and if any one of them seemed to be growing rich to impose upon him such a burden of public works as would cripple him.