HIDEYOSHI BECOMES REGENT

In May, 1583, after the downfall of Katsuiye, the Emperor appointed Hideyoshi to be a councillor of State, and conferred on him the fourth order of rank. In November of the following year, he received another step of rank and was nominated gon-dainagon. The Emperor Okimachi at that time contemplated abdication, but the palace which he would have occupied as ex-Emperor had fallen into such a state of disrepair as to be virtually uninhabitable. Hideyoshi signalized his loyalty on this occasion by spending a large sum on the renovation of the palace, and in recognition of his services the Emperor raised him to the high post of nai-daijin. It was confidently expected that he would then become sa-daijin, but, owing to complications which need not be related here, the outcome of the matter was that he received the still higher post of kwampaku (regent). There can be no doubt that he himself had contemplated becoming shogun. In fact, it is on record that he made proposals in that sense to Yoshiaki, the last of the Ashikaga shoguns. But it had come by that time to be recognized that only a scion of the Minamoto family could be eligible for the post of shogun, and thus Yoshiaki declined Hideyoshi's overtures, though to accept them would have materially altered the fallen fortunes of the Ashikaga sept. Hideyoshi ultimately became prime minister of State (dajo daijiri) and took the family name of Toyotomi. It is stated, but the evidence is not conclusive, that in order to reach these high posts, he had to be adopted into the house of a Fujiwara noble. He had been a Taira when he served under Nobunaga, and to become a Fujiwara for courtly purposes was not likely to cause him much compunction.

THE MONKS, SHIKOKU, AND ETCHU

Immediately on the termination of the Komaki War, Hideyoshi took steps to deal effectually with the three enemies by whom his movements had been so much hampered, namely, the Buddhist priests of Kii, the Chosokabe clan in Shikoku, and the Sasa in Etchu. It has already been stated that the priests of Kii had their headquarters at Negoro, where there stood the great monastery of Dai-Dembo-In, belonging to the Shingon sect and enjoying almost the repute of Koya-san. Scarcely less important was the monastery of Sawaga in the same province. These two centres of religion had long been in possession of large bodies of trained soldiers whose ranks were from time to time swelled by the accession of wandering samurai (ronin). The army despatched from Osaka in the spring of 1585 to deal with these warlike monks speedily captured the two monasteries, and, for purposes of intimidation, crucified a number of the leaders. For a time, Koya-san itself was in danger, several of the fugitive monks having taken refuge there. But finally Koya-san was spared in consideration of surrendering estates yielding twenty-one thousand koku of rice, which properties had been violently seized by the monasteries in former years.

Three months later, Hideyoshi turned his arms against the Chosokabe sept in Shikoku. This being an enterprise of large dimensions, he entrusted its conduct to five of his most competent generals, namely, Ukita Hideiye, Hachisuka Iemasa, Kuroda Nagamasa, Kikkawa Motoharu, and Kohayakawa Takakage. Hideyoshi himself would have assumed the direct command, and had actually set out for that purpose from Osaka, when couriers met him with intelligence that less than one month's fighting had brought the whole of the Island of the Four Provinces into subjection. He therefore turned eastward, and entering Etchu, directed the operations, in progress there under the command of Maeda Toshiiye against Sasa Narimasa. This campaign lasted seven days, and ended in the surrender of Narimasa, to whom Hideyoshi showed remarkable clemency, inasmuch as he suffered him to remain in possession of considerable estates in Etchu.

THE UESUGI

At this time Hideyoshi cemented relations of friendship with the Uesugi family of Echigo, whose potentialities had always been a subject of apprehension to Nobunaga. The powerful sept was then ruled by Kagekatsu, nephew of the celebrated Kenshin. This daimyo had given evidence of good-will towards Hideyoshi during the Komaki War, but it was naturally a matter of great importance to establish really cordial relations with so powerful a baron. History relates that, on this occasion, Hideyoshi adopted a course which might well have involved him in serious peril. He entered Echigo with a mere handful of followers, and placed himself practically at the mercy of Kagekatsu, judging justly that such trustful fearlessness would win the heart of the gallant Kagekatsu. Hideyoshi's insight was justified by the sequel. Several of the principal retainers of Kagekatsu advised that advantage should be taken of Hideyoshi's rashness, and that his victorious career should be finally terminated in Echigo. But this vindictive counsel was rejected by the Uesugi baron, and relations of a warmly friendly character were established between the two great captains.

INVASION OF KYUSHU

There now remained only three really formidable enemies of Hideyoshi. These were Hojo Ujimasa, in the Kwanto; Date Masamime, in Dewa and Mutsu, and Shimazu Yoshihisa, in Kyushu. Of these, the Shimazu sept was probably the most powerful, and Hideyoshi determined that Kyushu should be the scene of his next warlike enterprise. The Island of the Nine Provinces was then under the rule of three great clans; the Shimazu, in the south; the Otomo, in Bungo, and the Ryuzoji, in Hizen. The most puissant of these had at one time been Ryuzoji Takanobu, but his cruel methods had alienated the sympathy of many of his vassals, among them being Arima Yoshizumi, who threw off his allegiance to Takanobu and joined hands with Shimazu Yoshihisa. Takanobu sent an army against Yoshizumi, but the Satsuma baron despatched Shimazu Masahisa to Yoshizumi's aid, and a sanguinary engagement at Shimabara in 1585 resulted in the rout of Takanobu's forces and his own death.

Takanobu's son and successor, who was named Masaiye, being still a boy, advantage was taken of the fact by Otomo Yoshishige, who invaded Hizen, so that Masaiye had to apply to the Shimazu family for succour. The Satsuma chieftain suggested that the matter might be settled by mutual withdrawal of forces, but Yoshishige declined this overture, and the result was a battle in which the Otomo troops were completely defeated. Otomo Yoshishige then (1586) had recourse to Hideyoshi for assistance, thus furnishing the opportunity of which Osaka was in search. Orders were immediately issued to Mori, Kikkawa, Kohayakawa, and Chosokabe Motochika to assemble their forces for an oversea expedition, and in the mean while, Sengoku Hidehisa was despatched to Kyushu bearing a letter in which Hideyoshi, writing over his title of kwampaku, censured the Shimazu baron for having failed to pay his respects to the Imperial Court in Kyoto, and called upon him to do so without delay. This mandate was treated with contempt. Shimazu Yoshihisa threw the document on the ground, declaring that his family had ruled in Satsuma for fourteen generations; that only one man in Japan, namely Prince Konoe, had competence to issue such an injunction, and that the head of the house of Shimazu would never kneel to a monkey-faced upstart.

Hideyoshi had foreseen something of this kind, and had warned Sengoku Hidehisa in the sense that whatever might be the action of the Satsuma baron, no warlike measures were to be precipitately commenced. Hidehisa neglected this warning. Yielding to the anger of the moment, he directed the Otomo troops to attack the Satsuma forces, and the result was disastrous. When the fighting ended, the Satsuma baron had pushed into Bungo and taken sixteen forts there, so that fully one-half of Kyushu was now under the sway of the Shimazu. Hideyoshi, on receiving news of these disasters, confiscated the estates of Sengoku Hidehisa, and issued orders to thirty-seven provinces to provide commissariat for three hundred thousand men and twenty thousand horses for a period of one year. Soon an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men assembled at Osaka, and the van, numbering sixty thousand, embarked there on the 7th of January, 1587, and landed at Yunoshima in Bungo on the 19th of the same month—dates which convey some idea of the very defective system of maritime transport then existing. In Bungo, the invading army was swelled by thirty thousand men under the leadership of Kohayakawa and Kikkawa, and the whole force, under the command-in-chief of Hidenaga, Hideyoshi's brother, moved to invest the castle of Takashiro.

It is unnecessary to follow the fighting in all its details. The salient facts are that Hideyoshi left Osaka with the main army of one hundred and thirty thousand men on the 22d of January, 1587, and, travelling by land, reached the Strait of Akamagasaki—now called Shimonoseki—on the 17th of February. He marched through Chikuzen, making friends of the local chieftains by forbearance and diplomacy, and fighting the first great battle of the campaign at Oguchi on the Sendai-gawa. The Satsuma baron's younger brother, Iehisa, after a gallant resistance, surrendered to Hideyoshi, and was employed by the latter to communicate direct with his chief, Yoshihisa. It was generally supposed that Iehisa would never return from this mission, but would remain in the camp of Shimazu. He did return, however, his word of honour being of more importance in his estimation than the opportunity of recovering his liberty.

History states that Hideyoshi thereafter treated this noble man with the greatest consideration, but it is difficult to reconcile that account with the fact that Hideyoshi subsequently pressed Iehisa to guide the Osaka army through the mountains and rivers which constituted natural defences for the fief of Satsuma. Iehisa, of course, refused, and to Hideyoshi's credit it stands on record that he did not press the matter with any violence. This difficulty of invading an unknown country without any maps or any guides, a country celebrated for its topographical perplexities, was ultimately overcome by sending Buddhist priests to act as spies in the dominions of Shimazu. These spies were led by the abbot, Kennyo, with whose name the reader is already familiar, and as the Shimazu family were sincere believers in Buddhism, no obstacles were placed in the way of the treacherous monks. They were able ultimately to guide the Osaka army through the forests and mountains on the north of Kagoshima, and Hideyoshi adopted the same strategy as that pursued in a similar case three hundred years later, namely, sending a force of fifty thousand men by sea with orders to advance against Kagoshima from the south. The Satsuma troops were completely defeated, and only the castle of Kagoshima remained in their hands.

At this stage of the campaign Hideyoshi behaved with remarkable magnanimity and foresight. Contrary to the advice of some of his principal retainers, he refused to proceed to extremities against the Shimazu clan, and agreed to make peace, on the basis that the clan should be left in possession of the provinces of Satsuma, Osumi, and Hyuga, the only further stipulation being that the then head of the house, Yoshihisa, should abdicate in favour of his younger brother, Yoshihiro. As for the Buddhist priests who had sacrificed their honour to their interests, those that had acted as guides to the invading army were subsequently crucified by order of the Satsuma baron, and the Shin sect, to which they belonged, was interdicted throughout the whole of the Shimazu fief. Yoshihiro was summoned to Kyoto by Hideyoshi to answer for this action, but he pleaded that such treachery amply deserved such punishment, and that he was prepared to bow to Hideyoshi's judgment in the matter. The defence was admitted by Hideyoshi, but the abbot Kennyo received such large rewards that he was able to erect the great temple Nishi Hongwan-ji, "which became the wonder of after-generations of men and which has often been erroneously referred to by foreign writers as a proof of the deep religious feelings of Buddhist converts three hundred years ago."*

*A New Life of Hideyoshi, by W. Dening.

THE HOJO

From end to end of Japan there were now only two powerful barons whose allegiance had not been formally rendered to Hideyoshi and to the Emperor under the new regime. These were Date Masamune and Hojo Ujimasa. The origin and eminence of the Hojo family from the days of its founder, Nagauji, have already been described in these pages, and it need only be added here that Ujimasa enjoyed a reputation second to none of his predecessors. That he should stand aloof from all his brother barons seemed to the latter an intolerable evidence of pride, and they urged Hideyoshi to resort at once to extreme measures. There can be no doubt that this was the intention of Hideyoshi himself, but with characteristic prudence he had recourse at the outset to pacific devices. He therefore sent an envoy to the Hojo's stronghold at Odawara, urging Ujimasa to lose no time in paying his respects to the Court at Kyoto. The Hojo chief's reply was that Sanada Masayuki had encroached upon the Hojo estates in Numata, and that if this encroachment were rectified, the desired obeisance to the Throne would be made.

Thereupon, Hideyoshi caused the restoration of Numata, but the Hojo baron, instead of carrying out his part of the agreement, made this restoration the pretext for an unwarrantable act of aggression. Whatever sympathy might have been felt in Kyoto with the Hojo family was forfeited by this procedure, and in March, 1590, an army of over two hundred thousand men was set in motion for the Kwanto. Hideyoshi's troops moved in three columns. One, commanded by Ieyasu, marched by the seacoast road, the Tokaido; another, under Uesugi Kagekatsu and Maeda Toshiiye, marched by the mountain road, the Tosando, and the third attacked from the sea. None of these armies encountered any very serious resistance. The first approached Odawara by the Hakone range and the second by way of the Usui pass. The castle at Odawara, however, was so strongly built and so stoutly held that its capture by storm seemed impossible, and Hideyoshi's forces were obliged to have recourse to a regular siege which lasted nearly four months. During the latter part of that time, Hideyoshi encouraged his soldiers to indulge in all sorts of amusements, and thus the camp of the besiegers constantly echoed the notes of musical performances and the shouts of dancers and sake drinkers. Finally, in July, 1590, the great fortress surrendered, and the Hojo baron, Ujimasa, was put to death, his head being sent to Kyoto for exposure, but the life of his son, Ujinao, was spared on condition that he enter a monastery.

HOJO UJINORI

One incident of this struggle is very characteristic of the ethics of the era. During the interchange of messages that preceded recourse to arms, the Hojo baron sent his brother, Ujinori, to Kyoto as an envoy to discuss the situation with Hideyoshi. The latter received Ujinori with all courtesy and endeavoured to impress upon him the imperative necessity of his chief's acquiescence. Ujinori promised to contribute to that end as far as lay in his power, but history describes him as adding: "Should my brother fail to comply with your commands, and should it be necessary for you to send an army against the Kwanto, it must be clearly understood that this visit of mine to your Excellency shall not in any way prejudice my loyalty to my brother. On the contrary, if the peace be broken, I shall probably have to command the van of my brother's forces, and in that event I may have to offer to your Excellency a flight of my rusty arrows."

Hideyoshi is narrated to have laughingly replied that the peace was in no danger of being broken and that he trusted Ujinori to use his best endeavours to avert war. On his return to the Kwanto, Ujinori was ordered to defend the castle of Nira-yama with seven thousand men, and he soon found himself attacked by fifty thousand under seven of Hideyoshi's generals. Ujinori reminded his comrades that Nira-yama had been the birthplace of the founder of the Hojo family, and therefore it would be an eternal shame if even one of the entrenchments were lost. Not one was lost. Again and again assaults were delivered, but they were unsuccessful, and throughout the whole of the Kwanto, Nira-yama alone remained flying the Hojo flag to the end. Ujinori surrendered in obedience to Ujimasa's instructions after the fall of Odawara, but Hideyoshi, instead of punishing him for the heavy losses he had inflicted on the Osaka army, lauded his fidelity and bravery, and presented him with an estate of ten thousand koku.

DATE MASAMUNE

When news reached Date Masamune of the fall of all the Hojo's outlying forts and of the final investment of Odawara, he recognized, from his place in Mutsu and Dewa, that an attitude of aloofness could no longer be maintained with safety. Accordingly, braving considerable danger, he made his way with a small retinue to Odawara and signified his willingness to comply with any terms imposed by Hideyoshi. Thus, for the first time since the middle of the fifteenth century, the whole of the empire was pacified.

YEDO

It is historically related that, during the siege of Odawara, Hideyoshi invited Ieyasu to the former's headquarters on Ishigaki Hill, whence an uninterrupted view of the interior of the castle could be had. The Tokugawa baron was then asked whether, if the eight provinces of the Kwanto were handed over to him, he would choose Odawara for central stronghold. He replied in the affirmative. Hideyoshi pointed out the superior advantages of Yedo from a strategical and commercial point of view, and ultimately when he conferred the Kwanto on Ieyasu, he chose Yedo for the latter's capital, the accompanying revenue being about two and a half million koku. Hideyoshi further proposed to appoint Oda Nobukatsu to the lordship of the five provinces which had hitherto constituted the domain of Ieyasu, namely, Suruga, Totomi, Mikawa, Kai, and Shinano. Nobukatsu, however, alleging that he did not desire any large domain, asked to be allowed to retain his old estates in Owari and Ise.

This attitude angered Hideyoshi for reasons which will presently be apparent. He assigned to Nobukatsu a comparatively insignificant fief at Akita, in the remote province of Dewa, and gave the estates in Owari and Ise to Hidetsugu, the nephew and adopted successor of Hideyoshi, while the five provinces hitherto under the sway of Ieyasu were divided among Hideyoshi's generals and retainers. In September, 1590, Ieyasu entered Yedo, and subdivided his extensive domain among his followers in order of merit, thus establishing the Tokugawa system of hereditary daimyo and founding a new Bakufu. All this was very significant. In such matters, Hideyoshi had repeatedly shown himself to be a man of great magnanimity, and had allowed even his enemies to retain possession of lands which would certainly have been taken from them by other conquerors. Thus, in the case of the Mori sept, fully half of the midland counties was left in their occupation, and, in the case of the Shimazu family, they were suffered to retain two and a half provinces.

With regard to Ieyasu, however, Hideyoshi behaved with marked caution. By granting to the Tokugawa chieftain the whole of the Kwanto, Hideyoshi made it appear as though he were conferring a signal favour; but in reality his object was to remove Ieyasu out of the zone of potential danger to Kyoto. Ieyasu fully recognized this manoeuvre, but bowed to it as the less of two evils. As a further measure of precaution, Hideyoshi interposed one of his own family, Hidetsugu, between the Kwanto and Kyoto, and with the object of menacing the rear of Ieyasu and restraining the movements of the Date, he placed Gamo Ujisato at Aizu in Oshu. He further posted Ishida Katsushige at Sawa-yama (now called Hikone) in the province of Omi, to cover the principal route to Kyoto, and for similar reasons with regard to the Yamato and Tamba roads he assigned to his brother, Hidenaga, the castle of Kori-yama, which commanded Izumi and Kii, and to his adopted son, Hidekatsu, the castle at Fukuchi-yama in Tamba. This plan of distributing their domains, so that the daimyo should be mutually repressive, was followed with still greater care by Ieyasu when he, in turn, became supreme.

HIDEYOSHI AND BUDDHISM

There are evidences that, from his childhood, Hideyoshi had little reverence for the Buddhist faith. When only twelve years of age he is said to have beaten and smashed an image of Amida because it remained always insensible to the offerings of food placed daily before it. Again, when on his way to Kyoto to avenge the assassination of Nobunaga, he saw an idol floating on a stream, and seizing the effigy he cut it into two pieces, saying that the deity Daikoku, having competence to succour one thousand persons only, could be of little use to him at such a crisis as he was now required to meet. Finally, on the occasion of his expedition against the Hojo of Odawara, when the sailors of Mishima, in Sagami, objected to carrying war-horses in their boats on the plea that the god of the sea, Ryujin, hated everything equine, Hideyoshi did not hesitate to remove these scruples by addressing a despatch to the deity with orders to watch over the safety of the steeds.

Yet this same Hideyoshi evidently recognized that the Buddhist faith had great potentialities in Japan, and that its encouragement made for the peace and progress of the country. Buddhism suffered terribly at the hands of Nobunaga. The great monastery of Enryaku-ji was a mass of blackened ruins at the time of the Oda baron's death, and it has been shown that the monasteries of Kii and Osaka fared almost equally badly at the hands of Hideyoshi. Nevertheless the latter had no sooner grasped the supreme administrative power than he showed himself a protector and promotor of Buddhism. Scattered throughout the empire and apparently crippled for all time, the monks of Hiei-zan very soon gave evidence of the vitality of their faith by commencing a vigorous propaganda for the restoration of the great monastery. Many renowned priests, as Zenso, Gosei, and others, headed this movement; Prince Takatomo, adopted son of the Emperor Okimachi, agreed to become lord-abbot of the sect (Tendai), and the Imperial Court issued a proclamation exhorting the people to subscribe for the pious purpose. Hideyoshi, Ieyasu, and other great barons addressed their vassals in a similar sense, and in Hideyoshi's proclamation the imperative necessity of Enryaku-ji as a barrier at the "Demon's Gate" was distinctly stated. Under such auspices the monastery quickly rose from its ashes, though in point of size and magnificence it was inferior to its predecessor. At the same time Hideyoshi steadily pursued the policy of checking the military tendencies of the monks, and it may be said that, from his era, the soldier-priest ceased to be a factor in the political situation.

THE KYOTO DAIBUTSU

The erection of a colossal image of the Buddha at Nara, in the eighth century, and at Kamakura, in the thirteenth century, marked the consummation of great political programmes in which religious influence acted a strong part. Hideyoshi determined to set up a still more imposing effigy in Kyoto, and, in 1586, the work was commenced under the superintendence of Maeda Gen-i. All the principal idol-makers were summoned to the capital, and among them were said to have been some Chinese experts. Hideyoshi declared that whereas the Nara Daibutsu had taken twenty-seven years to build, the Kyoto image should be finished in five. He kept his word. No less than twenty-one provinces were placed under requisition for labour and materials. The enclosure of the temple containing the image measured 260 yards by 274, and the great hall had dimensions of 110 yards by 74.

The original intention had been to make the idol of copper; but as the statue was to have a height of 160 feet, the quantity of metal required could not have been obtained within the time fixed, and lacquered wood was therefore substituted for copper. It is related that timbers of sufficient scantling could not be found anywhere except in the forests at the base of Fuji-yama, and Ieyasu employed fifty thousand labourers at a cost of a one thousand ryo in gold, for the purpose of felling the trees and transporting them to Kyoto. The operations furnished evidence of the curiously arbitrary methods practised officially in that age. Thus, when the building was interrupted owing to a lack of large stones for constructing the pedestal, messengers were sent to appropriate rocks standing in private gardens, without consulting the convenience of the owners, and many beautiful parks were thus deprived of their most picturesque elements. Moreover, on the plea of obtaining iron to make nails, clamps, and so forth, a proclamation was issued calling upon the civilian section of the population at large to throw their swords, their spears, their muskets, and their armour into the melting-pot. This proclamation, though couched in terms of simulated benevolence, amounted in reality to a peremptory order. The people were told that they only wasted their substance and were impeded in the payment of their taxes by spending money upon weapons of war, whereas by giving these for a religious purpose, they would invoke the blessings of heaven and promote their own prosperity. But, at the foot of these specious arguments, there was placed a brief command that the weapons must be surrendered and that those concerned should take due note of their duty in the matter. The import of such an injunction was not lost on the people, and general disarming of the agricultural and the artisan classes marked the success of Hideyoshi's policy. It is on record that he himself actually joined in the manual labour of dragging stones and timbers into position, and that, clad in hempen garments, he led the labourers' chorus of "Kiyari."

THE JURAKU-TEI

In the year 1586, the Emperor Okimachi resigned the throne to his grandson, Go-Yozei. Like Nobunaga, Hideyoshi was essentially loyal to the Imperial Court. He not only provided for the renovation of the shrines of Ise, but also built a palace for the retiring Emperor's use. On the 11th of the seventh month of 1585, he was appointed regant (kwampaku), and on the 13th of the same month he proceeded to the Court to render thanks. He himself, however, was without a residence in the capital, and to remedy that deficiency he built a palace called Juraku-tei (Mansion of Pleasure) which, according to the accounts transmitted by historians, was an edifice of exceptional magnificence. Thus, the Taikoki (Annals of the Taiko) speak of "gates guarded by iron pillars and copper doors; of high towers which shone like stars in the sky; of roof-tiles which roared in the wind, and of golden dragons which sang songs among the clouds." Nothing now remains of all this grandeur except some of the gates and other decorative parts of the structure, which were given to the builders of the temples of Hongwan-ji after the destruction of the Juraku-tei when Hidetsugu and his whole family died under the sword as traitors. There can be no doubt, however, that the edifice represented every possible feature of magnificence and refinement characteristic of the era.

Hideyoshi took up his abode there in 1587, and at the ensuing New Year's festival he prayed to be honoured by a visit from the Emperor. This request was complied with during the month of May in the same year. All the details of the ceremony were ordered in conformity with precedents set in the times of the Ashikaga shoguns, Yoshimitsu and Yoshimasa, but the greatly superior resources of Hideyoshi were enlisted to give eclat to the fete. The ceremonies were spread over five days. They included singing, dancing, couplet composing, and present giving. The last was on a scale of unprecedented dimensions. The presents to the Imperial household and to the Court Nobles Varied from three hundred koku of rice to 5530 ryo of silver, and in the case of the Court ladies, the lowest was fifty koku and the highest three hundred.

The occasion was utilized by Hideyoshi for an important ceremony, which amounted to a public recognition of his own supremacy. A written oath was signed and sealed by six great barons, of whom the first four represented the Toyotomi (Hideyoshi's) family and the last two were Ieyasu and Nobukatsu. The signatories of this oath solemnly bound themselves to respect eternally the estates and possessions of the members of the Imperial house, of the Court nobles, and of the Imperial princes, and further to obey faithfully all commands issued by the regent. This obligation was guaranteed by invoking the curse of all the guardian deities of the empire on the head of anyone violating the engagement. A similar solemn pledge in writing was signed by twenty-two of the great military barons.

THE KITANO FETE

The esoterics of the tea ceremonial and the vogue it obtained in the days of the shogun Yoshimasa, have already been described. But note must be taken here of the extraordinary zeal displayed by Hideyoshi in this matter. Some claim that his motive was mainly political; others that he was influenced by purely esthetic sentiments, and others, again, that both feelings were responsible in an equal degree. There is no material for an exact analysis. He doubtless appreciated the point of view of the historian who wrote that "between flogging a war-steed along the way to death and discussing esthetic canons over a cup of tea in a little chamber nine feet square, there was a radical difference." But it must also have appealed keenly to his fancy that he, a veritable upstart, by birth a plebeian and by habit a soldier, should ultimately set the lead in artistic fashions to the greatest aristocrats in the empire in a cult essentially pacific.

However these things may have been, the fact remains that on the 1st of November, 1587, there was organized by his orders on the Pine Plain (Matsubara) of Kitano a cha-no-yu fete of unprecedented magnitude. The date of the fete was placarded in Kyoto, Nara, Osaka, Sakai, and other towns of importance more than a month in advance; all lovers of the tea cult were invited, whether plebeian or patrician, whether rich or poor; frugality was enjoined, and the proclamations promised that the choicest among the objects of art collected by Hideyoshi during many decades should be exhibited. It is recorded that over 360 persons attended the fete. Some erected simple edifices under the pine trees; some set up a monster umbrella for a roof, and some brought portable pavilions. These various edifices are said to have occupied a space of six square miles. Three pavilions were devoted to Hideyoshi's art-objects, and he himself served tea and exhibited his esthetic treasures to Ieyasu, Nobukatsu, Toshiiye, and other distinguished personages.

HIDEYOSHI'S LARGESSE

Hideyoshi's love of ostentation when political ends could be served thereby was strikingly illustrated by a colossal distribution of gold and silver. One morning in June, 1589, the space within the main gate of the Juraku palace was seen to be occupied throughout a length of nearly three hundred yards with gold and silver coins heaped up on trays each containing one hundred and fifty pieces. Immediately within the gate sat Hideyoshi, and beside him was the Emperor's younger brother, Prince Roku. The mass of glittering treasure was guarded by officials under the superintendence of Maeda Gen-i, and presently the names of the personages who were to be recipients of Hideyoshi's largesse were read aloud, whereupon each of those indicated advanced and received a varying number of the precious trays. The members of Hideyoshi's family were specially favoured in this distribution. His mother received 3000 ryo of gold and 10,000 ryo of silver; his brother, Hidenaga, 3000 ryo of gold and 20,000 of silver; and his nephew, Hidetsugu, 3000 of gold and 10,000 of silver. To Nobukatsu, to Ieyasu, to Mori Terumoto, to Uesugi Kagekatsu, and to Maeda Toshiiye, great sums were given, varying from 3000 ryo of gold and 10,000 of silver to 1000 of gold and 10,000 of silver. It is said that the total of the coins thus bestowed amounted to 365,000 ryo, a vast sum in that era. A history of the time observes that the chief recipients of Hideyoshi's generosity were the members of his own family, and that he would have shown better taste had he made these donations privately. Perhaps the deepest impression produced by this grand display was a sense of the vast treasure amassed by Hideyoshi; and possibly he contemplated something of the kind.

ENGRAVING: SNOW IMAGE OF DHARMA

ENGRAVING: A FENCING OUTFIT



CHAPTER XXXV

THE INVASION OF KOREA

CAUSES

HAVING brought the whole of Japan under his control, Hideyoshi conceived the project of conquering China. That appears to be the simplest explanation of his action. His motive, however, has been variously interpreted. Some historians maintain that his prime purpose was to find occupation for the vast host of soldiers who had been called into existence in Japan by four centuries of almost continuous warfare. Others do not hesitate to allege that this oversea campaign was designed for the purpose of assisting to exterminate the Christian converts. Others, again, attempt to prove that personal ambition was Hideyoshi's sole incentive. It does not seem necessary to estimate the relative truth of these analyses, especially as the evidence adduced by their several supporters is more or less conjectural. As to the idea that Hideyoshi was influenced by anti-Christian sentiment, it is sufficient to observe that out of nearly a quarter of a million of Japanese soldiers who landed in Korea during the course of the campaign, not so much as ten per cent, were Christians, and with regard to the question of personal ambition, it may be conceded at once that if Hideyoshi's character lays him open to such a charge, his well-proven statecraft exonerates him from any suspicion of having acted without thought for his country's good.

One fact which does not seem to have been sufficiently considered by annalists is that during the sixteenth century the taste for foreign adventure had grown largely in Japan. Many persons had gone abroad in quest of fortune and had found it. It is on record that emigrants from the province of Hizen had established themselves in considerable numbers in China, and that their success induced their feudal lord, Nabeshima, to seek the Central Government's permission for returning his province to the latter and taking, in lieu, the district near Ningpo, where his vassals had settled. Hideyoshi doubtless shared the general belief that in oversea countries Japanese enterprise could find many profitable opportunities, and it is easy to believe that the weakened condition of China towards the close of the Ming dynasty led him to form a not very flattering estimate of that country's power of resistance.

The conquest of Korea had not in itself any special temptation. He regarded the peninsula simply as a basis for an attack upon China, and he made it quite clear to the Korean sovereign that, if the latter suffered his territories to be converted into a stepping-stone for that purpose, friendship with Japan might be confidently anticipated. Korea, at that time, was under the sway of a single ruler, whose dynasty enjoyed the protection of the Chinese Court, and between the two sovereigns embassies were regularly exchanged. It has already been stated in these pages that towards the middle of the fifteenth century Japanese settlers in Korea had been assigned three places of residence, but owing to the exactions suffered at the hands of the local authorities, these settlers had risen in revolt and had finally been expelled from Korea until the year 1572, when a concession was once more set apart for Japanese use at Fusan. No longer, however, were envoys sent from Korea to Japan, and evidence of the outrages committed from time to time by Japanese pirates is furnished by a decree of the Korean Government that a Japanese subject landing anywhere except at Fusan would be treated as a corsair.

Such were the existing conditions when, in 1587, Hideyoshi called upon the Korean monarch to explain the cessation of the old-time custom of exchanging envoys. To this the King of Korea replied that he would willingly renew the ancient relations provided that the Japanese authorities seized and handed over a number of Korean renegades, who had been acting as guides to Japanese pirates in descents on the Korean coast. This stipulation having been complied with, a Korean embassy was duly despatched by Kyoto, and after some delay its members were received by Hideyoshi in the hall of audience. What happened on this occasion is described in Korean annals, translated as follows by Mr. Aston*:

*Hideyoshi's Invasion of Korea, by Aston. "Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan," Vol. VI.

The ambassadors were allowed to enter the palace gate borne in their palanquins. They were preceded the whole way by a band of music. They ascended into the hall, where they performed their obeisances. Hideyoshi is a mean and ignoble-looking man; his complexion is dark, and his features are wanting in distinction. But his eyeballs send out fire in flashes—enough to pierce one through. He sat upon a threefold cushion with his face to the south. He wore a gauze hat and a dark-coloured robe of State. His officers were ranged round him, each in his proper place. When the ambassadors were introduced and had taken their seats, the refreshments offered them were of the most frugal description. A tray was set before each, on which was one dish containing steamed mochi (rice-cake), and sake of an inferior quality was handed round a few times in earthenware cups and in a very unceremonious way. The civility of drinking to one another was not observed.

After a short interval, Hideyoshi retired behind a curtain, but all his officers remained in their places. Soon after, a man came out dressed in ordinary clothes, with a baby in his arms, and strolled about the hall. This was no other than Hideyoshi himself, and everyone present bowed down his head to the ground. Looking out between the pillars of the hall, Hideyoshi espied the Korean musicians. He commanded them to strike up all together as loud as they could, and was listening to their music when he was reminded that babies could despise ceremonies as much as princes, and laughingly called one of his attendants to take the child and bring him a change of clothing. He seemed to do exactly as he pleased, and was as unconcerned as if nobody else were present. The ambassadors, having made their obeisance, retired, and this audience was the only occasion on which they were admitted to Hideyoshi's presence.

After long delay Hideyoshi replied to the letter carried by the above envoys, and his language is important as clearly indicating the part which he designed for Korea in the pending war. The document is thus translated by Mr. Aston:

This empire has of late years been brought to ruin by internal dissensions which allowed no opportunity for laying aside armour. This state of things roused me to indignation, and in a few years I restored peace to the country. I am the only remaining scion of a humble stock, but my mother once had a dream in which she saw the sun enter her bosom, after which she gave birth to me. There was then a soothsayer who said: "Wherever the sun shines, there will be no place which shall not be subject to him. It may not be doubted that one day his power will overspread the empire." It has therefore been my boast to lose no favourable opportunity, and taking wings like a dragon, I have subdued the east, chastised the west, punished the south, and smitten the north. Speedy and great success has attended my career, which has been like the rising sun illuminating the whole earth.

When I reflect that the life of man is less than one hundred years, why should I spend my days in sorrow for one thing only? I will assemble a mighty host, and, invading the country of the great Ming, I will fill with the hoar-frost from my sword the whole sky over the four hundred provinces. Should I carry out this purpose, I hope that Korea will be my vanguard. Let her not fail to do so, for my friendship with your honourable country depends solely on your conduct when I lead my army against China.

The Korean envoys entrusted with the delivery of the above despatch were accompanied by one of the chief vassals of the Tsushima baron, and a monk, named Genso, who acted in the capacity of interpreter. By these two Japanese the Korean Government was clearly informed that nothing was required of Korea beyond throwing open the roads to China, and that she would not be asked to give any other assistance whatever in the war against her northern neighbour. In the context of this explanation, the Seoul Government was reminded that, three centuries previously, Korea had permitted her territory to be made a basis of Mongolian operations against Japan, and therefore the peninsula might well allow itself to be now used as a basis of Japanese operations against China. From Korean annals we learn that the following despatch was ultimately sent by the Korean sovereign to Hideyoshi*:

*Hulbert's History of Korea.

Two letters have already passed between us, and the matter has been sufficiently discussed. What talk is this of our joining you against China? From the earliest times we have followed law and right. From within and from without all lands are subject to China. If you have desired to send your envoys to China, how much more should we? When we have been unfortunate she has helped us. The relations which subsist between us are those of parent and child. This you know well. Can we desert both Emperor and parent and join with you? You doubtless will be angry at this, and it is because you have not been admitted to the Court of China. Why is it that you are not willing to admit the suzerainty of the Emperor, instead of harbouring such hostile intents against him? This truly passes our comprehension.

The bitterness of this language was intensified by a comment made to the Japanese envoys when handing them the above despatch. His Majesty said that Japan's programme of conquering China resembled an attempt to bail out the ocean with a cockle-shell. From Korea's point of view her attitude was perfectly justifiable. The dynasty by which the peninsula was then ruled owed its very existence to China's aid, and during two centuries the peninsula had enjoyed peace and a certain measure of prosperity under that dynasty. On the other hand, Korea was not in a position to think of resisting Japan on the battle-field. The only army which the former could boast of possessing consisted of men who were too indigent to purchase exemption from service with the colours, and thus she may be said to have been practically without any efficient military organization. Moreover, her troops were not equipped with either artillery or match-locks. The only advantage which she possessed may be said to have been exceedingly difficult topographical features, which were practically unknown to the Japanese. Japan had not at that time even the elements of the organization which she was ultimately destined to carry to such a high point of perfection. She had no secret-service agents or any cartographers to furnish her generals with information essential to the success of an invasion, and from the moment that her troops landed in Korea, their environment would be absolutely strange.

JAPAN'S PREPARATIONS

These considerations did not, however, deter Hideyoshi. Immediately on receipt of the above despatch from the Korean Court, preparations were commenced for an oversea expedition on a colossal scale. Nagoya, in the province of Hizen, was chosen for the home-basis of operations. It has been observed by several critics that if Hideyoshi, instead of moving by Korea, had struck at China direct oversea, he would in all probability have seen his flag waving over Peking in a few months, and the whole history of the Orient would have been altered. That may possibly be true. But we have to remember that the Korean peninsula lies almost within sight of the shores of Japan, whereas to reach China direct by water involves a voyage of several hundred miles over seas proverbially tempestuous and dangerous. Even in modern times, when maritime transport has been so greatly developed, a general might well hesitate between the choice of the Korean and the ocean routes to China from Japan, were he required to make a choice. In the face of the certainty of Korean hostility, however, Hideyoshi's selection was certainly open to criticism. Nevertheless, the event showed that he did not err in his calculations so far as the operations on shore were concerned.

He himself remained in Japan throughout the whole war. He went to Nagoya towards the close of 1592 and stayed there until the beginning of 1594, and it was generally understood that he intended ultimately to assume direct command of the oversea armies. In fact, at a council held to consider this matter, he proposed to cross the water at the head of one hundred and fifty thousand men, handing over the administration of affairs in Japan to Ieyasu. On that occasion, one of his most trusted followers, Asano Nagamasa, provoked a violent outburst of temper on Hideyoshi's part by declaring that such a scheme would be an act of lunacy, since Hideyoshi's presence alone secured the empire against recurrence of domestic strife. The annals are not very clear at this point, but everything seems to indicate that Hideyoshi's purpose of leading the armies in person would have been carried into practice had it not become certain that the invasion of China would have to be abandoned. The time and the manner in which this failure became clear will be seen as we proceed.

CONDITIONS FROM THE INVADER'S POINT OF VIEW

The sea which separates Japan from the Korean peninsula narrows on the south to a strait divided by the island of Tsushima into two channels of nearly equal width. Tsushima had, for centuries, been the Japanese outpost in this part of the empire. To reach the island from the Japanese side was always an easy and safe task, but in the fifty-six-mile channel that separates Tsushima from the peninsula of Korea an invading flotilla had to run the risk of an attack by Korean warships.* The army assembled at Nagoya totalled over three hundred thousand men, whereof some seventy thousand constituted the first fighting line and eighty-seven thousand the second, the remainder forming a reserve to meet contingencies. The question of maritime transport presented some difficulty, but was solved by the expedient of ordering each maritime feudatory to furnish two large ships for every hundred thousand koku of the fief's assessment, and their crews were obtained by compelling each fishing village to furnish ten sailors for every hundred houses it contained. These were not fighting vessels but mere transports. Fighting men to the number of ninety-two hundred were, however, distributed among the ships, and were armed with match-locks, bows, and swords. The problem of commissariat was very formidable. This part of the enterprise was entrusted solely to Asano Nagamasa, minister of Justice, one of the five bugyo,—that is to say, five officials called administrators, in whose intelligence and competence Hideyoshi placed signal reliance. In the records of the Asano family it is stated that an immense quantity of rice was shipped at the outset, but that on landing in Korea the army found ample supplies of grain in every castle throughout the peninsula. Nevertheless, the problem of provisions ultimately became exceedingly difficult, as might well have been predicted.

*See the Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition; article "Japan," by Brinkley.

PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

As for the plan of campaign, it was precisely in accord with the principles of modern strategy. The van, consisting of three army corps, was to cross rapidly to Fusan on the south coast of the peninsula, whence a movement northward, towards the capital, Seoul, was to be immediately commenced, one corps marching by the eastern coast-road, one by the central route, and one by the western. "Thereafter the other four corps, which formed the first fighting line, together with the corps under the direct orders of the commander-in-chief, Ukita Hideiye, were to cross for the purpose of effectually subduing the regions through which the van had passed; and, finally, the two remaining corps of the second line were to be transported by sea up the west coast of the peninsula, to form a junction with the van which, by that time, should be preparing to pass into China over the northern boundary of Korea, namely, the Yalu River. For the landing-place of these re-enforcements the town of Pyong-yang was adopted, being easily accessible by the Tadong River from the coast. In later ages, Japanese armies were destined to move twice over these same regions, once to the invasion of China [in 1894], once to the attack of Russia [in 1904], and they adopted almost the same strategical plan as that mapped out by Hideyoshi in the year 1592. The forecast was that the Koreans would offer their chief resistance, first, at the capital, Seoul; next at Pyong-yang, and finally at the Yalu, as the approaches to all these places constituted positions capable of being utilized to great advantage for defensive purposes."*

*Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th edition; article "Japan," by Brinkley.

THE MARCH TO SEOUL

On the 24th of May, 1592, the first army corps (18,700 men), under the command of Konishi Yukinaga, crossed unmolested to the peninsula. So little did the Koreans anticipate an invasion that the earliest intelligence they had of the advent of the invaders was furnished by the commandant of Fusan, who happened that day to be hunting on Deer Island at the entrance to the harbour, and who sighted the approach of the hostile flotilla. On the 25th, Konishi's troops carried the castle of Fusan by storm, after a brave resistance by the garrison, and, on the 27th, the same fate befell another and stronger fortress lying three miles inland and garrisoned by twenty thousand picked soldiers. Four days after the landing of Konishi's army, the second corps (20,800 strong), under Kato Kiyomasa, reached Fusan, and immediately took the east-coast road, according to the programme of campaign.

Thenceforth, however, it was really a race between the two armies as to which should form the van. At the pass of Cho-ryung a reunion was effected. This position offered exceptional facilities for defence, but owing to some unexplained reason no attempt was made by the Koreans to hold it. A few miles further north stood a castle reckoned the strongest fortress in the peninsula. Konishi and Kato continued the combination of their forces as they approached this position, but, contrary to expectation, the Koreans fought in the open and the castle fell without difficulty. Thereafter, the two corps separated, Kato taking the westerly road and Konishi the direct route to Seoul. In short, although the two generals have been accused of crippling themselves by jealous competition, the facts indicate that they co-operated effectively as far as the river Imjin, where a strenuous effort to check them was expected to be made by the Koreans.

From the landing place at Fusan to the gates of Seoul the distance is 267 miles. Konishi's corps covered that interval in nineteen days, storming two forts, carrying two positions, and fighting one pitched battle on the way. Kato's corps, travelling by a circuitous and more arduous road but not meeting with so much resistance, traversed the distance between Fusan and the capital in four days less. At Seoul, with its thirty thousand battlements and three times as many embrasures, requiring a garrison ninety thousand strong, only seven thousand were available, and nothing offered except flight, a course which the Royal Court adopted without hesitation, leaving the city to be looted and partially destroyed, not by the Japanese invaders but by the Korean inhabitants themselves.

The King did not halt until he had placed the Imjin River between himself and the enemy. Moreover, as soon as he there received news of the sack of the city, he renewed his flight northward and took up his quarters at Pyong-yang. It was on the 12th of June that the Korean capital fell, and by the 16th four army corps had assembled there, while four others had effected a landing at Fusan. After a rest of fifteen days, the northern advance was resumed from Seoul, with the expectation that a great struggle would take place on the banks of the Imjin. The conditions were eminently favourable for defence, inasmuch as the approach to the river from the south was only by one narrow gulch, whereas, on the northern side, lay a long, sandy stretch where troops could easily be deployed. Moreover the Japanese had no boats wherewith to negotiate a broad and swiftly flowing river. During ten days the invaders remained helpless on the southern bank. Then the Koreans allowed themselves to be betrayed by the common device of a simulated retreat. They crossed in exultant pursuit, only to find that they had been trapped into an ambush. Konishi and Kato now again separated, the former continuing the direct advance northward, and the latter taking the northeastern route, which he ultimately followed along the whole of the coast as far as Kyong-sang, whence he turned inland and finally reached Hai-ryong, a place destined to acquire much importance in modern times as the point of junction of the Kilin-Korean railways.

The distance from Seoul to Pyong-yang on the Tadong is 130 miles, and it was traversed by the Japanese in eighteen days, ten of which had been occupied in forcing the passage of the Imjin. On the southern bank of the Tadong, the invaders found themselves in a position even more difficult than that which had confronted them at the Imjin. They had to pass a wide rapid river with a walled city of great strength on its northern bank and with all the boats in the possession of the Korean garrison, which was believed to be very numerous. Some parleying took place, and the issue of the situation seemed very doubtful when the Koreans lost patience and crossed the river, hoping to destroy the Japanese by a night attack. They miscalculated the time required for this operation, and daylight compelled them to abandon the enterprise when its only result had been to disclose to the invaders the whereabouts of the fords. Then ensued a disorderly retreat on the part of the Koreans, and there being no time for the latter to fire the town, storehouses full of grain fell into the hands of the invaders. The Korean Court resumed its flight as far as Wi-ju, a few miles south of the Yalu River, whence messengers were sent to China to solicit succour.

THE COMMAND OF THE SEA

Thus far, everything had marched in perfect accord with the Japanese programme. A force of nearly two hundred thousand men had been carried over the sea and had overrun practically the whole of Korea. "At this point, however, the invasion suffered a check owing to a cause which in modern times has received much attention, though in Hideyoshi's days it had been little considered; the Japanese lost the command of the sea. The Japanese idea of sea fighting in those times was to use open boats propelled chiefly by oars. They closed as quickly as possible with the enemy and then fell on with the trenchant swords which they used so skilfully. Now, during the fifteenth century and part of the sixteenth, the Chinese had been so harassed by Japanese piratical raids that their inventive genius, quickened by suffering, suggested a device for coping with these formidable adversaries. Once allow the Japanese swordsman to come to close quarters and he carried all before him. To keep him at a distance, then, was the great desideratum, and the Chinese compassed this in maritime warfare by completely covering their boats with roofs of solid timber, so that those within were protected against missiles or other weapons, while loop-holes and ports enabled them to pour bullets and arrows on a foe.

"The Koreans learned this device from the Chinese and were the first to employ it in actual warfare. Their own history alleges that they improved upon the Chinese model by nailing sheet iron over the roofs and sides of the 'turtle-shell' craft and studding the whole surface with chevaux de frise, but Japanese annals indicate that in the great majority of cases timber alone was used. It seems strange that the Japanese should have been without any clear perception of the immense fighting superiority possessed by such protected war-vessels over small open boats. But certainly they were either ignorant or indifferent. The fleet which they provided to hold the command of Korean waters did not include one vessel of any magnitude; it consisted simply of some hundreds of row-boats manned by seven thousand men. Hideyoshi himself was perhaps not without misgivings. Six years previously, he had endeavoured to obtain two war-galleons from the Portuguese, and had he succeeded, the history of the Far East might have been radically different. Evidently, however, he committed a blunder which his countrymen in modern times have conspicuously avoided; he drew the sword without having fully investigated his adversary's resources.

"Just about the time when the van of the Japanese army was entering Seoul, the Korean admiral, Yi Sun-sin, at the head of a fleet of eighty vessels, attacked the Japanese squadron which lay at anchor near the entrance to Fusan harbour, set twenty-six of the vessels on fire, and dispersed the rest. Four other engagements ensued in rapid succession. The last and most important took place shortly after the Japanese troops had seized Pyong-yang. It resulted in the sinking of over seventy Japanese vessels, transports and fighting ships combined, which formed the main part of a flotilla carrying reinforcements by sea to the van of the invading army. This despatch of troops and supplies by water had been a leading feature of Hideyoshi's plan of campaign, and the destruction of the flotilla to which the duty was entrusted may be said to have sealed the fate of the war by isolating the army in Korea from its home base.

"It is true that Konishi Yukinaga, who commanded the first division, desired to continue his northward march from Pyong-yang without delay. He argued that China was wholly unprepared, and that the best hope of ultimate victory lay in not giving her time to collect her forces. But the commander-in-chief, Ukita Hideiye, refused to endorse this plan. He took the view that since the Korean provinces were still offering desperate resistance, supplies could not be drawn from them, neither could the troops engaged in subjugating them be freed for service at the front. Therefore it was essential to await the consummation of the second phase of Hideyoshi's plan, namely, the despatch of re-enforcements and munitions by water to Pyong-yang. The reader has seen how that second phase fared. The Japanese commander at Pyong-yang never received any accession of strength. His force suffered constant diminution from casualties, and the question of commissariat became daily more difficult. . . . Japanese historians themselves admit the fact that no wise effort was made to conciliate the Korean people. They were treated so harshly that even the humble peasant took up arms, and thus the peninsula, instead of serving as a basis of supplies, had to be garrisoned perpetually by a strong army."* Korean historians give long and minute accounts of the development and exploits of guerilla bands, which, though they did not obtain any signal victory over the invaders, harassed the latter perpetually, and compelled them to devote a large part of their force to guarding the lines of communication.

*Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th edition; article "Japan," by Brinkley.

CHINESE INTERFERENCE

Having suffered for their loyalty to China, the Koreans naturally looked to her for succour. Peking should have understood the situation thoroughly. Even without any direct communication from Japan, the Peking Court had cognizance of Hideyoshi's intentions. A letter addressed by him in the year 1591 to the King of Ryukyu stated clearly his intention of extending Japanese sovereignty throughout the whole Orient, and the ruler of Ryukyu had lost no time in making this fact known to Peking.* Yet it does not appear that the Chinese had any just appreciation of the situation. Their first response to Korea's appeal was to mobilize a force of five thousand men in the Liaotung peninsula, which force crossed the Yalu and moved against Pyong-yang, where the Japanese van had been lying idle for over two months. This occurred early in October, 1592. The incident illustrated China's confidence in her own superiority. "The whole of the Korean forces had been driven northward throughout the entire length of the peninsula by Japanese armies, yet Peking considered that five thousand Chinese braves would suffice to roll back this tide of invasion."

*There is still extant a letter addressed by Hideypshi in June, 1592, to Hidetsugu, his nephew, and then nominal successor. In this document it is distinctly stated that the attention of the Emperor of Japan should be directed to the Chinese capital, inasmuch as the Japanese Court would pay a visit to Peking in 1594, on which occasion the ten provinces surrounding the Chinese capital would be presented to his Majesty, and out of this territory the Court nobles would receive estates.

The result was a foregone conclusion. Three thousand of the Chinese were killed, and the rest fled pele-mele across the Yalu. China now began to be seriously alarmed. She despatched to Pyong-yang an envoy named Chen Weiching—known in Japanese history as Chin Ikei—who was instructed not to conclude peace but only to make such overtures as might induce the Japanese to agree to an armistice, thus enabling the Chinese authorities to mobilize a sufficient force. Konishi Yukinaga fell into this trap. He agreed to an armistice of fifty days, during which the Japanese pledged themselves not to advance more than three miles northward of Pyong-yang while Chen proceeded to Peking to arrange terms of peace. It is very evident that had the Japanese seen any certain prospect of proceeding to the invasion of China, they would not have agreed to such an arrangement as this—an arrangement which guaranteed nothing except leisure for the mobilization of a strong Chinese army. It had, indeed, become plain to the Japanese commanders, after six months of operations in the peninsula, that the wisest course for them was to arrange a satisfactory peace.

The second force put in the field by China is estimated by the Jesuits and the Japanese at 200,000 men and at 51,000 by Korean history. Probably the truth lies midway between the two extremes. This powerful army moved across Manchuria in the dead of winter and hurled itself against Pyong-yang during the first week of February, 1593. The Japanese garrison at that place cannot have greatly exceeded twenty thousand men, for nearly one-half of its original number had been detached to hold a line of forts guarding the communications with Seoul. Neither Chinese nor Japanese history comments on the instructive fact that the arrival of this army under the walls of Pyong-yang was China's answer to her envoy's promise of a satisfactory peace, nor does it appear that any discredit attached to Chen Weiching for the deception he had practised; his competence as a negotiator was subsequently admitted without cavil. The Chinese, though their swords were much inferior to the Japanese weapon, possessed great superiority in field artillery and cavalry, as well as in the fact that their troopers wore iron mail which defied the keenest blade. Thus, after a severe fight which cost the Japanese twenty-three hundred men, they had to evacuate Pyong-yang and retreat towards Seoul, the army under Kato Kiyomasa retiring at the same time from the northeast and fighting its way back to the central route. Orders were then issued by the commander-in-chief, Ukita, for the whole of the Japanese forces in the north of the peninsula to concentrate in Seoul, but Kohayakawa, one of Hideyoshi's most trusted generals, whose name has occurred more than once in these annals, conducted a splendid covering movement at a place a few miles northward of Seoul, the result of which was that the Chinese fled in haste over the Injin, losing ten thousand men in their retreat.

But, though the Japanese had thus shaken off the pursuit, it was impossible for them to continue in occupation of Seoul. The conditions existing there were shocking. Widespread famine menaced, with its usual concomitant, pestilence. According to Korean history, the streets of the city and the roads in the suburbs were piled with corpses to a height of ten feet above the wall. The Japanese, therefore, made proposals of peace, and the Chinese agreed, on condition that the Japanese gave up two Korean princes held captive by them, and retired to the south coast of the peninsula. These terms were accepted, and on May 9, 1593, that is to say, 360 days after the landing of the invaders' van at Fusan, the evacuation of the Korean capital took place. The Chinese commanders showed great lack of enterprise. They failed to utilize the situation, and in October of the same year they withdrew from the peninsula all their troops except ten thousand men. Negotiations for permanent peace now commenced between the Governments of Japan and China, but while the pourparlers were in progress the most sanguinary incident of the whole war took place. During the early part of the campaign a Japanese attack had been beaten back from Chinju, which was reckoned the strongest fortress in Korea. Hideyoshi now ordered that the Japanese troops, before sailing for home, should rehabilitate their reputation by capturing this place, where the Koreans had mustered a strong army. The order was obeyed. Continuous assaults were delivered against the fortress during the space of nine days, and when it passed into Japanese possession the Koreans are said to have lost between sixty and seventy thousand men and the casualties on the Japanese side must have been almost as numerous.

THE NEGOTIATIONS

After the fall of Chinju, all the Japanese troops, with the exception of Konishi's corps, were withdrawn from Korea, and the Japanese confined their operations to holding a cordon of twelve fortified camps along the southern coast of the peninsula. These camps were nothing more than bluffs overlooking the sea on the south, and protected on the land side by moats and earthworks. The action at Chinju had created some suspicion as to the integrity of Japan's designs, but mainly through the persistence and tact of the Chinese envoy, Chen Weiching, terms were agreed upon, and on October 21, 1596, a Chinese mission reached Japan and proceeded to Osaka. The island had just then been visited by a series of uniquely disastrous earthquakes, which had either overthrown or rendered uninhabitable all the great edifices in and around Kyoto. One corner of Osaka Castle alone remained intact, and there the mission was received. Hideyoshi refused to give audience to the Korean members of the mission, and welcomed the Chinese members only, from whom he expected to receive a document placing him on a royal pinnacle at least as high as that occupied by the Emperor of China. The document actually transmitted to him was of a very different significance as the following extract shows:

The Emperor, who respects and obeys heaven and is favoured by Providence, commands that he be honoured and loved wherever the heavens overhang and the earth upbears. The Imperial command is universal; even as far as the bounds of ocean where the sun rises, there are none who do not obey it. In ancient times our Imperial ancestors bestowed their favours on many lands: the Tortoise Knots and the Dragon Writing were sent to the limits of far Japan; the pure alabaster and the great-seal character were granted to the monarchs of the submissive country. Thereafter came billowy times when communications were interrupted, but an auspicious opportunity has now arrived when it has pleased us again to address you. You, Toyotomi Taira Hideyoshi, having established an Island kingdom and knowing the reverence due to the Central Land, sent to the west an envoy, and with gladness and affection offered your allegiance. On the north you knocked at the barrier of ten thousand li, and earnestly requested to be admitted within our dominions. Your mind is already confirmed in reverent submissiveness. How can we grudge our favour to so great meekness? We do, therefore, specially invest you with the dignity of "King of Japan," and to that intent issue this our commission. Treasure it carefully. As a mark of our special favour towards you, we send you over the sea a robe and crown contained in a costly case, so that you may follow our ancient custom as respects dress. Faithfully defend the frontier of our empire; let it be your study to act worthily of your position as our minister; practice moderation and self-restraint; cherish gratitude for the Imperial favour so bountifully bestowed upon you; change not your fidelity; be humbly guided by our admonitions; continue always to follow our instructions.*

*Quoted by W. Dening in A New Life of Hideyoshi.

Hideyoshi had already donned the robe and crown mentioned in the above despatch, his belief being that they represented his investiture as sovereign of Ming. On learning the truth, he tore off the insignia and flung them on the ground in a fit of ungovernable wrath at the arrogance of the Chinese Emperor's tone. It had never been distinctly explained how this extraordinary misunderstanding arose, but the most credible solution of the problem is that Naito, baron of Tamba, who had proceeded to Peking for the purpose of negotiating peace, was so overawed by the majesty and magnificence of the Chinese Court that, instead of demanding Hideyoshi's investiture as monarch of China, he stated that nothing was needed except China's formal acknowledgement of the kwampaku's real rank. Hideyoshi, in his natural anger, ordered the Chinese ambassadors to be dismissed without any written answer and without any of the gifts usual on such occasions according to the diplomatic custom of the Orient.

He was, however, induced not to prosecute his quarrel with the Middle Kingdom, and he turned his anger entirely against Korea. Accordingly, on March 19, 1597, nine fresh corps were mobilized for oversea service, and these being thrown into Korea, brought the Japanese forces in that country to a total of 141,000 men. But the campaign was not at first resumed with activity proportionate to this great army. The Japanese commanders seem to have waited for some practical assurances that the command of the sea would not be again wrested from them; a natural precaution seeing that, after five years' war, Korea herself was no longer in a position to make any contributions to the commissariat of the invaders. It is a very interesting fact that, on this occasion, the Japanese victories at sea were as signal as their defeats had been in 1592. The Korean navy comprised the same vessels which were supposed to have proved so formidable five years previously, but the Japanese naval architects had risen to the level of the occasion, and the Korean fleet was well-nigh annihilated.

Meanwhile, the Chinese had sent a powerful army to southern Korea, and against these fresh forces the Japanese attacks were directed. Everywhere the invaders were victorious, and very soon the three southern provinces of the peninsula had been captured. No actual reverse was met with throughout, but an indecisive victory near Chiksan, in the north of the metropolitan province, rendered it impossible for the Japanese to establish themselves in Seoul before the advent of winter, and they therefore judged it advisable to retire to their seaboard chain of entrenched camps. Early in 1598, a fresh army of forty thousand men reached Seoul from China, and for a moment the situation seemed to threaten disaster for the Japanese. Their strategy and desperate valour proved invincible, however, and the Kagoshima samurai won, on October 30, 1598, a victory so signal that the ears and noses of thirty-seven thousand Chinese heads were sent to Japan and buried under a tumulus near the temple of Daibutsu in Kyoto, where this terrible record, called Mimizuka (Mound of Ears), may be seen to-day.

Just about this time, intelligence of the death of Hideyoshi reached the Japanese commanders in Korea, and immediately an armistice was arranged. The withdrawal of the invading forces followed, not without some serious difficulties, and thus the six years' campaign terminated without any direct results except an immense loss of life and treasure and the reduction of the Korean peninsula to a state of desolation. It has been repeatedly pleaded for the wholly unprogressive state into which Korea thenceforth fell. But to conclude that a nation could be reduced by a six-years' war to three centuries of hopelessness and helplessness is to credit that nation with a very small measure of resilient capacity.

INDIRECT RESULTS

The war was not altogether without indirect results of some value to Japan. Among these may be cited the fact that, a few decades later, when the Tsing dynasty destroyed the Ming in China, subjugated Korea, and assumed a position analogous to that previously held by the Yuan, no attempt was made to defy Japan. The memory of her soldiers' achievements on the Korean battle-fields sufficed to protect her against foreign aggression. Another material result was that, in compliance with Hideyoshi's orders, the returning Japanese generals brought back many Korean art-artisans who contributed largely to the development of the ceramic industry. On no less than seven different kinds of now well-known porcelain and pottery in Japan did these experts exercise marked influence, and their efforts were specially timely in view of the great vogue then enjoyed by all utensils used in connexion with the tea ceremonial. It is not to be supposed, however, that these Korean artisans showed any superiority to the Japanese as artists. The improvements they introduced were almost entirely of a technical character. Another benefit derived by Japan from her contact with Korea at this time was the introduction of movable type. Up to this time the art of printing had been in a very primitive condition in Japan, and the first book printed with movable type made its appearance in the Bunroku era (1592-1595).

ENGRAVING: SIGNATURE OF TAKEDA SHINGEN

ENGRAVING: NAGOYA CASTLE



CHAPTER XXXVI

THE MOMO-YAMA EPOCH

MOMO-YAMA

THE epochs of Japanese history from the eighth century until the fall of the Ashikaga shogunate are generally divided into the Nara, the Heian, the Kamakura, the Muromachi, and the Higashi-yama. To these has now to be added the Momo-yama (Peach Hill), a term derived from the name of a palatial residence built by Hideyoshi in the Fushimi suburb of Kyoto. The project was conceived in 1593, that is to say, during the course of the Korean campaign, and the business of collecting materials was managed on such a colossal scale that the foundations could be laid by September in the same year. Two months sufficed not only to construct a mansion of extraordinary magnificence and most elaborate interior decoration, but also to surround it with a spacious park presenting all the choicest features of Japanese landscape gardens. The annals state that fifty thousand men were engaged on the work, and the assertion ceases to seem extravagant when we consider the nature of the task and the singularly brief period devoted to its completion. It was Hideyoshi's foible to surpass all his predecessors and contemporaries alike in the magnitude of his designs and in the celerity of their achievement. Even his pastimes were conceived on the same stupendous scale. Thus, in 1594, at the very time when his armies in Korea were conducting an oversea campaign of unprecedented magnitude, he planned a flower-viewing fete which will live in the pages of history as more sumptuous and more magnificent than the hitherto unrivalled festivities of Yoshimasa. The places visited were the cherry-clad hills of Yoshino and the venerable monastery of Koya, and some idea of the scale of the fete may be gathered from the fact that to a shrine on Koya-san, dedicated to the memory of his mother, Hideyoshi presented a sum equivalent to L14,000 or $68,000.

Still more lavish was a party organized four years later to visit the cherry blossoms at Daigo in the suburbs of Kyoto. This involved the rebuilding of a large Buddhist temple (Sambo-in) to accommodate Hideyoshi and his party as a temporary resting-place, and involved also the complete enclosing of the roads from Momo-yama to Daigo, as well as of a wide space surrounding the slopes of the cherry-clad hills, with fences festooned in silk curtains. Numerous tea pavilions were erected, and Hideyoshi, having sent home all his male guests and attendants, remained himself among a multitude of gorgeously apparelled ladies, and passed from pavilion to pavilion, listening to music, witnessing dancing, and viewing works of art.

HIDEYOSHI'S FAMILY

A conspicuous figure at the Daigo fete was Hideyori, the five-year-old son of Hideyoshi. Fate treated Hideyoshi harshly in the matter of a successor. His younger brother, Hidenaga, perished on the threshold of a career that promised to be illustrious; his infant son, Tsurumatsu, passed away in September, 1591, and Hideyoshi, being then in his fifty-fourth year, saw little prospect of becoming again a father. He therefore adopted his nephew, Hidetsugu, ceding to him the office of regent (kwampaku), and thus himself taking the title of Taiko, which by usage attached to an ex-regent.* Hidetsugu, then in his twenty-fourth year, had literary gifts and polite accomplishments much above the average. But traditions—of somewhat doubtful veracity, it must be admitted—attributed to him an inhuman love of taking life, and tell of the indulgence of that mood in shocking ways. On the other hand, if credence be due to these tales, it seems strange that they were not included in the accusations preferred finally against Hidetsugu by the Taiko, when the former's overthrow became advisable in the latter's eyes. For it did so become. Within less than two years of Hidetsugu's elevation to the post of regent, another son was born to Hideyoshi by the same lady, Yodo, the demise of whose child, Tsurumatsu, had caused Hideyoshi to despair of being succeeded by an heir of his own lineage. A niece of Oda Nobunaga, this lady was the eldest of three daughters whose mother shared the suicide of her husband, the great general, Shibata Katsuiye. Hideyoshi placed her among his consorts, bestowing upon her the castle of Yodo, hence her name, Yodogimi. Her rare beauty captivated the veteran statesman and soldier, and won for her suggestions a measure of deference which they did not intrinsically deserve. Soon the court became divided into two cliques, distinguished as the "civil" and the "military." At the head of the latter stood Hideyoshi's wife, Yae, a lady gifted with large discernment, who had shared all the vicissitudes of her husband's fortunes, and acted as his shrewd and loyal adviser on many occasions. With her were Kato Kiyomasa and other generals and nobles of distinction. The civil party espoused the cause of the lady Yodo, and among its followers was Ishida Katsushige, to whom chiefly the ultimate catastrophe is attributed by history.

*It is by this title, "Taiko," that Hideyoshi is most frequently spoken of in History.

The birth of Hideyori on August 29, 1593, immediately actuated the dissensions among these two cliques. Ishida Katsushige, acting in Hideyori's interests, set himself to convince the Taiko that Hidetsugu harboured treacherous designs, and Hideyoshi, too readily allowing himself to credit tales which promised to remove the one obstacle to his son's succession, ordered Hidetsugu to commit suicide, and at the same time (August 8, 1595), sentenced his concubines to be executed in the dry bed of the river Sanjo. Their heads, together with that of Hidetsugu himself, were buried in the same grave, over which was set a tablet bearing the inscription, "Tomb of the Traitor, Hidetsugu." To this day, historians remain uncertain as to Hidetsugu's guilt. If the evidence sufficed to convict him, it does not appear to have been transmitted to posterity. The Taiko was not by nature a cruel man. Occasionally fits of passion betrayed him to deeds of great violence. Thus, on one occasion he ordered the crucifixion of twenty youths whose sole offence consisted in scribbling on the gate-posts of the Juraku palace. But in cold blood he always showed himself forebearing, and letters written by his own hand to his mother, his wife, and others disclose an affectionate and sympathetic disposition. It would be unjust to assume that without full testimony such a man sentenced a whole family of his own relatives to be executed.

ENGRAVING: MAEDA TOSHIIYE

HIDEYOSHI'S DEATH

A few months after the Daigo fete, Hideyoshi was overtaken by mortal sickness. His last days were tormented by the thought that all his skill as an organizer and all his power as a ruler were incompetent to devise a system such as would secure the succession to his child. In June, 1596, he had procured the investiture of Hideyori, then three years old, with the title of regent, and when, just two years later, his own sickness began to develop alarming features, he resolved to place all his trust in Ieyasu. After much thought three boards were ordered to be formed: one consisted of five senior ministers (dairo), its personnel being Tokugawa Ieyasu, Mori Terumoto, Ukita Hideiye, Maeda Toshiiye, and Uesugi Kagekatsu. By these five statesmen the great affairs of the empire were to be managed. The second board was formed with three nobles of lesser note. They were designated the "middle ministers" (churo), whose duty was to arbitrate between the board of senior ministers and the third board, namely that of five "administrators" (bugyo). This third board had been originally organized by Hideyoshi in 1585, but it had not, of course, been associated with the other two boards which came into existence after Hideyoshi's death, though its personnel and its functions remained throughout the same as they had been originally. Again and again, with almost pitiable iteration, the Taiko conjured the thirteen nobles forming these boards to protect Hideyori and to ensure to him the heirship of his father's great fortunes. Each was required to subscribe a written oath of eight articles:

(1) That they would serve Hideyori with the same single-minded loyalty they had shown to his father.

(2) That the rules of Hideyoshi's house were not to be altered; and that if, in the administration of public affairs, the five bugyo were unable to determine a course of action, they should consult Hideyori through Ieyasu and Toshiie; or, if necessary before taking action, the Emperor was to be consulted.

(3) That there were to be no factions among them, personal considerations and partiality of every kind being excluded from their councils.

(4) That they must endeavour to work together in the discharge of their duties, suppressing all petty jealousies and differences.

(5) That, in settling matters, the opinion of the majority was usually to be followed, but, at the same time, if the opinion of the minority showed no sign of being dictated by personal interests, it should be duly considered. That without permission from Hideyori no administrator should dispose of any of his (the administrator's) territory to another person.

(6) That all accounts were to be kept in a manner above suspicion; that there were to be no irregularities and no pursuing of personal interests; that no questions concerning landed estates should be dealt with during the minority of Hideyori; that no petitions should be presented to him, and that Ieyasu himself would neither ask for changes to be made in the matter of land-ownership nor accept any gift of land from Hideyori during the latter's minority.

(7) That whatever Hideyori desired to have kept secret, whether connected with his private life or with the Government, must on no account be allowed to leak out.

(8) That if any of the administrators or their subordinates found that they had unwittingly acted contrary to orders, they should at once report the fact to their superiors, who would then deal leniently with them.

The above document was solemnly endorsed, the gods being called upon to punish any one violating its provisions. It was further ordered that Hidetada, son of Ieyasu, should give his daughter in marriage to Hideyori; that Ieyasu, residing in the Fushimi palace, should act as regent until Hideyori reached the age of fifteen, and that Maeda Toshiiye, governing the castle of Osaka, should act as guardian of Hideyori. It is recorded by some historians that the taiko conferred on Ieyasu discretionary power in the matter of Hideyori's succession, authorizing the Tokugawa baron to be guided by his own estimate of Hideyori's character as to whether the latter might be safely trusted to discharge the high duties that would devolve on him when he reached his majority. But the truth of this allegation is open to doubt. It may well have been invented, subsequently, by apologists for the line adopted by Ieyasu. Hideyoshi died on September 18, 1598. His last thoughts were directed to the troops in Korea. He is said to have addressed to Asano Nagamasa and Ishida Katsushige orders to go in person to the peninsula, and to provide that "the spirits of one hundred thousand Japanese soldiers serving there should not become disembodied in a foreign land." For a time the death of the great statesman was kept secret, but within three months the newly created boards found themselves strong enough to cope with the situation, and the remains of Hideyoshi were publicly interred at the shrine of Amida-ga-mine, near Kyoto.

HIDEYOSHI'S CHARACTER

In modern times many distinguished Japanese historians have undertaken to analyze Hideyoshi's character and attainments. They are divided in their estimate of his literary capacity. Some point to his letters, which, while they display a not inconsiderable familiarity with Chinese ideographs, show also some flagrant neglect of the uses of that script. Others refer to his alleged fondness for composing Japanese poems and adduce a verselet said to have been written by him on his death-bed:

Ah! as the dew I fall, As the dew I vanish. Even Osaka fortress Is a dream within a dream.

It is not certain, however, that Hideyoshi composed this couplet, and probably the truth is that his labours as a soldier and a statesman prevented him from paying more than transitory attention to literature. But there can be no question that he possessed an almost marvellous power of reading character, and that in devising the best exit from serious dilemmas and the wisest means of utilizing great occasions, he has had few equals in the history of the world. He knew well, also, how to employ pomp and circumstance and when to dispense with all formalities. Above all, in his choice of agents he never allowed himself to be trammelled by questions of birth or lineage, but chose his officers solely for the sake of their ability and attainments, and neither tradition nor convention had any influence on the appointments he made. He was passionate but not resentful, and he possessed the noble quality of not shrinking from confession of error. As for his military genius and his statecraft, it is only necessary to consider his achievements. They entitle him to stand in the very front of the world's greatest men. Turning to his legislation, we find much that illustrates the ethics of the time. It was in 1585 that he organized the board of five administrators, and the gist of the regulations issued in the following year for their guidance was as follows:

(1) No subordinate shall leave his liege lord without the latter's permission, nor shall anyone give employment to a violator of this rule.

(2) Farmers must remain on the land assigned to them and must never leave it untilled. On the other hand, landowners should visit their tenants and should investigate in company with the latter the actual amount of the harvest reaped. One-third of this should be left to the farmer and two-thirds should go to the owner of the land.

(3) If owing to natural calamity the harvest be less than two bushels per acre, the whole of the yield shall go to the farmer. But if the harvest exceed that figure, it shall be divided in the proportions indicated in (2).

(4) No farmer shall move away from his holding to avoid the land-tax or to escape forced labour. Anyone harbouring a violator of this rule shall expose to punishment not only himself but also the inhabitants of the entire village where he resides.

(5) The lord of a fief must issue such instructions as shall guarantee his agricultural vassals against trouble or annoyance, and shall himself investigate local affairs instead of entrusting that duty to a substitute. Landowners who issue unreasonable orders to farmers shall be punished.

(6) In calculating cubic contents, the regulated unit of measure shall be used, and two per cent, shall be the maximum allowance for shortage.

(7) Embankments injured by floods and other mischief wrought by natural calamities must be repaired during the first month of the year when agriculturists are at leisure. In the case, however, of damage which exceeds the farmers' capacity to repair, the facts should be reported to the taiko who will grant necessary assistance.

There follow various sumptuary regulations. We have next a series of interesting instructions known as "wall-writings" of the castle of Osaka:

(1) Intermarriages between daimyo's families require the previous consent of the Taiko.

(2) Neither daimyo nor shomyo is permitted to enter into secret engagements or to exchange written oaths, or to give or take hostages.

(3) In a quarrel the one who forebears shall be recognized as having reason.

(4) No man, whatever his income, should keep a large number of concubines.

(5) The amount of sake imbibed should be limited to one's capacity.

(6) The use of sedan-chairs shall be confined to Ieyasu, Toshiie, Kagekatsu, Terumoto, Takakage, the court nobles, and high priests. Even a daimyo, when young, should ride on horseback. Those over fifty years of age may use a sedan-chair when they have to travel a distance of over one ri (two and a half miles). Priests are exempted from this veto.

Very interesting, too, is the Taiko Shikimoku, consisting of seventy-three articles, of which thirteen are translated as follows:

(1) Free yourself from the thraldom of passion.

(2) Avoid heavy drinking.

(3) Be on your guard against women.

(4) Be not contentious or disputatious.

(5) Rise early.

(6) Beware of practical jokes.

(7) Think of your own future.

(8) Do not tire of things.

(9) Beware of thoughtless people.

(10) Beware of fire.

(11) Stand in awe of the law.

(12) Set up fences in your hearts against wandering or extravagant thoughts.

(13) Hold nobody in contempt.

The sumptuary rules referred to above were that, so far as a man's means permitted, all garments except those worn in winter should be lined with silk, and that this exception did not apply to the members of the Toyotomi family a strange provision showing that Hideyoshi did not expect his own kith and kin to set an example of economy, however desirable that virtue might be in the case of society at large. Further, it was provided that no wadded garment should be worn after the 1st of April—corresponding to about the 1st of May in the Gregorian calendar; that pantaloons and socks must not be lined; that men of inferior position must not wear leather socks, and that samurai must use only half-foot sandals, a specially inexpensive kind of footgear. Finally, no one was permitted to employ a crest composed with the chrysanthemum and the Paulownia imperialis unless specially permitted by the Taiko, who used this design himself, though originally it was limited to the members of the Imperial family. So strict was this injunction that even in the case of renovating a garment which carried the kiku-kiri crest by permission, the badge might not be repeated on the restored garment. Supplementary regulations enjoined members of the priesthood, whether Buddhist or Shinto, to devote themselves to the study of literature and science, and to practise what they preached. Moreover, men of small means were urged not to keep more than one concubine, and to assign for even this one a separate house. It was strictly forbidden that anyone should go about with face concealed, a custom which had prevailed largely in previous eras.

MOTIVES OF LEGISLATION

The 7th of August, 1595, was the day of the Hidetsugu tragedy, and the above regulations and instructions were promulgated for the most part early in September of the same year. It is not difficult to trace a connexion. The provision against secret alliances and unsanctioned marriages between great families; the veto against passing from the service of one feudal chief to that of another without special permission, and the injunction against keeping many concubines were obviously inspired with the purpose of averting a repetition of the Hidetsugu catastrophe. Indirectly, the spirit of such legislation suggests that the signatories of these laws—Takakage, Terumoto, Toshiiye, Hideiye, and Ieyasu—attached some measure of credence to the indictment of treason preferred against Hidetsugu.

AGRARIAN LAWS

The agrarian legislation of Hideyoshi is worthy of special attention. It shows a marked departure from the days when the unit of rice measurement was a "handful" and when thirty-six handfuls made a "sheaf," the latter being the tenth part of the produce of a tan. In Hideyoshi's system, all cubic measurements were made by means of a box of accurately fixed capacity—10 go, which was the tenth part of a koku (5.13 bushels)—the allowance for short measure was limited to two per cent., and the rule of 360 tsubo to the tan (a quarter of an acre) was changed to 300 tsubo.

At the same time (1583), land surveyors (kendenshi) were appointed to compile a map of the entire country. A similar step had been taken by the Ashikaga shogun, Yoshiteru, in 1553, but the processes adopted on that occasion were not by any means so accurate or scientific as those prescribed by the Taiko. The latter entrusted the work of survey to Nazuka Masaiye, with whom was associated the best mathematician of the era, Zejobo, and it is recorded that owing to the minute measures pursued by these surveyors and to the system of taking two-thirds of the produce for the landlord instead of one-half or even less, and owing, finally, to estimating the tan at 300 tsubo instead of at 360 without altering its taxable liability, the official revenue derived from the land throughout the empire showed a total increase of eight million koku, equivalent to about L11,000,000 or $54,000,000.

Hideyoshi has been charged with extortion on account of these innovations. Certainly, there is a striking contrast between the system of Tenchi and that of Toyotomi. The former, genuinely socialistic, divided the whole of the land throughout the empire in equal portions among the units of the nation, and imposed a land-tax not in any case exceeding five per cent, of the gross produce. The latter, frankly feudalistic, parcelled out the land into great estates held by feudal chiefs, who allotted it in small areas to farmers on condition that the latter paid sixty-six per cent, of the crops to the lord of the soil. But in justice to Hideyoshi, it must be owned that he did not devise this system. He was not even the originator of its new methods, namely, the abbreviation of the tan and the expansion of the rate. Both had already been put into practice by other daimyo. It must further be noted that Hideyoshi's era was essentially one of war. The outlays that he was obliged to make were enormous and perpetual. He became accustomed, as did his contemporary barons, to look lightly at vast expenditure. Not otherwise can we account for the fact that, within the brief period of eleven years, he undertook and completed five great works involving enormous cost. These works were the Osaka Castle, in 1583; a palace for the retiring Emperor Okimachi, in 1586; the palace of Juraku, in 1587; the Kyoto Daibutsu, in 1586, and the Momo-yama Palace, in 1594. What sum these outlays aggregated no attempt has been made to calculate accurately, but the figure must have been immense. In fact, when Hideyoshi's financial measures are considered, it should always be in the context of his achievements and his necessities.