At first it seemed as if the Kamakura men would emerge victorious. At the easily defended passes of Hakone they inflicted several successive though not signal defeats upon Mochifusa's army. But the appearance of Norizane in the field quickly changed the complexion of the campaign. Very soon the Kamakura force was shattered, and Mochiuji himself fled to the temple Shomyo-ji in Kanazawa, where he begged to be allowed to retire from the world. But the shogun declined to pardon him and remained obdurate in spite of earnest and repeated petitions from Norizane, praying that Mochiuji should be forgiven and allowed to retire in favour of his son, Yoshihisa. In the end, Mochiuji, his son, his uncle, and many others all died by their own hands. These things happened in 1439. The redeeming feature of the sombre family feud was the fine loyalty of Norizane. Though it had been against him chiefly that Mochiuji raged, and though his death was certain had he fallen under the power of the Kamakura kwanryo, Mochiuji's fate caused him such remorse that he attempted to commit suicide and finally became a priest. Thenceforth, the title of governor-general of the Kwanto passed to the Uesugi, two of whom were appointed to act simultaneously. As for the Kamakura Ashikaga, the three remaining sons of Mochiuji fled to Koga in Shimosa, where two of them were subsequently killed by a Kamakura army, and the third, Shigeuji, fared as has already been described.

ASSASSINATION OF THE SHOGUN

It has been shown that Akamatsu Norimura was among the captains who contributed most to the triumph of the Ashikaga cause. In recognition of his distinguished services the offices of high constable in the five provinces of Settsu, Inaba, Harima, Mimasaka, and Bizen were given to his three sons. Mitsusuke, grandson of the eldest of these, administered three of the above provinces in the days of the fourth Ashikaga shogun, Yoshimochi. A puny man of contemptible presence, Mitsusuke received little consideration at Muromachi, and the shogun was induced to promise his office of high constable to a handsome kinsman, Mochisada. Enraged at such partiality, Mitsusuke set fire to his mansion in Kyoto and withdrew to his castle at Shirahata in Harima. When, however, the shogun would have sent an army against him, none was found to take command, Mochisada having given universal offence by his haughty arrogance. In the sequel, Mitsusuke had to be pardoned and Mochisada ordered to kill himself.

After the death of the shogun, Yoshimochi, Mitsusuke fell into fresh trouble. The new shogun, Yoshinori, belonged to a very different category of men from his immediate predecessors. He conquered the Kitabatake family in Ise; repressed the remnants of the Southern Court league; crushed the military monks by capturing Nara and Hiei-zan; put an end finally to Kamakura's intrigues; obtained control of the west, and quelled his enemies in all directions. It now became his task to bend to his will the overstrong and over-presumptuous among the concerted families of the Ashikaga. Foremost of these were the Akamatsu, their chief, a man whose personality invited contumely. The shogun disliked Mitsusuke, and found it an agreeable occupation to slight him. Gradually the Akamatsu leader became bitterly estranged. Moreover, he saw his younger sister executed for disobedience though she was the shogun's mistress; he saw the nephew of his old enemy, Mochisada, treated with marked favour by the Muromachi potentate, and he learned, truly or untruly, that his own office of high constable was destined to be bestowed on this favourite.

It was now the time when Kamakura's mischievous potentialities had been finally destroyed, and to commemorate the event, entertainments in the shogun's honour were organized by the heads of the great military families. On the 6th of August, 1441, it fell to Akamatsu Mitsusuke to act as his host. So soon as the shogun and his personal attendants had passed the portals of the Akamatsu mansion, the horses in the stables were set free as though by accident; the gates were closed to prevent the escape of the animals; Yoshinori with his small retinue, being thus caught in a trap, were butchered; the mansion was fired, and Mitsusuke with seven hundred followers rode off in broad daylight to his castle in Harima, whence, assisted by the monk, Gison, he sent circulars in all directions inciting to revolt. Thus miserably perished a ruler whose strong hand, active brain, and fearless measures, had he been spared a few years longer, might have saved his country from some of the terrible suffering she was destined to undergo in the century and a half subsequent to his death. He did not live long enough to reach a high place in history. But all his measures were designed to make for the eradication of immorality and corruption, and for the restoration of law and order throughout the country. His fault seems to have been precipitancy. So many suffered by his reforms, and in such quick succession, that the hatred he provoked could scarcely have been kept within control. In the matter of finance, too, he resorted, as will be presently seen, to devices quite irreconcilable with just administration.

YOSHIKATSU AND YOSHIMASA

The murder of Yoshinori left the shogun's office without any designate occupant, but the heads of the great military families lost no time in electing Yoshikatsu*, the eight-year-old son of Yoshinori, and at the latter's nominal instance the Emperor ordered him to attack his father's assassin. The three Yamana chiefs, Mochitoyo (called also Sozen, or the "Red Monk," one of the ablest captains of his country), Noriyuki, and Norikiyo; the Hosokawa chief, Mochitsune; and Sadamura, representing the Akamatsu family, all joined forces for the expedition, and presently an army of fifty thousand men sat down before Shirahata Castle. In October, 1441, the stronghold fell. Mitsusuke perished, and the three provinces he had administered were transferred to the Yamana—Harima to Mochitoyo, Mimasaka to Norikiyo, and Bizen to Noriyuki.

*To be distinguished from Yoshikazu (shogun 1423-1425), son of Yoshimochi.

We have seen how, in 1392, the Yamana family was shattered in a revolt against the authority of the shogun, Yoshimitsu. We now see the fortunes of the family thoroughly rehabilitated. The young shogun, however, did not long survive the punishment of his father's murderers. He died in 1443, at the age of ten, and was succeeded by his brother Yoshimasa, then in his eighth year. During the latter's minority, the administration fell into the hands of Hatakeyama Mochikuni and Hosokawa Katsumoto, who held the office of Muromachi kwanryo alternately. The country now began to experience the consequences of Yoshinori's death before his plans to limit the power of the great military septs had matured. Disorder became the normal condition in the provinces. The island of Kyushu took the lead. There the Shoni, the Kikuchi, the Otomo, and the Shiba had always defied a central authority, and now Norishige, a younger brother of the assassin, Akamatsu Mitsusuke; found among them supporters of a scheme to restore the fortunes of his house. In the Kwanto partisans of the late kwanryo, Mochiuji, raised their heads. In the home provinces the warrior-priests of Nara sought to avenge the chastisement they had suffered at Yoshinori's hands, and among the immediate entourage of Muromachi, the Hosokawa, the Hatakeyama, the Shiba, and others engaged in desperate struggles about questions of succession.

ENGRAVING: ASHIKAGA YOSHIMASA

THE TOKUSEI

Even when he reached man's estate, Yoshimasa proved wholly incompetent to deal with these complications. He abandoned himself to dissipation and left everything, great or small, to be managed by his wife, Fujiwara Tomiko, and by his consort, Kasuga no Tsubone. Bribery and corruption were the motive forces of the time. The innocent were punished; the unworthy rewarded. The shogun remained indifferent even when his mandates were neglected or contravened. The building of splendid residences, the laying out of spacious parks, the gratification of luxurious tastes, and the procuring of funds to defray the cost of his vast extravagance—these things occupied his entire attention.

Associated with the Ashikaga shogunate is a financial device known in history as tokusei, a term signifying "virtuous administration." Originally imported from China, the tokusei meant nothing more than a temporary remission of taxes in times of distress. But during the financial straits to which the country was reduced after the Mongol invasion, the Hojo deemed it necessary to afford relief to landowners who had mortgaged their property, and thus, in 1297, a law—tokusei-rei—was enacted, providing that eviction for debt must not be enforced. Under the Ashikaga, the tokusei received a still wider import. It was interpreted as including all debts and pecuniary obligations of any kind. In other words, the promulgation of a tokusei ordinance meant that all debtors, then and there, obtained complete relief. The law was not construed exactly alike everywhere. Thus, in Nara a debtor must discharge one-third of his obligation before claiming exemption, and elsewhere a nominal sum had to be paid for release. Naturally, legislation so opposed to the fundamental principles of integrity led to flagrant abuses. Forced by riotous mobs, or constrained by his own needs, the Muromachi shogun issued tokusei edicts again and again, incurring the hot indignation of the creditor class and disturbing the whole economic basis of society. Yoshimasa was conspicuously reckless; he put the tokusei system into force thirteen times.

EXTRAVAGANCE AND INCOMPETENCE OF YOSHIMASA

It is stated in the records of the Onin era (1467-1469) that Yoshimasa subordinated his duties altogether to his pleasures, and that his thoughts seemed to turn wholly on banquets and fetes. His favourites, especially females, had the control of affairs and were the final arbiters in all important matters. Thus, a domain which had been in the undisputed possession of a family for generations might be alienated in favour of any claimant sufficiently unscrupulous and sufficiently rich to "commend" his title, and a judgment delivered by a court of law in the morning was liable to be reversed in the evening by the fiat of the ladies in the Muromachi "palace." Stability of policy had no existence. In a period of twenty-four years (1444-1468), three sentences each of punishment and pardon were pronounced in the case of the Hatakeyama family, and in twenty years, Yoshikado and Yoshitoshi of the Shiba sept were each punished and pardoned three times. In Kyoto it became a current saying that loyal acts, not evil deeds, were penalized, and the truth of the comment found confirmation in the case of an official, Kumagaya, who was dismissed from his post and deprived of his property for venturing to memorialize the shogun in a critical manner.

These same records of the Onin year-period also make clear that one of the factors chiefly responsible for the disturbance was Yoshimasa's curious lack of sympathy with the burdens of the people. Even one grand ceremony in the course of from five to six years sufficed to empty the citizens' pockets. But in Yoshimasa's time there Were nine of such fetes in five years, and four of them had no warrant whatever except pleasure seeking—as a performance of the Sarugaku mime on an immense scale; a flower-viewing party; an al-fresco entertainment, and a visit to the cherry blossoms. On each of these occasions the court officials and the military men had to pawn their estates and sell their heirlooms in order to supply themselves with sufficiently gorgeous robes, and the sequel was the imposition of house taxes and land taxes so heavy that the provincial farmers often found vagrancy more lucrative than agricultural industry. Pawnshops were mercilessly mulcted. In the days of Yoshimitsu, they were taxed at each of the four seasons; in Yoshinori's time the same imposts were levied once a month, and under Yoshimasa's rule the pawnbrokers had to pay nine times in November, 1466, and eight times in December of the same year.

Even after full allowance has been made for exaggeration, natural in the presence of such extravagance, there remains enough to convict Yoshimasa of something like a mania for luxury. He built for himself a residence so splendid that it went by the name of the Palace of Flowers (Hana no Gosho) and of materials so costly that the outlay totalled six hundred thousand strings of cash;* and he built for his mother, Shigeko, a mansion concerning which it is recorded that two of the sliding doors for the interior cost twenty thousand strings.** Yet at times this same Yoshimasa was reduced to such straits for money that we read of him borrowing five hundred "strings" on the security of his armour, to pay for a parturition chamber.

*L4,500,000—$22,000,000.

**L150,000—$7,300,000.

The Palace of Flowers came into existence in 1459, just on the eve of a period of natural calamities which culminated in famine and pestilence. In 1462, these conditions were at their worst. From various, provinces people flocked to the capital seeking food, and deaths from starvation became frequent in the city. A Buddhist priest, Gwana, constructed grass huts to which the famished sufferers were carried on bamboo stretchers to be fed with soft, boiled millet. It is recorded that, during the first two months of 1462, the number of persons thus relieved totalled eighty-two thousand. Another Buddhist priest erected a monument to the dead found in the bed of the river below the bridge, Gojo. They aggregated twelve hundred. Scores of corpses received no burial, and the atmosphere of the city was pervaded with a shocking effluvium.

But even the presence of these horrors does not seem to have sobered the Muromachi profligate. The costly edifices were pushed on and the people's resources continued to be squandered. Even the Emperor, Go-Hanazono, was sufficiently shocked to compose a couplet indirectly censuring Yoshimasa, and a momentary sense of shame visited the sybarite. But only momentary. We find him presently constructing in the mansion of his favourite retainer, Ise Sadachika, a bath-house which was the wonder of the time, a bath-house where the bathers were expected to come robed in the most magnificent costumes. One of the edifices that formed part of his palace after his retirement from active life, in 1474, was a "Silver Pavilion" intended to rival the "Golden Pavilion" of his ancestor, Yoshimitsu. During the last sixteen years of his life—he died in 1490—he patronized art with a degree of liberality that atones for much of his previous profligacy. In the halls of the Jisho-ji monastery, constructed on a grand scale as his retreat in old age, he collected chefs d'oeuvre of China and Japan, so that the district Higashi-yama where the building stood became to all ages a synonym for choice specimens, and there, too, he instituted the tea ceremonial whose votaries were thenceforth recognized as the nation's arbitri elegantiarum. Landscape gardens also occupied his attention. Wherever, in province or in capital, in shrine, in temple, in private house, or in official residence, any quaintly shaped rock or picturesque tree was found, it was immediately requisitioned for the park of Higashi-yama-dono, as men then called Yoshimasa, and under the direction of a trio of great artists, So-ami, Gei-ami, and No-ami, there grew up a plaisance of unprecedented beauty, concerning which a poet of the time wrote that "every breeze coming thence wafted the perfume of tea." The pastimes of "listening to incense," of floral arrangement, of the dramatic mime, and of the parlour farce were all practised with a zest which provoked the astonishment even of contemporary annalists.

ENGRAVING: A PICNIC DURING THE FLOWER SEASON IN THE ASHIKAGA PERIOD

All this contributed materially to educate the nation's artistic faculties, but the cost was enormous and the burden of taxation correspondingly heavy. It was under this financial pressure that Yoshimasa approached the Ming emperor seeking pecuniary aid. Thrice the shogun's applications were successful, and the amounts thus obtained are said to have totalled three hundred thousand strings of cash (equivalent of L450,000, or $2,200,000). His requests are said to have assumed the guise of appeals in behalf of famine-stricken people, but there is no evidence that any of the presents were devoted to that purpose. Partial apologists for Yoshimasa's infatuation are not wanting. Thus, it is alleged that he was weary of failure to reform the administration; that the corruption and confusion of society induced him to seek consolation in art; that outside the precincts of his palace he was restrained by the provincial magnates, and inside he had to obey the dictation of his wife, Tomi, of her brother, Katsumitsu, and of his own favourite page, Ise Sadachika, so that only in his tea reunions and his private theatricals could a semblance of independence be obtained; that his orders were not obeyed or his injunctions respected by any save the artists he had gathered around him, and that in gratifying his luxurious tastes, he followed the example of his grandfather, Yoshimitsu. But such exculpations amount to saying that he was an essentially weak man, the slave of his surroundings.

THE KWANTO TUMULT

The lawlessness of the time and the indifference with which the shogun's mandates were treated find illustration in the story of the Kwanto. When (1439) Mochiuji perished, the only member of his family that survived was his five-year-old son, Shigeuji. This child placed himself under the protection of Muromachi. It will be remembered that Uesugi Norizane, lamenting his unwilling share in Mochiuji's destruction, had entered religion. His son, Noritada, was then appointed to act as manager (shitsuji) to Shigeuji, his colleague being Uesugi Akifusa (Ogigayatsu Uesugi). But the Yuki family, who had given shelter to two sons of Mochiuji, objected to bow their heads to the Uesugi, and persuaded Shigeuji to have Noritada killed. Therefore, the partisans of the murdered man placed themselves under the banner of his brother, Fusaaki, and having received a commission from Muromachi as well as a powerful contingent of troops under Imagawa Noritada, they marched in great force against Kamakura from Kotsuke, Kazusa, and Echigo.

Kamakurawas well-nigh reduced to ruins, but Shigeuji retired to the fortress of Koga in Shimosa, and his cause against the Uesugi was espoused by the eight families of Chiba, Koyama, Satomi, Satake, Oda, Yuki, Utsunomiya, and Nasu, thenceforth known as the "eight generals" of the Kwanto. Against such a league it was difficult to operate successfully. Masatomo, a younger brother of Yoshimasa, built for himself a fortress at Horigoe, in Izu, which was thereafter known as Horigoe Gosho (the Horigoe Palace), Shigeuji in his castle of Koga being designated Koga Kuba (the Koga shogun). Castle building acquired from this time greatly increased vogue. Uesugi Mochitomo fortified Kawagoe in Musashi; Ota Sukenaga (called also Dokan), a vassal of the Ogigayatsu Uesugi, built at Yedo a fort destined to have world-wide celebrity, and his father, Sukekiyo, entrenched Iwatsuki in the same province of Musashi. Thus the Kwanto became the arena of warring factions.

PREFACE TO THE ONIN WAR

We now arrive at a chapter of Japanese history infinitely perplexing to the reader. It is generally called the Onin War because the struggle described commenced in the year-period of that name, but whereas the Onin period lasted only two years (1467-1469), the Onin War continued for eleven years and caused shocking destruction of life and property. When war is spoken of, the mind naturally conjectures a struggle between two or perhaps three powers for a cause that is respectable from some points of view. But in the Onin War a score of combatants were engaged, and the motive was invariably personal ambition. It has been described above that when the Ashikaga chief, Takauji, undertook to re-establish the Minamoto Bakufu, he essayed to overcome opposition by persuasion rather than by force. Pursuing that policy, he bestowed immense estates upon those that yielded to him, so that in time there came into existence holders of lands more extensive than those belonging to the shogun himself. Thus, while the landed estates of the Muromachi shogun measured only 15,798 cho* there were no less than eight daimyo more richly endowed. They were:

*A cho at that time represented 3 acres. It is now 2.5 acres.

Daimyo Area of Estates in cho (3 acres)

(1) Yanada Takasuke 32,083

(2) Uesugi Akisada 27,239

(3) Ouchi Mochiyo 25,435

(4) Hosokawa Katsumoto 24,465

(5) Shiba Mochitane 23,576

(6) Sasaki Takayori 16,872

(7) Hatakeyama Yoshmari 16,801

(8) Sasaki Mochikiyo 16,725

If we examine the list still more minutely, we find no less than twenty-two families, each of whose estates was equal to, or larger than, one-half of the Muromachi manors. Some families consisted of several branches whose aggregate properties represented an immense area. This was notably the case of the Yamana; their five branches held lands totalling 45,788 cho. The owners of such estates must not be confounded with the high constables (shugo). Thus Yamana Sozen, as the high constable of Harima province, held administrative authority in fourteen districts covering an area of 10,414 cho, and if to this be added the expanse of his fief, namely, 8016 cho, we get a total nearly equal to the manors of Hosokawa Katsumoto. Again, Shiba Yoshitoshi, in addition to owning 10,816 cho, officiated as tandai of Kyushu, which gave him jurisdiction over another extent of 106,553 cho, though it is true that his authority was defied in the provinces of Satsuma and Osumi. The military owner of one of these great estates levied a revenue on a scale which will be presently discussed, but the high constable was nominally empowered to collect and transmit only such taxes as were payable to the Bakufu, namely, the "military dues" (buke-yaku) and the "farmers' dues" (hyakusho-yaku), whereof the former were originally assessed at two per cent., and subsequently raised to five per cent., of a family income; and the latter varied from one to two per cent, of a homestead's earnings. So long as a high constable or a tandai was loyal to the Bakufu, the latter received the appointed quota of imposts; but in times of insurrection, the shugo or tandai appropriated to his own purposes the proceeds alike of the buke-yaku and the hyakusho-yaku.

Not merely inequalities of wealth operated to produce political unrest. It has also to be noted that each great military family supported a body of armed retainers whose services were at all times available; further, we must remember that the long War of the Dynasties had educated a wide-spread spirit of fighting, which the debility of the Ashikaga Bakufu encouraged to action. The Onin disturbance had its origin in disputes about inheritance. It has been recorded that the high post of kwanryo (governor-general) in the Muromachi polity was filled by a member of one of three families, the Hosokawa, the Hatakeyama, and the Shiba. The Hosokawa were the most powerful, and had for representative in the middle of the fifteenth century an administrator, Katsumoto, who to extensive erudition and a profound knowledge of medicine added very exceptional gifts of statecraft and organizing ability. The Hatakeyama had for head Mochikuni, called also Tokuhon, a man of parts; and it happened that the rival family of Yamana was led by Mochitoyo, or Sozen, who, on account of his powerful physique, shaved head, and peculiar complexion, sometimes received the name of the "Red Monk" (Aka-nyudo).

Tokuhon being without a legitimate son, adopted his nephew, Masanaga, but subsequently desired to secure the succession to Yoshinari, a son borne to him by a concubine. This change was not viewed with equanimity by all the vassals of Tokuhon, and to solve the problem the latter appealed to the shogun, Yoshimasa, who authorized the death of Masanaga. Tokuhon, in his capacity of kwanryo, naturally had much weight with the shogun, but Yoshimasa's conduct on that occasion must be attributed mainly to a laisser-aller mood which he had then developed, and which impelled him to follow the example set by the Imperial Court in earlier times by leaving the military families in the provinces to fight their own battles. Masanaga sought succour from Hosokawa Katsumoto, and that magnate, welcoming the opportunity of avenging an old injury at the hands of the Hatakeyama, laid siege to the mansion of Tokuhon, who barely escaped with his life, his son, Yoshinari, fleeing to the fortress of Wakae, in Kawachi, whence he was presently driven by the forces of Katsumoto and Sozen, then acting in conjunction but destined afterwards to become bitter enemies.

The shogun, true to his complacent policy, now recognized Masanaga as head of the house of Hatakeyama, Tokuhon having just died (1455). But Yoshinari did not acquiesce. In 1456, he marched with a Kawachi army against Masanaga, and a deadly struggle was barely prevented by the intervention of the shogun. Thenceforth, the Hatakeyama became divided into two families, Masanaga's branch being the more powerful, but Yoshinari obtaining favour at Muromachi and being nominated kwanryo. Owing, however, to some petty causes, the shogun's good-will was subsequently estranged, and Yoshinari had to flee from Kyoto, pursued by Masanaga, who now held a commission from Muromachi to kill him. A seven-years' fight (1460-1467) ensued in Kawachi and Yamato. Yoshinari displayed greatly superior skill as a strategist, and finally Yamana Sozen, who had always entertained a good opinion of him even while opposing his succession at the outset, openly espoused Yoshinari's cause. The immediate result was that Masanaga, who had been named kwanryo in 1464, had to give way to SOzen's nominee, Shiba Yoshikado, and found himself in deadly peril.

It is necessary here to recall the murder of the shogun Yoshinori, in 1441. That crime had resulted in the fall of the Akamatsu family, the direct agent of its overthrow being the united forces of Hosokawa, Takeda, and Yamana. There were no bonds of genuine friendship between the Hosokawa chief, Katsumoto, and Yamana Sozen. Their union was primarily due to Katsumoto's ambition. He desired to break the power of Hatakeyama Tokuhon, and with that ultimate object he courted the alliance of Sozen, giving his own daughter to the latter in marriage and himself adopting Sozen's son, Koretoyo. Thus, the two chiefs were subsequently found acting together against Tokuhon's attempt to substitute his son, albeit illegitimate, for his nephew, as heir to the Hatakeyama estates. Neither Katsumoto nor Sozen cared anything about the succession itself. Their object was simply to crush the Hatakeyama; and Sozen, who never relied on argument where force was applicable, lost no time in attacking Tokuhon and driving him from his burning mansion, as has been already stated. From the legal consequences of that violence, Sozen was saved by Katsumoto's intercession at Muromachi, and the alliance (1454) between the Hosokawa and the Yamana seemed stronger than ever. But Sozen did not greatly trust his crafty ally, with whose gifts of political strategy he was well acquainted. He suspected Katsumoto of a design to restore the fortunes of the once powerful Akamatsu family, and he began to muster forces for the great struggle which he anticipated. Therefore it was that, in 1467, as shown above, he not only espoused the cause of Hatakeyama Yoshinari, in whom he recognized an able captain, but also championed Shiba Yoshikado.

With regard to this latter, it is necessary to recognize that he also figured in a succession dispute. The great family of Shiba being without a direct heir, a relative was appointed to the headship in 1452. This successor, Yoshitoshi, attempting to enforce the acquiescence of one of his vassals, was defeated and became a fugitive, a successor, Yoshikado, being nominated by the Shiba vassals. But a sister of the fugitive subsequently married the shogun's favourite, Ise Sadachika, and through her influence the shogun was induced (1466) to recall Yoshitoshi and to declare him rightful head of the Shiba family. Yamana Sozen, who had given his daughter in marriage to Yoshitoshi's rival, Yoshikado, immediately set a powerful army in motion for Kyoto, and the alarmed shogun (Yoshimasa) not only recognized Yoshikado and drove out Yoshitoshi, but also nominated the former to be kwanryo.

From this grievously complicated story the facts which emerge essentially and conspicuously are: first, that Yamana Sozen now occupied the position of champion to representatives of the two great families of Hatakeyama and Shiba; secondly, that the rival successors of these families looked to Hosokawa Katsumoto for aid; thirdly, that the relations between Sozen and Katsumoto had become very strained, and fourthly, that the issue at stake in every case was never more lofty than personal ambition.. The succession to the shogunate also was in dispute. Yoshimasa, being childless, desired to adopt as his heir his younger brother who had entered religion under the name of Gijin. The latter declined the honour until Yoshimasa swore that were a son subsequently born to him, it should be made a priest but never a shogun. Gijin then took the name of Yoshimi, and was for a time recognized as heir-apparent, Hosokawa Katsumoto being appointed manager (shitsuji). Presently, however, the shogun's consort, Tomi, gave birth to a boy, Yoshihisa, and the mother persuaded Yoshimasa to contrive that her son should supplant the sometime priest. Of necessity, the aid of Sozen was sought to accomplish this scheme, Katsumoto being already officially attached to Yoshimi. The Yamana chief readily assented, and thus the situation received its final element, a claimant whose right rested on a deliberately violated oath.

THE ONIN WAR

By the close of 1466, the two great protagonists, Katsumoto and Sozen, had quietly collected in Kyoto armies estimated at 160,000 and 110,000 men, respectively. The shogun attempted to limit the area of disturbance by ordering that the various rival inheritors should be left to fight their own battles, and by announcing that whoever struck the first blow in their behalf would be proclaimed a rebel. Such injunctions were powerless, however, to restrain men like Sozen. In February, 1467, his followers attacked the former kwanryo, Hatakeyama Masanaga, and drove him from the capital. Katsumoto made no move, however; he remained on the watch, confident that thus the legitimacy of his cause would obtain recognition. In fact, the shogun was actually under guard of the Hosokawa troops, who, being encamped on the east and north of Muromachi, received the name of the Eastern Army; the Yamana forces, which were massed on the west and south, being distinguished as the Western Army.

It was evident that if either side retreated, the other would perforce be acknowledged by the Bakufu, and both were reluctant to put their fortunes to the final test. At length, early in July, 1467, a petty skirmish precipitated a general engagement. It was inconclusive, and the attitude of mutual observation was resumed. Two months later re-enforcements reached the Western Army, and thereafter, for nearly two years, victory rested with the Yamana. But Katsumoto clung desperately to his position. Kyoto was reduced almost completely to ruins, the Imperial palace, Buddhist temples, and other mansions being laid in ashes, countless rare works of art being destroyed, and the Court nobles and other civil officials being compelled to flee to the provinces for shelter. A celebrated poet of the time said that the evening lark soared over moors where formerly there had been palaces, and in the Onin Records it is stated that the metropolis became a den for foxes and wolves, and that Imperial mandates and religious doctrines were alike unheeded.

At one time things looked as though the ultimate triumph must be with Sozen. But what Katsumoto lacked in military ability he more than compensated in statecraft. From the outset he took care to legalize his cause by inducing the Emperor and the ex-Emperor to remove to Muromachi, where they were guarded by the Hosokawa troops, and the defections to which this must ultimately expose Sozen's ranks were supplemented by fomenting in the domains of the Yamana and their allies intrigues which necessitated a diversion of strength from the Kyoto campaign. Curious and intricate was the attitude of the Hosokawa towards the rival aspirants to the shogunate. Sozen's aid, as related above, had originally been invoked and exercised in behalf of Yoshimasa, the shogun's son by the lady Tomi.

Hence, it is not surprising to find the Yamana leader turning his back upon the sometime bonze, Yoshimi, in October, 1469. But it is surprising to see him openly espouse this same Yoshimi's cause two months later. The fact was that Sozen might not choose. He had been outmanoeuvered by his astute opponent, who now held complete control of the shogun, and who not only obtained an Imperial decree depriving Yoshimi of his offices, but also contrived that, early in 1469, the lady Tomi's four-year-old son, Yoshihisa, should be officially declared heir to the shogunate. In this matter, Katsumoto's volte-face had been nearly as signal as Sozen's, for the former was Yoshimi's champion at the beginning. Henceforth the war assumed the character of a struggle for the succession to the shogunate. The crude diplomacy of the Yamana leader was unable to devise any effective reply to the spectacular pageant of two sovereigns, a shogun, and a duly-elected heir to the shogunate all marshalled on the Hosokawa side. Nothing better was conceived than a revival of the Southern dynasty, which had ceased to be an active factor seventy-eight years previously. But this farce did little service to the cause of the Yamana. By degrees the hostile forces withdrew from the capital, of which the western half (called Saikyo) alone remained intact, and the strategy of the hostile leaders became concerned chiefly about preserving their own commissariat or depriving the enemy of his.

In 1472, a new feature was introduced: Hatakeyama joined the Eastern Army by order of the shogun, Yoshimasa. This was not merely a great accession of numerical strength, it also opened the road to the north where the Hatakeyama estates lay, and thus the Eastern Army found a solution of the problem which dominated the situation at Kyoto—the problem of provisions. The scale of success now swung in the direction of Hosokawa and his allies. But still no crushing victory was won, and meanwhile the war had continued seven years, with immense loss of life and treasure. There is evidence that alike Katsumoto and Sozen were fain to sheathe the sword in 1472, but during the long struggle conditions had developed which rendered peace difficult. In May, 1473, Sozen died and was followed to the grave in less than a month by Katsumoto. Still the struggle went on in a desultory way until December, 1477, when the Yamana forces burned their cantonments and withdrew, Yoshimi coming to terms with Muromachi and retiring to Mino. Peace at length dawned for Kyoto. But not yet for the provinces. There the sword was not immediately sheathed. In Echizen, Owari, and Totomi the great Shiba family was subjected to weakening onsets by the Asakura, the Oda, and the Imagawa. In Kaga, the Togashi house was divided against itself. In Kyushu there were bitter struggles between the Shimazu and the Ito, the Sagara and the Nawa, and the Otomo, the Shoni, and the Ouchi. Finally, Shinano, Suruga, and Mikawa were all more or less convulsed.

YOSHIHISA

In 1474, Yoshimasa retired from office and, at the close of the year, his nine-year-old son, Yoshihisa, succeeded him as shogun, the kwanryo being that Hatakeyama Yoshinari whose appearance in the field practically terminated the Onin War. The shogun Yoshimasa was in his thirty-ninth year at the time of this abdication, and he survived for sixteen years, not the least dissipated of his life, in which he instituted costly art reunions and carried self-indulgence to its extreme. During these years Tomi and her younger brother, Ise Sadachika, acquired such influence as to interfere in the administration, and under the pretext of procuring funds to rebuild the palace destroyed during the Onin War, they restored the toll-gates which had previously stood at the seven chief entrances to Kyoto, appropriating all the proceeds.

The young Yoshihisa could scarcely fail to be tainted by such an environment. Much to his credit, however, he showed sagacity and diligence, eschewing his father's luxurious habits, studying literature and military art, and taking lessons in statecraft from the ex-regent, Ichijo Kaneyoshi. Very early he became familiar with scenes of violence, for, goaded to madness by the taxes exacted at the seven toll-gates, a mob of the metropolitan citizens rose in arms, beat off the troops sent to quell them and threatened to sack the city, when, they were appeased by the issue of a tokusei ordinance, which, as already explained, meant the remission of all debts and the cancellation of all financial obligations. Socialism in such a genial form appealed not only to the masses but also to bushi who had pledged their property as security for loans to meet warlike outlays or the demands of luxurious extravagance.

Alike in the home provinces and in distant Kaga, Noto, Etchu, and the south, tokusei riots took place. Notably incompatible with any efficient exercise of Muromachi authority was the independence which the provincial magnates had now learned to display. They levied what taxes they pleased; employed the proceeds as seemed good to them; enacted and administered their own laws; made war or peace as they wished, and granted estates or revenues to their vassals at will. In short, the bushi had gradually constructed for themselves a full suit of feudal garments, and to bring them once again under the effective control of the sovereign or the shogun was almost a hopeless task. Yoshihisa might perhaps have refrained from attempting it had the empire been at peace. But, in truth, the empire was on the threshold of a century-long struggle compared with which the Onin War proved a bagatelle. The mutterings of the coming storm made themselves very audible during the years of Yoshihisa's early manhood. The Uesugi septs, and the Hojo and the Satomi, were fighting in the Kwanto; the western provinces, the central provinces, and Kyushu were the scenes of constant conflicts, and no prospect of tranquillity presented itself. Yoshihisa determined to undertake the work of subjugating the whole country as Yoritomo had done effectually and as Takauji had done partially. But he died in his twenty-fifth year when engaged in conducting a campaign against the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki family, in Omi province; a campaign which but for his death would certainly have been successful.

YOSHITANE

Yoshihisa, whose death took place in 1489, left no son, and his father, the ex-shogun Yoshimasa, made tardy atonement to his brother, Yoshimi, the sometime priest, by obtaining the high office of shogun for the latter's son, Yoshitane, a youth of twenty-five. In the following year Yoshimasa died, and, two years later (1492), Yoshitane placed himself at the head of an army to resume the Omi campaign which Yoshihisa's death had interrupted. His opponent was of Minamoto lineage, head of the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki family, whose representative in the days of the Kamakura Bakufu had been high constable of four provinces, Omi, Izumo, Aki, and Iwami.

That the shogun, Yoshihisa, and his successor, Yoshitane, turned their weapons so resolutely against this magnate was due to a cause illustrative of the abuses of the era. From the outset the Ashikaga sway over the provinces had been a vanishing quantity, and had disappeared almost entirely during the Onin War. Not alone did the writ of the sovereign or the shogun cease to run in regions outside Kyoto and its immediate vicinity, but also the taxes, though duly collected, did not find their way to the coffers of either Muromachi or the Court. Shugo there still existed, and jito and kokushi; but neither high constable nor land-steward nor civil governor acted as practical representative of any Central Government: each functioned for his own hand, swallowing up for his own use, or for inclusion in some local fief, the manors which had once been the property of the State or of the Court nobility.

It was evidently of prime necessity from the Muromachi point of view that a state of affairs which crippled the shogun by impoverishing him should be remedied. Sasaki Takayori, head of the Rokkaku house, was a conspicuous product of his time. He had seized the manors of nearly fifty landowners in the province of Omi, and to punish his aggressions signally would furnish a useful object lesson. That was done effectually by Yoshitane's generals, and Sasaki had to flee from Omi. But the young shogun's triumph was short lived. He allowed himself to be drawn by Hatakeyama Masanaga into a private feud. We have already seen this Masanaga engaged with Yoshinari in a struggle for the Hatakeyama succession on the eve of the Onin War. Yoshinari was no longer alive, but he had bequeathed to his son, Yoshitoyo, a heritage of resentment against Masanaga, and the latter, who now held the post of kwanryo for the fourth time, induced the shogun to order an attack upon Yoshitoyo in the provinces of Kii and Kawachi. But Yoshitoyo managed to enlist the aid of the recently discomfited Sasaki, of the soldier-monks of Kofuku-ji, and, above all, of Hosokawa Masamoto, son of Hatakeyama Masanaga's old opponent, Hosokawa Katsumoto. With these co-operated the Yamana, the Isshiki, and other septs, so that Yoshitane found himself between two powerful armies, one in Kyoto, the other in Kii. In the sequel, Masanaga committed suicide, and the shogun, Yoshitane, escaped to Suwo.

YOSHIZUMI AND YOSHIHARU

Hosokawa Masamoto was now master of the situation in Kyoto. It was for him to nominate a new shogun in lieu of the fugitive Yoshitane. He went to the Kwanto for a candidate. In 1461, Masatomo, brother of Yoshimasa, had been nominated governor-general (kwanryo) of the eight eastern provinces. His son, Yoshizumi, was chosen by Hosokawa to rule at Muromachi, and Hosokawa himself became kwanryo. The new shogun held office in name only; all administrative power was usurped by the kwanryo and his nominees. Now, as Hosokawa Masamoto practised asceticism for the better pursuit of necromancy, in which he was a believer, he had no offspring. Therefore he adopted three sons: the first, Sumiyuki, being the child of the regent, Fujiwara Masamoto; the second and third, Sumimoto and Takakuni, being kinsmen of his own. The first of these three was entrusted to Kasai Motochika; the last two were placed in the care of Miyoshi Nagateru. These guardians were Hosokawa's principal vassals in Shikoku, where they presently became deadly rivals. Motochika, believing that Hosokawa's ultimate intention was to elevate Sumimoto to the shogunate, in which event the latter's guardian, Nagateru, would obtain a large access of power, compassed the murder of Hosokawa, the kwanryo, and proclaimed Sumiyuki head of the Hosokawa house. Thereupon Miyoshi Nagateru moved up from Shikoku at the head of a strong army, and, after a fierce conflict, Motochika and Sumiyuki were killed, and Sumimoto, then in his eleventh year, became chief of the Hosokawa family, receiving also the office of kwanryo.

The Motochika faction, however, though defeated, were not destroyed. They conceived the plan of reinstating the shogun, Yoshitane, then a fugitive in the province of Suwo, and of securing the office of kwanryo for Takakuni, third son (by adoption) of the late Hosokawa Masamoto. The powerful Ouchi sept, which had its manors in Suwo, espoused the conspiracy, and escorted Yoshitane to Kyoto with a great army, the result being that the shogun, Yoshizumi, had to flee to Omi; that Yoshitane took his place, and that Ouchi Yoshioki became deputy kwanryo.

These things happened in 1508. Thenceforth, the great protagonists in the Kyoto arena were the two factions of the Hosokawa house, led by Sumimoto and Takakuni, respectively; the former championing the cause of the shogun, Yoshizumi, and in alliance with the Miyoshi; the latter supporting the shogun, Yoshitane, and aided by the Ouchi. One reverse befell the Yoshitane-Ouchi combination, but they quickly recovered from it, and from 1508 until 1518 a gleam of peace and prosperity shone once more in Kyoto under the administration of Ouchi Yoshioki, who governed with skill and impartiality, and whose influence seemed likely to restore the best days of the Bakufu. But, in 1518, he was recalled to his province by an attack from the shugo of Izumo, and by financial embarrassment resulting from his own generosity in supplying funds to the Crown and the shogun.

Hosokawa Takakuni now became kwanryo, exercising his authority with a high hand. Then the Sumimoto branch of the Hosokawa, taking advantage of Ouchi's absence, mustered a force in Shikoku and moved against Kyoto. Takakuni found himself in a difficult position. In the capital his overbearing conduct had alienated the shogun, Yoshitane, and from the south a hostile army was approaching. He chose Hyogo for battle-field, and, after a stout fight, was discomfited and fled to Omi, the position of kwanryo being bestowed on his rival, Sumimoto, by the shogun. In a few months, however, Takakuni, in alliance with the Rokkaku branch of the Sasaki family under Sadayori, marched into Kyoto in overwhelming force. Miyoshi Nagateru retired to Chion-in, where he committed suicide; Sumimoto fled to Awa, dying there a few months later, and Yoshitane, after brief refuge in the island of Awaji, died in Awa, in 1523. Thus, Hosokawa Takakuni found himself supreme in Kyoto, and he proceeded to appoint a shogun, without awaiting the demise of Yoshitane. Yoshizumi, the eleventh shogun, who, as related above, fled from Kyoto in 1508, dying three years later in exile, left two sons: Yoshiharu, whom he committed to the charge of Akamatsu Yoshimura, and Yoshikore, whom he entrusted to Hosokawa Sumimoto. In 1521, Takakuni invited Yoshiharu, then eleven years old, to the capital and procured his nomination to the shogunate.

ANARCHY

From this time forward the confusion grows worse confounded. The Miyoshi of Awa are found in co-operation with Yanamoto Kataharu espousing the cause of the shogun's younger brother, Yoshikore, and of Harumoto, a son of Hosokawa Sumimoto. We see this combination expelling Yoshiharu and Takakuni from Kyoto, and we see the fugitives vainly essaying to reverse the situation. Thereafter, during several years, there is practically no government in the capital. Riot and insurrection are daily features, and brigandage prevails unchecked. Kataharu, though not holding the office of kwanryo, usurps its functions so ostentatiously that the assassin's dagger is turned against him. Again the two Hosokawa chiefs, Takakuni and Harumoto, fight for power, and, in 1531, Takakuni is killed, Harumoto becoming supreme. Soon the Miyoshi brothers, Motonaga and Masanaga, engage in a fierce quarrel about their inheritance, and the former, with Yoshikore as candidate for the shogunate and Hatakeyama as auxiliary, raises the standard against Harumoto, who, aided by the soldier-priests of Hongwan-ji, kills both Yoshitaka and Motonaga and takes Yoshikore prisoner. Thereafter, Harumoto quarrels with the Hongwan-ji bonzes, and being attacked by them, obtains the aid of Rokkaku Sadayori and the Nichiren priests, with the result that the splendid fane of Hongwan-ji is reduced to ashes. A reconciliation is then effected between Harumoto and the shogun, Yoshiharu, while Miyoshi Masanaga is appointed to high office. Yet once more the untiring Takakuni, aided by Miyoshi Norinaga, Motonaga's son, called also Chokei, drives Yoshiharu and Harumoto from the metropolis, and presently a reconciliation is effected by the good offices of Rokkaku Sadayori, the real power of the kwanryo being thenceforth exercised by the Miyoshi family. Japanese historians have well called it an age of anarchy.

YOSHITERU

In 1545, the shogun, Yoshiharu, resigned in favour of his son, Yoshiteru. Two years of quiet ensued in Kyoto, and then the old feud broke out once more. The Hosokawa, represented by Harumoto, and the Miyoshi, by Chokei, fought for supremacy. Victory rested with the Miyoshi. The Hosokawa's power was shattered, and Chokei ruled in Kyoto through his vassal, Matsunaga Hisahide. The era is memorable for the assassination of a shogun. Yoshiteru had become reconciled with Chokei and was suffered to live quietly at Muromachi. But after Chokei's death (he was poisoned by Hisahide), Yoshiteru's cousin, Yoshihide, a son of Yoshikore, sought to be nominated successor to the shogunate through the aid of Masanaga and Hisahide. In 1565, this plot matured. Hisahide suddenly sent a force which attacked Yoshiteru's palace and killed the shogun. Yoshihide replaced the murdered potentate, and the Matsunaga family succeeded to the power previously wielded by the Miyoshi. Yoshiteru's younger brother, Yoshiaki, fled to Omi, but afterwards made his way to Owari, where Oda Nobunaga took him by the hand and ultimately placed him in the shogun's seat at Kyoto.

REVIEW OF THE ASHIKAGA

Among the fifteen representatives of the Ashikaga, two were slain by their own vassals, five died in exile, and one had to commit suicide. From the accession of Takauji, in 1338, to the death of Yoshiaki, in 1597, a period of 259 years, there was not so much as one decade of signal success and efficient government. With justice the story of the time has been summed up in the epithet "ge-koku-jo," or the overthrow of the upper by the lower. The appreciation of the eminent historian, Rai Sanyo, is most faithful. Every great conflict throughout the era was marked by similar features. It is a weary record of broken promises, violated allegiances, and family feuds. If the Hatakeyama, the Hosokawa, and the Miyoshi set their own interests above those of the shogun, the Ashikaga, in turn, sacrificed the interests of the Throne on the altar of their own ambition. A river cannot be purer than its source. If the Miyoshi vassals plotted against their chiefs, so did the latter against the Hosokawa; so did the Hosokawa against the Ashikaga; so did the Ashikaga against the Imperial family, and so did one branch of the Imperial family against another. Everywhere there was lack of loyalty.

The loyalty wanting among masters was equally deficient among servants. There is no more treacherous episode in the Middle Ages than Matsunaga Hisahide's poisoning of his liege lord to compass the downfall of the Miyoshi family and slaying the shogun, Yoshiteru, to overthrow the Ashikaga, though he enjoyed the confidence of both. The Dai Nihon-rekishi (History of Great Japan) observes that the ethical primers, with which a literary education had formerly familiarized the nation, lost their influence in this military era. There was no inordinate desire for landed property until the Gen-Hei epoch, when a manor became the principal reward of a successful soldier. Thereafter, greed for domains acquired strength every year. Again, when Yoritomo became so-tsuihoshi (commander-in-chief) and so-jito (general steward) of the whole country, and his meritorious vassals were appointed shugo and jito in each province, local authority passed from the Throne to the military families, and when, after the Shokyu struggle, the shugo and the jito came into actual possession of the estates they had previously administered, military feudalism was practically established. The Hojo, by their just administration and astute measures, brought this system into esteem, but under the Ashikaga regime the reality of landed possession grew to be the unique aim of existence, and, to achieve it, sons forgot their paternal relation and vassals lost sight of fealty. The nation engaged in an armed scramble; individualism became paramount, and social obligations were ignored. This is the more noteworthy because loyalty is so typical a Japanese virtue.

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ASHIKAGA

The common saying that the Kamakura Bakufu brought the entire country under one administrative control requires modification. It was not until Tokugawa days in the seventeenth century that the whole sixty provinces passed under one feudal ruler. Still as between the Kamakura Bakufu and the Muromachi, the latter, though its military supremacy was less complete, may be said to have extended its influence theoretically over the whole of the lands throughout the empire except the Chokodo estates.

In another respect, also, the advantage lay with the Muromachi shogunate. During the Kamakura era, the Court magnates continued to despise the Bakufu adherents, and the distance between the capital and Kamakura imparted to the latter an element of rusticity. But with the establishment of the Muromachi shogunate a change took place. The Bakufu, the visible repository of power, stood side by side with the Court, and opportunities for close relations existed constantly. Moreover, the Court nobles, notably antagonistic to the military regime, followed the fortunes of the Southern dynasty, those alone remaining in the capital who were on more or less intimate terms with the military. Such were the Nijo, the Saionji, the Hino, and so forth. These observed the behests of the Bakufu, sought to acquire the latter's confidence, and always paid respect to the Hana no Gosho, as the shogun was called. So close were the relations that for ceremonial purposes at the Bakufu, it was customary to employ Court officials, and witty writers of the time discourse amusingly on the often clumsy efforts made by the courtiers to ape the customs and acquire the dialects of the provincial soldiers.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL BAKUFU

The administrative power having been transferred from the Court to the Bakufu, it may be said that the sei-i tai-shogun exercised supreme authority throughout the empire. But the shogun himself did not actually discharge administrative duties. That was done by the kwanryo with the shogun's consent. Originally this official was called shitsuji (manager), and his functions were to look after the affairs of a provincial magnate's establishment. During the Kamakura era, the Ashikaga family occupied a high place. Of Minamoto origin, it was connected with the Hojo by marriage, and for generations its shitsuji had been a member of the Ko family. Ashikaga Takauji made Ko no Moronao his shitsuji, and a highly competent captain he proved himself. Subsequently, in 1362, Shiba Yoshimasa was appointed shitsuji, but soon his title was changed to kwanryo (governor-general), and it thenceforth became customary for the latter position to be occupied by a member of one of the three families, Shiba, Hosokawa, and Hatakeyama, in succession.

Speaking broadly, the kwanryo corresponded to the skikken (regent) of Kamakura days. But whereas, the Kamakura shikken exercised virtually autocratic authority, the shogun being a minor, the Muromachi kwanryo, nominally, at all events, was under the control of an adult shogun. In fact, the kwanryo in the Muromachi polity resembled the betto of the Man-dokoro in Yoritomo's time. For the rest, the Muromachi Bakufu was organized on practically the same lines as its Kamakura prototype. There was a Man-dokoro, a Monju-dokoro, and a Samurai-dokoro, and the staff of these offices was taken originally, as far as possible, from the families of men who had distinguished themselves as legislators and administrators at Kamakura. There were also officials called bugyo (commissioners) who directed the enforcement of laws and ordinances. These commissioners numbered thirty-six, and each had his own sphere of duties: as the shonin bugyo, who controlled judicial affairs; the tosen bugyo, who dealt with affairs of foreign trade; the jisha bugyo, who superintended temples and shrines; the onsho bugyo, who had to do with official rewards, etc.

ORGANIZATION OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

At Kamakura, also, there was a kwanryo to guard the eastern provinces (Kwanto). In Takauji's time, his second son, Motouji, was appointed to this office, and it was thenceforth inherited for some generations, the Uesugi family furnishing a shitsuji. Ultimately the Kamakura kwanryo became a powerful military satrap, hostile to the Muromachi shogun. The holder of the office then received the title of kubo, and the hitherto shitsuji became kwanryo. In other respects the Kamakura polity retained the form it had under Yoritomo: a Hyojo-shu (Council), a Hikitsuke-shu, a Monju-dokoro, a Samurai-dokoro, and various bugyo. In Kyushu and Dewa, the principal officer was called shugo, that post being of special importance; while in the other provinces shugo and jito (high constables and land-stewards) continued to officiate as before.

The jurisdiction of these high constables—great military magnates or relatives of the shogun—extended to two or more provinces, and the shugo were then called kuni-mochi-shu (province-holder). A daimyo (great name, i.e. feudal lord), in communicating with Muromachi, had to make a kuni-mochi his medium. For the Kwanto and Shikoku, the Hosokawa house was the kunimochi; for Shinano, Etchu, Echigo, and Kaga, the Hatakeyama; for Ise, Kai, and Suruga, the Yamana; and for Kyushu, the tandai. After the power of the tandai had declined, the Ouchi family took its place. In the days of Yoshinori's shogunate, there were twenty-two shugo in the country, and seven of them administered three provinces or more, each. The provincial governors appointed by the Southern Court disappeared, for the most part, during the War of the Dynasties, and on the restoration of peace the only one of these high officials that remained was Kitabatake of Ise.

SHUGO AND JITO

Originally appointed for administrative and fiscal purposes only, the shugo said jito acquired titles of land-ownership from the beginning of the Ashikaga era. To plunder and annex a neighbouring province became thenceforth a common feat on the part of these officials. In 1390, tracts of land measuring from one-half of a province to two or three provinces are found to have been converted from the shugo's jurisdictional areas into military domains. Such magnates as Yamana Tokiuji held from five to eleven provinces. These puissant captains had castles and armies of their own. At first, they respected the requisitions of the Bakufu. Thus, in 1463, when an elaborate Buddhist ceremony had to be performed on the decease of Yoshimasa's mother, a tax in the form of cotton cloth was levied from the shugo, a ruler of three provinces contributing ten thousand pieces; a ruler of two provinces, five thousand, and so on.*

*A "piece" was 40 feet, approximately. When the castle of Edo was built in Tokugawa days—seventeenth century—each daimyo had to contribute "aid" (otetsudai), after the Ashikaga custom.

But after the Onin War (1467-1469), military magnates resided wholly on their own domains and paid no attention to requisitions from the Bakufu. Further, these magnates compelled all jito and go-kenin within their jurisdiction to serve as their vassals. Previously to the Onin era the shugo had resided, for the most part, in Kyoto, delegating the discharge of their provincial functions to deputies (shugo-dai), chosen by the shugo and approved by the Bakufu. Presently, the process of selection was dispensed with, and the office became hereditary. Thus, Yusa of the Hatakeyama, Oda of the Shiba, Uragami of the Akamatsu, and so forth are examples of deputies who resided permanently in the provinces concerned and acquired influence there superior even to that of their principals. The deputies, in turn, had their vice-deputies (ko-shugo-dai), to whom the name daikwan (another term for "deputy") was often given. These daikwan were selected from among the members or vassals of a shugo's family to act provisionally as shugo-dai. As for the jito, from the middle of the Kamakura epoch their posts became mere sinecures, the emoluments going to support their families, or being paid over to a temple or shrine. Occasionally the office was sold or pawned. The comparatively small areas of land within which the jito officiated soon came to be recognized as their private domains, but after the Onin commotion this system underwent a change, the jito becoming vassals of the shugo. Many, however, held their original position until the middle of the sixteenth century. In the days of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Oda Nobunaga—namely, the second half of the sixteenth century—the name jito was given to the headman of a village or district, who served as the immediate representative of authority.

FINANCE

Cultivated land (koden) was the great source of official revenue. The area under rice—the principal staple of production—in the middle of the fifteenth century was about a million of cho,* or two and a half million acres; and this was owned by the Court, the Court nobles, the military magnates, the temples, and the shrines. From an uncertain date, but probably the close of the Kamakura Bakufu, the area of a domain ceased to be calculated in terms of cho and tan and was expressed in kwan (one thousand cash, or mori). The use of the kwanior this purpose had reference to the military service leviable upon the land. Thus, when land of one hundred kwan-mon was mentioned, an area capable of supporting military service valued at one hundred kwan-mon was understood. The calculation was very simple: one tsubo corresponded to one mon, so that one kwan-mon represented one thousand tsubo for the purposes of this assessment.**

*The cho was equal to 10 tan, and the tan comprised 360 tsubo, the tsubo being a square of 6 feet side. At present the area under cultivation is some 3 millions of cho (7.5 millions of acres).

**In the Ashikaga era the unit of currency may be said to have been the copper cash of China—called Eiraku-sen after the name (Chinese, Yunglo) of the Chinese year period when it was issued. Gold and silver coins were also in use; namely, the gold ryo, which was equivalent to 10 silver ryo; but their circulation was comparatively small. The gold ryo was equal to 2000 mon of copper coins, and as 100 mon purchased 1 to (one-tenth part of a koku) of rice, it follows that the gold ryo represented 2 koku, or 30 yen of modern currency, the silver ryo representing 3 yen (1 yen=2 shillings-50 cents). It follows also that 10 strings of cash (one kwan) were worth a koku of rice, or 15 yen. As for silk piece-goods, 1 roll (hiki = 48 yards) of the best kind was worth 45 yen, and the second and third-class kinds ranged from 33 to 22.5 yen. Finally, in the year 1498, the records show that the daily wage of a labourer was some 16 sen of modern money (about 4 pence or 8 cents).

From various documents it appears that the three grades of land—best, medium, and inferior—were taxed at the rate of sixty, forty, and thirty per cent., respectively, of the yield. In other words, the average land-tax was forty per cent, of the yield—called shi-ko roku-min—or four parts to the Government and six to the farmer. If we consider the rates between the current price of land and the tax, there is a record, dated 1418, which shows that the tax levied by a temple—Myoko-ji—was twenty per cent, of the market price of the land. But it would seem that the ratio in the case of Government taxation was much smaller, being only one and a half per cent, of the market value. There were, however, other imposts, which, though not accurately stated, must have brought the land-tax to much more than forty per cent, of the yield.

Turning to the Imperial Court, we find it supported by domains hereditarily held; by contributions from the seizei (expediency taxes, that is to say, taxes set aside for extraordinary State requirements); by occasional presents, and by revenues from kugoden (private Imperial land). The Court nobles had their own domains, usually small. All these estates, those of the Crown, of princes, and of Court nobles, were subject to a system called hansai. That is to say, one-half of their revenues were leviable for military purposes. Originally this impost was understood to be a loan to the Bakufu, but ultimately it came to be regarded as a normal levy, though its practical effect was to reduce the revenue from such domains by one-half. Moreover, as the arrogance of the military magnates in the provinces grew more insistent, and as the Bakufu's ability to oppose them became less effective, the domain of the Court nobles suffered frequent encroachments.

REVENUES OF THE BAKUFU

One source of revenue for the Bakufu was its domains in various places; another was the buke-yaku, or military-house dues. These were at first two per cent, of the land-tax of the house concerned, but afterwards they increased to five per cent. Thus an estate paying one hundred koku in the form of land-tax, had to pay a further five koku as buke-yaku, the latter proceeds being sent to Kyoto for the use of the shogun's household. Another important levy was the tansen, which, as its name implies, was a land-rate levied at so much per tan (one-quarter of an acre), the proceeds being devoted to special purposes, as, for example, to defray the cost of grand ceremonials or of new edifices. The records show one payment of tansen which works out at fifty mon per tan. Another document indicates that the monthly expenses of the Man-dokoro were some sixty kwanmon and that they were defrayed by levying taxes upon pawnbrokers and sake-dealers in Kyoto and in Omi province. The latter tax (shuko-zei) is shown to have been, on one occasion, two kwan eight hundred mon per house. The Bakufu collected dues on foreign commerce, also, and miscellaneous imposts of an irregular character made no small addition to its income.

REVENUE OF SHRINES AND TEMPLES

Temples and shrines derived part of their income from port-dues and barrier-tolls. Thus, the Hachiman temple of Iwashimizu received tolls from all traffic passing the Yamazaki barrier; Kofuku-ji levied duties on vessels entering Hyogo port, and Engaku-ji of Kamakura collected tolls at the Hakone barrier (sekisho). Such taxes proving very prolific and easy to levy, the number of barriers increased rapidly, to the no small obstruction of trade and travel. Further, the priests were constantly enriched with donations of land and money, in addition to the rents and taxes obtained from their own domains, and thus it resulted that several of the great monasteries possessed much wealth. To that fact is to be attributed the numerous establishments of soldier-priests maintained at Enryaku-ji, on Hiei-zan, and at Kofuku-ji, in Nara. To that also is to be ascribed in part the signal development of literature among the friars, and the influence wielded by the Shinto officials of Kitano and the betto of Hachiman.

REVENUE OF JITO

A special tax levied by the jito was the hyakusho-yaku, or farmers' dues. These were one per cent, of the land-tax originally, but the rate was subsequently doubled. Other heavy imposts were frequently and arbitrarily enacted, and there can be no doubt that financial disorder contributed materially to bringing about the terrible calamities of the Battle era (Sengoku Jidai), as the period of eleven decades ending in 1600 is called. For, if the fiscal system was thus defective during the comparatively prosperous age of the Ashikaga, it fell into measureless confusion at a later date. It has been stated above that the area under rice cultivation at the middle of the fifteenth century was about one million did; at the close of that century the figure was found to have decreased by more than fifty thousands of cho. From such a result, opposed as it is to all records of normal development, the unhappy plight of the agricultural classes may be inferred.

TOKENS OF CURRENCY

Minting operations also were discontinued under the Ashikaga. Cotton cloth and rice served as principal media of exchange. Fortunately, commerce with China in the days of the Ming rulers, and Yoshimasa's undignified though practical requests, brought a large supply of Yunglo (Japanese, Eiraku) copper cash, which, with other Chinese coins of the Tang and Sung dynasties, served the Japanese as media. This fortuitous element was conspicuous in all the domain of finance, especially after the Onin War, when the territorial magnates fixed the taxes at their own convenience and without any thought of uniformity. One of the only sincere and statesmanlike efforts of reform was made, in 1491, by Hojo Soun. He reduced the rate then ruling, namely, equal parts to the tax-collector and to the taxpayer, and made it forty per cent, to the former and sixty to the latter, and he ordained that any jito collecting so much as a mon in excess of the official figure, should be severely punished. How the people fared elsewhere it is not possible to say accurately, but the records show that extraordinary imposts were levied frequently, and that the tansen was exacted again and again, as also were taxes on trades. As for the Imperial household, such was its condition that it barely subsisted on presents made by certain military magnates, so complete was the decentralization of the empire in this period.

ATTITUDE OF THE ASHIKAGA TOWARDS THE THRONE

The policy of the Ashikaga towards the Daikagu-ji line (the Southern Court) of the Imperial house was evidently one of complete elimination at the outset. But the impossibility of achieving such a programme soon came to be recognized and reconciliation was substituted. Thenceforth, in appearance at all events, the representatives of the Daikagu-ji line received due consideration and were sufficiently provided with incomes, as witness the treatment of the ex-Emperor Go-Kameyama by Yoshimitsu. But subsequent and repeated neglect of the claims of the Southern branch in regard to the vital matter of the succession betrayed the insincerity of the Ashikaga, and provoked frequent appeals to arms.

The situation may be said to have been saved by the habit inaugurated at the close of the Heian epoch. From that time princes and nobles who saw no prospect of secular distinction began to take the tonsure, and this retirement to the cloister was assiduously encouraged by the Muromachi shoguns. A similar policy commended itself in the case of princes of the Jimyo-in branch (the Northern Court). It is true that, from the first, the representatives of this line had relied on the Bakufu, whether of Kamakura or of Muromachi. But in their hearts they deeply resented the usurpation of the shogunate, and the latter, fully cognisant of that sentiment, guarded against its effective display by providing only meagre allowances for the support of the Imperial household (Kinri) and the ex-Emperor's household (Sendo), and by contriving that only young and delicate princes should succeed to the throne. Thus, of seven sovereigns who reigned between 1336 and 1464, the oldest was only sixteen at the time of his succession and the youngest was six. When an Emperor reached maturity, it was usual that he should abdicate and administer thenceforth from the Inchu. Thus the influence of the Court was divided between the Kinri and the Sendo—the reigning sovereign and the retired. But the real depository of power was the shikken (regent) of the Inchu, to which office a member of the Hino family, maternal relatives of the Bakufu, was habitually appointed. When Yoshinori was shogun, he himself acted as shikken of the Inchu. As for the Court officials properly so called, from the kwampaku downwards, they were mere figureheads. Holding their posts, indeed, as of old, they constituted, not administrative actors, but an audience.

YOSHIMITSU AND THE THRONE

The shogun Yoshimitsu instituted the custom of inviting the sovereign to his mansion, and thenceforth such visits became a recognized feature of the relations between the Imperial and the Muromachi Courts. Yoshimitsu himself frequently repaired to the Kinri and the Sendo, and frequently accompanied the Empresses and their ladies on social visits or pleasure excursions. He is said to have gone in and out at the Imperial palaces without the slightest reserve, and on more than one occasion history accuses him of flagrantly transgressing the limits of decency in his intercourse with Suken-mon-in, mother of the Emperor Go-Enyu. As a subverter of public morals, however, the palm belongs, not to Yoshimitsu, but to his immediate successor, Yoshimochi. He is said to have visited the Kinri and the Sendo six or seven times every month, and to have there indulged in all kinds of licence. History says, indeed, that he was often unable to appear at Court owing to illness resulting from intoxication.

PRINCES AND PRIESTS

As to the fact that, from the close of the Heian epoch, the cloister often proved a prison for Imperial princes whose ambition might have been troublesome had they remained at large, the following figures are eloquent:

Number entering religion

Of 8 sons born to Emperor Fushimi (1287-1298) 7

9 " " " Emperor Go-Fushimi (1298-1301) 9

4 " " " Emperor Hanazono (1307-1318) 4

2 " " " Emperor Suko (1348-1352) 2

9 " " " Prince Sadatsune, 8 grandson of the Emperor Suko

14 " " " Emperor Go-Kogon (1352-1371) 14

Absolute accuracy is not claimed for these figures, but they are certainly close approximations. In fact, under the Muromachi Bakufu, every son of a sovereign, except the Prince Imperial, was expected to become a monk. The Ashikaga adopted a similar system and applied it ruthlessly in their own families. In truth, the Ashikaga epoch was notorious for neglect of the obligations of consanguinity. Father is found pitted against son, uncle against nephew, and brother against brother.

ENGRAVING: TILES OF THE DAIBUTSUDEN OF TODAI-JI

ENGRAVING: DECORATION OF TOKONOMA (AN ALCOVE IN A JAPANESE PARLOUR)—Muromachi Period



CHAPTER XXXII

FOREIGN INTERCOURSE, LITERATURE, ART, RELIGION, MANNERS, AND CUSTOMS IN THE MUROMACHI EPOCH

FOREIGN INTERCOURSE

AFTER the Mongol invasion of Kyushu, Japan held no intercourse with the outer world for several decades, nor does her friendship seem to have been sought by any oversea nation. In the closing year of the thirteenth century, merchantmen flying the Yuan flag are reported to have arrived, but the record is nebulous, and the same may be said of a passing reference that, in 1341, Japanese vessels were sent to China to procure articles manufactured there. We reach more solid ground a year later (1342), when the Ashikaga chief, Takauji, being engaged in building the temple Tenryu-ji, opened trade with China for the purpose of obtaining apparatus, vestments, and works of art. The number of vessels was limited to two annually, and the trade must not exceed five hundred kwan-mon (L750, or $3700). Some of the objects then carried to Japan survive to this day in the form of celadon vases known in Japan as Tenryuji-seiji.* Meanwhile, not a few Buddhist priests crossed the sea from China to preach their faith, and it is certain that during the War of the Dynasties in Japan, when the south of the country was in a state of anarchy, privateering in Korean waters was freely resorted to by Japanese adventurers. A Korean envoy arrived at Fukuhara, in Settsu, in 1367, bearer of a strong protest against this marauding, and declaring that for a decade past assassination and plunder had been freely practised by Japanese subjects on the inhabitants of the Korean littoral. China and Korea were then in a troubled condition.

*The merchantmen received the name of Tenryuji-bune (bune signifies "ship")

In the year (1368) after the arrival of this envoy, the Yuan dynasty went down in China before the Ming, and in Korea the kingdom of Koma was overthrown, the Yi dynasty rising on its ruins and calling the peninsula Chosen. The Ming sovereign immediately attempted to establish tradal intercourse with Japan, but the negotiations failed, and not until 1392 is there any record of oversea relations. Then, at length, Korea's protest elicited a reply from Japan. The shogun, Yoshimitsu, sent to Chosen a despatch, signifying that piracy had been interdicted, that all captives would be returned, and that he desired to establish friendly relations. It appears that at that time China also suffered from the depredations of Japanese corsairs, for the annals say that she repeatedly remonstrated, and that, in 1401, Yoshimitsu despatched to China an envoy carrying presents and escorting some Chinese subjects who had been cast away on the Japanese coast or carried captive thither. Another record suggests that the Chinese Emperor was perplexed between the two warring Courts in Japan. At the time of his accession, a body of Mongol fugitives established themselves in Shantung, where they received assistance from some Japanese adventurers. The Ming sovereign opened communications on the subject with Prince Kanenaga, who held Kyushu in the interests of the Southern Court, but the tone of the Chinese monarch was so arrogant that Prince Kanenaga made no reply. Then Taitsu employed a Buddhist priest, but the character of this bonze having been detected, he was thrown into prison.

These things happened in 1380. In the following year Taitsu despatched a duly credited envoy who used menacing language and was sent back with a defiance from Prince Kanenaga. The priest, however, was set free in 1382, and having learned while in Japan that two Courts were disputing the title to the Crown, he informed the Chinese sovereign in that sense, and the latter subsequently addressed himself to Kyoto, with the result noted above, namely, that Yoshimitsu opened friendly relations (1401). It was to the Ouchi family of Suwo that the management of intercourse with Chosen was entrusted, the latter sending its envoys to Yamaguchi. Subsequently, after Ouchi Yoshihiro's disaffection and disaster, a Buddhist priest and well-known artist, Soami, acted as Muromachi's envoy to the Ming Court, being accompanied by a merchant, Koetomi, who is described as thoroughly conversant with Chinese conditions. By these two the first commercial treaty was negotiated. It provided that an envoy should be sent by each of the contracting parties in every period of ten years, the suite of this envoy to be limited to two hundred, and any ship carrying arms to be regarded as a pirate.

The first envoy from the Ming Court under this treaty was met by Yoshimitsu himself at Hyogo, and being escorted to Kyoto, was hospitably lodged in a hotel there. Instructions were also issued from Muromachi to the officials in Kyushu, peremptorily interdicting piracy and ordering the arrest of any that contravened the veto. Further, the high constables in several provinces were enjoined to encourage trade with China by sending the best products of their localities. In fact, Yoshimitsu showed himself thoroughly earnest in promoting oversea commerce, and a considerable measure of success attended his efforts. Unfortunately, an interruption was caused in 1419, when some seventeen thousand Koreans, Mongolians, and "southern barbarians"—a name given promiscuously to aliens—in 227 ships, bore down on Tsushima one midsummer day and were not driven off until the great families of Kyushu—the Otomo, the Shoni, the Kikuchi, and the Shiba—had joined forces to attack the invaders. The origin of this incident is wrapped in mystery, but probably the prohibition of Japanese pirates was not enforced for the protection of Chosen, and the assault on Tsushima was a desperate attempt at retaliation.

Yoshimochi, however, who was then shogun, seems to have associated China with the invasion, for a Ming envoy, arriving just at the time of the contest, was indignantly refused audience. Thereafter, the tandai appointed from Muroinachi to administer the affairs of Kyushu was driven out by the Shoni family, and the shogun's policy of checking piracy ceased to be enforced, so that the coasts of China and Chosen were much harried, all legitimate commerce being suspended. When Yoshinori became shogun, however, this was one of the directions in which he turned his reforming hand. A Buddhist priest, Doen, proceeded to the Ming Court as Muromachi's delegate, and the Chinese sovereign agreed to restore the old relations, transmitting for that purpose a hundred tallies to be carried by the merchantmen. These tallies were distributed to several high constables, to five great temples, and to merchants in Hyogo and Sakai, the corresponding tallies* being entrusted to the Ouchi family, which, having now recovered its power, was charged with the duty of superintending the trade with China. Meanwhile, So Sadamori of Tsushima had established commercial relations with Chosen, and received from thence a yearly consignment of two hundred koku of soy beans, the vessel that carried the staple being guarded by boats known as Tsushima-bune.

*The tallies were cards on which a line of ideographs were inscribed. The card was then cut along the line, and a moiety was given to the trader, the corresponding moiety being kept by the superintendent.

Thus, it fell out that the right of supervising the trade with China and Korea came into the exclusive possession of the Ouchi and the So, respectively, and being liberally encouraged, brought great wealth to them as well as to other territorial magnates of the central and southern provinces. The records show that large profits were realized. Four or five hundred per cent, is spoken of, and, further, the Ming sovereign, in Yoshimasa's time, responded generously, as has been already shown, to the shogun's appeal for supplies of copper cash. One Japanese fan could be exchanged for a copy of a valuable book, and a sword costing one kwan-mon in Japan fetched five kwan-mon in China. Such prices were paid, however, for rare goods only, notably for Japanese raw silk, fifty catties (sixty-seven lbs.) of which sold for ten kwan-mon (L15, or $75, approximately). Gold, too, was much more valuable in China than in Japan. Ten ryo of the yellow metal could be obtained in Japan for from twenty to thirty kwan-mon and sold in China for 130. Sealskins, swords, spears, pepper, sulphur, fans, lacquer, raw silk, etc. were the chief staples of exports; and velvet, musk, silk fabrics, porcelains, etc., constituted the bulk of the imports. The metropolis being Kyoto, with its population of some 900,000, Hyogo was the most important harbour for the trade, and after it came Hakata,* in Chikuzen; Bonotsu, in Satsuma; Obi, in Hyuga, and Anotsu, in Ise. The customs duties at Hyogo alone are said to have amounted to the equivalent of L15,000, or $75,000, annually.

*Hakata's place was subsequently taken by Hirado.

In China, Ningpo was the chief port. It had a mercantile-marine office and an inn for foreign guests. The tribute levied on the trade was sent thence to Nanking. In size the vessels employed were from 50 to 130 tons, greater dimensions being eschewed through fear of loss. An invoice shows that the goods carried by a ship in 1458 were: sulphur (410,750 lbs.); copper (206,000 lbs.); spears (11); fans (1250); swords (9500); lacquered wares (634 packages), and sapan-wood (141,333 lbs.). During the days of Yoshimasa's shogunate such profits were realized that overtrading took place, and there resulted a temporary cessation. Fifty years later, when Yoshiharu ruled at Muromachi (1529), a Buddhist priest, Zuisa, sent by the shogun to China, and an envoy, Sosetsu, despatched by the Ouchi family, came into collision at Ningpo. It was a mere question of precedence, but in the sequel Zuisa was seized, Ningpo was sacked, and its governor was murdered. The arm of the shogun at that time could not reach the Ouchi family, and a demand for the surrender of Sosetsu was in vain preferred at Muromachi through the medium of the King of Ryukyu. Yoshiharu could only keep silence.

The Ming sovereign subsequently (1531) attempted to exact redress by sending a squadron to Tsushima, but the deputy high constable of the Ouchi compelled these ships to fly, defeated, and thereafter all friendly intercourse between Japan and China was interrupted, piratical raids by the Japanese taking its place. This estrangement continued for seventeen years, until (1548) Ouchi Yoshitaka re-established friendly relations with Chosen and, at the same time, made overtures to China, which, being seconded by the despatch of an envoy—a Buddhist priest—Shuryo from Muromachi, evoked a favourable response. Once more tallies were issued, but the number of vessels being limited to three and their crews to three hundred, the resulting commerce was comparatively small. Just at this epoch, too, Occidental merchantmen arrived in China, and the complexion of the latter's oversea trade underwent alteration. Thereafter, the Ashikaga fell, and their successor, Oda Nobunaga, made no attempt to re-open commerce with China, while his successor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, planned the invasion of the Middle Kingdom, so that the sword was more in evidence than the soroban.

JAPANESE PIRACY

It is difficult to trace the beginnings of Japanese piracy in Far Eastern waters, but certainly it dated from a remote past and reached its extreme in the middle of the sixteenth century. The records show that Murakami Yoshihiro, of Iyo province, obtained control of all the corsairs in neighbouring seas and developed great puissance. Nor did any measure of opprobrium attach to his acts, for on his death he was succeeded by Morokiyo, a scion of the illustrious Kitabatake family. Numbers flocked to his standard during the disordered era of the War of the Dynasties, and from Korea in the north to Formosa and Amoy in the south the whole littoral was raided by them.

For purposes of protection the Ming rulers divided the coast into five sections, Pehchihli, Shantung, Chekiang, Fuhkien, and Liangkwang, appointing a governor to each, building fortresses and enrolling soldiers. All this proving inefficacious, the Emperor Taitsu, as already stated, addressed to Ashikaga Yoshimitsu a remonstrance which moved the shogun to issue a strict injunction against the marauders. It was a mere formality. Chinese annals show that under its provisions some twenty pirates were handed over by the Japanese and were executed by boiling in kettles. No such international refinement as extra-territorial jurisdiction existed in those days, and the Japanese shogun felt no shame in delivering his countrymen to be punished by an alien State. It is not wonderful that when Yoshimitsu died, the Chinese Emperor bestowed on him the posthumous title Kung-hsien-wang, or "the faithful and obedient king." But boiling a score of the Wokou* in copper kettles did not at all intimidate the corsairs. On nearly all the main islands of the Inland Sea and in the Kyushu waters they had their quarters. In fact, the governors of islands and a majority of the military magnates having littoral estates, took part in the profitable pursuit. No less than fourteen illustrious families were so engaged, and four of them openly bore the title of kaizoku tai-shogun (commander-in-chief of pirates). Moreover, they all obeyed the orders of the Ouchi family. It is on record that Ouchi Masahiro led them in an incursion into Chollado, the southern province of Korea, and exacted from the sovereign of Chosen a promise of yearly tribute to the Ouchi. This was only one of several profitable raids. The goods appropriated in Korea were sometimes carried to China for sale, the pirates assuming, now the character of peaceful traders, now that of ruthless plunderers. The apparition of these Pahan** ships seems to have inspired the Chinese with consternation. They do not appear to have made any effective resistance. The decade between 1553 and 1563 was evidently their time of greatest suffering; and their annals of that era repay perusal, not only for their direct interest but also for their collateral bearing on the story of the invasion of Korea at the close of the century.

"On the 23d of the fifth month of 1553, twenty-seven Japanese vessels arrived at Lungwangtang. They looked like so many hills and their white sails were as clouds in the sky. On the fifth day of the fourth month of 1554, there appeared on the horizon a large ship which presently reached Lungwang-tang. Her crew numbered 562. They blew conches after the manner of trumpets, marshalled themselves in battle array, and surrounding the castle with flying banners, attacked it. On the fourth day of the ninth month of 1555, a two-masted ship carrying a crew of some hundreds came to Kinshan-hai, and on the next day she was followed by eight five-masted vessels with crews totalling some thousands. They all went on shore and looted in succession. On the 23d of the second month of 1556, pirate ships arrived at the entrance to Kinshan-hai. Their masts were like a dense forest of bamboo."