Among these obstacles were the lady Masa and the new shogun, Sanetomo. So long as these two lived, the Yoritomo family could count on the allegiance of the Kwanto, and so long as that allegiance remained intact, the elevation of the Hojo to the seats of supreme authority could not be compassed. Further, the substitution of Hojo for Minamoto must be gradual. Nothing abrupt would be tolerable. Now the Hojo chief's second wife, Maki, had borne to him a daughter who married Minamoto Tomomasa, governor of Musashi and lord constable of Kyoto, in which city he was serving when history first takes prominent notice of him. This lady Maki seems to have been of the same type as her step-daughter, Masa. Both possessed high courage and intellectual endowments of an extraordinary order, and both were profoundly ambitious. Maki saw no reason why her husband, Hojo Tokimasa, should lend all his great influence to support the degenerate scions of one of his family in preference to the able and distinguished representative of the other branch. Tomomasa was both able and distinguished. By a prompt and vigorous exercise of military talent he had crushed a Heike rising in Ise, which had threatened for a time to become perilously formidable. His mother may well have believed herself justified in representing to Hojo Tokimasa that such a man would make a much better Minamoto shogun than the half-witted libertine, Yoriiye, or the untried boy, Sanetomo. It has been inferred that her pleading was in Tokimasa's ears when he sent a band of assassins to murder Yoriiye in the Shuzen-ji monastery. However that may be, there can be little doubt that the Hojo chief, in the closing episodes of his career, favoured the progeny of his second wife, Maki, in preference to that of his daughter, Masa.

Having "removed" Yoriiye, he extended the same fate to Hatakeyama Shigetada, one of the most loyal and trusted servants of Yoritomo. Shigetada would never have connived at any measure inimical to the interests of his deceased master. Therefore, he was put out of the way. Then the conspirators fixed their eyes upon Sanetomo. The twelve-year-old boy was to be invited to Minamoto Tomomasa's mansion and there destroyed. This was the lady Maki's plan. The lady Masa discovered it, and hastened to secure Sanetomo's safety by carrying him to the house of her brother, Yoshitoki. The political career of Hojo Tokimasa ended here. He had to take the tonsure, surrender his post of regent and go into exile in Izu, where he died, in 1215, after a decade of obscurity. As for Minamoto Tomomasa, he was killed in Kyoto by troops despatched for the purpose. This conflict in 1205, though Hojo Tokimasa and Minamoto Tomomasa figured so largely in it, is by some historians regarded as simply a conflict between the ladies Maki and Masa. These two women certainly occupied a prominent place on the stage of events, but the figure behind the scenes was the white-haired intriguer, Tokimasa. Had the lady Maki's son-in-law succeeded Sanetomo, the former would have been the next victim of Tokimasa's ambition, whereafter the field would have been open for the grand climacteric, the supremacy of the Hojo.

HOJO YOSHITOKI

Crafty and astute as was Hojo Tokimasa, his son Yoshitoki excelled him in both of those attributes as well as in prescience. It was to the mansion of Yoshitoki that Sanetomo was carried for safety when his life was menaced by the wiles of Tokimasa. Yet in thus espousing the cause of his sister, Masa, and his nephew, Sanetomo, against his father, Tokimasa, and his brother-in-law, Tomomasa, it is not to be supposed that Yoshitoki's motive was loyalty to the house of Yoritomo. On the contrary, everything goes to show that he would have associated himself with his father's conspiracy had he not deemed the time premature and the method clumsy. He waited patiently, and when the occasion arrived, he "covered his tracks" with infinite skill while marching always towards the goal of Tokimasa's ambition.

The first to be "removed" was Wada Yoshimori, whom Yoritomo had gratefully appointed betto of the Samurai-dokoro. Yoritomo's eldest son, Yoriiye, had left two sons, Kugyo and Senju-maru. The former had taken the tonsure after his father's and elder brother's deaths, in 1204, but the cause of the latter was espoused with arms by a Shinano magnate, Izumi Chikahira, in 1213. On Wada Yoshimori, as betto of the Samurai-dokoro, devolved the duty of quelling this revolt. He did so effectually, but in the disposition of the insurgents' property, the shikken, Yoshitoki, contrived to drive Wada to open rebellion. He attacked the mansion of the shogun and the shikken, captured and burned the former, chiefly through the prowess of his giant son, Asahina Saburo; but was defeated and ultimately killed, Senju-maru, though only thirteen years old, being condemned to death on the pretext that his name had been used to foment the insurrection! After this convenient episode, Yoshitoki supplemented his office of shikken with that of betto of the Samurai-dokoro, thus becoming supreme in military and civil affairs alike.

DEATH OF SANETOMO

How far Sanetomo appreciated the situation thus created there is much difficulty in determining. The sentiment of pity evoked by his tragic fate has been projected too strongly upon the pages of his annals to leave them quite legible. He had seen his elder brother and two of the latter's three sons done to death. He had seen the "removal" of several of his father's most trusted lieutenants. He had seen the gradual upbuilding of the Hojo power on this hecatomb of victims. That he perceived something of his own danger would seem to be a natural inference. Yet if he entertained such apprehensions, he never communicated them to his mother, Masa, who, from her place of high prestige and commanding intellect, could have reshaped the issue.

The fact would appear to be that Hojo Yoshitoki's intrigues were too subtle for the perception of Sanetomo or even of the lady Masa. Yoshitoki had learned all the lessons of craft and cunning that his father could teach and had supplemented them from the resources of his own marvellously fertile mind. His uniformly successful practice was to sacrifice the agents of his crimes in order to hide his own connexion with them, and never to seize an opportunity until its possibilities were fully developed. Tokimasa had feigned ignorance of his daughter's liaison with Yoritomo, but had made it the occasion to raise an army which could be directed either against Yoritomo or in his support, as events ordered. There are strong reasons to think that the vendetta of the Soga brothers was instigated by Tokimasa and Yoshitoki, and that Yoritomo was intended to be the ultimate victim.

This was the beginning of a long series of intrigues which led to the deaths of Yoriiye and two of his sons, of Hatakeyama Shigetada, of Minamoto Tomomasa, of Wada Yoshimori, and of many a minor partisan of the Yoritomo family. In the pursuit of his sinister design, there came a time when Yoshitoki had to choose between his father and his sister. He sacrificed the former unhesitatingly, and it is very probable that such a choice helped materially to hide from the lady Masa the true purport of his doings. For that it did remain hidden from her till the end is proved by her failure to guard the life of Sanetomo, her own son, and by her subsequent co-operation with his slayer, Yoshitoki, her brother. A mother's heart would never wittingly have prompted such a course.

There is a tradition that Sanetomo provoked the resentment of Masa and Yoshitoki by accepting high offices conferred on him by Kyoto—chunagon, and general of the Left division of the guards—in defiance of Yoritomo's motto, "Wield power in fact but never in name," and contrary to remonstrances addressed to him through the agency of Oye no Hiromoto. There is also a tradition that, under pretense of visiting China in the company of a Chinese bonze, Chen Hosiang, he planned escape to the Kinai or Chugoku (central Japan), there to organize armed resistance to the Hojo designs. But it is very doubtful whether these pages of history, especially the latter, should not be regarded in the main as fiction. Sanetomo was too much of a litterateur to be an astute politician, and what eluded the observation of his lynx-eyed mother might well escape his perception.

In 1217, Yoshitoki invited Kugyo from Kyoto and appointed him to be betto of the shrine of Hachiman (the god of War) which stood on the hill of Tsurugaoka overlooking the town of Kamakura. Kugyo was the second and only remaining legitimate son of Yoriiye. He had seen his father and his two brothers done to death, and he himself had been obliged to enter religion, all of which misfortunes he had been taught by Yoshitoki's agents to ascribe to the partisans of his uncle, Sanetomo. Longing for revenge, the young friar waited. His opportunity came early in 1219. Sanetomo, having been nominated minister of the Left by the Kyoto Court, had to repair to the Tsurugaoka shrine to render thanks to the patron deity of his family. The time was fixed for ten o 'clock on the night of February 12th. Oye no Hiromoto, who had cognizance of the plot, hid his guilty knowledge by offering counsels of caution. He advised that the function should be deferred until daylight, or, at any rate, that the shogun should wear armour. Minamoto Nakaakira combatted both proposals and they were rejected. Sanetomo had a vague presentiment of peril. He gave a lock of his hair to one of his squires and composed a couplet:

Though I am forth and gone, And tenantless my home; Forget not thou the Spring, Oh! plum tree by the eaves.

Then he set out, escorted by a thousand troopers, his sword of State borne by the regent, Yoshitoki. But at the entrance to the shrine Yoshitoki turned back, pretending to be sick and giving the sword to Nakaakira. Nothing untoward occurred until, the ceremony being concluded, Sanetomo had begun to descend a broad flight of stone steps that led from the summit of the hill. Then suddenly Kugyo sprang out, killed Sanetomo and Nakaakira, carrying off the head of the former, and, having announced himself as his father's avenger, succeeded in effecting his escape. But he had been the agent of Yoshitoki's crime, and his survival would have been inconvenient. Therefore, when he appealed to the Miura mansion for aid, emissaries were sent by the regent's order to welcome and to slay him. Sanetomo perished in his twenty-eighth year. All accounts agree that he was not a mere poet—though his skill in that line was remarkable—but that he also possessed administrative talent; that he strove earnestly to live up, and make his officers live up, to the ideals of his father, Yoritomo, and that he never wittingly committed an injustice.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE HOJO REGENCY

Thus, after three generations occupying a period of only forty years, the Minamoto family was ruined, and the reins of power were effectually transferred to Hojo hands. It would seem natural, in the sequence of events, that the office of shogun should now descend to the Hojo. But Yoshitoki understood that such a measure would convict him of having contrived the downfall of Yoritomo's progeny in Hojo interests. Therefore a step was taken, worthy of the sagacity of the lady Masa and her brother, the regent. The Bakufu petitioned the Kyoto Court to appoint an Imperial prince to the post of shogun. That would have invested the Kamakura Government with new dignity in the eyes of the nation. But the ex-Emperor, Go-Toba, upon whom it devolved to decide the fate of this petition, rejected it incontinently.

His Majesty, as will presently be seen, was seeking to contrive the downfall of the Bakufu, and the idea of associating one of his own sons with its fortunes must have revolted him. In the face of this rebuff, nothing remained for the Bakufu except recourse to the descendants of the Minamoto in the female line. Yoritomo's elder sister had married into the Fujiwara family, and her greatgrandson, Yoritsune, a child of two, was carried to Kamakura and installed as the head of the Minamoto. Not until 1226, however, was he invested with the title of shogun, and in that interval of seven years a momentous chapter was added to the history of Japan.

THE SHOKYU STRUGGLE

The Shokyu era (1219-1222) gave its name to a memorable conflict between Kyoto and Kamakura. Affairs in the Imperial capital were ruled at that time by the ex-Emperor, Go-Toba. We have seen how, in 1198, he abdicated in favour of his eldest son, Tsuchimikado. It is not impossible that the idea of rebelling, sooner or later, against the Bakufu had begun to germinate in the mind of Go-Toba at that date, but the probability is that, in laying aside the sceptre, his dominant aim was to enjoy the sweets of power without its responsibilities, and to obtain leisure for pursuing polite accomplishments in which he excelled. His procedure, however, constituted a slight to the Bakufu, for the change of sovereign was accomplished without any reference whatever to Kamakura. Tsuchimikado was a baby of three at the time of his accession. He had been chosen by lot from among three sons of Go-Toba, but the choice displeased the latter, and in 1210, Tsuchimikado, then in his fifteenth year, was compelled to abdicate in favour of his younger brother, Juntoku, aged thirteen, the eighty-fourth occupant of the throne. Again, Kamakura was not consulted; but the neglect evoked no remonstrance, for Sanetomo held the post of shogun at the time, and Sanetomo always maintained an attitude of deference towards the Imperial Court which had nominated him to high office.

Juntoku held the sceptre eleven years, and then (1221) he, too, abdicated at his father's request. Very different considerations, however, were operative on this occasion. Go-Toba had now definitely resolved to try armed conclusions with the Bakufu, and he desired to have the assistance of his favourite son, Juntoku. Thus three cloistered Emperors had their palaces in Kyoto simultaneously. They were distinguished as Hon-in (Go-Toba), Chu-in (Tsuchimikado) and Shin-in* (Juntoku). As for the occupant of the throne, Chukyo (eighty-fifth sovereign) he was a boy of two, the son of Juntoku. Much has been written about Go-Toba by romanticists and little by sober historians. The pathos of his fate tends to obscure his true character. That he was gifted with exceptional versatility is scarcely questionable; but that he lacked all the qualities making for greatness appears equally certain. That his instincts were so cruel as to make him derive pleasure from scenes of human suffering, such as the torture of a prisoner, may have been due to a neurotic condition induced by early excesses, but it must always stand to his discredit that he had neither judgment to estimate opportunities nor ability to create them.

*Shin-in signifies the "original recluse;" Chu-in, the "middle recluse;" and Shin-in "the new recluse."

Briefly summarized, the conditions which contributed mainly to the Shokyu struggle had their origin in the system of land supervision instituted by Yoritomo at the instance of Oye no Hiromoto. The constables and the stewards despatched by the Bakufu to the provinces interfered irksomely with private rights of property, and thus there was gradually engendered a sentiment of discontent, especially among those who owed their estates to Imperial benevolence. A well-known record (Tai-hei-ki) says: "In early morn the stars that linger in the firmament gradually lose their brilliancy, even though the sun has not yet appeared above the horizon. The military families did not wantonly show contempt towards the Court. But in some districts the stewards were more powerful than the owners of the estates, and the constables were more respected than the provincial governors. Thus insensibly the influence of the Court waned day by day and that of the military waxed."

There were other causes also at work. They are thus summarized by the Kamakura Jidaishi: "The conditions of the time called two parties into existence: the Kyoto party and the military party. To the former belonged not only many officials of Shinto shrines, priests of Buddhist temples, and managers of private manors, but also a few nominal retainers of the Bakufu. These last included men who, having occupied posts in the Imperial capital for a long time, had learned to regard the Court with gratitude; others who had special grievances against the Bakufu, and yet others who, having lost their estates, were ready to adopt any means of recovering them. The family system of the time paid no heed to primogeniture. Parents fixed the succession by favouritism, and made such divisions as seemed expedient in their eyes. During a parent's lifetime there could be no appeal nor any remonstrance. But no sooner was a father's tombstone about to be erected, than his children engaged in disputes or appealed to the courts. Therefore the Bakufu, seeking to correct this evil state of affairs, issued an order that the members of a family should be subservient to the directions of the eldest son; which order was followed, in 1202, by a law providing that disputes between brothers must be compromised, and by another, in 1214, ruling that applications for official posts must have the approval of the members of the applicants' family in conclave instead of being submitted direct, as theretofore. Under such a system of family autocracy it frequently happened that men were ousted from all share in their paternal estates, and these men, carrying their genealogical tables constantly in their pockets, were ready to join in any enterprise that might better their circumstances. Hence the Shokyu struggle may be said to have been, politically, a collision between the Imperial Court and the Bakufu, and, socially, a protest against family autocracy."

The murder of Sanetomo inspired the Court with strong hope that a suicidal feud had commenced at Kamakura, and when the Fujiwara baby, Yoritsune, was sent thither, peace-loving politicians entertained an idea that the civil and the military administration would soon be found co-operating. But neither event made any change in the situation. The lady Masa and her brother remained as powerful as ever and as careless of the Court's dignity.

Two events now occurred which materially hastened a rupture. One was connected with an estate, in the province of Settsu, conferred by Go-Toba on a favourite—a shirabyoshi, "white measure-marker," as a danseuse of those days was called. The land-steward of this estate treated its new owner, Kamegiku, with contumely, and Go-Toba was sufficiently infatuated to lodge a protest, which elicited from Kamakura an unceremonious negative. One of the flagrant abuses of the time was the sale of offices to Court ladies, and the Bakufu's attitude in the affair of the Settsu estates amounted to an indirect condemnation of such evil practices. But Go-Toba, profoundly incensed, applied himself from that day to mustering soldiers and practising military tactics. The second incident which precipitated an appeal to arms was the confiscation of a manor owned by a bushi named Nishina Morito, who, though a retainer (keriin) of the Bakufu, had taken service at the Imperial Court. Go-Toba asked that the estate should be restored, but Yoshitoki flatly refused. It was then (1221) that Go-Toba contrived the abdication of his son, Juntoku, a young man of twenty-four, possessing, apparently, all the qualities that make for success in war, and thereafter an Imperial decree deprived Yoshitoki of his offices and declared him a rebel. The die was now cast. Troops were summoned from all parts of the Empire to attack Kamakura, and a motley crowd mustered in Kyoto.

STEPS TAKEN BY THE BAKUFU

It was on June 6, 1221, that the Imperial decree outlawing Hojo Yoshitoki appeared, and three days later Kamakura was informed of the event. The lady Masa at once summoned the leading generals of the Bakufu to her presence and addressed them thus: "To-day the time of parting has come. You know well what kind of work the late shogun, my husband, accomplished. But slanderers have misled the sovereign and are seeking to destroy the Kwanto institutions. If you have not forgotten the favours of the deceased shogun, you will join hearts and hands to punish the traducers and to preserve the old order. But if any of you wish to proceed to the west, you are free to do so."

This astute appeal is said to have moved the generals greatly. There was not one instance of disaffection; a sufficiently notable fact when we remember that the choice lay between the Throne and the Bakufu. A military council was at once convened by Yoshitoki to discuss a plan of campaign, and the view held by the great majority was that a defensive attitude should be adopted by guarding the Ashigara and Hakone passes.

Alone, Oye no Hiromoto opposed that programme. Regarding the situation from a political, not a strategical, standpoint, he saw that every day they remained unmolested must bring an access of strength to the Imperial forces, and he strenuously urged that a dash should be made for Kyoto at once. Even the lady Masa did not rise to Hiromoto's height of discernment; she advocated a delay until the arrival of the Musashi contingent. Another council was convened, but Hiromoto remained inflexible. He went so far as to urge that the Musashi chief—Yoshitoki's eldest son, Yasutoki—ought to advance alone, trusting his troops to follow. Then the lady Masa summoned Miyoshi Yasunobu and asked his opinion. He said: "The fate of the Kwanto is at stake. Strike at once." Thereupon Hojo Yoshitoki ordered Yasutoki, his son, to set out forthwith from Kamakura, though his following consisted of only eighteen troopers.

Thereafter, other forces mustered in rapid succession. They are said to have totalled 190,000. Tokifusa, younger brother of Yasutoki, was adjutant-general, and the army moved by three routes, the Tokai-do, the Tosan-do, and the Hokuriku-do, all converging upon the Imperial capital. On the night of his departure from Kamakura, Yasutoki galloped back all alone and, hastening to his father's presence, said: "I have my orders for the disposition of the forces and for their destination. But if the Emperor in person commands the western army, I have no orders to guide me." Hojo Yoshitoki reflected for a time and then answered: "The sovereign cannot be opposed. If his Majesty be in personal command, then strip off your armour, cut your bow-strings, and assume the mien of low officials. But if the Emperor be not in command, then fight to the death. Should you be defeated I will never see your face again."

THE STRUGGLE

When they learned that a great army was advancing from the Kwanto, the courtiers in Kyoto lost heart at once. There was no talk of Go-Toba or of Juntoku taking the field. Defensive measures were alone thought of. The Imperialist forces moved out to Mino, Owari, and Etchu. Their plan was to shatter the Bakufu columns separately, or, if that might not be, to fall back and cover the capital. It was a most unequal contest. The Kyoto troops were a mere mob without intelligence or coherence. They broke everywhere under the onset of the Kwanto veterans. At the river Uji, where their last stand was made, they fought gallantly and obstinately. But their efforts only deferred the result by a few hours. On the twenty-fifth day (July 6, 1221) after he had marched out of Kamakura, Yasutoki entered Kyoto. The Throne had no hesitation as to the course to be pursued in such circumstances. From the palace of the Shin-in a decree was issued restoring the official titles of the Hojo chief, and cancelling the edict for his destruction, while, through an envoy sent to meet him, he was informed that the campaign against the Bakufu had been the work of irresponsible subjects; that the sovereign did not sanction it, and that any request preferred by Kamakura would be favourably considered.

Yasutoki received these gracious overtures with a silent obeisance, and taking up his quarters at Rokuhara, proceeded to arrest the leaders of the anti-Bakufu enterprise; to execute or exile the courtiers that had participated in it, and to confiscate all their estates. In thus acting, Yasutoki obeyed instructions from his implacable father in Kamakura. He himself evinced a disposition to be merciful, especially in the case of the Court nobles. These he sent eastward to the Bakufu capital, which place, however, very few of them reached alive, their deaths being variously compassed on the way.

To the Imperial family no pity was shown. Even the baby Emperor* was dethroned, and his place given to Go-Horikawa (1221-1232), the eighty-sixth sovereign, then a boy of ten, son of Morisada, Go-Toba's elder brother. Go-Toba, himself was banished to the island of Oki, and Juntoku to Sado, while Tsuchimikado, who had essayed to check the movement against the Bakufu, might have remained in Kyoto had not the exile of his father and brother rendered the city intolerable. At his own request he was transferred, first, to Tosa, and then, to Awa. The three ex-Emperors died in exile. Go-Toba seems to have suffered specially from his reverse of fortunes. He lived in a thatched hut barely impervious to rain, and his lot is said to have been pitiful, even from the point of view of the lower orders.

*To this child, Kanenari, who lived a virtual prisoner in Kyoto for thirteen years subsequently, the Bakufu declined to give the title of Emperor. Not until the Meiji Restoration (1870) was he enrolled in the list of sovereigns under the name of Chukyo.

YASUTOKI'S EXPLANATION

There had not been any previous instance of such treatment of the Imperial family by a subject, and public opinion was not unnaturally somewhat shocked. No little interest attaches, therefore, to an explanation given by Yasutoki himself and recorded in the Biography of Saint Myoe (Myoe Shonin-deri). Visiting the temple after his victory, Yasutoki was thus addressed by Myoe:

The ancients used to say, "When men are in multitude they may overcome heaven for a moment, but heaven in the end triumphs." Though a country be subdued by military force, calamities will soon overtake it unless it be virtuously governed. From time immemorial in both Japan and China sway founded on force has never been permanent. In this country, since the Age of Deities down to the present reign, the Imperial line has been unbroken through ninety generations. No prince of alien blood has ascended the throne. Everything in the realm is the property of the Crown. Whatever the Throne may appropriate, the subject must acquiesce. Even life must be sacrificed if the cause of good government demands it. But you have broken an Imperial army; destroyed Imperial palaces; seized the persons of sovereigns; banished them to remote regions, and exiled Empresses and princes of the Blood. Such acts are contrary to propriety. Heaven will inflict punishment.

These words are said to have profoundly moved Yasutoki. He replied: I desire to express my sincere views. The late shogun (Yoritomo) broke the power of the Heike; restored peace of mind to the Court; removed the sufferings of the people, and rendered loyal service to the sovereign. Among those that served the shogun there was none that did not reverence the Emperor. It seems that his Majesty recognized these meritorious deeds, for he bestowed ranks and titles. Yoritomo was not only appointed dainagon and taisho, but also given the post of so-tsuihoshi with powers extending to all parts of the empire. Whenever such honours were offered, he firmly declined to be their recipient, his contention being that not for personal reward but for the sake of the Throne he had striven to subdue the insurgents and to govern the people mercifully. Pressed again and again, however, he had been constrained finally to accede, and thus his relatives also had benefitted, as my grandfather, Tokimasa, and my father, Yoshitoki, who owed their prosperity to the beneficence of the cloistered Emperor.

But after the demise of his Majesty and of the shogun, the Court's administration degenerated. The loyal and the faithful were not recognized and often the innocent were punished. When it was reported that an Imperial army numbering tens of thousands was advancing against the Kwanto, my father, Yoshitoki, asked my views as to dealing with it. I replied: "The Kwanto has been loyal and has erred in nothing. Yet we are now to be punished. Surely the Court is in error? Still the whole country belongs to the sovereign. What is now threatened must take its course. There is nothing for us but to bow our heads, fold our hands, and supplicate for mercy. If, nevertheless, death be our portion, it will be lighter than to live disloyal. If we be pardoned, we can end our lives in mountain forests." My father, after reflecting for a space, answered: "What you say may be right, but it applies only when the sovereign has properly administered the country. During the present reign, however, the provinces under Imperial sway are in confusion; the peace is disturbed, and the people are in misery; whereas those under the Bakufu are peaceful and prosperous. If the administration of the Court be extended to all the land, misrule and unhappiness will be universal. I do not resist the mandate for selfish reasons. I resist it in the cause of the people. For them I sacrifice my life if heaven be not propitious. There are precedents. Wu of Chou and Kao-tsu of Han acted similarly, but, when victorious, they themselves ascended the throne, whereas if we succeed, we shall merely set up another prince of the same dynasty. Amaterasu and Hachiman will not reproach us. We will punish only the evil councillors who have led the Throne astray. You will set out with all expedition."

Thus instructed, I took the road to Kyoto. But before departing, I went to worship at the shrine of Hachiman. There I prayed that if my taking the field was improper, I might be struck dead forthwith; but that if my enterprise could in any wise aid the country, bring peace to the people, and contribute to the prosperity of the shrines and temples, then might I receive the pity and sympathy of heaven. I took oath before the shrine of Mishima Myojin, also, that my purpose was free from all selfish ambition. Thus, having placed my life in the hand of heaven, I awaited my fate. If to this day I have survived all peril, may I not regard it as an answer to my prayer?

A difference will be detected between the views here attributed to Yoshitoki and his previously narrated instructions to his son, Yasutoki. There can be little doubt that the record in the Myoe Shonin-den is the correct version. Yoshitoki obeyed the Chinese political ethics; he held that a sovereign had to answer for his deeds at the bar of public opinion. Yasutoki's loyalty was of a much more whole-hearted type: he recognized the occupant of the throne as altogether sacrosanct. If he obeyed his father's instructions in dealing with the Court, he condemned himself to the constant companionship of regret, which was reflected in the excellence of his subsequent administration.

ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

By the Shokyu war the camera system of administration (Insei) at the Court was destroyed, and a great change took place in the relations of the Throne to the Bakufu. For, whereas the latter's authority in Kyoto had hitherto been largely nominal, it now became a supreme reality. Kamakura had been represented in the Imperial capital by a high constable only, whereas two special officials, called "inquisitors" (tandai) were now appointed, and the importance attaching to the office becomes apparent when we observe that the first tandai were Yasutoki himself and his uncle, Tokifusa. They presided over administrative machinery at the two Rokuhara—in the northern and southern suburbs of the city—organized exactly on the lines of the Kamakura polity; namely, a Samurai-dokoro, a Man-dokoro, and a Monju-dokoro. Further, in spite of imposing arrangements in Kyoto, no question was finally decided without previous reference to Kamakura, which thus became, in very truth, the administrative metropolis of the empire.

THE SHIMPO-JITO

When Yoritomo appointed retainers of his own to be land-stewards in the various manors, these officials did not own the estates where they were stationed; they merely collected the taxes and exercised general supervision. After the Shokyu struggle, however, some three thousand manors, hitherto owned by courtiers hostile to the Bakufu, were confiscated by the latter and distributed among the Minamoto, the Hojo, and their partisans. The recipients of these estates were appointed also to be their land-stewards, and thus there came into existence a new class of manor-holders, who were at once owners and jito, and who were designated shimpo-jito, or "newly appointed land-stewards," to distinguish them from the hompo-jito, or "originally appointed."

These shimpo-jito, in whom were vested at once the rights of ownership and of management, were the first genuine feudal chiefs in Japan—prototypes of the future daimyo and shomyo. It should be here noted that, in the distribution of these confiscated estates, the Kamakura regent, Yoshitoki, did not benefit to the smallest extent; and that the grants made to the two tandai in Kyoto barely sufficed to defray the charges of their administrative posts. Yoshitoki is, in truth, one of the rare figures to whom history can assign the credit of coveting neither wealth nor station. Out of the three thousand manors that came into his hands as spolia opima of the Shokyu war, he might have transferred as many as he pleased to his own name; and wielding absolute authority in Kyoto, he could have obtained any title he desired. Yet he did not take a rood of land, and his official status at the time of his death was no higher than the fourth rank.

THE BUILDERS OF THE BAKUFU

The great statesmen, legislators, and judges who contributed so much to the creation of the Bakufu did not long survive the Shokyu struggle. Miyoshi Yasunobu, who presided over the Department of Justice (Monju-dokoro) from the time of its establishment, had been attacked by mortal sickness before the Imperial army commenced its march eastward. His last advice was given to the lady Masa when he counselled an immediate advance against Kyoto. Soon afterwards he died at the age of eighty-two. The great Oye no Hiromoto, who contributed more than any other man to the conception and organization of the Kamakura system, and of whom history says that without him the Minamoto had never risen to fame, survived his colleague by only four years, dying, in 1225, at the age of seventy-eight. The lady Masa, one of the world's heroines, expired in the same year, and 1224 had seen the sudden demise of the regent, Hojo Yoshitoki. Fortunately for the Bakufu, the regent's son, Yasutoki, proved himself a ruler of the highest ability, and his immediate successors were not less worthy of the exalted office they filled.

ENGRAVING: SILK TASSEL

ENGRAVING: ITSUKUSHIMA JINJA (SHRINE), AT MIYAJIMA



CHAPTER XXVII

THE HOJO

THE HOJO IN KYOTO

THERE was nothing perfunctory in the administration of the "Two Rokuhara" (Ryo-Rokuhara) in Kyoto. The northern and the southern offices were presided over by the most prominent members of the Hojo family, men destined to fill the post of regent (shikkeri) subsequently in Kamakura. Thus, when Hojo Yoshitoki died suddenly, in 1224, his son, Yasutoki, returned at once to Kamakura to succeed to the regency, transferring to his son, Tokiuji, the charge of northern Rokuhara, and a short time afterwards the control of southern Rokuhara was similarly transferred from Yoshitoki is brother, Tokifusa, to the latter's son, Tokimori. Nominally, the jurisdiction of the two Rokuhara was confined to military affairs, but in reality their influence extended to every sphere within Kyoto and to the Kinai and the Saikai-do without.

THE HYOJOSHU

So long as the lady Masa lived, the administrative machinery at Kamakura suggested no sense of deficiency. That great woman accepted all the responsibility herself. But in the year (1225) of her death, Yasutoki, who had just succeeded to the regency, made an important reform. He organized within the Man-dokoro a council of fifteen or sixteen members, which was called the Hyojo-shu, and which virtually constituted the Bakufu cabinet. The Samurai-dokoro and the Monju-dokoro remained unchanged, but the political administration passed from the Monju-dokoro to the Hyojoshu, and the betto of the former became in effect the finance minister of the shogun.

THE GOOD ADMINISTRATION OF THE HOJO

Commencing with Yasutoki (1225), down to the close of the thirteenth century, Japan was admirably ruled by a succession of Hojo regents. Among them, Yasutoki deserves the highest credit, for he established a standard with the aid of very few guiding precedents. When he came into power he found the people suffering grievously from the extortions of manorial chiefs. It was not an uncommon practice for the owner of an estate to hold in custody the wives and daughters of defaulting tenants until the latter paid their rents, however exorbitant, and seldom indeed did the holder of a manor recognize any duty of succouring the peasants in time of distress. The former cruel practice was strictly forbidden by Yasutoki, and, to correct the latter defect, he adopted the plan of setting a fine example himself. It is recorded that in the Kwanki era (1229-1232), when certain places were suffering from crop failure, the regent distributed nine thousand koku of rice (45,000 bushels approximately) among the inhabitants and remitted all taxes throughout more than one thousand districts.

In the Azuma Kagami, a contemporaneous history generally trustworthy, we find various anecdotes illustrative at once of the men and the ethics of the time. Thus, it is related that the farmers of a village called Hojo being in an embarrassed condition, seed-rice was lent to them in the spring by the regent's order, they undertaking to repay it in the autumn. But a storm having devastated their fields, they were unable to keep their pledge. Nothing seemed to offer except flight. When they were on the eve of decamping, however, they received from Yasutoki an invitation to a feast at which their bonds were burned in their presence and every debtor was given half a bushel of rice. Elsewhere, we read that the regent himself lived in a house so unpretentious that the interior was visible from the highroad, owing to the rude nature of the surrounding fence. Urged to make the fence solid, if only as a protection against fire, his reply was: "However economically a new wall and fence be constructed, the outlay would be at the cost of the people. As for me, if I do my duty to the State, my life and my house will be safe. If I fail, the strongest fence will not avail."

In estimating what his bountiful assistance to the farmers meant, it is necessary to remember that he was very poor, The greater part of the comparatively small estates bequeathed to him by his father he divided among his half-brothers by a Fujiwara mother, reserving to himself only a little, for, said he: "I am the regent. What more do I desire?" One day, while attending a meeting of the Hyojoshu, he received news that the house of his brother, Tomotoki, was attacked. Immediately he hastened to the rescue with a small band of followers. Subsequently, one of his principal retainers remonstrated with him for risking his life in an affair so insignificant. Yasutoki answered: "How can you call an incident insignificant when my brother's safety was concerned? To me it seemed as important as the Shokyu struggle. If I had lost my brother, what consolation would my rank have furnished?"

Yasutoki never made his rank a pretext for avoiding military service; he kept his watch in turn with the other guards, remaining up all night and attending to all his duties. When he periodically visited the temple of Yoritomo, he always worshipped without ascending to the aisle, his reason being that, were the shogun, Yoritomo, alive, the regent would not venture to sit on the dais by his side. Thrifty and eminently practical, he ridiculed a priest who proposed to tranquillize the nation by building fanes. "How can peace be brought to the people," he asked, "by tormenting them to subscribe for such a purpose?" He revered learning, regarded administration as a literary art rather than a military, and set no store whatever by his own ability or competence.

THE JOEI CODE

The most memorable achievement during Yasutoki's regency was the compilation of a code of law called the Joei Shikimoku* after the name of the era (Joei, 1232-1233) when it was promulgated. What rendered this legislation essentially necessary was that the Daiho code of the eighth century and all the laws founded on it were inspired primarily by the purpose of centralizing the administrative power and establishing the Throne's title of ownership in all the land throughout the realm, a system diametrically opposed to the spirit of feudalism. This incongruity had made itself felt in Yoritomo's time, and had suggested the compilation of certain "Rules for Decisions" (Hanketsu-rei), which became the basis of the Joei code in Yasutoki's days. Another objection to the Daiho code and its correlated enactments was that, being written with Chinese ideographs solely, they were unintelligible to the bulk of those they concerned. Confucius laid down as a fundamental maxim of government that men should be taught to obey, not to understand, and that principle was adopted by the Tokugawa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But in the thirteenth, the aim of Yasutoki and his fellow legislators was to render the laws intelligible to all, and with that object they were indited mostly in the kana syllabary.

*Called also the Kwanto Goseibai Shikimoku.

The actual work of compilation was done by Hokkyo Enzen (a renowned bonze), but the idea originated with Hojo Yasutoki and Miyoshi Yasutsura, and every provision was carefully scanned and debated by the Bakufu's State council (Hyojoshu). There was no intention of suppressing the Daiho code. The latter was to remain operative in all regions to which the sway of the Kyoto Court extended direct. But in proportion as the influence of the Bakufu grew, the Joei laws received new adherents and finally became universally effective. A great modern authority, Dr. Ariga, has opined that the motive of the Bakufu legislation was not solely right for right's sake. He thinks that political expediency figured in the business, the Kamakura rulers being shrewd enough to foresee that a reputation for administering justice would prove a potent factor in extending their influence. If so, the scheme was admirably worked out, for every member of the council had to sign a pledge, inserted at the end of the Shikimoku, invoking* the vengeance of heaven on his head if he departed from the laws or violated their spirit in rendering judgment. Nothing, indeed, stands more signally to the credit of the Bakufu rulers from the days of Yoritomo and his wife, Masa, downwards, than their constant endeavour to do justice between man and man.

*"This oath indicates, among other things, the deep sense of the importance of unanimity, of a united front, of the individual sharing fully in the collective responsibility, that was cherished by the Bakufu councillors. This was, indeed, one of the chief secrets of the wonderful stability and efficiency of the machine." (Murdoch.)

NATURE OF THE CODE

The Joei Shikimoku is not a voluminous document: it contains only fifty-one brief articles, which the poet Basho compares to the luminosity of the full moon. It has been excellently translated and annotated by Mr. Consul-General J. C. Hall in the "Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan" (Vol. XXXIV, Part I), and Mr. J. Murdoch, in his admirable History of Japan, summarizes its provisions lucidly. We learn that slavery still existed in the thirteenth century in Japan; but the farmer was guarded against cruel processes of tax-collecting and enjoyed freedom of domicile when his dues were paid. Fiefs might not be sold, but a peasant might dispose of his holding. "Village headmen, while held to a strict discharge of their duties and severely punished for various malpractices, were safeguarded against all aggression or undue interference on the part of the jito. The law of property was almost entirely synonymous with that of fiefs. These, if originally conferred for public services rendered by the grantee, could not be sold. On the death of the holder it was not necessarily the eldest son—even though legitimate—that succeeded. The only provision affecting the father's complete liberty of bequest or gift to his widow—or concubine, in one article—or children, was that a thoroughly deserving eldest son, whether of wife or concubine, could claim one-fifth of the estate.

"Not only could women be dowered with, or inherit, fiefs, and transmit a legal title to them to their own children, but a childless woman was even fully empowered to adopt an heir. Yoritomo had been the first to sanction this broadminded and liberal principle. In Kamakura, an adulterer was stripped of half of his fief if he held one; and if he had none, he was banished. For an adulteress the punishment was no severer, except that if she possessed a fief, the whole of it was confiscated. A good many sections of the code deal with legal procedure and the conduct and duty of magistrates, the great objects being to make the administration of justice simple, prompt, and pure, while repressing everything in the shape of pettifogging or factious litigation.

"The penalties were neither cruel nor ferocious. Death for the worst offences—among which theft is specially mentioned—confiscation of fief, and banishment, these exhaust the list. The only other punishment mentioned is that of branding on the face, inflicted on a commoner for the crime of forgery, a bushi's punishment in this case being banishment, or simply confiscation of his fief, if possessed of one.

"Bakufu vassals were strictly forbidden directly to solicit the Imperial Court for rank or office; they must be provided with a special recommendation from Kamakura. But once invested with Court rank, they might be promoted in grade without any further recommendation, while they were free to accept the position of hebiishi. Analogous restrictions were placed on the Kwanto clergy, who were to be summarily removed from their benefices if found appealing to Kyoto for promotion, the only exception being in favour of Zen-shu priests. In their case the erring brother guilty of such an offence got off comparatively lightly—'an influential member of the same sect will be directed to administer a gentle admonition.' The clergy within the Bakufu domains were to be kept strictly in hand; if they squandered the revenues of their incumbency and neglected the fabric and the established services therein, they were to be displaced. As regards the monasteries and priests outside the Bakufu domain, the case was entirely different; they were virtually independent, and Kamakura interfered there only when instructed to do so by Imperial decree."*

*Murdoch's History of Japan.

FURTHER LEGISLATION

It is not to be supposed that the Joei Shikimoku represents the whole outcome of Kamakura legislation. Many additions were made to the code during the fourteenth century, but they were all in the nature of amplifications or modifications. Kyoto also was busy with enactments in those times—busier, indeed, than Kamakura, but with smaller practical results.

FALL OF THE MIURA

Yasutoki died in 1242, having held the regency (shikken) for eighteen years. His two sons had preceded him to the grave, and therefore his grandson, Tsune-toki, became shikken. Tsunetoki resembled his grandfather in many respects, but, as he died in 1246, he had little opportunity of distinguishing himself. Nevertheless, during his brief tenure of power, he took a step which had momentous consequences. It will be remembered that after the murder of Minamoto Sanetomo by his nephew Kugyo, in 1219, some difficulty was experienced in persuading the Imperial Court to appoint a successor to the shogunate, and finally the choice fell upon Fujiwara Yoritsune, then a child of two, who was not actually nominated shogun until 1226. This noble, when (1244) in the twenty-seventh year of his age and the eighteenth of his shogunate, was induced by the regent, Tsunetoki, to resign, the alleged reason being portents in the sky, and a successor was found for him in his son, Yoritsugu.

Now, for many years past the Miura family had ranked next to the Hojo in power and above it in wealth, but the two had always been loyal friends. Some umbrage was given to the Miura at this time, however, owing to the favours enjoyed at the regency by the Adachi family, one of whose ladies was the mother of the two shikken, Tsunetoki and Tokiyori. The situation thus created had its issue in a plot to kill Tokiyori, and to replace him by an uncle unconnected with the Adachi. Whether the Miura family were really involved in this plot, history gives no definite indication; but certainly the ex-shogun, Yoritsune, was involved, and his very marked friendship with Miura Mitsumura could scarcely fail to bring the latter under suspicion. In the end, the Miura mansion was suddenly invested by a Hojo force. Mitsumura and his elder brother, Yasumura, escaped to a temple where, after a stubborn resistance, they and 270 of their vassals committed suicide. No mercy was shown. The Miura were hunted and slaughtered everywhere, their wide, landed estates being confiscated and divided among the Bakufu, the fanes, and the courtiers at Kyoto.

The terribly drastic sequel of this affair illustrates the vast power wielded by the Hojo throughout the empire in the thirteenth century. Yoritomo's system of high constables and land-stewards brought almost every part of the country under the effective sway of Kamakura. It is not to be supposed, however, that these high constables and land-stewards were suffered to subject the people within their jurisdiction to arbitrary or extortionate treatment. Not only could complaints of any such abuses count on a fair hearing and prompt redress at the hands of the Bakufu, but also inspectors were despatched, periodically or at uncertain dates, to scrutinize with the utmost vigilance the conduct of the shugo and jito, who, in their turn, had a staff of specially trained men to examine the land survey and adjust the assessment and incidence of taxation.

ENGRAVING: HOJO TOKIYORI

HOJO TOKIYORI

Tokiyori, younger brother of Tsunetoki, held the post of shikken at the time of the Miura tragedy. He had succeeded to the position, in 1246, on the death of Tsunetoki, and he nominally abdicated in 1256, when, in the sequel of a severe illness, he took the tonsure. A zealous believer, from his youth upwards, in the doctrines of the Zen sect of Buddhism, he built a temple called Saimyo-ji among the hills of Kamakura, and retired thither to tend his health—entrusting the office of shikken to a relative, Nagatoki, as his own son, Tokimune, was still of tender age—but continuing himself to administer military and judicial affairs, especially when any criminal or civil case of a complicated or difficult nature occurred. Thus, there was a cloistered regent at Kamakura, just as there had so often been a cloistered Emperor in Kyoto. Tradition has busied itself much with Tokiyori's life. He carried to extreme lengths the virtue of economy so greatly extolled by his grandfather, Yasutoki. Such was the frugality of his mode of life that we read of him searching for fragments of food among the remnants of a meal, so that he might serve them to a friend, and we read, also, of his mother repairing with her own hands the paper covering of a shoji in expectation of a visit from him. He is further said to have disguised himself as an itinerent bonze and to have travelled about the provinces, observing the state of the people and learning their complaints. His experiences, on this pilgrimage read like a romance. Lodging at one time with an aged widow, he learns that she has been robbed of her estate and reduced to painful poverty, a wrong which Tokiyori hastens to redress; at another time his host is an old samurai whose loyal record comes thus to the knowledge of the shikken and is subsequently recognized.

But it must be confessed that these tales rest on very slender evidence. Better attested is the story of Aoto Fujitsuna, which illustrates at once the character of Tokiyori and the customs of the time. This Fujitsuna was a man of humble origin but considerable learning. One year, the country being visited by drought, Tokiyori gave rice and money to priests for religious services, and himself worshipped at the shrine of Mishima. These measures were vehemently criticized by Fujitsuna, who described them as enriching the wealthy to help the impoverished. When informed of this, Tokiyori, instead of resenting it, sent for Fujitsuna and nominated him a member of the Court of Recorders,* where he earned the reputation of being one of Japan's greatest judges.** It is related of him that he devoted his whole fortune to objects of charity, and that when Tokiyori, claiming a revelation from heaven, proposed to increase his endowments, his answer was, "Supposing heaven revealed to you that you should put me to death, would you obey?" ***

*The Hikitsuke-shii, a body of men who kept the archives of the Man-dokoro and conducted preliminary judicial investigations. It was organized in Tokiyori's, time and from its members the Hyojoshu was recruited.

**The other was Ooka Tadasuke of the Tokugawa period.

***It is related of this Aoto Fujitsuna that, having dropped a few cash into the Namera River at night, he expended many times the amount in paying torch-bearers to recover the lost coins, his argument being that the money thus expended was merely put into circulation, whereas the dropped money would have been irrevocably lost.

Tokiyori, as already related, though he nominally resigned and entered religion in 1256, really held the reins of power until his death, in 1263. Thus the Insei (camera administration) came into being in Kamakura, as it had done previously in Kyoto. There were altogether nine of the Hojo regents, as shown below:

(1) Tokimasa 1203-1205

(2) Yoshitoki 1205-1224

(3) Yasutoki 1224-1242

(4) Tsunetoki 1242-1246

(5) Tokiyori 1246-1256 Retired in 1256, but ruled in camera till 1263

(6) Tokimune 1256-1284

(7) Sadatoki 1284-1301 Retired in 1301, but ruled in camera till 1311

(8) Morotoki 1301-1311

(9) Takatoki 1311-1333

The first six of these were men of genius, but neither Tokimasa nor Yoshitoki can be called really great administrators, if in the science of administration its moral aspects be included. The next four, however, from Yasutoki down to Tokimune, are distinctly entitled to a high place in the pages of history. Throughout the sixty years of their sway (1224-1284), the Japanese nation was governed with justice* and clemency rarely found in the records of any medieval State, and it is a strange fact that Japan's debt to these Hojo rulers remained unrecognized until modern times.

*It is recorded that the first half of every month in Kamakura was devoted to judicial proceedings, and that at the gate of the Record Office there was hung a bell, by striking which a suitor or petitioner could count on immediate attention.

THE SHOGUNS IN KAMAKURA

In the Minamoto's original scheme of government the office of shogun was an administrative reality. Its purpose was to invest the Bakufu chief with permanent authority to command all the military and naval forces throughout the empire for the defence and tranquillization of the country. In that light the shogunate was regarded while it remained in the hands of Yoritomo and his two sons, Yoriie and Sanetomo. But with the death of Sanetomo, in 1219, and the political extinction of the Minamoto family, the shogunate assumed a different character in the eyes of the Minamoto's successors, the Hojo. These latter, not qualified to hold the office themselves, regarded it as a link between Kamakura and Kyoto, and even as a source from which might be derived lawful sanction for opposing the Throne should occasion arise. Therefore they asked the Emperor Go-Toba to nominate one of his younger sons, and on receiving a refusal, they were fain to be content with a member of the Fujiwara family, who had long held the Court in the hollow of their hands. This nomination was never intended to carry with it any real authority. The shoguns were mere puppets. During the interval of 114 years between the death of Sanetomo (1219) and the fall of the Hojo (1333), there were six of these faineant officials:

Age at Age at Appn't Depos'n

Fujiwara Yoritsune, 1219-1244 2 27

Yoritsugu 1244-1252 5 13

Prince Munetaka, 1252-1266 10 24 elder brother of Go-Fukakusa

Prince Koreyasu, son of Munetaka 1266-1289 3 26

Prince Hisaakira, son of Go-Fukakusa 1289-1308 13 32

Prince Morikuni, son of Hisaakira 1308-1333 7 32

The record shows that all these officials were appointed at an age when independent thought had not yet become possible, and that they were removed as soon as they began to think for themselves. It will be observed that there is a palpable break in the uniformity of the list. Yoritsugu alone was stripped of office while still in his teens. That was because his father, the ex-shogun, engaged in a plot to overthrow the Hojo. But the incident was also opportune. It occurred just at the time when other circumstances combined to promote the ambition of the Hojo in the matter of obtaining an Imperial prince for shogun. The throne was then occupied by Go-Fukakusa (the eighty-ninth sovereign), a son of Go-Saga (the eighty-eighth sovereign), who, as we shall see, owed his elevation to the influence exercised by Hojo Yasutoki after the Shokyu war. Now it happened that, in 1252, a conspiracy against Go-Saga was found to have been fomented by the head of that branch of the Fujiwara family from which the Kamakura shoguns were taken. The conspiracy was a thing of the past and so were its principal fomenters, but it served as a conclusive reason for not creating another Fujiwara shogun. Prince Munetaka, an elder brother of the reigning Emperor, was chosen, and thus the last four Bakufu shoguns were all of Imperial blood.

Their lineage, however, did not avail much as against Bakufu arbitrariness. The Hojo adopted towards the shoguns the same policy as that previously pursued by the Fujiwara towards the sovereigns—appointment during the years of childhood and removal on reaching full manhood.* But the shoguns were not unavenged.

*It is related that when the regent, Sadatoki, in 1289, removed Prince Koreyasu from the office of shogun, he ordered that the bamboo palanquin in which the prince journeyed to Kyoto should be carried with the back in front. The people said that the prince was banished to Kyoto.

It was owing to the social influence exercised by their entourage that the frugal and industrious habits of the bushi at Kamakura were gradually replaced by the effeminate pastimes and enervating accomplishments of the Imperial capital. For the personnel and equipage of a shogun's palace at Kamakura differed essentially from those of Hojo regents (shikken) like Yasutoki and his three immediate successors. In the former were seen a multitude of highly paid officials whose duties did not extend to anything more serious than the conservation of forms of etiquette; the custody of gates, doors, and shutters; the care of pavilions and villas; the practice and teaching of polite accomplishments, such as music and versification; dancing, handball, and football; the cultivation of refined archery and equestrianism, and the guarding of the shogun's person.*

*The officials of the shogun's court were collectively called banshu.

At the regency, on the other hand, functions of the most arduous character were continuously discharged by a small staff of earnest, unpretentious men, strangers to luxury or leisure and solicitous, primarily, to promote the cause of justice and to satisfy the canons of efficiency. The contrast could not but be demoralizing. Not rapidly or without a struggle, but slowly and inevitably, the poison of bad example permeated Kamakura society, and the sinecures in the shogun's household came to be coveted by the veterans of the Bakufu, who, throughout the peaceful times secured by Hojo rule, found no means of gaining honours or riches in the field, and who saw themselves obliged to mortgage their estates in order to meet the cost of living, augmented by extravagant banquets, fine buildings, and rich garments. Eight times between 1252 and 1330, edicts were issued by the Bakufu fixing the prices of commodities, vetoing costly residences, prohibiting expensive garments, censuring neglect of military arts, and ordering resumption of the old-time sports and exercises. These attempts to check the evil had only very partial success. The vices spread, and "in the complex of factors that led to the downfall of the Bakufu, the ultimate ascendancy of Kyoto's social standards in Kamakura must probably be regarded as the most important."*

*Murdoch's History of Japan.

THE TWO LINES OF EMPERORS

It is necessary now to turn for a moment to the story of the Imperial city, which, since the appearance of the Bakufu upon the scene, has occupied a very subordinate place in these pages, as it did in fact. Not that there was any outward or visible sign of diminishing importance. All the old administrative machinery remained operative, the old codes of etiquette continued to claim strict observance, and the old functions of government were discharged. But only the shadow of authority existed at Kyoto; the substance had passed effectually to Kamakura. As for the throne, its chiefly remarkable feature was the brevity of its occupation by successive sovereigns:

Order of Succession Name Date

77th Sovereign Go-Shirakawa 1156-1158

78th " Nijo 1159-1166

79th " Rokuju 1166-1168

80th " Takakura 1169-1180

81st " Antoku 1181-1183

82nd " Go-Toba 1184-1198

83rd " Tsuchimikado 1199-1210

84th " Juntoku 1211-1221

85th " Chukyo 1221

86th " Go-Horikawa 1221-1232

87th " Shijo 1233-1242

88th " Go-Saga 1243-1246

Here are seen twelve consecutive Emperors whose united reigns covered a period of ninety-one years, being an average of seven and one-half years, approximately. It has been shown that Go-Horikawa received the purple practically from the hands of the Hojo in the sequel of the Shokyu disturbance, and the same is true of Go-Saga, he having been nominated from Kamakura in preference to a son of Juntoku, whose complicity in that disturbance had been notorious. Hence Go-Saga's attitude towards Kamakura was always one of deference, increased by the fact that his eldest son, Munetaka, went to Kamakura as shogun, in 1252. Vacating the throne in 1246, he named his second son, Go-Fukakusa, to succeed; and his third, Kameyama, to be Prince Imperial. The former was only three years old when (1246) he became nominal sovereign, and, after a reign of thirteen years, he was compelled (1259) to make way for his father's favourite, Kameyama, who reigned from 1259 to 1274.

To understand what followed, a short genealogical table will assist:

88th Sovereign, Go-Saga (1243-1246) + + -+ 89th, Go-Fukakusa (1246-1259) 90th, Kameyama (1259-1274) 92nd, Fushimi (1287-1298) 91st, Go-Uda (1274-1287) + -+ + + -+ -+ 93rd, 95th, 94th, 96th, Go-Fushimi Hanazono Go-Nijo Go-Daigo (1298-1301) (1307-1318) (1301-1307) (1318-1339) + -+ + + -+ -+ Jimyo-in family Daikagu-ji Family (called afterwards Hoku-cho, (called afterwards Nan-cho, or the Northern Court) or the Southern Court)

The cloistered Emperor, Go-Saga, abdicating after a reign of four years, conducted the administration according to the camera system during twenty-six years. It will be observed from the above table that he essayed to hold the balance equally between the families of his two sons, the occupant of the throne being chosen from each alternately. But everything goes to show that he favoured the Kameyama branch. Like Go-Toba, he cherished the hope of seeing the Imperial Court released from the Bakufu shackles, and to that end the alert, enterprising Kameyama seemed better suited than the dull, resourceless Takakura, just as in Go-Toba's eyes Juntoku had appeared preferable to Tsuchimikado.

Dying in 1272, Go-Saga left a will with injunctions that it should be opened in fifty days. It contained provisions destined to have disastrous consequences. One clause entrusted to the Bakufu the duty of deciding whether the administrative power should be placed in the hands of the cloistered Emperor, Go-Fukakusa, or in those of the reigning sovereign, Kameyama. Another provided that a very large property, known as the Chokodo estates, should be inherited by the monarch thus deposed from authority; while a comparatively small bequest went to the depository of power. In framing this curious instrument, Go-Saga doubtless designed to gild the pill of permanent exclusion from the seats of power, believing confidently that the Imperial succession would be secured to Kameyama and his direct descendants. This anticipation proved correct. The Bakufu had recourse to a Court lady to determine the trend of the deceased sovereign's wishes, and the result was that Kameyama triumphed.

In the normal order of things the cloistered Emperor Go-Fukakusa would have succeeded to the administrative place occupied by Go-Saga, and a large body of courtiers, whose chances of promotion and emolument depended upon that arrangement, bitterly resented the innovation. The palace became divided into two parties, the Naiho (interior section) and the Inho (camera section), a division which grew more accentuated when Kameyama's son ascended the throne as Go-Uda, in 1274. Go-Fukakusa declared that he would leave his palace and enter a monastery were such a wrong done to his children. Thereupon Kameyama—now cloistered Emperor—submitted the matter to the Bakufu, who, after grave deliberation, decided that Go-Fukakusa's son should be named Crown Prince and should reign in succession to Go-Uda. This ruler is known in history as Fushimi.

Shortly after his accession a sensational event occurred. A bandit made his way during the night into the palace and seizing one of the court ladies, ordered her to disclose the Emperor's whereabouts. The sagacious woman misdirected him, and then hastened to inform the sovereign, who disguised himself as a female and escaped. Arrested by the guards, the bandit committed suicide with a sword which proved to be a precious heirloom of the Sanjo family. Sanjo Sanemori, a former councillor of State, was arrested on suspicion, but his examination disclosed nothing. Then a grand councillor (dainagori) charged the cloistered Emperor, Kameyama, with being privy to the attempt, and Fushimi showed a disposition to credit the charge. Kameyama, however, conveyed to the Bakufu a solemn oath of innocence, with which Fushimi was fain to be ostensibly content. But his Majesty remained unconvinced at heart. He sent to Kamakura a secret envoy with instructions to attribute to Kameyama an abiding desire to avenge the wrongs of Go-Toba and wipe out the Shokyu humiliation. This vengeful mood might find practical expression at anytime, and Fushimi, warned the Bakufu to be on their guard. "As for me," he concluded, "I leave my descendants entirely in the hands of the Hojo. With Kamakura we stand or fall."

How much of this was sincere, how much diplomatic, it is not possible to determine. In Kamakura, however, it found credence. Sadatoki, then regent (shikken), took prompt measures to have Fushimi's son proclaimed Prince Imperial, and, in 1298, he was enthroned as Go-Fushimi. This evoked an indignant protest from the then cloistered Emperor, Go-Uda, and after some consideration the Kamakura regent, Sadatoki, suggested—"directed" would perhaps be a more correct form of speech—that thenceforth the succession to the throne should alternate between the two families descended from Go-Fukakusa and Kameyama, the length of a reign being limited to ten years. Nominally, this arrangement was a mark of deference to the testament of Go-Saga, but in reality it was an astute device to weaken the authority of the Court by dividing it into rival factions. Kamakura's fiat received peaceful acquiescence at first. Go-Uda's eldest son took the sceptre in 1301, under the name of Go-Nijo, and, after seven years, he was succeeded by Fushimi's son, Hanazono, who, in twelve years, made way for Go-Uda's second son, Go-Daigo.

The descendants of Kameyama were called the "Daigaku-ji family," and the descendants of Go-Fukakusa received the name of the "Jimyo-in family." When a member of the latter occupied the throne, the Court enjoyed opulence, owing to its possession of the extensive Chokodo estates; but when the sovereign was of the Daigaku-ji line comparative penury was experienced. There can be little doubt that, throughout the complications antecedent to this dual system, the Fushimi princes acted practically as spies for the Bakufu. After all, the two Imperial families were descended from a common ancestor and should have shrunk from the disgrace of publishing their rivalries. It is true, as we shall presently see, that the resulting complications involved the destruction of the Hojo; but it is also true that they plunged the nation into a fifty years' war.

THE FIVE REGENT FAMILIES

It has already been related how, by Yoritomo's contrivance, the post of family—descended from Fujiwara Kanezane—and scions of the Konoe family—descended from Fujiwara Motomichi. This system was subsequently extended at the instance of the Hojo. The second and third sons of Michiiye, grandson of Kanezane, founded the houses of Nijo and Ichijo, respectively; while Kanehira, the second of two grandsons of Motomichi, established the house of Takatsukasa. These five families—Konoe, Kujo, Nijo, Ichijo, and Takatsukasa—were collectively called Go-sekke (the Five Regent Houses) in recognition of the fact that the regent in Kyoto was supposed to be taken from them in succession. The arrangement led to frequent strife with resulting weakness, thus excellently achieving the purpose of its contrivers, the Hojo.

THE FIRST MONGOL INVASION

The rule of the Hojo synchronized with two events of prime importance the invasion of Japan by a Mongolian army, first in 1274, and subsequently in 1281. Early in the twelfth century, the Emperor of China, which was then under the sway of the Sung dynasty, invited the Golden Tatars to deal with the Khitan Tatars, who held Manchuria, and who, in spite of heavy tribute paid annually by the Sung Court, continually raided northeastern China. The Golden Tatars responded to the invitation by not only expelling the Khitans but also taking their place in Manchuria and subsequently overrunning China, where they established a dynasty of their own from 1115 to 1234.

These struggles and dynastic changes did not sensibly affect Japan. Her intercourse with the Asiatic continent in those ages was confined mainly to an interchange of visits by Buddhist priests, to industrial enterprise, and to a fitful exchange of commodities. It does not appear that any branch of the Tatars concerned themselves practically about Japan or the Japanese. Ultimately, however, in the first part of the thirteenth century, the Mongols began to sweep down on the Middle Kingdom under the leadership of Jenghiz Khan. They crushed the Golden Tatars, transferred (1264) the Mongol capital from central Asia to Peking (Cambaluc), and, in 1279, under Kublai, completely conquered China. Nearly thirty years before the transfer of the capital to Peking, the Mongols invaded the Korean peninsula, and brought it completely under their sway in 1263, receiving the final submission of the kingdom of Koma, which alone had offered any stubborn resistance.

It is probable that Kublai's ambition, whetted by extensive conquests, would have turned in the direction of Japan sooner or later, but tradition indicates that the idea of obtaining the homage of the Island Empire was suggested to the great Khan by a Korean traveller in 1265. Kublai immediately acted on the suggestion. He sent an embassy by way of Korea, ordering the Koma sovereign to make arrangements for the transport of the envoys and to re-enforce them with a Korean colleague. A tempest interrupted this essay, and it was not repeated until 1268, when the Khan's messengers, accompanied by a Korean suite, crossed safely to Chikuzen and delivered to the Dazai-fu a letter from Kublai with a covering despatch from the Korean King. The Korean sovereign's despatch was plainly inspired by a desire to avert responsibility from himself. He explained that in transporting the embassy he acted unavoidably, but that, in sending it, the Khan was not actuated by any hostile feeling, his sole purpose being to include Japan in the circle of his friendly tributaries.

In short, the Koma prince—he no longer could properly be called a monarch—would have been only too pleased to see Japan pass under the Mongol yoke as his own kingdom had already done. Kublai's letter, however, though not deliberately arrogant, could not be construed in any sense except as a summons to send tribute-bearing envoys to Peking. He called himself "Emperor" and addressed the Japanese ruler as "King;" instanced, for fitting example, the relation between China and Korea, which he described at once as that of lord and vassal and that of parent and child, and predicated that refusal of intercourse would "lead to war."

The Japanese interpreted this to be an offer of suzerainty or subjugation. Two courses were advocated; one by Kyoto, the other by Kamakura. The former favoured a policy of conciliation and delay; the latter, an attitude of contemptuous silence. Kamakura, of course, triumphed. After six months' retention the envoys were sent away without so much as a written acknowledgment. The records contain nothing to show whether this bold course on the part of the Bakufu had its origin in ignorance of the Mongol's might or in a conviction of the bushi's fighting superiority. Probably both factors were operative; for Japan's knowledge of Jenghiz and his resources reached her chiefly through religious channels, and the fact that Koreans were associated with Mongols in the mission must have tended to lower the affair in her estimation. Further, the Japanese had been taught by experience the immense difficulties of conducting oversea campaigns, and if they understood anything about the Mongols, it should have been the essentially non-maritime character of the mid-Asian conquerors.

By Kublai himself that defect was well appreciated. He saw that to carry a body of troops to Japan, the seagoing resources of the Koreans must be requisitioned, and on the bootless return of his first embassy, he immediately issued orders to the Koma King to build one thousand ships and mobilize forty thousand troops. In vain the recipient of these orders pleaded inability to execute them. The Khan insisted, and supplemented his first command with instructions that agricultural operations should be undertaken on a large scale in the peninsula to supply food for the projected army of invasion. Meanwhile he despatched embassy after embassy to Japan, evidently being desirous of carrying his point by persuasion rather than by force. The envoys invariably returned re infecta. On one occasion (1269), a Korean vessel carried off two Japanese from Tsushima and sent them to Peking. There, Kublai treated them kindly, showed them his palace as well as a parade of his troops, and sent them home to tell what they had seen. But the Japanese remained obdurate, and finally the Khan sent an ultimatum, to which Tokimune, the Hojo regent, replied by dismissing the envoys forthwith.

War was now inevitable. Kublai massed 25,000 Mongol braves in Korea, supplemented them with 15,000 Korean troops, and embarking them in a flotilla of 900 vessels manned by 8000 Koreans, launched this paltry army against Japan in November, 1274. The armada began by attacking Tsushima and Iki, islands lying in the strait that separates the Korean peninsula from Japan. In Tsushima, the governor, So Sukekuni,* could not muster more than two hundred bushi. But these two hundred fought to the death, as did also the still smaller garrison of Iki. Before the passage of the narrow strait was achieved, the invaders must have lost something of their faith in the whole enterprise. On November 20th, they landed at Hako-zaki Gulf in the province of Chikuzen There they were immediately assailed by the troops of five Kyushu chieftains. What force the latter represented there is no record, but they were certainly less numerous than the enemy. Moreover, the Yuan army possessed a greatly superior tactical system. By a Japanese bushi the battle-field was regarded as an arena for the display of individual prowess, not of combined force. The Mongols, on the contrary, fought in solid co-operation, their movements directed by sound of drum from some eminence where the commander-in-chief watched the progress of the fight. If a Japanese approached to defy one of them to single combat, they enveloped and slew him. Further, at close quarters they used light arms dipped in poison, and for long-range purposes they had powerful crossbows, which quite outclassed the Japanese weapons. They were equipped also with explosives which they fired from metal tubes, inflicting heavy loss on the Japanese, who were demoralized by such an unwonted weapon. Finally, they were incomparable horsemen, and in the early encounters they put the Japanese cavalry out of action by raising with drums and gongs a din that terrified the latter's horses. But, in spite of all these disadvantages, the Japanese fought stubbornly. Whenever they got within striking distance of the foe, they struck desperately, and towards evening they were able to retire in good order into cover "behind the primitive fortifications of Mizuki raised for Tenchi Tenno by Korean engineers six centuries before."

*Grandson of Taira no Tomomori, admiral of the Hei fleet in the battle of Dan-no-ura.

ENGRAVING: REPULSE OF THE MONGOL INVADERS (From a scroll painting in possession of the Imperial Household)

That night the west coast of Kyushu was menaced by one of those fierce gales that rage from time to time in sub-tropical zones. The Korean pilots knew that their ships could find safety in the open sea only. But what was to be done with the troops which had debarked? Had their commanders seen any certain hope of victory, they would not have hesitated to part temporarily from the ships. The day's fighting, however, appears to have inspired a new estimate of the bushi's combatant qualities. It was decided to embark the Yuan forces and start out to sea. For the purpose of covering this movement, the Hakozaki shrine and some adjacent hamlets were fired, and when morning dawned the invaders' flotilla was seen beating out of the bay. One of their vessels ran aground on Shiga spit at the north of the haven and several others foundered at sea, so that when a tally was finally called, 13,200 men did not answer to their names. As to what the Japanese casualties were, there is no information.

THE SECOND MONGOL INVASION

Of course Kublai did not acknowledge this as a defeat at the hands of the Japanese. On the contrary, he seems to have imagined that the fight had struck terror into the hearts of the islanders by disclosing their faulty tactics and inferior weapons. He therefore sent another embassy, which was charged to summon the King of Japan to Peking, there to do obeisance to the Yuan Emperor. Kamakura's answer was to decapitate the five leaders of the mission and to pillory their heads outside the city. Nothing, indeed, is more remarkable than the calm confidence shown at this crisis by the Bakufu regent, Tokimune. His country's annalists ascribe that mood to faith in the doctrines of the Zen sect of Buddhism; faith which he shared with his father, Tokiyori, during the latter's life. The Zen priests taught an introspective philosophy. They preached that life springs from not-living, indestructibility from destruction, and that existence and non-existence are one in reality. No creed could better inspire a soldier.

It has been suggested that Tokimune was not guided in this matter solely by religious instincts: he used the Zen-shu bonzes as a channel for obtaining information about China. Some plausibility is given to that theory by the fact that he sat, first, at the feet of Doryu, originally a Chinese priest named Tao Lung, and that on Doryu's death he invited (1278) from China a famous bonze, Chu Yuan (Japanese, Sogen), for whose ministrations the afterwards celebrated temple Yengaku-ji was erected. Sogen himself, when officiating at the temple of Nengjen, in Wenchow, had barely escaped massacre at the hands of the Mongols, and he may not have been averse to acting as a medium of information between China and Kamakura.

Tokimune's religious fervour, however, did not interfere with his secular preparations. In 1280, he issued an injunction exhorting local officials and vassals (go-kenin) to compose all their dissensions and work in unison. There could be no greater crime, the document declared, then to sacrifice the country's interests on the altar of personal enmities at a time of national crisis. Loyal obedience on the part of vassals, and strict impartiality on the side of high constables—these were the virtues which the safety of the State demanded, and any neglect to practise them should be punished with the utmost severity. This injunction was issued in 1280, and already steps had been taken to construct defensive works at all places where the Mongols might effect a landing—at Hakozaki Bay in Kyushu; at Nagato, on the northern side of the Shimonoseki Strait; at Harima, on the southern shore of the Inland Sea; and at Tsuruga, on the northwest of the main island. Among these places, Hakozaki and Nagato were judged to be the most menaced, and special offices, after the nature of the Kyoto tandai, were established there.

ENGRAVING: HOJO TOKIMUNE

Seven years separated the first invasion from the second. It was not of deliberate choice that Kublai allowed so long an interval to elapse. The subjugation of the last supporters of the Sung dynasty in southern China had engrossed his attention, and with their fall he acquired new competence to prosecute this expedition to Japan, because while the Mongolian boats were fit only for plying on inland waters, the ships of the southern Chinese were large, ocean-going craft. It was arranged that an army of 100,000 Chinese and Mongols should embark at a port in Fuhkien opposite the island of Formosa, and should ultimately form a junction in Tsushima Strait with an armada of 1000 Korean ships, carrying, in addition to their crews, a force of 50,000 Mongols and 20,000 Koreans.

But before launching this formidable host, Kublai made a final effort to compass his end without fighting. In 1280, he sent another embassy to Japan, announcing the complete overthrow of the Sung dynasty, and summoning the Island Empire to enter into friendly relations. Kamakura's answer was to order the execution of the envoys at the place where they had landed, Hakata in Chikuzen. Nothing now remained except an appeal to force. A weak point in the Yuan strategy was that the two armadas were not operated in unison. The Korean fleet sailed nearly a month before that from China. It would seem that the tardiness of the latter was not due wholly to its larger dimensions, but must be attributed in part to its composition. A great portion of the troops transported from China were not Mongols, but Chinese, who had been recently fighting against the Yuan, and whose despatch on a foreign campaign in the service of their victors suggested itself as a politic measure. These men were probably not averse to delay and certainly cannot have been very enthusiastic.

In May, 1281, the flotilla from Korea appeared off Tsushima. Unfortunately, the annals of medieval Japan are singularly reticent as to the details of battles. There are no materials for constructing a story of the events that occurred on the Tsushima shores, more than six centuries ago. We do not even know what force the defenders of the island mustered. But that they were much more numerous than on the previous occasion, seven years before, is certain. Already, in 1280, Tokimune had obtained from Buddhist sources information of the Mongol preparations—preparations so extensive that the felling of timber to make ships inspired a Chinese poem in which the green hills were depicted as mourning for their trees—and he would not have failed to garrison strongly a position so cardinal as the midchannel island of Tsushima. It was not reduced. The enemy were able to effect a lodgement, but could not overrun the island or put its defenders to the sword, as had been done in 1274. The Korean ships remained at Tsushima awaiting the arrival of the Chinese flotilla. They lost three thousand men from sickness during this interval, and were talking of retreat when the van of the southern armada hove in sight. A junction was effected off the coast of Iki island, and the garrison of this little place having been destroyed on June 10th, the combined forces stood over towards Kyushu and landed at various places along the coast of Chikuzen, making Hakozaki Bay their base.

Such a choice of locality was bad, for it was precisely along the shores of this bay that the Japanese had erected fortifications. They were not very formidable fortifications, it is true. The bushi of these days knew nothing about bastions, curtains, glacis, or cognate refinements of military engineering. They simply built a stone wall to block the foe's advance, and did not even adopt the precaution of protecting their flanks. But neither did they fall into the error of acting entirely on the defensive. On the contrary, they attacked alike on shore and at sea. Their boats were much smaller than those of the invaders, but the advantage in dash and daring was all on the side of the Japanese. So furious were their onsets, and so deadly was the execution they wrought with their trenchant swords at close quarters, that the enemy were fain to lash their ships together and lay planks between them for purposes of speedy concentration. It is most improbable that either the Korean or the Chinese elements of the invading army had any heart for the work, whereas on the side of the defenders there are records of whole families volunteering to serve at the front. During fifty-three days the campaign continued; that is to say, from June 23rd, when the first landing was effected, until August 14th, when a tornado swept off the face of the sea the main part of the Yuan armada.

No account has been preserved, either traditionally or historically, of the incidents or phases of the long fight. We know that the invaders occupied the island of Hirado and landed in Hizen a strong force intended to turn the flank of the Hakozaki Bay parapet. We know, inferentially, that they never succeeded in turning it. We know that, after nearly two months of incessant combat, the Yuan armies had made no sensible impression on the Japanese resistance or established any footing upon Japanese soil. We know that, on August the 14th and 15th, there burst on the shores of Kyushu a tempest which shattered nearly the whole of the Chinese flotilla. And we know that the brunt of the loss fell on the Chinese contingent, some twelve thousand of whom were made slaves. But no such momentous chapter of history has ever been traced in rougher outlines. The annalist is compelled to confine himself to marshalling general results. It was certainly a stupendous disaster for the Yuan arms. Yet Kublai was not content; he would have essayed the task again had not trouble nearer home diverted his attention from Japan. The Island Empire had thus the honour of being practically the only state in the Orient that did not present tribute to the all-conquering Mongols.

But, by a strangely wayward fate, these victories over a foreign invader brought embarrassment to the Hojo rulers rather than renown. In the first place, there could not be any relaxation of the extraordinary preparations which such incidents dictated. Kublai's successor, Timur, lost no time in countermanding all measures for a renewed attack on Japan, and even adopted the plan of commissioning Buddhist priests to persuade the Bakufu of China's pacific intentions. One of these emissaries, Nei-issan (Chinese pronunciation, Ning I-shan), settled permanently in Japan, and his holy ministrations as a Zen-shu propagandist won universal respect. But the Bakufu did not relax their precautions, and for more than a score of years a heavy burden of expense had to be borne on this account.

Further, when the wave of invasion broke on the shores of Kyushu, the Court in Kyoto set the example of appealing to the assistance of heaven. Prayers were offered, liturgies were chanted, and incense was burned at many temples and shrines throughout the empire. Several of the priests did not hesitate to assert that their supplications had elicited signs and portents indicating supernatural aid. Rich rewards were bestowed in recognition of these services, whereas, on the contrary, the recompense given to the soldiers who had fought so gallantly and doggedly to beat off a foreign foe was comparatively petty. Means of recompensing them were scant. When Yoritomo overthrew the Taira, the estates of the latter were divided among his followers and co-operators. After the Shokyu disturbance, the property of the Court nobles served a similar purpose. But the repulse of the Mongols brought no access of wealth to the victors, and for the first time military merit had to go unrequited while substantial grants were made to the servants of religion. The Bakufu, fully conscious of this dangerous discrepancy, saw no resource except to order that strict surveys should be made of many of the great estates, with a view to their delimitation and reduction, if possible. This, however, was a slow progress, and the umbrage that it caused was more than commensurate with the results that accrued. Thus, to the Bakufu the consequences of a war which should have strengthened allegiance and gratitude were, on the contrary, injurious and weakening.

ENGRAVING: FIVE STRING BIWA (JAPANESE MANDOLIN)

ENGRAVING: KOTO, 13-STRINGED HORIZONTAL HARP



CHAPTER XXVIII

ART, RELIGION, LITERATURE, CUSTOMS, AND COMMERCE IN THE KAMAKURA PERIOD

ART

From the establishment of the Bakufu, Japanese art separated into two schools, that of Kamakura and that of Kyoto. The latter centered in the Imperial Court, the former in the Court of the Hojo. Taken originally from Chinese masters of the Sui and Tang dynasties, the Kyoto art ultimately developed into the Japanese national school, whereas the Kamakura art, borrowed from the academies of Sung and Yuan, became the favourite of the literary classes and preserved its Chinese traditions. Speaking broadly, the art of Kyoto showed a decorative tendency, whereas that of Kamakura took landscape and seascape chiefly for motives, and, delighting in the melancholy aspects of nature, appealed most to the student and the cenobite. This distinction could be traced in calligraphy, painting, architecture, and horticulture. Hitherto penmanship in Kyoto had taken for models the style of Kobo Daishi and Ono no Tofu. This was called o-ie-fu (domestic fashion), and had a graceful and cursive character. But the Kamakura calligraphists followed the pure Chinese mode (karayo), as exemplified by the Buddhist priests, Sogen (Chu Yuan) and Ichinei (I Ning).