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Again, even if we should grant that the world was created by an agent, then such an agent should have a body for we have never seen any intelligent creator without a body. If it is held that we should consider the general condition of agency only, namely, that the agent is intelligent, the objection will be that this is impossible, for agency is always associated with some kind of body. If you take the instances with some kind of effects such as the shoots of corn growing in the fields, it will be found that these had no intelligent agents behind them to create them. If it is said that these are also made by God, then you have an argument in a circle (cakraka), for this was the very matter which you sought to prove.

Let it be granted for the sake of argument that God exists. Does his mere abstract existence produce the world? Well, in that case, the abstract existence of a potter may also create the world, for the abstract existence is the same in both cases. Does he produce the world by knowledge and will? Well, that is impossible, for there cannot be any knowledge and will without a body. Does he produce the world by physical movement or any other kind of movement? In any case that is impossible, for there cannot be any movement without a body. If you suppose that he is omniscient, you may do so, but that does not prove that he can be all-creator.

Let us again grant for the sake of argument that a bodiless God can create the world by his will and activity. Did he take to creation through a personal whim? In that case there would be no natural laws and order in the world. Did he take to it in accordance with the moral and immoral actions of men? Then he is guided by a moral order and is not independent. Is it through mercy that he took to creation? Well then, we suppose there should have been only happiness in the world and nothing else. If it is said that it is by the past actions of men that they suffer pains and enjoy pleasure, and if men are led to do vicious actions by past deeds which work like blind destiny, then such a blind destiny (ad@r@s@ta) might take the place of God. If He took to creation as mere play, then he must be a child who did things without a purpose. If it was due to his desire of punishing certain people and favouring others, then he must harbour favouritism on behalf of some and hatred against others. If the creation took place simply through his own nature, then, what is the good of

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admitting him at all? You may rather say that the world came into being out of its own nature.

It is preposterous to suppose that one God without the help of any instruments or other accessories of any kind, could create this world. This is against all experience.

Admitting for the sake of argument that such a God exists, you could never justify the adjectives with which you wish to qualify him. Thus you say that he is eternal. But since he has no body, he must be of the nature of intelligence and will. But this nature must have changed in diverse forms for the production of diverse kinds of worldly things, which are of so varied a nature. If there were no change in his knowledge and will, then there could not have been diverse kinds of creation and destruction. Destruction and creation cannot be the result of one unchangeable will and knowledge. Moreover it is the character of knowledge to change, if the word is used in the sense in which knowledge is applied to human beings, and surely we are not aware of any other kind of knowledge. You say that God is omniscient, but it is difficult to suppose how he can have any knowledge at all, for as he has no organs he cannot have any perception, and since he cannot have any perception he cannot have any inference either. If it is said that without the supposition of a God the variety of the world would be inexplicable, this also is not true, for this implication would only be justified if there were no other hypothesis left. But there are other suppositions also. Even without an omniscient God you could explain all things merely by the doctrine of moral order or the law of karma. If there were one God, there could be a society of Gods too. You say that if there were many Gods, then there would be quarrels and differences of opinion. This is like the story of a miser who for fear of incurring expenses left all his sons and wife and retired into the forest. When even ants and bees can co-operate together and act harmoniously, the supposition that if there were many Gods they would have fallen out, would indicate that in spite of all the virtues that you ascribe to God you think his nature to be quite unreliable, if not vicious. Thus in whichever way one tries to justify the existence of God he finds that it is absolutely a hopeless task. The best way then is to dispense with the supposition altogether [Footnote ref 1].

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[Footnote 1: See _@Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya_,_ Gu@naratna on Jainism, pp. 115-124.]

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Mok@sa (emancipation).

The motive which leads a man to strive for release (mok@sa) is the avoidance of pain and the attainment of happiness, for the state of mukti is the state of the soul in pure happiness. It is also a state of pure and infinite knowledge (anantajnana) and infinite perception (anantadars'ana). In the sa@msara state on account of the karma veils this purity is sullied, and the veils are only worn out imperfectly and thus reveal this and that object at this and that time as ordinary knowledge (mati), testimony (s'ruta), supernatural cognition, as in trance or hypnotism (avadhi), and direct knowledge of the thoughts of others or thought reading (mana@hparyaya). In the state of release however there is omniscience (kevala-jnana) and all things are simultaneously known to the perfect (kevalin) as they are. In the sa@msara stage the soul always acquires new qualities, and thus suffers a continual change though remaining the same in substance. But in the emancipated stage the changes that a soul suffers are all exactly the same, and thus it is that at this stage the soul appears to be the same in substance as well as in its qualities of infinite knowledge, etc., the change meaning in this state only the repetition of the same qualities.

It may not be out of place to mention here that though the karmas of man are constantly determining him in various ways yet there is in him infinite capacity or power for right action (anantavirya), so that karma can never subdue this freedom and infinite capacity, though this may be suppressed from time to time by the influence of karma. It is thus that by an exercise of this power man can overcome all karma and become finally liberated. If man had not this anantavirya in him he might have been eternally under the sway of the accumulated karma which secured his bondage (bandha). But since man is the repository of this indomitable power the karmas can only throw obstacles and produce sufferings, but can never prevent him from attaining his highest good.

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CHAPTER VII

THE KAPILA AND THE PATANJALA SA@MKHYA (YOGA) [Footnote ref 1].

A Review.

The examination of the two ancient Nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism of two different types ought to convince us that serious philosophical speculations were indulged in, in circles other than those of the Upani@sad sages. That certain practices known as Yoga were generally prevalent amongst the wise seems very probable, for these are not only alluded to in some of the Upani@sads but were accepted by the two nastika schools of Buddhism and Jainism. Whether we look at them from the point of view of ethics or metaphysics, the two Nastika schools appear to have arisen out of a reaction against the sacrificial disciplines of the Brahma@nas. Both these systems originated with the K@sattriyas and were marked by a strong aversion against the taking of animal life, and against the doctrine of offering animals at the sacrifices.

The doctrine of the sacrifices supposed that a suitable combination of rites, rituals, and articles of sacrifice had the magical power of producing the desired effect—a shower of rain, the birth of a son, the routing of a huge army, etc. The sacrifices were enjoined generally not so much for any moral elevation, as for the achievement of objects of practical welfare. The Vedas were the eternal revelations which were competent so to dictate a detailed procedure, that we could by following it proceed on a certain course of action and refrain from other injurious courses in such a manner that we might obtain the objects we desired by the accurate performance of any sacrifice. If we are to define truth in accordance with the philosophy of such a ritualistic culture we might say that, that alone is true, in accordance with which we may realize our objects in the world about us; the truth of Vedic injunctions is shown by the practical attainment of our

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[Footnote 1: This chapter is based on my Study of Patanjali, published by the Calcutta University, and my Yoga philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of thought, awaiting publication with the same authority. The system has been treated in detail in those two works.]

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objects. Truth cannot be determined a priori but depends upon the test of experience [Footnote ref l].

It is interesting to notice that Buddhism and Jainism though probably born out of a reactionary movement against this artificial creed, yet could not but be influenced by some of its fundamental principles which, whether distinctly formulated or not, were at least tacitly implied in all sacrificial performances. Thus we see that Buddhism regarded all production and destruction as being due to the assemblage of conditions, and defined truth as that which could produce any effect. But to such a logical extreme did the Buddhists carry these doctrines that they ended in formulating the doctrine of absolute momentariness [Footnote ref 2]. Turning to the Jains we find that they also regarded the value of knowledge as consisting in the help that it offers in securing what is good for us and avoiding what is evil; truth gives us such an account of things that on proceeding according to its directions we may verify it by actual experience. Proceeding on a correct estimate of things we may easily avail ourselves of what is good and avoid what is bad. The Jains also believed that changes were produced by the assemblage of conditions, but they did not carry this doctrine to its logical extreme. There was change in the world as well as permanence. The Buddhists had gone so far that they had even denied the existence of any permanent soul. The Jains said that no ultimate, one-sided and absolute view of things could be taken, and held that not only the happening of events was conditional, but even all our judgments, are true only in a limited sense. This is indeed true for common sense, which we acknowledge as superior to mere a priori abstractions, which lead to absolute and one-sided conclusions. By the assemblage of conditions, old qualities in things disappeared, new qualities came in, and a part remained permanent. But this common-sense view, though in agreement with our ordinary experience, could not satisfy our inner a priori demands for finding out ultimate truth, which was true not relatively but absolutely. When asked whether anything was true, Jainism



[Footnote 1: The philosophy of the Vedas as formulated by the Mima@msa of Kumarila and Prabhakara holds the opposite view. Truth according to them is determined a priori while error is determined by experience.]

[Footnote 2: Historically the doctrine of momentariness is probably prior to the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva. But the later Buddhists sought to prove that momentariness was the logical result of the doctrine of arthakriyakaritva.]

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would answer, "yes, this is true from this point of view, but untrue from that point of view, while that is also true from such a point of view and untrue from another." But such an answer cannot satisfy the mind which seeks to reach a definite pronouncement, an absolute judgment.

The main departure of the systems of Jainism and Buddhism from the sacrificial creed consisted in this, that they tried to formulate a theory of the universe, the reality and the position of sentient beings and more particularly of man. The sacrificial creed was busy with individual rituals and sacrifices, and cared for principles or maxims only so far as they were of use for the actual performances of sacrifices. Again action with the new systems did not mean sacrifice but any general action that we always perform. Actions were here considered bad or good according as they brought about our moral elevation or not. The followers of the sacrificial creed refrained from untruth not so much from a sense of personal degradation, but because the Vedas had dictated that untruth should not be spoken, and the Vedas must be obeyed. The sacrificial creed wanted more and more happiness here or in the other world. The systems of Buddhist and Jain philosophy turned their backs upon ordinary happiness and wanted an ultimate and unchangeable state where all pains and sorrows were for ever dissolved (Buddhism) or where infinite happiness, ever unshaken, was realized. A course of right conduct to be followed merely for the moral elevation of the person had no place in the sacrificial creed, for with it a course of right conduct could be followed only if it was so dictated in the Vedas, Karma and the fruit of karma (karmaphala) only meant the karma of sacrifice and its fruits-temporary happiness, such as was produced as the fruit of sacrifices; knowledge with them meant only the knowledge of sacrifice and of the dictates of the Vedas. In the systems however, karma, karmaphala, happiness, knowledge, all these were taken in their widest and most universal sense. Happiness or absolute extinction of sorrow was still the goal, but this was no narrow sacrificial happiness but infinite and unchangeable happiness or destruction of sorrow; karma was still the way, but not sacrificial karma, for it meant all moral and immoral actions performed by us; knowledge here meant the knowledge of truth or reality and not the knowledge of sacrifice.

Such an advance had however already begun in the Upani@shads

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which had anticipated the new systems in all these directions. The pioneers of these new systems probably drew their suggestions both from the sacrificial creed and from the Upani@sads, and built their systems independently by their own rational thinking. But if the suggestions of the Upani@sads were thus utilized by heretics who denied the authority of the Vedas, it was natural to expect that we should find in the Hindu camp such germs of rational thinking as might indicate an attempt to harmonize the suggestions of the Upani@sads and of the sacrificial creed in such a manner as might lead to the construction of a consistent and well-worked system of thought. Our expectations are indeed fulfilled in the Sa@mkhya philosophy, germs of which may be discovered in the Upani@sads.

The Germs of Sa@mkhya in the Upani@sads.

It is indeed true that in the Upani@sads there is a large number of texts that describe the ultimate reality as the Brahman, the infinite, knowledge, bliss, and speak of all else as mere changing forms and names. The word Brahman originally meant in the earliest Vedic literature, mantra, duly performed sacrifice, and also the power of sacrifice which could bring about the desired result [Footnote ref l]. In many passages of the Upani@sads this Brahman appears as the universal and supreme principle from which all others derived their powers. Such a Brahman is sought for in many passages for personal gain or welfare. But through a gradual process of development the conception of Brahman reached a superior level in which the reality and truth of the world are tacitly ignored, and the One, the infinite, knowledge, the real is regarded as the only Truth. This type of thought gradually developed into the monistic Vedanta as explained by S'ankara. But there was another line of thought which was developing alongside of it, which regarded the world as having a reality and as being made up of water, fire, and earth. There are also passages in S'vetas'vatara and particularly in Maitraya@ni from which it appears that the Samkhya line of thought had considerably developed, and many of its technical terms were already in use [Footnote ref 2]. But the date of Maitraya@ni has not yet been definitely settled, and the details



[Footnote 1: See Hillebrandt's article, "Brahman" (E. R.E.).]

[Footnote 2: Katha III. 10, V. 7. S'veta. V. 7, 8, 12, IV. 5, I. 3. This has been dealt with in detail in my Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought, in the first chapter.]

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found there are also not such that we can form a distinct notion of the Sa@mkhya thought as it developed in the Upani@sads. It is not improbable that at this stage of development it also gave some suggestions to Buddhism or Jainism, but the Sa@mkhya-Yoga philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upani@sads with the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of relativism of the Jains.

Sa@mkhya and Yoga Literature.

The main exposition of the system of Sa@mkhya and Yoga in this section has been based on the Sa@mkhya karika, the Sa@mkhya sutras, and the Yoga sutras of Patanjali with their commentaries and sub-commentaries. The Sa@mkhya karika (about 200 A.D.) was written by Is'varak@r@s@na. The account of Sa@mkhya given by Caraka (78 A.D.) represents probably an earlier school and this has been treated separately. Vacaspati Mis'ra (ninth century A.D.) wrote a commentary on it known as Tattvakaumudi. But before him Gaudapada and Raja wrote commentaries on the Sa@mkhya karika [Footnote ref 1]. Narayanatirtha wrote his Candrika on Gaudapada's commentary. The Sa@mkhya sutras which have been commented on by Vijnana Bhik@su (called Pravacanabha@sya) of the sixteenth century seems to be a work of some unknown author after the ninth century. Aniruddha of the latter half of the fifteenth century was the first man to write a commentary on the Sa@mkhya sutras. Vijnana Bhiksu wrote also another elementary work on Sa@mkhya known as Sa@mkhyasara. Another short work of late origin is Tattvasamasa (probably fourteenth century). Two other works on Sam@khya, viz Simananda's Samkhyatattvavivecana and Bhavaga@nes'a's Sa@mkhyatattvayatharthyadipana (both later than Vijnanabhik@su) of real philosophical value have also been freely consulted. Patanjali's Yoga sutra (not earlier than 147 B.C.) was commented on by Vaysa (400 A.D.) and Vyasa's bhasya commented on by Vacaspati Mis'ra is called Tattvavais'aradi, by Vijnana Bhik@su Yogavarttika, by Bhoja in the tenth century Bhojav@rtti, and by Nages'a (seventeenth century) Chayavyakhya.



[Footnote 1: I suppose that Raja's commentary on the Karika was the same as Rajavarttika quoted by Vacaspati. Raja's commentary on the Karika has been referred to by Jayanta in his Nyayamanjari, p. 109. This book is probably now lost.]

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Amongst the modern works to which I owe an obligation I may mention the two treatises Mechanical, physical and chemical theories of the Ancient Hindus and the Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus by Dr B.N. Seal and my two works on Yoga Study of Patanjali published by the Calcutta University, and Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought which is shortly to be published, and my Natural Philosophy of the Ancient Hindus, awaiting publication with the Calcutta University.

Gu@naratna mentions two other authoritative Sa@mkhya works, viz. Ma@tharabha@sya and Atreyatantra. Of these the second is probably the same as Caraka's treatment of Sa@mkhya, for we know that the sage Atri is the speaker in Caraka's work and for that it was called Atreyasa@mhita or Atreyatantra. Nothing is known of the Matharabhasya [Footnote ref 1].

An Early School of Sa@mkhya.

It is important for the history of Sa@mkhya philosophy that Caraka's treatment of it, which so far as I know has never been dealt with in any of the modern studies of Sa@mkhya, should be brought before the notice of the students of this philosophy. According to Caraka there are six elements (dhatus), viz. the five elements such as akas'a, vayu etc. and cetana, called also puru@sa. From other points of view, the categories may be said to be twenty-four only, viz. the ten senses (five cognitive and five conative), manas, the five objects of senses and the eightfold prak@rti (prak@rti, mahat, aha@mkara and the five elements)[Footnote ref 2]. The manas works through the senses. It is atomic and its existence is proved by the fact that in spite of the existence of the senses there cannot be any knowledge unless manas is in touch with them. There are two movements of manas as indeterminate sensing (uha) and conceiving (vicara) before definite understanding (buddhi) arises. Each of the five senses is the product of the combination of five elements but the auditory sense is made with a preponderance of akasa, the sense of touch with a preponderance



[Footnote 1: Readers unacquainted with Sa@mkhya-Yoga may omit the following three sections at the time of first reading.]

[Footnote 2: Puru@a is here excluded from the list. Cakrapa@ni, the commentator, says that the prak@rti and puru@sa both being unmanifested, the two together have been counted as one. Prak@rtivyatiriktancodasina@m puru@samavyaktatvasadharmyat avyaktayam prak@rtaveva prak@sipya avyaktas'avbdenaiva g@rh@nati. Harinatha Vis'arada's edition of Caraka, S'arira, p. 4.]

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of air, the visual sense with a preponderance of light, the taste with a preponderance of water and the sense of smell with a preponderance of earth. Caraka does not mention the tanmatras at all [Footnote ref 1]. The conglomeration of the sense-objects (indriyartha) or gross matter, the ten senses, manas, the five subtle bhutas and prak@rti, mahat and aha@mkara taking place through rajas make up what we call man. When the sattva is at its height this conglomeration ceases. All karma, the fruit of karma, cognition, pleasure, pain, ignorance, life and death belongs to this conglomeration. But there is also the puru@sa, for had it not been so there would be no birth, death, bondage, or salvation. If the atman were not regarded as cause, all illuminations of cognition would be without any reason. If a permanent self were not recognized, then for the work of one others would be responsible. This puru@sa, called also paramatman, is beginningless and it has no cause beyond itself. The self is in itself without consciousness. Consciousness can only come to it through its connection with the sense organs and manas. By ignorance, will, antipathy, and work, this conglomeration of puru@sa and the other elements takes place. Knowledge, feeling, or action, cannot be produced without this combination. All positive effects are due to conglomerations of causes and not by a single cause, but all destruction comes naturally and without cause. That which is eternal is never the product of anything. Caraka identifies the avyakta part of prak@rti with puru@sa as forming one category. The vikara or evolutionary products of prak@rti are called k@setra, whereas the avyakta part of prak@rti is regarded as the k@setrajna (avyaktamasya k@setrasya k@setrajnam@r@sayo viduh). This avyakta and cetana are one and the same entity. From this unmanifested prak@rti or cetana is derived the buddhi, and from the buddhi is derived the ego (aha@mkara) and from the aha@mkara the five elements and the senses are produced, and when this production is complete, we say that creation has taken place. At the time of pralaya (periodical cosmic dissolution) all the evolutes return back to prak@rti, and thus become unmanifest with it, whereas at the time of a new creation from the puru@sa the unmanifest (avyakta), all the manifested forms—the evolutes of buddhi, aha@mkara,



[Footnote 1: But some sort of subtle matter, different from gross matter, is referred to as forming part of prak@rti which is regarded as having eight elements in it prak@rtis'ca@s@tadhatuki), viz. avyakta, mahat, aha@mkara, and five other elements. In addition to these elements forming part of the prak@rti we hear of indriyartha, the five sense objects which have evolved out of the prak@rti.]

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etc.—appear [Footnote ref 1]. This cycle of births or rebirths or of dissolution and new creation acts through the influence of rajas and tamas, and so those who can get rid of these two will never again suffer this revolution in a cycle. The manas can only become active in association with the self, which is the real agent. This self of itself takes rebirth in all kinds of lives according to its own wish, undetermined by anyone else. It works according to its own free will and reaps the fruits of its karma. Though all the souls are pervasive, yet they can only perceive in particular bodies where they are associated with their own specific senses. All pleasures and pains are felt by the conglomeration (ras'i), and not by the atman presiding over it. From the enjoyment and suffering of pleasure and pain comes desire (t@r@s@na) consisting of wish and antipathy, and from desire again comes pleasure and pain. Mok@sa means complete cessation of pleasure and pain, arising through the association of the self with the manas, the sense, and sense-objects. If the manas is settled steadily in the self, it is the state of yoga when there is neither pleasure nor pain. When true knowledge dawns that "all are produced by causes, are transitory, rise of themselves, but are not produced by the self and are sorrow, and do not belong to me the self," the self transcends all. This is the last renunciation when all affections and knowledge become finally extinct. There remains no indication of any positive existence of the self at this time, and the self can no longer be perceived [Footnote ref 2]. It is the state of Brahman. Those who know Brahman call this state the Brahman, which is eternal and absolutely devoid of any characteristic. This state is spoken of by the Sa@mkhyas as their goal, and also that of the Yogins. When rajas and tamas are rooted out and the karma of the past whose fruits have to be enjoyed are exhausted, and there is no new karma and new birth,



[Footnote 1: This passage has been differently explained in a commentary previous to Cakrapa@ni as meaning that at the time of death these resolve back into the prak@rti—the puru@sa—and at the time of rebirth they become manifest again. See Cakrapa@ni on s'arira, I. 46.]

[Footnote 2: Though this state is called brahmabhuta, it is not in any sense like the Brahman of Vedanta which is of the nature of pure being, pure intelligence and pure bliss. This indescribable state is more like absolute annihilation without any sign of existence (alak@sa@nam), resembling Nagarjuna's Nirva@na. Thus Caraka writes:—tasmi@ms'caramasannyase samulah@hsarvavedana@h asa@mjnajnanavijnana niv@rtti@m yantyas'e@sata@h. ata@hpara@m brahmabhuto bhutatma nopalabhyate ni@hs@rta@h sarvabhavebhya@h cihna@m yasya na vidyate. gatirbrahmavida@m brahma taccak@saramalak@sa@nam. Caraka, S'arira 1. 98-100.]

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the state of mok@sa comes about. Various kinds of moral endeavours in the shape of association with good people, abandoning of desires, determined attempts at discovering the truth with fixed attention, are spoken of as indispensable means. Truth (tattva) thus discovered should be recalled again and again [Footnote ref 1] and this will ultimately effect the disunion of the body with the self. As the self is avyakta (unmanifested) and has no specific nature or character, this state can only be described as absolute cessation (mok@se niv@rttirni@hs'e@sa).

The main features of the Sa@mkhya doctrine as given by Caraka are thus: 1. Puru@sa is the state of avyakta. 2. By a conglomera of this avyakta with its later products a conglomeration is formed which generates the so-called living being. 3. The tanmatras are not mentioned. 4. Rajas and tamas represent the bad states of the mind and sattva the good ones. 5. The ultimate state of emancipation is either absolute annihilation or characterless absolute existence and it is spoken of as the Brahman state; there is no consciousness in this state, for consciousness is due to the conglomeration of the self with its evolutes, buddhi, aha@mkara etc. 6. The senses are formed of matter (bhautika).

This account of Sa@mkhya agrees with the system of Sa@mkhya propounded by Pancas'ikha (who is said to be the direct pupil of Asuri the pupil of Kapila, the founder of the system) in the Mahabharata XII. 219. Pancas'ikha of course does not describe the system as elaborately as Caraka does. But even from what little he says it may be supposed that the system of Sa@mkhya he sketches is the same as that of Caraka [Footnote ref 2]. Pancas'ikha speaks of the ultimate truth as being avyakta (a term applied in all Sa@mkhya literature to prak@rti) in the state of puru@sa (purusavasthamavyaktam). If man is the product of a mere combination of the different elements, then one may assume that all ceases with death. Caraka in answer to such an objection introduces a discussion, in which he tries to establish the existence of a self as the postulate of all our duties and sense of moral responsibility. The same discussion occurs in Pancas'ikha also, and the proofs



[Footnote 1: Four causes are spoken of here as being causes of memory: (1) Thinking of the cause leads to the remembering of the effect, (2) by similarity, (3) by opposite things, and (4) by acute attempt to remember.]

[Footnote 2: Some European scholars have experienced great difficulty in accepting Pancas'ikha's doctrine as a genuine Sa@mkhya doctrine. This may probably be due to the fact that the Sa@mkhya doctrines sketched in Caraka did not attract their notice.]

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for the existence of the self are also the same. Like Caraka again Pancas'ikha also says that all consciousness is due to the conditions of the conglomeration of our physical body mind,—and the element of "cetas." They are mutually independent, and by such independence carry on the process of life and work. None of the phenomena produced by such a conglomeration are self. All our suffering comes in because we think these to be the self. Mok@sa is realized when we can practise absolute renunciation of these phenomena. The gu@nas described by Pancas'ikha are the different kinds of good and bad qualities of the mind as Caraka has it. The state of the conglomeration is spoken of as the k@setra, as Caraka says, and there is no annihilation or eternality; and the last state is described as being like that when all rivers lose themselves in the ocean and it is called ali@nga (without any characteristic)—a term reserved for prak@rti in later Sa@mkhya. This state is attainable by the doctrine of ultimate renunciation which is also called the doctrine of complete destruction (samyagbadha).

Gu@naratna (fourteenth century A.D.), a commentator of @Sa@ddars'anasamuccaya, mentions two schools of Sa@mkhya, the Maulikya (original) and the Uttara or (later) [Footnote ref 1]. Of these the doctrine of the Maulikya Sa@mkhya is said to be that which believed that there was a separate pradhana for each atman (maulikyasa@mkhya hyatmanamatmanam prati p@rthak pradhanam vadanti). This seems to be a reference to the Sa@mkhya doctrine I have just sketched. I am therefore disposed to think that this represents the earliest systematic doctrine of Sa@mkhya.

In Mahabharata XII. 318 three schools of Sa@mkhya are mentioned, viz. those who admitted twenty-four categories (the school I have sketched above), those who admitted twenty-five (the well-known orthodox Sa@mkhya system) and those who admitted twenty-six categories. This last school admitted a supreme being in addition to puru@sa and this was the twenty-sixth principle. This agrees with the orthodox Yoga system and the form of Sa@mkhya advocated in the Mahabharata. The schools of Sa@mkhya of twenty-four and twenty-five categories are here denounced as unsatisfactory. Doctrines similar to the school of Sa@mkhya we have sketched above are referred to in some of the



[Footnote 1: Gu@naratna's Tarkarahasyadipika, p. 99.]

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other chapters of the Mahabharata (XII. 203, 204). The self apart from the body is described as the moon of the new moon day; it is said that as Rahu (the shadow on the sun during an eclipse) cannot be seen apart from the sun, so the self cannot be seen apart from the body. The selfs (s'ariri@na@h) are spoken of as manifesting from prak@rti.

We do not know anything about Asuri the direct disciple of Kapila [Footnote ref 1]. But it seems probable that the system of Sa@mkhya we have sketched here which appears in fundamentally the same form in the Mahabharata and has been attributed there to Pancas'ikha is probably the earliest form of Sa@mkhya available to us in a systematic form. Not only does Gu@naratna's reference to the school of Maulikya Sa@mkhya justify it, but the fact that Caraka (78 A.U.) does not refer to the Sa@mkhya as described by Is'varak@r@s@na and referred to in other parts of Mahabharata is a definite proof that Is'varak@r@s@na's Sa@mkhya is a later modification, which was either non-existent in Caraka's time or was not regarded as an authoritative old Sa@mkhya view.

Wassilief says quoting Tibetan sources that Vindhyavasin altered the Sa@mkhya according to his own views [Footnote ref 2]. Takakusu thinks that Vindhyavasin was a title of Is'varak@r@s@na [Footnote ref 3] and Garbe holds that the date of Is'varak@r@s@na was about 100 A.D. It seems to be a very plausible view that Is'varak@r@s@na was indebted for his karikas to another work, which was probably written in a style different from what he employs. The seventh verse of his Karika seems to be in purport the same as a passage which is found quoted in the



[Footnote 1: A verse attributed to Asuri is quoted by Gu@naratna (Tarkarahasyadipika, p. 104). The purport of this verse is that when buddhi is transformed in a particular manner, it (puru@sa) has experience. It is like the reflection of the moon in transparent water.]

[Footnote 2: Vassilief's Buddhismus, p. 240.]

[Footnote 3: Takakusu's "A study of Paramartha's life of Vasubandhu," J. R.A.S., 1905. This identification by Takakusu, however, appears to be extremely doubtful, for Gu@naratna mentions Is'varak@r@s@na and Vindhyavasin as two different authorities (Tarkarahasyadipika, pp. 102 and 104). The verse quoted from Vindhyavasin (p. 104) in anu@s@tubh metre cannot be traced as belonging to Is'varak@r@s@na. It appears that Is'varak@r@s@na wrote two books; one is the Sa@mkhya karika and another an independent work on Sa@mkhya, a line from which, quoted by Gu@naratna, stands as follows:

"Pratiniyatadhyavasaya@h s'rotradisamuttha adhyak@sam" (p. 108).

If Vacaspati's interpretation of the classification of anumana in his Tattvakaumudi be considered to be a correct explanation of Sa@mkhya karika then Is'varak@r@s@na must be a different person from Vindhyavasin whose views on anumana as referred to in S'lokavarttika, p. 393, are altogether different. But Vacaspati's own statement in the Tatparyya@tika (pp. 109 and 131) shows that his treatment there was not faithful.]

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Mahabhasya of Patanjali the grammarian (147 B.C.) [Footnote ref 1]. The subject of the two passages are the enumeration of reasons which frustrate visual perception. This however is not a doctrine concerned with the strictly technical part of Sa@mkhya, and it is just possible that the book from which Patanjali quoted the passage, and which was probably paraphrased in the Arya metre by Is'varak@r@s@na was not a Sa@mkhya book at all. But though the subject of the verse is not one of the strictly technical parts of Sa@mkhya, yet since such an enumeration is not seen in any other system of Indian philosophy, and as it has some special bearing as a safeguard against certain objections against the Sa@mkhya doctrine of prak@rti, the natural and plausible supposition is that it was the verse of a Sa@mkhya book which was paraphrased by Is'varak@r@s@na.

The earliest descriptions of a Sa@mkhya which agrees with Is'varak@r@s@na's Sa@mkhya (but with an addition of Is'vara) are to be found in Patanjali's Yoga sutras and in the Mahabharata; but we are pretty certain that the Sa@mkhya of Caraka we have sketched here was known to Patanjali, for in Yoga sutra I. 19 a reference is made to a view of Sa@mkhya similar to this.

From the point of view of history of philosophy the Sa@mkhya of Caraka and Pancas'ikha is very important; for it shows a transitional stage of thought between the Upani@sad ideas and the orthodox Sa@mkhya doctrine as represented by Is'varak@r@s@na. On the one hand its doctrine that the senses are material, and that effects are produced only as a result of collocations, and that the puru@sa is unconscious, brings it in close relation with Nyaya, and on the other its connections with Buddhism seem to be nearer than the orthodox Sa@mkhya.

We hear of a Sa@s@titantras'astra as being one of the oldest Sa@mkhya works. This is described in the Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita as containing two books of thirty-two and twenty-eight chapters [Footnote ref 2]. A quotation from Rajavarttika (a work about which there is no definite information) in Vacaspati Mis'ra's commentary on the Sa@mkhya karika(72) says that it was called the @Sa@s@titantra because it dealt with the existence of prak@rti, its oneness, its difference from puru@sas, its purposefulness for puru@sas, the multiplicity of puru@sas, connection and separation from puru@sas, the evolution of



[Footnote 1: Patanjali's Mahabha@sya, IV. I. 3. Atisannikar@sadativiprakar@sat murttyantaravyavadhanat tamasav@rtatvat indriyadaurvalyadatipramadat, etc. (Benares edition.)]

[Footnote 2: Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita, pp. 108, 110.]

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the categories, the inactivity of the puru@sas and the five viparyyayas, nine tu@s@tis, the defects of organs of twenty-eight kinds, and the eight siddhis [Footnote ref 1].

But the content of the Sa@s@titantra as given in Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita is different from it, and it appears from it that the Sa@mkhya of the Sa@s@titantra referred to in the Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita was of a theistic character resembling the doctrine of the Pancaratra Vai@snavas and the Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita says that Kapila's theory of Sa@mkhya was a Vai@s@nava one. Vijnana Bhiksu, the greatest expounder of Sa@mkhya, says in many places of his work Vijnanam@rta Bha@sya that Sa@mkhya was originally theistic, and that the atheistic Sa@mkhya is only a prau@dhivada (an exaggerated attempt to show that no supposition of Is'vara is necessary to explain the world process) though the Mahabharata points out that the difference between Sa@mkhya and Yoga is this, that the former is atheistic, while the latter is theistic. The discrepancy between the two accounts of @Sa@s@titantra suggests that the original Sa@s@titantra as referred to in the Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita was subsequently revised and considerably changed. This supposition is corroborated by the fact that Gu@naratna does not mention among the important Sa@mkhya works @Sa@s@titantra but @Sa@s@titantroddhara



[Footnote 1: The doctrine of the viparyyaya, tusti, defects of organs, and the siddhi are mentioned in the Karika of Is'varakr@sna, but I have omitted them in my account of Samkhya as these have little philosophical importance. The viparyyaya (false knowledge) are five, viz. avidya (ignorance), asmita (egoism), raga (attachment), dve@sa (antipathy), abhimives'a (self-love), which are also called tamo, moha, mahamoha, tamisra, and andhatamisra. These are of nine kinds of tusti, such as the idea that no exertion is necessary, since prak@rti will herself bring our salvation (ambhas), that it is not necessary to meditate, for it is enough if we renounce the householder's life (salila), that there is no hurry, salvation will come in time (megha), that salvation will be worked out by fate (bhagya), and the contentment leading to renunciation proceeding from five kinds of causes, e.g. the troubles of earning (para), the troubles of protecting the earned money (supara), the natural waste of things earned by enjoyment (parapara), increase of desires leading to greater disappointments (anuttamambhas), all gain leads to the injury of others (uttamambhas). This renunciation proceeds from external considerations with those who consider prak@rti and its evolutes as the self. The siddhis or ways of success are eight in number, viz. (1) reading of scriptures (tara), (2) enquiry into their meaning (sutara), (3) proper reasoning (taratara), (4) corroborating one's own ideas with the ideas of the teachers and other workers of the same field (ramyaka), (5) clearance of the mind by long-continued practice (sadamudita). The three other siddhis called pramoda, mudita, and modamana lead directly to the separation of the prak@rti from the purus'a. The twenty-eight sense defects are the eleven defects of the eleven senses and seventeen kinds of defects of the understanding corresponding to the absence of siddhis and the presence of tustis. The viparyyayas, tu@stis and the defects of the organs are hindrances in the way of the achievement of the Sa@mkhya goal.]

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(revised edition of @Sa@s@titantra) [Footnote ref 1]. Probably the earlier @Sa@s@titantra was lost even before Vacaspati's time.

If we believe the @Sa@s@titantra referred to in the Ahirbudhnya Sa@mhita to be in all essential parts the same work which was composed by Kapila and based faithfully on his teachings, then it has to be assumed that Kapila's Sa@mkhya was theistic [Footnote ref 2]. It seems probable that his disciple Asuri tried to popularise it. But it seems that a great change occurred when Pancas'ikha the disciple of Asuri came to deal with it. For we know that his doctrine differed from the traditional one in many important respects. It is said in Sa@mkhya karika (70) that the literature was divided by him into many parts (tena bahudhak@rtam tantram). The exact meaning of this reference is difficult to guess. It might mean that the original @Sa@s@titantra was rewritten by him in various treatises. It is a well-known fact that most of the schools of Vai@s@navas accepted the form of cosmology which is the same in most essential parts as the Sa@mkhya cosmology. This justifies the assumption that Kapila's doctrine was probably theistic. But there are a few other points of difference between the Kapila and the Patanjala Sa@mkhya (Yoga). The only supposition that may be ventured is that Pancas'ikha probably modified Kapila's work in an atheistic way and passed it as Kapila's work. If this supposition is held reasonable, then we have three strata of Sa@mkhya, first a theistic one, the details of which are lost, but which is kept in a modified form by the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya, second an atheistic one as represented by Pancas'ikha, and a third atheistic modification as the orthodox Sa@mkhya system. An important change in the Sa@mkhya doctrine seems to have been introduced by Vijnana Bhik@su (sixteenth century A.D.) by his treatment of gu@nas as types of reals. I have myself accepted this interpretation of Sa@mkhya as the most rational and philosophical one, and have therefore followed it in giving a connected system of the accepted Kapila and the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya. But it must be pointed out that originally the notion of gu@nas was applied to different types of good and bad mental states, and then they were supposed in some mysterious way by mutual increase and decrease to form the objective world on the one hand and the



[Footnote 1: Tarkarahasyadipika, p. 109.]

[Footnote 2: eva@m sa@dvims'akam prahah s'ariramth manavah sa@mkhyam sa@mkhyatmakatvacca kapiladibhirucyate. Matsyapurana, IV. 28.]

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totality of human psychosis on the other. A systematic explanation of the gunas was attempted in two different lines by Vijnana Bhik@su and the Vai@s@nava writer Ve@nka@ta [Footnote ref l]. As the Yoga philosophy compiled by Patanjali and commented on by Vyasa, Vacaspati and Vijn@ana Bhik@su, agree with the Sa@mkhya doctrine as explained by Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhik@su in most points I have preferred to call them the Kapila and the Patanjala schools of Sa@mkhya and have treated them together—a principle which was followed by Haribhadra in his @Sa@ddars'anasamuaccaya.

The other important Sa@mkhya teachers mentioned by Gaudapada are Sanaka, Sananda, Sanatana and Vo@dhu. Nothing is known about their historicity or doctrines.

Sa@mkhya karika, Sa@mkhya sutra, Vacaspati Mis'ra and Vijnana Bhik@su.

A word of explanation is necessary as regards my interpretation of the Sa@mkhya-Yoga system. The Sa@mkhya karika is the oldest Sa@mkhya text on which we have commentaries by later writers. The Sa@mkhya sutra was not referred to by any writer until it was commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth century A.D.). Even Gu@naratna of the fourteenth century A D. who made allusions to a number of Sa@mkhya works, did not make any reference to the Sa@mkhya sutra, and no other writer who is known to have flourished before Gu@naratna seems to have made any reference to the Sa@mkhya sutra. The natural conclusion therefore is that these sutras were probably written some time after the fourteenth century. But there is no positive evidence to prove that it was so late a work as the fifteenth century. It is said at the end of the Sa@mkhya karika of Is'varak@r@s@na that the karikas give an exposition of the Sa@mkhya doctrine excluding the refutations of the doctrines of other people and excluding the parables attached to the original Sa@mkhya works—the @Sa@s@titantras'astra. The Sa@mkhya sutras contain refutations of other doctrines and also a number of parables. It is not improbable that these were collected from some earlier Sa@mkhya work which is now lost to us. It may be that it was done from some later edition of the @Sa@s@titantras'astra (@Sa@s@titantroddhara as mentioned by



[Footnote 1: Venka@ta's philosophy will be dealt with in the second volume of the present work.]

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Gu@naratna), but this is a mere conjecture. There is no reason to suppose that the Sa@mkhya doctrine found in the sutras differs in any important way from the Sa@mkhya doctrine as found in the Sa@mkhya karika. The only point of importance is this, that the Sa@mkhya sutras hold that when the Upani@sads spoke of one absolute pure intelligence they meant to speak of unity as involved in the class of intelligent puru@sas as distinct from the class of the gu@nas. As all puru@sas were of the nature of pure intelligence, they were spoken of in the Upani@sads as one, for they all form the category or class of pure intelligence, and hence may in some sense be regarded as one. This compromise cannot be found in the Sa@mkhya karika. This is, however, a case of omission and not of difference. Vijnana Bhik@su, the commentator of the Sa@mkhya sutra, was more inclined to theistic Sa@mkhya or Yoga than to atheistic Sa@mkhya. This is proved by his own remarks in his Samkhyapravacanabha@sya, Yogavarttika, and Vijnanam@rtabhasya (an independent commentary on the Brahmasutras of Badarayana on theistic Sa@mkhya lines). Vijnana Bhiksu's own view could not properly be called a thorough Yoga view, for he agreed more with the views of the Sa@mkhya doctrine of the Pura@nas, where both the diverse puru@sas and the prak@rti are said to be merged in the end in Is'vara, by whose will the creative process again began in the prakrti at the end of each pralaya. He could not avoid the distinctively atheistic arguments of the Sa@mkhya sutras, but he remarked that these were used only with a view to showing that the Sa@mkhya system gave such a rational explanation that even without the intervention of an Is'vara it could explain all facts. Vijnana Bhik@su in his interpretation of Sa@mkhya differed on many points from those of Vacaspati, and it is difficult to say who is right. Vijnana Bhik@su has this advantage that he has boldly tried to give interpretations on some difficult points on which Vacaspati remained silent. I refer principally to the nature of the conception of the gu@nas, which I believe is the most important thing in Sa@mkhya. Vijnana Bhik@su described the gu@nas as reals or super-subtle substances, but Vacaspati and Gau@dapada (the other commentator of the Sa@mkhya karika) remained silent on the point. There is nothing, however, in their interpretations which would militate against the interpretation of Vijnana Bhik@su, but yet while they were silent as to any definite explanations regarding the nature of the gu@nas, Bhik@su definitely

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came forward with a very satisfactory and rational interpretation of their nature.

Since no definite explanation of the gu@nas is found in any other work before Bhik@su, it is quite probable that this matter may not have been definitely worked out before. Neither Caraka nor the Mahabharata explains the nature of the gu@nas. But Bhik@su's interpretation suits exceedingly well all that is known of the manifestations and the workings of the gu@nas in all early documents. I have therefore accepted the interpretation of Bhik@su in giving my account of the nature of the gu@nas. The Karika speaks of the gu@nas as being of the nature of pleasure, pain, and dullness (sattva, rajas and tamas). It also describes sattva as being light and illuminating, rajas as of the nature of energy and causing motion, and tamas as heavy and obstructing. Vacaspati merely paraphrases this statement of the Karika but does not enter into any further explanations. Bhik@su's interpretation fits in well with all that is known of the gu@nas, though it is quite possible that this view might not have been known before, and when the original Sa@mkhya doctrine was formulated there was a real vagueness as to the conception of the gu@nas.

There are some other points in which Bhik@su's interpretation differs from that of Vacaspati. The most important of these may be mentioned here. The first is the nature of the connection of the buddhi states with the puru@sa. Vacaspati holds that there is no contact (sa@myoga) of any buddhi state with the puru@sa but that a reflection of the puru@sa is caught in the state of buddhi by virtue of which the buddhi state becomes intelligized and transformed into consciousness. But this view is open to the objection that it does not explain how the puru@sa can be said to be the experiencer of the conscious states of the buddhi, for its reflection in the buddhi is merely an image, and there cannot be an experience (bhoga) on the basis of that image alone without any actual connection of the puru@sa with the buddhi. The answer of Vacaspati Mis'ra is that there is no contact of the two in space and time, but that their proximity (sannidhi) means only a specific kind of fitness (yogyata) by virtue of which the puru@sa, though it remains aloof, is yet felt to be united and identified in the buddhi, and as a result of that the states of the buddhi appear as ascribed to a person. Vijnana Bhik@su differs from Vacaspati and says that if such a special kind of fitness be admitted, then there is no

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reason why puru@sa should be deprived of such a fitness at the time of emancipation, and thus there would be no emancipation at all, for the fitness being in the puru@sa, he could not be divested of it, and he would continue to enjoy the experiences represented in the buddhi for ever. Vijnana Bhik@su thus holds that there is a real contact of the puru@sa with the buddhi state in any cognitive state. Such a contact of the puru@sa and the buddhi does not necessarily mean that the former will be liable to change on account of it, for contact and change are not synonymous. Change means the rise of new qualities. It is the buddhi which suffers changes, and when these changes are reflected in the puru@sa, there is the notion of a person or experiencer in the puru@sa, and when the puru@sa is reflected back in the buddhi the buddhi state appears as a conscious state. The second, is the difference between Vacaspati and Bhik@su as regards the nature of the perceptual process. Bhik@su thinks that the senses can directly perceive the determinate qualities of things without any intervention of manas, whereas Vacaspati ascribes to manas the power of arranging the sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate sense-data determinate. With him the first stage of cognition is the stage when indeterminate sense materials are first presented, at the next stage there is assimilation, differentiation, and association by which the indeterminate materials are ordered and classified by the activity of manas called sa@mkalpa which coordinates the indeterminate sense materials into determinate perceptual and conceptual forms as class notions with particular characteristics. Bhik@su who supposes that the determinate character of things is directly perceived by the senses has necessarily to assign a subordinate position to manas as being only the faculty of desire, doubt, and imagination.

It may not be out of place to mention here that there are one or two passages in Vacaspati's commentary on the Sa@mkhya karika which seem to suggest that he considered the ego (aha@mkara) as producing the subjective series of the senses and the objective series of the external world by a sort of desire or will, but he did not work out this doctrine, and it is therefore not necessary to enlarge upon it. There is also a difference of view with regard to the evolution of the tanmatras from the mahat; for contrary to the view of Vyasabha@sya and Vijnana Bhik@su etc. Vacaspati holds that from the mahat there was aha@mkara and

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from aha@mkara the tanmatras [Footnote ref 1]. Vijnana Bhik@su however holds that both the separation of aha@mkara and the evolution of the tanmatras take place in the mahat, and as this appeared to me to be more reasonable, I have followed this interpretation. There are some other minor points of difference about the Yoga doctrines between Vacaspati and Bhik@su which are not of much philosophical importance.

Yoga and Patanjali.

The word yoga occurs in the @Rg-Veda in various senses such as yoking or harnessing, achieving the unachieved, connection, and the like. The sense of yoking is not so frequent as the other senses; but it is nevertheless true that the word was used in this sense in @Rg-Veda and in such later Vedic works as the S'atapatha Brahmana and the B@rhadara@nyaka Upani@sad [Footnote ref 2]. The word has another derivative "yugya" in later Sanskrit literature [Footnote ref 3].

With the growth of religious and philosophical ideas in the @Rg-Veda, we find that the religious austerities were generally very much valued. Tapas (asceticism) and brahmacarya (the holy vow of celibacy and life-long study) were regarded as greatest virtues and considered as being productive of the highest power [Footnote ref 4].

As these ideas of asceticism and self-control grew the force of the flying passions was felt to be as uncontrollable as that of a spirited steed, and thus the word yoga which was originally applied to the control of steeds began to be applied to the control of the senses [Footnote ref 5].

In Pa@nini's time the word yoga had attained its technical meaning, and he distinguished this root "yuj samadhau" (yuj in the sense of concentration) from "yujir yoge" (root yujir in the sense of connecting). Yuj in the first sense is seldom used as a verb. It is more or less an imaginary root for the etymological derivation of the word yoga [Footnote ref 6].



[Footnote 1: See my Study of Patanjali, p. 60 ff.]

[Footnote 2: Compare R.V.I. 34. 9/VII. 67. 8/III. 27. II/X. 30. II/X. 114. 9/IV. 24. 4/I. 5. 3/I. 30. 7; S'atapatha Brahma@na 14. 7. I. II.]

[Footnote 3: It is probably an old word of the Aryan stock; compare German Joch, A.S. geoc. l atm jugum.]

[Footnote 4: See Chandogya III. 17. 4; B@rh. I. 2. 6; B@rh. III. 8. 10; Taitt. I. 9. I/III. 2. I/III. 3. I; Taitt, Brah, II. 2. 3. 3; R.V.x. 129; S'atap. Brah. XI. 5. 8. 1.]

[Footnote 5: Katha III. 4, indriya@ni hayanahu@h vi@sayate@sugocaran. The senses are the horses and whatever they grasp are their objects. Maitr. 2. 6. Karmendriya@nyasya haya@h the conative senses are its horses.]

[Footnote 6: Yugya@h is used from the root of yujir yoge and not from yuja samadhau. A consideration of Pa@nini's rule "Tadasya brahmacaryam," V.i. 94 shows that not only different kinds of asceticism and rigour which passed by the name of brahmacarya were prevalent in the country at the time (Pa@nini as Goldstucker has proved is pre-buddhistic), but associated with these had grown up a definite system of mental discipline which passed by the name of Yoga.]

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In the Bhagavadgita, we find that the word yoga has been used not only in conformity with the root "yuj-samadhau" but also with "yujir yoge" This has been the source of some confusion to the readers of the Bhagavadgita. "Yogin" in the sense of a person who has lost himself in meditation is there regarded with extreme veneration. One of the main features of the use of this word lies in this that the Bhagavadgita tried to mark out a middle path between the austere discipline of meditative abstraction on the one hand and the course of duties of sacrificial action of a Vedic worshipper in the life of a new type of Yogin (evidently from yujir yoge) on the other, who should combine in himself the best parts of the two paths, devote himself to his duties, and yet abstract himself from all selfish motives associated with desires.

Kau@tilya in his Arthas'astra when enumerating the philosophic sciences of study names Sa@mkhya, Yoga, and Lokayata. The oldest Buddhist sutras (e.g. the Satipa@t@thana sutta) are fully familiar with the stages of Yoga concentration. We may thus infer that self-concentration and Yoga had developed as a technical method of mystic absorption some time before the Buddha.

As regards the connection of Yoga with Sa@mkhya, as we find it in the Yoga sutras of Patanjali, it is indeed difficult to come to any definite conclusion. The science of breath had attracted notice in many of the earlier Upani@sads, though there had not probably developed any systematic form of pra@nayama (a system of breath control) of the Yoga system. It is only when we come to Maitraya@ni that we find that the Yoga method had attained a systematic development. The other two Upani@sads in which the Yoga ideas can be traced are the S'vetas'vatara and the Ka@tha. It is indeed curious to notice that these three Upani@sads of K@r@s@na Yajurveda, where we find reference to Yoga methods, are the only ones where we find clear references also to the Sa@mkhya tenets, though the Sa@mkhya and Yoga ideas do not appear there as related to each other or associated as parts of the same system. But there is a remarkable passage in the Maitraya@ni in the conversation between S'akyayana and B@rhad ratha where we find that the Sa@mkhya metaphysics was offered

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in some quarters to explain the validity of the Yoga processes, and it seems therefore that the association and grafting of the Sa@mkhya metaphysics on the Yoga system as its basis, was the work of the followers of this school of ideas which was subsequently systematized by Patanjali. Thus S'akyayana says: "Here some say it is the gu@na which through the differences of nature goes into bondage to the will, and that deliverance takes place when the fault of the will has been removed, because he sees by the mind; and all that we call desire, imagination, doubt, belief, unbelief, certainty, uncertainty, shame, thought, fear, all that is but mind. Carried along by the waves of the qualities darkened in his imagination, unstable, fickle, crippled, full of desires, vacillating he enters into belief, believing I am he, this is mine, and he binds his self by his self as a bird with a net. Therefore, a man being possessed of will, imagination and belief is a slave, but he who is the opposite is free. For this reason let a man stand free from will, imagination and belief—this is the sign of liberty, this is the path that leads to Brahman, this is the opening of the door, and through it he will go to the other shore of darkness. All desires are there fulfilled. And for this, they quote a verse: 'When the five instruments of knowledge stand still together with the mind, and when the intellect does not move, that is called the highest state [Footnote ref 1].'"

An examination of such Yoga Upani@sads as S'a@n@dilya, Yogatattva, Dhyanabindu, Ha@msa, Am@rtanada, Varaha, Ma@n@dala Brahma@na, Nadabindu, and Yogaku@n@dalu, shows that the Yoga practices had undergone diverse changes in diverse schools, but none of these show any predilection for the Sa@mkhya. Thus the Yoga practices grew in accordance with the doctrines of the



[Footnote 1: Vatsyayana, however, in his bha@sya on Nyaya sutra, I. i 29, distinguishes Sa@mkhya from Yoga in the following way: The Sa@mkhya holds that nothing can come into being nor be destroyed, there cannot be any change in the pure intelligence (niratis'aya@h cetana@h). All changes are due to changes in the body, the senses, the manas and the objects. Yoga holds that all creation is due to the karma of the puru@sa. Do@sas (passions) and the prav@rtti (action) are the cause of karma. The intelligences or souls (cetana) are associated with qualities. Non being can come into being and what is produced may be destroyed. The last view is indeed quite different from the Yoga of Vyasabha@sya, It is closer to Nyaya in its doctrines. If Vatsyayana's statement is correct, it would appear that the doctrine of there being a moral purpose in creation was borrowed by Sa@mkhya from Yoga. Udyotakara's remarks on the same sutra do not indicate a difference but an agreement between Sa@mkhya and Yoga on the doctrine of the indriyas being "abhautika." Curiously enough Vatsyayana quotes a passage from Vyasabha@sya, III. 13, in his bha@sya, I. ii. 6, and criticizes it as self-contradictory (viruddha).]

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S'aivas and S'@aktas and assumed a peculiar form as the Mantrayoga; they grew in another direction as the Ha@thayoga which was supposed to produce mystic and magical feats through constant practices of elaborate nervous exercises, which were also associated with healing and other supernatural powers. The Yogatattva Upani@sad says that there are four kinds of yoga, the Mantra Yoga, Laya Yoga, Ha@thayoga and Rajayoga [Footnote ref 1]. In some cases we find that there was a great attempt even to associate Vedantism with these mystic practices. The influence of these practices in the development of Tantra and other modes of worship was also very great, but we have to leave out these from our present consideration as they have little philosophic importance and as they are not connected with our present endeavour.

Of the Patanjala school of Sa@mkhya, which forms the subject of the Yoga with which we are now dealing, Patanjali was probably the most notable person for he not only collected the different forms of Yoga practices, and gleaned the diverse ideas which were or could be associated with the Yoga, but grafted them all on the Sa@mkhya metaphysics, and gave them the form in which they have been handed down to us. Vacaspati and Vijnana Bhik@su, the two great commentators on the Vyasabha@sya, agree with us in holding that Patanjali was not the founder of Yoga, but an editor. Analytic study of the sutras brings the conviction that the sutras do not show any original attempt, but a masterly and systematic compilation which was also supplemented by fitting contributions. The systematic manner also in which the first three chapters are written by way of definition and classification shows that the materials were already in existence and that Patanjali systematized them. There was no missionizing zeal, no attempt to overthrow the doctrines of other systems, except as far as they might come in by way of explaining the system. Patanjal is not even anxious to establish the system, but he is only engaged in systematizing the facts as he had them. Most of the criticism against the Buddhists occur in the last chapter. The doctrines of the Yoga are described in the first three chapters, and this part is separated from the last chapter where the views of the Buddhist are

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[Footnote 1: The Yoga writer Jaigi@savya wrote "Dharanas'astra" which dealt with Yoga more in the fashion of Tantra then that given by Patanjali. He mentions different places in the body (e.g. heart, throat, tip of the nose, palate, forehead, centre of the brain) which are centres of memory where concentration is to be made. See Vacaspati's Tatparya@tika or Vatsyayana's bha@sya on Nyaya sutra, III. ii. 43.]

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criticized; the putting of an "iti" (the word to denote the conclusion of any work) at the end of the third chapter is evidently to denote the conclusion of his Yoga compilation. There is of course another "iti" at the end of the fourth chapter to denote the conclusion of the whole work. The most legitimate hypothesis seems to be that the last chapter is a subsequent addition by a hand other than that of Patanjali who was anxious to supply some new links of argument which were felt to be necessary for the strengthening of the Yoga position from an internal point of view, as well as for securing the strength of the Yoga from the supposed attacks of Buddhist metaphysics. There is also a marked change (due either to its supplementary character or to the manipulation of a foreign hand) in the style of the last chapter as compared with the style of the other three.

The sutras, 30-34, of the last chapter seem to repeat what has already been said in the second chapter and some of the topics introduced are such that they could well have been dealt with in a more relevant manner in connection with similar discussions in the preceding chapters. The extent of this chapter is also disproportionately small, as it contains only 34 sutras, whereas the average number of sutras in other chapters is between 51 to 55.

We have now to meet the vexed question of the probable date of this famous Yoga author Patanjali. Weber had tried to connect him with Kapya Pata@mchala of S'atapatha Brahma@na [Footnote ref l]; in Katyayana's Varttika we get the name Patanjali which is explained by later commentators as patanta@h anjalaya@h yasmai (for whom the hands are folded as a mark of reverence), but it is indeed difficult to come to any conclusion merely from the similarity of names. There is however another theory which identifies the writer of the great commentary on Pa@nini called the Mahabha@sya with the Patanjali of the Yoga sutra. This theory has been accepted by many western scholars probably on the strength of some Indian commentators who identified the two Patanjalis. Of these one is the writer of the Patanjalicarita (Ramabhadra Dik@sita) who could not have flourished earlier than the eighteenth century. The other is that cited in S'ivarama's commentary on Vasavadatta which Aufrecht assigns to the eighteenth century. The other two are king Bhoja of Dhar and Cakrapa@nidatta,

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[Footnote 1: Weber's History of Indian Literature, p. 223 n.]

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the commentator of Caraka, who belonged to the eleventh century A.D. Thus Cakrapa@ni says that he adores the Ahipati (mythical serpent chief) who removed the defects of mind, speech and body by his Patanjala mahabha@sya and the revision of Caraka. Bhoja says: "Victory be to the luminous words of that illustrious sovereign Ra@nara@nigamalla who by composing his grammar, by writing his commentary on the Patanjala and by producing a treatise on medicine called Rajam@rga@nka has like the lord of the holder of serpents removed defilement from speech, mind and body." The adoration hymn of Vyasa (which is considered to be an interpolation even by orthodox scholars) is also based upon the same tradition. It is not impossible therefore that the later Indian commentators might have made some confusion between the three Patanjalis, the grammarian, the Yoga editor, and the medical writer to whom is ascribed the book known as Patanjalatantra, and who has been quoted by S'ivadasa in his commentary on Cakradatta in connection with the heating of metals.

Professor J.H. Woods of Harvard University is therefore in a way justified in his unwillingness to identify the grammarian and the Yoga editor on the slender evidence of these commentators. It is indeed curious to notice that the great commentators of the grammar school such as Bhart@rhari, Kaiyya@ta, Vamana, Jayaditya, Nages'a, etc. are silent on this point. This is indeed a point against the identification of the two Patanjalis by some Yoga and medical commentators of a later age. And if other proofs are available which go against such an identification, we could not think the grammarian and the Yoga writer to be the same person.

Let us now see if Patanjali's grammatical work contains anything which may lead us to think that he was not the same person as the writer on Yoga. Professor Woods supposes that the philosophic concept of substance (dravya) of the two Patanjalis differs and therefore they cannot be identified. He holds that dravya is described in Vyasabha@sya in one place as being the unity of species and qualities (samanyavis'e@satmaka), whereas the Mahabha@sya holds that a dravya denotes a genus and also specific qualities according as the emphasis or stress is laid on either side. I fail to see how these ideas are totally antagonistic. Moreover, we know that these two views were held by

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Vya@di and Vajapyayana (Vya@di holding that words denoted qualities or dravya and Vajapyayana holding that words denoted species [Footnote ref 1]). Even Pa@nini had these two different ideas in "jatyakhyayamekasmin bahuvacanamanyatarasyam" and "sarupanamekas'e@samekavibhaktau," and Patanjali the writer of the Mahabha@sya only combined these two views. This does not show that he opposes the view of Vyasabha@sya, though we must remember that even if he did, that would not prove anything with regard to the writer of the sutras. Moreover, when we read that dravya is spoken of in the Mahabha@sya as that object which is the specific kind of the conglomeration of its parts, just as a cow is of its tail, hoofs, horns, etc.—"yat sasnala@ngulakakudakhuravi@sa@nyartharupam," we are reminded of its similarity with "ayutasiddhavayavabhedanugata@h samuha@h dravyam" (a conglomeration of interrelated parts is called dravya) in the Vyasabhasya. So far as I have examined the Mahabha@sya I have not been able to discover anything there which can warrant us in holding that the two Patanjalis cannot be identified. There are no doubt many apparent divergences of view, but even in these it is only the traditional views of the old grammarians that are exposed and reconciled, and it would be very unwarrantable for us to judge anything about the personal views of the grammarian from them. I am also convinced that the writer of the Mahabha@sya knew most of the important points of the Sa@mkhya-Yoga metaphysics; as a few examples I may refer to the gu@na theory (1. 2. 64, 4. 1. 3), the Sa@mkhya dictum of ex nihilo nihil fit (1. 1. 56), the ideas of time (2. 2. 5, 3. 2. 123), the idea of the return of similars into similars (1. 1. 50), the idea of change vikara as production of new qualities gu@nantaradhana (5. 1. 2, 5. 1. 3) and the distinction of indriya and Buddhi (3. 3. 133). We may add to it that the Mahabha@sya agrees with the Yoga view as regards the Spho@tavada, which is not held in common by any other school of Indian philosophy. There is also this external similarity, that unlike any other work they both begin their works in a similar manner (atha yoganus'asanam and athas'abdanus'asanam)—"now begins the compilation of the instructions on Yoga" (Yoga sutra)—and "now begins the compilation of the instructions of words" (Mahabha@sya).

It may further be noticed in this connection that the arguments



[Footnote 1: Patanjali's Mahabha@sya, 1. 2. 64.]

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which Professor Woods has adduced to assign the date of the Yoga sutra between 300 and 500 A.D. are not at all conclusive, as they stand on a weak basis; for firstly if the two Patanjalis cannot be identified, it does not follow that the editor of the Yoga should necessarily be made later; secondly, the supposed Buddhist [Footnote ref 1] reference is found in the fourth chapter which, as I have shown above, is a later interpolation; thirdly, even if they were written by Patanjali it cannot be inferred that because Vacaspati describes the opposite school as being of the Vijnana-vadi type, we are to infer that the sutras refer to Vasubandhu or even to Nagarjuna, for such ideas as have been refuted in the sutras had been developing long before the time of Nagarjuna.

Thus we see that though the tradition of later commentators may not be accepted as a sufficient ground to identify the two Patanjalis, we cannot discover anything from a comparative critical study of the Yoga sutras and the text of the Mahabha@sya, which can lead us to say that the writer of the Yoga sutras flourished at a later date than the other Patanjali.

Postponing our views about the time of Patanjali the Yoga editor, I regret I have to increase the confusion by introducing the other work Kitab Patanjal, of which Alberuni speaks, for our consideration. Alberuni considers this work as a very famous one and he translates it along with another book called Sanka (Sa@mkhya) ascribed to Kapila. This book was written in the form of dialogue between master and pupil, and it is certain that this book was not the present Yoga sutra of Patanjali, though it had the same aim as the latter, namely the search for liberation and for the union of the soul with the object of its meditation. The book was called by Alberuni Kitab Patanjal, which is to be translated as the book of Patanjala, because in another place, speaking of its author, he puts in a Persian phrase which when translated stands as "the author of the book of Patanjal." It had also an elaborate commentary from which Alberuni quotes many extracts, though he does not tell us the author's name. It treats of God, soul, bondage, karma, salvation, etc., as we find in the Yoga sutra, but the manner in which these are described (so

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[Footnote 1: It is important to notice that the most important Buddhist reference naraika-cittatantram vastu tadaprama@nakam tada kim syat (IV. 16) was probably a line of the Vyasabha@sya, as Bhoja, who had consulted many commentaries as he says in the preface, does not count it as sutra.]

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far as can be judged from the copious extracts supplied by Alberuni) shows that these ideas had undergone some change from what we find in the Yoga sutra. Following the idea of God in Alberuni we find that he retains his character as a timeless emancipated being, but he speaks, hands over the Vedas and shows the way to Yoga and inspires men in such a way that they could obtain by cogitation what he bestowed on them. The name of God proves his existence, for there cannot exist anything of which the name existed, but not the thing. The soul perceives him and thought comprehends his qualities. Meditation is identical with worshipping him exclusively, and by practising it uninterruptedly the individual comes into supreme absorption with him and beatitude is obtained [Footnote ref 1].

The idea of soul is the same as we find in the Yoga sutra. The idea of metempsychosis is also the same. He speaks of the eight siddhis (miraculous powers) at the first stage of meditation on the unity of God. Then follow the other four stages of meditation corresponding to the four stages we have as in the Yoga sutra. He gives four kinds of ways for the achievement of salvation, of which the first is the abhyasa (habit) of Patanjali, and the object of this abhyasa is unity with God [Footnote ref 2]. The second stands for vairagya; the third is the worship of God with a view to seek his favour in the attainment of salvation (cf. Yoga sutra, I. 23 and I. 29). The fourth is a new introduction, namely that of rasayana or alchemy. As regards liberation the view is almost the same as in the Yoga sutra, II. 25 and IV. 34, but the liberated state is spoken of in one place as absorption in God or being one with him. The Brahman is conceived as an urddhvamula avaks'akha as'vattha (a tree with roots upwards and branches below), after the Upani@sad fashion, the upper root is pure Brahman, the trunk is Veda, the branches are the different doctrines and schools, its leaves are the different modes of interpretation. Its nourishment comes from the three forces; the



[Footnote 1: Cf. Yoga sutra I. 23-29 and II. 1, 45. The Yoga sutras speak of Is'vara (God) as an eternally emancipated puru@sa, omniscient, and the teacher of all past teachers. By meditating on him many of the obstacles such as illness, etc., which stand in the way of Yoga practice are removed. He is regarded as one of the alternative objects of concentration. The commentator Vyasa notes that he is the best object, for being drawn towards the Yogin by his concentration. He so wills that he can easily attain concentration and through it salvation. No argument is given in the Yoga sutras of the existence of God.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. Yoga II. 1.]

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object of the worshipper is to leave the tree and go back to the roots.

The difference of this system from that of the Yoga sutra is: (1) the conception of God has risen here to such an importance that he has become the only object of meditation, and absorption in him is the goal; (2) the importance of the yama [Footnote ref 1] and the niyama has been reduced to the minimum; (3) the value of the Yoga discipline as a separate means of salvation apart from any connection with God as we find in the Yoga sutra has been lost sight of; (4) liberation and Yoga are defined as absorption in God; (5) the introduction of Brahman; (6) the very significance of Yoga as control of mental states (citta@rttinirodha) is lost sight of, and (7) rasayana (alchemy) is introduced as one of the means of salvation.

From this we can fairly assume that this was a new modification of the Yoga doctrine on the basis of Patanjali's _Yoga sutra_ in the direction of Vedanta and Tantra, and as such it probably stands as the transition link through which the Yoga doctrine of the sutras entered into a new channel in such a way that it could be easily assimilated from there by later developments of Vedanta, Tantra and S'aiva doctrines [Footnote ref 2]. As the author mentions rasayana as a means of salvation, it is very probable that he flourished after Nagarjuna and was probably the same person who wrote _Patanjala tantra_, who has been quoted by S'ivadasa in connection with alchemical matters and spoken of by Nages'a as "_Carake_ Patanjali@h." We can also assume with some degree of probability that it is with reference to this man that Cakrapa@ni and Bhoja made the confusion of identifying him with the writer of the _Mahabha@sya. It is also very probable that Cakrapa@ni by his line "_patanjalamahabha@syacarakapratisa@msk@rtai@h_" refers to this work which was called "Patanjala." The commentator of this work gives some description of the lokas, dvipas and the sagaras, which runs counter to the descriptions given in the _Vyasabha@sya_, III. 26, and from this we can infer that it was probably written at a time when the _Vyasabha@sya_ was not written or had not attained any great sanctity or authority. Alberuni



[Footnote 1: Alberuni, in his account of the book of Sa@mkhya, gives a list of commandments which practically is the same as yama and niyama, but it is said that through them one cannot attain salvation.]

[Footnote 2: Cf. the account of Pas'upatadars'ana in Sarvadas'anasa@mgraha.]

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also described the book as being very famous at the time, and Bhoja and Cakrapa@ni also probably confused him with Patanjali the grammarian; from this we can fairly assume that this book of Patanjali was probably written by some other Patanjali within the first 300 or 400 years of the Christian era; and it may not be improbable that when Vyasabha@sya quotes in III. 44 as "iti Patanjali@h," he refers to this Patanjali.

The conception of Yoga as we meet it in the Maitraya@na Upani@sad consisted of six a@ngas or accessories, namely pra@nayama, pratyahara, dhyana, dhara@na, tarka and samadhi [Footnote ref 1]. Comparing this list with that of the list in the Yoga sutras we find that two new elements have been added, and tarka has been replaced by asana. Now from the account of the sixty-two heresies given in the Brahmajala sutta we know that there were people who either from meditation of three degrees or through logic and reasoning had come to believe that both the external world as a whole and individual souls were eternal. From the association of this last mentioned logical school with the Samadhi or Dhyana school as belonging to one class of thinkers called s'as'vatavada, and from the inclusion of tarka as an a@nga in samadhi, we can fairly assume that the last of the a@ngas given in Maitraya@ni Upani@sad represents the oldest list of the Yoga doctrine, when the Sa@mkhya and the Yoga were in a process of being grafted on each other, and when the Sa@mkhya method of discussion did not stand as a method independent of the Yoga. The substitution of asana for tarka in the list of Patanjali shows that the Yoga had developed a method separate from the Sa@mkhya. The introduction of ahi@msa (non-injury), satya (truthfulness), asteya (want of stealing), brahmacaryya (sex-control), aparigraha (want of greed) as yama and s'auca (purity), santo@sa (contentment) as niyama, as a system of morality without which Yoga is deemed impossible (for the first time in the sutras), probably marks the period when the disputes between the Hindus and the Buddhists had not become so keen. The introduction of maitri, karu@na, mudita, upek@sa is also equally significant, as we do not find them mentioned in such a prominent form in any other literature of the Hindus dealing with the subject of emancipation. Beginning from the Acara@ngasutra, Uttaradhyayanasutra,



[Footnote 1: pra@nayamah pratyaharah dhyanam dhara@na tarkah samadhih sa@da@nga ityucyate yoga (Maitr. 6 8).]

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the Sutrak@rta@ngasutra, etc., and passing through Umasvati's Tattvarthadhigamasutra to Hemacandra's Yogas'astra we find that the Jains had been founding their Yoga discipline mainly on the basis of a system of morality indicated by the yamas, and the opinion expressed in Alberuni's Patanjal that these cannot give salvation marks the divergence of the Hindus in later days from the Jains. Another important characteristic of Yoga is its thoroughly pessimistic tone. Its treatment of sorrow in connection with the statement of the scope and ideal of Yoga is the same as that of the four sacred truths of the Buddhists, namely suffering, origin of suffering, the removal of suffering, and of the path to the removal of suffering [Footnote ref 1]. Again, the metaphysics of the sa@msara (rebirth) cycle in connection with sorrow, origination, decease, rebirth, etc. is described with a remarkable degree of similarity with the cycle of causes as described in early Buddhism. Avidya is placed at the head of the group; yet this avidya should not be confused with the Vedanta avidya of S'a@nkara, as it is an avidya of the Buddhist type; it is not a cosmic power of illusion nor anything like a mysterious original sin, but it is within the range of earthly tangible reality. Yoga avidya is the ignorance of the four sacred truths, as we have in the sutra "anityas'ucidu@hkhanatmasu nityas'ucidu@hkhatmakhyatiravidya" (II. 5).

The ground of our existing is our will to live (abhinives'a). "This is our besetting sin that we will to be, that we will to be ourselves, that we fondly will our being to blend with other kinds of existence and extend. The negation of the will to be, cuts off being for us at least [Footnote ref 2]." This is true as much of Buddhism as of the Yoga abhinives'a, which is a term coined and used in the Yoga for the first time to suit the Buddhist idea, and which has never been accepted, so far as I know, in any other Hindu literature in this sense. My sole aim in pointing out these things in this section is to show that the Yoga sutras proper (first three chapters) were composed at a time when the later forms of Buddhism had not developed, and when the quarrels between the Hindus and the Buddhists and Jains had not reached such